Are Moral Disputes Intractable?

Are Moral Disputes Are Moral Disputes Intractable?Intractable?

Stephen StichStephen StichDept. of Philosophy &

Center for Cognitive ScienceRutgers University

WORKSHOP ON INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTRACTABLE GLOBAL PROBLEMS

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IntroductionIntroduction

Many of the most vexing global problems are -- at least in part -- rooted in moral disputesmoral disputes

The question I want to address is whether some of these disputes are intractableintractable

I’ll approach the question from the perspective of an empirically oriented philosopher interested in the psychology & evolution of moral psychology & evolution of moral normsnorms

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This is an exciting time for philosophers who take an empirical approach to moral norms

Over the last decade there has been an explosion of interest in the area

Resulting in an impressive body of philosophically informed philosophically informed and empirically sophisticated empirically sophisticated inter-inter-disciplinary researchdisciplinary research

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My theme will be that this work gives us the tools to ask the question tools to ask the question I have posed in my title in a new and new and innovative wayinnovative way

And to provide at least the beginning of an answerbeginning of an answer as well as a roadmap for future research roadmap for future research

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What is an “intractable” moral What is an “intractable” moral dispute?dispute?

One way to get clear about this is to focus on a theory of moral psych-focus on a theory of moral psych-ologyology on which moral disputes are moral disputes are NOT intractableNOT intractable

If that theory is mistakenmistaken, and I will argue that it is, then alternative accounts will show us some of the ways in which moral disputes can be intractable, and can help us think about how to deal with them

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The first step is the “linguistic analogy” “linguistic analogy” first suggested by Rawls in A Theory of Justice and recently developed in great detail in an important new book by John John MikhailMikhail

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Milhail


The starting point of the analogy is the observation that moral judgments, like grammatical judgments, can be made about an endless number of new cases endless number of new cases that we have never encountered before, and that typically these judgments are made very quicklyquickly with no no conscious accessconscious access to the underlying cognitive processes

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Trolley cases Trolley cases provide a clear example

The first time we encounter these cases we quickly make a judgment about whether the action on morally permissible

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Jon Haidt’s Jon Haidt’s notorious dogdog and chickenchicken cases provide additional examples

“A family’s dog was killed by a car in front of their house. They had heard that dog meat was delicious, so they cut up the dog’s body and cooked it and ate it for dinner.”

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Should the family be stopped or punished in any way?

Jon Haidt’s Jon Haidt’s notorious dogdog and chickenchicken cases provide additional examples

“A man does to the super market once a week and buys a dead chicken. But before cooking the chicken, he has sexual intercourse with it.”

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Should the man be stopped or punished in any way?

Clearly, we don’t have judgments about specific specific trolley casestrolley cases and strange sex strange sex cases stored stored in our mind/brain in our mind/brain ready to be retrieved when a question arises

Rather, Mikhail suggests, we have a set of general rules or principlesgeneral rules or principles -- just as we do in the case of grammargrammar

These rules must be applied to specific cases applied to specific cases in a way that depends on the facts about depends on the facts about that casethat case

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General Moral Principles & Rules

(“moral grammar”)

Beliefs about the facts of the case

+ Judgment About the Case


Where Do the Rules Come From?

The most venerable answer is nativismnativism:

The rules are innateinnate and are shared by all normal humans

Endorsed by a Endorsed by a wide variety of wide variety of thinkersthinkers, from antiquity to the present, including

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PlatoCiceroHume

Adam Smith J.J. Rousseau

JeffersonDarwinMikhail


Many nativistsnativists, both historical & contemporary, have also been moral realistsmoral realists: they hold that (most) moral claims are either true true or falsefalse

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InnatInnatee CorrecCorrec

t t (True) (True)

If these If these are trueare true

These will These will be true be true

tootoo



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t t (True) (True)


Why should we think that InnateInnate moral principles are CorrectCorrect? Some religious religious

philosophers philosophers think that they were implanted in our mind by GodGod


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t t (True) (True)


Why should we think that InnateInnate moral principles are CorrectCorrect? Some secular thinkers secular thinkers think

that they reflect “the “the wisdom of nature” wisdom of nature” or natural selectionnatural selection

