A Skillful Show of Strength U.S. Marines in the … Skillful Show...The Camp at Grand Turk The most exotic sidelight in the history of Marines in the Caribbean in the 1990s was the

OPERATION SEA SIGNAL 31

After a few more days of stalemate, there wasa solution of sorts. A senior Jamaican diplomatattended a ceremony on board the comfort on 20

July. He praised the joint humanitarian contribu-tions of the Haitian and American governments toresolve the plight of the migrants. Even thoughthe diplomatic impasse between Jamaica and theU.S. had not clearly been resolved, the JTF treat-ed the ceremony as closure and the comfort sim-ply pulled anchor and sailed to Guantanamo.Once there, the Haitians resisted disenibarking,saying they wanted to stay in the care of theirfamiliar Marine protectors rather than facing theunknown soldiers waiting on the pier. Marine offi-cers and Red Cross officials eventually persuadedthe migrants they had to disembark. But beforethey left, they presented Lieutenant Colonel Allenwith a hand-lettered certificate of appreciationsigned by the camp leaders attesting the Marineshad accomplished their work.'9

Soon after their arrival at Guantanamo, Mienand his Marines staged an unusual ceremony. Aspart of a long-planned reorganization, their bat-talion was to he re-designated 2d Battalion, 6thMarines, part of a famous regiment that hadfought at Belleau Wood and been the military

home of the legendary Spanish-American Warhero Sergeant John H. Quick. On 23 July,Lieutenant Colonel Allen and the regimental com-mander, Colonel Richard A. Huck, led a routemarch from the pier where the Gomjbrt haddocked to Cuzco 1-lills, where Sergeant Quick hadearned the Medal of Honor for signaling the fleetwhile under fire. With Quick's sword at hand,Colonel Hock furled 2d Battalion, 4th Marines'battle colors and replaced it with 2d Battalion, 6thMarines' colors. A few days later, Allen leftCompany F at Guantanamo with JTF 160 and ledthe rest of the battalion back to Camp Lejeune forwhat would prove to be only a short respite frommigrant operations for his troops.2°

The Camp at Grand Turk

The most exotic sidelight in the history ofMarines in the Caribbean in the 1990s was theplan to process Haitian migrants in the Turks andCaicos Islands, a dependent territory of the UnitedKingdom occupying a glistening stretch of oceanbetween the Bahamas and I-laid, Within the terri-tory, JTF planners focused on Grand Turk Island.it was an unusual place for most Marines.

About eight-miles long and one-mile wide,Grand Turk is, in the words of one Marine, an"austere paradise" at the eastern end of a string oflow-lying limestone islands dotted by extensivemarshes and mangrove swamps.2t Only 2 percentof the territory is arable, which gives the visitor anidea of its severity. One of the territory's principalcash crops was salt, evaporated from seawaterintentionally trapped on land that was at or belowsea level.

The capital of the territory was CockburnTown, which reminded the same Marine of theCombat Town training area at Camp Lejeune. a set

of partially completed houses that generations ofMarines have fought over. Cockburn Town hadlittle to offer apart from a scattering of concretebuildings, some of which appear to he perma-nently under construction. Among the buildingswere one or two hotels, including the KitinaHotel, which had a relaxed, barefoot charm.There also were a number of dive shops thatsewed the many divers who found paradise in thedeep clear water. Three to four hundred metersoffshore was a 7,000-foot deep wall for divers toexplore, which made the absence of luxuryashore almost irrelevant.

The Turks and Caicos Islands were one ofBritain's few remaining dependencies and had a

OYL—- h$u,v

Ceo CeKZ//4 '.'-c

avl oecotI4 o vec deocee4T4oniC' .v.oT,,'e

7c4,j yui/vctr ott4'ech/4),Z O4MJ 4.

/YQ7n'/,cer'etr /aa 'r4,,iea'

courtesy ot Ltcol John R. Allen

A hand-lettered "Certfficate of Merit," written inFrench and signed by six Haitian migrants, waspresented to the Marines on the Comfort.

