APPENDICES

1a

APPENDIX A

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FORTHE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THOMAS ROBINS, individuallyand on behalf of all others simi-larly situated,

Plaintiff–Appellant,v.

SPOKEO, INC., a Californiacorporation,

Defendant–Appellee.

No. 11-56843

D.C. No.2:10-cv-5306-ODW-AGR

OPINION

On Remand from theSupreme Court of the United States

Argued and Submitted December 13, 2016San Francisco, California

Filed August 15, 2017

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Susan P. Graber,and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

2a

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

On remand from the Supreme Court, we mustdetermine whether an alleged violation of a consum-er’s rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act con-stitutes a harm sufficiently concrete to satisfy the in-jury-in-fact requirement of Article III of the UnitedStates Constitution.

I

A

Spokeo, Inc., operates a website by the samename that compiles consumer data and builds indi-vidual consumer-information profiles. At no cost,consumers can use spokeo.com to view a report con-taining an array of details about a person’s life, suchas the person’s age, contact information, marital sta-tus, occupation, hobbies, economic health, andwealth. More detailed information is available forusers who pay subscription fees. Spokeo markets itsservices to businesses, claiming that its reports pro-vide a good way to learn more about prospectivebusiness associates and employees.

At some point, Thomas Robins became awarethat Spokeo had published an allegedly inaccuratereport about him on its website. Robins then suedSpokeo for willful violations of the Fair Credit Re-porting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. FCRAimposes a number of procedural requirements onconsumer reporting agencies to regulate their crea-

3a

tion and use of consumer reports.1 The statute givesconsumers affected by a violation of such require-ments a right to sue the responsible party, includingthe right to sue (and to recover statutory damages)for willful violations even if the consumer cannotshow that the violation caused him to sustain any ac-tual damages. See id. §§ 1681n, 1681o.

Robins’s suit alleged that Spokeo willfully violat-ed various procedural requirements under FCRA, in-cluding that Spokeo failed to “follow reasonable pro-cedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” of theinformation in his consumer report. Id. § 1681e(b).He alleged that, as a result, Spokeo published a re-port which falsely stated his age, marital status,wealth, education level, and profession, and whichincluded a photo of a different person. Robins allegedthat such errors harmed his employment prospectsat a time when he was out of work and that he con-tinues to be unemployed and suffers emotional dis-tress as a consequence.

1 “Consumer reports”—also commonly referred to as credit re-ports—are any communications of information by a consumerreporting agency that bear on issues such as a consumer’s cred-it-worthiness, character, or general reputation, and which areused or expected to be used in establishing the consumer’s eli-gibility for credit, insurance, employment, and other similarpurposes. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).

“Consumer reporting agencies” are entities that regularly as-semble or evaluate consumer information “for the purpose offurnishing consumer reports to third parties.” Id. § 1681a(f).Although Spokeo has questioned whether it qualifies as a con-sumer reporting agency under the statute, we assume that itdoes for purposes of this appeal. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins(Spokeo II), 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546 n.4 (2016).

4a

B

The district court dismissed Robins’s FirstAmended Complaint, upon its determination that helacked standing to sue under Article III of the UnitedStates Constitution. Specifically, the district courtconcluded that Robins alleged only a bare violation ofthe statute and did not adequately plead that suchviolation caused him to suffer an actual injury-in-fact.

Robins appealed to this court, and we reversed.Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Spokeo I), 742 F.3d 409, 414(9th Cir. 2014). We held that Robins’s allegations es-tablished a sufficient injury-in-fact—that is, that heallegedly suffered a concrete and particularized inju-ry—because Robins alleged that Spokeo violated spe-cifically his statutory rights, which Congress estab-lished to protect against individual rather than col-lective harms. Id. at 413. Likewise, we concludedthat the alleged harm to Robins’s statutory rightswas certainly “caused” by Spokeo’s alleged violationsof FCRA and that FCRA’s statutory damages couldredress such injury. Id. at 414. We ordered the caseto be remanded to the district court for further pro-ceedings.

C

On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated ouropinion, and held that our standing analysis was in-complete. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo II), 136S. Ct. 1540 (2016). The Supreme Court noted thatalthough our analysis properly addressed whetherthe injury alleged by Robins was particularized as tohim, we did not devote appropriate attention towhether the alleged injury is sufficiently concrete aswell. Id. at 1548. The Court emphasized that particu-

5a

larity and concreteness are two separate inquiries,and it vacated our opinion and remanded the casewith instructions to consider specifically whetherRobins’s alleged injuries “meet the concreteness re-quirement” imposed by Article III. Id. at 1550. TheCourt did not call into question our conclusions onany of the other elements of standing.

D

On remand to this court, and after further brief-ing and oral argument, the question before us iswhether Robins has sufficiently pled a concrete inju-ry under the Spokeo II rubric.

II

Robins argues that Spokeo’s alleged violation ofFCRA—specifically its failure reasonably to ensurethe accuracy of his consumer report—is, alone,enough to establish a concrete injury. Robins con-tends that he has no need to allege any additionalharm caused by that statutory violation becauseFCRA exists specifically to protect consumers’ con-crete interest in credit-reporting accuracy. Thus,Robins argues, so long as Spokeo’s alleged FCRA vio-lations harm this real-world and congressionally rec-ognized interest, he has standing to sue.

A

Robins’s argument requires us to consider, fol-lowing the Supreme Court’s guidance in Spokeo II,the extent to which violation of a statutory right canitself establish an injury sufficiently concrete for thepurposes of Article III standing.

6a

1

Robins is certainly correct that FCRA purported-ly allows him to sue for willful violations withoutshowing that he suffered any additional harm as aresult. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. But the mere fact thatCongress said a consumer like Robins may bringsuch a suit does not mean that a federal court neces-sarily has the power to hear it.

In Spokeo II, the Supreme Court made clear thata plaintiff does not “automatically satisf[y] the inju-ry-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants aperson a statutory right and purports to authorizethat person to sue to vindicate that right.” 136 S. Ct.at 1549. Even then, “Article III standing requires aconcrete injury.” Id. To establish such an injury, theplaintiff must allege a statutory violation thatcaused him to suffer some harm that “actually ex-ist[s]” in the world; there must be an injury that is“real” and not “abstract” or merely “procedural.” Id.at 1548-49 (internal quotation marks omitted). Inother words, even when a statute has allegedly beenviolated, Article III requires such violation to havecaused some real—as opposed to purely legal—harmto the plaintiff.

2

The Court emphasized, however, that congres-sional judgment still plays an important role in theconcreteness inquiry, especially in cases—like thisone—in which the plaintiff alleges that he sufferedan intangible harm. Although they are often harderto recognize, intangible injuries—for example, re-strictions on First Amendment freedoms or harm toone’s reputation—may be sufficient for Article IIIstanding. See id. at 1549. And in this somewhat

7a

murky area, Congress’s judgment as to whatamounts to a real, concrete injury is instructive. TheCourt explained, “In determining whether an intan-gible harm constitutes injury in fact, both historyand the judgment of Congress play important roles.”Id. Indeed, “because Congress is well positioned toidentify intangible harms that meet minimum Arti-cle III requirements, its judgment is . . . instructiveand important.” Id. “Congress may ‘elevate to thestatus of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de factoinjuries that were previously inadequate in law.’’’ Id.(alteration omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wild-life, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). And “Congress has thepower to define injuries and articulate chains of cau-sation that will give rise to a case or controversywhere none existed before.” Id. (internal quotationmarks omitted). In some areas—like libel and slan-der per se—the common law has permitted recoveryby victims even where their injuries are “difficult toprove or measure,” and Congress may likewise enactprocedural rights to guard against a “risk of realharm,” the violation of which may “be sufficient insome circumstances to constitute injury in fact.” Id.

