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A320

ENGINEERING

CONTINUATION TRAINING

Q1 & Q2 2014

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Contents:

1 Introduction & review of approval changes relating to the A320 2 ADs 3 A320 MOR – Maintenance Related

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1 Introduction / Changes to the A320 approval The A320 approval was made active again in the Summer of 2014 to establish a line station in Libya. Due to the civil unrest in that country, the contract has been terminated and the line station closed.

2 A320 Airworthiness Directives (Note that engine “shop” visit & structural ADs and some revised ADs are not listed).

AD No Description 2014-0014 Stabilizers – Elevators - Inspection

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AD No Description 2014-0058 MLG – Sliding Tube Axles - Inspection

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AD No Description 2014-0096 MLG Fixed Fairing Assembly

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AD No Description 2014-0130 Engine Stationary Parts

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AD No Description 2014-0141 MLG Upper Cardan – Life Limitation

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AD No Description 2014-0147 THSA - Inspection

3 A320 Family – Maintenance Related MOR The following are maintenance related MOR from the UK CAA MOR digest. As the information is protected and strictly controlled by the UK CAA, it is respectfully requested that this information is not circulated. British Airways A320 Engine received at foreign overhaul contractor with a defect detailed on incorrect paperwork. Fan cowl hold open device not fitted. CAA Closure: Investigation found an unrecorded robbery action by the operator for which there is no absolute conclusion. It would appear that the 'carried forward sheet' was not raised as per procedures. Procedures have been re-enforced. The engine overhauler also reported that there had been an incorrect interpretation of a drawing. Since the event, a Quality Alert has been issued to all relevant staff and a new functionality check introduced into the repair process.

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Easyjet A320 Incomplete actions during maintenance. Aircraft had a blue system hydraulic pump fail. The pump was replaced and the aircraft departed. Engineer called MOC and advised that the clamp for the cooling duct was not fitted prior to release. MOC advised Ops and the aircraft was declared AOG. The area of the pump and ducting was inspected with no damage found and the clamp/bracket was despatched to the aircraft, fitted, tested and the aircraft declared serviceable. CAA Closure: During installation there was an incident with hydraulic fluid coming into contact with the technician's eyes. The technician was using personal glasses at the time. Safety glasses were available. The incident resulted in a break in the pump installation sequence and clamping of the hose was missed. Subsequent verification procedures did not revealed any malfunction. Tools verification and loose item check was only carried after aircraft departure. With tools / loose items verification procedure carried out after aircraft departure, loose clamp was found. The root cause was that time pressure was exacerbated due to passengers and crew being on board during the maintenance activity. Remedial actions taken; Acquisition of new safety goggles and the requirements will take into account the comfort factor for engineers that use personal glasses. This verification action will be replicated for other self protective equipment. A Quality Notice has been issued to remind engineers of the good practice of returning 3 steps back every time a task handover/interrupted occurs. In case of incidents the 2nd engineer shall recheck the tasks performed by the injured engineer. A Quality Notice was issued reminding engineers to perform the tool check prior to issuing the CRS. EasyJet A319 Aircraft operated for three days with a level one 'no dispatch' ADD. Flight crew arrived at the aircraft and checked the Tech Log. There was a level one ADD for AIR RH wing leak fault which is a no dispatch MEL entry. ADD had been open for three days. Aircraft had been operating under MEL item 36-00-01A for three days. MOC consulted and local engineers called. It was decided to do an engine ground run to investigate the fault. Engines were started with engine bleed valves selected closed and 'ECAM Air RH wing leak' appeared with no maintenance messages. It was decided this confirmed a leak detector fault which is a no dispatch item. The crew did not accept the aircraft. A further Tech Log entry was made to reflect the known situation, and the aircraft was left with maintenance staff for further investigation. CAA Closure: After being briefed by the Captain regarding the defect and on completion of the R WING AIR LEAK checks and WING LOOP C/B's RESET being unable to clear message, the Engineer on duty had declared the aircraft AOG, as MEL 36-22-02A did not have any provisions to permit service and MOC was informed. Passengers and crew disembarked and trouble shooting was performed to find any leaks. MOC called to say that if there is NO AIR LEAKS, NO BMC FAILURE and there is an AIR BLEED MAINT. MSG on the STATUS SD PAGE, the aircraft can be dispatched as per MEL 36-22-02A with reference to the note (FAILURE OF ONE LOOP IN ONE OR BOTH WING L/E IS INDICATED BY A MAINT.MSG DISPLAYED ON THE STATUS SD PAGE) refer Item 36-00-01 AIR BLEED MAINT. MSG. Considering the information from the MOC Duty Engineer and together with the Outbound Captain, all parties read the note on MEL 36-22-02A and the situation on aircraft matched the conditions: 1) No BMC FAILURES; 2) MESSAGE SHOWS R WING LOOP B; 3) MAINT.MSG ON STATUS SD PAGE. MOC Duty Engineer contacted the Chief Captain Pilot and he himself contacted the Outbound Captain, therefore it was understood that if there is a MAINT.

