APO Fruits Corp vs LBP

8/10/2019 APO Fruits Corp vs LBP

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Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

EN BANC

APO FRUITS CORPORATION

and HIJO PLANTATION, INC.,

Petitioners,

- versus -

LAND BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 164195

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ,MENDOZA, andSERENO,JJ.

Promulgated:

October 12, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

R E S O L U T I O N

BRION, J.:
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We resolve the petitionersmotion for reconsiderationaddressing our

Resolution of December 4, 2009 whose dispositive portion directs:

WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners second motion for

reconsideration (with respect to the denial of the award of legal interest and

attorneys fees), and reiterates the decision dated February 6, 2007 and theresolution dated December 19, 2007 of the Third Division.

For a fuller and clearer presentation and appreciation of this Resolution, we hark

back to the roots of this case.

Factual Antecedents

Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI), together also

referred to aspetitioners,were registered owners of vast tracks of land; AFC

owned 640.3483 hectares, while HPI owned 805.5308 hectares. On October 12,

1995, they voluntarily offered to sell these landholdings to the

government viaVoluntary Offer to Sell applications filed with the Department of

Agrarian Reform (DAR).

On October 16, 1996, AFC and HPI received separate notices of land

acquisition and valuation of their properties from the DARs Provincial Agrarian

Reform Officer (PARO). At the assessed valuation of P165,484.47 per hectare,AFCs land was valued atP86,900,925.88, while HPIs property was valued

at P164,478,178.14. HPI and AFC rejected these valuations for being very low.

In its follow through action, the DAR requested the Land Bank of the

Philippines (LBP) to deposit P26,409,549.86 in AFCs bank account

and P45,481,706.76 in HPIs bank account, which amounts the petitioners then

withdrew. The titles over AFC and HPIs properties were thereafter cancelled, and

new ones were issued on December 9, 1996 in the name of the Republic of

the Philippines.

On February 14, 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate petitions for

determination of just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB).

When the DARAB failed to act on these petitions for more than three years, AFC

and HPI filed separate complaints for determination and payment of just


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compensation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City, acting as

a Special Agrarian Court. These complaints were subsequently consolidated.

On September 25, 2001, the RTC resolved the consolidated cases, fixing the

just compensation for the petitioners 1,338.6027 hectares ofland[1]at P1,383,179,000.00, with interest on this amount at the prevailing market

interest rates, computed from the taking of the properties on December 9, 1996

until fully paid, minus the amounts the petitioners already received under the initial

valuation. The RTC also awarded attorneys fees.

LBP moved for the reconsideration of the decision. The RTC, in its order of

December 5, 2001, modified its ruling and fixed the interest at the rate of 12%

per annum from the time the complaint was filed until finality of thedecision. The Third Division of this Court, in its Decision of February 6, 2007,

affirmed this RTC decision.

On motion for reconsideration, the Third Division issued its Resolution of

December 19, 2007, modifying its February 6, 2007 Decision by deleting the 12%

interestdue on the balance of the awarded just compensation. The Third Division

justified the deletion by the finding that the LBP did not delay the payment of just

compensation as it had deposited the pertinent amounts due to AFC and HPI

within fourteen months after they filed their complaints for just compensation withthe RTC.The Court also considered that AFC had already collected

approximately P149.6 million, while HPI had already collected

approximately P262 million from the LBP. The Third Division also deleted the

award of attorneys fees.

All parties moved for the reconsideration of the modified ruling. The Court

uniformly denied all the motions in its April 30, 2008 Resolution. Entry of

Judgment followed on May 16, 2008.

Notwithstanding the Entry of Judgment, AFC and HPI filed the following

motions on May 28, 2008: (1) Motion for Leave to File and Admit Second Motion

for Reconsideration; (2) Second Motion for Reconsideration, with respect to the

denial of the award of legal interest and attorneys fees; and (3) Motion to Refer

the Second Motion for Reconsideration to the Honorable CourtEn Banc.
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The Third Division found the motion to admit the Second Motion for

Reconsideration and the motion to refer this second motion to the Court En

Bancmeritorious, and accordingly referred the case to the CourtEn Banc. On

September 8, 2009, the CourtEn Bancaccepted the referral.

The Court En BancResolution

On December 4, 2009, the CourtEn Banc,by a majority vote, denied the

petitioners second motion for reconsideration based on two considerations.

First, the grant of the second motion for reconsideration runs counter to the

immutability of final decisions. Moreover, the Court saw no reason to recognizethe case as an exception to the immutability principle as the petitioners private

claim for the payment of interest does not qualify as either a substantial or

transcendental matter or an issue of paramount public interest.

Second, on the merits, the petitioners are not entitled to recover interest on

the just compensation and attorneys fees because they caused the delay in the

payment of the just compensation due them; they erroneously filed their

complaints with the DARAB when they should have directly filed these with the

RTC acting as an agrarian court. Furthermore, the Court found it significant thatthe LBP deposited the pertinent amounts in the petitioners favor within fourteen

months after the petitions were filed with the RTC. Under these circumstances, the

Court found no unreasonable delay on the part of LBP to warrant the award of 12%

interest.

The Chico-Nazario Dissent

Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,

[2]

the ponenteof the original December19, 2007 Resolution (deleting the 12% interest) , dissented from the CourtEn

Bancs December 4, 2009 Resolution.

