Ash'Ari's Theological Determinism

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Vol. XV No. 1

AL-ASH'AE~~STHEOLOGIC A L DETERMINISM AND

THE SENSES OF 'CAN'

In this paper I argue that ~ l - A s h ' a g(873--935) was aTheological Determinist whose position on free will and humanresponsibility was marred by his failure to distinguish between twosenses of 'can' (yastati'ul, or, as he and his fellowMutakallims mightsay, =man's having power over his actions". This is not to say thatif a l - ~ s h ' a shad made the distinction in question then his position

would have been an adequate or acceptable view of free will andresponsibility. My main point is that the logic of his position, as heexplains it to us in al-Luma',strongly hints at a distinction which al-

Ash'ari does not make. Consequently, his position appears not onlysomewhat inelegant, but also subject to a serious objection whichmight have been easily avoided.

The interest which I have in looking a t the way al-Ash'azdeals

with 'can' is not just to show one respect in which his system standsto be improved. For I think that the distinction which al-Ash'agfails

to make has intrinsic interest in that it can be used to yield a new

perspective on the nature and extent of the disagreement which existedbetween the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites on the question of.free

will and human responsibility.In the second section of this paper I explain what I mean by

'Determinism' in general, and Theological Determinism' inparticular. In the third section I first explain how the distinctionbetween different senses of 'can' comes into play in the discussion of the relation between Determinism and free will. Then I discuss theway al-Ash'arydeals with the concepts of 'can' and 'cannot'. Here i t

will become evident that al-Ash'ags position strongly hints at adistinction between two senses of 'can', a distinction which he is unableto make on account of his view of the relation between human powerand it objects.

Finally, I compare al-Ash'ags position to the one held by the



Hamdard Islarnicw 40 Vol XV No. 1

Mu'tazilite thinker a-Q&$ 'Abd alJabbEr (d. 1025) and I suggestthat the positions of these two representatives of the Ash'arite andMu'tazilite thought on free will and responsibility were not so muchopposed to each other as merely different. This result should, I think,

invite us to re-evaluate the nature and extent of the disagreementbetween the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites over the free will question.

The term 'Determinism' has had much currency in modern andrecent discussions of the philosophy of physical science as well as thefree will problem. Different philosophers define the term in somewhatdifferent ways but, on the whole, the different definitions seem to

come down to this. A Determinist is someone who believes that foreverything that happens, including human actions, there are (i)

antecedent conditions, which may be thought of as causes in thebroad sense of the word, and (ii) laws of nature which, in the finalanalysis, say that under such and such (antecedent) conditions, suchand such a result and not another, is bound to occur.

This understanding of Determinism is well-reflected in AlvinGoldman's definition of a determined event as one that is 'deduciblefrom some aet of antecedent conditions and laws of nature,"' as well

as G.E.M. Anscombe's defmition of deterministic laws as 'laws suchthat always, given initial conditions and the laws, a unique result isdetermined.-

It is by no means easy to find convincing examples from therealm of human affairs which would illustrate the determinist position.Still, for the purpose of fixing ideas, we will let the following serve asan example of how things would look if Determinism were true. Letthe antecedent conditions be such facts as the fact that Smith is verythirsty, that there is a glass of water which he can see in front of him,

that there is nothing to prevent him from drinking it

-

.g., hishands are free, and he can move them. As to the laws involved in thiscase, they are even more difficult to specify. But according to thedeterminist picture they will register the biological and psychologicaldeterminants of behaviour, and will, in the fmal analysis, say thatunder such antecedent conditions as we mentioned above, a man willdrink the glass of water. Thus Smith's act of drinking the water isdetermined by his antecedent conditions and the laws ofmature.

The relevance of Determinism thus understood to human freedomis not difficult to see. For if human actions are thus determined, thengiven one's antecedent conditions which, together with the laws of nature, logically imply what one will (or will not) do, it follows thatno one can do other than what one actually does.g But if this is so, i tis then argued, it follows that no one is free. For to be free meanshaving a possibility of doing as well as a possibility of not doing



Hamdard Islamicus 41 Vol. XV No. 1

possibilities to just one. In this way it is inferred that Determinismand free will are incompatible: if we are free, then Determinisim isfalse, and if Determinism is true, then there is no such thing asfreedom.

A l - ~ s h ' a sof course, had no idea of man's actions being a t somemoment determined by his (and the world's) state at the previousmoment, together with the laws of nature. A notion like this wouldundoubtedly have seemed profoundly wrong and blasphemous to him.But still, he was a Determinist in the sense which interests those whoare concerned with free will.

In order to clarify the sense in which a l - ~ s h ' a zwas aDeterminist, we need to distinguish between two kinds of Determinism:Scientific and Theological.' Scientific Determinism, which we briefly

explained above, is a naturalistic, science-

inspired kind of Determinism.Where 'Pis a human action, Scientific Determinism says that the(natural) antecedent conditions (including, of course, the state of theagent) in conjunction with the laws of nature, necessitate (makenecessary) either the occurrence of 'P,or its non-occurrence.

Now, Theological Determinism ought to say something like this- that human actions are somehow necessitated. Otherwise we shouldreally have no right to call it Determinism and expect to be understood.But how, according to Theological Determinism, are human actions to

be made necessary? What would make them so? There is, I think, one

explication of Theological Determinism which can answer the question.(It is a little artificial hcause it is tailored to correspond to Scientific

Determinism, but other than this, I think i t accords well with theintuitive understanding of the idea that human actions and otherevents are determined by God.