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MSG on SD page together with R WING AIR LEAK, the aircraft could be dispatched IAW MEL 36-22-02A as mentioned by the MOC Duty Engineer. This was followed for the next 3 days but on the 23-09-13 only ECAM AIR R WING appeared therefore, MEL that was raised no longer was valid if there is no MAINT MSG on SD. This was how the Eng, Captain, MOC Eng, and the Chief Pilot understood the release of the aircraft which was signed by the Engineer on duty and accepted by the outbound captain. Consulting the operators MEL item 36-22-02 there is no doubt that if one loop detects a wing leak and a message is displayed, that is a NO-GO condition. After confirming the R WING LOOP B and after consulting Operator technical staff, the Engineer on duty changed his decision. The contributing factor for Engineer on duty changing its initial decision is inserted in a cultural issue, which is related with human factors (complacency). This behaviour, passengers on board, the time pressure to release the aircraft to service, and Operator technical opinion contributed for the reduction the engineer level of confidence to make a correct evaluation of the maintenance scenario. A quality note was distributed in order to alert the engineers that all Customer/Operator/CAMO technical opinion should always be evaluated by comparing with all collected facts, as the final responsibility always belongs with the engineer that releases the maintenance task and not to the Customer/Operator/CAMO. British Airways A320 Galley boiler damaged/chafed wiring. Reference weekly check, cleaning of forward & aft worktop scupper drains. Cleaned forward galley beverage maker scupper drain, refitted beverage maker and reset C/B. When the C/B was reset there was a blue flash and a loud bang from behind beverage maker. C/B Pulled, beverage maker removed and on inspection of electrical components located behind the beverage Maker location, found damaged/chaffed wiring on the back of the connector. Potential Electrical hazard. Possibly due to method of drain cleaning.

British Airways A320 Required MEL maintenance actions not carried out. A/C dispatched under MEL ref 21-51-01 for air pack 2 regulator fault. Incorrect MEL ref was used and flow control valve was not secured in closed position as required/pack not switched off. ADD queried engineers and maintrol. Correct MEL entry identified and a/c dispatched under amended ADD. A/C previously operated one sector with incorrect MEL item & maintenance procedures not carried out. EasyJet A319 Rudder trim out of limits. After flight, crew advise with either autopilot engaged in cruise 2.5 or 2.6 units left rudder trim required to correct trim of aircraft, as part of t/shooting either autopilot has been selected and both same, if autopilot disengaged and aircraft flown manually, all normal. During troubleshooting, rudder found mis-rigged with reference to the tail cone rigging mark. Engineers carried out AMM 27-24-00-820-001 - Adjustment of the rudder neutral position and they were unable to insert the rigging pin. Adjustment of the rudder mechanism control performed iaw AMM 27-21-00-820-003-a Rev 42 satisfactory, found actuator input rod misadjusted. Rigging of actuator input rod performed acc AMM sub Task 27-21-00-820-058-a Rev 42. Previous maintenance on 17 Nov, AFU replaced; Loan back AFU (artificial feel unit) from w/o 209069 from 209069 loan order l0265513 P/N: d2727040001400 S/N: TV4061 POS 001 Artificial feel unit replaced iaw AMM 27-23-41 PB 401 rev. 41 Ops test of rudder art. Feel load and rudder Trim act. Performed by engineers DE.145.0001 approval 404163.

