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Centre for Research in Futures and Innovation,

University of Glamorgan

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IMCORE Project - A review of approaches to scenario-building and scenario development for coastal areas

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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.......................................................................................................... 3

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 6

NEW APPROACHES AND METHODS ...................................................................................... 8

SCENARIOS ......................................................................................................................... 11

OBJECTIVES AND MAIN USES ................................................................................................... 13 TYPES ................................................................................................................................ 16 PARTICIPANTS AND PARTICIPATION............................................................................................ 18 STAKEHOLDER DEFINITIONS ..................................................................................................... 19 EXPLORATORY SCENARIOS ...................................................................................................... 22

The Explanatory Scenario Process ................................................................................ 23 NORMATIVE SCENARIOS ......................................................................................................... 27

The Normative Scenario Process................................................................................... 28 Backcasting .................................................................................................................. 31

NORMATIVE VERSUS EXPLORATORY SCENARIOS ........................................................................... 33

APPENDIX 1: REFERENCES AND FURTHER INFORMATION .................................................. 34

BOOKS AND ARTICLES ............................................................................................................ 34 ONLINE .............................................................................................................................. 39

APPENDIX 2: GLOSSARY...................................................................................................... 41

APPENDIX 3: CASE STUDIES ................................................................................................ 47

GENERIC............................................................................................................................. 48 EXPLORATORY...................................................................................................................... 59 NORMATIVE ........................................................................................................................ 93


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Executive Summary Futures tools such as scenarios help organise and interpret thinking about the future and also allow us to understand how to create the conditions in which our desired futures can be achieved. The EU Interreg IVB IMCORE Project (2008-2011) partnership is promoting a trans-national, innovative and sustainable approach to reducing the Ecological, Social and Economic impacts of climate change on the coastal resources of North West Europe. The 3rd Work Package of this project is dedicated to the examining the use of future scenario building in the context of ICZM and climate change adaptation in the IMCORE study sites.

Scenarios are perceived as having great potential role in developing more robust organisational strategies well as being useful adjuncts to conventional planning methods, supporting decision making by helping identify more robust adaptation strategies i.e. a strategy that performs well compared to the alternatives over a wide range of plausible future scenarios. The very process of scenario development offers a number of complementary benefits, especially concerning awareness raising, experiential learning and reconsideration of policies and their variety.

There are many definitions of scenarios as tools to contemplate the range of possible futures that could develop from the influence of key drivers, events and issues. Although scenarios can take advantage of quantitative forecasts and projections, scenarios are not designed to predict the future per se, but rather to develop capacity to consider a range of possible futures, developed from the interactions between important variables. Scenario building is different to other analytical methods in its focus on plausible futures. Scenarios are not extrapolations of current trends and inherently involve acceptance of complexity and non-linear thinking. They can however use the same essential set of variables or issues but enable the construction of different possible futures based on the different interactions between these elements.

There is a growing use of scenarios in framing climate change strategies and policies at many levels. Of all the areas of climate change in which scenarios have been used, adaptation is one of the most dynamic, since adaptation necessarily includes assumptions about the capacity of societies to respond to and anticipate expected climatic changes. Adaptation scenarios have to take into account complex feedback loops and active or pro-active adaptation strategies as well as passive or reactive human behaviour. Scenarios typically cover periods of 3-5, 10, 20, or even 50 years and vary in scale enormously. They offer specific advantages for ICZM practitioners and planners faced with the uncertainties of climate change adaptation. When scenarios are developed in coastal management they are necessarily complementary to pre-existing plans and policies e.g. regional climate change adaptation strategy, regional spatial plans etc. Realisable scenarios can only be created in the available predetermined policy space or framework – which is itself a driver taken into account in the scenario development process of course.


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Scenarios can be predictive, exploratory or normative or a combination of these approaches or types. Predictive scenarios i.e. ‘‘What will happen?’’ provide some of the most rigorous scientific attempts to estimate direct climate changes (expressed in ranges of temperatures, sea-level rises etc, including their perceived secondary impacts – such as the IPCC reports or UKCIP09) and will be familiar to many ICZM practitioners. These are based on standard predictive forecasting models traditionally used by DEFRA etc. Exploratory scenarios describe events and trends as they could evolve based on alternative assumptions on how these events and trends may influence the future. i.e. “What can happen?” These are based on a different paradigm and exploit new technologies. The Exploratory scenario type provides a plurality of plausible alternative futures, in which active strategies to adapt (or not) have been pursued. Normative scenarios describe how a desirable future can emerge from the present. i.e. ‘‘How can a specific target be reached?’’ They describe a pre-specified future - a world achievable (or avoidable) only through certain actions. They include "worst case" scenarios and "target-based" scenarios. Backcasting, a normative scenario technique which works ‘backwards’ from a normative future, might be especially effective. This review focuses on the uses and application of the less known or employed scenario methods in coastal management contexts i.e. the Exploratory and Normative scenario types.

Within public organisations, the main uses made of scenarios are to develop strategy and policy and to stimulate critical thinking and challenge assumptions. They are also employed beneficially for the internal processes and culture of the organisation. The success of scenarios can be measured according to their “predictive success” – how accurately they are realised in outcomes and their “decision success” - the extent to which good decisions result , and also their “learning success” - the extent of participation, learning and capacity building derived from involvement.

Scenario exercises are more effective if key stakeholders and policy-makers are directly involved in developing them. Main impacts such as awareness raising, reconsideration of the validity of policy assumptions etc are often due more to the process of scenario development than the published record disseminated when the process end. Climate change adaptation calls for a broad constituency of participants. Civil society groups and businesses need to be part of the strategic conversation that will ultimately lead to explicit adaptation strategies (and tacit knowledge in anticipating change).

It must be born in mind that scenarios will not make the decisions for you, begin an unstoppable course of action, ever be 100% right or persuade everyone. They are effective when they are plausible and/or compelling (and ought to stretch their audience). Coastal stakeholders can as a result sometimes be put off by aspects of scenarios, and will have to be mindful of certain pitfalls. Close collaboration between scenario developers and users, especially at the outset and ending of a scenario exercise, is critical in climate change


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adaptation applications. The value of the outputs of scenario exercises is influenced also by the organisational settings and institutional cultures of the ultimate target group.

This Review supplies a full and lengthy detailed step-by-step breakdown of both the Normative and Exploratory scenario building processes for use in developing scenarios for coastal area, and compares their relevance in different coastal contexts. Appendix 1 supplies a full and current list of books and journal literature in the field as well as the best current online resources. Appendix 2 contains a glossary of all the most common terms used in eth scenarios literature and for other techniques commonly employed within or in conjunction with them. In Appendix 3 the user will find representative samples of recent case study materials deriving from academic, governmental and corporate sources illustrating the various uses of scenario building in different adaptation contexts. There are also a number of synopses of technical reviews concerning aspects of scenarios use in futures generally, which also may reflect on their application in coastal management. The arranged under (a) Generic relevance (b) Exploratory scenario case studies and (c) Normative scenario case studies.


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Introduction

Thinking about the future is something that we all do as individuals, citizens, policy makers or politicians – and as coastal management practitioners. Thinking about the future can however be difficult, confusing and, often, frightening. Futures tools such as scenarios can help us to organise and interpret our thinking about the future and to understand how to create the conditions in which our desired futures can be achieved.

At a time when changing climates oblige us to contemplate complex uncertainties about future opportunities and challenges, we need to find ways to plan for the future which do not rely on ad hoc policies created from imperfect knowledge and constrained thinking.

Individuals, communities, businesses, organisations and public authorities in coastal zones at all levels often have to react to external events that may be caused by the effects of climate change. These effects are unpredictable and potentially far-reaching, so reacting effectively and accurately requires at least an ability to understand, anticipate and deal with their potential impacts.

Figure 1: “Top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches used to inform adaptation to climate

change (from Dessai and Hulme 2004)

We need to increase our capacity to respond to the ecological, social and economic impacts of climate on the viability of coastal sectors such as fisheries and aquaculture, ports and


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shipping, marine recreation, and the defence of coastal communities from flooding and erosion. To date, most attention has been focused on predicting the types and rates of physical change likely to occur but what is needed now is a method to identify the adaptation measures that need to be applied to coastal use and management, both top down and bottom up ( see figure 1).

The EU Interreg IVB IMCORE Project (2008-2011) partnership is promoting a trans-national, innovative and sustainable approach to reducing the Ecological, Social and Economic impacts of climate change on the coastal resources of North West Europe. The 3rd Work Package of this project is dedicated to the examining the use of future scenario building in the context of ICZM and climate change adaptation in the IMCORE study sites. This desktop study has therefore been composed as a First Phase in this process, in order to help develop a common methodology for scenario development, using case studies from North West Europe and other parts of the world. It sets out to review approaches to scenario-building and scenario development for coastal areas and to investigate transferability of futures research methodologies to coastal climate change scenario building. Two more phases follow: Phase 2 prepares a preparatory pack and materials for running futures workshops (for internal IMCORE partner use only) and Phase 3 involves a project workshop informing partners of preferred futures approaches to use and investigating preferred applications within case studies.

The current exigencies of adaptation to changes in the climate also allow us to experiment and incorporate newer and more creative and anticipatory approaches to policy and management. Futures tools, especially scenarios are increasingly providing these necessary approaches. Futures use a variety of methods to stimulate engagement across society in understanding and debating the uncertain future. By this means present day policy choices can be made that will influence the achievement of the “desired” future1

Within the IMCORE project futures scenario building figure in two principal components - the identification of coastal futures across the whole of North West Europe and the use of futures techniques at local levels to enable the development of better informed local coastal adaptation strategies. This approach has been adopted to enable stakeholders to think more creatively about the future, encouraging more proactive attitudes to adaptation as well as enhancing appreciation of the interconnectivity of processes and stakeholders operating at different scales. The use of integrated participatory scenario building at local level is still rare and it is thus hoped that it will benefit from greater capacity building and practice offered by the IMCORE futures work which it is hoped will also contribute significantly to the literature and the development of coastal scenario building techniques.

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1 Global environmental changes are potentially too urgent and too `wicked' to be resolved by conventional methods of scientific inquiry. Instead, we suggest, they demand the extended processes of a post-normal science methodology that reaches beyond the traditional scientific facts and experts into the wider communities affected by an issue.


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New approaches and methods Traditional and many current coastal planning processes are increasingly perceived as being unable to cope with long term changes or the exceptional events associated with climate change. Facing greater risk and more uncertainty, coastal policy-makers therefore need to increasingly use scenario planning to guide decision-making.

The impact potential of climate change and appropriate management solutions (in contrast) have been the subject of much attention over the last two decades years. The chief driving forces most apparent and significant acting on coasts in the previous century were however very definitely human induced, tied to population and economic development. Although some climate change impacts on the coasts (e.g. temperature increases in the arctic and equatorial zones) will have direct impacts on Europe, non-climate drivers will still be making more important contributions to coastal change, frequently in the form of multiple and interacting stresses. Unless policy measures are taken most non-climate coastal drivers are likely to grow due to rising population and affluence over the twenty-first century. Consequently, accurate analysis of the implications of climate change needs to be placed in the context of all these other changes - climatic, socio-economic and environmental - so that the relative importance of different drivers of change and their interactions can be taken on board and appropriate management strategies developed.

Scenarios are perceived as having great potential role in developing more robust organisational strategies well as being useful adjuncts to conventional planning methods, supporting decision-making by helping identify more robust adaptation strategies i.e. a strategy that performs well compared to the alternatives over a wide range of plausible future scenarios (see mini case study – Menai Strait & NW Wales below for illustration of this). The very process of scenario development offers a number of complementary benefits, especially concerning awareness raising, experiential learning and reconsideration of policies and their variety. Experience also suggests that by engaging stakeholders and policy-makers more directly in developing adaptation strategies, the value and credibility of results are boosted. The innovative and integrative opportunities that future scenario planning can supply in such contexts of cumulative uncertainty have been promoted for sometime already:

“Understanding the interactions between the coastal catchment zones and environmental change cannot be achieved solely by natural science modelling and observational studies. Modelling and analysis of socio-economic, socio-cultural and political processes is also a vital component of any decision-support system aiming to buttress coastal management institutions and practice. Integrated natural and social sciences must be the ultimate goal…. For ICZM to succeed it must do so incrementally over time, constantly challenged by complexity and uncertainty constraints. The future will always be shrouded in uncertainty and therefore accurate forecasting of coastal future is not a feasible goal. It is however


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possible to formulate scenarios which can shed light on and offer insights into possible future environmental and socio-economic developments. The information generated by such “futures” thinking can assist the policy process in a more efficient and effective search for appropriate projects, programmes and policies. “2

Yet although a wider range of relevant climate scenarios is emerging as shown in the IPCC AR4 (Solomon et al. 2007) for generic adaptation and scaling down, useful scenarios of non-climate environmental and socio-economic changes relevant to coastal areas are still woefully under-developed. The latest review of the UKCIP socioeconomic scenarios inter alia (see page 61) also underlines the dearth of useful scenario building models readily applicable in local or sub regional policy coastal contexts.

Integrating scenarios with current planning and management conversion

Making the Most of the Coast: Scoping Study Developing recommendations for the delivery of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in the Menai Strait and Conwy Bay CCW Policy Research Report No. 08/28 This was a scoping study commissioned by the Countryside Council for Wales (CCW) from CoastNet in order to develop recommendations to deliver Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in the Menai Strait and Conwy Bay in North West Wales. Although previous work had established the desirability amongst stakeholders for an integrated approach to management of this coastal area, there were no existing structures to allow for an integrated approach across all key sectors and key stakeholders, or to take into account the increasing complexity of the system due to impending legislation. The ICZM imperatives were: • creating structures enabling policy convergence • embedding these structures within the mainstream systems, with longevity to operate

over long times scales. • identifying short and medium term action priorities for change and possibilities of

integrated implementation The chief stakeholders were the local authorities, CCW and the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG). The report identified key drivers of change through background research and getting the stakeholders involved in prioritisation process. The principal outputs of the exercise were four potential future scenarios illustrating possible

2 p 256-257, R. Kerry Turner in Chapter 14 Integrated environmental assessment and coastal futures in ed. Vermaat, J, Bouwer, L, Turner, K and Salomons, W (2005) Managing European coasts: past, present and future, Springer Berlin Heidelberg


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management routes. The report’s recommendations fed off the stakeholders’ reactions and responses to these scenarios. For full case study and details of how these scenarios were developed see page 75 For full report download see http://www.scribd.com/doc/14443812/Developing-Recommendations-for-the-Delivery-of-Integrated-Coastal-Zone-Management-ICZM-in-the-Menai-Strait-and-Conwy-Bay

The trend in ICZM is for conventional systems for managing and interpreting information centrally to be increasingly being replaced by systems based on access, sharing and interoperability. However, the European Environment Agency’s innovative Shared Environment Information System (SEIS), for example - a distributed 'system of systems' for environmentally relevant information) - allocates scenarios a core function (see Figure 2).

Environmental information systems

with forward looking components

(SEIS/Forward)

Institutional arrangements and capacities

Forward Looking

indicators

Models and methods

Scenarios

Figure 2: The Shared Environment Information System, EEA 2009

http://www.scribd.com/doc/14443812/Developing-Recommendations-for-the-Delivery-of-Integrated-Coastal-Zone-Management-ICZM-in-the-Menai-Strait-and-Conwy-Bay�




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Scenarios There are many definitions of scenarios.

“Scenarios are a way to structure, think about, and plan for, future uncertainties. They require the articulation of more than one possible future (typically three or four). Scenarios do not predict the future. Rather they provide the means to consider today’s policies and decision-making processes in light of potential future developments. ”3

“Scenarios provide a methodology for ordering perceptions about alternative future environments in which today’s decisions might be played out. In practice, scenarios resemble a set of stories, written or spoken, built around carefully constructed plots often termed narrative storylines. Scenarios are not predictions; instead, scenarios are an approach to help manage the inherent uncertainties of decisions based on assumptions, rather than on facts, by examining several alternatives of how the future might unfold and compare the potential consequences of different future contexts.”

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Scenarios are special stories that portray plausible futures. Their purpose is to systematically explore, create, and test both possible and desirable future conditions. They can help generate long-term policies, strategies, and plans, which help bring desired and likely future circumstances in closer alignment. They can also expose ignorance; show that we do not know how to get to a specific future or that it is impossible. One expert describes scenario building as ‘a tool for ordering one’s perceptions about alternative futures environments in which one’s decisions might be played out’ (Schwartz, 1996: 4). Scenarios can be very powerful tools to contemplate the range of possible futures that could develop from the influence of key drivers, events and issues. Although scenarios can take advantage of quantitative forecasts and projections, scenarios are not designed to predict the future per se, but rather to develop capacity to consider a range of possible futures, developed from the interactions between important variables.

“Scenarios are distinct from assessments, models, and other decision-support activities, although they can provide important inputs to these activities. Scenarios can also be distinguished less sharply from other types of future statements used to inform decisions, such as projections, predictions, and forecasts. Compared to these, scenarios tend to presume lower predictive confidence, because they are based on processes in which causal relationships or longer time horizons increase uncertainty.” 5

3 Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre (2008) Exploring the Futures: Tools for Strategic Futures Thinking Government Office for Science, London UK

(see also figure 3 below)

4 Shearer, A.W., 2005. Approaching scenario-based studies: three perceptions about the future and considerations for landscape planning. Environ. Planning B 32, 67–87. 5 Nicholls R. J.et al (2008) "Climate change and coastal vulnerability assessment: scenarios for integrated assessment." Sustainability Science, 3 (1), p 90


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Scenario Building is different to other analytical methods in its focus on plausible futures. In terms of method, it digresses from some quantitative analytical techniques that seek to understand the future. However, information on trends is a very important input in developing plausible scenarios. But scenarios are not merely extrapolations of current trends, as “most if not all trends eventually change direction and speed as time passes” (Cornish, 2004: 99). So inherent within scenario building is an acceptance of complexity and non-linear thinking. Scenarios (can) use the same essential set of variables or issues but enable the construction of different possible futures based on the different interactions between these elements.

Usually, a variety of scenarios are developed in parallel. The typical number of scenarios developed is three to four. These scenarios are then researched to provide a sufficient level of plausibility, detail and scope for real decision-making.

Scenarios have been used in studying climate change since the late 1970s. Their use has spread to cover greenhouse gas emissions, climatology, land use, socio-economy, adaptation scenarios and policy scenarios. The principles of scenario thinking, especially in stimulating strategic thinking have transferred from central government and the corporate world to climate change studies. There is a growing use of scenarios in framing climate

change strategies and policies at many levels ranging from the global, such as the IPCC scenarios, the European (for example, the work done by the European Environment Agency) to the local. Of all the areas of climate change in which scenarios have been used, adaptation is one of the most dynamic, since adaptation necessarily includes assumptions about the capacity of societies to respond to and anticipate expected climatic changes. Adaptation scenarios have to take into account complex feedback loops and active or pro-active adaptation strategies as well as passive or reactive human behaviour.

Figure 3: UK Government Foresight/ Horizon Scanning Centre Exploring the future: tools for strategic


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Objectives and Main Uses Scenario Building has been used both in companies and in public organisations because the approach offers several generic advantages offering:

• a non-linear and dynamic way of thinking

• the ability to deal with complexity, to consider multiple variables simultaneously, and with ‘different interpretation’ over time

• Counteracting the historical bias of quantitative forecasting approaches

• Challenging assumptions

• Thinking “outside in” – big, external forces

• Organisational alignment to vision (see Shell example in box below)

• Develops group of people with ability to think strategically

There is no prescribed timescale for scenarios. It varies according to organisational needs, questions addressed and themes covered. Typically they cover periods of 3-5, 10, 20, or even 50 years. Project scales can vary enormously in scenarios work. Two important dimensions of scale relate to the issue or theme under consideration and the geographical boundaries of the application. Since most scenarios work deals with uncertainty, their capacity to adopt macro-level perspectives is often invaluable as a way of surveying the bigger picture, especially at a strategic level e.g. the global scenarios produced by Royal Dutch Shell at a high corporate level. The integration of multiple spatial levels – from the global to the local – has however often been problematic for scenario exercises although some recent examples have sought more purposefully to combine global, top-down elements with more localised, bottom-up elements (van Notten et al., 2003: 431). Appropriate scaling of scenarios in critical for achieving “granularity”, whereby participants gain a more nuanced appreciation of how scenarios might impact on their areas of interest.

