A320 ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING - …cbt.altitudeglobal.aero/Files/A9 A320 Q1 and Q2 2016.pdf · FOR REFERENCE ONLY 1 Introduction / Changes to the A320 approval The A320 approval

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A320

ENGINEERING

CONTINUATION TRAINING

Q1 & Q2 2016

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Contents:

1 Introduction & review of approval changes relating to the A3202 A320 Airworthiness Directives3 A320 Maintenance Related MOR’s4 A320 Puncture to aircraft’s fuselage5 A320 Worn avionic blower fan bearing

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1 Introduction / Changes to the A320 approval

The A320 approval is still currently inactive having previously beensuspended last year due to the civil unrest in Libya and the line stationestablished there in the summer of 2014. There are no other A320 approvalsat this time.

However in order to maintain knowledge of the type, the following informationhas been formulated and presented for this purpose.

Engineers that currently have this on their PAC, need to prove 6 in 24 onrenewal. If recency cannot be demonstrated on renewal, then this will beremoved from your PAC or annotated as passive.

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2 A320 Airworthiness Directives

EASA AD No.: 2012-0032R1Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/

ATA 57 Wings – Outer Wing Main Landing Gear Support Rib 5Fitting – Inspection / Modification

Manufacturer(s): Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries)

Applicability: Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111,A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132,A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216,A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131,A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers (MSN), except thosehaving embodied Airbus modification (mod) 155881 inproduction.

Reason: Several cases of corrosion of the main landing gear (MLG)support Rib 5 fitting lug bores have been reported on A320 familyaeroplanes. In some instances, corrosion pits caused thecracking of the forward lug (sometimes through its completethickness).

This condition, if not detected, may lead to the complete failure ofthe fitting, possibly affecting the structural integrity of the MLGinstallation.

To address this unsafe condition, EASA issued AD 2007-0213 torequire, for pre-mod 32025 aeroplanes, repetitive inspections ofthe MLG support Rib 5 fitting forward lugs and, as terminatingaction, the embodiment of Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A320-57-1118.

After that AD was issued, a case of Rib 5, ruptured at the 4o’clock position, was discovered on an aeroplane on which AirbusSB A320-57-1118 had already been embodied. Investigation ofthat case revealed that corrosion damage and cracking thatshould have been removed by repair machining was below thelevel of detectability of the Non Destructive Test (NDT) techniquethat cleared the surfaces prior to bush installation.

Continued.....

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EASA AD No.: 2012-0032R1 Continued

Prompted by these findings, EASA issued AD 2011-0011, partiallyretaining the requirements of EASA AD 2007-0213, which wassuperseded, and to require the same actions for all aeroplanes onwhich Airbus SB A320-57-1118 has been embodied in service, oron which Airbus SRM 57-26-13 or individual adapted approvedAirbus Repair Instructions had been applied. That AD also reducedthe Applicability by excluding A318 aeroplanes, since Airbus mod32025 is embodied in production on both left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) wings for all A318 aeroplanes.

After EASA AD 2011-0011 was issued, three cases of corrosion ofRib 5 were discovered on aeroplanes on which Airbus mod 32025had been embodied in production. Investigations revealed that theunsafe condition addressed by AD 2011-0011 could occur ordevelop on those aeroplanes as well. For the reasons describedabove, EASA issued AD 2012-0032, retaining the requirements ofEASA AD 2011-0011, which was superseded, expanding theApplicability to all aeroplanes, and to require the same actions forpost-mod 32025 aeroplanes.

Since that AD was issued, Airbus has developed mod 155881 thatimproves the corrosion protection and constitutes terminating actionfor the required repetitive inspections. For in-service aeroplanes,this solution can only be introduced through a dedicated repair.

This AD is revised to exclude post-mod 155881 aeroplanes from theApplicability and to confirm the availability of the optionalterminating action, upon request from Airbus.

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ATA 27 Flight Controls – Trimmable Horizontal StabilizerActuator Ballscrew Lower Splines – Inspection /Replacement


Applicability: Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111,A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132,A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216,A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131,A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Reason: Some Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuators (THSA), PartNumber (P/N) 47147-500 fitted on A330/A340 aeroplanes werefound with corrosion, affecting the ballscrew lower splinesbetween the tie bar and the screw-jack. The affected ballscrew ismade of steel and anti-corrosion protection is ensured, except onboth extremities (upper and lower splines) where Molykote isapplied.

The results of the technical investigations identified that thecorrosion was caused by a combination of contact/frictionbetween the tie bar and the inner surface of the ballscrew leadingto the removal of Molykote (corrosion protection) at the level ofthe tie bar splines, humidity ingress initiating surface oxidationstarting from areas where Molykote is removed, and waterretention in THSA lower part leading to corrosion spread out andto the creation of a brown deposit (iron oxide).

The results of the technical investigations also concluded that theballscrews of THSA P/N 47145-XXX (where XXX stands for aspecific numerical value), installed on A320 family aeroplanes,might be affected by this corrosion issue.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, may lead, in case ofballscrew rupture, to loss of transmission of THSA torque loadsfrom the ballscrew to the tie-bar, prompting THSA blowback,possibly resulting in loss of control of the aeroplane.

Prompted by these findings, EASA issued AD 2012-0175 (laterrevised to exclude a new THSA P/N 47145-168, which is notaffected) to require repetitive detailed inspections of the ballscrewlower splines of the affected THSA to detect corrosion and,depending on findings, the accomplishment of applicablecorrective actions.

Continued......

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Since EASA AD 2012-0175R1 was issued, new P/N THSA havebeen developed by UTC Aerospace Systems (UTAS, formerlyGoodrich) that are not affected by the corrosion issue addressed bythis AD. Airbus issued SB A320-27-1222 to provide correspondingaeroplane modification instructions. Consequently, this AD is furtherrevised to include a full list (Appendix 1 of this AD) of affectedTHSA. Installation of any other P/N THSA not listed in appendix 1constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections requiredby this AD: at the issue date of the revision 2 of this AD, the THSAP/N 47145-148, P/N 47145-168, P/N 47145-248 and P/N 47145-268 are certified and known to be not affected by the corrosionissue addressed by this AD.


ATA 32 Landing Gear – Main Landing Gear Door Actuator –Monitoring / Inspection / Replacement / Modification



Reason: Some operators reported slow operation of the main landing gear(MLG) door opening/closing sequence, leading to the generationof ECAM warnings during the landing gear retraction or extensionsequence. Investigations showed that the damping ring andassociated retaining ring of the MLG door actuator maydeteriorate. The resultant debris increases the friction inside theactuator which can be sufficiently high to restrict opening of theMLG door by gravity, during operation of the landing gearalternate (free-fall) extension system.

This condition, if not corrected, could prevent the full extensionand/or down locking of the MLG, possibly resulting in MLGcollapse during landing or rollout and consequent damage to theaeroplane and injury to occupants.

Continued.....

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EASA AD 2006-0112 (later revised) was issued to require repetitiveinspections of the opening sequence of the MLG door in order toidentify the affected actuators, and to introduce as an optionalterminating action Airbus production Modification (mod) 38274 andassociated Service Bulletin (SB) A320-32-1338, which incorporatesan improved retaining ring, located on the piston rod's extensionend, and a new piston rod with machined shoulder to accommodatethe thicker section of the modified retaining ring.

After in-service introduction of the new MLG door actuator, PartNumber (P/N) 114122012 (Post-mod 38274 – SB A320-32-1338),several operators reported failures of internal parts of the MLG dooractuator. Investigations confirmed that these failures could result inslow extension of the actuator rod, delaying the MLG dooroperation, or possibly stopping just before the end of the stroke,preventing the door to reach the fully open position.

EASA AD 2011-0069 (later revised), which superseded EASA AD2006-0112R1, was issued to require amendment of the applicableAirplane Flight Manual (AFM), repetitive checks of specificCentralized Fault Display System (CFDS) messages, repetitiveinspections of the opening sequence of the MLG door actuator and,depending on findings, corrective action(s).Since EASA AD 2011-0069R1 was issued, Airbus introduced areinforced MLG door actuator P/N 114122014 (mod 153655). Airbusissued SB A320-32-1407 containing instructions for in-servicereplacement of the affected MLG door actuators, or modification ofthe actuators to the new standard.

In addition, following an occurrence with a gear extension problem,the result of additional analyses by Airbus revealed that the CFDSexpected specific messages may not be generated and as a result,repetitive checks of messages are not effective for aeroplanes fittedwith landing gear control interface unit (LGCIU) interlinkcommunication ARINC 429 (applied in production through Airbusmod 39303, or in service through Airbus SB A320-32-1409), incombination with LGCIUs 80-178-02-88012 or 80-178-03-88013 inboth positions and at least one MLG door actuator pre-mod 153655(pre-Airbus SB A320-32-1407 – pre-General Electric (GE) SB114122-32-105) installed.

