Beyond Nation State-Kalim Siddiqui.pdf

7/27/2019 Beyond Nation State-Kalim Siddiqui.pdf

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BEYOI\D THE I.,IJSLIM MTION-STATES

Kal im Siddiqui

A paper ptesented at the\/ Fjrst WozLd Confetence on Musiim Ed,ucationMeCCa37 March - I ApriT 7977(17 - 79 Rubi aL-Thani 7397)

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I{alin Siddiqui's major wotks areConflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan(London: MaemilTan, New Yotk:Pt:aeget, 7972),' Towards A New Destiny(London: The Open Press, 7974); andThe Funclions of International Conflict(Katachi: The Rogal Book Compang17975).He has aTso published numerous

monographs. As a journalist in Englandhe worked on The Guardian in FLeetStreet. He holds the degtees ofBSc (Econ) ' trrsc and Phd ftom theuniversitg of London. Duting 7972'74he was Assistant Professot in the{Jniversitg of Southern California.IIe is now with the MUSLIM INSTIWTE-


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IN oo field of human endeavour is theconlemporary Muslim more confused thanhe is in the field of policical science.This confusion is both at theincellectual level as well as at thelevel of the practitioners of t.he rartror the osciencet r:f politics - thepoliticians. In this paper we are notconcerned with the politicians, thoughwe may have to refer to them and totheir political systems.The confusion at the intellectual levelis great.est among those least expectedto be confused - the politieal scientists.The modern political scienList who is aMuslim is in great difficul-ty. He is apolitical scientist, with perhaps adoetorate in political science, ateaching post at a university, and evenperhaps a few books to his credit. Yetthe Muslin political scientist musrask himself a simpl"e question: is heany different from non-Muslim politicalscientists who have identieal degrees,university posts, and publications?The honest answer is rnot and that isatso the correct answer. The catch liesin the phrase rMuslim poi-iricalscientist.r In point of fact theMuslim in the political scientist isindepmdent of his academic discipline.There are, so to speak, two personsin one - a Muslim and a politicalscientist. The Muslim is the standardrbelieverf in Is1am, but hi-s politicalscience is non-Muslirn. The Muslirnrfaithful' and the non-Muslim politicalscientist live in the single individualside by side and are the cause of muchconfusion. And when this schizophrenicrMuslim political scientistf sets outto pronounce on rthe political theoryof Islamt and rthe Islamic Statet,t,he confusion is worse confounded.The Roots ofPol itical ScienceIt is not much more than fifty yearsago that those paragons of wisdom, the

professors of political science, werean unknown breed. The first of themwere appointed in this century(1).But when one asks what is the subjectmatter of politics, the innnediateanswer is the thoughrs of Plaro(2),Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas,Machiavelli, Dante, Hobbes, Locke,Rousseau, Bentham, Marx and JohnStuart Mill. Then there are thedecriptions of modern great States -the United States, Great Britain,Fr-ance, Germany, the Soviet Union anda few others. Finally, there is theextensive contemporary literature onanalytical conceptualizations.Looking at the above a little moreelosely, a number of questions arise"If, for instance, the tfather ofpolitical sciencer (Plato) had writtenhis Republic almost 24AO years ago, wherehas the child been in the meantime? Theanswer, partly, is that the child hasbeen to Church for many hundreds ofyears and then been put through theReformation and the Renaissance. Itthen had to come through the facultiesof law, history and philosophy beforebeing recognised as a discipli.ne on itsown, though its twin sister, internationalrelations, is stil1 having some difficultyin being born(3). This answer, however,is sti1l not entirely satisfactory. Thequestion stil1 remains as to why did theChurch and the faculties of 1aw, historyand philsophy hold the infant back for solong and then suddenly deliver iL soquickly as a healthy child which has inf.Lf.ty years (whieh is no time at all in(1) W J M Mackenzie, Politics and SocialSeience, London: fetiffi(2) Plato is given the title of rfaLherof political sciencer and his book,Republie, is the first book of politics(3) J W Burton, International Relations:A General Theory, Cambridge: TheUniversity Press, 1965, chapters 1 & 2