Scenarios also have specific advantages for ICZM practitioners and planners faced with the uncertainties of climate change adaptation. In addition to the generic advantages already listed, scenarios

The main benefits of scenarios outlined by Shell (cited in Ringland, 2002: 4) are:

• helping us to understand today better by imagining tomorrow, increasing the breadth of vision and enabling us to spot change earlier.

• effective future thinking brings a reduction in the level of “crisis management” and improves management capability, particularly change management.

• provide an effective mechanism for assessing existing strategies and plans and developing and assessing options.


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a) are the analytical tool most favoured for climate change adaptation planning e.g. IPCC, UKCIP Socio-economic Scenarios 2001, UKCIP 09. By contrast traditional and many current coastal planning processes are perceived as being unable to cope with long term changes or exceptional events and challenge us to innovate in the way we make decisions.

b) set out a common language and comprehensions – across disciplinary, departmental and institutional silos

c) support decisions in coastal management are more likely to be implemented successfully. Scenarios permit stakeholder inclusion in an integrated decision-making process that ensures buy-in and support form those upon whom such decisions impact. Long term decision making about the coast these days also needs consideration of the uncertainties and complexities of climate change as well as the various levels of stakeholder support.

d) use more effective tools to support decision making processes avoids cognitive complexity for those obliged to make the decisions and is less opaque.

e) fit naturally with innate human ways of processing and interpreting complex knowledge through stories/narrative.

f) Help organisations adopt strategies less prone to failure as a result of unforeseen events.

g) support communities which lack internal cohesion or agreement by enhancing their ability to reach consensus since individuals are enabled to concur on near-term actions without having to sign up to longer-term expectations.

Some thoughts on using scenarios “Scenarios are an integral part of the DPSIR framework and climate impact assessment and are widely used by the scientific and policy-making communities. Although scenario development is an imperfect ‘science’, few alternatives exist in exploring unknown futures. One of the principal limitations of scenarios results from feedbacks across scale boundaries in complex systems. An example of this in RegIS is the effect of changing land-use areas on agricultural prices: increasing the local supply of an individual crop may result in lower prices dependent on market demand and supply. These types of dynamic cross-scale processes cannot be readily dealt with n a satisfactory way using a regional scenario approach… the representation of global-scale processes is not always adequate (due to the complexity and variety of the world) and there is a loss of regional specification and detail that is the aim of a ‘regional study’ such as RegIS. There are clear conflicts, therefore, in the ability to model all the processes that are important for a region, at the regional scale…. At a pragmatic level, there are fundamental difficulties in the construction of regional (sub-national) socio-economic scenarios: the development of scenarios, and in particular the stakeholder engagement and dialogue process, is time consuming. The time and resources required to develop the level of spatial disaggregation required by distributed models and by stakeholders, such as depicted within the downscaled RegIS socio-economic


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scenarios, should not be under-estimated. Although they are only illustrative and deliberately intended to demonstrate the potential for divergent futures and associated changes, the speculative (but necessarily precise given the need for quantification) nature of the down-scaled scenarios means they are contentious and inevitably subject to some disagreement…..significant time resources are specifically required to convey the meaning, basis and limits of the scenarios. In addition, the level of spatial detail can render them, in the eyes of some local stakeholders, as unacceptable portrayals of future development….Furthermore, it was necessary to develop an additional ‘Planners’ Scenario’ for urbanization based on discussions with planning officers in the two regions who felt that the RegIS socio-economic scenarios were ‘extremes’ between which the future would lie, and that the scenario projections for 2050 did not relate well to the changes envisaged within the Planners 15 year cycle of the structural planning process. The ‘Planners’ Scenario’ is effectively a ‘preferred’ scenario on the part of regional planners, given the context of current trends and changes (dynamics as usual). The Scenario was based on the reinforcement of current trends for housing commitments within pre-existing regional planning guidance and economic strategies. These commitments are location specific but are not necessarily a guide to the future type of permitted development (in terms of density for example) or the extent of future development. Such misconceptions of the role of scenarios can prolong the stakeholder dialogue process needed to develop agreement, or can indeed prevent agreement. Nevertheless the development of such quantified local scenarios, and their use in numerical impact models can be successful. ” Holman, I.P. et al, A REGIONAL, MULTI-SECTORAL AND INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE UK – REGIS PART II, Climatic Change Climatic Change (2005) 71: p 27–29

It is important that scenarios supply accurate, predictive “successes” of in relation to adaptation to climate change. It is also worth pointing out however that benefits accrue from the process of scenario building by ICZM professionals, in addition to achieving set goals or outcomes. Although scenario exercises culminate in products – the narrative accounts and other communicative devices – the learning and strategic dialogue at the heart of many scenario exercises is typically considered at least as important as the tangible outputs. Scenarios have been described as “more of a participation sport than a spectator sport”. This aspect is recognised within the environmental sciences community, where scenarios are seen either as products or as social processes. Some evaluate UK national climate scenarios in terms of predictive success, decision success (the extent to which good decisions have subsequently been made) and learning success (the extent of participation and learning). In using this framework within environmental scenarios, “credibility is concerned with the scientific adequacy of the technical component of the scenarios, salience is concerned with the relevance of the scenarios to the needs of decision-makers and legitimacy is concerned with the process and transparency of the scenario design, construction and distribution’ (Hulme and Dessai, 2008b: 56).6

6 Rhisiart, M. & Ballinger, R.C., Integrating ICZM and futures approaches in adapting to changing climates, MARE Conference Paper 2009 (see in further detail on page x)


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Scenarios

Predictive

What will happen?

Exploratory

What can happen?

Normative

How can a specific target be

reached?

It must be stressed that when scenarios are developed in coastal management they are necessarily complementary to pre-existing plans and policies e.g. regional climate change adaptation strategy, regional spatial plans etc. Realisable scenarios can only be created in the available predetermined policy space or framework – which is itself a driver taken into account in the scenario development process of course. The case study section (Appendix 3) includes examples of the fit between scenarios and the broader institutional and policy regional contexts.

Types Scenarios can be predictive, exploratory or normative or a combination of these approaches or types.

Predictive scenarios i.e. ‘‘What will happen?’’ these provide some of the most rigorous

scientific attempts to estimate direct climate changes (expressed in ranges of temperatures, sea-level rises etc, including their perceived secondary impacts – such as the IPCC reports or UKCIP09) and will be familiar to many ICZM practitioners. These are based on standard predictive forecasting models traditionally used by DEFRA etc

Exploratory scenarios describe events and trends as they could evolve based on

alternative assumptions on how these events and trends may influence the future. i.e. “What can happen?” These are based on a different paradigm and exploit new technologies. The exploratory scenario type provides a plurality of plausible alternative futures, in which active strategies to adapt (or not) have been pursued e.g. UK Government report Future Flooding 2004 (See Case Studies).

Figure 4: Scenario types


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Normative scenarios describe how a desirable future can emerge from the present. i.e.

‘‘How can a specific target be reached?’’7

Climate change adaptation is naturally complex, since it connects many environmental, economic and social issues. The methods it employs – such as scenarios - do not however have to fall into the rigid traditional binary categories of quantitative versus qualitative, indeed to the contrary - a combination of qualitative and quantitative elements can in fact make a scenario rather more consistent and robust. A quantitative scenario can be enriched and its communicability enhanced with the help of qualitative information. Likewise, a qualitative scenario can be tested for plausibility and consistency through the quantification of information where possible.

. They describe a pre-specified future - a world

achievable (or avoidable) only through certain actions. They Include "worst case" scenarios and "target-based" scenarios. The normative scenario is less prominent in the literature to date but can also play an important role in adaptation since framing a preferred future can be very useful in revealing pathways and decision points to achieve the desired state. Backcasting, a normative scenario technique which works ‘backwards’ from a normative future, might be especially effective (see Case Studies for examples).

Other common characteristics Within public organisations, the main uses made of scenarios are the following:

• Development of strategy and policy: this is a typical use of scenarios in public sector organisations. Scenarios can be used as a key tool in the development of a variety of strategies and policies (thematic, spatial and organisational), e.g. a new innovation strategy, a corporate plan, a territorial or spatial plan;

• Stimulate critical thinking, challenge assumptions – within organisations, the general population. All sorts of issues can be addressed using scenarios, and on different scales, e.g. regions might a scenario building approach to challenge stakeholders to think about scenarios that deal with globalisation and climate change. This approach can be used equally for the internal processes and culture of the organisation.

Measuring results

The success of scenarios can be measured according to their • Predictive success – how accurately they are realised in outcomes • Decision success - the extent to which good decisions result • Learning success - the extent of participation, learning and capacity building derived

from involvement.

7 L. Borjeson et al. (2006)


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Participants and participation Scenario exercises are more effective if key stakeholders and policy-makers are directly involved in developing them. Main impacts such as awareness raising, reconsideration of the validity of policy assumptions etc are often due more to the process of scenario development than the published record disseminated when the process ends (see Box pages 12-13 above.)

Scenario development originally focussed on using specialists in niche fields. Climate change adaptation, however, calls for a broader constituency of participants. In addition to environmental scientists, policy-makers (at several levels) and specialist consultants, stakeholders need to be actively engaged in the process (see stakeholder definitions page 16 below) . Civil society groups and businesses need to be part of the strategic conversation that will ultimately lead to explicit adaptation strategies (and tacit knowledge in anticipating change). Skill sets within environmental scenarios are broad, and will benefit from techniques and insights gained from futures and, more broadly, social science methods (see figure 4).

Figure 5: Typical stakeholder and expert roles and relationships in the scenario building process


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Stakeholder definitions “Since the 1990s, a feature of ICM implementation in the UK has been the development of local and regional coastal initiatives, through a bottom up approach, or as part of a variety of national programmes. These initiatives are largely non-statutory and rely on voluntary participation by government, private and civil society stakeholders. They operate in different types of association, including ‘Partnerships,’ ‘Networks,’ ‘Fora,’ or newly constituted authorities. They aim to reduce the sectoral divide in co-operation at a local level, by providing multi-stakeholder approaches to planning and management….”

Stojanovic, T.A. & Ballinger, R.C. Integrated Coastal Management: A comparative analysis of four UK initiatives Applied Geography 29 (2009) 49–62.

Typically coastal stakeholders involved in ICZM and also adaptation to climate change would be considered the range of organizations (statutory authorities, competent authorities, non-governmental organizations, and commercial), interest and user groups, community groups, and individuals that have an interest in the locality/sub region/region

The Severn Estuary Partnership – one of the study sites of the IMCORE project – supplies a representative typology of the sort of stakeholders likely to get involved in environmental planning and policy development employing scenarios – plus some additional national stakeholder bodies given the area’s border status between two component countries of the UK:

National and Regional Government e.g. Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, DEFRA; Government Office for the South West and the Welsh Assembly Government.

Local Authorities e.g. Bristol City Council; Forest of Dean District Council and Gloucester City Council

Statutory Agencies e.g. Cadw: Welsh Historic Monuments; Caldicot & Wentloog Levels IDB; Countryside Council for Wales; English Heritage; Environment Agency; Natural England; South West of England Regional Development Agency

Non-Statutory Agencies e.g. Wales Coastal and Maritime Partnership

Ports and Harbours e.g. Associated British Ports, ABP; Cardiff Harbour Authority and Gloucester Harbour Trustees etc

UK Nationwide Organisations e.g. Country Land and Business Association, Avon/Somerset; National Farmers Union (South West)

Private Sector e.g. British Energy; British Waterways; Confederation of British Industries; Institute of Chartered Shipbrokers; Severn Trent Plc and Welsh Water - Dwr Cymru


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Environmental Groups e.g. Council for the Protection of Rural England; Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group and RSPB England & RSPB Cymru

Local Community / Action Groups e.g. Gordano Footpath Group; Parents Concerned About Hinkley

Recreation Groups e.g. Barry Yacht Club and Gloucestershire Wildfowlers Association

Culture and Archaeology e.g. Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological Society and Welsh Historic Gardens Trust

University and Research e.g. Cardiff University; Severn Estuary Research Group and the University of Glamorgan

Pitfalls to avoid

It must be born in mind that scenarios will not

• Make the decisions for you

• Begin an unstoppable course of action

• Ever be 100% right (although elements of each scenario might be)

• Persuade everyone

Scenarios are effective when they are plausible and/or compelling (and ought to stretch their audience). Coastal stakeholders can as a result sometimes be put off by aspects of scenarios, and you will have to be mindful of these:

• People are not skilful at contemplating the future and so find it difficult to understand where the scenarios come from

• They invite people to expose their hidden assumptions

• They remove the rules and frameworks of today, causing stress to some

• They invite people to explore what might occur, yet people seek to control what will occur

• They rely on understanding driving forces and uncertainties, yet many people do not have a detailed understanding of the actual situation or circumstances

• They may have a technocratic bias in terms of ICZM

Scenarios fail to impact if they present irrelevant information, have no support from relevant actors, are poorly integrated into the relevant organisations or are oblivious to critical institutional contexts. Scenarios also loose impact when they e.g. identify threats for


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which there is no viable response, or use flawed methodologies. This kind of long-term futures thinking faces many challenges in the public sector due to the compartmentalised character of modern government and contexts driven by short-termist concerns. Diversity of objectives and interests within government sometimes makes establishing exactly who is the client of a scenarios exercise somewhat difficult.

Enhancing scenario effectiveness

Close collaboration between scenario developers and users, especially at the outset and ending of a scenario exercise critical in climate change adaptation applications. Sound and rigorous process is important because it has implications for how much people will trust the scenarios and use them. Trust can derive from

• the sources used (i.e. the people who develop the scenarios)

• the content (i.e. the information used in the scenarios)

• from using a credible methodology to generate them

• the quality of the narrative

• the use of individuals of stature – and implicitly worthy of trust – in disseminating the results

The value of the outputs of scenario exercises is influenced also by the organisational settings and institutional cultures of the ultimate target group. Public sector sluggishness or excessive institutional scale and complexity can (for example) be combated by using small, flexible, task-oriented, managerial teams to analyse and act on scenarios. The robustness or otherwise of Exploratory scenarios is also dependent on the balanced management by the process facilitators of divergent stakeholder interest groupings at critical stages e.g. the selection of critical axes for the 2 x 2 matrix (see in further detail below).


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Ways to develop scenarios for coastal areas

The literature on developing predictive scenarios for use in ICZM and climate change adaptation is great and relatively well understood. This chapter therefore focuses more on the best ways to build and develop exploratory and normative scenarios.8

Exploratory Scenarios

Exploratory scenarios describe how the future might unfold based on known processes of change and extrapolations of past trends. These include "business-as-usual" scenarios, but can also describe bifurcations or other assumptions about regulation or adaptation as outlined below.

Exploratory scenario building can be an involved and complex activity so to get maximal stakeholder participation you may have to hold a number of workshops across several months. If this is the case the workshops can be structured according to the following sequence:

• Workshop A: identifying the drivers

• Workshop B: building the scenario

• Workshop C: getting feedback on the developed scenario storyline and obtaining

additional input.

8 Any specialist technical terms involved in both types of scenario building that may require further explanation are in bold italic and included in the Glossary, page x.


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The Exploratory Scenario Process

The exercise overview below, describes each activity in a workshop setting. It does not prescribe individual workshops.

1. Establish the focus, scale and the outcomes you desire from the scenario exercise:

• A scenario planning exercise represents a healthy commitment to futures investigations. It is a popular and robust tool. It is also typically resource hungry and it can occupy a few months of ‘mental’ time. Thus, it is imperative that solid expectations are stated and shared at the outset.

• Setting the focus concerns the core issue to address and the timescale involved. It may be that other techniques such as issues trees or trend analysis are used to provide initial definition here.

• Scaling the task and involving participants is about resource constraints, but consideration of the end goal is also important. Some scenario processes are designed, for instance to be communicated very broadly – across large multi-nationals and in an external context as well. Participants can be included for their capacity to contribute,


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their obvious stakeholder connectivity or simply to communicate to them, through the scenario process. Desired outcomes should be clearly defined, as the essence of scenario processes is to deal with uncertainty and preparedness – not facts and predictions.

• Research is actually a stage that occurs throughout the scenario construction process. However, emphasis should be placed on research early in the process to inform the process and engage key players. Desk-based research can be used to kick off the project, stimulate discussion, or fill gaps that become evident. Primary research, via interviews, provides rich contextual information, while engaging participants. Seven questions is a good tool for this activity. Both desk-based and interview research can be used to seek contribution from non-participating experts.

2. Appropriate participants/stakeholders are invited

Consider the following before entering on this phase:

• The various interest groups within the study area and without (nationally and internationally) of relevance to those policy issues and contexts at issue.

• pre-existing institutional systems and structures of authority/power • extant networks of stakeholders (or the non-existence of them) • Combinations of these networks (or the non-existence of them) that have influence

on the various choices of policy outcomes.

3. Carry out research

In order to get critical stakeholders engaged further research maybe needed to fill any gaps that may become apparent e.g. additions and update of the evidence base.

4. Scenario building

Figure 6: Scenario Building Process


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This is the key stage/phase of the entire process and requires intense reflective activity sequenced according to the sub-stages illustrated in Figure 5 above.

Drivers are firstly identified. The drivers are identified within a wider set of acting forces and then reduced in number by ranking, discussion, selection, de-selection and other methods discursive analytical methods. When they have been reduced to a group of the most critical drivers, these can be assessed in greater detail with respect to their impact and uncertainty. At this stage if the drivers’ analysis reveals no uncertainty or high impact possibilities which are essential for scenario building, then more predictive and strategic tools should be used instead of exploratory scenarios. The scenario frame can begin to be built by identifying the axes of the scenario matrix - it is crucial that they are independent of each other. Critical uncertainties (high impact and high uncertainty) must then be clustered (5-10 per cluster). This clustering is typically done by the facilitator of the exercise – in the case of IMCORE professionals of the Expert Couplet Nodes themselves or their contracted experts– in consultation with the stakeholders, of course. Each driver cluster should be given a name and its importance assessed. Typically the more important clusters – ones seen to be the most relevant to the subject or topic – supply the axes. It is necessary however to test a number of other axes too to ascertain if they fit. Frequently, where policy areas are in question, the two axes of the 2x2 matrix relate to a trait of governance and some societal perspective e.g. Figure 7.

