Additional Cases POLI Atty Marian

7/28/2019 Additional Cases POLI Atty Marian

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.

D E C I S I O NPURISIMA,J.:

This is a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections inSPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, againstprivate respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses,Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian.In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.

On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church inManila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as acandidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental.In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent,Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her allegedAustralian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippinecitizenship, the Commission on Elections en bancdismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:

"A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that respondent was ableto produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship o f her late father... and consequently, prove her owncitizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to thecontrary notwithstanding.

On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other evidence substantial innature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner th at respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino.Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is anequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequence. The evidence adduced bypetitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipinocitizenship".1

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao

Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95 -066 beforethe COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citi zenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed bythe COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governorof Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, CiriloValles, in SPA No. 98-336.

On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition, anddisposing as follows:

"Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant case on the merits tryingit de novo, the above table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to disturb theResolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066 . The present petition merely restates the same matters andincidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the Resolution ofEPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in characteror sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows asa matter of course.

x x x x x x x x x

"WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues tendered, We find no

convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and reverse t he Resolutions promulgated by thisCommission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES toDISMISS the present petition.

SO ORDERED."2

Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same wasdenied by the COMELEC in its en bancResolution of January 15, 1999.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court viathe present petition; questioning the citizenship of privaterespondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.

The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen andtherefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by

virtue of the principle ofjus sanguinisshe was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) shewas married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jureunder Section 4 of CommonwealthAct 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department ofImmigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified toby the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Fili pino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position ofDavao Oriental governor.

Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance onthe admitted facts that:

a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australiannational and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), andc) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.

Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had renounced herFilipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrantcertificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject ofAustralia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run forelective office.

As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship on January15, 1992 before the Department of I mmigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passportcancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that
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the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According topetitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatoryrequirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public office didnot mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated.Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become astateless person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.

Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle ofres judicatato thecase under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,3that:

"xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,

whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generallynot considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.xxx"

The petition is unmeritorious.

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle ofjus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows thenationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctri ne ofjussoliwhich determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of pl ace of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, WesternAustralia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and TheresaMarquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at thattime, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United

States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act ofAugust 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Billof 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:

SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Phili ppine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the

eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their

children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as suchentitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to pr eserve their allegiance to theCrown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spainsigned at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)

The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:

SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,

eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto,shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preservetheir allegiance to the Crown of Spain i n accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between theUnited States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety -eight, and except suchothers as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, hereinprovided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine cit izenship by those nativesof the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessionsof the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the Uni ted

States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.(underscoring ours)

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 andresided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father,Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certifiedtrue copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in forceat the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise acitizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle ofjus sanguinisas basis forthe acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of thisConstitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, electPhilippine citizenship.(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

So also, the principle ofjus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequentlyretained under the 19734and 19875Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez,is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is nottantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle ofjussoli, then at most,private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citi zen, she hasnonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited privaterespondents application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence(ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may l ose his citizenship:

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constituti on or laws of a foreign countryupon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;

(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in timeof war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in herhusbands country, she acquires his nationality.

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioners contentionthat the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, isbereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case ofAznar vs. COMELEC6and in the more recent caseofMercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.7
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In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificatestating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an aliencertificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

And, inMercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered asan American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport onApril 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertionsof his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.

Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport andhad an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituti ng an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not

militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in t he loss of citizenship,the same must be express.8As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an aliencertificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship. Theapplication of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of anAustralian passport, as in the case ofMercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenshipbefore she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she wasan Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another countryhas not been included as a ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose orrenounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent must go through the process ofrepatriation does not hold water.

Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she isdisqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known asthe Local Government Code of 1991, which states:

"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

x x x x x x x x x(d) Those with dual citizenship;

x x x x x x x x x

Again, petitioners contention is untenable.

In the aforecited case ofMercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the LocalGovernment Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dualallegiance.9Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as aninvoluntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the

Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Courtsuccinctly pronounced:

"xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understoodas referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under thisdisqualification."

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from runningfor a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect

Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons withdual citizenship.10The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectivelyremoving any disqualification as a dual citizen.11This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declaresthat he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the P hilippines andwill maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effectiverenunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein pri vate respondent filed her certificate ofcandidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration ofRenunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs ofAustralia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent

was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. Asaptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dualcitizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioners claim that priv aterespondent must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.

Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings,the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicatain any subsequent proceeding challengingthe same; citing the case ofMoy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration.12He insists that the same issue ofcitizenship may be threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle ofres judicatagenerally does notapply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case ofBurca vs. Republic,13an exception to thisgeneral rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicatamay beapplied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case ofMoy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight ofprior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent officialfindings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler.14Indeed, there appears sufficient basis torely on the prior rul ings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved theissue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantiallythe same evidence presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or superveningevent to warrant a reversal of such prior resoluti ons. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, consideredon the merits, the petition cannot prosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 andJanuary 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental.No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs.EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor ofthe City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of theelection were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed bya certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a ci tizen of the Philippines but of theUnited States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamariland ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dualcitizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified fromrunning for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano ascandidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in t he May 11, 1998 elections. The petiti on is based on theground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigrat ion andmisrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, t he respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreignerwith the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is aFilipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in theUnited States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under USLaws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is born a Filipino and a US citizen.In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed hiscertificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from runningfor any elective local position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIEDas candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 3 The motion remained pending evenuntil after the election held on May 11, 1998.

Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board ofcanvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.

On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for di squalification. 4 Petitioner's motion wasopposed by private respondent.

The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution.Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its SecondDivision and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11,1998 elections. 5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquiredUS citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father andmother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippinesusing an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the PhilippineBureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the lossof his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegianceto the United States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, andvoted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under Americanlaw. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, wasnot yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor

of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closestrival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or amargin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959 ) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fiftyfour thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err infavor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving priv ate international law whichmay well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division, adopted onMay 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of t he respondent's certificate of candidacy.

We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position ofvice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to theparties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate forvice-mayor of Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the C OMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31,1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and todeclare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vi ce mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:


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A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 yearsold; and,2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in theelections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzanois disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzanowhether petitionerMercado his personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party i n the case fordisqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC insupport of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside theruling denying his motion for intervention:

Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene.Any person allowed to initiate an action orproceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in itsdiscretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in thesuccess of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected bysuch action or proceeding.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission.In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commissionor the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delayor prejudice the adjudication of the r ights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights may befully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest toprotect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] c annot beproclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final andexecutory judgment."

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings beforethe COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoraltycontest for Makati City, on the basis of which petit ioner came out only second to priv ate respondent. The fact,

however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest inousting private respondent from the race at the t ime he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, 6reiterated in several cases, 7 only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and thequestion is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In thepresent case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there hadbeen no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondentdisqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril(who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a r egistered voter of Makati City, was competent tobring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only onMay 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among thecandidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for thedisqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the ElectoralReform Law of 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votescast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before anelection to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, theCourt or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion ofthe complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation ofsuch candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if therehas yet been no final judgment rendered.

The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was tantamount to a denialof the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc insteaddecided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motionfor intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on theground of dual citizenship.

This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and,if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government Code of1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Thosewith dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. 8

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case,contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms theineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to ho ld local elective office."

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of theconcurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered anational by the said states. 9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens ofa state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of bothstates. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes ofcitizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jussoli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father's'country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unlessby their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.


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There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also acitizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible g iven the constitutional provisions on ci tizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by somepositive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of anindividual's volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimicalto the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution atthe instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows: 10

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a

memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegi anceand I reiterate a dual allegianceis larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps,never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, Ido not question double citizenship at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem of dualallegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-ChineseChambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, aswell as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact chat the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in theLegislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland Chinain the People's Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein allof Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved afterseveral years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Fili pino-Chinese were also represented in thatOverseas Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizenswho are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Pekingor Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, includingCommissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, andespecially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our naturalresources.

Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, Ch ina or Malaysia, and this isalready happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino -owned, owned byFilipino-Chineseit is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have toendure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we askthat the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section, probablySection 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TOCITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus: 11

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense that i timplies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheelingdebate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itselfwhich implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligationsexclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it isthreatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the courseof those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision toestablish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these

naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renewtheir oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when theanniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concernabout double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty andnational security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a futurelegislature. But considering the scale of the probl em, the real impact on the securi ty of this country, arising from,let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertaina proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?

Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of t he Constitutional Commission was not withdual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of orig in evenafter their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20

must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fallunder this disqualification. Unlike those with dual all egiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict processwith respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon thefiling of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons withdual citizenship considering that their condition i s the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of differentstates. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointedout: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of t he laws on citizenship ofother countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is considered a citizen of anothercountry is something completely beyond our control." 12

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country ofwhich they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point ofview of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:13

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dualcitizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective l ocal position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President,someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippine s but his father is a foreigner i s a natural-born citizen of theRepublic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elector give up Philippine citizenship.

On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of hi s or her fatherand one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a l ocalgovernment position?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want torun for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.

SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of ori gin or the country ofthe father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the

world.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an electionfor him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.

SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under theConstitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of t he Philippines is, at birth, a ci tizen without any overt act toclaim the citizenship.


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SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's example, if he doesnot renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, thefirst thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only onecitizenship."

SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will alwayshave one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he alsoacknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.

This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to

any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before hecan be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounce, his loyalty to any othercountry or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, thecondition imposed by law is satisfied and compiled with. The determination whether such re nunciation is valid orfully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusiveprerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of theRepublic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of theChinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what ourlegislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought or i ntended toexact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazenencroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, ofFilipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States followsthe doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of theUnited States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Phili ppine elections in 1992, 1995 ,and 1998, private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he issolely a Philippine national.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely t aking part in Philippine elections is not sufficientevidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondentwas already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship, theCOMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, whichprovided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose hisnationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to

determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by theU.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreignrelations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondentelected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondent's certificate ofcandidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:

6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED")NATURAL-BORN

xxx xxx xxx

10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.

11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT ANDDEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH ANDALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREESPROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY,WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE

FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing anydisqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, i n Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held: 17

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of hisrepatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code woulddisqualify him "from running for any elective l ocal position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there iscogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and evenbefore that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced andhad long abandoned his American citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in theinterimwhen he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipinocitizenship."

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath ofallegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Everycertificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have notbeen effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic th at such findings of the Commission are conclusiveupon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in privaterespondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be effective, suchrenunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requiresthe election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in

the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his lasttravel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate ofcandidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The a cts attributed to him can be considered simply as theassertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said inAznar v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has aCertificate staring he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he isan American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied


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renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenshipmust be "express," it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there i s norenunciation, either "express" or "implied."

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanentresident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines andbear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he d oes so without mental reservation, private respondent has, asfar as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything whichhe may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact thathe has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part

in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betraythat trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation inappropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial of entry into the country ofpetitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of hisPortuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national.A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreignnationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.


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EN BANC[B.M. No. 914. October 1, 1999]RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BARVICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

R E S O L U T I O NKAPUNAN, J.: Jksm

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly electPhilippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought tobe resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, aFilipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in thePhilippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in BaguioCity, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated September1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Courtproof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional RegulationsCommission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, i ssued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission onElections (COMELEC) in Tubao, La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth E. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as amember of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful Barexaminees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because ofthe questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution ofthis Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the sameresolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petiti on foradmission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father anda Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon

reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship"1 [Citing Cu vs. Republic of the Philippines, 89Phil. 473, 476 (1951)] in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An ActProviding for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a PersonWhose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that (w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoatePhilippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority."2 [Citi ng CRUZ,Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed. p 359.] In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur inorder that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person makingthe election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made 'upon reaching the age ofmajority."3 [Citing Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 5 SCRA 108, 110 (1962)] The OSG then explains themeaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:" Chiefx

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching theage of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p.51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940) . Said period may be extended under certaincircumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos.355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after overseven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine cit izenship and, if ever he does,it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiarcircumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on theconstruction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in

accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of PhilippineCitizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 Ju ly 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:

1.......I have always considered myself as a Fi lipino;

2.......I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my s chool records and other officialdocument;

3.......I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;

4.......I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

5.......I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;

6.......I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;

7.......My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public;

8.......I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and theGovernment of the Philippines;

9.......I filed my election of Philippine citi zenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao LaUnion, and

10.I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps 10.00) as filing fees.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he haselected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by electionretroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3)of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien fatherfollowed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippinecitizenship.4 [Sec. 1. Art IV of the 1935 Constitution reads: Esm

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;


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(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of th is Constitution, hadbeen elected to public office;

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippine;

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines, and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippinecitizenship;

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.] This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized inthe 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisionsof the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines.5 [Sec. 1(1) , Article III,1973 Constitution.] Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution

which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenshipupon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens.6 [Sec 1(3), Article IV, 1987 Constitution.] It should benoted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship shouldnot be understood as having a curative effect on any i rregularity in the acquisition of ci tizenship for thosecovered by the 1935 Constitution.7 [BERNAS The constitution of the Republic of the Ph ilippines, First Ed.(1987), p. 502.] If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject tochallenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity ofthe new Constitution.8 [Ibid., citing Convention Session of November 27,1972 and noting that it is alsoapplicable to the 1987 constitution.]