32 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

civil service run largely by the British, Remnantsof the Colonial Service, the civil servants werelargely white and included a governor appointedby the Queen. The islands largely black popula-tion dominated the legislature. While there waslittle ethnic tension on the islands, there wereoccasional brief outbursts of violence with racialovertones, such as when poor black citizensexpressed frustration with prosperous and some-times overbearing white bar owners in the sum-mer of 1994. While that attitude created someanticipation among Marines, they generally foundall of the islanders to be more than friendly. Thelocals could not do enough for their military visi-tors, literally opening their homes and businessesto them.22

Partly because it was a British dependency—the British government being generally receptiveto American overtures and the local governmentremembering the benefits of having one of thelend-lease American bases on Grand Turk—theU.S. Government, with Joint Task Force i6o at theforefront, conceived the contingency plan toprocess Haitian migrants on Grand Turk. When itbecame clear the Jamaican option, by itself,would be inadequate, the Grand Turk optiontook on new luster.23 On 3 June, the Clinton

administration applauded the general declarationby the government of Turks and Caicos Islandsthat it would allow the U.S. to process migrantson its territory, and the JTF soon dispatched offi-cers to the island on a reconnaissance mission.24

From 6 to 8 June 1994, Major Brian J. Vincent,executive officer of JTF 160s Marine component,visited potential sites on Grand Turk. He first sur-veyed, and rejected, a truly desolate 405-acre tractthat had been a salt flat in the 1950s and 1960sthat the island government had proposed. Then,despite the limited port facilities and small air-field, Major Vincent saw potential for an ashoremigrant support facility (AMSF) for as many as2,500 migrants at the southern tip of the island.Even so, the chosen site was unprepossessing: a52-acre patch of rocks, scrub brush, and tangleweed that was far from level.25

When Major Vincent reported his findings toMarFor 160 headquarters, which had been estab-lished at Guantanamo Bay, the staff discussedvarious courses of action and began to draft oper-ations plans and orders. One draft directed a

small task force to deploy to Grand Turk rapidly"to construct, support, sustain, and provide secu-rity for the AMSF." Along with the ashore migrantsupport facility, the task force would operate a

OPEEATION SEA SIGNAL 33

migrant processing center, dividing migrants intothe now familiar categories of unscreened,screened-in, and screened-out. The order definedsuccess as the "secure, peaceful, and orderly pro-cessing of Haitian migrants."26

A red-letter date for the Grand Turk operationwas 19 June 1994, when MarFor 160's command-er, Lieutenant Colonel Redlich, also became com-mander, Joint Task Force Grand Turk Island, anda colorful, popular Sergeant Malor, Royce S.

Restivo, became the senior noncommissionedofficer of the small JTFI In one of the many reor-ganizations that would occur during this deploy-ment, the JTF absorbed much of MarFor 160headquarters, along with Company C, 8thMarines, which had been attached to 2d Battalion,4th Marines. The principal Army component onGrand Turk was the 401st Military PoliceCompany. There also were a number of small butvital detachments from other Services, includingthe 56th Air Transportable 1-lospital from the AirForce and some very hard-working Seabees fromNaval Mobile Construction Battalion 7427

Within hours of his appointment, LieutenantColonel Redlich flew to Grand Turk to conducthis own site survey. He was another in the line of

energetic, hands-on, common sense Marine lead-ers working on migrant operations during theseyears, and he wanted ro see for himself exactlywhat had to he done. Assisting in the start-upphase was General Williams' lawyer, LieutenantColonel John M. McAdams, Jr., a problem solverand the kind of lawyer the Marines needed.General Williams was thinking of McAdams whenhe quipped, tongue in cheek that "you don't wantto get too close to your lawyer, hut you neverwant to deploy without him."28

One of the first steps was to reach a detailedunderstanding with the local government, whichhad some reservations about having Haitianmigrants on the island for any length of time. Theprospect of more illegal or semi-legal 1-laitianmigrants was troubling to them given the locationof the islands. Haitian migrants, albeit in smallnumbers, had been coming ashore for years. Thepopulation of the island was about 3,000, andnow the U.S. Government wanted to house asmany as 2,500 Haitians in a camp on Grand Turk.The islands' government also had its own agenda.In return for its cooperation, the Turks and CaicosIslands wanted the U.S. military to undertake anumber of civil engineering projects, such as the

Photo courtesy of Ltcol John M. McAclarns, Jr.