3

Accordingly, while Robins may not show an inju-ry-in-fact merely by pointing to a statutory cause ofaction, the Supreme Court also recognized that somestatutory violations, alone, do establish concreteharm. As the Second Circuit has summarized,Spokeo II “instruct[s] that an alleged procedural vio-lation [of a statute] can by itself manifest concrete in-jury where Congress conferred the procedural rightto protect a plaintiff ’s concrete interests and wherethe procedural violation presents ‘a risk of real harm’to that concrete interest.” Strubel v. Comenity Bank,

8a

842 F.3d 181, 190 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Spokeo II,136 S. Ct. at 1549). Other circuits—and our own—have suggested similar interpretations of standing inthis context. See, e.g., Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols.,Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 346 (4th Cir. 2017) (concrete harmmay be shown by FCRA violation that causes theplaintiff to “suffer[] . . . the type of harm Congresssought to prevent when it enacted the FCRA”); Lyshev. Levy, 854 F.3d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Spokeo[II] allows for a bare procedural violation to create aconcrete harm . . . [based on] the failure to complywith a statutory procedure that was designed to pro-tect against the harm the statute was enacted toprevent.”); Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC,847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017) (recognizingstanding where alleged statutory violations “pre-sent[ed] the precise harm and infringe[d] the sameprivacy interests Congress sought to protect in enact-ing the [Telephone Consumer Protection Act]”). Andwe now agree that the Second Circuit’s formulationin Strubel best elucidates the concreteness standardsarticulated by the Supreme Court in Spokeo II.

B

In evaluating Robins’s claim of harm, we thusask: (1) whether the statutory provisions at issuewere established to protect his concrete interests (asopposed to purely procedural rights), and if so, (2)whether the specific procedural violations alleged inthis case actually harm, or present a material risk ofharm to, such interests.

1

As to the first question, we agree with Robinsthat Congress established the FCRA provisions at is-sue to protect consumers’ concrete interests. We have

9a

previously observed that FCRA “was crafted to pro-tect consumers from the transmission of inaccurateinformation about them” in consumer reports.Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Spokeo II, 136 S.Ct. at 1550 (Congress enacted FCRA to “curb the dis-semination of false information”); S. Rep. No. 91-517,at 1 (1969) (“The purpose of the fair credit reportingbill is to prevent consumers from being unjustlydamaged because of inaccurate or arbitrary infor-mation in a credit report.”). Put differently, FCRAaims “to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting”and to “protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. ofAm. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007); see 15 U.S.C. §1681; Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1042. “To achieve thisend,” FCRA imposes on consumer-reporting agencies“a host of [procedural] requirements concerning thecreation and use of consumer reports” and, as men-tioned, allows individuals to sue those which arenon-compliant. Spokeo II, 136 S. Ct. at 1545. Rele-vant to Robins’s claims, § 1681e(b) of the statute spe-cifically requires reporting agencies to “follow rea-sonable procedures to assure maximum possible ac-curacy” of the information contained in an individu-al’s consumer report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).

a

We have little difficulty concluding that these in-terests protected by FCRA’s procedural requirementsare “real,” rather than purely legal creations. Tobegin, the Supreme Court seems to have assumedthat, at least in general, the dissemination of falseinformation in consumer reports can itself constitutea concrete harm. See Spokeo II, 136 S. Ct. at 1550.Moreover, given the ubiquity and importance of con-sumer reports in modern life—in employment deci-

10a

sions, in loan applications, in home purchases, andmuch more—the real-world implications of materialinaccuracies in those reports seem patent on theirface. Indeed, the legislative record includes pages ofdiscussion of how such inaccuracies may harm con-sumers in light of the increasing importance of con-sumer reporting nearly fifty years ago. See, e.g., 116Cong. Rec. 35,941 (1970) (statement of Sen.Proxmire); id. at 36,570 (statement of Rep. Sullivan);id. at 36,574 (statement of Rep. Wylie); 115 Cong.Rec. 2410-15 (1969); see also Dalton v. Capital Asso-ciated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409, 414 (4th Cir. 2001)(“Employers [in 1970] were placing increasing reli-ance on consumer reporting agencies to obtain in-formation on the backgrounds of prospective employ-ees. Congress found that in too many instances agen-cies were reporting inaccurate information that wasadversely affecting the ability of individuals to obtainemployment.”). In this context, it makes sense thatCongress might choose to protect against such harmswithout requiring any additional showing of injury.The threat to a consumer’s livelihood is caused bythe very existence of inaccurate information in hiscredit report and the likelihood that such infor-mation will be important to one of the many entitieswho make use of such reports. Congress could haveseen fit to guard against that threat (and, for exam-ple, against the uncertainty and stress it could causeto the consumer’s life), especially in light of the diffi-culty the consumer might have in learning exactlywho has accessed (or who will access) his credit re-port.

b

As other courts have observed, the interests thatFCRA protects also resemble other reputational and

11a

privacy interests that have long been protected inthe law. See, e.g., In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc.Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 638-40 (3d Cir.2017) (comparing FCRA’s privacy protections tocommon law protections for “a person’s right to pre-vent the dissemination of private information”);Gambles v. Sterling Infosystems, Inc., No. 15 Civ.9746, — F. Supp. 3d — , 2017 WL 589130, at *8(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2017) (discussing the “significanthistory . . . of lawsuits based on (1) the unauthorizeddisclosure of a person’s private information, and (2)the disclosure of adverse information claimed to havebeen misleading or false”). For example, the commonlaw provided remedies for a variety of defamatorystatements, including those which falsely attributedcharacteristics “incompatible with the proper exer-cise of [an individual’s] lawful business, trade, pro-fession, or office.” Restatement (First) of Torts § 570(1938). The first Restatement of Torts explained thatthe publication of such a libel was “actionable per se,that is irrespective of whether any special harm hasbeen caused to the plaintiff ’s reputation or other-wise,” because the “publication is itself an injury.” Id.§ 569 cmt. c. As is true with respect to FCRA, the“social value of this rule” was to prevent the falsepublication from causing further harm by allowingthe “defamed person to expose the groundless char-acter of a defamatory rumor before harm to the repu-tation has resulted therefrom.” Id. § 569 cmt. b. Justas Congress’s judgment about an intangible harm isimportant to our concreteness analysis, so is the factthat the interest Congress identified is similar toothers that traditionally have been protected. SeeSpokeo II, 136 S. Ct. at 1549; Van Patten, 847 F.3d at1042-43.