Figure 7: 2X2 explanatory scenario matrix

Source: Powering our Lives: Sustainable Energy Management and the Built Environment

(DIUS 2008)


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Once axes have been defined, terminal states for each axis need to be labelled or named . Such descriptions must be polar opposites and extreme in what they represent. They should however, be phrased in neutral non-judgemental terms (e.g. ‘high’ / ‘low’ instead of ‘good’ / ‘bad’). With the axes in place, drafting the scenarios can begin. A scenario storyline can now be developed, using different levels of language or detail depending on the outputs required and the temporal constraints. The more elaborate the narrative the greater the tangible benefits for the strategy and decision-makers. The storyline can also introduce new stakeholders to the project and the completed outputs. The storyline can be embodied in literary works, or as annexes in handbooks and are often visualised using illustrations (see Glossary). Here is a brief narrative fragment taken from one of the scenarios developed in Powering our Lives: Sustainable Energy Management and the Built Environment final report (DIUS/Foresight) 2008 (see 2 x2 matrix, Figure 6 above):

Resourceful Regions: An international climate of political instability drives energy security up the domestic agenda of most countries. Fossil fuel-rich countries can afford to ‘game’ at the expense of energy importers by forging and breaking alliances opportunistically. This increases the price of fossil fuel while also reducing consumer, corporate and political levels of trust in the role of multi-lateral agreements and institutions to meet the UK’s ongoing energy needs. Low levels of trust have spurred greater national (and sometimes regional) desire for control over decision-making – if countries can’t talk directly trust is impossible; bilateral agreements are now more common because a country can walk away if dissatisfied……………..

Further examples of different types of scenario narrative to be found the Case Studies section (Appendix 3, below).

5. Prove the scenarios through testing

• One primary test is to consider if the scenarios provide any additional insight, through comparison with existing policy frameworks. Various ancillary techniques exist to do this e.g. Wind tunnelling, plausibility matrix, reverse engineering, gaming etc (see Glossary for definitions and descriptions).

• The goal of testing is to highlight the robustness of decisions or policies included in each scenario and to ensure a quality control mechanism for both stakeholders and the policy commissioning body e.g. ensuring internal coherence of the scenarios and their narrative quality.

Testing the plausibility of the explanatory scenarios is itself a validation - they must in all cases ultimately be “realisable”.

6. Publish and disseminate the scenarios

• A scenarios exercise is not just an end in itself - the outcomes ought be deployed and used widely whilst they have currency to communicate and aid strategy.


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• The exercise should be accompanied by communications planning so that that the results will be distributed efficiently to all stakeholders taking part, relevant decision-makers, planning specialist, strategy-makers and other concerned interests.

Useful examples of exploratory scenario process and outputs

Most of the case studies contained in the section the majority of these are wholly or primarily examples of exploratory scenarios. Especially clear illustrations of the standard exploratory process are provided by:

• CoastNet/CCW - Menai Straits & Conwy Bay - see pages 71-75 • UK Foresight Programme - Future Flooding 2004 – see

http://www.foresight.gov.uk/OurWork/CompletedProjects/Flood/index.asp

Normative Scenarios

Normative scenarios describe a pre-specified future - a world achievable (or avoidable) only through certain actions. Includes "worst case" scenarios and "target-based" scenarios, often requiring "back casting".

A normative scenario can be developed using a participatory process to outline future changes in climate and their everyday implications for coastal managers and stakeholders seeking to cope and adapt to them. Such a scenario is “normative”, because it makes explicit the values, attitudes and mindset of its authors. It depicts a preferable or preferred future vision (sometime called a “lead vision”) without going beyond the realm of that which is possible. Unlike exploratory scenarios –usually based on trend extrapolations and interactions or assumptions - normative scenarios are developed on the basis of hoped for future situations. They often employ backcasting techniques (see below). After having set out a desired future state or condition, one must then identify the necessary steps, decisions or prerequisites to realise or achieve this particular state.

In contrast to the situation where a whole set of different explorative scenarios is developed (e. g. by means of cross-impact analysis), the normative scenario is usually singular and constructed from a consensus. Sometimes though when there are conflicts or outright contradictions between different values and viewpoints different normative scenarios need to be developed (e. g. one scenario highlighting managed retreat, another emphasising holding –the-line and a third based on soft defences). Normative scenarios are usually formulated in a narrative, as brief stories about people or organisations, putting the vision in an everyday fictional context. They are frequently, but not always constructed in a participatory process e.g. using focus groups/multiple sub-groups of expert. This group or groups develops the main visions to be incorporated into the scenario, and supports the

http://www.foresight.gov.uk/OurWork/CompletedProjects/Flood/index.asp�


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process of writing it through their ideas and additional inputs. The focus group ultimately owns the written scenario as a kind of legitimation.

A well-drafted normative scenario permits an organisation to become proactive, acting more specifically for its desired future, rather passively observing and awaiting what the world around it may provide. The utility of the normative scenario -building process also derives from the candid realisation that if stakeholders were able to begin again from scratch, very few of the management systems or elements of those which they have developed would be have been designed the way they actually turned out. In other words, it ignores what exists and turns instead to a disciplined exploration of what should exist. The normative references it provides as by-products also supply benchmarks for studies of existing practices and systems and their validation or otherwise.

The Normative Scenario Process

Creating a normative scenario is usually a 7 or 8 stage process.

The narrative format of the scenario output usually contains the following elements:

• A short introduction, if necessary listing the premises behind it (and an orientation on how to approach the scenario, including its aims, background, the process etc

• Core - a narrative account of the future state, along a timeline in most cases

The Normative Scenario Process

8. Publish and disseminate the scenario

7. Intepret the scenario

6. Enhance the scenario

5. Write up the scenario

4. Put together a storyboard

3. Elaborate exposition of the scenario

2. Vision Workshops

1. Set definition and limits


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• Notes highlighting specific elements and giving additional explanations

Normative though it might be, any scenario is still a subject for further discussion. Scenarios aren’t complete in themselves – they may not necessarily describe all aspects of a topic, satisfy all the different author/ stakeholder worldviews or perspectives. Generating more debate is a criterion of success - a “tame” scenario which elicits a weak response from stakeholders is most probably too polished or superficial, not contributing to the analysis of the problem nor stimulating recipients. Conversely a “strong” scenario can elicit spontaneous reactions, exchange of opinions and reflections on underlying premises concerning the convictions of recipients – regardless of prior knowledge or status.

1. Setting definition and limits

During Stage 1 the aims and objectives of the scenario and its organisational framework must be defined. The project team should meet, questions of the scenario process (time frame, workshops, and feedbacks) agreed upon, and the format of the scenario (scale etc) fixed. The time horizon of the scenario and its subject should be specified. Sometimes the most problematic part is setting the limits and bounds of the scenario, which involves agreeing about those aspects not belonging to the scenario. With regard to all these issues the core team (i.e. those actually writing the scenario or organising the project) may set out a proposal; if not these points may be discussed and decided on during a workshop (the first part of the vision workshop may be useful for doing that). In this first stage other preparation measures can also occur e. g. initial data gathering and analysis, or a search for potential participating experts.

2. Vision workshop(s)

This stage consists in pinpointing down the core content of the scenario i.e. the scenario premises

• What sort of topics, situations, aspects of life ought to be addressed in the main subject of the scenario?

• What are the general assumptions about the context of the scenario (setting)?

• Which key drivers of change are determined though PEST, PESTLE analysis?

PESTLE analysis stands for "Political, Economic, Social, Technological, and Legal and

Environmental analysis" and describes a framework of macro-environmental factors used in helping to identify the different driving forces in play in a particular situation. Sometimes this is also represented as PEST (without the Legal and Environmental). It is a very useful and widely employed tool – especially at the trend analysis stage - as it offers a wide ranging framework from which to build scenarios.

• Which future visions for the subject ought to be depicted?


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This is largely achieved though team brainstorming. It makes sense in some situations to start this workshop with a presentation from an expert about the main trends in the field. Alternatively the workshop participants themselves can develop the trend assumptions. During the following brainstorming, creativity techniques and tools can be used to obtain a comprehensive set of “seeds” of visions, ideas that hold the potential to evolve into more holistic visions e.g. an imaginary “voyage into the future, fictional newspaper “future headlines”, radio news show scripts etc .It is really useful to have external experts involved in this process as they offer an objective view and knowledge of the subject area.

This ought to yield enough concrete “seed” visions agreed as positive future options by all participants. Part one of the brainstorming seeks to generate a great quantity and originality of visions; part two supplies concrete rationales and examples – the Hows and Whats.

3. Elaborating exposition of the scenario

The exposition consists of:

• Scenario background: premises, especially the supposed evolution of key factors in the given time horizon and its normative assumptions

• Seed visions to be incorporated, usually emphasising their normative content

• First ideas for the “plot” of the scenario – who are the lead actors/ protagonists? what sort of narrative style might be best suited (story, interview, report, reported speech etc)?

Integration of the seed visions into a whole/weeding out those which are too inconsistent and incompatible with the bulk of the others is necessary, and must be agreed upon – just like the exposition as a whole – with the participants of the scenario process. The Delphi futures survey technique is often employed at this stage (see Glossary).

4. Putting together a Story Board

Scenario writing is much helped by a detailed outline of the plot, integrating all seed visions into one, in Story Board form. The term Story Board derives from the world of film, animation and TV, although it is also used now widely used in other fields such as computing systems design (e.g. as a logical and conceptual description of system functionality for a specific scenario, including the interaction required between the system users and the system). A storyboard "tells a specific story", a set of composite images or texts on which a group of sketches is arranged depicting consecutively the important stages of policymaking and action in a scenario.

5. Writing up the scenario

Development of the scenario narrative requires the skills of a professional writer or at least one who is experienced in the field. All the different elements – the visions, the


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protagonists, and the background – have to be integrated. Stereotyped images of the future should be avoided as should satire based on current affairs. The draft of the scenario is then passed to the client and/or the larger scenario team for discussion and comment. In its narrative form it may resemble an Exploratory scenario in many cases.

6. Enhancing the scenario

The feedback from client and the larger scenario team enriches the texture of the scenario with new ideas and visions that fit into the general setting complemented by insights derived from their specialist expertise.

7. Interpreting the scenario

Normative scenarios are used in different ways, depending on the framing research or communication process. In most cases they are primarily a visualisation and evaluation tool that focuses results from the discursive process and provides a starting point for policy implementation. It is therefore crucial that the visionary content of the scenario is systematically made accessible and used- so some guidance on how to read it and use it should be formulated or at least outlined.

8. Publishing and disseminating the scenario

The form of the scenario output is dependant on its target group e.g. Technical language and specific explanations for expert audiences versus plain English for the broader public. Reading sin and versioning for different audience types is a good idea. Scenarios are after all intended as tools to produce certain results through persuading readers and users of their value.

Backcasting This is a specific technique that is often integrated into the building of a specific variant of the normative scenario, which also allows policymakers and strategists to describe a vision of their preferred future and then set out the steps they will take to deliver it .

A normative scenario build employing backcasting can be laid out as follows:

1. Describe a preferred future.

Figure 8: Normative scenario – backcasting timeline


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2. Define the key differences between the preferred future and how things are today.

3. Identify the key steps needed to achieve the desired future.

4. Brainstorm the drivers and trends which could impact on your ability to achieve the preferred future.

5. Map the drivers and trends onto a 2x2 matrix according to whether they are barriers (to achieving the preferred vision) or enablers (towards achieving the preferred vision); and whether they are in your control or out of your control.

6. Discuss what you need to do to ensure that barriers inside your control are

minimised; and that enablers inside your control are optimised.

7. Explore how to get around barriers outside your control.

8. Define performance indicators that will help you monitor progress towards your preferred future.

Useful examples of normative scenario process and outputs

See Case Studies:

• East Anglia & North-West England, UK (RegIS) page 82-

• Manhood Peninsula page 80

Also not ICZM-specific but very useful illustrations can be found in Case Studies under

Figure 9: 2X2 Normative scenario matrix used in backcasting


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• Landscape Ecology Use page 62

• VIBAT page 81

Normative versus Exploratory Scenarios

There is scant evidence as to when either of the two scenario building approaches is more valuable, and in practice futures exercises often involve mixing the two. On the whole it appears that predominantly normative approaches are more effective if a widely shared goal already exists, and thus the scenario build can flesh out this implicit vision of the future e.g. a common long-term local or regional goal may be for more consistent and equitable development of coastal defences in a particular area (see Manhood Peninsula case study above). In such instances, the normative approach can have a potent influence on priority-setting and aspects of policy and decision making (e.g. supplying road-maps and indicators useful in monitoring progress towards the desired future). Conversely, normative approaches can be considered too subjective, or there may be an absence of consensus regarding common or shared goals. Exploratory methods in such situations are predominant.


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Appendix 1: References and further information

Books and articles Andrews, J., Beaumont, N., Brouwer, R., Cave, R., Jickells, T., Ledoux, L., Kerry Turner, R. 2005 Integrated assessment for catchment and coastal zone management: the case of the Humber. In: J. Vermaat, L. Bouwer, K. Turner and W. Salomons (Eds.), Managing European coasts, past, present and future, Berlin Heidelberg New York: Springer, Pp. 323 – 354. Arnell, N.W., Livermore, M.J.L., Kovats, S., Levy, P.E., Nicholls, R., Parry, M.L., Gaffin, S.R. 2004 Climate and socio-economic scenarios for global-scale climate change impacts assessments: characterising the SRES storylines. Global Environmental Change 14:3–20. Ballinger, R.C., Stojanovic, T. In press Policy development and the estuary environment: a Severn Estuary Case Study, Marine Pollution Bulletin, in press. Ballinger, R.C., Cummins, V., O’Hagan, A.M., Phillippe, M. (Eds.) 2008 The point of Corepoint: improving capacity for Integrated Coastal Zone Management in North West Europe, Corepoint Report, Pp. 81, Available: //corepoint.ucc.ie/) Ballinger, R.C., Taussik, J. and Potts, J.S. 2004 Sharing responsibility for managing coastal risk: lessons from the British Experience, Delivering sustainable coasts: connecting science and policy, Proceedings of Littoral, 2004, the 7th International Symposium, Aberdeen, UK, Sept. 20 – 22, 2004, p199 – 204. Berkout F. et al(2002). "Foresight Futures Scenarios: developing and applying a partcipative strategic planning tool." Greener Planning International(37-51). Bishop, P., A. Hines, T. Collins 2007 The current state of scenario development: an overview of techniques. Foresight 2007 9 (1): 5-25 Börjeson, L., M. Höjer, K.Dreborg, T. Ekvall, G. Finnveden 2006 Scenario types and techniques: towards a user’s guide. Futures 38 (7) : 723-739 Bradfield R. et al (2005). "The origins and evolution of scenario techniques in long range business planning " Futures Volume 37(8): 795-812 Burgess, K., Jay, H., Nicholls, R.J., Green, C., Penning-Rowsell, E.


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2005 Assessment of future coastal erosion risk, In: Thorne, C.R., Evans, E.P., Penning-Rowsell, E.C. (Eds.), Future flooding and coastal erosion risks, London: Thomas Telford, Pp. 280 – 296. Centre, F. H. S. (2008). Exploring the Futures: Tools for Strategic Futures Thinking U. G. O. f. Science. London, UK Government Office for Science. Dawson, R., Dickson, M., Nicholls, R., Hall, J.W., Walkden, M., Stansby, P., Mokrech, M., Richards, J., Zhou, J., Milligan, J., Jordan, A., Pearson, S., Rees, J., Bates, P., Koukoulas, S., Watkinson, A. 2006 Integrated analysis of risk of coastal flooding and cliff erosion under scenarios of long term change: Tyndall Centre Working Paper 110, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. Defra/EA Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management R&D Programme (2008) Social Justice in the Context of Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management: A Review of Policy and Practice (2008) R&D Technical Report FD2605/TR (UK) De Groot, T.M., Orford, J.D. 2001 Implications for coastal zone management. In: D. Smith, S.B. Raper, S. Zerbini and A. Sanchez-Archilla (Eds.), Sea level change and coastal processes: implications for Europe, Brussels: European Commission, Pp. 214 – 242. Dessai, S., van der Sluijs, J. (2007). Uncertainty and Climate Change Adaptation - a Scoping Study. Utrecht, Universiteit Utrecht. European Commission,(2009). Commission staff working document: Climate Change and Water, Coasts and Marine Issues. D. Environment. Brussels. SEC (2009) 386/2. European Commission( (25 November 2008). Roadmap for Maritime Spatial Planning: Achieving Common Principles in the EU. Brussels, Commission of the European Communities. European Environment Agency 2009 Looking back on looking forward: a review of evaluative scenario literature, European Environment Agency Technical Report 3/2009, Copenhagen: European Environment Agency, Pp. 28. European Environment Agency 2006 The changing faces of Europe’s coastal areas, Copenhagen: European Environment Agency Report 6 / 2006, Pp. 107. Evans, E.P., Ashley, R.M., Hall, J., Penning-Rowsell, E., Sayers, P., Thorne, C., Watkinson, W. 2004 Foresight: future flooding. Scientific summary: managing future risks. vol II. Office of Science and Technology.


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Füssel, H-M. 2007 Adaptation planning for climate change: concepts, assessment approaches and key lessons. Sustainabili Sci. 2: 265-275 Gaßner, R. & Steinmüller, K. EU-US SEMINAR: NEW TECHNOLOGY FORESIGHT, FORECASTING & ASSESSMENT METHODS-Seville 13-14 May 2004 POSTER SESSION : Paper 4 : Scenarios that tell a story; Normative Narrative Scenarios – An efficient tool for participative innovation-oriented foresight Government Office of Science,(2008). Foresight Sustainable Energy Management and the Built Environment Project - Final Project Report. London, Government Office for Science Hofmann, J., Behrendt, H., Gilbert, A., Janssen, R., Kannen, A., Kappenberg, J., Lenhart, H., Lise, W., Nunneri, C., Windhorst, W. 2005 Catchment-coastal zone interaction based on scenario and model analysis: Elbe and the German Bight case study, Regional Environmental Change, 5: 54 – 81. Holman, I.P, Rounsevell, M.D.A., Shackley, S., Harrison, P.A., Nicholls, R.J., Berry, P.M., Audsley, E. 2005 A regional, multi-sectoral and integrated assessment of the impacts of climate change and socio-economic chance in the UK: I methodology, Climate Change 71(1-2), 9 – 41. Holman, I.P, Nicholls, R.J., Berry, P.M., Harrison, P.A., Audsley, E., Shackley, S., Rounsevell, M.D.A. 2005 A regional, multi-sectoral and integrated assessment of the impacts of climate change and socio-economic chance in the UK: II results, Climate Change 71(1-2), 9 – 41. Holman, I. P., · Rounsevell, M.D.A., Cojacaru, G., Shackley, S., McLachlan, C., Audsley, E., Berry, P.M., Fontaine, C., Harrison, P.A., Henriques, C., Mokrech, M., Nicholls, R.J., · Pearn, K.R., · Richards, J.A. 2008 The concepts and development of a participatory regional integrated assessment tool, Climatic Change (2008) 90:5–30. Holmberg, J. (2000). "Backcasting from non-overlapping sustainability principles - a framework for strategic planning." International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology 7: 291-308. Hughes N. et al (2009). Critical review of the applications of the UKCIP socioeconomic scenarios: lessons learnt and future directions. London, UKCIP/ King's College London. Glenn, J. C. (2003). Scenarios. Futures Research Methodology V2.0. Washington DC, Ac/UNU Millennium Project. Hulme, M., S. Dessai 2008a Predicting, deciding, learning: can one evaluate the ‘success’ of national climate scenarios? Environmental Research Letters 3: 1-7