Where 'P is, again, a human action, replace ScientificDeterminism's idea of antecedent conditions with the idea of God'swill, or decree. Furthermore, replace the laws of nature by one supremelaw (of Divine Nature, if you wish) which says: For any event (E), if

God wills, or decrees that Y E ) be the case, then %' comes to be.Theolgoical Determinsim may thus be briefly formulated as thedoctrine that everything which happens, including human actions,

has been willed, or decreed, to happen by God, Who is such thatwhatever He wills, or decrees, comes to be. This formulation easilyyields the conclusion that Zayd's unbelief (like Smith's drinking in

the example mentioned above in connection with ScientificDeterminism) i s something which had to happen, given God's willthat i t should happen, and the necessary effectiveness of God's actsof will.

The above explication of Theological Determinism is rather

schematic, in that it can be elaborated in more than one way. For itdoes not say whether God realizes His will directly, by bringing theevent into being without mediation, or if He realizes His will in anindirect manner, by creating conditions which in their turn cause the



Ham dnrd I sl amicus 42 Vol XV No. 1

event in question to happen.Both ways of elaborating Theological Determinism are equally

deterministic leading, as they do, to the result tha t whatever happens,including human actions, could not have failed to happen. The only

difference is that the second way of elaborating TheologicalDeterminism may be thought to place some efficacy in the thingswhich God uses a s instruments for realizing His will.

Now we can proceed to ascertain how al -Ash 'ass tands in relationto Theological Determinism. That al-Ash'a6 was a Determinist isclearly revealed in his discussion, in al-Luma' , of the case of theunbeliever whom God charges with the duty to believe. An imaginaryopponent asks al -Ash 'as if he (the unbeliever, th at is) can believe.Al-~sh'a; answers by saying that if the unbeliever could believethen h e would b e l i e ~ e . ~The clear implication, therefore, is that, the

unbeliever cannot believe. And since believing is other than what theunbeliever does, we may safely infer that, according to al-Ash'ari theunbeliever cannot do other than what he actually does, namely, not-believe.

But why cannot the unbeliever believe? Al-Ash'ari has to offeran explanation of this, if his position is to be more than a bare assertionof Determinism. But, unfortunately, al-Ash'aas (apparent) explanationof the fact of unbelief seems to be ra ther vacuous. For, in the presentcontext, al -Ash 'as goes on to say that the unbeliever cannot believebecause, or given that, "he leaves lbeliefl undone and is occupiedwith its contrary (li-tarkihi wa inshighiilihi bi-diddihi)."6 As R.M.Frankexpresses i t in h i i analysis of this part ofal-Luma', 'the actualityof unbelief in the unbeliever excludes the pos$bility of thesimultaneous actuality of belief in him."'

Well, of course it does. And i t should, for otherwise the elementarylogical Principle of Non-Contradiction would be violated.

Is this, therefore, what al-~sh'ar i"s Determinism amounts to:Zayd cannot believe (tha t is, his unbelief is a necessary fact) becausehe is busy not-believing? Surely, this is a trivial thesis which no onecan deny, but which says nothing and explains nothing. Of course,one cannot sit, given that one is standing, and one cannot stop, given

that one is running. But this does not explain why one is standing,or by one is running. In fact, if we understand by 'sitting' not-standing,and by 'stopping' not-running, then all we do here is to repeat ourselvesin a completely uninformative manner.

Let us therefore ask again why, according to al-Ash'ar: anunbeliever cannot believe. A better answer, I think, can be based onal-Ash'ari's Creed, which is to be found in his MaqZlZt al-IslZmiyyin.In the Creed, a l - A s h ' d m a k e s it clear tha t (i) Everything that happenshas been willed by God. With Ah1 al-Ithb Zt ("the People of Truthn) , a l -A s h ' a 6 a f i r m s that "There is nothing on earth, good or bad, except

what God wills."

What this means, of course, is thatif

somethingexists, then God willed it. If God wills something, then i t comes to be.This, and more, al-Ash'an' expresses by saying (%th the generality



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of the Muslims"), that What God wills is, and what He does not will,

is not.m

In these terms we can, I think, best explain why, according to

al-Ash'ac the unbeliever cannot believe. Even if we say initially that

the unbeliever cannot believe because he is busy not-believing, the

fact remains that he is occupied in this way because God willed, ordecreed, that he be so occupied. In short, what underlies al-Ash'ass

claim that the unbeliever cannot believe is none other than hisTheological Determinism.

To complete our sketch of a l - ~ s h ' a a sDeterminism we only need

to ask whether, according to al-Ash'ar';, God realizes his will directly,without mediation, or (at least sometimes) by creating things, or

conditions which in their turn, cause the events which are willed byGod.

I think that, on the whole, R.M. Frank is right in his belief thatal-Ash'agintended to allow for some kind of human c a u ~a l i t y ? ~What

is being referred to here, of course, is al-Ash'ags notion of generated

power, the idea that God creates in man a power to act, which, intum, 'causes" those acts for which man is responsible. This created

power to act we may perhaps add other conditions or accompanimentsof actior, which al-Ash'az seems to recognize if only implicitly, e.g.,

the bodily member (the limb, al-jasha) required for the action" and,

in the case of %ol~n ta r i ly?~

Such considerations should, I think, make it reasonable tobelievethat an elaboration of al-Aah'ari's Determinism can have room forconditions, or causes, by which the fulfillment of God's will is mediated.