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CAA Closure: Analysis of maintenance actions performed concluded that the most probable cause was a result of incorrect rigging during both AFU replacements. To provide further confidence that rudder surface neutral position is at zero post AFU replacements, Engineering suggested that the aircraft manufacturer consider adding an additional step to the AMM 27-23-41-400-001 'to carry out a check of the rudder trailing edge to the aft tail cone neutral mark', unfortunately they considered this additional step not necessary because during job-set-up procedures rigging pins are installed thus preventing any input to rudder surface. There is no evidence to prove any maintenance error occurred with the work performed. EasyJet A319 Incorrect p/n Air Cycle Machine (ACM) ordered and installed. Indications show from w/o that the incorrect PN (1263A0000-03) Air Cycle Machine was ordered and subsequently installed. PN 1263A0000-03 is not applicable to this aircraft type. Parts admin (APN:59) clearly identifies this in the remarks. TAQ 225019 raised to flag error and subsequently w/o issued to make A/C AOG on arrival in next destination. British Airways A319 Aircraft returned to service without mandatory corrective action being taken after cracks were discovered. During review of feedback for mandatory inspection A320-53-1258 TOI 10145342 it was noted that there appeared to be no outgoing messages to Airbus regarding the repair to be actioned in case of crack findings. Airbus has been contacted and they have found no communication traffic. The aircraft was removed from service until the necessary approval was received. A search of documents against this aircraft showed no ITI raised to record the damage found and necessary rework approval for continued airworthiness. The mandatory text in work card states *If cracks are found Contact Airbus and apply corrective action defined by Airbus before the next flight.* This was not done at the time and the aircraft was returned to service. Also no details of the crack damage found, was recorded. Documents scanned and attached. The report sheet for A320-53-1258 DCN 75 showed the side box beam upper flange FR43 LH 'AFT HOLE CRACKED' and side box beam upper flange FR43 RH 'AFT HOLE CRACKED'. British Airways A320 Aircraft had been modified to a Service Bulletin in a non-allowable configuration. The subject SB shows four configurations, three of which are allowable and the other non-allowable. It was identified that three aircraft had been modified to the non-allowable configuration inadvertently. CAA Closure: The maintenance organisation carried out an investigation as to why the flight warning computers on three aircraft were modified to the H2F5 standard, despite the spoiler elevator controllers not being to the required standard detailed in SB 31-1334. When interviewed, the technician responsible was unable to recall specifically the incident due to the time frame, however the only explanation he could offer was that he misinterpreted the taskcard notes and incorrectly continued to action the SB. He did recall reading both the AD and SB for applicability. Further investigation has highlighted that this task should not have been included into the workpack.

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This was a significant factor as this task had been carried out on a several consecutive aircraft for which the technician responsible for this particular lapse had been part of. The incorrect fitment of modified SECs to the three affected aircraft occurred due to inappropriate wording on the task card and the engineer's familiarity with the task, given other eligible aircraft had previously been modified. Task list wording amended and now reads, 'Do NOT install FWC Std H2F5 on aircraft equipped with FCDC Std 57 and SEC below Std 119. At the time of TOM release the following aircraft are affected....'. Pre-input planning meetings will ensure the intent of modification programmes and are fully understood. The engineer should now be more aware in the future and the task cards have been amended in order to make clear the requirement. British Airways A320 Transit pin left in BCF fire extinguisher. During cabin checks prior to passenger boarding, cabin crew noted that BCF fire extinguisher had a "Transit Pin" still fitted with a disc stating it should be removed before flight. Tech informed. Pin removed and taken away by an engineer. EasyJet A319 Incomplete maintenance procedure carried out. After MOC request to meet a/c on arrival to perform maintenance procedure due to inlet valve deactivated in closed position as per MEL 21-26-05-A. During execution of bite test as per AMM 21-26-00-710-001-a result was "test ok". So that means that the maintenance procedure of deactivation on inlet valve iaw AMM 21-26-00-040-004 that was certified in tech log was not correctly performed. Inlet valve not deactivated. British Airways A320 Incorrect weight found to have been recorded after installation of elevator. During Airworthiness Review Certificate (ARC) review of Airworthiness Directive 2012-0221, elevator weight check and re-identification sampled for compliance. Service Bulletins 55-1034 and 1042 R1 details actions required. Tasks were completed for this aircraft in October 2013 and the following was identified. Task for reinstallation of the right elevator serial number IC4020 after weighting and re-identification shows the weight to be 53.45 (Kgs). The weighting report completed on 03/10/13 and the SB 1042 R1 reporting sheet records the weight of this elevator as 53.95 (Kgs). In this case the elevator remains within the same ‘weight band’ of SB 1042. It is however possible for this to result in elevators being identified at the incorrect weight band. This affects interchange ability of elevators and if a ‘heavier’ elevator is installed on a light aircraft this can result in structural damage and potential loss of the aircraft. With a number of aircraft having the above SBs now completed how can operator be confident of compliance with this mandatory requirement? British Airways A320 Engine fire detection wiring fault. During high power engine runs followed fitting of new engine nr2 Fire Loop A fault and a separate Centralised Flight Display System (CFDS) message regarding nacelle temperature sensor appeared.