On the issue of immutability of judgment, Justice Chico-Nazario pointed out

that under extraordinary circumstances, this Court has recalled entries of judgment

on the ground of substantial justice. Given the special circumstances involved in
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the present case, the CourtEn Bancshould have taken a second hard look at the

petitioners positions in their second motion for reconsideration, and acted to

correct the clearly erroneous December 19, 2007 Resolution.

Specifically, Justice Chico-Nazario emphasized the obligation of the State,in the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain, to pay just compensation

to the owner of the expropriated property. To be just, the compensation must not

only be the correct amount to be paid; it must also be paid within a reasonable time

from the time the land is taken from the owner. If not, the State must pay the

landowner interest, by way of damages, from the time the property was taken until

just compensation is fully paid. This interest, deemed a part of just compensation

due, has been established by prevailing jurisprudence to be 12% per annum.

On these premises, Justice Nazario pointed out that the government deprived

the petitioners of their property on December 9, 1996, and paid the balance of the

just compensation due them only on May 9, 2008. The delay of almost twelve

years earned the petitioners interest in the total amount of P1,331,124,223.05.

Despite this finding, Justice Chico-Nazario did not see it fit to declare the

computed interest to be totally due; she found it unconscionable to apply the full

force of the law on the LBP because of the magnitude of the amount due. She thusreduced the awarded interest to P400,000,000.00, or approximately 30% of

the computed interest.

The Present Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion to reconsider the CourtEn Bancs December 4, 2009

Resolution (the present Motion for Reconsideration), the petitioners principally

argue that: (a) the principle of immutability of judgment does not apply since theEntry of Judgment was issued even before the lapse of fifteen days from the

parties receipt of the April 30, 2008 Resolution and the petitioners timely filed

their second motion for reconsideration within fifteen days from their receipt of

this resolution; (b) the April 30, 2008 Resolution cannot be considered immutable

considering the special and compelling circumstances attendant to the present case


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which fall within the exceptions to the principle of immutability of judgments; (c)

the legal interest due is at 12% per annum, reckoned from the time of the taking of

the subject properties and this rate is not subject to reduction. The power of the

courts to equitably reduce interest rates applies solely to liquidated damages under

a contract and not to interest set by the Honorable Court itself as due and owing injust compensation cases; and (d) the Honorable Courts fears that the interest

payments due to the petitioners will produce more harm than good to the system of

agrarian reform are misplaced and are based merely on conjectures.

The Comment of the Land Bank of the Philippines

The LBP commented on the petitioners motion for reconsideration on April28, 2010. It maintained that: (a) the doctrine of immutability of the decisions of

the Supreme Court clearly applies to the present case; (b) the LBP is not guilty of

undue delay in the payment of just compensation as the petitioners were promptly

paid once the Court had determined the final value of the properties expropriated;

(c) the Supreme Court rulings invoked by the petitioners are inapplicable to the

present case; (d) since the obligation to pay just compensation is not a forbearance

of money, interest should commence only after the amount due becomes

ascertainable or liquidated, and the 12% interest per annum applies only to the

liquidated amount, from the date of finality of judgment; (e) the imposition of 12%interest on the balance of P971,409,831.68 is unwarranted because there was no

unjustified refusal by LBP to pay just compensation, and no contractual breach is

involved; (f) the deletion of the attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the amount

finally awarded as just compensation is proper; (g) this case does not involve a

violation of substantial justice to justify the alteration of the immutable resolution

dated December 19, 2007 that deleted the award of interest and attorneys fees.

The Courts Ruling

We find the petitioners arguments meritorious and accordingly

GRANT the present motion for reconsideration.

Just compensationa Basic L imi tation on

the States


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Power of Eminent Domain

At the heart of the present controversy is the Third Divisions December 19,

2007 Resolution which held that the petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest onthe balance of the just compensation belatedly paid by the LBP. In the presently

assailed December 4, 2009 Resolution, we affirmed the December 19, 2007

Resolutions findings that: (a) the LBPdeposited pertinent amounts in favor of

the petitioners within fourteen months after they filed their complaint for

determination of just compensation; and (b) the LBP had already paid the

petitioners P411,769,168.32. We concluded then that these circumstances refuted

the petitioners assertion of unreasonable delay on the part of the LBP.

A re-evaluation of the circumstances of this case and the parties arguments,

viewed in light of the just compensation requirement in the exercise of the States

inherent power of eminent domain, compels us to re-examine our findings and

conclusions.

Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for public

use.[3] It is an inherent power of State as it is a power necessary for the States

existence; it is a power the State cannot do without.[4]As an inherent power, it does

not need at all to be embodied in the Constitution; if it is mentioned at all, it issolely for purposes of limiting what is otherwise an unlimited power. The

limitation is found in the Bill of Rights[5] that part of the Constitution whose

provisions all aim at the protection of individuals against the excessive exercise of

governmental powers.

Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (which reads No private

property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.) provides two

essential limitations to the power of eminent domain, namely, that (1) the purpose

of taking must be for public useand (2)just compensation must be given to the

owner of the private property.

It is not accidental that Section 9 specifies that compensation should be

just as the safeguard is there to ensure a balance property is not to be taken for

public use at the expense of private interests; the public, through the State, must
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balance the injury that the taking of property causes through compensation for

what is taken, value for value.