Cockburn Town was the capital of Turks and Caicos Islands, a British overseas territory where JTF 160planned to conduct migrant operations. Note the sign jbr the Supreme Court of the territory over the stair-case. There was definitely a kind of island charm about the local government.

renovation of the abandoned U.S. Navy base atthe northern tip of Grand Turk and improvementsto a pre-existing facility for Haitians.

Although a basic memorandum of understand-ing between the governments of the UnitedStates, United Kingdom, and Turks and Caicoswas signed on 18 June, a number of issuesremained unresolved. For example, it was unclearwhether the proposed site for the migrant facilitywas on private or public land, and the localgovernment attempted without success to involvethe JTF with a local citizen in this long-standingdispute. Another issue was whether the Americanservicemen should be armed. The chief constable,a retired British policeman who had not fired ashot in anger in some 30 years of active service,successfully argued for stringent safeguards onthe issue. Even though it was not a smoothprocess—in mid-July parts of the memorandumwould be renegotiated—Lieutenant ColonelRedlich found the overall task of dealing with thelocal government to be an enjoyable and chal-lenging departure from his normal routine.29

With the legalities more or less settled, themini-JTF could turn to the business at hand. It was

an enormous undertaking for the 700 to 800Marines, sailors, airmen, and soldiers who servedon Grand Turk. Since the islands had little ornothing to offer in the way of infrastructure orgoods and services apart from salt—and therewas a limit to the amount of salt the JTF needed—a phenomenal amount of equipment and supplieshad to be imported.

Once the Navy mad.e the essential deliveries,the Seabee construction crews began their work.They cleared and graded more than 50 acres and.started to build an infrastructure for the camp.There were other tasks which planners mighthave taken for granted at other locations, such asproviding for water purification and desaliniza-tion, and establishing a field kitchen and diningfacility that could feed more than 3,000 people.3°

There was a race against time in June and July,and the advance elements of the joint task forceworked at a nearly superhuman pace. The basicquestion remained: would the camp on GrandTurk be ready soon enough to take the overflowfrom Jamaica, or to replace the Jamaican effortaltogether? This was important because thepolicy-makers still wanted to avoid a sequel to the


ovic DM-ST-08-02 128

Robert Hall, the Minster of Immigation1, Labor, and Public Works of Turks and Caicos, signs the memo-randum of understanding between the United States and the island lerri!oiy which would allow JYF 160to construct and operate a camp for migrants. A US. State Department representativç, Richard Devine(left), and the local Chief Minister, Charles Misick, look on.


open-ended Operation GTMO. The rear echelonof the JTF at Guantanamo could support the oper-ations on Grand Turk or in Jamaica, but it wasbetter not to use Camp McCalla or Camp Bulkeleyfor large numbers of migrants.

In late June, like Redlich before him, GeneralWilliams visited the island to judge the situationfor himself. His first impression was that he hadsomehow landed in Lonesome Dove, an expedi-tionary air base in the Gulf War named for the for-lorn Texas cow town in a Larry McMurtry novel."For most of the hours of the day," McMurtry hadwritten in Lonesome Dove, "and most of themonths of the year, the sun had the town trappeddeep in the dust, far out in the chaparral flats, aheaven for snakes and horned toads Therewas not even a respectable shade tree withinmiles."3'

But through the dust, General Williams wasable to see the outlines of the facility takingshape. "There are almost no buildings on theisland ... [but] ... [flirst steps are taken. ... [Seabees]are there pushing dirt. "32 By the time he wasready to leave the island, General Williams wassatisfied Lieutenant Colonel Redlich would pushthe right issues. To maintain the pressure, Redlich

and his staff moved to Grand Turk fromGuantanamo on 26 June.