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Hulme, M., S. Dessai 2008b Negotiating future climates: a critical review of the development of climate scenarios for the UK, Environmental Science Policy 11: 54-70 Kannen, A. Holistic Systems Analysis for ICZM: The Coastal Futures Approach, Coastline Reports, 1, (2004), 177 – 181. Kates, R.W., Clark, W.C., Corell, R., Hall, J.M., Jaeger, C., Lowe, I., McCarthy, J.J, Schnellnhuber, H-J., Bolin, B., Dickson, N.M., Facherux, S., Gallopin, G.C., Gruebler, A., Huntley, A., Jager, J., Jodha, N.S., Kasperson, R.E., Mabogunje, A., Matson, P., Mooney, H., Moore, III, B., O’Riordan, T., Svedin, U. Sustainability science, Science, 27 (292), 641 – 642. Kok, K., Biggs, R., Zurek, M. Methods for developing multiscale participatory scenarios: insights from southern Africa and Europe. Ecology and Society 13(1): 8. Available: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art8/ Kristensen, P. (2004). The DPSIR Framework. UNEP workshop on a comprehensive / detailed assessment of the vulnerability of water resources to environmental change in Africa using river basin approach. UNEP Headquarters, Nairobi, National Environmental Research Institute, Denmark: 10. Mickwitz P., et al. (2009). PEER (Partnership for European Enviornmental Research) Report No. 2 - Climate Policy, Integration, Coherence and Governance Helsinki. No.2 66. Millett, S. 2003 The future of scenarios: challenges and opportunities. Strategy and Leadership 31 (2): 16-24 Nicholls, R.J., Klein, R.J.T. Climate change and coastal management on Europe’s coast. In: J. Vermaat, L. Bouwer, K. Turner and W. Salomons (Eds.), Managing European coasts, past, present and future, Berlin Heidelberg New York: Springer, Pp. 199 – 226. Nicholls, R.J., Wong., P.P., Burkett, V., Woodroffe, C.D., Hay, J. Climate change and coastal vulnerability assessment: scenarios for integrated assessment, Sustainability Science, 3: 89 – 102. Nordlund, G. 2008 Futures research and the IPCC assessment study on the effects of climate change. Futures 40: 873-876 Nunneri, C., Turner, K.R., Cieslak, A., Kannen, A., Klein, R.J.T., Ledoux, L., Marquenie, J.M., Mee, L.D., Moncheva, S., Nicholls, R.J., Salomons, W., Sarda, R., Stive, M.J.F., Vellinga, T

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Group report: integrated assessment and future scenarios for the coast. In: J. Vermaat, L. Bouwer, K. Turner and W. Salomons (Eds.), Managing European coasts, past, present and future, Berlin Heidelberg New York: Springer, Pp. 271 – 290. O’Neill, B., S. Pulver, S. VanDeever, Y.Garb 2008 Where next with global environmental scenarios? Environmental Research Letters 3 Pielke, R.A. Jr, T.M.L.Wigley, C.Green 2008 Dangerous assumptions. Nature 452: 531-2 Pielke, R.A. Jr 2008 Climate predictions and observations. Nat. Geosci. 1: 206 Rahmstorf, S., A. Cazenave, J.A.Church, J.E.Hansen, R.F. Keeling, D.E. Parker, R.C.J. Somerville2007 Recent climate observations compared to projections. Science 316: 709 Rhisiart, M. & Ballinger,R. (2009) unpublished conference paper Integrating ICZM and futures approaches in adapting to changing climates MARE 2009, Amsterdam 10 July 2009 Schwartz, P. 1991 The Art of the Long View. New York: Doubleday/Currency Slaughter, R. 2008 Reflections on 40 years of futures studies and Futures. Futures 40: 912-914 Stern, N. Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change, London: Office of Climate Change, Pp. 576. Swart, R.J., Raskin, P. and Robinson, J. The problem of the future: sustainability science and scenario analysis, Global Environmental Change, 14, 137 – 146. Thorne, C.R. et al Ed. (2007). Future flooding and coastal erosion risks. London, Thomas Telford. Tomkins E.L. et al (2008). "Scenario-based stakeholder engagement: incorporating stakeholders' preferences into coastal planning for climate change." Journal of Environmental Management 88: 1580 - 1592. Turner, K.R. Integrated environmental assessment and coastal futures. In: J. Vermaat, L. Bouwer, K. Turner and W. Salomons (Eds.), Managing European coasts, past, present and future, Berlin Heidelberg New York: Springer, Pp. 255 – 270.


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UK Climate Impacts Programme Socio-economic scenarios for climate change impact assessment: a guide to their use in the UK climate impacts programme. UKCIP, Oxford. Available: http://www.ukcip.org.uk/resources/publications/documents/34.pdf. van Notten, P., J. Rotmans, M.B.A van Asselt, D.S. Rothman 2003 An updated scenario typology. Futures 35: 423-443 Van Vuuren, D. and B.C. O’Neill 2006 The consistency of IPCC’s SRES scenarios to 1990-2000 trends and recent projections. Clim. Change 75: 9-46 Voros, J. 2008 Integral Futures: An Approach to futures inquiry. Futures 40: pages Watkinson, A.R., Cornell, S.E., Jordan, A. 2006 The governance of responses, In: Thorne, C.R., Evans, E.P., Penning-Rowsell, E.C. (Eds.), Future flooding and coastal erosion risks, London: Thomas Telford, Pp. 475 – 490.

Online UK Climate Projections (UKCP09) UKCP09 provides the latest information on how continued emissions of greenhouse gases may change the UK’s climate over 21st century. The information provided by UKCP09 will be valuable to anyone with responsibility for forward planning in the public, private and voluntary sectors. UKCP09 comprises a package of information including, publications, key findings, user support and customisable output. This is primarily available on-line. * For access to the main technical information about UKCP09, and the full range of information and support, go to http://ukclimateprojections.defra.gov.uk. * A gentler introduction is available at http://ukcp09.defra.gov.uk. UKCP09 is accompanied by a training programme – Projections in Practice (PiP) – and more information can be found at www.ukcip.org.uk/training. JISC INfoNet Scenario Planning Guide http://www.jiscinfonet.ac.uk/tools/scenario-planning European Commission, JRC FOR-LEARN Scenario Methods Guide http://forlearn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/guide/4_methodology/meth_scenario.htm UK Government Horizon Scanning Centre Toolkit

http://www.foresight.gov.uk/Horizon%20Scanning%20Centre/GoodPractice/Toolkit.asp

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IMCORE - Innovative Management for Europe’s Changing Coastal Resource

http://imcore.eu/

COREPOINT – IMCORE’s precursor

http://corepoint.ucc.ie/

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Appendix 2: Glossary

Adaptation

Change in human or natural systems in response to climate change or other pressures. It is the complementary approach to mitigation (qv). [DEFRA] Climate Change

The Earth’s climate changes constantly. This term is usually used to mean artificial or anthropogenic climate change caused by greenhouse gas emissions, which have to be distinguished from natural variation in climate. [Foresight]

DELPHI

The Delphi method is a systematic, interactive futures method relying on a panel of experts. These experts answer questionnaires in two or more rounds. After each round, a facilitator provides an anonymous summary of the experts’ forecasts from the previous round as well as the reasons they provided for their judgments. The experts are thus encouraged to revise their earlier answers in light of the replies of other members of their panel. It is believed that during this process the range of the answers will decrease and the group will converge towards the "correct" answer. Delphi is based on the belief that forecasts from a structured group of experts are more accurate than those from unstructured groups or individuals. [Millennium Project] Drivers

These are the key forces which are driving and shaping change in relation to the policy area or aspects of the future you are considering. A driver is also any phenomenon that may change the state of a system. A driver may change sources, pathways, receptors or a combination of them: [Foresight]

• Sources: Weather-related phenomena (rainfall, marine storms, snow melt etc.) that generate water that could cause flooding.

• Pathways: Mechanisms by which water travels from its source to places where it may

affect receptors (e.g. runoff, fluvial flows, sea defence overtopping, floodplain inundation).

• Receptors: People, industries and built and natural environments that flooding can

affect.


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DP-S-I-R - Driving pressures-State-Impacts-Response framework

The DP-S-I-R (driving pressures-state-impacts-response) framework, originally developed by the OECD, is a useful device for the scoping of complicated management issues and problems. It can make tractable the complexity of causes of water resources, habitat/species degradation or loss and the links to socio-economic activities, across the relevant spatial and temporal scales. It also provides the important conceptual connection between ecosystem change and the effects of that change (impacts) on people’s economic and social well-being. Relevant indicators of environmental change can be derived (see below), and the loss of ecosystem function provision in terms of goods and services (direct and indirectly received) can be translated into human welfare loss and quantified in monetary and/or other more qualitative ways. (Ledoux et al. 2002)

Futures

‘Futures’ is a mulfi-faceted and multi-disciplinary field. It can be • a way of thinking • a practical application • an academic pursuit.

Discussions on ‘the future’ – and the futures field – are underpinned by the concepts of complexity and uncertainty. Futures is not a synonym for forecasting. Although futures makes use of forecasts, it is not about predicting one future. Rather it is concerned with asking ‘What if’ questions and exploring how key variables, trends and events might shape a range of possible futures. Futures is a process used to make sense of complexity and uncertainty –for organisations and individuals. Futures approaches are creative and anticipatory. They improve organisational (and individual) capacity to think strategically. Looking at the future(s) helps us to make better decisions in the present. Futures approaches can be used by all organisations – government, companies, NGOs and voluntary bodies. Examples of the areas where futures approaches are used include:

• Developing a new strategy or policy • Generating dialogue about the future of the organisation or territory • Making an investment decision • Understand the impact of external influences on the organisation • Challenging mindsets and shaking off complacency • Avoiding path dependency and ‘business as usual’

Many tools have been developed to help apply futures. Examples include trend analysis, scenario building, Delphi and futures workshops. [CRI-FI] Uncertainty


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The nature of uncertainty is multi-dimensional: it includes statistical uncertainty, scenario uncertainty and recognized ignorance in observed data, in climate models, in climate impacts, in policy context, and on all these locations uncertainties are both epistemic (imperfect knowledge) and stochastic (intrinsic variability in the climate system. Mitigation

Action taken to reduce an undesired effect such as climate change. It is the complementary approach to adaptation. [DIUS] PESTLE

PESTLE analysis stands for "Political, Economic, Social, Technological, and Legal and Environmental analysis" and describes a framework of macro-environmental factors used in helping to identify the different driving forces in play in a particular situation. Sometimes this is also represented as PEST (without the Legal and Environmental). It is a very useful and widely employed tool – especially at the trend analysis stage - as it offers a wide ranging framework from which to build scenarios.

Resilience

The capacity of human and natural systems to deal with surprises or changes including climate change, severe weather events, or terrorism. [DIUS]

Scenarios (also see main text)

A tool for ordering one’s perceptions about alternative futures environments in which one’s decisions might be played out. [Schwartz Scenarios are a recognised technique for investigating long-term futures where there are many complex and interacting variables, and where the future is very uncertain. [Government Office for Science 2004] A plausible description of how the future may develop, based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about key relationships and driving forces (e.g., rate of technology changes, prices). Note that scenarios are neither predictions nor forecasts. [IPPC Glossary of Terms, 1995] Scenarios are coherent, internally consistent and plausible descriptions of possible future states of the world, used to inform future trends, potential decisions, or consequences. They can be considered as a convenient way of visioning a range of possible futures, constructing worlds outside the normal time spans and processes covering the public policy environment. [UKCIP]


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Seven Questions “A technique used to draw information from key individuals, such as senior managers and decision makers, regarding the future. The seven open-ended questions cause the interviewee to pause, think out loud and to place themselves in the future. The seven questions are designed to explore information that the interviewee may have about the future, but which they may not have expressed yet……

1. The Vital Issues (the Oracle) Would you identify what you see as the critical issue for the future? (When the conversation slows, continue with the comment) Suppose I had full fore-knowledge of the outcome as a general clairvoyant, what else would you wish to know?

2. A favourable outcome If things went well, being optimistic but realistic, talk about what you would see as a desirable outcome.

3. An unfavourable outcome As the converse, if things went wrong, what factors would you worry about? 4. Where culture will need to change Looking at internal systems, how might these need to be changed to help bring about the desired outcome?

5. Lesson from past successes and failures Looking back, what would you identify as the significant events which have produced the current situation?

6. Decisions which have to be faced Looking forward, what would you see as priority actions which should be carried out soon?

7. If you were responsible If all constraints were removed and you could direct what is done, what more would you wish to include? (The 'Epitaph' question.)

There is always scope to modify or reword the questions to suit the project, but this general outline is maintained. This method is a good way to involve people who may not be able to participate in workshops or other futures activities, gains their support and engagement. Interestingly, seven question interviews, can quickly uncover a large percentage of the key strategic issues that the project faces – up to 70% in some cases. Steps

1. Define the scope of the study. 2. Select the interviewees, interview team and prepare explanatory material. 3. Conduct the interviews. 4. Highlight the key issues. 5. Cluster key themes. 6. Compile the material.”

[UK Horizon Scanning Centre Toolkit]


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Windtunnelling

Users can employ windtunnelling to test how future changes in the external environment might affect their ability to deliver a particular project or set of strategic objectives. By inviting participants to imagine how they would meet their objectives in different scenarios, windtunnelling helps them identify critical planning points where strategy needs to be flexible and adaptable. Windtunnelling is viewed as a good public sector technique for policy testing.

Process:

1. Develop scenarios, or work with suitable existing ones. 2. Clarify the project idea or desired outcome to be tested. 3. Examine how the external conditions described in each scenario affect delivery of

the desired outcome. 4. Identify the implications for strategy implementation.

Issues trees

An issues tree establishes a key question and a logical sequence for addressing it. The exercise gives appropriate focus at the outset of a futures investigation. It can encourage the participation of stakeholders and broaden the knowledge of participants. The key output is a hierarchy of questions that define the core elements of the topic. Each question is addressed by a sub-level set of questions. Together, these questions form a clearoverview of keyworkstreams. An issues tree can be used to identify key areas to analyse further. It can also be used to help align the work of a project team or to communicate the broad outline of the project.

Process:

1. Introduce the broad scope. 2. Capture critical issues. 3. Discuss the various issues. 4. Consider the dependencies of the issues. 5. Construct trial issues trees. 6. Select the final tree. Use to identify work streams.

Trend analysis

Trend analysis is a study of historic performance in order to indicate possible future trends. Existing trends and their interrelatedness are identified. Underlying drivers are understood. Trend longevity and impact is assessed. Trends are usually described as short, medium or long term.


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Process:

1. Set the boundaries of the investigation – time allotted, sources, areas to research, degree of impact, etc.

2. Assign areas of investigation to the research team. 3. Conduct research by locating information, observation, cross-referencing and

drawing synthesis. 4. Share findings (a workshop setting is ideal). Compile the trends. Try to understand

their underlying causes. 5. Revise the trends to include new or restated observations of the participants. Assess

for impact and importance. Circulate to all stakeholders. 6. Develop response by focusing on the most critical trends and their underlying

causes.

Fifth Scenario

The fifth scenario exercise is a workshop-based discussion where participants use elements from an existing set of four scenarios to describe their preferred future and the steps required to deliver it. The approach allows policy makers and strategist to develop a ‘customised’ scenario which builds on the strengths, and overcomes the weaknesses, of the existing scenario set; and to describe the steps they will take to deliver it.

Process:

1. Present and discuss an existing set of scenarios. 2. Use a plausibility matrix to identify which scenario is closest to the future the group

aspires to. 3. Describe a fifth scenario that improves on this scenario by:

• building on its strengths • overcoming its weaknesses • drawing on positive elements from other scenarios.

4. Agree the steps and tasks needed to deliver the fifth scenario.


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Appendix 3: Case studies This section contains a representative sample of recent case study materials deriving from academic, governmental and corporate sources illustrating the various uses of scenario building in different adaptation contexts. There is also a number of synopses of technical reviews concerning aspects of scenarios use in futures generally, which also may reflect on their application in coastal management.

In compiling this resource it became clear as noted previously that although scenarios have been used and are being used very widely at national and regional level in the European Union and elsewhere, they have only recently been applied to coastal adaptation issues and situations in much of North-West Europe. Much of this novel use has been driven by the urgency of the climate change agenda. Wherever possible URLs are also provided leading to more detailed resources to which these abstracts and synopses refer.

They are arranged accordingly:

• Generic – general information about scenarios use and the relevant ICZM policy contexts

• Exploratory – the most current and widely practised scenarios methodology used in ICZM

• Normative – the less widely practised but perhaps more applicable methodology for more discrete and defined geographical or community areas, with pre-existing solidarity and consensus within and between relevant stakeholder groups

Note that case studies have been chosen primarily for their value as examples of good practice. Some derive from disciplines other than coastal management but are valuable models for study nevertheless.


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Generic

Type: Scenarios used as national climate change forecasts

Date: 2002 & 2009 Place: United Kingdom

Author/source: The UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) climate change scenarios- UKCIP02, UKCIP09

The UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) “helps organisations to assess how they might be affected by climate change, so that they can prepare for its impacts” was set up by UK Government in 1997, is funded by DEFRA and based at University of Oxford.

The UKCIP02 Climate Change Scenarios provided four alternative descriptions of how UK climate might evolve over the course of the 21st century . These alternative descriptions result from uncertainty about future trends and behaviour – such as population growth, socio-economic development and technological progress – and how these might influence future global emissions. To address this emissions uncertainty, UKCIP02 scenarios describe future climate change under four alternative futures, ranging from rapid economic growth with intensive use of fossil fuels (High Emissions) to increased economic, social and environmental sustainability with cleaner energy technologies (Low Emissions). For each of the four UKCIP02 scenarios, changes are described for three future thirty-year time-slices: 2011 to 2040 (the 2020s), 2041 to 2070 (the 2050s) and 2071 to 2100 (the 2080s). All changes in climate are given relative to the baseline period of 1961 to 1990. The changes described for the next 30 or 40 years are broadly similar for all four scenarios, as they are largely influenced by past and current emissions of greenhouse gases. Adaptation, to respond to these changes, is required now to minimise the impacts of unavoidable climate change.

The UKCIP02 website supplies case studies of the application of these scenarios by regional level stakeholders in various parts of the UK in stages explicitly identified by an Adaptation Wizard describing the progression from simple understanding of climate change to integration of climate risks into decision-making. These stages are sequenced as follows:

1. Scoping the impacts: Engagement in scoping activities, aimed at identifying key climate risks

2. Quantifying risks: Development of a deeper understanding of key risks by undertaking more detailed quantitative assessments


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3. Decision making and action plans: Identification and evaluation of climate adaptation options

4. Adaptation strategy review: Implementation of strategies, with regular review and modification as required

See http://www.ukcip.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=352&Itemid=407

UKCIP recently published the next generation of climate change impact scenarios (UKCIP09). These new scenarios are more advanced than the previous UKCIP02 scenarios, presenting information in a ‘probabilistic’ way for a range of climate variables via an interactive user interface.

http://ukclimateprojections.defra.gov.uk/content/view/868/531/

Type: Model use of scenarios in international environmental assessments

Date: 2001 Place: EU-wide

Author / source: Alcamo, J. (2001) Scenarios as tools for international environmental assessments Experts' Corner Report Prospects and Scenarios No 5 Environmental issue report No 24 European Environmental Agency

This builds on the EA’s 1999 Environment in the EU at the turn of the century which was their first comprehensive scenarios exercise. It explains a scenarios approach balancing and combining qualitative and quantitative sources of information. The report lays out a “story-and-simulation” scenarios building approach – i.e. a storyline and set of model calculations. The storyline provides a future narrative whilst the model calculations provide numerical estimates of future environmental indicators and maintain the consistency of the storyline. It lays down a 10 stage approach and provides case studies of large specific EU and other international scenario exercises both qualitative and quantitative form the late 90 sand early 2000s e.g. IIASA Future environments of Europe; IMAGE Scenarios – Global environmental change in the 21st century.

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Figure 11: Example of time planning for an international scenario project assuming a total time of three years Page 26

Figure 10: SAS Overview (p 25)


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Type: Typology of new environmental scenarios

Date: 2008 Place: Global

Author/source: Wilkinson, A. et al Evolving practices in environmental scenarios: a new scenario typology Environ. Res. Lett. 3 (October-December 2008) 045017

See http://www.iop.org/EJ/article/1748-9326/3/4/045017/erl8_4_045017.html

This suggests a new environmental-centric approach to scenarios to engender more sustained and collaborative action to meet current climate change concerns and crisis. It proposes a new scenario typology to help guide scenario-based interventions, making explicit the types of and/or the approaches to knowledge which underpins a scenario approach.