But still, this does not mean that we should attribute to al-Aah'afi

any willingness to accept secondary causality, as Frank seems to beinclined to doJ3In fact, there seems to be a vast difference betweenthe way humans cause their actions according to al-Ash'ac and the

way they would cause them, if secondary causality, as it is normally

understood, were operative. The difference may be briefly explained

in terms of an analogy which will also serve to make clearer the

workings of al-Ash'ags brand of Determinism.

Consider an ordinary metal wire which does not normally, ornaturally deflect the compass needle. But sometimes it will do just

that - as when someone happens to pass an electric current in thewire, which becomes then magnetized. The effect which the ordinary

metal wire has on the compass needle must not be regarded as an

instance of secondary causality, because it is not something which the

piece of wire does normally, or naturally (by its nature). Rather, ispurely accidental, depending as it does on the accidental circumstance

of someone passing an electric current through it. The situation ispatently different in those cases which may fairly be taken to illustrate

the operation of secondary causality: e.g., the fire which naturally

bums a piece of wood, or food which naturally appeases hunger.But al-Ash'arTdoes hot believe that man by nature is able to act




(qiidirun bi-tab'ihi)." In this way man is like the ordinary piece of metal wire which is not naturally able to deflect the compass needle.Sometimes man will act, but this happens only when God creates inhim the power to act. He is then momentarily able to act, just like thepiece of wire which is momentarily magnetized.

Humans might indeed cause their acts according to al-Ash'ari,but their causality is not secondary causality. Rather, it is the causalityof tool, or an instrument which acts, not in accordance with a naturethat it has, but in accordance with the purposes of its user.

I11

Determinism, a s explained earlier, seems a t first sight to conflictwith free will. For (it is usually thought) one is not really free with

respect to doing something unless one can do as well as refrain fromdoing it. Determinism, on the other hand, implies that what happenshas to happen. Consequently, one cannot fail to do what one does.

Still, with regard to the scientific variety of Determinism, thereis a well-established school of thought that goes back to Hobbesaccording to which Determinism is compatible with freed~rn. '~In themore recent expressions of this compatibilist view, attention is usuallyfocussed on the analysis of 'can' as it occurs in freedom-expressingstatements such as "He can (i.e. he is free to) do thisn and 'He didthat, but he wuld have done otherwise (i.e. he was free to dootherwise)". The aim is to show that what 'can' means here is notinconistent with the act's being determined or necessitated.

The classical modern analysis of 'can' along these lines is to befound in G.E.Moore. This i s what he has to say about 'could', which,of course, applies to 'can' with slight modifications.

What is the sense of the word 'could' in which i t is so certainthat we o h n could have done what we did not do? What, forinstance, is the sense in which I could have walked a mile in

twenty minutes this morning though I did not? m e r e is onesuggestion which is very obvious, namely, that what I mean issimply, after all, that I could if I had chosen ... or "I should if Ihad chosen"."

Surely, nothing here is incompatible with th

e

belief that one'santecedent conditions (together with the laws of nature) may be suchas to determine or necessitate, one to choose and do 'A', or to chooseand do otherwise. Despite the fact that one's action is determined, itmay still be true that were one to choose 'A', then he would do 'A', andwere one to choose not to do 'A', then one would not. He thereforeacts freely, even if his action is determined.

The fact that someone's action (or desire or choice) is determined(or necessitated) does not rob him of his freedom, according to theabove analysis of'can'. What would rob him of his freedom is, rather,



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anything that makes it no longer the case that Yf he chooses, then hedoes and if he chooses not to, then he does not". And this might besuch things a s physical constraint or illness. The effect of the lattermay be illustrated by means of one of KalEm's favorite examples.Consider the action of the person who, shaking with fever, moves his

hand. His 'action", according to the above analysis, is not free: for i tis not the case that if he chooses to move his hand, then he movesit, and if Ke chooses not to mvoe his hand, then he does not move it.

Clearly, he often wishes not to (and chooses not to) move his hand,but he nevertheless does.

The compatibilist position explained above promises toaccommodate both Determinism and freedom by distinguishingbetween two senses of 'can'. This is what makes this position of interestto us, as we try to understand the logic which underlies al-Ash'ass

position. For al-Ash'aKis a compatibilist of sorts, or a t least he setsout to be one. He insists on Determinism in no equivocal terms, buthe nevertheless wants to hold onto a meaningful notion of humanresponsibility, which (to our minds, a t least) presupposes freedom of the will.

However, before we go on to ascertain how al-Ash'ag seeks toaccommodate both Determinism and responsibility, we need to

distinguish and label the two different senses of 'can' upon which themodem wmpatibilist position rests.

Firstly, there is what we may call %hecausal-deterministic senseof 'can'." This is the sense which we negate when we say, for example,

of a glass of water that is exposed to extreme heat , that i t cannot staycold. We mean that, given the water's antecedent conditions (which

include exposure to heat), and the laws of nature, the water has tobecome hot - it cannot stay cold. If Determinism is true with regard

to human actions also, then we cannot, in the present sense of 'can',

do except what we actually do.

