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David Frost
FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM
1) Are free will and causal determinism incompatible?
FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM
1) Are free will and causal determinism incompatible?
2) If yes, which obtains?
FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM
1) Are free will and causal determinism incompatible?
2) If yes, which obtains?
Libertarianism: Free will obtains; causal determinism does not.
FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM
1) Are free will and causal determinism incompatible?
2) If yes, which obtains?
Libertarianism: Free will obtains; causal determinism does not.
Hard Determinism: Causal determinism obtains; free will does not.
FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM
1) Are free will and causal determinism incompatible?
2) If yes, which obtains?
Libertarianism: Free will obtains; causal determinism does not.
Hard Determinism: Causal determinism obtains; free will does not.
Compatibilism: Free will and causal determinism both obtain.
FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
• For Ayer:
– It is a mistake to contrast freedom with causation.
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
• For Ayer:
– It is a mistake to contrast freedom with causation.
– Freedom is properly contrasted with constraint.
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
• For Ayer:
– It is a mistake to contrast freedom with causation.
– Freedom is properly contrasted with constraint.
– Every event is caused. Free events are caused in a special way.
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
A Free Action An Unfree Action
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
is
caused
A Free Action An Unfree Action
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
is
caused
is
caused
A Free Action An Unfree Action
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
is
caused
in a special way
is
caused
A Free Action An Unfree Action
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
is
caused
in a special way
is
caused
in a different special way
A Free Action An Unfree Action
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
is
caused
in a special way
i.e., in an “unconstraining” way
is
caused
in a different special way
A Free Action An Unfree Action
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
is
caused
in a special way
i.e., in an “unconstraining” way
is
caused
in a different special way
i.e., in a constraining way
A Free Action An Unfree Action
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
is
caused
in a special way
i.e., in an “unconstraining” way
e.g., by my own desire
is
caused
in a different special way
i.e., in a constraining way
A Free Action An Unfree Action
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
is
caused
in a special way
i.e., in an “unconstraining” way
e.g., by my own desire
is
caused
in a different special way
i.e., in a constraining way
e.g., by some one else
A Free Action An Unfree Action
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
Part II: Early Paragraphs
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
Notes on reading Ayer: it might be difficult to follow him since he doesn’t come right out and say what he believes. Instead he follows a common philosopher’s style of proceeding through a network or series of ideas – making each seem as plausible as possible. Some will seem plausibly to be counterexamples to the idea that came before, until Ayer argues just as plausibly or even more so that it is no counterexample at all and is even irrelevant. You may bristle after that – if it’s irrelevant, then why have we been talking about it? But it is a way of pro-actively undermining an opponent’s potential counterexample. Someone might be tempted, for instance, to argue that humans are free because science can’t always show that what they did was causally determined or lawfully predictable. Ayer maps out this trajectory of thought only to reject it. “But this does not give the moralist what he wants.”
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• The problem of free will is the conflict between
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• The problem of free will is the conflict between
– our sense that every event has a cause and
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• The problem of free will is the conflict between
– our sense that every event has a cause and
– our sense that we possess freedom of the will.
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• Every event has a cause
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• Every event has a cause
– Or, at least, in principle, everything is explainable (paragraphs 3-4)
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• In principle, everything is explainable.
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• In principle, everything is explainable. • Deny the “in principle.”
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• In principle, everything is explainable. • Deny the “in principle.”
– Perhaps freedom exists where explanation ends (paragraph 5)
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• In principle, everything is explainable. • Deny the “in principle.”
– Perhaps freedom exists where explanation ends (paragraph 5)
• “But that does not give the moralist what he wants,” (paragraph 6).
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• In principle, everything is explainable. • Deny the “in principle.”
– Perhaps freedom exists where explanation ends (paragraph 5)
• “But that does not give the moralist what he wants,” (paragraph 6).
– i.e., it doesn’t give the possibility of moral responsibility
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• In principle, everything is explainable. • Deny the “in principle.”
– Perhaps freedom exists where explanation ends (paragraph 5)
• “But that does not give the moralist what he wants,” (paragraph 6).
– i.e., it doesn’t give the possibility of moral responsibility
– “he’s free because there is no explanation of what he does,” doesn’t sound free
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• The moralist doesn’t want actions to come from randomness
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• The moralist doesn’t want actions to come from randomness
• The moralist wants actions to come from choices
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• The moralist doesn’t want actions to come from randomness
• The moralist wants actions to come from choices
– “For when he makes it a condition of my being morally responsible that I should act freely…. What he wishes to imply is that my actions are the result of my own free choice: and it is because they are the result of my own free choice that I am held morally responsible for them,” (Ayer, pp. 112-113).
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• But what about the causal history of that choice?
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• But what about the causal history of that choice?• Ayer says that the choice is either an accident or it is not.
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• But what about the causal history of that choice?• Ayer says that the choice is either an accident or it is not.
– If it is an accident, then the moralist does not get the freedom he’s looking for.
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• But what about the causal history of that choice?• Ayer says that the choice is either an accident or it is not.
– If it is an accident, then the moralist does not get the freedom he’s looking for.