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the context of 24OO years) grown into avigorous adult with a virile tendencyto proereate? I,lhy did this happen almosrsuddenly in the twentieth century? Whydid iL not happen in the eighteenth ornineteenth centuries or why could it not,wait for the twentyfirst century? Why,oh why, in the twent.ieth century? Whyexactly at this time?'Ihe answer(s) to this question holdsthe key to resolving a great number ofmysteries.One of the possible answers perhaps isthat the political science we have wasmost needed at this time and hence itsgreat success, great expansion, greatrecognit.ion, great patronage and greatfollowing. Who needed it and why?A J P Taylor, the celebrated Englishhistorian, has recently written:"Europe to_ok a long time to get going.Its lead fou", non-EuropeancivilLzationg/ began only in rhesixteenth century fthe Uuslims lostSpaig]; rts triumph came onlg in thetwentieth. "(1) Taylor was reviewingJ M Robertsrsbook, The HutchinsonHi-story of the Wor1d. Tayl-r becomeslyrical- in Roberts's praise: "This isthe unrivalled World History for ourdag.(z). It extends over all ages andall continents. IE covers theexperiences of ordinary men as well aschronicling the acts of men in power.It is unbelievably accurate in itsfacts and almost incontestable in itsjudgments." Taylor goes on to praiseRoberts for holding "the balance fairlybetween Lhe different civilizationsn inhis 1100 pages. Taylor then lets outthe secret. "...he (Roberts) cannotresist devoting most attention to theEuropean civilization he knows bestand to which he beTongs. Over half ofhis book deals with the recent centurieswhen Europe took the 1ead.'r Taylor doesnot regret this imbalanee, but adds:"The reader will wetcome this emphasis..t'Wtry is Taylor so confident that thereader will welcome this emphasis on theEuropean civilization? Obviou.sly becauseTaylor knows that this is not history

proper; this is r,yestern view af historqand hence would be popular. This isindeed why he calls it ,historg forour dagt.Taylor thus tacitly admits that eachcivilization has to produce its ownview of world history and othercivilizations. No objectiviry cantherefore be attributed to his ownjudgments, 1et alone to those of hissubj ect .Let us stay with Taylorts view ofhistory and accept, for the sake ofargument, that Europers lead began inthe sixteenth century. He omits to tel1 \__us who was i.n the lead until thesixteenth century. Weo the Muslims,happen to know, but the fact is carefullyhidden from their readers by the historiansof the west. The Muslim civilization hadremained dominant for over 1OO0 years andthe western civilization, as Tayl_or admits,did noE in fact triumph until thetwentieth century.Once the triumph of the west had beenfinally accomplished and Muslims sackedfrom the stage of historyn the west neededtr^ro types of intellectuals - the historianswho would confine Islam and Muslims to afew paragraphs and footnotes, and politicalscientists who would justify and rationalisethe dominance that had been achieved. Inthis enterprise to falsify history and pr< :ea secular view of man and his political \v-development, the newly triumphant eivilizationof the west proceeded to invest huge humanand material resources. A third plank ofthe same strategy was the Orientalisttradition of scholarship, instituted largelyto infiltrate the remaining body of Islamand to scuttle it from within. The Christianmissionaries also joined in the sameenterprise and received rich rewards. (1)It is now possible to see clearly theroots of (western) political science. Theseroots have not been allowed to spread oftheir own free wi1l. They have not beenallowed, for instance, to draw anything from(1) Christians. now admit that'-for morethan a century ttmany m:i,.gsionaries servedthe interests of the colonial powers. "See the ttStatement of the Conference onChristian Mission and Islamic Datwahtt,Chambesy, June 1976, published in Impact,622I, L2-25 November 1976

(1)(2)