Nor is it accidental that the Bill of Rights is interpreted liberally in favor of

the individual and strictly against the government. The protection of the individualis the reason for the Bill of Rights being; to keep the exercise of the powers of

government within reasonable bounds is what it seeks.[6]

The concept of just compensation is not new to Philippine constitutional

law,[7]but is not original to the Philippines; it is a transplant from the American

Constitution.[8]It found fertile application in this country particularly in the area of

agrarian reform where the taking of private property for distribution to landless

farmers has been equated to the public use that the Constitutionrequires. InLand Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla,[9]a valuation case under our

agrarian reform law, this Court had occasion to state:

Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market

value of the property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open

market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair

value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires to

sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just

compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property takenfrom its owner by the expropriator.It has been repeatedly stressed by this

Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word"just" is used to modify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the

idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real,substantial, full and ample.

[10][Emphasis supplied.]

In the present case, while the DAR initially valued the petitioners

landholdings at a total of P251,379,104.02,[11]the RTC, acting as a special agrarian

court, determined the actual value of the petitioners landholdings to

be P1,383,179,000.00. This valuation, a finding of fact, has subsequently been

affirmed by this Court, and is now beyond question.In eminent domain terms, thisamount is the real, substantial, full and ample compensation the government

must pay to be just to the landowners.

Significantly, this final judicial valuation is far removed from the initial

valuation made by the DAR; their values differ by P1,131,799,897.00in itself a
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very substantial sum that is roughly four times the original DAR valuation. We

mention these valuations as they indicate to us how undervalued the petitioners

lands had been at the start, particularly at the time the petitioners landholdings

were taken.This reason apparently compelled the petitioners to relentlessly

pursue their valuation claims all they way up to the level of this Court.

While the LBP deposited the total amount of P71,891,256.62 into the

petitioners accounts (P26,409,549.86 for AFC and P45,481,706.76 for HPI) at the

time the landholdings were taken, these amounts were mere partial payments that

only amounted to 5% of the P1,383,179,000.00 actual value of the expropriated

properties. We point this aspect out to show that the initial payments made by the

LBP when the petitioners landholdings were taken, although promptly withdrawn

by the petitioners, could not by any means be considered a fair exchange of valuesat the time of taking; in fact, the LBPs actual deposit could not be said to be

substantial even from the original LBP valuation ofP251,379,103.90.

Thus, the deposits might have been sufficient for purposes of the immediate

taking of the landholdings but cannot be claimed as amounts that would excuse the

LBPfrom the payment of interest on the unpaid balanceof the compensation due.

As discussed at length below, they were not enough to compensate the petitioners

for the potential income the landholdings could have earned for them if no

immediate taking had taken place. Under the circumstances, the State actedoppressively and was far from just in their position to deny the pe titioners of the

potential income that the immediate taking of their properties entailed.

Just Compensation fr om the

Pri sm of the Element of Taking.

Apart from the requirement that compensation for expropriated land must be

fair and reasonable, compensation, to be just, must also be made without

delay.[12]Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" if the

property is immediately takenas the property owner suffers the immediate

deprivation of both his land and its fruits or income.

This is the principle at the core of the present case where the petitioners

were made to wait for more than a decade after the taking of their propertybefore
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they actually received the full amount of the principalof the just compensation due

them.[13]What they have not received to date is the income of their

landholdings corresponding to what they would have received had no

uncompensated taking of these lands been immediately made.This income, in

terms of the interest on the unpaid principal, is the subject of the currentlitigation.

We recognized inRepublic v. Court of Appeals[14]the need for prompt

payment and the necessity of the payment of interest to compensate for any delay

in the payment of compensation for property already taken. We ruled in this case

that:

The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be

the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to bethe price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of

legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one whoreceives, and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking by

the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation

is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case,the final

compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from

the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid

or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and

the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a

position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the

taking occurred.[15]

[Emphasis supplied.]

Aside from this ruling,Republic notably overturned the Courts previous

ruling inNational Power Corporation v. Angas[16]which held that just

compensation due for expropriated properties is not a loan or forbearance of

money but indemnity for damages for the delay in payment; since the interest

involved is in the nature of damages rather than earnings from loans, then Art.

2209 of the Civil Code, which fixes legal interest at 6%, shall apply.

InRepublic, the Court recognized that the just compensation due to the

landowners for their expropriated property amounted to an effective

forbearance on the part of the State. Applying theEastern Shipping

Linesruling,[17]the Court fixed the applicable interest rate at 12% per annum,

computed from the time the property was taken until the full amount of just
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compensation was paid, in order to eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation

and inflation of the value of the currency over time. In the Courts own words:

The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing

interest[s] on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time

petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and took the property inSeptember 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the

value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective

forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the

constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over

time.[18]


We subsequently upheldRepublics12% per annum interest rate on the

unpaid expropriation compensation in the following cases:Reyes v. National

Housing Authority,[19]Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[20]Republic v.

Court of Appeals,[21]Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,[22]Philippine Ports

Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc,[23]and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.[24]

These were the established rulings that stood before this Court issued the

currently assailed Resolution of December 4, 2009. These would be the rulings

this Court shall reverse and de-establish if we maintain and affirm our ruling

deleting the 12% interest on the unpaid balance of compensation due for

properties already taken.