There are three scenario types in this new typology:

1. Problem-focused Problem-focused scenarios tend to involve an approach to the environment that casts it, or some aspect of it, as an objective and quantifiable entity, divorced from the values judgments and impacts of actors or stakeholders. In essence, it involves the idea that the future is comprehensible and knowable. It involves experts working in particular disciplines to produce scholarly output that is validated by their peers. There is an assumption that accuracy guides decision making and a bias towards evidence-based research, with an emphasis on quantifiable data, rigor and excellence in a particular branch of learning. e.g. IPCC special report on emissions scenarios (SRES) http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_sr/?src=/climate/ipcc/emission/index.htm

2. Actor-centric

These are scenarios produced with a focus on the actors involved, and their relationship to the environment, drawing attention to their interpretation of events. The scenarios are used to shape organizational strategy, renewal and planning. The bias of the data can be towards qualitative, rather than quantifiable evidence, turning on the interpretation of any particular input. But since knowledge is deemed to emerge primarily from the consensus of the group, this may result in the idea that debate is the most effective method for acquiring wisdom. e.g. World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) Water Scenarios http://www.wbcsd.org/Plugins/DocSearch/details.asp?DocTypeId=33&ObjectId=MTk5OTI In this approach, the focus is on a `strategic environment', i.e. the environment specific to a group of actors that will use the scenarios.

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3. RIMA'—`reflexive interventionist or multi-agent based' This third and new approach aims both to bridge and enrich the first two approaches, recognizing uncertainty and variety in the processes and products of scenario building. In this approach, scenarios are a mode of action research: many forms of knowledge are sought—from explicit knowledge generated through formal modelling, to tacit local know-how, from quantitative data to qualitative input. Similarly, this approach necessitates clear descriptions of both the environment itself, and the relationships of many different actors to that environment, weighting each of those relationships equally, and acknowledging contradictions.

One possible challenge of this approach is apparently how to survey and involve all relevant worldviews, not only acknowledging multiple worldviews at the start of a project, but to find a way to involve them explicitly and sufficiently throughout the process. Moreover, this needs to be done in a manner that avoids a polarization of perspectives or the reduction of archetypes to stereotypes, and encourages learning between worldviews across different scales.

Figure 12. The reflexive interventionist/multi-agent-based (`RIMA') scenario approach in a context of increasing decision stakes/uncertainties

The authors imagine one way might be to design a series of processes—workshops, interviews, surveys, for example—occurring throughout a project, designed specifically to elicit different worldviews, followed by processes for disseminating and involving the information collected. This method would also allow for the inclusion of voices that might not be present among more directly involved participants. Such an approach demands not only time, which would need to be built into all stages of the project, but also new skills for hearing, recording and incorporating what could become overwhelming amounts of information.


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Lessons learned

This approach to scenarios emphasises the importance of the involvement and recombination of different knowledge approaches in a scenario-based process of action learning in the public interest to create a more effective bridge between longer-term thinking and more immediate actions.

Type: Scenarios and policy change

Date: 2009 Place: North Carolina, USA

Source: Poulter, B., Feldman, R.L., Brinson, M.M., Horton, B.P., Orbach, M.K., Pearsall, S.H., Reyes, E., Riggs, S.R., Whitehead, J.C., March 2009. Sea-level rise research and dialogue in North Carolina: Creating windows for policy change. Ocean & Coastal Management 52 (3-4), 147-153

“Coastal areas are among the world's most vulnerable landscapes to impacts related to climate change, including inundation from sea-level rise (SLR), increased exposure to shoreline erosion, and greater frequency and intensity of storms. The status of research on the physical, ecological, and socio-economic effects of vulnerability to SLR and progress toward planning for its consequences varies from region to region worldwide. Here, we synthesize the results of three decades of SLR research and the development of coastal management policies in North Carolina, USA. We identify the major factors responsible for opening new policy ‘windows’ that address SLR, including how stakeholders have developed an increased understanding of the risks, the extent of public dialogue about potential response strategies, and advances in political receptivity to policy change. Research and policy progress in North Carolina continue to provide a model for other regions to help guide and evaluate the development of coastal policies.”

The paper summarises assessments from a number of disciplines on long term change and climate change impacts in North Carolina. The area is characterised by barrier islands and large sheltered estuary- could be dramatic changes if this system collapsed. The paper makes an assessment of physical (e.g. overwashing of barrier islands), ecological (e.g. pine forest retreat) and socio-economic change (e.g. beachfront property damage), drawing on a variety of research. Concerning adaptation, land management practices are deemed to be significant- better control of shoreline development and many other activities. ). Adaptation/Mitigation options include large scale aquatic and terrestrial restoration. The authors point out that whilst research has been going on for sometime, few policies have

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2008.09.010�




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been implemented, but a number of factors are bringing about increased dialogue including public opinion, new streams of regulation and more integrated researc

Type: Regional climate change adaptation policymaking framework and scenarios

Date: 2006 Place: California, USA

Source: Luers, A.L. Moser, S.C. [California Climate Change Center] 2006 Preparing for the impacts of climate change in California: opportunities and constraints for adaptation. March 2006 Report Number: CEC-500-2005-198-SF

This report by a multidisciplinary group of researchers from the well financed climate change centre which provides a context on climate change in California. The report puts forward six key findings (a) mitigation and adaptation are complementary and both required (b) abrupt or surprising shifts have the potential to increase climate vulnerability (c) Adaption is not being addressed due to emphases on mitigation or denial of climate change (d) decision makers need to implement strategies based on good awareness/analysis/actions (e) the state's adaptive capacity is good but requires special attention and greater commitment (f) the differential impacts of climate change raise ‘environmental justice’ questions.

Type: Regional strategy

Date: 2009 Place: California USA

Source: Matthew Heberger, Heather Cooley, Pablo Herrera, Peter H. Gleick, and Eli Moore 2009. The impacts of sea-level rise on the California coast. A report for the California Climate Change Center. March 2009. Report Number CEC-500-2009-024-D

This report concentrates on flood events and erosion risks to the California Coast, seeking to quantify population, infrastructure and natural habitats at risk through spatial analysis and economic valuation.


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Type: Regional strategy

Date: 2009 Place: Miami-Dade County, Florida, USA

Source: Miami-Dade Climate Change Advisory Task Force (CCATF).2008. Second Report and Initial Assessment. Miami-Dade County Board of County Commissioners.

An Interesting example of how a major municipality is seeking to address climate change.

For download see: http://www.miamidade.gov/derm/climate_change

Type: Participatory scenario tools

Date: 2002 Place: UK

Source: Berkhout, F. & Hertin, J. Foresight Futures Scenarios: developing and applying a participatory strategic planning tool, U. Sussex GMI 37 Spring 2002

This sets out an earlier version of the UK Foresight Programme Scenario Framework set elaborated in more detail and relevance to climate change strategic response in the Future flooding report (2004). The same 4 generic scenarios are off reed for the UK in 2020 – namely (1) World Markets, (2) Global Responsibility (3) national EEnterprise and (4) Local Stewardship. It does have some good materials concerning the pros and cons of contemporary scenario use – especially in the emphasis on transparency and diversity:

Transparency - the process of making explicit assumptions about relationships between driving forces

Diversity – implies that scenarios go beyond a single best estimate, or a high or low projection either side of this and encourage us to explore a number if different , logically consistent pathways as way for framing our question regarding the future.

The literature summarises many empirical findings on the characteristics of high performance organisations (see Light, 2005) (4). However, the literature review for this report did not find any studies that have thoroughly tested claims that scenario analysis favours robust strategies by carrying out ex-post assessments of the performance of organisations that have conducted such analysis.

http://www.miamidade.gov/derm/climate_change�


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Type: ICM use of scenarios and futures in integrated environmental assessment

Date: 2005 Place: Global, EU

Source: ICM application of futures/scenarios - chapters 14 & 15 by Turner, R and Nunneri, C et al in book: Vermaat, J, Bouwer, L, Turner, K and Salomons, W (2005) Managing European coasts: past, present and future, Springer Berlin Heidelberg

R. Kerry Turner in Chapter 14 Integrated environmental assessment and coastal futures discusses the use of futures for better forward looking analysis especially for locally specific and more generic problems, coupled with DP-S-I-R analysis as a scoping framework “to identify significant environmental change driving pressures and their ecological and socio-political consequences”. Given the high degree of uncertainty futures scenario analysis is recommended to indicate the likely outcomes and policy options available. It also identifies a number of probable new policy contexts in the future re ICM namely 1. Future impacts of trade and economic development e.g. dredging, exotic species, environmental degradation 2. Environmental change impact on fisheries and implications for intensive aquaculture 3. Coastal protection and sea defence 4. Water quality 5. Degradation of natural habitats and ecosystem.

He also supplies a useful conceptual framework: ( see Figure X page Y below). Scenarios in this setting foster a process by which alternative worldviews (ecocentrism, technocentrism, weak sustainability or strong sustainability) and conventional wisdoms are challenged and clarified in order to focus on critical issues. There is no shortage of existing candidates scenarios to choose from. Turner suggests a hybrid approach: borrows existing sets of scenarios to investigate the impact of climate change, technological advances and environmental consequences in a variety of contexts. Set out set off contextual narratives. Next uses them to fix the 4 UNEP 2002 more specific scenarios for coastal and catchment areas. Uses the 2002 Foresight stuff. Then goes through them one by one with emphasis on the DP-S-I-R drivers in relation to the ICM headings etc. p 271 Group Report: Integrated assessment and future scenarios for the coast covers a lot of ground already covered by Ledoux et al on the Humber but with a broader global perspective.


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Chapter 15 p 271 Group Report: Integrated assessment and future scenarios for the coast Corinna Nunneri et al identifies present and futures driving forces for the development of coastal zones in different sea basins and their consequent impacts in the coastal zone function and ecosystems across Europe. It takes an integrative perspective utilising both natural science and social science findings. The methodologies used are DP-S-I-R (Driver Pressure-State-Impact -Response) and the use of qualitative futures scenarios. It reveals a strong stress on stakeholder dialogue approach to mitigate stakeholder conflicts, depending on the kind of society, needs and awareness of the general public – either bottom-up or top-down participatory approaches. It suggests that active stakeholder participation has the following advantages – it enriches assessment by offering multiple insights and point of view, provides a basis for confronting issues and needs that are fundamental causes of discontent and lobbying e.g. arguing parties may agree on the choice of 3rd party as an objective arbiter for different management strategies and it engages people actively in decision making thereby making them more likely to help implement it. It is also suggested that the participatory approach is best operationalised by taking a few pragmatic steps – (1)involving people in expressing their desires for “their” future coastal environment and what the coastal zone should be “offering” them; (2) setting out a set of indicator methodologies for describing the current state of the system , once the future vision is agreed (3) plotting the desirable steps etc , back-casting style 0 step by step pathways to attain the vision, regardless of how short or long term the target vision is.

An assessment procedure will be needed as a safeguard to check the appropriacy of adopted policies, plus periodic review of the vision to see if it is still fit for purpose. The participatory approach is apparently very good at adapting to changing expectations, new information flows and lesson learning. It has drawbacks however as well – especially in its assumptions of achieved consensus among stakeholders. Time constraints might also make top-down interventions necessary. A totally bottom-up participatory approach sensu strictu might be difficult to achieve. The analysis scenarios as outputs can inform baseline studies initiating the integrated environmental assessment system. Scenarios can also be used later in the assessment process to test approach against achieved objectives. Thus scenarios play a secondary role as checking device for successes. Scenario can also show up best matches between different policy approaches and their evolutionary status, giving more robust management options.


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Figure 13: Turner, RK et al - Conceptual framework for scenarios use in ICM


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Exploratory

Type: Scenarios used in testing coastal governance processes

Date: 2009 Place: East of England, UK

Author/source: SQW / Report to the East of England Coastal initiative Who decides? A study of governance processes across three coastal areas (August 2009)

For download see http://insighteast.org.uk/viewResource.aspx?id=17490&fs=1

Also the EECI website: http://www.go-east.gov.uk/goeast/environment_and_rural/environment_issues/Coastal_Initiative/

This is a report commissioned by GO-East (UK) on behalf of Sustainability East from SQW Consulting as part of a wider coastal initiative. Its purpose is

“to examine structures and processes of governance in three coastal areas in the East of England and to test their robustness and resilience in the context of different futures scenarios.”

It addresses the variety of issue types involved in coastal governance and related priorities: what does it mean to so many people? A protected landscape, deprived communities etc? The Report sets out to find out what the critical stakeholders perceived and what they required – locally, regionally and nationally –and addresses existing perceived needs: environmental protection, social deprivation; leisure and tourism; economic development and community regeneration. Issues of progressive complexity, uniquely coastal issues get lost within the mainstream economic agenda. It poses the critical question: In what way are decisions about managing the coast made?

This exercise was conducted as part of the East of England Coastal Initiative (EECI). This is a multi-agency project set up by the UK Government Office - East and guided by a number of regional bodies. By bringing together partners at a national, regional and local level, the Initiative seeks to consider the long-term future of the coast in an integrated manner. The EECI partnership includes the EEDA, EERA, the UK Environment Agency, Natural England, the coastal Local Authorities (Norfolk County Council, Essex County Council and Suffolk Coastal District Council), CoastNet and Sustainability East.

The EECI address key long-term challenges/issues facing the region's coast, namely:

• understanding the possibilities and tensions created by high quality natural environments and areas in need of regeneration (and greater economic opportunity) existing together

• additional pressures presented by climate change - along a coast that is particularly vulnerable to the effects of sea level rise - and the need to identify ways in which the coast and its communities can adapt

http://insighteast.org.uk/viewResource.aspx?id=17490&fs=1�

http://www.go-east.gov.uk/goeast/environment_and_rural/environment_issues/Coastal_Initiative/�

http://www.go-east.gov.uk/goeast/environment_and_rural/environment_issues/Coastal_Initiative/�


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• more consistent approaches to coastal management and for improved policy integration, so that stakeholders can respond effectively to these challenges

To tackle these problems EECI focuses on 5 work areas:

1. Integrating and improving decision-making processes for and about the coast 2. Enhancing the effectiveness of community engagement in these processes 3. Improving the evidence base for considering coastal futures 4. Providing an input to policies for the coast 5. Managing the implementation (and implications) of decisions about the coast

The Initiative works closely with Whitehall departments (through the involvement of GO-East) to highlight issues and test proposals. It is also an IMCORE Project activity and output.

The report found that “governance” is a very fluid term and definition, largely contextually defined by who and where, issues and circumstances. The strengths and weaknesses of current decision making processes were however examined. In addition, given that coastal governance (however defined) is a constantly evolving practice the authors of the report undertook a futures exercise “not by imaging scenario for climate change erosion and flooding, but by considering how the policy landscape might evolve and the effect this may have on governance arrangements”.

The report’s authors concluded that coastal issues tend to be treated as a specialist subject not well connected into “mainstream” strategies and programmes. They stress the distinction between three types of decision-making roles that organisations must carry:

• Roles using statutory powers

• Roles applying financial or author resources

• Roles exerting “real” influence (via non-statutory plans or partnerships)

Fiscal and spending timescales for the various activities and objectives of governance in the region were found to be very out of kilter and unhelpful with regards to effective deployment of resources to combat natural or anthropogenic changes in the coastal zone e.g. whilst spending plans have 2-3 year perspectives (determined by Spending Review cycles), Local development Frameworks and Sustainable Community Strategies have 20 year planning horizons and Shoreline Management Plans 100 year horizons. The report also reflects on the fact that a long term perspective is not always easy to hold in the mind or grasp, partly due to the science underpinning projects addressing natural coastal processes:

The point is that this long term perspective should always be evident in the thinking behind short term strategies or plans that have a lasting legacy in areas that are subject to coastal change. (p2)

Commenting on Shoreline Management Plans – the knowledge based toolkit from which political decisions relating to the coats are currently made – the report comments that although they have produced a framework for prioritising coastal defences, since they are not however statutory documents, their links to local people and communities (in governance and accountability terms) are weak - plus they supply no mechanism of implementation. Despite


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directives for ICZM and UK compliance via DEFRA,” coastal governance actions still fit very often into discrete sectoral thematic domains and terrestrial spatial planning domains”, cross cutting various levels of legislative obligation.

The report underlines the important role of communities’ own coastal governance especially those facing common threats though property destruction caused by coastal erosion e.g. North Norfolk. These have organised around the common threat, built solid platforms of support and knowledge and achieved considerable influence at high levels of government.

Method and structure

The study was commissioned as a research exercise with a bottom-up focus. It was conducted over 3 phases:

Phase 1: A review of existing structures and process of governance relating to the three coastal

areas in the East of England:

(a) Blackwater Estuary

(b) Great Yarmouth / Lowestoft

(c) North Norfolk

These resulted in an output of 3 respective situational analyses reflecting the realities of coastal government at local scale.

This was done initially from the perspective of five “lenses”, used to filter the raft of strategies and plans relating to the coastal territories defining each of the 3 case studies:

Economic regeneration

1. Flood risk and coastal defence 2. Housing and affordable homes 3. Environmental asset management 4. Transport & accessibility This was followed by a more detailed investigation of the existing governance processes surrounding the issues identified on these cases studies , through consultation with local (and some regional ) stakeholders.

Phase 2: The development of 3 futures scenario as tools to test current governance processes

with the objective of their robustness and resilience. These were structured primarily in response to known policy drivers. These scenarios' robustness and resilience were tested through consideration in workshops held in each case study area.

Phase 3: Summary of recommendations based on study findings , for use in policy making at regional and national levels, especially proposed revisions to the Regional Spatial Strategy in the East of England.


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The characteristics of each scenario are laid out in tabular form thus:

Figure X: The 3 policy-based scenarios developed

Figure 14: East of England 2 x 2 scenario matrix


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The report authors stress that they were less concerned with the form/content of the scenarios and more preoccupied with their consequences within the governance context:

The use of the scenarios in the workshop discussion in each of the there case study areas was analogous to a pebble being thrown into a pond: what mattes is not so much the shape or composition of the pebble (i.e. the three scenarios) but the consequences for the pond (in this case the processes of governance in coastal areas) …we make no further comment on the scenarios themselves, other than to say that they reflect the plausible directions already evident in government policy and that they serve to stretch current governance arrangements in a way that is revealing. (p 28)

They are more concerned rather with the scenario testing process – i.e. how resilient are processes of coastal governance and in what ways (and why) might these processes change?

It must be stressed that the initial scoping of drivers and issues for the development of these scenarios was achieved through the use of a limited group of experts, whose output was reviewed and discussed with Coastal Initiative Steering Group and through interviews with coastal experts conducted by the report authors. A number of possible options for determining axes for these drivers’ clusters or themes – from which would derive the content of the scenarios to a greater or lesser extent, were also evaluated ( see fig x below).

Figure 15: East of England coastal policy scenarios 1-3 and their characteristics


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The two thematic axes eventually chosen were selected for their reflection of the broad contrasts between

• Tendency for decision making to be increasingly devolved and for solutions to be negotiated locally versus increasingly centralised, impact-focused decision making processes

• Contrast in perspective between imperatives of the natural environment and pressures for economic growth and physical regeneration.

The report authors admit the possible flaws in the relative simple clarity offered by the 2X2 matrix approach – the possibility of false dichotomies etc but felt the consultation process would counter this and provide rich and elaborate interpretations of driver interactions.

Within each of the sub regional workshops 3 breakout groups were held as well. Each breakout group was given free rein to consider 1, 2 or all 3 scenarios in relation to governance processes previously identified for specific “crunchy” issues. Given time limitations in practice this meant many of these breakout groups focused on 1 scenario in relation to the governance of 1 issue.