The Observer, London, 19 Dec 1976My emphases throughout


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Imaur Ai-Ghazali, Ibn Taimiya or even lbnKhaldun. Instead, the roots of modernpoi-itical science have been carefullynursed to avoid contact with Muslims orIslam and to go directly to the ancientGreeks, the medieval Church, and backto feudal, and l-ater national, Europe.Hence, right up to our own times, thepoliticatr- philosophers of the west arestill arguing such issues as the natureof man and trying to explain politica1behaviour in terms of the Christiandoctrine of toriginal sint. We have tobear in mind these contrived roots ofpolitical science" The westernpolirical science, as western history,philosphy and the arts, have all beencontrived to serve the purposes of thewestern civilization.One EssentialDi fferenceThe above analysis of the backgroundto modern political science prompts aquestion: if each civilization needsits own political science, how did theMuslirn civilization lasting oVer 1000years manage without a political scienceof its own?The answer is, in its own way, simpleand yet complex. For Muslims generally,and for Muslim intellectuals andthinkers, political power anddominance was neither nernr andsurprising nor did it need justification.For them, and for Muslim statesmen andadministrators, political power was thevery essence of Islam. They could notconceive of Islam or themselves outsideLhe framework of a political system.To them political 1i-fe was as naturalas life itself; they took it forgranted as they did sunshine, rain, airand the earth. They were like fish thatdid not have to stop to ask why waterwas necessary. Indeed, the Sunnah ofthe Prophet demanded the esEE6-lishmenrof a political system without whichIslam itself could not be understoodor practised. There was no need torationalise, t.heorise or explain.So long as political power lasted andthe political framework for theexpansion and protection of the Muslimernpire existed, Muslims worried 1itt1e

that the office of the Khalifah hadbecome hereditory and, TfG".u amonarchy. The ruler ca1led himselfKhalifah and, though he was no longera selfless ruler, he was stillrecognised and obeyed as Amir-u1-Mumineen.This is in total contrast with the ideaof Ehe separation of Church and Statein the history of western politicalthought and development. EarliestChristians were organised, if they wereorganised at all, as a monastic orderand not as political, military or civilunits. Christians obeyed the Romanauthority in virtually all matters.Ultimately, Church and State came inconfrontation with boundary disputesbetween the profane and the sacred. Is1am,on the other hand, began by defying theexisting authority, by organising civiland military and administrative systems,and, in the lifetirne of the Prophet,defeating the opposition and establishingthe unchallenged supremacy of the newway of Islam. As Iqbal puts it:ttln Islam the spiritual and thetemporal are not two distinctdomains, and the nature of anaet, however secular in itsimport, is determined by theattitude of mind with which theagent does it. It is the invisiblemental background of the act whichultimately determines itscharacter. An act is temporal orprofane if it is done in a spiritof detachment from the infinitecomplexity of life behind it;it is spiritual if it is inspiredby that eomplexity. In Islam itis the same reality which appearsas Church looked aL from one pointof view, and State from another.It is not true to say that Churchand State are t\n/o sides or facets ofthe same thing. Islam is a singleunanalysable reality which is oneor the other as your point of viewvaries. The point is extremely far-reaching and a fu11 elucidation ofit will involve us in a highlyphilosophical discussion. Sufficeit to say that this ancientmistake arose out of the bifurcationof the unity of man into two distinctand separate rgalities which somehow


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The above discussion and lqbalts argumenta- T'- ^tion shows clearly that rhe idea of Srare *HtsSin rslam is fundamentally different from )]Euallon

have a point of contact, but whichare in essence opposed to each other.The truth, however, is Lhat matteris spirit in space-time reference.The unity ca11ed man is body whenyou look at it as acling in regardto what we call the external worl.d;it is mind or soul when you lookat it as acting in regard to theultimate aim and ideal of suchacting. The essence of tTauhidtas a working idea is equ?ITS,solidarity and freedom. The State,from the Islamic standpoint, is anendeavour to transform theseideal principles into space-timeforces, an aspiration to realisethem in a definite humanorganisation. " (1)