Under the circumstances of the present case, we see no compelling reason to

depart from the rule thatRepublic firmly established. Let it be remembered that

shorn of its eminent domain and social justice aspects, what the agrarian land

reform program involves is the purchaseby the government, through the LBP, of

agricultural lands for sale and distribution to farmers. As a purchase, it involves an

exchange of values the landholdings in exchange for the LBPs payment. In

determining the just compensation for this exchange, however, the measure to

be borne in mind is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss[25]

since what is

involved is the takeover of private property under the States coercive

power. As mentioned above, in the value-for-value exchange in an eminent

domain situation, the State must ensure that the individual whose property is taken

is not shortchanged and must hence carry the burden of showing that the just

compensation requirement of the Bill of Rights is satisfied.
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The owners loss, of course, is not only his property but also its income-

generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value

must immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the

potential income lost. The just compensation is made available to the property

owner so that he may derive income from this compensation, in the same mannerthat he would have derived income from his expropriated property. If full

compensation is not paid for property taken, then the State must make up for the

shortfall in the earning potential immediately lost due to the taking, and the

absence of replacement property from which income can be derived; interest on the

unpaid compensation becomes due as compliance with the constitutional mandate

on eminent domain and as a basic measure of fairness.

In the context of this case, when the LBP took the petitioners landholdingswithout the corresponding full payment, it became liable to the petitioners for the

income the landholdings would have earned had they not immediately been taken

from the petitioners. What is interesting in this interplay, under the developments

of this case, is that the LBP,by taking landholdings without ful l payment whi le

holding on at the same time to the interest that i t should have paid, ef fectively

used or retained funds that should go to the landowners and thereby took

advantage of these funds for its own account.

From this point of view, the December 19, 2007 Resolution deleting theaward of 12% interest is not only patently and legally wrong, but is also morally

unconscionable for being grossly unfair and unjust. If the interest on the just

compensation due in reality the equivalent of the fruits or income of the

landholdings would have yielded had these lands not been taken would be

denied, the result is effectively a confiscatory action by this Court in favor of the

LBP. We would be allowing the LBP, for twelve long years, to have free use of the

interest that should have gone to the landowners. Otherwise stated, if we continue

to deny the petitioners present motion for reconsideration, we would illogically and without much thought to the fairness that the situation

demands uphold the interests of the LBP, not only at the expense of the

landowners but also that of substantial justice as well.

Lest this Court be a party to this monumental unfairness in a social program

aimed at fostering balance in our society, we now have to ring the bell that we have


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muted in the past, and formally declare that the LBPs position is legally and

morally wrong. To do less than this is to leave the demands of the constitutional

just compensation standard (in terms of law) and of our own conscience (in terms

of morality) wanting and unsatisfied.

The Delay in Payment I ssue

Separately from the demandability of interest because of the failure to fully

pay for property already taken, a recurring issue in the case is the attribution of the

delay.

That delay in payment occurred is not and cannot at all be disputed. While

the LBP claimed that it made initial payments of P411,769,168.32 (out of the

principal sum due of P1,383,179,000.00), the undisputed fact is that the

petitioners were deprived of their lands on December 9, 1996 (when titles to

their landholdings were cancelled and transferred to the Republic of the

Philippines), and receivedfull payment of the principal amount due them only

on May 9, 2008.

In the interim, they received no income from their landholdings because

these landholdings had been taken. Nor did they receive adequate income from

what should replace the income potential of their landholdings because the LBPrefused to pay interest while withholding the full amount of the principal of the just

compensation due by claiming a grossly low valuation. This sad state continued

for more than a decade. In any language and by any measure, a lengthy delay in

payment occurred.

An important starting point in considering attribution for the delay is that

the petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their landholdings to the

governments land reform program; they themselves submitted their Voluntary

Offer to Sell applications to the DAR, and they fully cooperated with the

governments program. The present case therefore is not one where substantial

conflict arose on the issue of whether expropriation is proper; the petitioners

voluntarily submitted to expropriation and surrendered their landholdings, although

they contested the valuation that the government made.


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Presumably, had the landholdings been properly valued, the petitioners

would have accepted the payment of just compensation and there would have been

no need for them to go to the extent of filing a valuation case. But, as borne by the

records, the petitioners lands were grossly undervalued by the DAR, leaving the

petitioners with no choice but to file actions to secure what is justly due them.

The DARs initial gross undervaluation started the cycle of court actions that

followed, where the LBP eventually claimed that it could not be faulted for seeking

judicial recourse to defend the governments and its own interests in light of the

petitioners valuation claims. This LBP claim, of course, conveniently forgets that

at the root of all these valuation claims and counterclaims was the initial gross

undervaluation by DAR that the LBP stoutly defended. At the end, this

undervaluation was proven incorrect by no less than this Court; the petitionerswere proven correct in their claim, and the correct valuation more than five-fold

the initial DAR valuationwas decreed and became final.

All these developments cannot now be disregarded and reduced to

insignificance. In blunter terms, the government and the LBP cannot now be heard

to claim that they were simply protecting their interests when they stubbornly

defended their undervalued positions before the courts. The more apt and accurate

statement is that they adopted a grossly unreasonable position and the adverse

developments that followed, particularly the concomitant delay, should be directlychargeable to them.