Workshop results re Scenario 1 (Big project, Big solution) and Scenario 2 (Big Green Brother) considering the process of coastal governance came to the following conclusions:

• Clarity of responsibility – welcomed by all, irrespective if policy drivers underpinning it

• The size of stakes: risk and rewards – i.e. decisions with regard to implementing priorities would be more substantially based and less scatter gun

• Change in bases of community engagement – some thought this would cause greater solidarity in the face of a massive singular threat. Others maintained it would cause disengagement, disempowerment and disenfranchisement.

Figure 16: East of England pre-scenario possible axial themes


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Workshop results re Scenario 3 (Locally Integrated and Negotiated Solutions) considering the processes of coastal governance came to the following conclusions:

These show some equivocation with regard to this particular scenario:

• Gives more scope for inventive, bespoke and tailored solutions – however some participant felt this was happening despite and not because of regional governance

• Breadth of community perspective – yes but might negate the collaboration so vital and interconnected typical of the sub-regions

• Need for real expertise – given the complexity of issues, local action could not really be effective without resource to higher expertise, for a more intelligent and robust understanding?

• Effectiveness of local partnerships : Scenario 3 was felt to expose the weaknesses of local partnerships[s], and could be a recipe for stasis and inertia

Within the consultation exercise as a well the consultants felt that the scenario testing process represented the culmination of the study. The preparatory phases required by the scenarios – extensive reviewing, the listing of crunchy issues etc. They also though the instrumental rather than result led function of scenarios was critical:

The results underline the use of scenarios as a tool but not an end in themselves. ( p31)


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Figure 17: East of England scenario impact on the ICZM Principles


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Figure 17: East of England scenario impact on the ICZM Principles (continued)


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Type: Exploratory national socioeconomic climate change scenarios

(UKCIP SES)

Date: 2001 Place: United Kingdom

Author/source: UKCIP Socio-economic scenarios (SES) for climate change impact assessment: A guide to their use in the UK Climate Impacts Programme

This was the first large scale UK public sector attempt at visioning for future climate change societies that wasn’t just an extrapolation of short-term trends. It derives in great part from two other processes – (1) the IPCC emission scenarios, a major of which was to construct qualitative storylines drawing on expertise in the business and academic worlds (2) the Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI’s) Foresight Panel on Natural Resources and Environment identification and the development of a number of contextual scenarios to engage the private sector and wider audiences in environmental futures. Through the study UKCIP 1) Reviewed other work on future scenarios to develop a robust futures framework for impact analysis 2) Polled impacts researchers and the stakeholder community to define practical non-climate information requirements to be accommodated in a range of possible future scenarios 3) Developed a range of possible scenarios of socio-economic change and development, along with a suitable framework for their use in UKCIP, providing a detailed analysis of possible futures at both 2020 and 2050, giving consideration as well to governance structures and social values; 4) Provided accompanying quantified indicators to meet the demands of the impacts and stakeholder community, including demography, economic growth an development, land use change and settlement patterns 5) Added regional characterisation to these national scenarios.

Figure 18: IPCC IS99 scenarios exercise 2x2 matrix


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The aim was to provide a framework for the studies within UKCIP. UKCIP selected four criteria for the development of the socio-economic scenarios: • credibility (not over-estimating the rate of change) • relevance (applicable to public and private sector decision-making) • consistency(based on coherent assumptions) • transparency (clear exposition of assumptions) The scenarios were constructed with the following aims: • The basic scenario dimensions. The more qualitative dimensions of socio-economic change were the basis of scenario construction. These dimensions relate to: a) governance and the capacity of institutions at different levels to manage change; and b) the orientation of social and political values. The choice was justified by stakeholder engagement throughout the project but could have been different. • Other scenario dimensions were associated to a varying extent with governance and values. Some dimensions e.g. population develop in a predictable, semi-autonomous way, while e.g. technology depend more on social values and regulation. The stakeholders contributed especially to the elaboration of storylines in the context of these qualitative dimensions. • Relevance at national and regional levels - although the scenarios referred to the UK, they were applicable at a regional/country level - scenarios for developments in the UK implicitly assume characteristics about developments in Europe and globally. • Consistency of indicators. a set of consistency checks was used to ensure that different indicators (e.g. household formation and economic growth), although determined through expert judgement, are telling the same story. Sector specialists were consulted in choosing relevant indicators and defining indicator values. • Symmetry in treatment of scenarios. They struck a balance between scenarios which were plausible since they extrapolated existing trends, and those representing a break with the past and deliberately challenged to the conventional notions. A set of four scenarios was thus produced which did not break all bounds of plausibility. Equivalent effort was devoted to elaborating each scenario - a practice recommended to users of the scenario framework. • Drivers and impact domains. For ease of use in climate change research and planning the exposition of each of the scenarios was based around drivers and impact domains. In the case of this study there were drivers were: values and policy; economic development; and settlement and planning. The impact domains were: agriculture; water; ecosystems; coastal zones; tourism; and the built environment. See http://www.ukcip.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=21&Itemid=9 The UKCIP SES were further consolidated by the BESEECH Building Economic and Social information for Examining the Effects of Climate cHange project which set out to generate



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enhanced socio-economic scenario characterising in particular the adaptive ability and capacity of different actors and individuals relevant to the built environment. See http://www.k4cc.org/bkcc/beseech The 2002 UKCIP SES scenarios were recently reviewed (February 2009) for UKCIP in the report Critical review of the application of the UKCIP Socioecomic scenarios: lessons learned and future directions by Nick Hughes, Julia Tomei and Paul Ekins of King's College London. It makes some valuable criticisms of the UKCIP SES 2001 which you should bear in mind; • the 2x2 scenarios grid has a drawback - by ensuring a wide number of parameters fit

within each scenario 'value space' it results in slightly caricatured visions of the future. It tends to produce an unrealistic polarisation of values within scenarios, making it difficult to 'ground' scenarios constrained by such axes to kinds of policy concerns and other dynamics

• the scenarios are defined by high level drivers, but do not adequately define the activities and influence of different actors, making it less clear what role potential scenario users might play in the future.

• the scenarios are not adequately 'grounded' in presently evident factors, especially policy and regulatory development frameworks which will be of great relevance to local and regional actors who are potential users of them.

• It lacks a “focal question “defining what they are actually for. Just as interesting was the feedback from the stakeholders vis a vis the original SES:

• the scenarios did not appear to have a strong link to their particular concerns, with scant relation to the 'real world'.

• due to the perceived resource intensiveness of socioeconomic scenarios, the additional complications etc. many preferred 'off the shelf' scenarios which they could obtain and apply with minimal resources.

• issues of agency: the business of mapping one set of scenarios on another is complicated by different levels of agency operating at global and local levels: regional actors are influential in their regional context, but have little critical influence in the global. The agency of different actors should be clearly defined.

http://www.k4cc.org/bkcc/beseech�


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Type: Scenario-based stakeholder engagement combining stakeholder analysis, climate change management scenarios and deliberative techniques

Date: 2008 Place: Christchurch Bay (England) & Orkney Islands (Scotland), United Kingdom

Author/source: Emma L. Tompkins et al Scenario-based stakeholder engagement: Incorporating stakeholders preferences into coastal planning for climate change Journal of Environmental Management Volume 88, Issue 4, September 2008, Pages 1580-1592

This study employed a novel synthetic method of scenario-based stakeholder engagement (see figure x below) bringing together stakeholder analysis, climate change management scenarios and deliberative techniques to examine necessary trade-offs associated with long term coastal planning.

The method was applied to two case studies of coastal planning in Christchurch Bay on the south coast of England and the Orkney Islands off the north coast of Scotland. The study revealed a range of conflicting preferences existing as to the ideal governance structure for coastal management subject to different climate change scenarios. Study results also showed that public understanding of the necessary trade-offs is critical for gaining public

Figure 19: Stakeholder and expert roles


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support for long term coastal decision-making. The researchers concluded that scenario-based stakeholder engagement is a useful tool for facilitating coastal management planning as it took into account the complexities and challenges of climate change plus it could be used in conjunction with existing approaches e.g. Shoreline Management Planning.

Interestingly the study underlined the weakness of current coastal zone management approaches in the UK which either do not adequately incorporate changing stakeholder preferences, or do not make stakeholders aware necessary trade-offs in coastal management decision-making .

The resulting exploratory scenarios are illustrated below:

Figure 20: 2 X2 Scenario Model: Future Coastal Management Option


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Type: Typology and characteristics of evaluative scenarios as used in environmental planning

Date: 2009 Place: EU, Global

Author/source: EEA technical report No. 3 Looking back on looking forward: a review of evaluative scenario literature

“Scenarios are at their most useful for supporting decision-making through helping identify robust strategies in public policy. “

This is a very recent and thorough examination of the advantages and pitfalls of using scenarios and debunks quite a few received wisdoms.

See http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/looking-back-on-looking-forward-a-review-of-evaluative-scenario-literature

Handling surprises and discontinuities in scenarios

Scenario planning is useful as tool to analyse future events since it can reduce overconfidence about the future. One resulting weakness of this is however that it is difficult for scenarios to accommodate or anticipate surprises or discontinuities. In 1999 20 scenario studies of national security in the United States all tended to focus on extrapolations of current concerns and rarely focused on factors producing startling emergent behaviour leading to the 9/11 terror bombings. The standard scenario approaches following the axis approach tend to exclude surprising or paradoxical developments as inconsistent or logically impossible. This can be avoided by building scenarios inductively from scoped trends rather than just 2 key driving forces, ensuring that surprising elements and influence factor combinations are addressed that might drop out in the axial framework of the usual deductive approach. This allows more attention for wild cards, extending the scenario building process and permitting the introduction of ostensibly paradoxical elements. Claims of inconsistency are after all highly subjective and be exposed as irrelevant in larger group discussions.

Public sector applications

Scenario users in the public sector often find it difficult to establish who exactly is theclient, given the integrated character of many environmental problems. Many policy actors either shape and implement policies or are directly or indirectly affected by environmental policies and thus have an interest. Framing the purpose of the engagement and eliciting participation from all relevant parties can be difficult, since a lot of policy processes interact and influence each other at different stages. Methods that work well in developing scenarios for small groups may not work well for large organisations or contribute to broad political debates. Decision makers also face constraints e.g. Diversity of legitimate but competing objectives and societal interests.

http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/looking-back-on-looking-forward-a-review-of-evaluative-scenario-literature�

http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/looking-back-on-looking-forward-a-review-of-evaluative-scenario-literature�


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Although the traditional scenario axis approach argues against including probabilistic information with scenarios, in some public sector applications, however, such probabilities may prove useful. There is much debate in particular on this issue in the climate change community. Probabilities may certainly be useful in some situations, especially particular when key variables distinguishing the scenarios are few and quantitative.

Making scenarios more effective

You get more bangs for your buck if key stakeholders and policy-makers are directly involved in the process of developing the scenarios. Impacts like raising awareness, policy learning and reviewing the validity of policy assumptions often result via the actual process of developing scenarios than from the published output e.g. global environmental assessments. Close collaboration between scenario developers and users, at the outset and the conclusion of a scenario exercise, is needed to establish the process and them build trust. Process is important since it has implications for the extent scenarios are trusted scenarios and used. Trust may relate to sources (i.e. the scenario developers) or to content. Methodological credibility is also needed to establish trust as in trust in these advocating and disseminating the scenario outputs. The usefulness of information from scenario exercises is influenced not also by organisational settings and institutional routines of final target groups.

Short-termist concerns, the compartmentalised structure of modern governments obstruct long-term thinking and decision-making. The mix of government objectives and interests can make it difficult to establish one single client, especially in the field of environmental policy, which cuts across several other policy areas, as noted in the UKCIP SES Review above.

Type: Scenarios used in holistic systems analysis

Date: 2004 Place: North Sea coast of Schleswig- Holstein, Germany

Author/source: Andreas Kannen, Forschungs- und Technologiezentrum Westküste, Germany Holistic Systems Analysis for ICZM: The Coastal Futures Approach Coastline Reports 1 (2004) Zukunft Küste – Coastal Future was one of two large platform projects funded by the German Ministry of Research (BMBF). Starting in April 2004, the project was designed to support sustainable development along the North Sea coast of Schleswig- Holstein and address the ICZM needs of region. It involved a total of 50 project partners and consists of four interrelated project modules and 12 sub-projects, each of which is guided by specific research questions. The scientific concept was based on bringing together tools from both natural and social sciences - e.g. scenario techniques, modelling, stakeholder dialogues and Multi-Criteria Analysis - in order to develop planning and management options at the local, regional and national level. A key theme was the assessment of interactions resulting from offshore wind farm development, including impacts on ecosystem and habitat structures, the economy and infrastructure, conflicts between stakeholders as well as social values


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such as perception of the coast by local people. To ensure methodological and conceptual integration, integrated assessment (known e.g. from LOICZ) and indicators (based on the DPSIR approach) formed the framework. This framework, building on former international research, was flexibly applied to different thematic fields and used qualitative and quantitative information. It also allowed comprehensive dialogue with local, regional and national stakeholders, which integrated these actors as research partners. Some of the key drivers identified were:

• Rural area, low population density, • High importance of coastal defence, • Wadden Sea protected as National Park, • Agriculture as dominating land use, • Tourism as dominating economic sector, • emergence of wind energy as a new challenge

Figure 21: Drivers Web used in Zukunft Küste


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Type: Scenarios as aids to decision-making, inclusion and policy option evaluation

Date: 2002 Place: Humber Estuary (England), United Kingdom

Author/source: Laure Ledoux et al Towards integrated catchment/ coastal zone management: science, policy and scenarios CSERGE Working Paper ECM 02-05

This research investigated the use of scenarios within an overall decision-support process and toolbox, as part of an ongoing European research project, EURO-CAT, which aimed to achieve integrated catchment and coastal zone management by analysing the response of the coastal sea to changes in fluxes of nutrients and contaminants from the catchments. This was set in the context of the impending imposition of one policy initiative - The European Water Framework Directive - on water quality objectives for all water bodies, including coastal waters. The scenarios use examined in Humber River Basin were seen to be largely beneficial as a method to aid decision-makers grappling with uncertainty, and not as a simple predictive method. It detailed the consequences of attempting policy strategies incorporating radically different worldviews in a more visionary fashion. The scenarios were also used within a multi-criteria analysis to facilitate dialogue in a situation where multiple competing stakeholder interests were at stake. They were considered to have provided (a) a more inclusionary process for decision-making, (b) a useful tool to investigate future fluxes and (c) evaluated policy options for a more integrated coastal/catchment management strategy.

Figure 22: Zukunft Küste Toolbox model for scenarios integration into ICZM assessment


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The scenarios used in this Humber study were is embedded within a stepped Integrated Environmental Assessment (IEA) for Water Resources:

1. Scoping and auditing stage - to scope the nature of the problem and the causes and consequences that are relevant.

The DP-S-I-R (driving pressures-state-impacts-response) framework, originally developed by the OECD, applied to scope management issues and problems as well as salient drivers of change within the estuarine system. Also provided important conceptual connection between ecosystem change and the effects of that change (impacts) on people’s economic and social well-being.

Relevant indicators of environmental change and the loss of ecosystem function provision in terms of goods and services (direct and indirectly received) were translated into human welfare loss and quantified in monetary and/or other more qualitative ways.

Stakeholders mapping – essential to scenarios development –was also conducted identifying:

• different ‘interest’ groups within the catchment and outside (national and international)

at relevant to the policy issues and contexts being focussed on;

• existing stakeholder networks (or the lack of networks);

• existing institutional arrangements and ‘power’ structures; and

• Aggregate ‘policy networks’ (or the lack of networks) that serve to influence policy

choice outcomes.

2. Identification and selection of complementary analytical methods and techniques - such

as GIS, coupled natural science models, costs benefit analysis, etc;

3. Data collection and monitoring via indicators of change and forecasting of future

possibilities via environmental change scenarios;

4. Evaluation of project, policy or programme options - using methods such as stakeholder

analysis, cost effectiveness, cost benefit analysis and multi-criteria analysis.


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Figure 23: DPSIR framework for the Humber catchment

Drivers found to be specific to the Humber were population growth and urbanisation, agriculture, industry, port development and climate change. The Humber study used the National scenario templates (OST, 1999) of the The UK Foresight Programme 2040 as its archetypes. These scenarios are framed by two orthogonal axes, representing societal values (ranging from consumerist, self-interested market-based preferences to collectivist and conservationist social preferences) and level of effective governance (from local to global) respectively. Three regional variants were derived from the OST national scenarios and adapted to the Humber: 1. The Business As Usual scenario: the baseline scenario, corresponding roughly to the World Markets scenario at national level. It is a forward projection of the past 20 year trends in data, ignoring the recent sustainable development strictures. 2. The Policy Target scenario: current and prospective legislative targets and objectives are all met on time, according to the EU schedule, with a genuine effort to comply and/or to over-comply with the objectives. 3. The Deep Green scenario: environmental protection is given maximum priority. It corresponds loosely to a state between the Global Sustainability and Local Stewardship


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national scenarios. This represents some environmental state beyond that which could be achieved if current policies were implemented.

Figure 24: Humber Estuary 2 X 2 Scenario Matrix

The Scenarios were used to describe different policy contexts and environmental objectives to investigate their consequences, in particular what reduction in fluxes they would imply, and what policy measures should be implemented to reach these objectives. These scenarios also met the Water Framework Directive requirement for the use of baseline scenarios to assess future impacts. Two of the scenarios compiled with the Directive the Business as Usual scenario (a pessimistic baseline) and the Policy Targets scenario could be (an optimistic one). The scenarios were also felt to be potentially useful as a framework for policy analysis, within multicriteria analysis which also allows co-consideration of cost benefits etc as well in contexts of great uncertainty.


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Type: Developing and linking exploratory scenarios for social-ecological systems across multiple spatial scales

Date: 2007 Place: Worldwide (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) global scenarios)

Author/source: Biggs, R. et al Linking Futures across Scales: a Dialog on Multiscale Scenarios Ecology and Society 12(1): 17

The motivations for developing multiscale scenarios are to engage stakeholders and help understand driving forces, processes, perspectives, and responses at multiple scales.

Multiscale scenarios can better maintain relevance across multiple decision-making scales than, for instance, a single-scale global exercise, and thereby potentially enhance stakeholder engagement and use of the scenario results. The development of multiscale scenarios may facilitate increased communication among stakeholder groups or decision makers at different scales and increase our appreciation of differences in stakeholder concerns or perspectives. Furthermore, social, political, economic, and ecological processes can often be more readily observed, or have stronger impacts, at some scales than others. Multiscale scenario exercises can highlight these differences. Cross-scale interactions, which are important in social-ecological systems, can also be better considered in multiscale scenarios. They also make it easier to examine the impacts of mismatches between the scale at which ecological processes occur and the scale at which management occurs.

Exploratory scenarios typically use the present or recent past as a starting point and explore how the future may develop under different sets of assumptions. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) global scenarios are an example of a scenario exercise that was primarily exploratory: it sketched out four plausible future worlds to 2050 and analyzed the implications for ecosystem services.

The authors synthesised four methods of linking scenario elements and outcomes from case studies in the MA and the Global Environmental Change and Food Systems programme - the methods may be used for any set of scales:

• Driver trajectories at the global scale are used as boundary conditions to frame developments within the regional-scale scenarios. The regional scenarios are developed in a way that ensures that the outcomes of the regional scenarios do not conflict with those of the global scenarios. An iterative process is often used whereby the global-scale storylines are reassessed and reworked in response to regional-scale outcomes. This approach may be used to develop loosely linked multiscale scenarios or tightly coupled cross-scale scenarios. The MedAction scenarios used an iterative approach to link local-level degradation scenarios to scenarios for the Mediterranean region in a tightly coupled cross-scale exercise. The Gariep Basin component of the Southern African MA used a non-iterative loosely linked approach to translate a set of scenario archetypes.