12a

We recognize, of course, that there are differ-ences between the harms that FCRA protects againstand those at issue in common-law causes of actionlike defamation or libel per se. As Spokeo points out,those common-law claims required the disclosure offalse information that would be harmful to one’s rep-utation, while FCRA protects against the disclosureof merely inaccurate information, without requiringa showing of reputational harm. But the SupremeCourt observed that “it is instructive to considerwhether an alleged intangible harm has a close rela-tionship to a harm that has traditionally been re-garded as providing a basis for a lawsuit,” not thatCongress may recognize a de facto intangible harmonly when its statute exactly tracks the common law.Spokeo II, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (emphasis added); seealso Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.83, 102 (1998) (judicial power extends to “cases andcontroversies of the sort traditionally amenable to,and resolved by, the judicial process” (emphasis add-ed)). Even if there are differences between FCRA’scause of action and those recognized at common law,the relevant point is that Congress has chosen toprotect against a harm that is at least closely similarin kind to others that have traditionally served asthe basis for lawsuit. See In re Horizon Healthcare,846 F.3d at 638-41. Courts have long entertainedcauses of action to vindicate intangible harms causedby certain untruthful disclosures about individuals,and we respect Congress’s judgment that a similarharm would result from inaccurate credit reporting.See generally Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043 (“We deferin part to Congress’s judgment [as to an intangibleharm].”).

In short, guided by both Congress’s judgmentand historical practice, we conclude that the FCRA

13a

procedures at issue in this case were crafted to pro-tect consumers’ (like Robins’s) concrete interest inaccurate credit reporting about themselves. Cf.Dreher, 856 F.3d at 346 (FCRA violations that un-dermine “the fairness or accuracy” of an individual’scredit report are concrete harms (internal quotationmarks and alterations omitted)); In re HorizonHealthcare., 846 F.3d at 638-41 (unauthorized disclo-sure in violation of FCRA’s privacy protections is aconcrete harm).

2

Second, we must determine whether Robins hasalleged FCRA violations that actually harm, or atleast that actually create a “material risk of harm”to, this concrete interest. See Spokeo II, 136 S. Ct. at1550; Strubel, 842 F.3d at 190. Robins must allegemore than a bare procedural violation of the statutethat is “divorced from” the real harms that FCRA isdesigned to prevent. Spokeo II, 136 S. Ct. at 1549;Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1042.

This second requirement makes clear that, inmany instances, a plaintiff will not be able to show aconcrete injury simply by alleging that a consumer-reporting agency failed to comply with one of FCRA’sprocedures. For example, a reporting agency’s failureto follow certain FCRA requirements may not resultin the creation or dissemination of an inaccurateconsumer report. See Spokeo II, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. Insuch a case, the statute would have been violated,but that violation alone would not materially affectthe consumer’s protected interests in accurate creditreporting.

But Robins argues that Spokeo’s alleged violationof § 1681e(b) is enough to show harm to the statute’s

14a

underlying concrete interests because his claim turnson whether Spokeo properly ensured the accuracy ofhis consumer report, and to prevail Robins will haveto show that Spokeo did prepare a report that con-tained inaccurate information about him.2 See 15U.S.C. § 1681e(b); Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333. Moreo-ver, Robins has alleged not only that Spokeo pre-pared such a report, but also that it then publishedthe report on the Internet.3 His claim thus clearlyimplicates, at least in some way, Robins’s concrete in-terests in truthful credit reporting. See also SpokeoII, 136 S. Ct. at 1553-54 (Thomas, J., concurring)(unlike other FCRA procedural requirements,§ 1681e(b) potentially creates a private duty to pro-tect an individual’s personal information).

Nevertheless, Robins is not correct that anyFCRA violation premised on some inaccurate disclo-sure of his information is sufficient. In Spokeo II, theSupreme Court explicitly rejected the notion thatevery minor inaccuracy reported in violation of FCRA

2 Robins’s complaint also alleged violations of other FCRA pro-visions, which do not turn on any alleged reporting inaccura-cy—and which would thus present great difficulty for his stand-ing argument. But, following remand from the Supreme Court,Robins now insists that these “inartfully styled . . . ‘claims”’ arenot alleged as independent grounds for relief but instead serveas “merely examples of Spokeo’s willful failure to use reasona-ble procedures and to assure maximum possible accuracy in itspublished reports.” Robins now states that he has alleged only“a single claim for relief under Section 1681e(b).” We thereforedo not consider the extent to which Robins would have standingto pursue claims for relief based on these other violations, givenour understanding that he no longer attempts to do so.

3 We do not consider whether a plaintiff would allege a concreteharm if he alleged only that a materially inaccurate reportabout him was prepared but never published.

15a

will “cause [real] harm or present any material riskof [real] harm.” Id. at 1550 (majority opinion). TheCourt gave the example of an incorrectly reported zipcode, opining, “It is difficult to imagine how the dis-semination of an incorrect zip code, without more,could work any concrete harm.” Id. The Court leftopen the question of what other sorts of informationwould “merit similar treatment.” Id. at 1550 n.8.

Thus, Spokeo II requires some examination ofthe nature of the specific alleged reporting inaccura-cies to ensure that they raise a real risk of harm tothe concrete interests that FCRA protects. SeeStrubel, 842 F.3d at 190 (“[E]ven where Congress hasaccorded procedural rights to protect a concrete in-terest, a plaintiff may fail to demonstrate concreteinjury where violation of the procedure at issue pre-sents no material risk of harm to that underlying in-terest.”). Put slightly differently, the Court suggestedthat even if Congress determined that inaccuratecredit reporting generally causes real harm to con-sumers, it cannot be the case that every trivial ormeaningless inaccuracy does so. See id. Unfortunate-ly, the Court gave little guidance as to what varietiesof misinformation should fall into the harmless cate-gory, beyond the example of an erroneous zip code.

We need not conduct a searching review forwhere that line should be drawn in this case, howev-er, because it is clear to us that Robins’s allegationsrelate facts that are substantially more likely toharm his concrete interests than the SupremeCourt’s example of an incorrect zip code. Robins spe-cifically alleged that Spokeo falsely reported that heis married with children, that he is in his 50s, thathe is employed in a professional or technical field,that he has a graduate degree, and that his wealth

16a

level is higher than it is. It does not take much imag-ination to understand how inaccurate reports onsuch a broad range of material facts about Robins’slife could be deemed a real harm. For example, Rob-ins alleged that he is out of work and looking for ajob, but that Spokeo’s inaccurate reports have“caused actual harm to [his] employment prospects”by misrepresenting facts that would be relevant toemployers, and that he suffers from “anxiety, stress,concern, and/or worry about his diminished employ-ment prospects” as a result. We acknowledge that thealleged misrepresentations could seem worse—forexample, Spokeo could have reported that Robinshad less education or money than he has. But weagree with Robins that information of this sort (age,marital status, educational background, and em-ployment history) is the type that may be importantto employers or others making use of a consumer re-port. Ensuring the accuracy of this sort of infor-mation thus seems directly and substantially relatedto FCRA’s goals.