the idea of the modern naEion-Stat.e.The two types of States are not the samething. They have nothing in conrnon.While Islam brings the Srate intoexistence as an instrument of Divinepurpose, the nation-State comes intoEfiS6ce for precisely the opposirereason - to dismiss God and to replaceHirn with the rnational-interestr asdetermined byrhuman reason. Let usexamine what one western politicalscientist has to say. W T Jones agreeswith Bodin that the concept ofsovereignty was unknor.m to Greek ormedieval thinkers, and goes on:"The reason is that certainconditions arose at Lhebeginning of the early modernperiod which necessitated anew theoretical schema. Theschema which was finallyworked out is based on thenotion of sovereignty, and,since the same conditionssurvive today, the notion ofsoverignty is stil1 of thefirst importance. Theseconditions are, of course,the emergence out of the(1) Muhamnad Iqbal, The Reeonstructionof neligious thought@Ashraf , 1971, p.154

feudal political system of thenational terricorial state.This kind of political organisa-tion had to come into being;or, rather, the modern world wouldnot have developed as it has -into a lay, industrial andcapitalistic culture - had itnot been for the ereation of thenational territorial State,which is at once an instrumentand an effect of this development...They fMachiavelli, Bodin andHobbeq'J see simply, but veryclear1y, that a supreme andabsolutely powerful ruler - asovereign - is an indispensabl-econdition of the new order ofthings. " (1) (2)

We have now indieated some of the areacovered.by the eonceptuai_ jungle whichis causing so much confusion in thepolitical thinking of contemporaryMuslims, including professionalpolitical scientists, politicians andalso traditional ulema attempting toanalyse and prescribe for the politicalills of the Ununah.The confusion, incidentally, is at thesource - in the western politicalscience irself. There is, as yet, no \/agreement among the pundits ofpolitical science as to the meaning ofrpoliticsr. Though the word 'politicsloriginated with the Greek 'polisr, ithas acquired many new shades of meaning.(1) W T Jones (ed), Masrers of politicalThought, vol.Il, ton@,1963, p.19(2) For a discussion of rhe origins ofthe nation-State system in Europe, itsuniversalization through colonialism,and its impact on non-European areas ofthe world, see Kalim Siddiqui, TheFunctions of Internalional ConfTiEr,Karachi-: Royal Book Company, L975,especially Introduction and Chapter II,"Political Legitimacy in the Third World".See, also, R Emerson, From Empire toNation, Boston: Beacon@l33F


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Definitions of politics vary from"politics is a struggle for power"(Morgenthau), "the study of influeneeand the influential" (Lassrrell), to"the authoritacive allocation of valuestt(Easton) (1). Bernard Crick settles forthe trite cotrmlent that 'rpolitics ispolitics"(2). Crick quotes Isaac DrIsraelias having said that politics is "Lhe artof governing rnankind by deceiving them"(3). The "dirty game" image of politicsand politicians persists throughout thewor1d, including the west. Somepoliticians, once they have attainedhigh office, have even attempted topuE themselves "above politics". Othershave tried torrsave the country frompoliticanst'. Statesmen are oftenadvised I'not to play politics with thenational interestrr. This is hardlysurprising in a situation where thehighest form of political organisation,the nation-State, itself does notrecognise any moral values, except thoseof the profane world. Such values areneither irrnutable nor universal.They are different from nation-State tonation-State, and in the same nation-State different values are often usedin different situations depending onthe rnational interestf involved ineach situation. Not surprisingly,therefore, international relationsbetween nation-States represents astruggle for power, by means of power,for the sake of more power(4).Enough has been said to make the centralpoint about the current situation inpredominanly Muslim areas of the worldtoday. It is simply that the Muslimworld is now divided into nations andeach nation has its own rnation-Stater.(1) Ibid., and also see Kalin Siddiqui,"Is Politics Relevant" in Impact, London3:5, 27 July-gAugust L973