To be sure, the petitioners were not completely correct in the legal steps they

took in their valuation claims. They initially filed their valuation claim before the

DARAB instead of immediately seeking judicial intervention. The DARAB,

however, contributed its share to the petitioners error when it failed or refused to

act on the valuation petitions for more than three (3) years. Thus, on top of the

DAR undervaluation was the DARAB inaction after the petitioners landholdingshad been taken. This Courts Decision of February 6, 2007 duly noted this and

observed:

It is not controverted that this case started way back on 12 October 1995,

when AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. In view

of the failure of the parties to agree on the valuation of the properties, theComplaint for Determination of Just Compensation was filed before the DARAB


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on 14 February 1997. Despite the lapse of more than three years from the filing

of the complaint, the DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation of the

land. Meantime, the titles over the properties of AFC and HPI had already beencancelled and in their place a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the

Republic of the Philippines, even as far back as 9 December 1996. A period of

almost 10 years has lapsed. For this reason, there is no dispute that this case hastruly languished for a long period of time, the delay being mainly attributable toboth official inaction and indecision, particularly on the determination of the

amount of just compensation, to the detriment of AFC and HPI, which to date,

have yet to be fully compensated for the properties which are already in the handsof farmer-beneficiaries, who, due to the lapse of time, may have already

converted or sold the land awarded to them.

Verily, these two cases could have been disposed with dispatch were it

not for LBPs counsel causing unnecessary delay. At the inception of this case,

DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was commissioned by law to determine

just compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFCand HPI filed the cases before the RTC. We underscore the pronouncement of the

RTC that the delay by DARAB in the determination of just compensation

could only mean the reluctance of the Department of Agrarian Reform and

the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the claim of just compensation by

corporate landowners.

To allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave them empty-handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly

oppressive. [Emphasis supplied.]

These statements cannot but be true today as they were when we originallydecided the case and awarded 12% interest on the balance of the just compensation

due. While the petitioners were undisputedly mistaken in initially seeking recourse

through the DAR, this agency itselfhence, the governmentcommitted a graver

transgression when it failed to act at all on the petitioners complaints for

determination of just compensation.

In sum, in a balancing of the attendant delay-related circumstances of this

case, delay should be laid at the doorsteps of the government, not at the

petitioners. We conclude, too, that the government should not be allowed to

exculpate itself from this delay and should suffer all the consequences the delay

caused.

The LBPs arguments on the applicability

of cases imposing


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12% interest

The LBP claims in its Comment that our rulings inRepublic v. Court of

Appeals,[26]Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[27]andLand Bank of the

Philippines v. Imperial,[28]

cannot be applied to the present case.

According to the LBP,Republicis inapplicable because,first, the

landowners inRepublicremained unpaid, notwithstanding the fact that the award

for just compensation had already been fixed by final judgment; in the present

case, the Court already acknowledged that pertinent amounts were deposited in

favor of the landowners within 14 months from the filing of their

complaint. Second, whileRepublicinvolved an ordinary expropriation case, the

present case involves expropriation for agrarian reform.Finally, the just

compensation inRepublicremained unpaid notwithstanding the finality of

judgment, while the just compensation in the present case was immediately paid in

full after LBP received a copy of the Courts resolution

We find no merit in these assertions.

As we discussed above, the pertinent amounts allegedly deposited by LBP

were mere partial payments that amounted to a measly 5% of the actual value of

the properties expropriated. They could be the basis for the immediate taking of theexpropriated property but by no stretch of the imagination can these nominal

amounts be considered pertinent enough to satisfy the full requirement of just

compensationi.e.,the full and fair equivalent of the expropriated property, taking

into account its income potential and the foregone income lost because of the

immediate taking.

We likewise find no basis to support the LBPs theory that Republicand the

present case have to be treated differently because the first involves a regular

expropriation case, while the present case involves expropriation pursuant to the

countrys agrarian reform program. In both cases, the power of eminent domain

was used and private property was taken for public use. Why one should be

different from the other, so that the just compensation ruling in one should not

apply to the other, truly escapes us. If there is to be a difference, the treatment of
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agrarian reform expropriations should be stricter and on a higher plane because of

the governments societal concerns and objectives. To be sure, the government

cannot attempt to remedy the ills of one sector of society by sacrificing the

interests of others within the same society.

Finally, we note that the finality of the decision (that fixed the value of just

compensation) inRepublicwas not a material consideration for the Court in

awarding the landowners 12% interest. The Court, inRepublic, simply affirmed the

RTC ruling imposing legal interest on the amount of just compensation due. In the

process, the Court determined that the legal interest should be 12% after

recognizing that the just compensation due was effectively a forbearance on the

part of the government. Had the finality of the judgment been the critical factor,

then the 12% interest should have been imposed from the time the RTC decisionfixing just compensation became final. Instead, the 12% interest was imposed

from the time that theRepubliccommenced condemnation proceedings and took

the property.

The LBP additionally asserts that the petitioners erroneously relied on the

ruling inReyes v. National Housing Authority. The LBP claims that we cannot

applyReyesbecause it involved just compensation that remained unpaid despite the

finality of the expropriation decision. LBPs point of distinction is that just

compensation was immediately paid in the present case upon the Courtsdetermination of the actual value of the expropriated properties. LBP claims, too,

that inReyes, the Court established that the refusal of the NHA to pay just

compensation was unfounded and unjustified, whereas the LBP in the present case

clearly demonstrated its willingness to pay just compensation. Lastly, inReyes, the

records showed that there was an outstanding balance that ought to be paid, while

the element of an outstanding balance is absent in the present case.

Contrary to the LBPs opinion, the imposition of the 12% interestinReyesdid not depend on either the finality of the decision of the expropriation

court, or on the finding that the NHAs refusal to pay just compensation was

unfounded and unjustified. Quite clearly, the Court imposed 12% interest based on

the ruling inRepublic v. Court of Appealsthat x x x if property is taken for

public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over

the case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on i ts just value to be


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computed from the time the proper ty is taken to the time when compensation i s

actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the

property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the

owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before

the taking occurred.[29] This is the same legal principle applicable to the presentcase, as discussed above.