Further, determining whether any given inaccu-racy in a credit report would help or harm an indi-vidual (or perhaps both) is not always easily done.For example, in support of Robins, the Consumer Fi-nancial Protection Bureau has argued that evenseemingly flattering inaccuracies can hurt an indi-vidual’s employment prospects as they may cause aprospective employer to question the applicant’struthfulness or to determine that he is overqualifiedfor the position sought. Even if their likelihood actu-ally to harm Robins’s job search could be debated, theinaccuracies alleged in this case do not strike us asthe sort of “mere technical violation[s]” which are tooinsignificant to present a sincere risk of harm to thereal-world interests that Congress chose to protect

17a

with FCRA. In re Horizon Healthcare, 846 F.3d at638; see also Spokeo II, 136 S. Ct. at 1556 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (describing Robins’s allegations as“[f]ar from an incorrect zip code”). Robins’s complaintthus sufficiently alleges that he suffered a concreteinjury.4 See In re Horizon Healthcare, 846 F.3d at638-41; Strubel, 842 F.3d at 190.

C

Finally, we reject Spokeo’s suggestion that Rob-ins’s allegations of harm are too speculative to estab-lish a concrete injury. Relying on Clapper v. AmnestyInternational USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013),Spokeo argues that Robins has failed to allege howthe “seemingly flattering but inaccurate information”published about him would “expose Robins to any in-jury that was ‘certainly impending.”’ Spokeo arguesthat, at best, Robins has asserted that such inaccu-racies might hurt his employment prospects, but notthat they present a material or impending risk of do-ing so.

Spokeo’s reliance on Clapper is misplaced. InClapper, the plaintiffs sought to establish standingon the basis of harm they would supposedly sufferfrom threatened conduct that had not happened yetbut which they believed was reasonably likely to oc-

4 We caution that our conclusion on Robins’s allegations doesnot mean that every inaccuracy in these categories of infor-mation (age, marital status, economic standing, etc.) will neces-sarily establish concrete injury under FCRA. There may betimes that a violation leads to a seemingly trivial inaccuracy insuch information (for example, misreporting a person’s age by aday or a person’s wealth by a dollar). We express no opinion onthe circumstances in which alleged inaccuracies of this naturewould or would not cause a concrete harm.

18a

cur—specifically on their belief that “some of thepeople with whom they exchange[d] . . . information[were] likely targets of surveillance” under a federalstatute. Id. at 1145 (emphasis added). The plaintiffssought to strike down the statute authorizing suchsurveillance in order to remove the threat that theircommunications would eventually be intercepted. Id.at 1145-46. The question for the Court was how cer-tain such predicted surveillance needed to be in orderto create an injury in fact. In such a case, the Su-preme Court explained that a plaintiff cannot showinjury-in-fact unless the “threatened injury [is] cer-tainly impending” as opposed to merely speculative.Id. at 1147-48 (emphasis added) (internal quotationmarks omitted).

Here, by contrast, both the challenged conductand the attendant injury have already occurred. Asalleged in the complaint, Spokeo has indeed pub-lished a materially inaccurate consumer report aboutRobins. And, as we have discussed, the alleged in-tangible injury caused by that inaccurate report hasalso occurred. We have explained why, in the contextof FCRA, this alleged intangible injury is itself suffi-ciently concrete. It is of no consequence how likelyRobins is to suffer additional concrete harm as well(such as the loss of a specific job opportunity). SeeSpokeo II, 136 S. Ct. at 1549; Strubel, 842 F.3d at190.

Clapper’s discussion of what must be shown toestablish standing based on anticipated conduct oran anticipated injury is therefore beside the point.Clapper did not address the concreteness of intangi-ble injuries like the one Robins asserts, and theCourt in Spokeo II did not suggest that Congress’sability to recognize such injuries turns on whether

19a

they would also result in additional future injuriesthat would satisfy Clapper. Many previous SupremeCourt cases recognize that such statutorily recog-nized harms alone may confer standing (without ad-ditional resulting harm), none of which the Courtpurported to doubt or to overrule in Spokeo II. See,e.g., Spokeo II, 136 S. Ct. at 1553 (Thomas, J., con-curring) (collecting cases); id. at 1554-55 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (same).

In short, we need not—and we do not—decidewhether Robins’s allegations of additional harm tohis job opportunities would satisfy the demands ofClapper.

III

We are satisfied that Robins has alleged injuriesthat are sufficiently concrete for the purposes of Arti-cle III. As noted, we previously determined that thealleged injuries were also sufficiently particularizedto Robins and that they were caused by Spokeo’s al-leged FCRA violations and are redressable in court.See Spokeo I, 742 F.3d at 412-14. The Supreme Courtdid not question those prior conclusions, and we donot revisit them now. Robins has therefore adequate-ly alleged the elements necessary for standing.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

20a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THOMAS ROBINS, individuallyand on behalf of all others simi-larly situated,

Plaintiff–Appellant,v.

SPOKEO, INC., a Californiacorporation,

Defendant–Appellee.

No. 11-56843

D.C. No.2:10-cv-5306-ODW-AGR

Appeal from the United States District CourtFor the Central District of California

Otis D. Wright, II, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and SubmittedNovember 6, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed February 4, 2014

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Susan P. Graber,and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether an individual has Article IIIstanding to sue a website’s operator under the FairCredit Reporting Act for publishing inaccurate per-sonal information about himself.

ISpokeo, Inc. operates a website that provides users

21a

with information about other individuals, includingcontact data, marital status, age, occupation, eco-nomic health, and wealth level. Thomas Robins suedSpokeo for willful violations of the Fair Credit Re-porting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., relatedto its website. Although he asserted that Spokeo’swebsite contained false information about him, Rob-ins’s allegations of injury were sparse. Spokeo movedto dismiss Robins’s original complaint for lack of sub-ject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that Robinslacked standing sufficient under Article III of theUnited States Constitution.

On January 27, 2011, the district court ruled thatRobins had failed to allege an injury in fact becausehe had not alleged “any actual or imminent harm.”The court characterized Robins’s allegations as simp-ly “that he has been unsuccessful in seeking em-ployment, and that he is concerned that the inaccu-racies in his report will affect his ability to obtaincredit, employment, insurance, and the like.” Thedistrict court noted that “[a]llegations of possible fu-ture injury do not satisfy the [standing] require-ments of Art. III” and dismissed the complaint with-out prejudice.

Robins thereafter filed his First Amended Complaint(FAC). Similar to the original complaint, the FAC al-leged willful violations of the FCRA. For example,the website allegedly described Robins as holding agraduate degree and as wealthy, both of which are al-leged to be untrue. Robins, who is unemployed, de-scribed the misinformation as “caus[ing] actual harmto [his] employment prospects.” Remaining unem-ployed has cost Robins money as well as caused “anx-iety, stress, concern, and/or worry about his dimin-

22a

ished employment prospects.”

Again, Spokeo moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that Robins lackedstanding under Article III. On May 11, the districtcourt denied the motion and concluded that Robinshad alleged a sufficient injury in fact, namelySpokeo’s “marketing of inaccurate consumer report-ing information about” Robins. The court also ruledthat the injury was traceable to Spokeo’s alleged vio-lations of the FCRA and that the injury wasredressable through a favorable court decision.

On September 19, after Spokeo moved to certify aninterlocutory appeal, the district court reconsideredits previous ruling on standing. It then ruled, contra-ry to its May 11 order, that Robins failed to plead aninjury in fact and that any injuries pled were nottraceable to Spokeo’s alleged violations, dismissingthe action. Robins timely appealed.