-2).Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics,London: Pe1ican, 196f pf6--(3) rbid.(4) The leading exponent of this view ofinternational relations is Hairs J Morgenthau.See his Politics Among Nations, New York,Knopfrf@;

(Exceptions such as Palestine, Eritreaand Kashmir are either under foreignoccupation or colonial rule).Muslim nation-States are essenciallyno different from alt other nation-States. Few, if any, admit moralvalues, except as slogans. Some, likePakistan, even fly a flag of convenienceand call themselves tlslamic Republic'.The fact, however, is that all naEion-States are the product of the westerncivilization and its period of colonialdominance. Their purposes, structuresand behaviour patterns are all alikewhether the nation-State happens to bein Europe (its rmotherr continent), orin Afriea, Asia or America. The sameanalogy holds here as that we advancedin the case of the Muslim politicalscientist where the individual wasMuslim but hts political sciencefnon-Mus1imt. In precisely the sameway the countries are Muslim but theirpolitieal structures - the nation-State -non-Muslim. Nationalism is the veryantithesis of Islam. We must, therefore,face up to the situation and admit thereality that now stares us in the face:that no political manifestation of Islamexists today, Indeedo Ehis phase ofhistory when the Muslin populations areparcelled into nation-States i-s, strictlyspeaking, a continuation of the periodof European colonialism. Instead ofhaving direct rule from Europe, Muslimcountries are now ruled over byEuropean institutions through localMuslim elites thaL share the European,secular and profane view of the world(1).In a very real senserthen, we are allEuropeans. And we are still under aform of western colonialism. Indeed,the economics of Muslim tnation-Statesrare all capitalistic and integrated intothe international capitalist economy.International trade, aid and finance(1) It was this view that led me topropose a model of the tlslamic Movementtin which Muslim States are merely sub-systems, see Kalim Siddiqui, TheIslamic Movement: A Systems Approach,This paper is also an example of howan analytical tool of modern politicalscience might be used by a Muslimpolitical scientist


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and insurance corporations are the modernversions of the former East IndiaCompany(l). It is in this context, rheuniversalization of the nation-State andthe capitalistic culture, that we shouldview A J P Taylorrs claim that thetriumph of the western eivilization cameonly in the twentieth century(2). We arenow tindependentt prisoners of thewestern civilization.Towards A NewPol itical ScienceMuslim political seientists must now talkas a group of prisoners. They musE definethe scale and model of the prison inwhich they 1ive. They must map the prisonin detail. The three dimensions of Lhisprison are sociat, economic and political.These dimensions are linked byintellectual corridors of which thepolitical sciencists themselves are theleading exponents as well as its victims.To plan and ultimately execute an escapefrorn this all-encompassing topent prison,we may, for a while, have to behave likemodel prisoners and mix among ourtormentors in a way that does not arousetheir suspicion. To some extent itmighteven be possible to take the rguardsrinto our eonfidence. They might evenco-operate with us so long as we do notbecome a threat to their positions andleadership roles in the short-term.

lJe have got into this nighrmarishsituation through the cumulative effectsof hundreds of years of neglect and thesins of conmission and omission of ourforefathers. There is, therefore, noresponsibility on us to get out of thisbog of history in one jump. The mosL wecan do is build, or begin building, asolid platform from which a futuregeneration can launch its escape. Wehave got into the present morass bydefault, but we can escape only by design.(1) It is this rhesistreated at Length in a Ehat has beenstudy of Pakistan.

The first set of problems that confrontsany team of design-engineers is conceptual.It is only after these have been clearedthat model-builders can proceed withexperimentation. Perhaps a period ofexperimentation and, hopefully, successwill yield increased confidence andgreater human and material resources forthe final assault on the overridingforces of history. The first stage,however, is 1argely, if not exclusively,one of removing the conceptual obstaclesand shaping a bagful of new conceptualtoo1s. Whether the whole enterprise getsoff the ground at all and proceeds tothe subsequent stages depends largely onhow well the initial tasks areaccomp 1 ished .It is clear thar this firsr srage mightbe cal1ed one of teducationt. A11educators must participate, whatevertheir fie1d. Yer the political scienristhas a central role to play. The Muslimhistorian doafnot need to write history aspropaganda, nor does the Muslim politicalscientist need to theorise for the sake ofappearing respectable and profound. InIslam there is a framework which bestowslegitimacy on scholarship, especiallyteleological scholarship directed at goalattainmentr