Prompted by these findings, EASA issued Emergency AD 2013-0132-E to require identification of the affected aeroplanes toestablish the configuration and, for those aeroplanes, repetitiveinspections of the opening sequence of the MLG door actuator and,depending on findings, replacement of the MLG door actuator. ThatAD also provided an optional terminating action by disconnection ofthe interlink for certain LGCIUs, or in-service modification of theaeroplane through Airbus SB A320-32-1407 (equivalent to Airbusproduction mod 153655).

Continued.....

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Since those ADs (EASA AD 2011-0069R1 and EASA AD 2013-0132-E) were issued, analyses performed by Airbus have revealedthat the MLG door opening sequence inspection interval needed tobe reduced, and that the (previously optional) terminating actionneeded to be made mandatory.

Prompted by these findings, EASA issued AD 2013-0288, retainingthe requirements of EASA AD 2011-0069R1 and EASA AD 2013-0132-E, which were superseded, but with reduced inspectionintervals, and to require replacement or modification, as applicable,of the affected MLG door actuators as terminating action to themonitoring and repetitive checks and inspections.

Following introduction of post-mod 153655 MLG door actuators onin-service aeroplanes, it has been observed that, in case theremoved pre-mod MLG door actuator has internal damage,contamination of the hydraulic system could have occurred.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result inperformance degradation (damping degradation) of the post-modMLG door actuator. Testing performed with a new actuator tested inheavily contaminated hydraulic system did not show abnormalhydraulic restriction/blockage. It is thus not requested to performthis "flushing procedure" on aircraft already retrofitted with std-14actuators. In addition, since EASA AD 2013-0288 was issued, theapplicable AFM was revised and repetitive checks of specific CFDSmessages are no longer considered to be required, due to thereduced intervals required by EASA AD 2013-0288.

For the reasons described above, this AD partially retains therequirements of EASA AD 2013-0288, which is superseded,introduces improved wording for clarification and requires, inaddition to the revised operational (AFM) procedure, hydraulicflushing prior to any installation of a post-mod MLG door actuator.

This AD is revised to provide additional optional terminating actions.

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

EASA AD No.: 2015-0218Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/

ATA 53 Fuselage – Cabin / Cargo Compartment Parts –Inspection / Replacement [Wrong Material]


Applicability: Airbus A318-112, A319-111, A319-112, A319-115, A319-132,A319-133, A320-214, A320-216, A320-232, A320-233, A321-211,A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes,manufacturer serial numbers (MSN) 3586, 3588, 3589, 3590,3595, 3604, 3608, 3614, 3615, 3620, 3632, 3634, 3638, 3647,3651, 3657, 3660, 3661, 3663, 3671, 3675, 3680, 3683 to 3687inclusive, 3689, 3691, 3694, 3700, 3702, 3704, 3705, 3710,3720, 3727, 3728, 3733, 3735, 3742, 3744, 3746, 3754, 3757,3759, 3763, 3768, 3770, 3772, 3774, 3775, 3779, 3788, 3790,3794, 3797, 3799, 3801, 3803, 3808, 3810, 3818, 3822, 3824,3826 to 4329 inclusive, 4331 to 6051 inclusive, 6053 to 6061inclusive, 6063 to 6072 inclusive, 6074 to 6100 inclusive, 6102 to6115 inclusive, 6117 to 6126 inclusive, 6128 to 6136 inclusive,6138 to 6143 inclusive, 6145 to 6150 inclusive, 6152 to 6159inclusive, 6161 and 6162.

Reason: Following an Airbus quality control review on the final assemblyline, it was discovered that wrong aluminium alloy were deliveredby a supplier for several structural parts. The results of theinvestigations highlighted that 0.04% of the stock could beimpacted by this wrong material. Structural investigationsdemonstrated the capability to sustain the static limits loads, andsufficient fatigue life up to a certain inspection threshold.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could reduce thestructural integrity of the aeroplane. To address this potentialunsafe condition, Airbus issued Service Bulletin (SB) A320-53-1298 and SB A320-53-1299 to provide inspection instructions.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires a one-timeSpecial Detailed Inspection (SDI) of certain cabin and cargocompartment parts for material identification and, depending onfindings, replacement with serviceable parts.

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ATA 53 Fuselage – Cabin / Cargo Compartment Parts –Inspection / Replacement [Improper Heat Treatment]


Applicability: Airbus A318-112, A319-111, A319-112, A319-115, A319-132,A319-133, A320-214, A320-216, A320-232, A320-233, A321-211,A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes,manufacturer serial numbers (MSN) 4895, 4903, 4911, 4919,4929, 4938, 4942, 4944, 4946, 4948 and 4951, MSN 4956 to5541 inclusive, MSN 5544, 5547, 5550, 5551, 5553, 5556, 5559,5561, 5562, 5563, 5565, 5566, 5570, 5572, 5576 and 5578.

Reason: Following an Airbus quality control review on the final assemblyline, it was discovered that aluminium alloy with inadequate heattreatment were delivered by a supplier for several structural parts.The results of the investigations highlighted that 1% of the stockcould be impacted by this wrong material. Structuralinvestigations demonstrated the capability to sustain the staticlimits loads, and sufficient fatigue life up to a certain inspectionthreshold.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could reduce theaeroplane structural integrity following fatigue load.

To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued ServiceBulletins (SB) A320-53-1292, SB A320-53-1293 and SB A320-53-1294 to provide inspection instructions.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires a one-timeSpecial Detailed Inspection (SDI) of certain cabin, cargocompartment and frame parts and, depending on findings,replacement with serviceable parts.

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ATA 71 Power Plant – Forward Engine Mount Bolts – Inspection/ Replacement


Applicability: Airbus A319-113, A319-114, A320-211 and A320-212aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Reason: A review of the maintenance instructions revealed that anincorrect torque value with wrong unit for the four forward enginemount pylon bolts was included in task 71-00-00-400-040-A01,“Installation of the power plant with Engine Positioner TWW75E”,of the A320 family (CFMI) Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM),revision dated May 2013. It was determined that this AMMinconsistent torque unit affected the A319/A320 aeroplaneequipped with CFM56-5A engines only.

Subsequently, AMM task 71-00-00-400-040-A01 was corrected toinclude the correct values in the August 2015 revision. During theperiod between these two AMM revisions, incorrect torque valuesmay have been applied.

This condition, if not corrected, and if combined with inducedmaintenance damage, could lead to forward engine mount failure,possibly resulting in engine detachment and consequent reducedcontrol of the aeroplane, damage to the aeroplane and/or injury topersons on the ground.

To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued AlertOperators Transmission (AOT) A71N010-15 (hereafter referred toas “the AOT” in this AD), to provide instructions to check thetorque values of the forward engine mount bolts.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires identificationof CFM56-5A engines that were installed by using the incorrecttorque data, verifying the proper torque value of the all fourforward engine mount pylon bolts and, depending on findings,accomplishment of corrective action(s).

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ATA 52 Doors – Main Landing Gear Door Tie Rod Assembly –Inspection


Applicability: Airbus A319-115, A319-132, A320-214, A320-216, A320-232,A321-211, A321-213 and A321-231 aeroplanes, manufacturerserial numbers (MSN) as listed in Airbus Service Bulletin (SB)A320-52-1167.

Reason: A production quality issue was identified concerning tie rodassemblies, having Part Number (P/N) starting withD52840212000 or D52840212002, which are installed on themain landing gear (MLG) hinged fairing assembly. This qualityissue affects the cadmium plating surface treatment which wasinadvertently omitted from the rod end threads of the assembly.The absence of cadmium plating reduces the corrosion protectionscheme.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead togalvanic corrosion of the tie rod end threads, possibly resulting inrod end failure, loss of a MLG door, and consequent injury topersons on ground.

To address this unsafe condition, Airbus identified the affectedMSN and issued SB A320-52-1167 to provide inspectioninstructions.

For the reason described above, this AD requires a one-timeinspection of the affected MLG hinged fairing tie rod assemblies,and, depending on findings, replacement of the affected tie rodassembly.

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ATA 71 Powerplant – Aft Engine Mount Retainers – Inspection /Replacement


Applicability: Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113,A319-114, A319-115, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215,A320-216, A321-111, A321-112, A321-211, A321-212, and A321-213 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers

Reason: During in-service inspections, several aft engine mount innerretainers, fitted on aeroplanes equipped with CFM56-5A/5Bengines, have been found broken. The results of the initialinvestigations highlighted that two different types of surface finishhad been applied (respectively bright and dull material finishes),and that dull finish affects the strength of the retainer with regardto fatigue properties of the part. The pins which attach the enginelink to the aft mount are secured by two nuts, which do not have aself-locking feature; this function is provided by the retainerbrackets. In case of failure of the retainer bracket, the lockingfeature of the nuts of the inner and outer pins is lost; as a result,these nuts could subsequently become loose.