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Articl e IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes theprocedure that should be followed in order to made a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention"in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administeroaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil reg istry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement

with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines." Esmsc

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election ofPhilippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "uponreaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years.9 [Art.402. Civil Code.] In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election ofPhilippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior tothe effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenshipwas, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to theeffect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority.10 [LimTeco vs. Collector of Customs, 24 SCRA 84, 88 (1912)] The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted tomean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.11 [Muoz vs.Collector of Customs, 20 SCRA 494, 498 (1911); Lorenzo vs. Collector of Customs, 15 SCRA 559 592 (1910)]However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice,12 [5 SCRA 108 (1962)] that the three (3) year period is notan inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, andthat the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenshipunder the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances,as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.13 [Id., at 110.]

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citi zenship is notindefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16,1944.His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over

seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "uponreaching the age of majority."14 [Id.]

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when hecomplied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he hadreached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercisethe privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., hiscontinuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a regi steredvoter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically laysdown the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informalelection of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare,15 [59 SCRA 45 (1974)]the pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of theright of suffrage when he cane of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has beenestablished that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when hewas about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for certaincandidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship.16 [Id., at 52.] Esmmis

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very different fromthose in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity ofthe 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribedunder the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him.Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for

Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of aFilipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Fil ipino, and no other act wouldbe necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse,29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954).Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non -Filipino divest him of the citi zenshipprivileges to which he is rightfully entitled.17 [Id.]

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House ofRepresentatives,18 [199 SCRA 692 (1991)] where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines 'election' as both a formal and an informal process.

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) the Court held that the exercise of the right of

suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positiv e act of election of Philippine citizenship. Inthe exact pronouncement of the Court we held:

"Esteban s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive act of Philippinecitizenship" (p. 52: emphasis supplied)"

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in thePhilippines.


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For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected Philippinecitizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule. Esmso

x x x

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship.For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice whi ch cannot beless binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship i s aqualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature arethemselves formal manifestations for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful

because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino whenhe turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only havebean superfluous but would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippinecitizenship?19 [Id at 707-709 (Underscoring Supplied)]

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the specialcircumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines, all his life and his consistent belief thathe is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of theOSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span Of fourteen (14)years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to electPhilippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching theage of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship.The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. Allthat is required of the elector i s to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and thereafter, file thesame with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot besimply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressedwhen convenient.20 [Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago, 169 SCRA 364, 379 (1989)] One who privileged to electPhilippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right withfervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippinecitizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admissionto the Philippine Bar. Msesm

SO ORDERED.


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EN BANC[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORALTRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.D E C I S I O NKAPUNAN, J.:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirementthat "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen."[1]

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April

27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.[2]

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted i n the United States Marine Corps and, without theconsent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, helost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Fi lipino citizen may lose hiscitizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreigncountry." Said provision of law reads:

Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his cit izenship in any of the following waysand/or events:

x x x

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, Thatthe rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, andthe taking of an oath of allegiance i ncident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall notdivest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the foll owing circumstances is present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic ofthe Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino ci tizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptanceof said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident ther eto, states that he does so only in connectionwith his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering serviceto, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned inparagraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of thePhilippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon hisdischarge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment ofhis civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a

U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine c itizenship through repatriation under RepublicAct No. 2630.[3] He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in theMay 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III,who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of RepresentativesElectoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House

of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of theConstitution.[4]

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision[5] dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaringrespondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections.The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April27, 2000.[6]

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, whenit ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased

being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, whenit considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire hisPhilippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committedserious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of juri sdiction, when it dismissed the petitiondespite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.[7]

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine ci tizenship.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost hisPhilippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the Unit ed States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same byrepatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizensare those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he wasrepatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborncharacteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the

age of majority, and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[8]

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiringcitizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. Aperson who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.[9]

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birthwithout having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."[10]


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On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, whichrepealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.[11] To be naturalized, anapplicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications[12] and none of the disqualifications[13] providedby law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only aftertwo (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the i ntervening period, the applicanthas (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not beenconvicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial tothe interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.[14]

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.

Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may bereacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.[15]

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initiallyacquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On theother hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citi zenship is governed by Commonwealth ActNo. 63.[16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possesscertain qualifications[17] and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.[18]

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)desertion of the armed forces;[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;[20] (3)service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time;[21] (4) marriage o f a Filipino woman to analien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oathof allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in t he Local Civil Registry of the placewhere the person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacqui rePhilippine citizenship would not even be r equired to file a petition i n court, and all that he had to do was to takean oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the placeof his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.][25]

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.[26] This means that a naturalizedFilipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the otherhand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to hisformer status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino

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