– If it is not an accident, then it has a cause and we are back to the Hard Determinist line.
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• But:
– “Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9).
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• But:
– “Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9).
• But in what way am I responsible for my character?
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• But:
– “Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9).
• But in what way am I responsible for my character?
– “Only, surely, in the sense that there is a causal connection between what I do now and what I have done in the past…” (p. 113, paragraph 9).
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• But:
– “Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9).
• But in what way am I responsible for my character?
– “Only, surely, in the sense that there is a causal connection between what I do now and what I have done in the past…” (p. 113, paragraph 9).
– If I have “made myself what I am,” then I caused my character.
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• But:
– “Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9).
• But in what way am I responsible for my character?
– “Only, surely, in the sense that there is a causal connection between what I do now and what I have done in the past…” (p. 113, paragraph 9).
– If I have “made myself what I am,” then I caused my character.
• But there’s causation again.
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• But:
– “Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9).
• But in what way am I responsible for my character?
– “Only, surely, in the sense that there is a causal connection between what I do now and what I have done in the past…” (p. 113, paragraph 9).
– If I have “made myself what I am,” then I caused my character.
• But there’s causation again.
– “Once more, either it is an accident or it is not.”
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• So, Ayer considers a final attempt to create an account satisfying what the moralist wants.
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• So, Ayer considers a final attempt to create an account satisfying what the moralist wants.
• Consciousness of necessity.
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• Constraining
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• Constraining • Non-constraining
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• Constraining
– Another person compels you
• Non-constraining
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• Constraining
– Another person compels you
– Hypnosis
• Non-constraining
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• Constraining
– Another person compels you
– Hypnosis
– Pistol to the head
• Non-constraining
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• Constraining
– Another person compels you
– Hypnosis
– Pistol to the head
– Kleptomania
• Non-constraining
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• Constraining
– Another person compels you
– Hypnosis
– Pistol to the head
– Kleptomania
• Non-constraining
– Deliberative process of deciding
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• Constraining
– Another person compels you
– Hypnosis
– Pistol to the head
– Kleptomania
• Non-constraining
– Deliberative process of deciding
– Myself, not another person
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• Constraining
– Another person compels you
– Hypnosis
– Pistol to the head
– Kleptomania
• Non-constraining
– Deliberative process of deciding
– Myself, not another person
– Unlike the kleptomaniac
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
• Constraining
– Another person compels you
– Hypnosis
– Pistol to the head
– Kleptomania
• Non-constraining
– Deliberative process of deciding
– Myself, not another person
– Unlike the kleptomaniac
– Could have done otherwise
AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
is
caused
in a special way
i.e., in an “unconstraining” way
e.g., by my own desire
is
caused
in a different special way
i.e., in a constraining way
e.g., by some one else
A Free Action An Unfree Action
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
is
caused
in a special way
i.e., in an “unconstraining” way
e.g., by my own desire
better, by a desire I identify with
is
caused
in a different special way
i.e., in a constraining way
e.g., by some one else
A Free Action An Unfree Action
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
is
caused
in a special way
i.e., in an “unconstraining” way
e.g., by my own desire
better, by a desire I identify with
is
caused
in a different special way
i.e., in a constraining way
e.g., by some one else
possibly, by a desire I don’t identify with
A Free Action An Unfree Action
AYER’S COMPATIBILISM
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
• Consider the addicted smoker example.
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
• Consider the addicted smoker example.
– The addiction is a desire within him
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
• Consider the addicted smoker example.
– The addiction is a desire within him
– But he wants to quit, which is also a desire within him
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
• Consider the addicted smoker example.
– The addiction is a desire within him
– But he wants to quit, which is also a desire within him
• We might say that he does not identify with his addiction
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
• First order desire: a want to do something
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
• First order desire: a want to do something• First order volition: an effective first order desire, my
will
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
• First order desire: a want to do something• First order volition: an effective first order desire, my
will• Second order desire: a want to have a certain want
(rare)
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
• First order desire: a want to do something• First order volition: an effective first order desire, my
will• Second order desire: a want to have a certain want
(rare)• Second order volition: a want that a certain first order
desire be effective
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
• Consider, again, the addicted smoker
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
• Consider, again, the addicted smoker
– He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
• Consider, again, the addicted smoker
– He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke
– But he also has a second order volition or an attitude towards which of these wants he prefers or identifies with
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
• Consider, again, the addicted smoker
– He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke
– But he also has a second order volition or an attitude towards which of these wants he prefers or identifies with
• He has a SOV that his want to not smoke be his will
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
• Consider, again, the addicted smoker
– He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke
– But he also has a second order volition or an attitude towards which of these wants he prefers or identifies with
• He has a SOV that his want to not smoke be his will
• Frankfurt says that you are free when your SOV is satisfied
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
• Consider, again, the addicted smoker
– He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke
– But he also has a second order volition or an attitude towards which of these wants he prefers or identifies with
• He has a SOV that his want to not smoke be his will
• Frankfurt says that you are free when your SOV is satisfied
– i.e., when the FOD you second-order wanted to be your will becomes your will
FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM
LECTURE ON AYER AND FRANKFURT
THE END