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• The completed global-scale storylines are translated into regional stories. For example, scenarios for the agricultural future of Europe and the Netherlands have been developed in this way using the IPCC emissions scenarios as a starting point, and then modifying the scenarios to address region-specific uncertainties. The Portugal MA scenarios were similarly constructed using assumptions and decision-making paradigms from the MA global scenarios (Pereira et al. 2004), and the ongoing GEO scenario effort has also adopted this approach (Rothman 2006). In contrast to the previous method, some of the resulting scenario outcomes may conflict with those at the larger scale. This approach is common in developing loosely linked multiscale scenarios.

• Regional scenarios are developed with little or no reference to the global scenarios and then mapped onto the global scenarios. The mapping may be done by classifying the scenarios at each scale into several archetypes, based on their drivers and outcomes. The Southern African MA and Caribbean Sea MA scenarios were linked in this way to the MA global scenarios. This approach is particularly effective if engaging stakeholders and maintaining credibility at multiple scales is a key focus of the scenario development process. The disadvantage is that the scenario storylines will contain a substantial degree of inconsistency, and cross-scale processes and feedbacks are not well accounted for.

• Global scenarios are used to test the viability and effectiveness of regional policy options without developing complete regional scenarios. This allows exploration of, for example, which policy options would be the most effective or robust in alternative future worlds.

Drawing on the limited number of multiscale scenario exercises conducted to date, they suggest that the following are important issues to note:

• Different goals and methods at different scales may lead to incomparable results. Because scenario design is often guided by the rule “form follows function,” a multiscale scenario exercise faces the challenge that scenarios at each scale often have different functions or goals and hence use different methods and processes. In the exercises carried out to date, global-scale scenarios have tended to be more science- or research-oriented and rely heavily on quantitative methods, whereas local-scale scenarios have often been more stakeholder-oriented with greater use of qualitative methods. On the one hand, such differences in goals and methods make multiscale scenarios powerful, in that they broaden the perspectives adopted and the issues addressed. On the other hand, these differences can lead to scenario results that are not easily integrated or compared, at least in a stricter quantitative sense. At any scale, it is crucial to define the goals of the scenario exercise as clearly as possible to avoid confusion among participants and stakeholders.

• Linking is difficult when the relevance of issues and processes changes with scale.

Some issues and processes are scale-specific and lose meaning when transferred to other scales. In many local-scale scenario exercises, scenario developers report


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difficulties with upscale-ing or accounting for important local processes or issues in global-scale scenarios (e.g. , local factors that contribute to collective action, such as social capital, networks, and knowledge, may be difficult to account for in global scenarios. Local knowledge is also sometimes seen as irrelevant or unreliable at broader scales or discarded because of the complexities and time constraints faced in integrating very different types of knowledge (Erickson et al. 2005). In the case of downscaling, certain elements of global scenarios may become less relevant at sub-global scales. For instance, the rapid rise in green technology in the MA “Techno Garden” scenario (Carpenter et al. 2005) seems of little importance, or at least much less important than other factors, when considering the future of some parts of the developing world. Scenario developers or stakeholders may be reluctant to include processes or issues that are important at other scales but which they feel do not directly affect them. For example, some of the sub-global assessments of the MA chose not to use the MA global scenarios because they felt that the importance of local issues outweighed those stressed in the global scenarios.

• Credibility is often sacrificed at one scale or another.

Multiscale scenarios must often sacrifice either local specificity or global significance. Trade-offs frequently exist between scenario credibility to users at different scales. Large-scale studies are often eager to use smaller-scale studies to ground-truth or verify their findings. However, excessive encouragement to incorporate global issues such as climate change and global trade regulations in local scenarios may result in a “hi-jacking” of local-scale scenarios with broader-scale issues and the neglect of important local-scale concerns and uncertainties. The outcome is often a loss of scenario ownership and credibility by stakeholders at the local level. The reverse is also possible, i.e., hi-jacking global scenarios with issues important only to certain places, although there is less evidence of this in the multiscale exercises conducted to date. It may, however, play a role to the extent that the global scenario exercises tend to be dominated by scientists, mostly from developed countries, owing to their greater level of technical expertise and funding. Those who initiate the scenario process influence who becomes engaged and may encourage or discourage certain groups from participating or particular threads of discussion from being pursued. The issues considered most important in global scenarios may therefore be somewhat biased toward the interests of scientists and the concerns of developed countries and framed from their perspectives. For example, a change in values and attitudes toward the environment was a major axis of uncertainty in both the MA and IPCC scenarios. In many developing countries, this is seen as substantially less important to future environmental conditions than the ability of governments to develop and implement policies and regulations.

Lessons learned

Scenario analysis is a useful tool for exploring key uncertainties that may shape the future of social-ecological systems. This paper explores the methods, costs, and benefits of developing and linking scenarios of social-ecological systems across multiple spatial scales. Drawing largely on experiences in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, the authors suggest that the desired degree of cross-scale linkage depends on the primary aim of the


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scenario exercise. Loosely linked multiscale scenarios appear more appropriate when the primary aim is to engage in exploratory dialogue with stakeholders. Tightly coupled cross-scale scenarios seem to work best when the main objective is to further our understanding of cross-scale interactions or to assess trade-offs between scales. The main disadvantages of tightly coupled cross-scale scenarios are that their development requires substantial time and financial resources, and that they often suffer loss of credibility at one or more scales. The reasons for developing multiscale scenarios and the expectations associated with doing so therefore need to be carefully evaluated when choosing the desired degree of cross-scale linkage in a particular scenario exercise.

Type: integrating scenarios with planning and management conversion at local /sub-regional level

Date: 2009 Place: Menai Strait & Conwy Bay, Wales

Author/source: Making the Most of the Coast: Scoping Study Developing recommendations for the delivery of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in the Menai Strait and Conwy Bay CCW Policy Research Report No. 08/28

For full document download see

http://www.scribd.com/doc/14443812/Developing-Recommendations-for-the-Delivery-of-Integrated-Coastal-Zone-Management-ICZM-in-the-Menai-Strait-and-Conwy-Bay

This was a scoping study commissioned by the Countryside Council for Wales (CCW) from CoastNet in order to develop recommendations to deliver Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in the Menai Strait and Conwy Bay in North West Wales. Although previous work had established the desirability amongst stakeholders for an integrated approach to management of this coastal area, there were no existing structures to allow for an integrated approach across all key sectors and key stakeholders in the study area, or to into account the increasing complexity of the system due to impending legislation. The ICZM imperatives were:

• creating structures enabling policy convergence

• embedding these structures within the mainstream systems, with longevity to operate over long times scales.

• identifying short and medium term action priorities for due to urgent need for

change and possibilities of integrated implementation The chief stakeholders were the local authorities, CCW and the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) The study identified key drivers of change through background research




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and getting the stakeholders involved in prioritisation process. The principal outputs of the exercise were four potential but also extreme future scenarios illustrating possible management routes. The report’s recommendations fed off the stakeholders’ reactions and responses to these scenarios. The methodology employed for the futures work involved was founded on the scenario-based approach employed by the UK Government Foresight Programme (see page x re Future Flooding 2004). The rationales for this choice were: the approach's strategic nature which would be able to attract the attention of vital strategic managers; its embrace of uncertainty, which would provide flexibility for adaptation imperatives down the line; it is increasingly the approached favoured by central government and thus current and credible.

The process involved the following stages:

1. Preliminary Review

1.1 Baseline review, to update and validate the stakeholder analysis, and to identify significant policy initiatives, framed in the context of the EU ICZM principles. and strategies

1.2 strategic policy analysis

1.3 writing up a report

2. Identifying the chief drivers of change using Environmental/Horizon scanning and structured interviews 2.1 Environmental scanning - usually used at the start of a futures project – explores all major trends, issues, advancements, events and ideas across a wide range of activities. This is in order is to understand the broader context for the study. Normally conducted as a desk-based study in tandem with 2.2 2.2 Structured interviews with key actors and experts – thus promoting the initiative, securing commitment to the scenario process and getting a grasp of key people’s perspectives . The principle output was a prioritised list of drivers rated medium or high impact and uncertainty by stakeholders e.g.

• Introduction of Marine Planning alters perceptions of the relation between terrestrial and marine resources

• Lifestyle changes and continued rise in living standards creates ever increasing explosion in volume and scale of development proposals for port capacity, marinas, leisure facilities and waterside housing

• Proliferation of initiatives and designations creates confusion regarding policy and management priorities

• Fisheries policy continues to fail in taking the necessary action to tackle long-term stock declines and the need to establish sustainable levels of harvesting natural resources.

• Environmental disaster – large scale coastal flood, big pollution incident, large scale coastal landslide – creates fundamental changes in public and political opinion


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• Increasing environmental conflicts emerge for important industrial sectors such as ports, leading to hard choices between economic development and the need for environmentally sustainable policies.

• Geo-political and security situation in the Middle-East deteriorates, increasing political and economic pressure to accelerate renewable energy development and in turn sacrifice environmental ideals.

• UK Coastal holiday industry continues to decline, increasing unemployment and driving social deprivation

3. Building believable but contrasting scenarios, based on reliable information.

3.1 Develop framework scenarios, deriving from the chief drivers and uncertainties.

The two principal axes of uncertainty identified are: Axis x: Policy priorities – UK Government policy dominates activity or locally driven policy dominates activity; Axis y: Management objectives – For economic development or for environment protection.

The four scenarios thus derived were illustrated as below in figure 17.

3.2 Circulate these framework scenarios among the working group plus other relevant

Figure 25: Menai Strait 2 X2 Scenario Matrix


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stakeholders to build into full narrative scenarios.

Since all four scenarios had certain advantages and disadvantages – they are presented as extremes - stakeholders were ask to supply their views on them, in the following format.

a. Assumptions and facts: Does the scenario strike you as completely impossible, lacking any relation

to reality? Or do you see elements which are within the bounds of possibility, and if so, which? Please explain your answers.

b. Pros and cons

For each scenario, think about the positive aspects and the negative aspects. Prioritise up to three of each and briefly explain why you have chosen them and what would be their likely impacts. 3.3 More desk-based research to develop contents of each scenario in detail, in order that driving forces in each are understood sufficiently to carry out an impact analysis.

4. Assessing the potential impact and added value of ‘Making the most of the coast’

4.1 Impact analysis on each scenario, in a common framework.

4.2 Assessment of added value of ‘Making the most of the coast’ by an expert panel

5. Recommending an action plan to implement ‘Making the most of the coast’.

CoastNet also provides an instructive list of alternative options to using scenarios and its reasons for rejecting them:

Option Reason for rejection

CoastNet undertakes a comprehensive research study, and recommends a focussed strategy and action plan

This approach would not fully incorporate local and regional perspectives, would have little stakeholder involvement, and would therefore be unlikely to secure commitment

CoastNet undertakes further community-led work to develop a bottom up strategy and action plan

Community-based approaches to date have not delivered a strategic approach. Furthermore, such processes tend to deliver locally-focussed solutions, and do not integrate well with strategic policy.

CoastNet updates policy audit, analyses policy frameworks, and recommends a new governance structure

This approach would not fully incorporate local and regional perspectives, would have little stakeholder involvement, and would therefore be unlikely to secure commitment

CoastNet calculates indicators, based on EU ICZM set, and makes recommendations accordingly

Indicators are useful but have their limitations. They just provide a snapshot of the current situation and a basis for discussion and further investigation. CoastNet feels that their best use in the project area will be at a later stage, when there is strong institutional commitment.


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Type: Scenarios use in coastal vulnerability assessments

Date: 2008 Place: global to local

Author/source: Nicholls, R.J. et al. Climate change and coastal vulnerability assessment: scenarios for integrated assessment Sustain Sci (2008) 3:89–102 This paper provides a very good illustration of how to redress the balance between the excessive attention paid in coastal vulnerability assessments to physical change e.g. sea level rise, and the comparative neglect of other dimensions of climate change e.g. environmental and socioeconomic change. The authors feel that there are significant interactions between climate changes with non-climate drivers which need addressing and understanding in order to support climate and coastal management policy development better. This they feel can be brought about through more integrated assessments of climatic change in coastal areas incorporating all significant non-climatic changes, considering impacts and adaptation. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) scenarios are used in illustration. In this context the development of scenarios is considered an essential process - but it can only have currency, respect and add value if the assumptions the scenarios make about future coastal conditions are explicit, transparent and open to scientific debate concerning their realism and likelihood.

Environmental changes Socio-economic developments Climate induced Accelerated sea-level rise Autonomous adaptation Changes in rainfall patterns Planned adaptation Changes in sea-surface temperature Changes in wind, wave patterns El Niño-related changes Sediment-budget changes Non Climate induced

Vertical land movement Population changes

Sediment-budget changes Land-use changes Changes in GDP

Figure 26: A typology for the different types of scenarios that can be used in coastal vulnerability assessment [from the UNEP Handbook methodology for coastal areas (Klein and Nicholls 1998, 1999)

“The development of appropriate and self-consistent environmental and socio-economic scenarios for climate change assessment requires a coherent view of the future, including its socio-economic and technological characteristics, and hence the likely greenhouse emissions that can then be used to drive climate models. These in turn produce scenarios of climate change whose potential impacts and adaptation needs can be analysed using the ‘‘world’’ that produced these changes, assuring more self-consistency in the results. ” p91


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Some of the most ambitious and wide ranging efforts in this respect were the SRES scenarios. The four SRES storylines or global ‘‘futures’’ (A1, A2, B1, and B2) (see Figure X below) depict different world futures in two distinct dimensions: a focus on economic versus environmental concerns, and global versus regional development patterns. They also represent internally consistent characterisations of how the world might evolve over the coming century. Each one of the storylines or ‘‘Futures’’ consists of a brief narrative, which explores what might happen if political, economic, technical, and social developments take specific alternative directions at the global level, including considering potential regional differences and interactions.

Figure 27: The four SRES storylines or global ‘‘futures’’ When these SRES scenarios have been applied to global analysis of coastal areas, according to the paper authors, results show that estimates of impact and vulnerability are sensitive to the socio-economic scenario, as well as to the magnitude of climate change, and that climate change is not always the most important change driver. Some national socio-economic scenarios e.g. UKCIP see page X ) broadly consistent with the SRES scenarios have also been developed for policy analysis, which are often with the – and some of these have then been applied to coastal areas, e.g. Future Flooding (2004) see page X). At the sub-national or regional level this has been little attempted.

The authors stress that whilst climate scenarios are often direct model outputs, environmental and socio-economic scenarios are less amenable to such analysis and cause debate. They recommend two explicit two stages in the interpretation of a scenario storyline: 1) the qualitative (or conceptual) interpretation 2) the quantitative realisation of (a)

A1 World - World Markets B1 World - Global Sustainability Increasing globalisation/convergence Increasing global cooperation/

convergence Rapid global economic growth Environmental priority Materialist consumers Clean and efficient technologies Rapid uniform technological innovation

A2 World - National Enterprise B2 World – Local Stewardship Heterogneous world Heterogeneous world/local emphasis Rapid regional economic growth Environmental priority Materialist/consumerist Clean and efficient technologies Diverse technological innovation


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Apparently the qualitative interpretation is much more fundamental in the process than the quantitative realisation, and these differences need to be transparent so that a debate on fundamental issues can follow it: “the underlying qualitative framework remains fundamental, as this might indicate that some models or approaches are not appropriate.” The authors stress that impacts in coastal areas depend on the amount and success of adaptation to climate and other changes. This complex issue is however still poorly understood in comparison to the potential for impacts assuming constant management, and urgently requires more research, in their view. One issue that the paper particularly highlights is that of cost-benefit analyses of the impact of sea-level rise, including the protection versus retreat debate. This response assumes a proactive approach to protection coupled with perfect knowledge. Since cost-benefit analyses have limited scope, they take little account of the impact of coastal management on wider costs and benefits. Proactive approach is more

Adaptation factors

20th Century Trends

21st Century trends (by SRES futures)

A1 A2 B1 B2 Adaptation

timing Reactive More

reactive More

proactive

Hazard risk management

Growing priority

Lower priority

Higher Priority

Coastal management

Growing priority

Lower priority

Higher priority

Figure 28: Interpretation of attitude to costal adaptation and coastal management under the SRES narrative storylines (Nicholls 2004)


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Coastal sectors

21st century trends (by SRES futures)

A1 World A2 World B1 World B2 World Water supply Emphasis on increasing supply via water

transfers and sufficient use of desalination (with little consideration of energy sources) demand control where there is no alterative. Less desalination than the A2 World.

Emphasis on demand control but increased supply also required, including growth in desalination, exploiting non-carbon energy sources and reducing costs. Less desalination in B2 World.

Agriculture Strong focus on market-led agriculture and costal agricultural areas may be abandoned where uneconomic (unplanned retreat), or protected for production using polders (and widespread displacement by coastal urbanisation (see below)).

Strong focus on sustainable agriculture.

Technologies such as genetic modification for salt tolerance might also be explored.

Less unplanned retreat than A1. New technologies and breeds less available.

Globalised perspective allows selective abandonment of coastal agriculture for habitat recreation and coastal buffering purposes combined with planned coastal urbanisation. Protection using hard engineering is minimised.

Strong focus on maintaining local agriculture which conflict with aspirations for coastal habitat recreation (see below). Protection accomplished via a mixing of hard and soft engineering.

Settlements and Industry

Strong largely uncontrolled urbanising trend greatly increases exposure and necessitates an often reactive hard protection response (so there is an increasing number of coastal disasters). Soft engineering approaches used to sustain eroding tourist areas.

Widespread use of land-use planning to accomplish retreat and accommodation for new and where possible existing settlements. Emphasis on soft engineering and natural buffers.

Favours unplanned urbanisation at all scales, including a number of large global cities requiring protection.

Global cities less favoured (with drop in population??) leading to many more regional urban centres and their protection needs.

Favour planned urbanisation at all scales, including a number of large global cities. Favours soft measure but hard protection used where necessary.

Least urbanized scenario with numerous smaller settlements, so large scale protection is least favoured state (although agricultural areas may require protection).

Ecosystems and habitat conservation

Lower protection than the B1/B2 worlds but there may be inadvertent benefits due to the unplanned retreat of uneconomic agricultural and in coastal areas (see above).

High priority, with no net loss and some coastal habitat recreation.


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Ecosystems and habitat conservation (continued)

Habitat conservation may be promoted for global iconic species with economic value.

Habitat conservation may be promoted for iconic species with economic or national value (e.g. national symbols).

Largest habitat recreation

Lesser potential than B1 World for proactive habitat recreation due to desire to preserve local biodiversity, and conflict with other coastal land uses (e.g. agriculture).

The paper underlines that there are numerous successful examples of scenarios helping decision-makers explore the range of potential futures, thereby confronting critical uncertainties, and understanding how today decisions affects future outcomes. Socio-economic scenario use it argues should be extended to climate change impact and adaptation analysis in the coastal zone for the same reasons that scenarios, rather than single forecasts, are used in assessing future emissions and their climatic influence. Scenarios can be constructed for several particularly important forms of impact in the coastal zone:

• impacts associated with an increase in the rate of sea level rise, • altered terrestrial fluxes of freshwater and sediment to the coast • increase in the intensity of storms

The authors recommend that instead of selecting a mid-range sea-level rise scenario from the most recent IPCC report, coastal zone decision makers should be supplied a range of plausible sea levels from UKCIP. Scenarios that then result would consequently reflect local conditions and processes such as human and natural induced subsidence. Impact scenarios - when coupled with socio-economic scenarios - provide policy makers with more complete descriptions of ranges of possible future coastal conditions. Coastal decision makers could benefit form a “combination of internally consistent, plausible socio-economic and climate change impact scenarios in coastal regions”. These are needed in order to understand the wide range of potential futures, to confront critical uncertainties, and to comprehend current decisions’ future effects future. Given that the usefulness of such scenarios depends on how successfully they meet users’ information needs, it is important that users be involved early in their development. The authors define integrated coastal assessment (ICA) as a “multidisciplinary problem crossing many areas of human knowledge and future assessments need to integrate engineering, natural and social sciences”. They highlight the fact that ICA is constrained by the state of present knowledge for adaptation measures into the future despite the diverse adaptation options available for use singly or in combination.