In case of full loss of the nuts, there is the potential to also losethe pins, in which case the aft mount link will no longer besecured to the aft engine mount. The same locking feature isused for the three link assemblies of the aft mount.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to in-flight loss of an aft mount link, possibly resulting in damage to theaeroplane and/or injury to persons on the ground.

To address this potential unsafe condition, EASA issued AD2013-0050 to require a detailed inspection (DET) of the aft enginemount inner retainers and the replacement of all retainers withdull finish with retainers having a bright finish. Since that AD wasissued, inspection results showed that the main cause of crackinitiation remains the vibration dynamic effect that affects bothretainers, either with "dull" or "bright" surface finishes. The non-conforming "dull" surface’s pitting is an aggravating factor.Consequently, EASA issued AD 2015-0021, retaining therequirements of EASA AD 2013-0050, which was superseded,and requiring repetitive DET of all aft engine mount innerretainers and, depending on findings, their replacement.

Continued....

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Since that AD was issued, a production quality deficiency wasidentified by Airbus and UTAS (formerly Goodrich Aerostructures,the engine mount retainer manufacturer) on the delivery of the innerretainer, Part Number (P/N) 238-0252-505, installed in the threeLink assemblies of the engine mount fitted on CFM56-5A/5Bengines. Airbus issued AOT A71N011-15 and SB A320-71-1070providing a list of affected parts and applicable corrective actions.

Consequently, EASA issued AD 2016-0010, retaining therequirements of EASA AD 2015-0021, which was superseded, andin addition requiring the identification and replacement of all non-conforming aft engine mount inner retainers.

Since that AD was issued, AOT A71N011-15 was revised, removingerrors and reducing the list of affected parts.

For the reason described above, this AD is revised, addingreference to the revised AOT, and removing AD appendixes, whichcontent is included in the referenced Airbus documentation.

This AD is still considered to be an interim action, pendingdevelopment and availability of a final solution.

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ATA 53 Fuselage – Door Stop Fitting Holes – Inspection /Repair


Applicability: Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111,A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132,A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216,A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131,A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers, except those onwhich Airbus modification (mod) 157039 has been embodied inproduction.

Reason: During an A320 fatigue test campaign, it was determined thatfatigue damage could appear at the door stop fitting holes offuselage frame (FR) 66 and FR68 on left hand (LH) and right hand(RH) sides.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could affect thestructural integrity of the airframe.

Two inspections, Airworthiness Limitations Item (ALI) tasks 534129and 534130, were introduced in the Airworthiness LimitationsSection (ALS) Part 2 with the April 2012 revision and with somecompliance time changes with revision 3 of this ALS part 2 ofOctober 2014. Since these ALI tasks were implemented, asignificant number of reports was received concerning non-criticaldamage and early crack findings. Consequently, Airbus publishedService Bulletin (SB) A320-53-1288 and SB A320-53-1290,providing inspection instructions to improve damage managementand modification instructions.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitiverototest inspections of the affected door stop fitting holes and,depending on findings, repair of any cracked area(s).

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ATA 32 Landing Gear – Main Landing Gear Side StayAssemblies – Replacement / Modification



Reason: During studies for a new landing gear design, it was discovered thatthe single-locked upper and lower cardan joints of the Main LandingGear (MLG) do not comply with the certification specifications of(CS, formerly JAR) Part 25.607.

This condition, if not corrected, could lead to MLG side stay lockingfailure that, during take off and landing, may result in damage to theaeroplane and detrimental effect on safe flight.

To address this potential unsafe condition, the MLG manufacturerdeveloped a modification to change the single-locked MLG joint intoa double-locked one. This modification is available for in-serviceapplication through Messier-Bugatti-Dowty (MBD) Service Bulletin(SB) 200-32-315 or SB 201-32-63, or Airbus SB A320-32-1429.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires modification orreplacement of the MLG side stay assemblies to introduce thedouble locking of the MLG upper and lower cardan joints.

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY


ATA 26 Fire Protection – Optical and Ambient Smoke Detectors– Identification / Replacement

Manufacturer(s): SIEMENS S.A.S.

Applicability: Part Number (P/N) PMC1102-02, P/N PMC3100-00 and P/NGMC1102-02 smoke detectors, having a date of manufacture(DMF, in digits as ‘MMYYYY’, e.g. 072010, see Appendix 2 of thisAD) between November 2010 to January 2013 inclusive, andcertain repaired units, as identified by P/N and serial number (s/n)in Appendix 1 of this AD.

in service by Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) modificationon certain Airbus A319 and A320,

Reason: During a maintenance operation, some smoke detectors P/NPMC1102-02 failed an acceptance test, due to a significantdegraded optical sensitivity. Investigation results concluded thatlight-emitting diodes (LED) were abnormally degraded, affectingspecific batches where changes occurred in the LED manufacturerproduction process. Further investigation has determined that theaffected LED have been installed on smoke detectorsmanufactured between November 2010 and January 2013, and oncertain repaired units.

This condition, if not corrected, will generate an abnormal ageing ofthe smoke detector, leading to a decrease of the light intensitycapability, possibly resulting in failure to detect smoke andconsequent risk of an on board uncontrolled fire.

Prompted by these findings, Siemens published Service InformationLetter (SIL) PMC-26-002 and SIL PMC-26-003 (hereaftercollectively referred to as ‘the applicable SIL’ in this AD), providinginstructions to identify the affected smoke detectors for repairaction.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires identification andremoval from service of all affected smoke detectors.

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ATA 72 Engine – Low Pressure Turbine Rear Frames –Inspection / Replacement

Manufacturer(s): CFM INTERNATIONAL S.A.

Applicability: CFM56-5B1, CFM56-5B1/P, CFM56-5B2, CFM56-5B2/P, CFM56-5B3/P, CFM56-5B3/P1, CFM56-5B4, CFM56-5B4/P, CFM56-5B4/P1, CFM56-5B5, CFM56-5B5/P, CFM56-5B6, CFM56-5B6/P,CFM56-5B7,CFM56-5B7/P, CFM56-5B8/P and CFM56-5B9/P engines, all serialnumbers.

Reason: The design approval holder performed an analysis of the servicelives of certain turbine rear frames (TRF), part number (P/N) 338-102-907-0 and P/N 338-102-908-0, installed on the low-pressureturbine (LPT) frame assembly of CFM56-5B engines. This resultedin the need to correct the lives of those parts.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to failure ofa TRF on the LPT frame assembly, possibly resulting in engineseparation, with consequent reduced control of the aeroplane andinjury to persons on the ground; or damage to the engine, withconsequent damage to the aeroplane.

To address this potential unsafe condition. CFM International S.A.(CFM) issued CFM56-5B Service Bulletin (SB) No. 72-0850(hereafter referred to as ‘the SB’ in this AD) to provide inspectioninstructions.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitiveinspections of affected TRFs and, depending on findings,replacement with serviceable parts.

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY


ATA 25 Equipment / Furnishings – Buffet and Galley / TrolleyCompartments – Modification

Manufacturer(s): Airbus

Applicability: Airbus A319-112, A319-115, A320-214, A320-232 and A321-211aeroplanes, manufacturer serial numbers 1479, 3096, 3693, 3713,3739, 3791, 3896, 3902, 3907, 3931, 3949, 3969, 4030, 4045,4049, 4059, 4066, 4077, 4083, 4124, 4146, 4158, 4188, 4198,4206, 4209, 4218, 4235, 4255, 4264, 4304, 4321, 4371, 4374,4395, 4411, 4417, 4431, 4485, 4492, 4502, 4528, 4541, 4548,4592, 4595, 4638, 4651, 4669, 4703, 4724, 4737, 4746, 4770,4780, 4783, 4826, 4827, 4860, 4863, 4865, 4902, 4934, 4945,4951, 4952, 4971, 4996, 5023, 5029, 5042, 5088, 5095, 5132,5159, 5164, 5171, 5175, 5192, 5210, 5227, 5241, 5247, 5251,5275, 5277, 5297, 5306, 5340, 5343, 5348, 5356, 5366, 5370,5385, 5387, 5392, 5396, 5400, 5407, 5418, 5427, 5438, 5456,5458, 5469, 5495, 5517, 5555, 5624, 5674, 5678, 5698, 5699,5709, 5714, 5791, 5704, 5745, 5753, 5761, 5781, 5786, 5788,5789, 5798, 5804, 5810, 5821, 5827, 5842, 5874, 5882, 5889,5903, 5907, 5916, 5924, 5958, 5984, 5994, 6000, 6004, 6054,6080, 6107, 6166, 6176, 6234, 6266, 6293, 6335, 6344, 6365, 6430and 6444 inclusive.