While the LBP immediately paid the remaining balance on the just

compensation due to the petitioners after this Court had fixed the value of the

expropriated properties, it overlooks one essential fact from the time that the

State took the petitioners properties until the time that the petitioners were fully

paid, almost 12 long years passed. This is the rationale for imposing the 12%

interest in order to compensate the petitioners for the income they would havemade had they been properly compensated for their properties at the time of the

taking.

Finally, the LBP insists that the petitioners quoted our ruling inLand Bank

of the Philippines v. Imperial out of context. According to the LBP, the Court

imposed legal interest of 12% per annum only after December 31, 2006, the date

when the decision on just compensation became final.

The LBP is again mistaken. TheImperialcase involved land that wasexpropriated pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27,[30]and fell under the coverage

of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 13.[31]This AO provided for the payment

of a 6% annual interest if there is any delay in payment of just compensation.

However,Imperialwas decided in 2007 and AO No. 13 was only effective up to

December 2006. Thus, the Court, relying on our ruling in theRepubliccase,

applied the prevailing 12% interest ruling to the period when the just compensation

remained unpaid after December 2006. It is for this reason that December 31, 2006

was important, not because it was the date of finality of the decision on justcompensation.

The 12% I nterest Rate and

the Chico-Nazario Dissent
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To fully reflect the concerns raised in this Courts deliberations on the

present case, we feel it appropriate to discuss the Justice Minita Chico-Nazarios

dissent from the Courts December 4, 2009 Resolution.

While Justice Chico-Nazario admitted that the petitioners were entitled tothe 12% interest, she saw it appropriate to equitably reduce the interest charges

fromP1,331,124,223.05 to P400,000,000.00. In support of this proposal, she

enumerated various cases where the Court, pursuant to Article 1229 of the Civil

Code,[32]equitably reduced interest charges.

We differ with our esteemed colleagues views on the application of equity.

While we have equitably reduced the amount of interest awarded innumerous cases in the past, those cases involved interest that was essentially

consensual in nature, i.e., interest stipulated in signed agreements between the

contracting parties. In contrast, the interest involved in the present case runs as

a matter of lawand follows as a matter of course from the right of the landowner

to be placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the date of

taking.[33]

Furthermore, the allegedly considerable payments made by the LBP to the

petitioners cannot be a proper premise in denying the landowners the interest duethem under the law and established jurisprudence. If the just compensation for

the landholdings is considerable, this compensation is not undue because the

landholdings the owners gave up in exchange are also similarly considerable

AFC gave up an aggregate landholding of 640.3483 hectares, while HPIs gave

up 805.5308 hectares. When the petitioners surrendered these sizeable

landholdings to the government, the incomes they gave up were likewise sizeable

and cannot in any way be considered miniscule. The incomes due from these

properties, expressed as interest, are what the government should return to thepetitioners after the government took over their lands without full payment of just

compensation. In other words, the value of the landholdings themselves should be

equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due; interest is due and

should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal sum af ter

taking has been completed.This is the compensation arrangement that should
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prevail if such compensation is to satisfy the constitutional standard of being

just.

Neither can LBPs payment of the full compensation due before the finality

of the judgment of this Court justify the reduction of the interest due them. To ruleotherwise would be to forget that the petitioners had to wait twelve years from the

time they gave up their lands before the government fully paid the principal of the

just compensation due them. These were twelve years when they had no income

from their landholdings because these landholdings have immediately been taken;

no income, or inadequate income, accrued to them from the proceeds of

compensation payment due them because full payment has been withheld by

government.

If the full payment of the principal sum of the just compensation is legally

significant at all under the circumstances of this case, the significance is only in

putting a stop to the running of the interest due because the principal of the just

compensation due has been paid. To close our eyes to these realities is to condone

what is effectively a confiscatory action in favor of the LBP.

That the legal interest due is now almost equivalent to the principal to be

paid is notper se an inequitable or unconscionable situation, considering the length

of time the interest has remained unpaid almost twelve long years. From theperspective of interest income, twelve years would have been sufficient for the

petitioners to double the principal, even if invested conservatively, had they been

promptly paid the principal of the just compensation due them. Moreover, the

interest, however enormous it may be,cannot be inequitable and unconscionable

because it resulted directly from the application of law and jurisprudence

standards that have taken into account fairness and equity in setting the interest

rates due for the use or forebearance of money.

If the LBP sees the total interest due to be immense, it only has itself to

blame, as this interest piled up because it unreasonably acted in its valuation of the

landholdings and consequently failed to promptly pay the petitioners. To be sure,

the consequences of this failurei.e., the enormity of the total interest due and the

alleged financial hemorrhage the LBP may suffer should not be the very reason

that would excuse it from full compliance. To so rule is to use extremely flawed


21/30

logic. To so rule is to disregard the question of how the LBP, a government

financial institution that now professes difficulty in paying interest at 12% per

annum, managed the funds that it failed to pay the petitioners for twelve long

years.

It would be utterly fallacious, too, to argue that this Court should tread

lightly in imposing liabilities on the LBP because this bank represents the

government and, ultimately, the public interest. Suffice it to say that public interest

refers to what will benefit the public, not necessarily the government and its

agencies whose task is to contribute to the benefit of the public. Greater public

benefit will result if government agencies like the LBP are conscientious in

undertaking its tasks in order to avoid the situation facing it in this case. Greater

public interest would be served if it can contribute to the credibility of thegovernments land reform program through the conscientious handling of its

part of this program.