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Wiring to Core fire detector element and nacelle temp sensor found crushed by C-Duct mating pads due to wiring had been incorrectly installed at the position where it is in a vertical run just fwd of the nacelle temp sensor connector. The wiring is part of the engine harness. Additionally 3 backshell wire clamps found excessively loose but wirelocked. EasyJet A319 Foreign object (FOD) found in intake during replacement of nr2 engine inlet cowl,. During replacement of #2 engine inlet cowl, a metallic rattle was heard when the intake was lifted from the transportation pallet. When the lower access panel was opened for inspection a blow gun and rivet tails were found inside the intake. All foreign matter was removed and the intake installed. EasyJet A319 Emergency exit light unit incorrectly installed. On turnaround, CM mentioned to Captain that the doorway illumination unit at Door 1L has been incorrectly installed (up-side down). Engineers called and found the trim on top of the light unit had been installed incorrectly and fixed the problem. The light unit itself was OK, however with the trim the wrong way round was totally useless. EasyJet A319 Serious Incident: Fan cowl panel detached from nr1 engine. PAN declared and aircraft returned. No injuries reported, fuselage damaged. Italian Authority investigation. CAA Closure: The engineer working on the aircraft prior to departure was distracted by the task he was undertaking, no prescribed method existed for making inoperative a single interphone socket. Subsequently the unlatched cowls were not identified during the pre-flight inspection; it is not obvious when the fan cowls are unlatched but not opened due to the design of the fan cowls. The operator issued two instructions to raise awareness of the fan cowl issue to the network and to high light the policy regarding cowlings. Subsequent to the event: • The flight crew walk around procedure has been reviewed to ensure that an appropriate location and stance is taken during inspection of the fan cowl latches; • The flight crew walk around training has been updated to include the point above; • A trial has taken place involving the use of a specific flag, attached to a fan cowl catch when unlatched. The trail will conclude on 27/01/2014 when a decision about implementation will be made; • A fan cowl working group has been established to identify best practice and lobby the manufacturer for urgent design proposals. Tooling has been developed and trialled which makes it more obvious that fan cowls are unlatched. This tooling will be rolled out throughout the operators network during April and will complement the revised procedures. There is work on-going with the manufacturer to find a permanent solution to this problem. They have stated that the design is in conceptual stage and could take up to two years to materialise for adoption. The fatigue investigation determined that fatigue was a contributory factor in this event. Engineering should consider introducing a system for managing Fatigue in terms of roster reviews.

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British Airways A319 MAYDAY declared and aircraft returned due to pressurisation problems. AS LAS E, I was informed by the next sector controller that the aircraft had declared a MAYDAY and was descending with a presumed pressurisation problem, we split the sector. The aircraft was reluctant to take a frequency change to TC so worked aS12 at FL100 for some time before being transferred to TC for a return to departure airport. Supplementary 06/03/14: Airborne return due to excessive cabin altitude. Following excessive cabin altitude aircraft descended to 10000ft and returned. Normal landing with fire services in attendance. Debrief by DFCM & TDM prior to transfer to BCG to resume service. Excessive cabin altitude, ECAM/QRH actioned, , emergency descent performed to FL100. In climb, passing approx. FL150, flt crew noticed the cabin vertical speed was higher normally expected. A/C rate of climb was reduced to 1500ft/min passing approx FL200, indications still looked abnormal so a level off at FL240 was requested. All valves showed closed on ECAM but cabin alt continued to increase. Mayday declared, in the descent cabin alt. reached approx. 10500ft. Cabin masks did not deploy. At FL100 cabin alt stabilised at 3000ft. drills and briefings completed return LHR. Suspect possible leak from recently installed cargo seal. Pressurisation was controllable below FL100. Normal landing and A/C assessed after vacating by fire services. Aircraft taxied to stand. Supplementary 06/03/14: Seal fitted in wrong orientation - holes to outside of door. Supplementary 05/03/14: A press report, dated today, states: aircraft en route, was climbing through FL240, when the crew initiated an emergency descent to FL100, due to problems with the cabin pressure, today. About 45 minutes later, the aircraft turned around and returned for a safe landing on runway 27R. A replacement aircraft, reached destination with a delay of two hours and 30 minutes. The aircraft was performing its first flight after maintenance between Feb 28 to Mar 5. Easyjet A319 Unreported crack damage following inspection and incorrect completion of paperwork. AOT A54N002-12 - Inspection of Aft Pylon Fixed Fairings for Cracks, was performed on the aircraft on 03 February 2014. This inspection was signed off on workorder and TLP. A crack was found on the LH Pylon Aft Fixed Fairing. Work order was raised for a 25mm crack found on the inboard side at rib 14-15. This was stop drilled IAW AOT Appendix 3 R54512052 and deferred for 24months/7500FH/5000fc with a 120 day / 750FH/750FC repeat inspection. Engineering experience shows that this temporary repair is not sufficient for the 24 month deferral, so work order 4383005 was amended to have the LH pylon aft fixed fairing replaced at the next P check. There was also a request on this work order to complete the attached reporting form with the P/N and S/N off and the P/N and S/N of the ongoing fairing and to email the form. Part of the requirement for repair traceability from manufacturer is for engineering to maintain accurate details of the fairings that have been repaired and which fairings are fitted to which aircraft. LH aft fixed fairing S/N: SC4774 was removed and replaced by S/N: SC4444 on work order 4383005 on 08 March 2014 and certified on TLP. The damaged fairing was routed to AMO for a permanent splice repair. The reporting form attached to work order was not completed and sent as requested.