Reason: Following in-service experience and further analyses, it wasascertained that the galley 5 without kick load retainers on externalposition could not withstand the expected loading during severalflight phases or in case of emergency landing.

This condition, if not corrected, could lead to galley / trolleydetachment and collapse into an adjacent cabin aisle or cabin zone,possibly spreading loose galley equipment items, compartmentdoors or leaking fluids, blocking an evacuation route, andconsequently resulting in injury to crew or passengers.

To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued 6 ServiceBulletins (SB) to provide modification instructions for the affectedaeroplanes.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires modification ofgalley 5 trolley compartments to install kick load retainers.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY


ATA 25 Equipment / Furnishings – Escape Slide Rafts –Modification / Replacement



Reason: Two occurrences were reported on Airbus A320 family aeroplaneswhere the escape slide raft inflation system did not deploy whenactivated. This was due to the rotation of the cable guide in adirection, which resulted in jamming of the inflation control cable.Additionally, one case was reported where the system did notdeploy properly due to a cracked inflation hose fitting. Investigationconducted by Air Cruisers Company, the slide raft manufacturer,showed that the hose fitting could be subject to a bending moment,if improperly packed. Consequently, the hose fitting could separatefrom the reservoir and the inflation of the slide raft would beimpaired.

This condition, if not corrected, could delay the evacuation from theaeroplane in case of emergency, possibly resulting in injury to theoccupants.

To address this potential unsafe condition, DGAC France issuedAD F-2004-072, to introduce an inflation hose retainer preventingan incomplete inflation of emergency escape slides, which coulddelay passenger evacuation, and EASA issued AD 2011-0160(later revised twice) to require modification of the affected slide raftsor replacement thereof with modified units.

Since EASA AD 2011-0160R2 was issued, Air Cruisers developeda modification of the slide and slide/raft, part of the escape slidepack assemblies, to improve its deployment. Modified slides andslide/rafts are identified by a different Part Number (P/N);consequently, also the escape slide pack assemblies are identifiedby a different P/N.

For the reasons described above, this AD retains the requirementsof DGAC France AD F-2004-072 (EASA approval 2004-5335) andEASA AD 2011-0160R2, which are superseded, and requiresinstallation of modified escape slide pack assemblies.

Continued...

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

EASA AD No.: 2016-0043 Continued

Appendix 1 of this AD provides a comprehensive list of escape slidepack assemblies P/N that, at the issue date of the AD, are notapproved for further installation on any aeroplane.


ATA 71 Power Plant – Fan Cowl Door Latch with Key and Flag,IAE engines – Modification


Applicability: Airbus A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-231, A320-232,A320-233, A321-131, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, allmanufacturer serial numbers.

Reason: Fan Cowl Door (FCD) losses during take-off were reported onaeroplanes equipped with IAE V2500 engines. Prompted by theseoccurences, DGAC France issued AD 2000-444-156(B), mandatingFCD latch improvements. This AD was later superseded by AD2001-381(B), requiring installation of additional fan cowl latchimprovement by installing a hold open device.

Since that AD was issued, further FCD in flight losses wereexperienced in service. Investigations confirmed that in all cases,the fan cowls were opened prior to the flight and were not correctlyre-secured. During the pre-flight inspection, it was then not detectedthat the FCD were not properly latched.

This condition, if not corrected, could lead to in-flight loss of a FCD,possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane and/or injury topersons on the ground.

Prompted by these recent events, new FCD front latch and keeperassembly were developed, having a specific key necessary to un-latch the FCD. This key cannot be removed unless the FCD frontlatch is safely closed. The key, after removal, must be stowed in theflight deck at a specific location, as instructed in the applicableAircraft Maintenance Manual. Applicable Flight Crew OperatingManual has been amended accordingly. After modification, the FCDis identified with a different Part Number (P/N).

For the reasons described above, this AD retains the requirementsof DGAC

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY


ATA 27 Flight Controls – Spoiler Elevator Computer Softwareupdate


Applicability: Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111,A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132,A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216,A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131,A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers..

Reason: Following the introduction of new Spoiler and Elevator Computer(SEC) hardware C Part Number (P/N) B372CAM0100 with software(SW) standards 122, 124 and 125 (identified by P/NB372CAM0101, P/N B372CAM0102 and P/N B372CAM0103,respectively, and hereafter referred to as an “affected SEC SWstandard” in this AD), some airlines reported receiving maintenancemessages, e.g. “SEC OR WIRING FROM L or R ELEV POS MONXDCR” and/or “SEC OR WIRING FROM G or Y ELEV POS XDCR”,which are associated with servo control or elevator transducermonitoring. Such messages are triggered by a short datainconsistency due to power transients, when the engines arestarted.

This condition, if not corrected, could lead to an undetected loss ofredundancy during flight if an affected SEC cannot control therelated elevator servo control(s), possibly resulting in reducedcontrol of the aeroplane.

To address this potential unsafe condition, EASA issued AD 2015-0191 to require amendment of the applicable Airplane FlightManual (AFM) to include the flight crew procedure necessary torecover full SEC redundancy.

Since that AD was issued, to fix the software deficiency, SECsoftware standard 126 (identified by P/N B372CAM0104) wasdeveloped, which is embodied in production through Airbusmodification (mod) 161208 (installation of SEC software standard126), and introduced in service through Airbus Service Bulletin (SB)A320-27-1252.

For the reason described above, this AD retains the AFM changerequirements of EASA AD 2015-0191, which is superseded, andrequires the removal and/or upgrade of SEC.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY


ATA 71 Power Plant – Fan Cowl Door Latch with Key and Flag,CFM engines – Modification


Applicability: Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113,A319-114, A319-115, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215,A320-216, A321-111, A321-112, A321-211, A321-212, and A321-213 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Reason: Fan Cowl Door (FCD) losses were reported on aeroplanesequipped with CFM56 engines.

Investigations confirmed that in all cases the fan cowls wereopened prior to the flight and were not correctly re-secured. Duringthe pre-flight inspection, it was then not detected that the FCD werenot properly latched.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to in-flightloss of a FCD, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane and/orinjury to persons on the ground.

Prompted by these events, new FCD front latch and keeperassembly were developed, having a specific key necessary to un-latch the FCD. This key cannot be removed unless the FCD frontlatch is safely closed. The key, after removal, must be stowed in theflight deck at a specific location, as instructed in the applicableAircraft Maintenance Manual. Applicable Flight Crew OperatingManual has been amended accordingly. After modification, the FCDis identified with a different Part Number (P/N).

For the reasons described above, this AD requires modification andre-identification of FCD.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY


ATA 78 Exhaust – Thrust Reverser Pivot Fitting – Inspection


Applicability: Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113,A319-114, A319-115, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215,A320-216, A321-111, A321-112, A321-211, A321-212 and A321-213 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Reason: Several operators reported finding cracks, during an unscheduledinspection, on the 3 o’clock and 9 o’clock pivot fittings of a CFM56engine’s thrust reverser (T/R). Investigation results revealed thatthese cracks were caused by a combination of stress and fatigueeffects. Further analysis determined that only aeroplanes fitted withCFM56-5A or CFM56-5B series engines could be affected by thisissue.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to T/Rmalfunction and, in a case of rejected take off at V1 on a wetrunway, a consequent runway excursion, possibly resulting indamage to the aeroplane and injury to occupants.

For the reasons described above, EASA issued AD 2016-0068,requiring repetitive inspections of the T/R pivot fittings at the 3o’clock and 9 o’clock positions and, depending on findings,accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s).

Since that AD was issued, it was determined that the list of partnumbers (P/N) of affected T/R pivot fitting , as identified in that AD,was incomplete.

For the reason stated above, this AD retains the requirements ofEASA AD 2016-0068, which is superseded, but expands the list ofaffected fitting P/Ns.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY


ATA 05 Time Limits / Maintenance Checks – AirworthinessLimitations Section Part 3 – Certification MaintenanceRequirements – Implementation



Reason: The airworthiness limitations for Airbus A320 family aeroplanes arecurrently defined and published in Airbus A318/A319/A320/A321Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) documents. Theairworthiness limitations applicable to the Certification MaintenanceRequirements (CMR), which are approved by EASA, are publishedin ALS Part 3.The instructions contained in the ALS Part 3 have been identifiedas mandatory actions for continued airworthiness. Failure to complywith these instructions could result in an unsafe condition.