Nevertheless, doubts about Grand Turk persist-ed, especially in the general's mind. The generalquestioned Redlich about the status of the campand was told a barebones facility could be inplace by 29 June, but only if the mission's much-needed airlift resources were diverted fromGuantanamo. General Williams once again notedthat Grand Turk did not appear to be a workablesolution for large numbers of migrants. "[It] is

more expensive per capita than comfort since it isnot expandable and will require a huge logisticseffort." Given the scale of that effort, this was asignificant understatement. His interim conclusionwas that "Iwle are [simply) delaying theinevitable"—that is, housing and processingmigrants at Guantanamo,33

It was during the next few days that GeneralWilliams became acutely aware of the continuingproblems in Jamaica, and of the hundreds ofHaitian migrants often literally just over the hori-zon waiting to be rescued. That led to more dis-cussions about alternatives for processing themigrants in a variety of places as diverse asSurinam, Guantanarno, Panama, and later, St.

Photo courtesy of Ltcol John M. McAdaois, Jr.

Ready/or business but wanting for customers, the migrant camp, which Marines and Sea hees worked sohard to construct on Grank Turk, sits idle in the summer of 1994.


Lucia, not to mention tiny and remote Dominica.There also was talk about a long-term bilateralagreement with the BahamasM

Given the continuing uncertainties of the situa-tion, neither the Grand Turk nor the Jamaicaoperation ended as the Guantanamo operationshifted into a new and higher gear. GeneralWilliams decided to give himself the maximumamount of flexibility by formalizing the system ofmaintaining three subordinate !0it task forces—

As General Walls had noted two yearsearlier, the military used concertinawire Jbr fences because that is what ithad, not because it was the material ofchoice.

the one at Guantanamo, which was becoming themain effort after all, as well as the JTFs on GrandTurk and off Jamaica. Each subordinate com-mander would have the freedom to conduct oper-ations as he saw fit, while General Williamswould reserve for himself issues of resource allo-cation and overarching policy.35

A few days later, on 9 July, General Williamswas unhappy to learn the facility on Grand Turkwas not going to open on time. (The target datewas 12 July.) On 10 July, he was equally unhap-py to learn the Turks and Caicos government didnot want any Haitian migrant to spend more thanseven clays on the island. General Williams con-cluded this limitation would make Grand Turkmore of a liability than an asset, since it meantmigrants would have to go from there to otherintermediate destinations—just the kind of situa-tion the general wanted to avoidl.36

The scale, complexity, and cost of the work onGrand Turk weighed heavily on the debit side ofthe ledger. Lieutenant Colonel Redlich's troopshad been continuhig their Herculean efforts tomeet the challenge of turning the chaparral flatsinto a working camp on schedule. On 26 June,there were only four general-ptirpose tents readyfor migrants. Six days later, there were 145 suchtents neatly arranged in 10 separate compounds.Continuing to work at full speed, the Seabeeseventually constructed 11 elaborate concretelatrines, complete with running water and under-ground pipes leading to a treatment plant. Whenthe final tally was made, the Seabees had laid a

staggering total of 10,000 feet of pipe to meet allof the camp's plumbing needs. Subsequentreports referred to the latrines as 'the finest engi-neering achievement of the JTF."

As if they had not already done enough, theSeahees continued the work of constructing andmaintaining roads in and around the migrant facil-ity, which meant harvesting, transporting, andcompacting more than 5,000 cubic yards of coral.All members of the JTF pitched in to lay 40,000linear feet of concertina wire to fence rhe individ-ual compounds from one another. As atGuantanamo, the intent was not to create a

prison, but to create and maintain administrativeunits. As General Walls had noted two years ear-lier, the military used concertina wire for fencesbecause that is what it had, not because it was thematerial of choice.