The goals the Muslim political scientistset himself have nothing to do withwriting on the popular recent themes ofIthe political theory of Islamr and ttheIslamic Statet. Such literature as wasneeded on these themes has already beenwritten(l). The goals that have to be set(1) I am not convinced of the effieacy ofthis literature. I find it apologetic intone. Authors who have written in thisframework include such eminent figures asMaulana A A Maudoodi. It appears to me thatthese authors have tried to mould Islam intothe framework of western political science,they ask who is the sovereign and come upwith the answer 'Allah'. They then spend pageson the concept of sovereignty in Islam,though the fact perhaps is that the conceptas such never occurred to Muslims or Muslimrulers. But I am not qualified enough tochallenge these authors and their literature.I am therefore confining my unease to thissma11 footnote.Perhaps others will produceevidence to show I am right, or, betterstillr put me right.

See, Kalim Siddiqui, Conflict, Crisisand War in Pakistan, London: MaEEIIGn, andNew York: Praeger, L972(2) Loc. cit.


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must be rooted in and derived from thepresent situation. As politicalscientists we know that the Ination-State' is alien to Muslirn politicalculture and an importation from Europe.We also know that the presenEgeneration of Muslim nation-Srates havenot solved and are unlikely to solveany of the problems that now confrontthe Ummah. We must prepare our studentsand Tuilre ge.nerations for the timewhen the nation-State will be no more"We must look beyond the nation-State andprepare the blueprint for a post-nation-Stale era. We must \^/ith our analysis.- prepare the intellectual climate whichwould look forward to the time when thenation-State will be no more. Some willgo of their own volition; others rnighthave to be brought down. The danger,however, is that the present institutions,bad though they are, mighE collapsebefore we and our peoples are ready withan alternative form of politicalorganisation to replace them. Politicianscannot be expected to plan to replacethemselves and their systems; the Muslimpolitical scientist has no choice.The reeenE political 'revivalisltmovements among Muslims have failed toaecomplish their desired goals. We needa number of dispassionate studies to tryand discover why such movements as those- :fthe Ikhwan and Jamaft-e-Islami failed(r). e-ffiber or pffii61fG6s, or acombination of these, need to beexamined. These must, of course, includetheir structures, leadership rolesand tstylesr, and other thumantfactors. But the greatest emphasisshould be placed on the basic conceptualroots of these movements, their rreadingrof the situation they tried to tackleand the policies they pursued. Forinstance, one would like to know whether(1) The many brothers who are with thesemovements will probably deny that theyhave rfailedf. Indeed, they get very hurtby what they call raccusations of failurelfrom toutsiderst. My apologies to them,but I hope they will aecept that if theirtfailuret is not a fact at least thereare sufficient grounds for me to holdthe view that I do.