Secondly, there is what we may call the 'can' of freedom. This is

the 'can' which the compatibilist claims is in question when weaffirm that someone is free to do something, meaning that he can do

it, as well as refrain from doing it. This 'can', according to the

compatibilist, is analyzable along the lines which G.E.Moore suggests.In this sense of 'can', we still can do something (or its opposite) even

if we cannot, in the causal-deterministic sense of 'cad, do except

what we in fact do. Only impotence occasioned by such things asillness or physical constraintcan make it true that we cannot, in the

present sense of 'can', do something or other.

Having distinguished the two senses of 'can' in terms of whichthe modem compatibilist seeks to reconcile freedom and Determinism,

let us now go on to see how a l - ~ s h ' a zproposes to find room for

Detrminism as well as human responsibility. In the part of al-Luma'

which deals with istita'at, (capacity), al-Ash'a; is at pains t o



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distinguish between two ways of understanding 'cannot' as it occursin statements as 'Zayd cannot believe." The crucial passage readsthus:

Q. Has not God charged the unbeliever with the #dutyof believing?

A Yes

Q. Then the unbeliever can believe.A If he could believe, he would believe.Q. Then God enjoins on him an obligation which he cannot

fulfil.A. This is a statement which involves two matters. If' you

mean by your words that he cannot believe because of his impotence ('ajz) to do so - no. But if you mean that

he cannot believe because he omits to do so and is occupiedwith the contrary of belief - yes.I8

Thus when confronted with the opponent's challenge, which, ineffect, says "According to you the unbeliever cannot believe",Al-Ash'aXresponds by offering two different interpretations of the challenge.Interpreted one way, the opponent's challenge calls for the response'No", that is, 'No, it i s not true that the believer cannot believe".Interpreted another way, it calls for the response Yes", that is, "Yes,

it is true that the unbeliever cannot believe."

Clearly, al-Aswasintends to distin

gui

sh here between two waysof taking 'cannot'. One way to take i t would be to think tha t Zayd isincapable of believing CcTju). Let us call this 'cannot' the cannot of impotence and abbreviate i t to 'cannot-i'. Thus in his first response tothe opponent's challenge a l -~ sh ' agsays, in effect, " It is not true that

the unbeliever cannot-i believe."The other way of taking 'cannot' is tosay that, given the unbeliever's condition of leaving belief undone(tark) and occupation with the opposite of believing, he cannot believe.Let us call this 'cannot' the cannot of tark, and abbreviate i t to

'cannot-t'. Thus in his second response to the opponent's challenge, al-

Ash'ari, in effect, says: It is true that the unbeliever cannot- t believe."In sum, then, al-Ash'ag asserts that the unbeliever cannot-t

believe, while he denies that the unbeliever cannot-i believe. Butwhat is 'cannot-t' and what is 'cannot-i? I think i t will be fair tounderstand them in terms of the two senses of 'can' which weencountered earlier in connection with the modem compatibilistposition. That is to say, I propose to take 'cannot-i' as the negation of th 'can' of freedom, and 'cannot-t' as the negation of the causal-deterministic 'can1.

That al-Ash'a6's 'cannot-i' may be understood as the negation of

th 'can' of freedom which we explained earlier is made reasonable bythe examples which al-Ash'an'mentions of cases where God would notimpose duties on man. Not long after distinguishing between twoways in which the unbeliever cannot believe, al-Ash'as goes on to




say, or rather imply, that God would not impose a duty on man whenthe bodily member (Limb) required for that duty is missing (ghiyab al -jaF%a).lg Similarly, the duty to pay alms is suspended when one hasno money or wealth."

What stands out when we consider these two examples andothers in their spirit (e.g., al-~sh'agwillagree that God does notimpose duty to fight on one who is ill or who is in chains) is thefollowing fact. In each case i t is not true that if one chooses, or willsto perform the action in question, then one performs it, and if onechooses not to, or wills not to, then one does not. And this is preciselywhat the negation of the 'can' of freedom amounts to. Like al-Ash'ass'cannot-?, the negation of the 'can' of freedom is incompatible with theassignment of responsibility.

With regards to al-Ash'ari7s 'cannot-t', the situation is a little

more complicated. For what al-Ash'agsays here is simply that someonecannot believe because he is not-believing. But as we suggested earlier,i t is not satisfactory to think that al-Ash'ds Determinism reduces toa trivial logical argument based on the premise tha t one cannot believeand not-believe a t the same time. but when we consider that theperson's actual unbelief (which cannot co-exist with belie0 is somethingwhich was willed by God, Who is such that whatever He wills has tocome to be, the matter begins to look more interesting. For then al -Ash'ass position on the believer who cannott believe appears rathersimilar to the position of the Compatibilist who says that Smith cannot

but drink the water which is placed in front of him, given his extremethirst, and the laws of nature. In both cases the person cannot doexcept what he does (not believe, drink the water), not because of incapacity or constraint (as in the case a person who is subjected tobrain-washing, or who is being force-fed), but because the antecedentconditions, together with certain "laws", make it impossible forsomething different to happen.