As our last point, equity and equitable principles only come into full play

when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.[34] As we have shown above,

established rulings of this Court are in place for full application to the present

case. There is thus no occasion for the equitable consideration that Justice Chico-

Nazario suggested.

The Amount Due the Peti tioners as Just

Compensation

As borne by the records, the 12% interest claimed is only on the difference

between the price of the expropriated lands (determined with finality to

be P1,383,179,000.00) and the amount of P411,769,168.32 already paid to the

petitioners. The difference between these figures amounts to the remaining balance

of P971,409,831.68 that was only paid on May 9, 2008.

As above discussed, this amount should bear interest at the rate of 12%

per annum from the time the petitioners properties were taken on December

9, 1996 up to the time of payment. At this rate, the LBP now owes the petitioners


22/30


23/30

x x x Phrased elsewise, a final and executory judgment can no longer be

attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the

highest court of the land.

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial

justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property,(b) theexistence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case,(d)a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by

the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is

merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustlyprejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to

facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which wouldresult in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial

justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this

principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive andcompelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be

final.[48]


That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not

hard to discern from these discussions. A constitutional limitation, guaranteed

under no less than the all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can

compensation in an eminent domain be just when the payment for the

compensation for property already taken has been unreasonably delayed? To

claim, as the assailed Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in thiscase is to forget that an expropriation involves the government as a necessary

actor. It forgets, too, that under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or

standards apply to government who carries the burden of showing that these

standards have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss this case as a private interest

matter is an extremely shortsighted view that this Court should not leave

uncorrected.

As duly noted in the above discussions, this issue is not one of first

impression in our jurisdiction; the consequences of delay in the payment of justcompensation have been settled by this Court in past rulings. Our settled

jurisprudence on the issue alone accords this case primary importance as a contrary

ruling would unsettle, on the flimsiest of grounds, all the rulings we have

established in the past.


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More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of

transcendental importance to the nation because of the subject matter involved

agrarian reform, a societal objective that the government has unceasingly sought to

achieve in the past half century. This reform program and its objectives would

suffer a major setback if the government falters or is seen to be faltering, wittinglyor unwittingly, through lack of good faith in implementing the needed

reforms. Truly, agrarian reform is so important to the national agenda that the

Solicitor General, no less, pointedly linked agricultural lands, its ownership and

abuse, to the idea of revolution.[49] This linkage, to our mind, remains valid even if

the landowner, not the landless farmer, is at the receiving end of the distortion of

the agrarian reform program.

As we have ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not be applied in avery rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not

override, substantial justice.[50]As we explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals:[51]

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as

mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid

application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than

promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Courtreflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so

pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already

declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.

x x x x

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every partylitigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,

free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has

consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to overridesubstantial justice.

[52][Emphasis supplied.]

Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[53]we had occasion to state:

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines

in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it,for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of

judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always

been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the

balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the

other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of

Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation.[54]

[Emphasissupplied.]
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We made the same recognition inBarnes,[55]on the underlying premise that

a courts primordial and most important duty is to render justice; in discharging the

duty to render substantial justice, it is permitted to re-examine even a final andexecutory judgment.

Based on all these considerations, particularly the patently illegal and

erroneous conclusion that the petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest, we find

that we are duty-bound to re-examine and overturn the assailed Resolution. We

shall completely and inexcusably be remiss in our duty as defenders of justice if,

given the chance to make the rectification, we shall let the opportunity pass.

Attorneys Fees

We are fully aware that the RTC has awarded the petitioners attorneys fees

when it fixed the just compensation due and decreed that interest of 12% should bepaid on the balance outstanding after the taking of the petitioners landholdings

took place. The petitioners, however, have not raised the award of attorneys feesas an issue in the present motion for reconsideration. For this reason, we shall not

touch on this issue at all in this Resolution.

WHEREFORE,premises considered, we GRANTthe petitioners motionfor reconsideration. The CourtEn Bancs Resolution dated December 4, 2009, as

well as the Third Divisions Resolutions dated April 30, 2008 and December 19,

2007, are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.

The respondent Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ORDERED to pay

petitioners Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. interest at the rate of

12% per annum on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, computed from

the date the Government took the properties on December 9, 1996, until the

respondent Land Bank of the Philippines paid on May 9, 2008 the balance on the

principal amount.

Unless the parties agree to a shorter payment period, payment shall be in

monthly installments at the rate of P60,000,000.00 per month until the whole

amount owing, including interest on the outstanding balance, is fully paid.


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Costs against the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

(on wellness leave)

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROAssociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO

MORALESAssociate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice

(on leave)

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA


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LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice

(on wellness leave)

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZAssociate Justice

Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOAssociate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOAssociate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certifiedthat the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation

before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA


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Chief

Justice

On wellness leave.On leave.On wellness leave.[1] While the petitioners owned a total of 1,454.8791 hectares based on the landholdings stated in this Courts

February 6, 2007 Decision, the RTC, in its decision, fixed just compensation for 1,388.6027 hectares of land.[2] Retired from the Court on December 5, 2009.[3] SeeMasikip v. City of Pasig,G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 391,citingVisayan Refining Co. v.