Figure 29: Interpretation of adaptation preferences by coastal sector


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The authors suggest that empirical approaches gathering further data on how and why people adapt is essential e.g. Manhood Peninsula case study page 80) . They also recommend strategic approaches assessing the benefits of different portfolios of adaptation options. It is noted that particular coastal environments offer especial adaptation challenges e.g. deltas where the non-climate scenarios are likely to be important constraints on adaptation. The occurrence of disasters may also produce step changes affecting the progress of adaptation e.g. New Orleans and the Mississippi delta post-Katrina The scenario approaches recommended only work with good sources of data, which can cause significant constraint on their application. Reference is made to the new coastal database was developed as part of the DINAS-COAST project, representing the world’s coast as approximately 12,000 variable-length linear sections associated with approximately 100 natural, ecological, and social parameters, including population and GDP scenarios based on simple scaling (Vafeidis et al. 2004, 2008; DINASCOAST Consortium 2006). The issues raised in the paper are generic, to inform new frameworks as they emerge, especially post-IPCC AR4. They note however that “all existing frameworks are sparse in their description of the key issues that are most pertinent to the impacts and the adaptation in the coastal zone. Hence, there is a need for analysis to elaborate the storylines and to make explicit the assumptions made about the future. As the impacts are highly dependent on socio-economic scenarios and the treatment of adaptation, these critical issues must be made transparent so that the results of different studies can be debated and compared openly.” A wider range of relevant climate scenarios is emerging as shown in the IPCC AR4 (Solomon et al. 2007) for generic adaptation but useful scenarios of non-climate environmental and socio-economic changes relevant to coastal areas are still woefully under-developed. The approach in this paper is illustrative – i.e. it can be applied to other existing scenario frameworks e.eg IPCC, or integrated into new scenario frameworks which emerge. A feature of this approach is its stress on being more explicit on assumptions about the future thereby causing more useful debate on the realism of any assessment and its policy value. More systematic efforts towards coastal scenario development would be useful, “The development of scenarios is a process that needs to engage widely with relevant stakeholders so that the scenarios are both credible and cover the range of uncertainty.”


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Normative

Type: Model normative scenario approach used in transport planning (VIBAT) – CO2 mitigation

Date: 2006 Place: UK

Author/source: The Bartlett School of Planning, University Department for Transport: ‘Visioning and backcasting for UK transport policy’ (VIBAT)

Full download from

http://www.vibat.org/vibat_uk/pdf/vibatuk_method_issues.pdf

The VIBAT project (Visioning and Backcasting of UK Transport Policy) examined the possibility of reducing transport CO2 emissions by 60 per cent in 2030. It looked at a range of policy measures), and assessed how they could be combined effectively to achieve such a level of CO2 emissions reduction. The brief was to assess whether such a target is feasible, to identify the problems, and to comment on chief decision points over the time horizon. It was structured in three main stages. Stage 1 set targets for 2030 and forecast the business-as- usual situation for all forms of transport in the UK over that period, so that the scale of change could be assessed in terms of achieving the emissions reductions. Stage 2 described the transport system in 2030 that would meet the reduction target, in the form of two alternative visions of the future pushing technological and behavioural options, separately and in combination. Stage 3 stage was a backcasting process, where alternative policy packages were assembled to lead to the image of the future, along with a sequencing in terms of when implementation ought to take place.

Type: Methods for conducting multiscale participatory scenarios

Place: South Africa & EU Date: 2007

Author/source: Kok, K. et al Methods for Developing Multiscale Participatory Scenarios: Insights from Southern Africa and Europe Ecology and Society 13(1): 8

See http://www.ecologyandsociety This study provides insights from participatory scenario development in two separate multiscale environmental assessments.

http://www.vibat.org/vibat_uk/pdf/vibatuk_method_issues.pdf�

http://www.ecologyandsociety/�


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1. Europe MedAction (2001–2004) aimed to develop an information and decision-support system on land degradation to assist decision makers at multiple levels. The study addressed desertification and mitigation measures at the European, Mediterranean, and local levels, and developed land-use change scenarios for each level. The scenarios in MedAction were all largely qualitative and took the form of narrative storylines Three European scenarios were thus developed: Convulsive Change, in which climate change triggers droughts and floods; Big Is Beautiful, in which merger mania and a 40-country European Union fail to take social responsibility; and Knowledge Is King, in which the information and communications technology sector booms and leads to increased mobility and the formation of a European sunbelt. Scenarios were subsequently further enriched with national-level detail and downscaled to the Mediterranean level. Using a variety of approaches, we developed local scenarios during two stakeholder workshops in each of the case study areas. During the first series of workshops we presented the main developments in the three Mediterranean scenarios to a group of 20– 25 stakeholders and invited them to discuss the future of their region in light of these higher-level forces. The researchers emphasised that, although these large scale external drivers were important, local scenarios should be based as much as possible on local circumstances. Local facilitators were trained to stimulate creative thinking. In a second series of workshops, they used a backcasting methodology in which stakeholders selected desirable end points and identified sets of short-term actions aimed at achieving these desired futures. Both workshops stimulated a critical evaluation of the key uncertainties and main developments in the Mediterranean scenarios. As a result, the majority of the local scenarios were indeed a mixture of high level developments and local specifics. Thus, applying strict downscaling methodologies facilitated comparison and upscaling across scales. The process and results of the scenario development activities within MedAction are described in detail in the literature.

2. Southern Africa Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (SAfMA) The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) was a 4-year international effort, carried out between 2001 and 2005, to provide decision makers with information on the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). The approach adopted by the MA focused on ecosystem services, including provisioning services such as for food and water, as well as regulating services such as flood mitigation, supporting services such as soil formation, and cultural services related to spiritual or aesthetic values. The MA comprised three major components: (1) an assessment of the current condition and trend in the supply of and demand for ecosystem services, (2) the development of scenarios of plausible future changes in the supply and demand of ecosystem services and the consequences for human well-being, and (3) an analysis of the types of responses that could be implemented to improve ecosystem management and thereby human well-being.


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A diversity of scenario development methods was used in SAfMA. The storylines from four existing regional scenario studies were cross-tabulated against five scenario archetypes derived from the MA. Both studies used similar methods:

• Work was carried out at three hierarchically nested scales, i.e., continental, national, and local, emphasizing slow processes at the broadest scale and fast processes at the local scale.

• The goal in both was to aid decision makers at multiple scales. Each scale therefore had its own problem definition and group of experts and users.

• Scenarios at the broadest scale were adapted from existing published scenarios. Although the original work involved stakeholders in scenario development, the adaptation process in both SAfMA and MedAction was a desktop study.

• Scenarios at the intermediate level, i.e., Mediterranean in MedAction and basin-

scale in SAfMA, were developed within the projects but without any active stakeholder involvement.

• Scenarios at the local level were developed using highly participatory methods, both during the development phase and to communicate results. Scenario workshops were the key method of involving stakeholders. Stakeholders included policy and decision makers, as well as community members and journalists.

• Scenarios at all scales took the form of highly integrative but largely qualitative

storylines. In specific instances, models were used to illustrate the quantitative

Fig. 30: Simplified Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) diagram of the main activities in MedAction (upper right) and scales for which multiscale scenarios were developed (lower left).


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consequences of scenarios, but they were not central to the methodology in either study.

Lessons Learned

• Stakeholder selection procedure is crucial to the outcome of the participatory process. The studies suggest that not just the usual four groups of stakeholders should be represented: policy makers, business representatives, citizens, and experts - but also a broader participation, involving groups such as young people, poets, and free thinkers, and explicitly groups that are usually under-represented. Variety must be maximized in terms of profession, gender, and age.

• Multiscale scenario development was proven to be an excellent tool to engage

stakeholders in thinking creatively about the future, encouraging a more proactive attitude to either helping shape or adapting to the future.

• Linking multiple scales introduces a greater appreciation of the interconnectivity of processes and people operating at different scales, which may have been missed in a single-scale exercise. Multiscale scenarios can be particularly important in sensitising stakeholders at each scale to the perspective of stakeholders at other scales and broadening the range of issues considered at each scale.

• Taken away from daily conflicts and discussing possible futures, stakeholders develop a greater understanding for each other’s point of view and fosters mutual respect.

• Scenarios are products that can be understood and communicated to many people. The results of MedAction were presented in almost the same form to local stakeholders, scientific experts, and students. Scenarios were an excellent vehicle for bridging knowledge systems, enhancing dialogue, and educating stakeholders.

When downscaling is used to ensure consistency, there can be important consequences for (1) the diversity of scenario outcomes, (2) timing mismatches in the storylines at different scales, and (3) power relationships among stakeholders at different scales. Downscaling scenarios from the continental to the local level is possible, resulting in sets of linked scenarios across scales. However, adopting a methodology that predefines the main driving forces across scales limits variability and can potentially limit stakeholders’ creativity. By constructing scenarios with clear end points for every decade and by the flexible use of a higher-level framework, creativity and ownership at lower levels can be encouraged without losing the cross-scale connections. Locally important factors that might be more influential than regional-scale drivers need to be explicitly considered when a downscaling exercise is contemplated. Participatory scenarios at multiple scales have strong potential for better environmental decision making, only if substantial investments of time and resources are dedicated to maximise their potential.


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Type: Normative scenario use

Date: 2007 Place: Iowa, USA

Author/source: Nassauer, J.I. Using normative scenarios in landscape ecology Landscape Ecology 19: 343–356, 2004.

Normative landscape scenario is one of many types of scenario methods that are used by landscape ecologists. In this instance normative landscape scenarios are differentiated from other types to create special potential for engaging science to build landscape policy and for exploring scientific questions in realistic simulated landscapes. The method and criteria are applied to an interdisciplinary project that proposed alternative scenarios for federal agricultural policy and related futures for agricultural watersheds in Iowa, USA Corn Belt. “Normative landscape scenarios are distinctive in that they portray futures that should be….They can inspire policy by providing images of landscapes that could meet societal goals. Normative futures may not yet exist, but they plausibly could exist…. While all prospective scenarios depict futures that may not be predictable, the specific type, normative scenarios, has the goal of generating desirable futures that are plausibly but not necessarily assuredly achievable.”

Figure 31: The iterative process used to identify policy goals, propose desirable landscape characteristics, and develop landcover location models for Corn Belt agriculture landscape futures in 2025.


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Normative scenarios formulated to embody hypotheses about landscape functions are distinguished from normative scenarios developed by stakeholders in a particular landscape. Scenarios embodying stakeholder values and choices about landscape pattern usefully imply of potential decisions about particular landscapes. Developing these scenarios can engage stakeholders in articulating their values, building consensus, or understanding a problem scenarios that embody hypotheses are helpful in a different way. They rely on science to invent landscape patterns that may not be imaginable to stakeholders, but that are hypothesized to have certain ecological, economic, or cultural effects.

The adequacy of normative scenarios that are intended to contribute to the science base as well as environmental policy can be judged according to the following criteria derived from their components characteristics:

• Be constructed in an iterative design process. • Employ expert knowledge to hypothesize what landscape pattern characteristics will

produce desired ecological and cultural effects. • Integrate multiple disciplinary perspectives in the landscape futures for each

scenario. • Be imaginative, speculative, or didactic to inspire policy. • Be plausible. • Be replicable. • Include adequate detail to meet both public and policy needs for realism and

scientific needs for precision. • Be constructed to allow investigation of pattern: process relationships and

comparative evaluation of the alternatives. Lessons learned

• Normative scenarios challenge both policy-makers and scientists to think about the future in a new way, as a tangible goal to explore rather than as a prediction about what might happen under certain circumstances.

• Scenarios that imaginatively depict plausible futures will meet resistance if they are

treated as predictions.

• Normative scenarios can be cognizant of institutional and cultural inertia without acquiescing to it. They also incorporate knowledge and methods of science without being constrained by misplaced paradigms of ‘proof’.


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Type: Scenarios used for local coastal defence planning and consultation

Date: 2008 Place: Manhood Peninsula, West Sussex, England, UK

Author/source: Pagham to East Head Coastal Defence Strategy Consultation Report A01 Environment Agency (October 2008)

For full report download see http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/static/documents/Research/report_a01_low_res_2150616.pdf Contained within this report is a useful account of a three day workshop organised by the Manhood Peninsula Partnership in West Sussex (MPP) in 2008 . The MPP, which included local authorities and agencies involved in the sub-region plus local representatives, invited 22 Dutch and British coastal spatial planners, engineers and environmentalists to consult on the coastal. This built on a previous workshop for yet same area held in 2001. It provides a good processual model for integrating mass stakeholder consultation on strategic integration of coastal defence and climate change adaptation with the outputs of driver scoping exercises involving expert practitioners (DP-S-I-R etc) panels as necessary preliminaries to normative scenario building.

Type: Climate and socio-economic impacts and adaptation options; cross-sectoral interactions between four major sectors driving landscape change (agriculture, biodiversity, coastal zones and water resources)

Date: 2005 Place: East Anglia & North-West England, UK

Author/source: Holman, I.P. et al, A REGIONAL, MULTI-SECTORAL AND INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE UK – REGIS PART II, Climatic Change Climatic Change (2005) 71: 43–73

The ‘Regional Climate Change Impact and Response Studies in East Anglia and North West England’ (RegIS) integrated assessment (IA) investigated climate and socio-economic impacts and adaptation options, and cross-sectoral interactions between four major sectors driving landscape change (agriculture, biodiversity, coastal zones and water resources). The baseline and two contrasting climate change scenarios (with and without regional socio-economic change scenarios) were investigated. The assessment demonstrated that unless policy adaptation took place climate change could occasion severe flooding impacts in East Anglia, and serious agricultural abandonment. The authors point out that although e.g. cropping is largely insensitive to climate change it is highly sensitive to socio-economic change due to seasonality to river flows, compounded by increased urbanisation and

http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/static/documents/Research/report_a01_low_res_2150616.pdf�

http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/static/documents/Research/report_a01_low_res_2150616.pdf�


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irrigation demand. The responses of biodiversity to climate change they conclude are regional, habitat and species-specific, but much of the future of biodiversity in these regions will be dependent on planned adaptation in the other sectors. The authors also felt that it is in the by-product of numerous examples of public engagement with the global change process engendered by RegIS, that the success of the project laid. The projects rationale was specifically to do with localising more efficiently global level scenario models: “Efforts to observe model and assess climate change and other environmental stresses have principally, to date, taken a global or national perspective. However, there is a widespread view that the next generation of studies should focus at the sub-national (regional) scale, on specific, coherently defined regions, as these represent an important and underexplored geographical and political foci for analysing the impacts of, and responses to, global change. Two beliefs or rationales underpin this regional emphasis. Firstly, that stakeholders will engage more effectively with climate change if the impacts can be demonstrated at the local-regional scale with which they interact, rather than if impacts are only presented at national or international scales. And secondly, that much of the policy response can, and should, be developed and implemented at local and regional scales rather than at the national scale. Such a regional scale should allow studies to seek advanced integrated understanding of linked environmental systems and stresses in the region, with both the process detail and spatial resolution necessary to inform regional decision makers.” Two contrasting regions within England supplied the case studies areas (Figure x below) to demonstrate the diversity of problems and approaches to be examined.

The climate change scenarios developed on behalf of the United Kingdom Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP), known as the UKCIP98 scenarios9

9“ The third set of UK climate change scenarios – UKCIP98 – were one of the first major publications of UKCIP (which was formed in 1997). They were based on the results from the second Met Office Hadley Centre global

, were applied in the RegIS integrated

Figure 32 : RegIS Study areas - North West England and E. Anglia. p 45)


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assessment (IA): the Low and High scenarios for the 2050s. These represent the lower and upper boundaries of change from the UKCIP98 core scenarios, accounting for uncertainties in future global warming rates attributable to different climate sensitivities and greenhouse gas missions scenarios. These scenarios were then downscaled to a 5 km× 5 km spatial resolution for the two regions. The study found it only feasible to run two of the regional socio-economic scenarios through its integrated impact models, due to resource and time: 1. The Regional Enterprise scenario - selected because it represented a socioeconomic future desired by many regional stakeholders and potentially imposes a high level of stress upon the environment and natural resources (relative to other scenarios). Combining this socio-economic scenario with the High climate change scenario described it was hoped would generate a future likely to be a ‘higher environmental change/stress’ scenario. T 2. Global Sustainability - the diagonal matching scenario for 1. Above, reflecting a world where socio-economic pressures on environmental systems and natural resources are less pronounced. This was combined with the Low climate change scenario to generate a ‘lower environmental change/stress’ future. The integrated impact models were applied on a common 5 km × 5 kms patial grid within the two study regions. Five runs were undertaken for each region: (i) Baseline (1961–1990) conditions (ii) Low climate change scenario for the 2050s coupled with current (1990) socio-economic conditions—hereafter referred to as the 2050s Low climate scenario (iii) High climate change scenario for the 2050s coupled with current (1990) socioeconomic conditions—hereafter referred to as the 2050s High climate scenario (iv) Low climate change scenario coupled with the Global Sustainability socioeconomic scenario for the 2050s—hereafter referred to as the 2050s Low (Global Sustainability) future (v) High climate change scenario coupled with the Regional Enterprise socioeconomic scenario for the 2050s—hereafter referred to as the 2050s High (Regional Enterprise) future. One of the resulting outputs was the Normative Scenario for East Anglia (below) for the 2050s under Low climate change/global sustainability scenario:

climate model (HadCM2). For the first time, future climate changes were associated with scenarios of future emissions of greenhouse gases, labelled Low, Medium-Low, Medium-High and High. Changes to a wider range of climate variables were reported, with many mapped to show the six ~250 km resolution grid squares that cover the UK. The results were similar to those presented in CCIRG96. UKCIP98 presented results from three other global climate models in map form to illustrate differences and similarities between different climate models. “- see http://www.ukcip.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=255

http://www.ukcip.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=255�


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Figure 29: RegIS Normative Scenario for East Anglia (below) for 2050s under Low climate change/global sustainability scenario The lessons learned from RegIS at the communal and local level are in the authors; own words as follows: • “It was the first time that the implications of the inter-connectedness of the environment on climate change impacts was demonstrated and explored. Many non-technical stakeholders have an innate understanding that the environment is not divided into a series of isolated compartments, but that they are linked with the potential for knock-on effects to occur. • The scale of the assessment gave the confidence to stakeholders to debate, or even challenge, the results. The ability to locate their own area in the project’s output allowed some people to stand up and disagree with the results or the interpretation. This was seen by the project team as a positive outcome, as the results merely represented possible futures rather than probable outcomes. It can be easy for people to passively accept the outcome of any study, but to actively engage (even if it is to express disagreement) represents a step forward..... • Previous climate change studies have tended to focus on the effects of climate change in isolation. The explicit recognition given to the socio-economic scenarios in RegIS demonstrated that we are not on a defined ‘conveyor belt’ to the future but that society has the potential to shape the future, through adaptation and mitigation. That society is not inexorably progressing towards a preordained


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future, but still maintains an element of self-direction and management was a powerful message.”

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