Previously, EASA issued AD 2013-0148 to require accomplishmentof all maintenance tasks as described in ALS Part 3 at Revision 01.The new ALS Part 3 Revision 03 (hereafter referred to as ‘the ALS’in this AD) includes new and/or more restrictive requirements.

For the reason described above, this AD retains the requirements ofEASA AD 2013-0148, which is superseded, and requiresaccomplishment of all maintenance tasks as described in the ALS.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY


ATA 05 Time Limits / Maintenance Checks – AirworthinessLimitations Section Part 4 – System EquipmentMaintenance Requirements (SEMR) – Implementation



Reason: The airworthiness limitations for Airbus A320 family aeroplanes arecurrently defined and published in Airbus A318/A319/A320/A321Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) documents. Theairworthiness limitations applicable to the System EquipmentMaintenance Requirements, which are approved by EASA, arespecified in ALS Part 4.

The instructions contained in the ALS Part 4 have been identifiedas mandatory actions for continued airworthiness. Failure to complywith these instructions could result in an unsafe condition.

Previously, EASA issued AD 2013-0146 to require accomplishmentof all maintenance actions as described in ALS Part 4 at Revision01. The new ALS Part 4 Revision 03 (hereafter referred to as ‘theALS’ in this AD) includes new and/or more restrictive requirements.ALS Part 4 Revision 03, issue 02, has been released to includeeditorial changes.

For the reason described above, this AD retains the requirements ofEASA AD 2013-0146, which is superseded, and requiresaccomplishment of the actions specified in the ALS.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY


ATA 53 Fuselage – Cabin Floor Beam Junction - Inspection


Applicability: Airbus A321-111, A321-112, A321-131, A321-211, A321-212,A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturerserial numbers.

Reason: Following the results of a new full scale fatigue test campaign onthe A321 airframe in the context of the A321 extended service goal,it was identified that cracks could develop in the cabin floor beamjunctions at fuselage frame (FR) 35.1 and FR 35.2, on both lefthand (LH) and right hand (RH) sides, also on aeroplanes operatedin the context of design service goal.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could reduce thestructural integrity of the fuselage.

Prompted by these findings, Airbus developed an inspectionprogramme, published in Service Bulletin (SB) A320-53-1317, SBA320-53-1318, SB A320-53-1319 and SB A320-53-1320, eachcontaining instructions for a different location.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitivedetailed inspections (DET) of the affected cabin floor beamjunctions and, depending on findings, accomplishment of a repair.

This AD is considered an interim action, pending development of apermanent solution.

Note: The grace period for the initial inspection has been modifiedfrom “within 2 500 Flight Cycles (FC) after the effective date of thisAD” (as anticipated during the consultation period of this AD) to“within 2 100 FC after the effective date of this AD”.Further public consultation for this modified grace period has beendeemed not in the interest of aeroplane operators.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY


ATA 53 Fuselage – Frame 35.2A - Inspection


Applicability: Airbus A321-111, A321-112, A321-131, A321-211, A321-212,A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturerserial numbers.

Reason: Following a new full scale fatigue test campaign on the A321airframe, in the context of the A321 extended service goal, it wasidentified that cracks could develop on holes at frame (FR) 35.2Abetween stringers (STR) 22 and STR 23 on right hand (RH) and lefthand (LH) sides, also on aeroplanes operated in the context ofdesign service goal.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could reduce thestructural integrity of the fuselage.

Prompted by these findings, Airbus developed an inspectionprogramme, published in Service Bulletin (SB) A320-53-1315 andSB A320-53-1316, each containing instructions for a differentlocation.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitive specialdetailed (rototest) inspections (SDI) of the affected holes and,depending on findings, accomplishment of a repair.

This AD is considered an interim action, pending development of apermanent solution.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY


ATA 27 Flight Controls – Flap Interconnecting Strut –Identification / Modification / Replacement


Applicability: Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111,A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132,A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216,A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131,A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers (MSN).

Reason: The flap interconnecting strut is a safety device of the High LiftSystem which acts as an alternative load path from one flap surfaceto another in case of a flap drive system disconnection. In such afailure case, the installed proximity sensors provide information tothe slat flap control computer (SFCC) and the operation of the flapdrive system is inhibited.

An engineering investigation showed that, when a certaincombination of target/sensor serial number (s/n) is installed on aflap interconnecting strut, a "target FAR" signal cannot be detectedwhen reaching the mechanical end stop of the interconnecting strut.

This condition, if not corrected, could cause a flap down drivedisconnection to remain undetected, due to an already-failedinterconnecting strut sensor, potentially resulting in asymmetric flappanel movement and consequent loss of control of the aeroplane.

To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued ServiceBulletin (SB) A320-27-1206 and SB A320-57-1164, to provideidentification and replacement instructions for struts that have acertain target/sensor s/n combination installed. Aeroplanes onwhich modification (mod) 27956 had been accomplished inproduction were identified as not affected by the unsafe condition.Consequently, EASA issued AD 2012-0012 to requireaccomplishment of these inspections and corrective actions.

Since that AD was issued, Airbus has informed EASA about a batchof aeroplanes that were delivered with pre-mod 27956 Part Number(P/N) flap interconnecting strut(s) installed, but declared to be inpost-mod configuration in the Aircraft Inspection Report. Airbus SBA320-57-1202 has been issued to provide instructions to verify theinterconnecting strut P/N, and to update aircraft documentation.

In addition, to ensure that all pre-mod parts are checked andcorrected as required, SB A320-27-1206 was revised to include awider range of P/N of affected interconnecting struts.

Continued...

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY


For the reasons described above, this AD retains the requirementsof EASA AD 2012-0012, which is superseded, expands theApplicability, changes the compliance time and requires anadditional inspection for aeroplanes that have already beeninspected.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY


ATA 28 Fuel – Fuel Vent Protector – Inspection / Replacement


Applicability: Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111,A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132,A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216,A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131,A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers (MSN).

Reason: On each aeroplane wing, a NACA duct assembly is installed,including a Fuel Vent Protector (FVP) which is used as flamearrestor. This FVP is maintained in its NACA duct assembly by acirclip (also known as C-clip). Following a wing water pressure test,the FVP is removed and dried with heat. During an inspection afterthis test, several circlips were reported to be discoloured.Investigation revealed that a batch of circlips fitted on some FVPPart Number (P/N) 786073-1-0 have an increased risk of corrosiondue to a manufacturing quality issue.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to circlipfailure and consequent FVP movement, reducing the flameprotector capability of the FVP cartridge, possibly resulting indamage to the aeroplane in case of lightning impact or fire onground.

Airbus issued Service Bulletin (SB) A320-28-1221, providinginstructions for identification by serial number (s/n) and removalfrom service of the affected FVP P/N 786073-1-0, and EASA issuedAD 2014-0234, later revised, to require those actions and toimplement installation requirements for the FVP.

After that AD was issued, one step in the FVP re-installationinstructions was identified as missing. Consequently, Airbus revisedSB A320-28-1221 to provide instructions for sealant installation onsome nuts and bolts on the NACA duct assembly.

For the reasons described above, this AD retains the requirementsof EASA AD 2014-0234R1, which is superseded, and requiresadditional work for aeroplanes already modified in accordancewith Airbus SB A320-28-1221 original issue or Revision 01.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY


ATA 22 Auto Flight – Flight Management and GuidanceComputer – Replacement


Applicability: Airbus A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115,A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214,A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131,A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Reason: Following an instrument landing system (ILS) approach, duringnight, in rainy condition, an A321 aeroplane experienced alongitudinal runway excursion. Investigation revealed that theapproach was not stabilized with an overspeed of 19 knots (kts)over the runway threshold, followed by a long flare (18 seconds)with touchdown far behind the touchdown zone. The aeroplaneexited the runway at 75 kts and came to rest around 300 metersbeyond the end of the runway. During the final approach, at 150feet Radio Altimeter (RA) altitude, the corrected airspeed of theaeroplane was 165 kts (24 kts overspeed). Auto thrust (ATHR)commanded a transient N1 increase up to 70% due to the ATHRspeed Mach control law.

The ATHR system on A320 family aeroplane was designed tomaintain accurately the aircraft speed/Mach to speed/Mach targetby commanding the thrust, featuring also a trade-off at low altitudebetween thrust corrections to maintain speed equal to speed targetand too large thrust corrections destabilizing the aircraft trajectorynear the ground. The conclusions of the investigations were that themain contributor to this runway excursion was a non-stabilizedapproach not followed by a go-around. ATHR misbehaviour in caseof large overspeed led to an unexpected thrust increase, which isconsidered as a contributor to the long flare.