If we are right to understand al-Ash'ass 'cannot-i' and 'cannot-t' in the above indicated manner, then we have some reason forthinking that al-Ash'an'must have seen in the distinction between

two senses of 'cannot' a plausible method for reconciling the rivalclaims of Determinism and responsibility. On the one hand,Determinism is safeguarded by insisting that one cannot do exceptwhat one actually does. But, on the other hand, the fact that wecannot act differently does not abolish responsibility. This happensonly when one 'cannot' (la yastaFu) in a different sense of 'cannot'- the sense of impotence. And since i t is not true that the unbelievercannot, in this latter sense, believe (for he is not 'Giz),it follows tha the is responsible for his unbelief. Thus there is room for bothDeterminism g d responsibility.

Al-Ash'ari's compromise may sound very plausible, or, at least,as plausible as Compatibilism in general is. But al-Ash'ari'scompromise has problems of its own. The main difficulty is tha t he



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is logically required to distinguish between two senses of 'can', arequirement which al-Ash'ari does not, and, in fact, cannot meet.

Let us take up the first point first. That al-Ash'ass positionrequires him to distinguish between two senses of 'can' follows fromthe fact that he wishes to distinguish between two senses of %annot'.He wishes to say that there are two ways one can take a statementlike "Zayd cannot believe." But surely, if the statement "Zayd cannotbelieve"can signify in two different ways, then so must the statement"Zayd can believe." Furthermore, it is easy to specify what these twosignifications are. Firstly, we may take the statement "Zayd canbelieven as a denial of (Theological) Determinism. If Zayd can, in thissense, believe then it is no longer the case that Zayd's antecedentconditions, together with the "lawsn, make i t impossible for him to dootherwise. (It is immaterial how one might come to take a position of

denying Theological Determinism. One might think that God's willingis not necessarily effective, or, more plausibly, that i t does not extendto all human actions). Call this sense of 'can' 'can-t'. To say that Zaydcan-t believe is, then, incompatible with (Theological) Determinism.The second way of taking the statement uZaydcan believen is to takeit not as a denial of Determinism, but as a denial of impotence. To saythat Zayd can, in this sense, believe, is to say that he is sane, thathe heard the call to believe, or simply that there is nothing whichconstrains him to not-believe. Call this sense of 'can' 'can-i'. To saythat Zayd can-i believe is then incompatible with impotence. But i t is

not incompatible with Determinism. One can be a Determinist and still believe that one can-i do other than what one does.

But al-~sh'a; does not permit himself to say that there is asense in which the unbeliever can believe. His view is that the power(istiti'at) which the unbeliever has, in power over unbelief only - i tdoes not extend to both the act and i ts opposite. This is how his viewunfolds.

Immediately after distinguishing between 'cannot-i' and 'cannot-t', al-Ash'an'puts in the mouth of his opponent a question about God'simposing on the believer a duty which he, the unbeliever, is incapableof doing ('ijiz,impotent) because he leaves it undone ( t~rk ) .~ 'Of course,from al-Ash'ass standpoint, the question represents a confusionbetween 'cannoti' and 'cannot-t', and so he hastens to set mattersstraight by explaining the difference between impotent and tark.Impotence, unlike tark, extends to both the act and i ts opposite. Thuswe must not describe one who cannot-i stand as one who can sit. Butit is not like this with the unbeliever who cannot-t believe. For hemay be legitimately described a s one who can not-believe, or evendisbelieve. Hence it must be incorrect to speak of someone who leaves

something undone (tark) as someone who is "impotent".Having explained the difference between tark and impotence in

I his way al-Ash'ac by a natural progression of thought, moves on toanswer the question of whether qudraf (power), in analogy with '42,



Hamdnrd Islamisus 49 Vol. XV No. 1

might also extend to both the act and it s opposite. He clearly statesthat qudrat, unlike 'qir, does not extend to pairs of opposite acts. Twoarguments are offered why this is so. One of them, the first, rests onunduly assimilating 'awn (assistance, helping, aiding) to qudrat, and

may he easily disposed of. The second argument however, rests on al-Ash 'ass concept of the nature of the relation between power and itsobjects. It is ultimately this latter which stands in the way of al -

Ash'arTs being able to distinguish between two senses of 'can'.The first argument may be re-stated thus. If we were to say

that power over something was also power over its opposite, inanalogy with 'ajz, then we must say that 'awn over something wasalso 'awn over its opposite. But this is not so. Therefore power oversomething is not power over its o p p ~ s i t e . ~

This argument is not convincing. It rests on the assumption that

qudrat and 'awn are similar, and tha t they stand together in oppositionto 'ajz. But this by no means the case. 'Awn over something means(the process of) lending assistance, or help-giving. As such, it s tandsin opposition not to 'ajz,as al-~sh'asseemsto think, but to obstructionor obstacle-laying. Qudrat is opposed to 'ajz, and 'awn to obstruction.

It may indeed he that 'awn is not over something and its opposite.But then the same thing applies to obstruction: obstruction is not

obstruction in something and it s opposite. There is nothing here to

show why qudrat, like impotence, does not extend to pairs of opposite

acts.So much for al-Ash'ass first argument. His second argument is

more effective, given his conception of the necessitating nature of power. Here the substance of the argument seems to he that if theunbeliever can, or has power to, believe then he will believe. For(originated) power (qudrat rnuwatha), as al-Ash'as understands it,is such that, when it exists, so must that which it is power for.=

Hence if he who actually does not believe could believe, then he would.