IIOn appeal, Robins first argues that the law-of-the-case doctrine prohibited the district court from revis-iting its own May 11 decision. In United States v.Smith, however, we held that the law-of-the-casedoctrine does not apply “to circumstances where adistrict court seeks to reconsider an order over whichit has not been divested of jurisdiction.” 389 F.3d 944,949 (9th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (describing the doc-trine as “wholly inapposite”). In this case, the districtcourt was not divested of jurisdiction prior to its Sep-tember 19 order.

Although United States v. Alexander held that thelaw-of-the-case doctrine precluded a district courtfrom reconsidering an evidentiary issue after a mis-

23a

trial, 106 F.3d 874, 876–77 (9th Cir.1997), we distin-guished Alexander in Smith and do so again here.The rule from Alexander applies only to cases inwhich a submission to the jury separates the two de-cisions. See Smith, 389 F.3d at 949–50 (distinguish-ing Alexander on the ground that the district court inthat case had reconsidered its decision only aftersubmitting the case to a jury).

Here, because the district court had neither been di-vested of jurisdiction nor submitted this case to thejury, it was free to reconsider its own prior ruling.The law-of-the-case doctrine did not limit the districtcourt.

III

Robins next argues that the FAC sufficiently allegesArticle III standing and that the May 11 ruling wascorrect.1 The FAC indeed alleges violations of variousstatutory provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(1)(listing the circumstances in which consumer report-ing agencies (CRAs) may provide “consumer reportsfor employment purposes”); id. § 1681 e(b) (requiringCRAs to “follow reasonable procedures to assuremaximum possible accuracy of” consumer reports);

1 Spokeo briefly responds that the FAC “pleads no facts fromwhich an inference of willfulness might be drawn.” We disagree.“[W]illful [ ]” violations within the meaning of 15 U.S.C.§ 1681n include violations in “reckless disregard of statutoryduty.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57, 127 S.Ct.2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007). The facts that Robins pled makeit plausible that Spokeo acted in reckless disregard of dutiescreated by the FCRA. Robins pled, among other things, thatSpokeo knew about inaccuracies in its reports and marketed itsreports for purposes covered by the FCRA despite disclaimingany such uses.

24a

id. § 1681e(d) (requiring CRAs to issue notices toproviders and users of information); id. § 1681j(a)(requiring CRAs to post toll-free telephone numbersto allow consumers to request consumer reports).Robins contends that because these provisions areenforceable through a private cause of action, see id.§ 1681n, they create statutory rights that he hasstanding to vindicate in court. See Warth v. Seldin,422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343(1975) (“The actual or threatened injury required byArt[icle] III may exist solely by virtue of statutescreating legal rights, the invasion of which createsstanding.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly recognized that it wouldnot have subject-matter jurisdiction if Robins did nothave standing. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,547 U.S. 332, 341–42, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d589 (2006). The district court also correctly identifiedthe three components of standing: (1) the plaintiff“has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concreteand partlarized and (b) actual or imminent, not con-jectural or hypothetical”; (2) “the injury is fairlytraceable to the challenged action of the defendant”;and (3) “it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative,that the injury will be redressed by a favorable deci-sion.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). Although more may be requiredat later stages of the litigation, on a motion to dis-miss, “general factual allegations of injury resultingfrom the defendant’s conduct may suffice.” Lujan v.Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct.2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

25a

AIn standing cases that analyze statutory rights, ourprecedent establishes two propositions. First, Con-gress’s creation of a private cause of action to enforcea statutory provision implies that Congress intendedthe enforceable provision to create a statutory right.See Fulfillment Servs. Inc. v. United Parcel Serv.,Inc., 528 F.3d 614, 619 (9th Cir.2008). Second, the vi-olation of a statutory right is usually a sufficient in-jury in fact to confer standing. See Edwards v. FirstAm. Corp., 610 F.3d 514, 517 (9th Cir.2010) (“Essen-tially, the standing question in such cases is whetherthe constitutional or statutory provision on which theclaim rests properly can be understood as grantingpersons in the plaintiff ’s position a right to judicialrelief.”); Fulfillment Servs., 528 F.3d at 619 (same).

Spokeo contends, however, that Robins cannot sueunder the FCRA without showing actual harm. Butthe statutory cause of action does not require a show-ing of actual harm when a plaintiff sues for willfulviolations. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (“Any person whowillfully fails to comply with any requirement im-posed under this subchapter with respect to any con-sumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equalto ... damages of not less than $100 and not morethan $1,000....”); see also Beaudry v. TeleCheckServs., Inc., 579 F.3d 702, 705–07 (6th Cir.2009) (rul-ing that the FCRA “permits a recovery when thereare no identifiable or measurable actual damages”);Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 952–53(7th Cir.2006) (ruling that the FCRA “provide[s] for

26a

modest damages without proof of injury”).2

The scope of the cause of action determines the scopeof the implied statutory right. See Edwards, 610 F.3dat 517 (“Because the statutory text does not limit li-ability to instances in which a plaintiff is over-charged, we hold that Plaintiff has established an in-jury sufficient to satisfy Article III.”). When, as here,the statutory cause of action does not require proof ofactual damages, a plaintiff can suffer a violation ofthe statutory right without suffering actual damages.

BOf course, the Constitution limits the power of Con-gress to confer standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577,112 S.Ct. 2130 (refusing “[t]o permit Congress toconvert the undifferentiated public interest in execu-tive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘indi-vidual right’ vindicable in the courts”); id. at 580, 112S.Ct. 2130 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and con-curring in the judgment) (“The Court’s holding thatthere is an outer limit to the power of Congress toconfer rights of action is a direct and necessary con-sequence of the case and controversy limitations

2 Spokeo urges that such interpretation of the FCRA “wouldraise serious constitutional issues,” suggesting that we shouldadopt the contrary reading, which the Eighth Circuit has de-scribed as “reasonable.” See Dowell v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA,517 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (noting that one“reasonable reading of the [FCRA] could still require proof ofactual damages but simply substitute statutory rather than ac-tual damages for the purpose of calculating the damageaward”). We are not persuaded. As we explain below, our read-ing of the FCRA does not raise difficult constitutional questions.That our sister circuit has described Spokeo’s reading as “rea-sonable,” without actually ruling on the best interpretation ofthe statutory text, is of little consequence here.

27a

found in Article III.”). This constitutional limit, how-ever, does not prohibit Congress from “elevating tothe status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, defacto injuries that were previously inadequate inlaw.” Id. at 578, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (majority opinion).

The issue before us is whether violations of statutoryrights created by the FCRA are “concrete, de facto in-juries” that Congress can so elevate. We are not thefirst Court of Appeals to face this question. InBeaudry, the Sixth Circuit considered whether anFCRA plaintiff suing under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n hadsufficiently alleged an injury in fact by alleging a vio-lation of the FCRA. 579 F.3d at 707. The court identi-fied two constitutional limitations on congressionalpower to confer standing. First, a plaintiff “must be‘among the injured,’ in the sense that she alleges thedefendants violated her statutory rights.” Id. Second,the statutory right at issue must protect against “in-dividual, rather than collective, harm.” Id. TheBeaudry court held that the plaintiff satisfied both ofthese requirements. Id.