This ATHR characteristic, reported as “Spurious thrust increaseduring approach”, was initially found in 1996 and a modification wasdeveloped and introduced in Flight Guidance (FG) 2G standard “C8or I8” (C for CFM engines and I for IAE engines) in 2001.

Continued...

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY


Prompted by these findings, Airbus introduced a programme toencourage operators to replace the FMGC Legacy with the FMGCequipped with Flight Management System type 2 (FMS2) and FGstandard, which introduces additional operational capabilities,including Runway Overrun Protection System / Runway OverrunWarning (ROPS/ROW) and Autopilot/Traffic Collision AvoidanceSystem (AP/TCAS). It was determined that the ROPS, in a scenariosimilar to the one described above, would have triggered a«RUNWAY TOO SHORT» aural alert before touchdown.Information was made available through Airbus Service InformationLetter (SIL) 22-039 (later superseded by Word In ServiceExperience (WISE) In Service Information 22.83.00003), and EASApublished Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) 2013-19, recommendingthe FMGC upgrade.

Since EASA SIB was published, it was determined that manyoperators have chosen not to implement the optional upgrade thatimproves the ATHR behaviour.

More recently, prompted by a recommendation from the BEA(Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviationcivile) of France, to reduce the risk of further runway excursions dueto uninterrupted unstable approaches performed with the legacyFMGC standard, EASA decided to require installation of at least thefirst version of the FMS2 and associated FG for legacy aeroplanes.

DGAC France issued AD 1999-411-140(B)R1 and AD 1998-226-119(B)R1 to address different unsafe conditions, requiring to installa certain previous FMGC standard that may be susceptible to the“Spurious thrust increase during approach”.

For the reasons described above, this AD supersedes DGACFrance AD 1999-411-140(B)R1 and AD 1998-226-119(B)R1, andrequires replacement of the affected FMGC units with upgradedunits.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

3. A320 Maintenance Related MOR’sThe following are maintenance related MOR from the UK CAA MOR digest.As the information is protected and strictly controlled by the UK CAA, it isrespectfully requested that this information is not circulated.

“No part of the MOR publication may be reproduced or transmittedoutside of the organisation without the express permission in writing ofthe Civil Aviation Authority Safety Data Office.”

NB A318/319/320/321 all annotated as A320

Airbus A320

AMM inspections not carried out following damage to nr1 engine cowling. This wasdue to the poor standard of Tech Log completion following the incident.

AMM Inspections not carried out at line station. Aircraft arrived at OSL and whilemanoeuvring onto stand No 1 engine intake cowl came into contact with the airbridge. Damage area was assessed and photographs placed on Quality DamageDrive. The engineer at OSL was directed to carry out inspections as per AMM 05-51-27 Eng Cowls and inspect assess IAW Goodrich Manual 54-10-00 Page 110 - 118.Issues. Poor standard of Tech Log completion. (Wrong SRM Reference quoted inTec Log). AMM inspections not recorded as being carried out. (Phase 1 in particularCantilever structure when damage to inlet cowl). IMPORTANT. There seems to beno checks subsequent to direction to outstation to carry out inspections to ensureinspection has been completed as directed. In this case no AMM inspection hasbeen completed.

Airbus A320

EASA Airworthiness Directive (AD) overrun.

Operator informed Aircraft Engineering that AD 2013-0277 R1 may have beenentered onto the maintenance system incorrectly, which may of caused a mandatorymaintenance inspection iaw the corresponding Airbus Service bulletin (SB) A320-57-1152 overrun. Upon investigation Technical Services had set up the original AD2011-0034 (dated 02/03/11) correctly. The AD required inspections by a specificMSN range. All the A320 aircraft were outside of the MSN range as per 2011-0034.AD 2013-0277 which superceded 2011-0034 on 26/11/13 required that all A318,A319, A320 & A321 aeroplanes that were not listed in the original AD MSN table 1,within 24 months after the effective date of this AD (10/12/13), determine whether acorrosion repair has been accomplished on an overwing refuelling apperture of theaeroplace, whereby a primer coating was applied on the mating surface of theaperture flange. These requirements were not set up on the maintenance system.AD 2013-0277 R0 & R1 of the AD were set up using the specific MSN range. Theeffective date to comply with the AD was 10/12/15. Workorders were raised on17/02/16 to perform the requirements of SB A320-57-1152 by no later than 19/02/.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Airbus A320

Aircraft departed with outstanding maintenance. Daily inspection not performed.

Subject a/c had under gone a Phase check and an Engine # 2 replacement duefindings. On arrival at a/c crew requested clarification that the daily inspection hadbeen performed. Due to multiple tech log pages of entries due maintenance, it wasnot clear to crew if it had been performed. MOC reviewed AMOS APN 25 & A/CStatus report Daily Inspection showed over due. The crew were notified andengineers requested to attend the a/c.

When the engineers arrived at the stand, the aircraft had departed.

Airbus A320

Cargo doors left open on unattended aircraft.

On arriving at the aircraft to carry out maintenance we found it to be without GPU(Stand 42L ground power required due to noise restrictions) and both cargo doorsleft open. There was nobody in attendance at the aircraft. At the same time a groundhandler arrived and started to remove the steps, without obtaining prior permission.This would have left the aircraft with the holds open and no way for anyone to accessit and power it up to close the doors.

Airbus A320

Fumes in the flight deck and cabin. 'Sweaty Socks' smell noted when APU bleedselected on prior to doors closing.

On selection of APU Bleed on a strong smell of 'Sweaty Socks' was noted in theflight deck initially, then in the cabin. This was subsequent to the smell being noted(although faintly) during the previous sector as the descent was commencedalthough this was not correlated by all of the crew. Passengers were offloaded backto the Terminal.

Airbus A320

Incorrect positioning of clamps causing damage to C-duct heat shield.

We are repeatedly finding damage to c-duct inner barrel heat shields caused bycontact with engine air system clamps that have been badly positioned, i.e.positioned with the extremities of the clamp (usually the attaching bolt/nut) facing asfar out as possible which causes minimum clearance between the clamp itself andthe cowl once it has been closed. On the A321 with CFM engines it is usually the IPCheck valve clamp that causes this damage which then has to be repaired bywelding a patch onto the heat shield material. On a previous C-check the patch thathad been applied had again been worn through by the same clamp as it hadn't beenrepositioned.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Airbus A320

Alleged inappropriate behaviour during fuelling.

Whilst conducting a surveillance check on the an A320 it was noted that the fueltruck arrived to stand 220 at approximately 18:56 and the hose was connected to theaircraft at 19:01. Shortly after that time, the “green switch” had been activated by thecrew from inside the cabin, the fuelling agent was holding the “dead man” switch andfuelling was taking place as per normal. Nevertheless, it was noticed that the agenthimself was not supervising the fuelling activities as per mandatory procedures, butinstead was partly leaning forward inside the truck cabin. Initially, it was perceivedthat he was involved with some sort of activities related to the fuelling of the aircraft,however after it was checked that aircraft was indeed taking fuel unsupervised. TheLH DM approached the agent. He was immediately reminded of his duties andagreed that he should have been positioned away from the truck ensuring the correctand safe fuelling of the aircraft. Corrective measures by AFS fuelling: AFS hasimmediately suspended the agent and all staff are to be going reminded of thecorrect procedures to avoid similar issues in the future.

Airbus A320

Lightning conductor strip found detached due to incorrect installation.

On daily walkround inspection it was noticed that the lightning conductor strip on theL/H side of the rudder was adrift from structure. On further, closer examination oncethe aircraft was docked in the hangar, it was possible to see that the strip had pulledfrom the rudder surface from all but the bottom 6 fasteners. Most of the strip hadbeen lost but the lower 5 inches was still present but not secure. This section was cutfrom the rudder to allow the a/c to operate with a temporary repair.

We then tried to action a repair which details how the repair strip should beattached, it states that the strip should be a) Bonded with a resin and fiberglass clothmaterial, and then b) attached with fasteners either with dimpled washers or that therepair strip had been dimpled prior to fit. Neither of these two operations appeared tohave been carried out as there was no evidence of bonding or dimpling/dimpledwashers.

Airbus A320

Attendant seat permanent repairs overran due to lack of controlling ADDs.

Attendant seat permanent repairs overran due to lack of controlling ADDs. As followup to a recent GOR ref G-****Attendant Seat Cracking. As part of more preliminarywork on the Part 21 Audit, EDI was sampled and covered three attendant seatsacross on G-****. When checking for complete close out of work these seats weretemporarily repaired and allowed to continue in service for six months from the datethe Form 1 was issued. A requirement of the Form 1 box 12 is to raise an ADD in thetech log on fitment to remove the seats for permanent repair. It appears no ADD wasraised to capture this. The seats were fitted on 10/07/14 during 8C check. An overrunmeeting was called, involving cabin technical.