the political party approach to change isacceptable? Was the Jama't justified,conceptually or on the basis ofconvenience and expedieney, to jump tothe conclusion that relectionsr coul-dproduce the desired result? What is theplace of expediency when the availableoptions are in conflict with the valuesand traditions of Islam? Can an 'Islamicmovementt climb an unlslamic ladder andhope to arrive at Islam? I,{hat, if any,'compromisest are possible or desirablein a tdemocraticf situation? Is theacceptance of the rdemocratic' process in anationalist-capitalist framework justif ied?Another range of questions that must beasked concern the social origins andrelevance of the recent Islamic movements.Were these movements too 'midd1'e class'?Did they represent, or appear torepresent, the established sectionalinterests in their society? Did or didthey not identify themselves with thepoorest and the weakest in their society?Did the need for funds drive the Islamicmovements into the arms or influence ofthose who wished to maintain the economic/social status quo under the banner of Islam?Did the Islamic movements appear to supportthe capitalists in the dialogue for change?I^Ihat lessons are there for a futurelslamic movement to learn from past, recentand current failures? Another set ofquestions concern the rlevel of competencetof the Islamic workers and the naEure andextent of their commitment and life-style(1)Eeyond tlLeMusl im Nation-StatesThe Muslim teachers of political scienceface a most challenging task. Initially,they must reveal to their students and awider public the true nature of the nation-State and all its structures and functions.They have to develop a body of literature toprove that the nation-State cannot possiblysolve any of the problems that now confrontthe Urmnah. Contemporary history is full ofdata-6-Trive this point home. The Muslimstudents of political science, indeed allstudents, must be made aware that they mustlook forward to and prepare for a time whenthe nation-State form of politicalorganisation will have disappeared.(1) This point is discussed in my paperThe Islamic Movement: A Syslelqs Approach,op. cit.


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But the passing of the nation-StaLerhoin,ever desirable, must not be allowedto leave a vaeuum or lead to disorderand anarchy, though some temporaryimbalance during transition andfundamental change will be inevitable.The teacher of political science hasto mould the mind of his Muslimstudents in a direction towards change.The political scientist, working amongand with his students, has also t.oshape an overall strategy of change.He also has to produce operationalmodels of change. The climate ofopinion is to be so infused with theexpeccation of change that the eomingof change will be welcomed and helpedby Muslims everywhere.Before that stage is reached, however,the Muslim political (economic andsocial) philosopher has to produce animage of the future which makes thepresent unbearable. A new set ofsocio-economic political systems ofIslam have lo be shaped. These modelsshould be so rationally convincingand attractive that a whole newgeneration of Muslims would struggleto bring them into being.This means that the Muslim politicalscientist must also develop in himselfand his students the qualities of thebody, mind and spirir that would berequired in the next phase of history.If the nation-State goes, with it mustalso go lhe present sLyle, socialorigin and function of leadership.Perhaps we will have to offer anentirely new or Islamic concept ofleadership. l'traybe the wordrleadershipr would not apply to theactive workers in an Islamic socialorderl perhaps all members of thenew order would so participatenormally and naturally in thepromotion of the collective good thatthe trolet and 'functionr ofleadership would become diffuse andinstitutionalised aE all 1eve1sthroughout the society.

IIt is, of course, impossible to foretellthe future, but it would be negligentnot to plan it. It is also important tobe eonscious and realistic about thetime scale that would be involved. Itwould be useful, for instance, to dividethe I future I into three parts. Theshort-term (next five years), themedium-term (next 20 years), and thelong-term (20-30 years and beyond).The processes of history are such thatwhat is going to happen in the short-termis probably already beyond control orplanning. The most that can be done overthis distance is limited to marginalmanoeuvres by top decision-makers. Few \ /academics can possibly hope to influenceevenls and their course over theshort-term.Over the medium-term the situation isnot much better, though it improves as onegets into the latter part of the period.Though reventsr might sti11 exercise astrong pomentum of their om, it ispossible to influence our tresponset tothem. For instance, it rnay be possibleto make our social, economic and politicalsystems aware of a wider range ofalternatives in determining theirbehaviour pattern. This would greatlyimprove the efficiency of these systemsand the output per unit of resourcesmight also improve dramatically. But inthe 20-30 year range it would be possible \,,to project a period of intense activityfor the attainment of major intermediategoals; these goals will be of the typewhich might be cal1ed rpre-requisites'for the ultimate triumph of the 'IslauicMovementt over all other forces, inLernaland external-. Just what form this triumphwould or should take is itself a challengeto social scientists of the present tirne.What is not in doubt and incontrovertibleis that only a major act of will andlong-term planning can deliver the Unrnahinto the next phase of hisrory tharTTGbeyond the Muslim nation-State.

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Beyond Nation State-Kalim Siddiqui.pdf