Camus, 40 Phil. 550, 558-559 (1919).[4] SeeManapat v. Court of Appeals,G.R. Nos. 110478, 116176 and 116491-503, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 32.[5] SeeHeirs of Alberto Saguitan v. City ofMandaluyong, G.R. No. 135087, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 137.[6] Id., citingCity of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila , 40 Phil. 349 (1919).[7] The authority to exercise the power of eminent domain was expressly conferred to the Philippine Government

through Section 63 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, which states:

That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, subject to the limitations and

conditions prescribed in this Act, to acquire, require, hold, maintain, and convey title to real and

personal property, and may acquire real estate for public uses by the exercise of the right of

eminent domain. (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.)

Section 74 of the same law, which deals with the authority of the Philippine Government to grant franchises and

concessions, provides:

That the Government of the Philippine Islands may grant franchises, privileges, and concessions,

including theauthority to exercise the right of eminent domainfor the construction and

operation of works of public utility and service x x x: Provided, That no private property shallbe taken for any purpose under this section without just compensation paid or tendered

thereforx x x.

More specifically, Section 3 of the Jones Act (of 1916) provides that [p]rivate property shall not be taken for

public use without just compensation.

SeeVisayan Refining Co. v. Camus,supranote 3.[8] We derived the concept of just compensation from the last clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, which reads: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless

on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the

Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same

offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;nor shall privateproperty be taken for public use, without just compensation.

The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the government from taking its citizens' property; rather, it merely

prohibits the government from taking property without paying just compensation. (26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent

Domain 3, citingDiamond Bar Cattle Co. v. U.S., 168 F.3d 1209 [10th Cir. 1999].) It is designed to secure

compensation, not to limit governmental interference with property rights. (Id., citingPreseault v. I.C.C.,494U.S.1, 110 S. Ct. 914, 108 L. Ed. 2d 1 [1990].) It prevents the legislature (and other government actors) fromdepriving private persons of vested property rights except for a "public use" and upon payment of "just
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compensation."(Id., citingLandgraf v. USI Film Products, 511U.S.244, 114S. Ct.1522, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229[1994].)

[9] G.R. No. 157206, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 102, 116-117.[10]Id.[11]P86,900,925.88 for the land of AFC andP164,478,178.14 for HPI.[12]Land Bank v. Rodriguez,G.R. No. 148892, May 6, 2010.[13]Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla,supranote 9, at 117.[14]G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 611.[15]Id. at 622-623.[16]G. R. Nos. 60225-26, May 8, 1992,208 SCRA 542.[17]InEastern Shipping Lines, Inc.v.Court of Appeals(G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78), we said:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money,i.e., aloan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in

writing.Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially

demanded.In the absence of stipulation,the rate of interest shall be 12%per annumto be

computed from default,i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the

provisions of Article 1169of the Civil Code.2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on

the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the courtat the rate of

6%per annum.No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except

when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.Accordingly, where the

demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the

claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot

be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only

from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may

be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal

interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate

of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% perannumfrom such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then anequivalent to a forbearance of credit.

[18]Supranote 12.[19]G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003,395 SCRA 494.[20]G.R. No. 140160, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 67.[21]G.R. No. 147245, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 516.[22]G.R. No. 157753, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 449.[23]G.R. No. 173392, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 198.[24]G.R. No. 154211-12, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 214.[25]Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467;J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, No. L-

21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413;Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, No. L-35861, October 18,1979, 93 SCRA 503;Manotok v. National Housing Authority, No. L-55166, May 21, 1987, 150 SCRA 89.

[26]Supranote 14.[27]Supranote 19.[28]Supranote 22.[29]Supranote 14.[30]Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to Them the Ownership of the

Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanisms Therefor.
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[31]Rules and Regulations Governing the Grant of Increment of Six Percent (6%) Yearly Interest Compounded

Annually on Lands Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228(Effective October 21,1994). Amended by DAR AO No. 02, series of 2004 (Issued on November 4, 2004).

[32]Article 1229 states: The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partlyor irregularly complied with by the debtor.

[33]Republic v. Juan,G.R. No. L-24740, July 30, 1979,92 SCRA 26; citing 30 CJS 230.

[34]SeeParent-Teachers Association of St. Mathew Christian Academy v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co .,G.R.

No. 176518, March 2, 2010, citingTirazona v. Philippine EDS Techno-Service, Inc. (PET, Inc.),G.R. No.169712, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 625, 626.

[35]Rollo, p. 1337.[36]Equitable Banking Corp. v. Sadac, G.R. No. 164772, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 380, 416-417.[37] G.R. No. 82467, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 510.[38] G.R. No. L-72670, September 12, 1986, 144 SCRA 43.[39] G.R. No. L-63318, August 18, 1984, 131 SCRA 200.[40] G.R. No. L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422.[41] G.R. No. L-58011, November 18, 1983, 125 SCRA 577.[42]

G.R No. L-64276, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 396.[43] G.R. No. L-18452, May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 207.[44] G.R. No. 125451, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 741.[45] 434 Phil. 753 (2002).[46] G.R. No. 162335, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468.[47] 482 Phil. 903 (2004).[48]Id. at 915.[49]Oral arguments at the Supreme Court,Hacienda Luisitacase, G.R. No. 171101, August 26, 2010.[50]Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43511, July 28, 1976, 72 SCRA 121;Mc Entee v. Manotoc, G.R. No.

L-14968, October 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 279;Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-40098, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA441.

[51]

G.R. No. 127596, September 24, 1998, 292 SCRA 38.[52]Id.at 51-52.[53]326 Phil. 182 (1996).[54]Id.at 191.[55]Supranote 47.
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