Why nativistsnativists (& many moral realistsmoral realists) think that moral disputes are tractable

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Everyone agrees that there is a LOT of LOT of disagreement disagreement in moral judgments moral judgments both WITHINWITHIN and BETWEENBETWEEN cultures



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If nativism is correct, then ALLALL of that diversity must be explained by different different beliefs about the beliefs about the facts of the casefacts of the case



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If nativism is correct, then ALLALL of that diversity must be explained by different different beliefs about the beliefs about the facts of the casefacts of the case

…… or by a failure to grasp what the rules & principles say about the case



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Thus nativistsnativists (and many moral realistsmoral realists) make TWO TWO PREDICTIONSPREDICTIONS



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1. When people make different moral different moral judgments judgments about the same case, it is because they have different different factual beliefs about the factual beliefs about the casecase.

2. If these factual factual disagreements were disagreements were eliminatedeliminated, moral moral disagreement would be disagreement would be eliminated as welleliminated as well.


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I will call this the “Eliminating Eliminating

Factual Factual Disagreement Disagreement

Will Eliminate All Will Eliminate All Moral Moral

Disagreement” Disagreement” Prediction


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I will call this the “Eliminating Eliminating

Factual Factual Disagreement Disagreement

Will Eliminate All Will Eliminate All Moral Moral

Disagreement” Disagreement” Prediction

If the prediction is true, then there is a clear sense in

which moral disagreements are

tractabletractable!

Do nativistsnativists and moral realists moral realists really think that eliminating factual disagreement would eliminate moral disagreement? Richard Boyd Richard Boyd - one of the foundersof contemporary moral realism

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“Careful philosophical exam- ination will reveal …that agreement on nonmoral issues agreement on nonmoral issues would eliminate almost all would eliminate almost all disagreement about the sorts disagreement about the sorts of issues which arise in of issues which arise in ordinary moral practiceordinary moral practice.” (1988)

There is now a substantial body of research suggesting that the answer is NONO

Haidt’s dog

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Is the Prediction True? Is the Prediction True? Are Moral Disputes Really Are Moral Disputes Really

Tractable? Tractable?

% yes

There is now a substantial body of research suggesting that the answer is NONO

Haidt’s chicken

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% yes

It is singularly implausible that the high SES & low SES participants have different factual beliefs different factual beliefs about eating dogs or masturbating with chickens

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% yes

% yes

It is much more plausible that the disagreement herehere

derives from a difference herehere not herehere

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There are many other studies that point in the same direction

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So it looks like nativistsnativists and moral moral realistsrealists like Boyd are wrong

Eliminating factual disagreement will NOTNOT eliminate all moral disagreement

Some important moral disputes NOTNOT tractable

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So where DODO the Rules Come From?

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Where do we go from here? Where do we go from here?


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Boyd & Richerson, Henrich and others have made a powerful case that they are the product of social learningsocial learning, a process in which information-rich mental states are copied from one mind to another


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Boyd & Richerson, Henrich and others have made a powerful case that they are the product of social learningsocial learning, a process in which information-rich mental states are copied from one mind to another

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Different sets of rules Different sets of rules will arise in different different material, cultural and historical settingsmaterial, cultural and historical settings, and will be transformed by a process of cultural cultural group selectiongroup selection

If we are to learn to deal with the global global problems that arise from these intractable problems that arise from these intractable moral disputesmoral disputes, we’ll have to learn much more about the dynamics of social learningdynamics of social learning and the psychological and neurological processes psychological and neurological processes that underlie itthat underlie it.

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Among the questionsquestions we’ll need to answer are:

What are the factors that affect whether a newly introduced normnewly introduced norm will spreadspread thru a population?

What are the factors that lead to a widely widely shared norm shared norm becoming less common less common within a population?

What effect does competition between competition between groups groups have on which norms survive and survive and spread spread and which disappeardisappear?

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Though there is much to learn, we already know we already know a great deal about these issuesa great deal about these issues as the result of the work of

… and our next speakerand our next speaker

Rob Boyd Pete Richerson

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Are Moral Disputes Intractable?