And then he will be believing and not-believing all at once.24

Thus al-Ash'acwill not say that the unbeliever can believe. If

he had a different conception of human power, or if he had found away to say that the unbeliever can believe, then he would have been

well on his way to making a distinction between two different senses

of 'can'. For given the distinction between 'cannot-t' and 'cannot-?, thestatement T h e unbeliever can believe" can only mean that he iscapable of believing, that is, he is sound of mind, he has heard thecall to believe, and there is nothing to constrain him to not-believe.Or, more briefly, he can-i believe. The statement does not, and cannot,

mean that i t is possible for the unbeliever to believe despite God's will

in this regard. In other words, i t does not, and cannot, mean tha t theunbeliever can-t believe.As matters stand, al-Ash'aas conception of power prevents him

from saying that the unbeliever can, in any way believe. This not onlyburdens a l - ~ s h ' a zwith the charge that he is a Jabrite in disguise,



Ham dnrd Islamicus 50 Vol. XV No. 1

but i t also robs his view of a certain degree of elegance that it mighthave otherwise had. For having already distinguished between twosenses of 'cannot', nothing would have been more logical than todistinguish between two corresponding senses of 'can'.

But that was not to be. Al-Ash'aas emphasis on DivineOmnipotence and Determinism, and the secondary status he assignsto Divine justice and human responsibility, seem to have preventedhim from taking this further step.

Whether the compatibilist position explained earlier in 111 is

ultimately found to be a satisfactory view of free will or not, one

thing, at any rate, is certain: it is by no means obvious thatDeterminism is incompatible with free will. The same thing shouldapply to Theological Determinism also, for, in essence, this latter isnot profoundly different from Scientific Determinism.

Be that as it may, al-Ash'az is not able to say that man can doother than what he does. And as the ability to do otherwise seems, at

least on reflection, to be an essential part in any serious advocacy of free will and human responsibility, it is not surprising to find that al-Ash'arTs Mu'tazilite opponents make much of this point in their

criticism of the Ash'ass kasb (acquisition) theory.One such Mu'tazilite thinker is al-QSdT'Abd alJabb5r. It will be

instructive for us to examine his view, for this will show not only that'Abd alJabb5r's treatment of the word 'can' was in some ways evenless satisfactory than the one offered by al-Ash'az, but also that theMu'tazilite and Ash'arite positions on free will may not have been so

much opposed to each other a s merely different, emphasizing differentsenses of 'can'.

Let us take up 'Abd al-JabbZr's criticism of kasb first. In a l-

~ u h she compares acts which occur by way of kasb to acts which oneis constrained to do (muljZ), going as far as to illustrate this bymeans of an example of a man who falls down to the ground when he

is pushed from high above. The similarity, to 'Abd al-Jabbar's mind,is that an act which occurs by way of kasb occurs necessaiily, so thatone cannot avoid it, or do otherwise, any more than a person who is

falling down can do other than fall towards the ground. In both casesthere is no room for praise or blame (human responsibility) or choice.In 'Abd a l J a b b 3 s words, this is how matters stand with kasb.

According to you, an act which occurs by way of kasb cannot be

avoided. For it is not possible that God should bring into being

this act and the power [to perform this act] without this actbecoming necessarily an acquisition. He [the agent1 is in the

position of one who is constrained blame




a high place. There would be choice if it were the case that,given the power [to do], one could acquire or not."

It i s obvious what 'Abd alJabbZr9sattention is primarily focussed

on here. To be deserving of praise and blame, and for there to begenuine choice in what one does, all this requires, according to 'Abdal-JabbZr, that one be able to do or refrain from doing. But since anacquired act is necessitated (God causes it by giving us the power toperform it), it follows that the act is one which cannot but be performed.

Earlier we saw how al-Ash'az tries to deal with this matter.Essentially, he says that, in a sense, one cannot do except what.one

does, but, in another sense, this is not so. One expects al-Ash'az togo on to acknowledge that, in this other sense, one can do other thatwhat one does. But al-Ash'ac apparently, cannot bring himself to dothis. So he stops short. Burdened with the claim that one cannot doother than what one does, he makes an easy target for those whothink that such a position cannot accommodate genuine humanresponsibility.

Abd alJabbZr's position, on the other hand, like that of thegenerality of the Mu'tazilah, is that man's power over his actionsextends to both the action and its opposite. And because the Mu'tazilahin this way oppose the Jabrites and the kasb theorists, it is oftenthought that they must be regarded as the representatives of the

Libertarian position in Islam. J.R.T.M. Peters (for example),commenting on 'Abd alJabbZr's view of human ability, says:

By describing human ability in this way [ability hasthe possibility

of two opposite acts1 'Abd alJabbZr lays the basis for his doctrinethat man really has free choice in his acting and that he is reallyresponsible for his acts.z6

But before we pronounce 'Abd al-JabbZr an advocate of free willit is only fair to determine how he conceived of this human ability

which is supposed to extend to pairs of opposite acts. For our discussionso far has made it clear that it is possible to be a Determinist and to

claim that one who performed a certain act could have performed itsopposite. Thus if it turns out that 'Abd alJabb5r was a Determinist,then the gap which separates his position from that of a l -~sh 'azwi l l

be narrowed. For al-Ash'a; was a Determinist who did not really

stand to lose much by extending ability to opposite acts. And the netresult of all of this will be to weaken the ground on which 'Abd al-

JabbZr and the Mu'tazilah are distinguished by the advocacy of freewill. Al-Ash'ar: and his followers can easily join the club bysanying

to its logical conclusion a certain distinction which al-Ash'ari himself makes.