Robins is in the same position. First, he alleges thatSpokeo violated his statutory rights, not just thestatutory rights of other people, so he is “among theinjured.” Second, the interests protected by the stat-utory rights at issue are sufficiently concrete andparticularized that Congress can elevate them.Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Like “an in-dividual’s personal interest in living in a racially in-tegrated community” or “a company’s interest inmarketing its product free from competition,” Rob-ins’s personal interests in the handling of his creditinformation are individualized rather than collective.Id. (describing two “concrete, de facto injuries” that

28a

Congress could “elevat[e] to the status of legally cog-nizable injuries”). Therefore, alleged violations ofRobins’s statutory rights are sufficient to satisfy theinjury-in-fact requirement of Article III.

CIn addition to injury in fact, of course, standing re-quires causation and redressability. See Laidlaw, 528U.S. at 180–81, 120 S.Ct. 693. Where statutoryrights are asserted, however, our cases have de-scribed the standing inquiry as boiling down to “es-sentially” the injury-in-fact prong. See Edwards, 610F.3d at 517; Fulfillment Servs., 528 F.3d at 618–19.When the injury in fact is the violation of a statutoryright that we inferred from the existence of a privatecause of action, causation and redressability willusually be satisfied. First, there is little doubt that adefendant’s alleged violation of a statutory provision“caused” the violation of a right created by that pro-vision. Second, statutes like the FCRA frequentlyprovide for monetary damages, which redress the vi-olation of statutory rights. See Jewel v. Nat’l Sec.Agency, 673 F.3d 902, 912 (9th Cir.2011) (ruling thatthere was “no real question about redressability”when a plaintiff sought “an injunction and damages,either of which is an available remedy”). Therefore,Robins has adequately pled causation andredressability in this case.3

IV

For the foregoing reasons, Robins adequately alleges

3 Because we determine that Robins has standing by virtue ofthe alleged violations of his statutory rights, we do not decidewhether harm to his employment prospects or related anxietycould be sufficient injuries in fact.

29a

Article III standing.4

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

4 Because standing is the only question before us, we do not in-timate any opinion on the merits of this case. We do not decide,for example, whether Spokeo qualifies as a consumer reportingagency or whether Spokeo actually violated the FCRA.

30a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. CV10-05306 ODW (AGRx)

Date January 27, 2011

Title Thomas Robins v. Spokeo, Inc.

Present: The Honorable Otis D. Wright, II,United States District Judge

Raymond Neal . Not Present . n/a .Deputy Clerk Court Reporter Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s):

Not Present

Attorneys Present for Defendant(s):

Not Present

Proceedings (In Chambers): Order GRANT-ING Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’Complaint [22] (Filed 11/03/10)

I. INTRODUCTION

Currently before this Court is Defendant, Spokeo,Inc.’s (“Defendant”), Motion to Dismiss PlaintiffThomas Robin’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint pursuant toFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Dkt.# 22.) On January 10,2011, Plaintiff filed an Opposition (Dkt.# 30), towhich Defendant responded on January 20, 2011(Dkt. # 31). Having carefully considered the papersfiled in support of and in opposition to the instant

31a

Motion, the Court deems the matter appropriate fordecision without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78;L.R. 7–15. For the following reasons, Defendant’sMotion is GRANTED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant operates its website,Spokeo.com, in violation of the Fair Credit ReportingAct (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681.1 (Compl.¶¶ 1, 2.)Specifically, Plaintiff claims that reports generatedby Spokeo.com contain inaccurate consumer infor-mation that is marketed to entities performing back-ground checks. (Compl. ¶¶ 13, 17.) As a result of De-fendant’s FCRA violations, Plaintiff is concerned thathis ability to obtain credit, employment, insuranceand the like will be adversely affected. (Compl.¶¶ 23, 24.)

In response, Defendant argues that it is not a con-sumer reporting agency under the FCRA, and there-by cannot be sued for alleged FCRA violations. (Mot.at 8.) Moreover, Defendant argues that even if itcould be sued under the FCRA, Plaintiff does nothave standing to bring such a claim. (Mot. at 17.) De-fendant now brings the instant Motion to Dismissthe Complaint in its entirety for failure to state aclaim upon which relief can be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6), and lack of subject matter jurisdiction be-cause Plaintiff lacks standing, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).

III. DISCUSSION

In order for this Court to have subject matter juris-

1 Plaintiff ’s causes of action are for: violations of the Fair CreditReporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(b); 1681(e); 1681(j); and viola-tion of Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200, et seq.

32a

diction over the merits of Plaintiff ’s claims, Plaintiffmust have established the requisite standing to sue.See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154, 110S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). Thus, as an ini-tial matter, this Court will address Defendant’s ar-gument that Plaintiff does not have standing.

A plaintiff has standing where (1) the plaintiff hassuffered an injury in fact; (2) there is a causal con-nection between the injury and the conduct com-plained of; and (3) it is likely that the injury will beredressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. De-fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct.2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). In the instant matter,Defendant contends that Plaintiff does not havestanding because he has not alleged that he has infact suffered any injury due to Spokeo’s alleged con-duct. (Mot. at 18.) The Court agrees.

Plaintiff argues that he has met the requirements ofstanding simply by alleging that Defendant is in vio-lation of a statute that grants individuals a privateright of action. (Opp. at 14.) However, even when as-serting a statutory violation, the plaintiff must allege“the Article III minima of injury-in-fact.” Gomez v.Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019,1020–21 (9th Cir.1983). An “injury in fact,” for thepurposes of standing, must be actual or imminentand not conjectural or hypothetical. Whitmore v. Ar-kansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons,461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675(1983)). At this point, Plaintiff has not suffered an in-jury in fact because Plaintiff has failed to allege thatDefendant has caused him any actual or imminentharm. Plaintiff only expresses that he has been un-

33a

successful in seeking employment, and that he is“concerned that the inaccuracies [in] his report willaffect his ability to obtain credit, employment, insur-ance, and the like.” (Compl. ¶¶ 23, 24) (emphasisadded.) The Supreme Court has “said many times be-fore” that [a]llegations of possible future injury donot satisfy the [standing] requirements of Art. III.”Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158. Thus, Plaintiff ’s concernthat he will be adversely affected by Defendant’swebsite in the future, is an insufficient injury to con-fer standing.

Because Plaintiff does not have standing to bring hisclaims before this Court, no subject matter jurisdic-tion exists and, at this time, the Court will not ad-dress the merits of Plaintiff ’s claims. See id. at 154.This case is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUTPREJUDICE.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion toDismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall have twenty(20) days from the date of this Order to amend hisComplaint to meet the standing requirements. IfPlaintiff fails to do so, all claims will be dismissedwith prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

34a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. CV10-05306 ODW (AGRx)

Date May 11, 2011

Title Thomas Robins v. Spokeo, Inc.