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Airbus A320

Engineers discovered AMM was only partially carried out for an ELAC 1 Fault.

We reported in LHR and the aircraft had an ELAC 1 fault with the MEL reference inthe OPDEF. When we arrived at the aircraft the ELAC 1 fault was in the deffereddefects comfirming we were to dispatch under the MEL. The operational procedure inthe MEL says we are to expect 3-4 ECAM alerts after the maintenance procedure.These were not present but we assumed that the ECAM had been cleared down byengineers. We carried out the Ops procedure for 'ELAC 1 fault' being displayed onthe ECAM as that was the reference in the OPDEF and the defered defect (notdisplayed on ECAM). We left LHR after the procedure was complete. On arrival,requested an engineer for the transit check and they informed us that only some ofthe CB's that were required to be pulled and collared had been actioned. Theycompleted the AMM fully and we continued to dispatch under the MEL. Engineer saidthis isn't the first time this fault has been actioned incorrectly from an aircraftdispatched from London.

Airbus A320

Incorrect Oxygen PSU fitment.

While carrying out a inspection of the PSU on the aircraft it was noticed that anumber of OXY PSU where fitted incorrectly. On inspection of these units they werefound that the wrong handed units had been fitted in these

positions. Total found incorrectly fitted 17 on the L/H side and 23 on the R/H side.During time on rectifying this it was noticed that from door 1 all the way to the doorafter the wing on both sides the OXY PSU where incorrect as per the PSU Layout forthe aircraft, i.e. l/h units should have been fitted to the r/h side of the aircraft wherefound on the l/h side of the aircraft and visa versa. They looked correct when fitted inplace.

Airbus A320

Incorrect parts fitted on trailing edge flaps.

R/H WING TRAILING EDGE FLAPS INTERCONNECT STRUT FWD EYE ENDATTACHMENT BOLT, WASHER, NUT, IPC 27-51-05-01 ITEMS 110, 120, 130 &BUSH IPC 57-53-21 ITEM 50 FOUND INCORRECT PARTS FITTED. BOLT FOUNDFITTED UNABLE TO DETERMINE P/N OF BUSH, BUT BUSH DIAMETERSMALLER THAN CORRECT PART. L/H WING TRAILING EDGE FLAPSINTERCONNECT STRUT FWD EYE END

ATTACHMENT WASHER IPC 27-51-05-01 ITEM 120 INCORRECT PART FOUNDFITTED.

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Airbus A320

Expired fire bottle cartridges.

It has been identified that on several occasions when installing a Fire Extinguisherthat is missing a Cartridge that during label booking the Cartridge is not beingswapped across to the ongoing bottle. This means that the Cartridge that isphysically on the A/C is U/S and therefore the Scrap requirement was not beingtracked in the maintenance forecast. I noticed that there was a mismatch of installedAPU Fire Bottle Cartridges in maintenance database to the number of A/C. This ledto do a full fleet check of all APU, ENGINE and CARGO FIRE BOTTLECARTRIDGES and have found that on 32 occasions when label booking fire bottlesthe engineers have failed to swap the cartridges onto the ongoing unit and haveremoved these in error (The squibs were not identified on the Form 1 therefore werenot verified).

Airbus A320

Aircraft under maintenance placard procedure not followed.

On arrival at aircraft the Aircraft Under Maintenance placard was in place in thecentre consol. In addition a hand drawn works card was on the P1 table, with only 1of 3 items signed as complete. No engineers were observed at aircraft so 131.805called for assistance. Engineer answered the call and stated it was a mistake that theworks card and placard were still in place and to remove them. Flight crew queriedthis stating this was an engineering procedure and how could they be sure the workwas all complete - especially as the works card was not all signed off. Engineeringappeared ambivalent and confirmed we should remove the placard and throw awaythe unofficial work card. The procedure for using the placard is not being followedrigorously and may not trap errors if used in this manner.

Airbus A320

During investigation for incoming defect for Nav Light System 1 CB tripped, cablefound chafing on Adaptor Plate Assy situated in APU tail cone.

Damaged cable had been chafing on adjacent ground point terminal tag. Airbusadvised of the routing and installation of cable loom on adaptor plate assy.

Airbus A320

Uncommanded fuel transfer from R/H outer tank.

Leak tracked down to float valve in R/H wing outer tank.

On removal found valve shut off, Plate attachment to float arm fractured anddetached.

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Airbus A320

During walk around static ports and pitot tubes were discovered to be blocked.Aircraft taken out of service.

Aircraft towed from base after being washed. FO window covered in fluid, clear butsame consistency as glue, smeared window when tried to wipe off. During walkaround, FO noticed aircraft was partially covered in this substance, including thestatic ports on the left and right side of the aircraft. More than half the static holes ofeach port were blocked with this substance. Engineers called, maintrol consulted andresulted in aircraft swap. Engineers were unable to confirm ports would becompletely cleared without taking the ports apart. Flight crew considered this event aconsiderable potential hazard as it could have affected the air data once airborneresulting in unreliable airspeed.

Ground Handling Report: Aircraft was being washed at base which had no sectors,The aircraft movements tractor arrived to take the aircraft to the terminal for serviceas this was now an aircraft change. The wash crew rinsed off the aircraft as soon aspossible to avoid any further delay. I had a call from the Airport centre saying that aresidue of soap had been found on the aircraft and in and around the Pitot tubes andstatic ports and they were trying to be dried out, after a further call from the AirportCentre I was informed that the problem was worse than was first thought and theaircraft had to be taken out of service. I attended the aircraft on stand and pictureswere taken. I called the AOM to see if an SIRP was needed to be raised and was toldnot in this case. The aircraft was not damaged but after the aircraft had been towedfrom stand TB1 to stand 519 being previously washed, upon arrival on stand 519 itwas seen that the front of the aircraft had a residue of soap on it more on thestarboard side and around all of the Pitot tubes and Static Ports. there was to muchsoap on the aircraft to be wiped off on stand and with the possibility of the ports andtubes may be blocked the aircraft was taken out of service.

Airbus A320

Door 1R slide arming lever incorrectly installed.

During cruise, crew requested to confirm if door is indicating armed or not on ecamand when the defect was noticed, reply received at 0824z 'door 1r shows armedlever does not fully stow cc observed this at arming'. a further message wasreceived at 0836z 'door 1r now showing disarmed in crz'. Engineers requested toattend upon aircraft arrival to investigate. Engineers later report the handle had beenincorrectly installed and was preventing the door from being armed correctly. no techlog entry was made by either the captain or engineer regarding this defect. Picture ofarming lever before removal and installation sent to MOC.

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Airbus A320

During engine fire test (first flight of the day) Agent 1 & 2 squib lights on both nr2 andnr2 engines found to be inoperative. CBs had been pulled during maintenance andnot reset.

CM2 was PF. During eng fire test (first flight of the day) Agent 1 & 2 squib lights onboth ENG 1 & 2 found to be inoperative. Call made to MOC for advice. During CBreset (under MOC direction) it was noted that Q41-Q44 were also "tripped". All CBwere re-engaged following MOC instructions. Both ENG 1 & 2 subsequently testedcorrectly. The previous days tech log entries were reviewed by CM1 and MOC but noreason found for Q41-44 being "tripped", so local engineering was called to attendthe aircraft.

Local engineering arrived and reviewed previous tech pages. It was identified that onMarch

22nd ENG1 had been replaced and a tech log entry made "for crew info: the mightbe transient odour when air conditioning is first selected on". The local engineerconfirmed that Q41-Q44 would be pulled during the engine change event.

The aircraft flew 4 sectors on 22nd March

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4. A320 Puncture to aircraft’s fuselageAircraft Type and Registration: Airbus A321-231, G-ZBADNo & Type of Engines: 2 International Aero Engine V2533-A5 turbofan

enginesYear of Manufacture: 2013 (Serial no: 5582)Date & Time (UTC): 23 June 2015 at 0710 hrsLocation: Manchester AirportType of Flight: Commercial Air Transport (Passenger)Persons on Board: Crew - 7 Passengers - 193Injuries: Crew - None Passengers - NoneNature of Damage: Puncture to aircraft’s fuselageCommander’s Licence: Airline Transport Pilot’s LicenceCommander’s Age: 41 yearsCommander’s Flying Experience: 6,400 hours (of which 4,000 were on type)

Last 90 days - 181 hoursLast 28 days - 91 hours

Information Source: Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by thepilot and further enquiries by the AAIB

Synopsis

After being pushed back the aircraft was pulled forward onto the taxiway centrelineusing a tug and towbar. As it did so the tug’s raised cabin came in to contact with theaircraft, puncturing the fuselage. While the towbar used was suitable for the aircrafttype it was shorter than that normally used. It has now been removed from service.