Let us therefore begin by considering how 'Abd alJabbZr

conceived of this human ability which is supposed to extend to pairs




of opposite acts. It seems to me that he thought of human ability asa disposition. In other words, to say of someone that he is able (qiidir)

is like saying of a piece of metal that it is magnetic. To say of a pieceof metal that i t is magnetic is not to say tha t i t is currently engagedin attracting iron filings. It may be doing this, or it may not: whatmatters is that i t has a disposition to do so. I t is constituted in sucha way that it can do so. And it is somewhat like this with one whois able (qiiddir): it may be that he is engaged in performing a certainact, or it may not. In either case his ability stands indifferently toboth alternatives. As 'Abd al-JabbEr expresses it, "One who is able(qiidir) may be in such conditions that he does not choose to act, orhe may be in such conditions that he inevitably chooses to act".* Inboth cases he is able - whether or not he acts. His ability, therefore,

is a disposition which may be realized under certain conditions (e.g.,when there is a strong motive to act) or which remain unrealized forthe time being.

'Abd al-Jabhiir's dispositional understanding of ability is alsoevident in connection with his belief that God is 'able"." God is ablenot only in the general sense of the word, but also in specific ways -e.g., He is able to perform unjust acts. With regard to God's generalability, 'Abd al-JabbZr does not hesitate to describe God as being"strong" (qaww3, for the meaning of qawwTand qZdu, he says, is the

~ a m e . ~ ~ A n dit goes without saying that 'strong'is a term that describesa disposition. For to say of someone that he is strong is not to say thathe is doing this or tha t a t the moment, but only that he can, or tha the would, given the appropriate conditions. With regard to God'sspecific ability to perform unjust acts, 'Abd alJabbzr argues thatunjust acts are of the same species as just acts, and hence God Whocan perform just acts can perform unjust ones." But, of course to saythat God ean perform unjust acts is not to say that He is currentlyperforming them, or even that He ever will. It only means that He

can, or would, if He were to will to. Again, 'Abd aldabbzr's ability

seems to be a disposition.Again distinguished between two senses of 'rannot' in connection

with Scientific Determinism, as well as al-~sh'arps .Theological

Determinism, we naturally want to know what manner of 'can' 'Abdal-JabbZr speaks of, when he says about both man and God that theycan perform a certain act or its opposite. I s it the causal-deterministic'can' whose negation is required by the belief in Determinism? Or isit the freedom 'can' whose affirmation is required by the belief in freewill and responsibility?

Evidently, i t is the freedom 'can', the 'can' which is incompatiblewith incapacity. (Incapacity may in fact be defined as the conditionof one in whom the ability disposition does not exist). But what aboutthe causal-deterministic 'can'? Does it receive any recognition from'Abd al-JabbZr? The remarkable fact is that 'Abd al-JabbZr's position

appears to require a causal-deterministic sense of 'can', which he is



Hamdnrd Islamicus Vol. XV No. 1

as unwilling to admit as al-Ash's; is unwilling to admit a freedom-

related sense of 'can'.

Let us begin with the first point, th at is, the claim that 'Abd al-JabbZr's position requires a sense of'can' in which one cannot do that

which he is not doing, There are many places where 'Abd al-fabbzrpresents himself as a Determinist of some kind. Thus in Volume VIII

of al -Mughnl in a chapter that deals with the connection betweenability, actions, and motives (dnwZ'3, he says:

Similarly, the dn'l' (motive), if it is unopposed ( infarida)necessitates (yaqtadi) the action inevitably ( l i m a G la h) . Forthis reason God strengthens the motives of the mukallaf (he whois subject to religious duties and commands) by promise of rewardand threat of punishment. This would not make sense if i t werenot the case that these [the promise and threat] necessitated thedoing on the part of the mukallaf when he is free from othermotives. Yet some mukallafs do not choose to worship becausethere are other motives which oppose [the motive to worship],such as immediate desires, and the like.31

Here 'Abd alJabb5r seems to be a Psychological Determinist

who believes that our actions (or choices) are necessitated by ourmotives and desires. Should one object by saying th at there are times

when one has a very strong motive, or desire, to do something, andyet does not do it, 'Abd alJabbZr would answer, in the manner of themodem Determinist, by making reference to opposing motives and

desires.It is true that there are many places where 'Abd alJabb2r says

that a motive is not necessitating ( m i i j 5 ) like the 'illah (cause).3zButit seems tha t what this means is that the necessitation occasioned by

the 'illah is one which the 'illah does per se, and which cannot bedefeated. Motives, on the other hand, can be opposed and defeated bythe other motives. But none of th is makes it false to say that motives,

when unopposed, do necessitate.Another place where 'Abd al-fabbzr exhibits a determinist line

of thought is a chapter that deals with the question of whether

something can be an object of power ( m a q d l r ) to two possessors of power (qiidirayn). 'Abd alJabbEr wants to argue that we have no

reason to connect Zayd's action with a being other than Zayd (e.g.,God). This he does by drawing an analogy between Zayd's action

which must happen when ,Zaydis willing, intending, and unrestrained,and someone's becoming %nowledgeable" ('alTrn), which also has tohappen when the 'illah of knowledge comes to be present in him.