Present: The Honorable Otis D. Wright, II,United States District Judge

Raymond Neal . Not Present . n/a .Deputy Clerk Court Reporter Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s):

Not Present

Attorneys Present for Defendant(s):

Not Present

Proceedings (In Chambers): Order GRANT-ING in part and DENYING in part Defendant’sMotion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First AmendedComplaint [42]

I. INTRODUCTION

Currently before this Court is Defendant, Spokeo,Inc.’s (“Defendant”), Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff,Thomas Robin’s (“Plaintiff”), First Amended Com-plaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. # 45.) Having carefullyconsidered the papers filed in support of and in oppo-sition to the instant Motion, the Court deems the

35a

matter appropriate for decision without oral argu-ment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; L.R. 7–15. For the follow-ing reasons, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED inpart and DENIED in part.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On January 27, 2011, this Court dismissed Plaintiff ’sComplaint for lack of standing and gave Plaintifftwenty days to amend his Complaint to meet thestanding requirements.1 (Dkt.# 35.) On February 16,2011, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint(“FAC”). (Dkt.# 36.) In his FAC, Plaintiff alleges thatDefendant operates its website, Spokeo.com, in viola-tion of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15U.S.C. § 1681.2 (FAC ¶¶ 1, 2.) Specifically, Plaintiffclaims that reports generated by Spokeo.com containinaccurate consumer information that is marketed toentities performing background checks, including“HR professionals and potential employers[.]” (FAC¶¶ 13–15, 22, 29.) As a result of Defendant’s FCRAviolations, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant hascaused him “actual and/or imminent harm by creat-ing, displaying, and marketing inaccurate consumerreporting information about Plaintiff.” (FAC ¶ 35.)

In response, Defendant avers that it cannot be suedfor alleged FCRA violations because it is not a con-sumer reporting agency. (Memorandum in Support ofMotion (“Memo”), Dkt. # 46, at 2.) Defendant now

1 Specifically, Plaintiff ’s Complaint was dismissed on the basisthat he did not sufficiently allege an injury in fact to confer Ar-ticle III standing.

2 Plaintiff ’s causes of action are for: violations of the Fair CreditReporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(b); 1681(e); 1681(j); and viola-tion of Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200, et seq.

36a

brings the instant Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff ’s FACin its entirety for failure to state a claim upon whichrelief can be granted, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure12(b)(6), and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed-eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (1).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In order for this Court to have subject matter juris-diction over the merits of Plaintiff ’s claims, Plaintiffmust establish the requisite standing to sue. SeeWhitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154, 110 S.Ct.1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). A plaintiff has ArticleIII standing to sue where the plaintiff alleges factsshowing that “(1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ ...(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged ac-tion of the defendant; and (3) it is likely ... that theinjury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). “The litigant must clearly andspecifically set forth facts to satisfy these Art. IIIstanding requirements.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–56.

B. Failure to State a Claim

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismissfor failure to state a claim, a court must construe“[a]ll factual allegations set forth in the complaint ...as true and ... in the light most favorable to [theplaintiff].” See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688(9th Cir.2001) (citing Epstein v. Washington EnergyCo., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996)). “To survive a[12(b)(6) ] motion to dismiss ... a complaint generallymust satisfy only the minimal notice pleading re-

37a

quirements of Rule 8(a) (2).” Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d483, 494 (9th Cir.2003). Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a shortand plain statement of the claim showing that thepleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Fora complaint to sufficiently state a claim, its “[f]actualallegations must be enough to raise a right to reliefabove the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Mere “labels and conclusions” ora “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause ofaction will not do.” Id. Rather, to overcome a 12(b)(6)motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factualmatter, accepted as true, to state a claim to reliefthat is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, –––U.S. ––––, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, Defendant moves to dismissPlaintiff ’s FAC pursuant to Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 12(b)(1) asserting that this Court does nothave subject matter jurisdiction to consider Plain-tiff ’s claims. (Memo at 1.) The Court disagrees. Inlight of Plaintiff ’s FAC, the Court finds that Plaintiffhas alleged sufficient facts to confer Article III stand-ing. Specifically, Plaintiff has alleged an injury infact—the “marketing of inaccurate consumer report-ing information about Plaintiff”—that is fairly trace-able to Defendant’s conduct—alleged FCRA viola-tions-and that is likely to be redressed by a favorabledecision from this Court. (FAC ¶¶ 1, 35, 65) SeeFriends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180–81. According-ly, Plaintiff has established the requisite standing tosue and the Court has subject matter jurisdictionover Plaintiff ’s claims.

38a

Alternatively, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff ’sFAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, asserting that: (1)Defendant is not a consumer reporting agency underthe FCRA, (2) Defendant “is immune from the al-leged liability under the Communications DecencyAct (“CDA”) [,]” and (3) “Plaintiff ’s claim under Cali-fornia’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. &Prof.Code § 17200 et seq. (“UCL”) fails both becauseit depends entirely on the failed FCRA claims andbecause Plaintiff does not and cannot allege that helost money or property because of [Defendant’s] al-leged conduct[.]” (Memo at 2.) The Court considerseach argument below.

A. Defendant’s argument that it is not a con-sumer reporting agency

Under the FCRA, a consumer reporting agency is:

any person which, for monetary fees,dues, or on a cooperative nonprofitbasis, regularly engages in whole orin part in the practice of assemblingor evaluating consumer credit infor-mation or other information on con-sumers for the purpose of furnishingconsumer reports to third parties,and which uses any means or facilityof interstate commerce for the pur-pose of preparing or furnishing con-sumer reports.

15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). Defendant avers that Plaintifffails to state a claim against it under the FCRA be-cause Defendant is not a “consumer reporting agen-cy.” (Memo at 12.) Specifically, Defendant contends

39a

that it does not regularly engage in providing con-sumer credit information for the purpose of furnish-ing consumer reports. (Id.) Conversely, Plaintiff al-leges that “Defendant falls within the scope of FCRAbecause [Defendant] ... collects and creates [consum-er] information for the purpose of furnishing it topaid subscribers who regularly provide monetaryfees in exchange for Spokeo’s reports, which containdata and evaluations regarding consumers’ economicwealth and creditworthiness.” (Opp. at 14; FAC ¶¶18–19, 26, 29.)

To overcome a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a com-plaint must only “contain sufficient factual matter,accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that isplausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Ac-cordingly, Plaintiff need not at this stage prove thatDefendant is in fact a “consumer reporting agency.”Plaintiff ’s allegations that Defendant regularly ac-cepts money in exchange for reports that “containdata and evaluations regarding consumers’ economicwealth and creditworthiness” (FAC ¶¶ 18–19, 26, 29)are sufficient to support a plausible inference thatDefendant’s conduct falls within the scope of theFCRA.3 Thus, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to

3 Defendant further contends that its reports cannot constitute“consumer reports” because the FCRA requires that such re-ports are “used or expected to be used or collected in whole or inpart for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing theconsumer’s eligibility for[any unauthorized FCRA purpose,]” 15U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1), and disclaimers on Defendant’s websitespecifically provide that the information “cannot be used forFCRA purposes.” (Memo at 13–15.) The Court, however, findsthat this argument fails for the same reasons as the previousargument. Plaintiff ’s allegations that Defendant expects its re-ports to be used for unauthorized FCRA purposes because De-

40a

survive Defendant’s Motion on this ground.