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AMO performed an inspection of the fairing on receipt and emailed the results to Structures team. This inspection highlighted an additional crack on the upper spar at the aft end that extended under Rib 15 and around the fairing aft mount points. This additional crack was not reported when AOT A54N002-12 was performed, despite being plainly visible and within the Area 2 inspection zone as given in AOT A54N002-12 and shown in R54512052. This cracking has been shown to be severe and is the reason the inspection is performed. Cracking of this nature should have been repaired prior to the aircraft next flight IAW R54512052. The Appendix 1 attachment shows a photograph of the unreported crack with Rib 15 still attached, a photograph of the unreported crack with Rib 15 removed and a copy of AOT A54N002-12 and R54512052. Question 1: Please investigate why the crack was not reported initially, it is located well within the inspection area of AOT A54N002-12? Question 2: Why were the work requests on work order not complied with and the completed reporting form emailed back? EasyJet A319 During replacement of #2 engine inlet cowl, a metallic rattle was heard when the intake was lifted from the transportation pallet. When the lower access panel was opened for inspection a blow gun and rivet tails were found inside the intake. All foreign matter was removed and the intake installed. CAA Closure: The unit was repaired by a contracted organisation and it was confirmed that the tool had belonged to them. Contributing factors were: 1. The work process was followed but did not bring about the desired outcome as there was no close up inspections required by the task card stage instructions. 2. The air blow gun which was left inside the engine cowl belonged to the permanent contractor who completed the repair and was used by him during the repair of the cowl. The investigation confirmed that no internal training was given to the individual who completed the work and as a result he had little knowledge of the MOE and its procedures including those instructions contained in Part 2.6.4. This lead to a failure to report the missing tool to the certifying member of staff and prevented a non routine task card being generated in order to locate the missing tool. 3. There was an overnight time lapse between close out inspections and the fitment of outer skin access panels. In response to the 3 root cause items identified during the investigation the following preventive actions are offered / implemented by the contracted organisation; 1. All close out inspections to be an independent (duplicate) inspection activity and included on the task card. Close out inspection of inlet cowls to include the lifting and tilting of inlet to ensure any trapped debris will have a chance of being freed and subsequently audible. 2. All staff in maintenance activity are to be made aware of the MOE and its procedures for the work that they involved with. This is to be part of their induction into the Company by their respective workshop managers. All maintenance staff will need reviewing with immediate effect. 3.Close out inspections to be carried out immediately prior to the commencing of access panel installation, to ensure no time lag between the two activities. QA Manager confirmed all prevention strategies are now fully implemented. EasyJet A319 Adjustable spanner found inside panel 191BB during inspection. During under belly fairings open ups, namely panel 191BB, an adjustable spanner was found resting on the inside of belly fairing 191BB. The spanner has the number 411 engraved on it. Operator Representative was informed and he also had a look at the place where we found it and made an impromptu investigation of when and on what it was used last. It looks as if it was used to work on the Air Conditioning Pack No 1. Some chaffing marks were seen on the water extractor where the water drain hose is attached to. These chaffing marks could have been made by the adjustable spanner during unscrewing or tightening of the said hose.