(Just as we do not need to assume additional causes in the latter



Hamdard Islamicus 54 Vol. XV No.1

If this [that it i s not right to account for someone's W i g knowingby invoking additional causes, when he is knowing by virtue of the 'illah of knowledge which i s present in him1 is proved, andit is furthermore true that Zayd's action has to happen fyajibu

wuqiikhu) when Zayd is intending, willing, and unrestrained, so that his intention in this case...

is like (bimanzilati) the causes

which necessitate attributes, then it follows that, just as we donot relate the effect of the 'illah to anything but the 'illah, weshould not relate the occurrence of the act to any being but thisintending being IZaydl."

Thus it would appear that 'Abd alJabbSr sometimes speaks asa Determinist." As such, he must recognize that there is a sense inwhich one (sometimes) cannot do except what one does. This will be,

of course, the causal-deterministic sense of 'can, which we negate

when we say that, given the determining conditions, and the laws,one cannot but perform (or omit) a certain act.

But i s 'Abd al-JabbZr willing to recognize such a sense of 'can'?

It does not seem so. That he is averse to recognizing a causal-

deterministic sense of 'can' is evident from the way he deals with anobjection which he puts in the mouth of an imaginary opponent. Theobjection is made in Part 2 of Volume VI of al-Mughnx in a chapterthat deals with the point that he who has knowledge of the nature of that which is evil, together with knowledge that he does not need to

perform it (ghiiiahu hnhu), does not in any way choose to perform it.The opponent seems td be saying that the assertion that:

He who has knowledge of the nature of that which is evil, together

with knowledge that he does not need to perform it, does notchoose to perform it, nor is it possible for him Lto choose toperform it1

contradicts the statement that

He has power over it fqzdirun 'alayht) (i.e., he can performit)."

Consider how 'Abd alJabbXr tackles the objection, completelyby-passing the causal-deterministic sense of 'can' which we are a h r :

One who is able may be in such conditions that he does notchoose to act, or he may be in such conditions that he inevitably

chooses to act. But just as the fact that he who is constrained

fmulja) to act necessarily acts, does not contradict his beingable, so it is with the necessity of Chis1 not doing that which is

evil, when he has knowledge that it is evil together withknowledge that he does not need to perform it."



Hamdnrd Islamicus 55 Vol XV No. 1

As an example of someone who is mu&?to do something, considerthe case of someone who is in danger of starving to death. He choosesto eat a dead animal, and he does. Now, surely, there is a sense of 'can' in which it would be right to say that the starving man cannot

but do what he does, that is, eat the dead animal. And if this is so,then i t should be correct to say that the starving man is not able torefrain from eating. But 'Abd alJabb-r does not seem to see this. Hesays that being mulja7 does not contradict beingqiidir. And, of course,this is true when we take q a i r in the dispositional sense. For inthis sense q d i r is opposed to incapucitated or being impotent. Clearly,one who is rnulji' may very well be able to eat as well as refrain fromeating. For his limbs and general wndition may be such that i t is notthe case that his hands reach for the food, or fail to reach for thefood, against his will, as may be the case of someone who is subject

to involuntary motion, or involuntary immobility. Thus we admit tha tbeing mulja' to do 'A' does not contradict its being the case that onecan, in one sense of 'can', do 'A' as well as refrain from doing 'A'.

But still, we want to insist that there is another sense of 'can'in which one who is mulja' to do 'A' cannot but do 'A'. Such a senseis what we want to associate with 'Abd al-Jabb2s own statementsabout the unopposed da'rwhich necessitates the action inevitably (hi

mahZlahJ, and Zayd's action which has to happen (yajibu wuqii'uhuJ

when Zayd is willing, intending, and unrestrained. For clearly, if Zayd's action has to happen, then there is a sense of 'can' in which

Zayd cannot but act. This will be true even if Zayd is sound of bodyand mind, so that in another, dispositional sense of 'can', he canrefrain from acting.

Thus it would appear that 'Abd a1Jabbsr understands 'can' onlyin its dispositional, freedom-related sense. Of the causal-deterministicsense of 'can', he shows no sign of recognition.

If this understanding of 'Abd alJabbZr on the matter of 'can' iscorrect, then the contrast between his position and tha t of al-Ash'az

begins to appear to be a matter of emphasizing different things, rather

than a matter of conflicting principles.For his part, 'AM alJabbZr places emphasis on the idea thatman can act or refrain from acting. This, he believes is required bythe facts of Divine justice and human responsibility. As it turns out,the 'can' which he employs here is the dispositional 'can' which mustbe withheld only from those who are incapacitated (impotent) insome way or other. But this sense of 'can' is not one that al-Ash'aG

cannot live with. In fact, he is logically required to recognize it whenhe denies that the unbeliever cannot (in the sense of incapacity) believe.

For his own part, al-Ash'az emphasizes the idea that man's

actions ar e determined, that man cannot do except what he does. Butis this something that'Abd alJabbiir needs to deny? No. In fact,there is evidence to suggest that he was a Psychological Deterministof sorts, and as such, he must recognize that there is a sense of 'can'





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Ash'Ari's Theological Determinism