B. Defendant’s argument that it is immuneunder the CDA

The CDA states that “[n]o provider or user of an in-teractive computer service shall be treated as thepublisher or speaker of any information provided byanother information content provider.” 47 U.S.C.§ 230(c). This provision “immunizes providers of in-teractive computer services against liability for con-tent created by third parties[.]” Fair Hous. Council ofSan Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.2008). Defendant assertsthat it is immune under the CDA because it is an “in-teractive computer service” that “passively displayscontent that is created entirely by third parties.”(Memo at 19.) Plaintiff, however, alleges that CDAimmunity does not apply to Defendant because un-like information content providers that simply reor-ganize information obtained from other content pro-viders, “Defendant develops original content basedon information obtained from a variety of sourcesand posts it online[.]” (Opp. at 21; FAC ¶¶ 12–13.)Accordingly, application of the immunity is not clearat this time and the Court declines to dismiss theComplaint on this basis.

C. Plaintiff’s UCL Claim

California’s UCL defines unfair competition as “any

fendant’s reports contain information traditionally associatedwith “consumer reports” and Defendant markets such reports to“HR professionals and potential employers” (Opp. at 16–17;FAC ¶ ¶ 26–29) are sufficient to support a plausible inferencethat Defendant’s reports are “consumer reports” within thescope of the FCRA.

41a

unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or prac-tice[.]” Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200. The UCLgrants a private right of action to any “person whohas suffered injury in fact and has lost money orproperty as a result of the unfair competition.” Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 17204. Defendant avers thatPlaintiff does not have standing under the UCL be-cause “he does not plead any factual basis for [the]conclusion” that he has “lost money” as a result ofDefendant’s conduct. (Memo at 22.) Plaintiff, howev-er, alleges that Defendant’s conduct has caused actu-al harm to [his] employment prospects.” (FAC ¶ 35.)As a result, Plaintiff contends that he has “sufferedeconomic injury in the form of lost income during hisperiod of unemployment.” (Opp. at 23; FAC ¶ 36.)The Court agrees with Defendant.

Plaintiff ’s conclusory allegations that Defendant’sconduct has harmed his employment prospects areinsufficient. While, at this stage the Court is re-quired to accept allegations contained in the Com-plaint as true, mere labels and conclusions will notdo. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d at 688; Twombly,550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not pro-vided sufficient facts to “raise a right to relief abovethe speculative level,” See Twombly, at 555, andPlaintiff ’s UCL claim is hereby DISMISSED WITHPREJUDICE.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion toDismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED inpart. Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED with respectto Plaintiff ’s UCL claim and DENIED as to Plain-tiff ’s claims arising under the FCRA.

42a

IT IS SO ORDERED.

43a

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. CV10-05306 ODW (AGRx)

Date September 19, 2011

Title Thomas Robins v. Spokeo, Inc.

Present: The Honorable Otis D. Wright, II,United States District Judge

Sheila English . Not Present . n/a .Deputy Clerk Court Reporter Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s):

Not Present

Attorneys Present for Defendant(s):

Not Present

Proceedings (In Chambers): Order Correct-ing Prior Ruling [52] and Finding Moot Motionfor Certification. [57]

Upon further review, the Court finds it necessary tostrike the standing discussion from its May 11, 2011Order. (Docket No. 52.) In its stead, the Court rein-states the January 27, 2011 Order, which found thatPlaintiff fails to establish standing. (See Docket No.35.) Among other things, the alleged harm to Plain-tiff ’s employment prospects is speculative, attenuat-ed and implausible. Mere violation of the Fair CreditReporting Act does not confer Article III standing,moreover, where no injury in fact is properly pled.

44a

Otherwise, federal courts will be inundated by websurfers’ endless complaints. Plaintiff also fails to al-lege facts sufficient to trace his alleged harm toSpokeo’s alleged violations. In short, Plaintiff fails toestablish his standing before this Court. This actionis therefore DISMISSED. Spokeo’s motion for certi-fication of appeal is MOOT.

SO ORDERED.

45a

APPENDIX F

Fair Credit Reporting Act,15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.

15 U.S.C. § 1681a. Definitions; rules ofconstruction

* * *

(d) CONSUMER REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘consumer report’’means any written, oral, or other communication ofany information by a consumer reporting agencybearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, creditstanding, credit capacity, character, general reputa-tion, personal characteristics, or mode of living whichis used or expected to be used or collected in whole orin part for the purpose of serving as a factor in estab-lishing the consumer’s eligibility for—

(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily forpersonal, family, or household purposes;

(B) employment purposes; or

(C) any other purpose authorized under section1681b of this title.

* * *

(f) The term ‘‘consumer reporting agency’’ means anyperson which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a coop-erative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole orin part in the practice of assembling or evaluatingconsumer credit information or other information onconsumers for the purpose of furnishing consumerreports to third parties, and which uses any means

46a

or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose ofpreparing or furnishing consumer reports.

* * *15 U.S.C. § 1681e. Compliance procedures

(b) Accuracy of report

Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares aconsumer report it shall follow reasonable proce-dures to assure maximum possible accuracy of theinformation concerning the individual about whomthe report relates.

* * *

15 U.S.C. § 1681n. Civil liability for willful noncompliance

(a) In general

Any person who willfully fails to comply with anyrequirement imposed under this subchapter with re-spect to any consumer is liable to that consumer inan amount equal to the sum of—

(1)(A) any actual damages sustained by the con-sumer as a result of the failure or damages of notless than $100 and not more than $1,000; or

(B) in the case of liability of a natural personfor obtaining a consumer report under false pretens-es or knowingly without a permissible purpose, actu-al damages sustained by the consumer as a result ofthe failure or $1,000, whichever is greater;

(2) such amount of punitive damages as the courtmay allow; and

(3) in the case of any successful action to enforceany liability under this section, the costs of the ac-

47a

tion together with reasonable attorney’s fees as de-termined by the court.

(b) Civil liability for knowing noncompliance

Any person who obtains a consumer report froma consumer reporting agency under false pretensesor knowingly without a permissible purpose shall beliable to the consumer reporting agency for actualdamages sustained by the consumer reporting agen-cy or $1,000, whichever is greater.

(c) Attorney’s fees

Upon a finding by the court that an unsuccessfulpleading, motion, or other paper filed in connectionwith an action under this section was filed in badfaith or for purposes of harassment, the court shallaward to the prevailing party attorney’s fees reason-able in relation to the work expended in respondingto the pleading, motion, or other paper.

(d) Clarification of willful noncompliance

For the purposes of this section, any person whoprinted an expiration date on any receipt provided toa consumer cardholder at a point of sale or transac-tion between December 4, 2004, and June 3, 2008,but otherwise complied with the requirements of sec-tion 1681c(g) of this title for such receipt shall not bein willful noncompliance with section 1681c(g) of thistitle by reason of printing such expiration date on thereceipt.

15 U.S.C. § 1681o. Civil liability for negligentnoncompliance

(a) In general

48a

Any person who is negligent in failing to complywith any requirement imposed under this subchapterwith respect to any consumer is liable to that con-sumer in an amount equal to the sum of—

(1) any actual damages sustained by the consum-er as a result of the failure; and

(2) in the case of any successful action to enforceany liability under this section, the costs of the ac-tion together with reasonable attorney’s fees as de-termined by the court.

(b) Attorney’s fees

On a finding by the court that an unsuccessfulpleading, motion, or other paper filed in connectionwith an action under this section was filed in badfaith or for purposes of harassment, the court shallaward to the prevailing party attorney’s fees reason-able in relation to the work expended in respondingto the pleading, motion, or other paper.