History of the flight

The aircraft was to be pushed back from Stand 86R using a tug and a towbar. Inattendance were two ground crew, one on a headset to communicate with the flightcrew and one to drive the tug.

After the aircraft had been pushed back the aircraft was required to be pulled forwardonto the taxiway centreline. Prior to this the tug driver’s cabin needed to be raised toallow him forward visibility during the pull. At the tug driver’s request the headsetoperator monitored the raising of the cabin. This was achieved with the headsetoperator using a thumbs up during the raising and a clenched fist to signal when tostop. When raised the cabin was clear of the aircraft. It had been raised about 45-55cm. The cabin’s height when fully raised is 254 cm.

As the tug started to pull the aircraft forward the headset operator noticed that thecabin was getting close to the aircraft’s underside and attempted to attract the tugdriver’s attention, but was unable to do so because the latter was looking away fromhim and the aircraft. After the aircraft had been pulled forward 2-3 metres the tugdriver heard a “crunch” to which he responded by applying the brakes. The roof ofthe tug’s beacon light and cabin had come into contact with the aircraft, puncturingthe underside of the fuselage just aft of the radome. At the time of impact the towbar’s shear pin, which connects the towbar to the aircraft’s nose leg, also sheared.The aircraft remained in its position and the passengers subsequently disembarked.There were no injuries.

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Additional information

A two-man pushback is standard from Stand 86R.

Stand 86R is at the end of a taxiway cul-de-sac. A pull forward is required after apushback, to position the aircraft onto the taxiway centreline, due to a fence at theend of the cul‑de‑sac.

The towbar used in this incident was 4,300 mm long and suitable for this aircrafttype. However, all other tow bars for this aircraft type at the airport were 5,200 mmlong.

Safety actions

The 4,300 mm towbar was suitable for the aircraft type. However, the handling agentbelieved that if a 5,200 mm towbar had been used the tug’s cabin would not havecontacted the aircraft.

The handling agent subsequently removed the 4,300 mm towbar from service.

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5. A320 Worn avionic blower fan bearingAircraft Type and Registration: Airbus A320-232, G-EUYENo & Type of Engines: 2 International Aero Engine V2527-A5 turbofan

enginesYear of Manufacture: 2009 (Serial no: 3912)Date & Time (UTC): 27 July 2015 at 2110 hrs UTCLocation: 90 nm south-east of London Heathrow AirportType of Flight: Commercial Air Transport (Passenger)Persons on Board: Crew - 6 Passengers - 157Injuries: Crew - None Passengers - NoneNature of Damage: Worn avionic blower fan bearingCommander’s Licence: Airline Transport Pilot’s LicenceCommander’s Age: 41 yearsCommander’s Flying Experience: 10,250 hours (of which 4,700 were on type)

Last 90 days - 255 hoursLast 28 days - 93 hours

Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation

Synopsis

Whilst in the cruise at FL240, the flight crew became aware of an unusual noise andan electrical burning smell. The noise quickly developed into a high pitched squeal,with some associated vibration and the smell became stronger, although there wasno visible smoke. After donning their oxygen masks the flight crew actioned theappropriate emergency checklist, after which the noise ceased. The aircraft landedsafely at its planned destination.

Investigation revealed the cause of the event to be worn bearings in the avionicsblower fan. This is a known problem, and both the fan and aircraft manufacturershave taken safety actions to prevent similar incidents in future.

History of the flight

The incident occurred during a scheduled passenger flight between Paris Charles deGaulle Airport and London Heathrow Airport. Whilst cruising at FL240 andapproaching the descent point for London, the flight crew became aware of anunusual noise and an electrical burning smell. The noise quickly developed into ahigh pitched squeal with some associated vibration and the smell became stronger,although there was no visible smoke.

The flight crew donned their full-face oxygen masks and selected a 100% oxygensupply to protect against the fumes. At the time, the co-pilot was the handling pilot.The commander transmitted a MAYDAY call and received clearance from LondonATC for an expeditious descent. He then initiated the drill for smoke/fumes/avionicssmoke using the Quick Reference Handbook (the first step, donning the oxygenmasks, having already been completed).

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The next step of the checklist required that the ‘blower’ fan in the avionics ventilationsystem be set to override, following which the noise immediately ceased. Thecommander completed the checklist, and the crew thought it most likely that theblower fan had been the source of the problem, although they had no means ofconfirming it.

The commander contacted the senior cabin crew member and briefed her on thesituation. She was unaware of the problem and reported that the cabin wasunaffected. There was a brief report later of a similar burning smell in part of thecabin, but this did not persist.

There were no unusual flight deck indications before the onset of the problem. Afterthe checklist was actioned, the ECAM1 alerted the crew to a ventilation systemBLOWER FAULT. Later, as the aircraft neared Heathrow, the ECAM generated afurther caution, EXTRACT FAULT. The crew noted the cautions, which did notnecessitate any further crew action.

As the approach progressed, the flight crew considered that the situation hadprobably been successfully contained. However, as a precaution, they elected toremain on 100% oxygen until after landing. The approach and landing wereuneventful. After the aircraft had vacated the runway, the commander brought it to astop to allow an external inspection by the airport fire service. As there were noabnormal indications, the aircraft then continued taxiing to its parking stand.

The flight crew later commented that the service provided by London ATC inresponse to their emergency had greatly assisted them in achieving an expeditiousdescent and landing. In particular, direct routings and minimal frequency changeshad helped to keep their workload at a reasonable level.

Flight crew training

The use of the flight crew oxygen masks is practised during simulator training andchecking details. The crew considered that their simulator training had been effectivein allowing them to don the masks quickly, to communicate through them and tocontinue to deal with the situation effectively. After the incident the commanderremarked that, because simulator masks are used regularly for training, they do notinclude the protective clear film cover over the visor which is in place on the actualaircraft masks. Consequently, it is easy to forget that the cover is present, particularlyas a situation requiring mask use will inevitably be a stressful one. This happened inthis case, although omitting to remove the protective cover did not cause the crewany difficulties with vision.

Engineering investigation

The avionics blower fan is part of the equipment cooling system and is located in theforward avionics compartment. Visual examination of the fan from G-EUYE in siturevealed no anomalies, but when the fan was switched on a rumbling noise washeard and vibration was felt through the cabin floor. The symptoms were similar toprevious fan failures caused by worn bearings, which typically results in a rumblingnoise, followed by the smell of burning in the cabin. The fan was removed and whenspun by hand it emitted a burning odour and the bearings were worn and noisy.

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There are two types of avionics blower fan bearing in service: the original blower fanuses steel ball bearings and the improved fan has ceramic bearings.

The fan removed from G-EUYE contained ceramic bearings.

The operator advised that, following a number of recent events, they were in theprocess of implementing a revised maintenance policy to overhaul fans with ceramicbearings every 12,000 flying hours. At the time of failure the fan from G-EUYE hadaccrued approximately 16,000 flying hours and was due to be removed for overhaulat the next scheduled maintenance (‘C Check’), in September 2015.

The aircraft manufacturer advised that, in the longer term, fan vibration monitoringwill be the subject of an in-service evaluation aimed at reducing similar events in thefuture.

- END -

In March 2005 the fan manufacturer issued a Vendor Service Bulletin, 3454‑21‑108,to replace the original steel ball bearings with an improved ceramic bearing. Theaircraft manufacturer issued a corresponding Service Information Letter, SIL 21-141,to notify operators. SIL 21-141 was replaced by In Service Information (ISI)21.26.00027, published in November 2013. The introduction of ceramic bearings hasreduced the in-service arising rate, but the aircraft manufacturer reported that fanfailure still causes between five and 10 aircraft diversions per year. In August 2013the fan manufacturer issued a Service Information Letter, 3454HC-21-250, to informoperators that a new overhaul task had been added to the fan ComponentMaintenance Manual. The task periodically replaces the bearings and othercomponents subject to wear, with a recommended periodicity of 10,000 FlyingHours. However, the fan manufacturer acknowledged that operators may wish to settheir own avionics blower fan maintenance plan and recommended that operatorsavoid exceeding 12,000 flying hours between fan overhauls.

Documents

A320 ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING - …cbt.altitudeglobal.aero/Files/A9 A320 Q1 and Q2 2016.pdf · FOR REFERENCE ONLY 1 Introduction / Changes to the A320 approval The A320 approval