Looking offshore, the Navy and Coast Guardaddressed the island's hydrographic problem,which made it difficult and dangerous for deepdraft and V-hulled vessels to approach. Without asolution to this particular problem, the CoastGuard could not deliver migrants to the AMSF,which was the prerequisite for the entire exercise.If migrants could not come ashore, all the otherwork was for nothing. In short order, the twoServices agreed on the installation of a 200-footextension of the existing pier by adding two 100-foot floating barges. The Navy's UnderwaterConstruction Team 1 ultimately performed thework, sinking chains and moorings to anchor thebarges.

One of the final steps to ready the camp foroccupancy was for virtually all hands to go online and sweep the area, picking up any foreignobjects that could injure the migrants, or thatmigrants could use to injure their custodians inthe event of a disturbance. Some of the lessons ofOperation GTMO were clearly not forgotten.When it was over, The New York Times stated thecost of erecting the tents and repairing the infra-structure of Grand Turk was $18 million.3H Theresult of all this hard work was that, on theevening of 11 July, Redlich and assorted localdignitaries gathered in the glare of a dozenmobile military light generators, not too differentfrom stage lights, and declared die camp "com-plete."39

But complete did not mean operational and.ready to receive migrants. The local governmenthad yet to ratify the requisite enabling legislation,and there was still no sign of the representativesof the various civilian agencies of the U.S.


OVIC DN-ST-98-02147

Guantanamo Bay's (amp Phillips, which had a capacity of approximately 2,000, served as billeting formany members ofJTF 160. It was far from sumptuous, bra it was better than other encampments. Therewas a degree of comfort, with some air-conditioned spaces, recreational opportunities, a messhall, anda bathhouse.

Government who would actually determine themigrants' status. (JTF 160 existed to run camps,not for deciding who was qualified to immigrateto the United States.) The small task force onGrand Turk entered the first of many weeks ofuncertainty and waiting after the intensive workof making the camp ready. Although there was acertain sense of anticlimax, the time was notuneventful.

The highlight of the first week of waiting wasa story ahout the camp in the London-basedtabloid The Evening Standard with the sensation-al headline, "I Find Secret Invasion Base."Possibly convinced he had found a staging areafor the invasion of Haiti, visiting British journalistHoward Smith wrote the story. He studiouslyavoided talking to anyone in an official capacitywho might have set him straight.4°

The JTF attempted to remedy the situation byestablishing a link with the British Foreign andCommonwealth Office (FO), and by grantingSmith an exclusive two-hour interview (of course,there were no other journalists clamoring for a

story about Grand Turk). During that interview,Redlich's public affairs officer stressed the human-itarian mission of the small base, but it was apointless effort. The headline on Smith's nextstory, published on 14 July, read "The MarinesThat The FO Says Do Not Exist." in part, the storyexposed the work of the public affairs officer. AsSmith wrote: "Marine Lieutenant Pete Mitchell,acting as spokesman, had launched a charmoffensive to calm fears about the role of the base."Three days later, Smith left the island, never toreturn, although he did make one call toLieutenant Mitchell for an update. In the words ofthe command chronology: "he was given a cor-dial, although, we are certain, frustratingly unsub-stantive response."4'

On 11 July, the Commandant of the MarineCorps, General Cad E. Mundy, Jr., and theCommander of Marine Forces,. Atlantic, Lieutenant

* The press officer who gave Smith a complete briefing andtour of the facilities was lstLt Peter 5. Mitchell.


General Robert B. Johnston, a familiar face fromDesert Storm where he served as General H.Norman Schwarzkopts chief of staff, appeared atGuantanamo Bay and requested to visit the oper-ations at Grand Turk and Jamaica, The whirlwindtour of the entire joint task force included a"windshield" tour of Grand Turk. Accompaniedby the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, 1-laroldG. Overstreet, the Commandant gathered theMarines on Grand Turk in a box formation in theirspacious galley tent and told them he was awedby their accomplishments. The Commandant wasquick to acid they needed to stay flexible, sincethe future of the camp remained uncertain.Despite that message, Marine morale remainedhigh; the Marines' sense of accomplishment andthe Commandants praise were genuine. GeneralWilliams also had consistently conveyed the same

Back at Guantanaino, GeneralWilliams reflected on the camp and itsfuture. "Camp is ready," he wrote,"but we made a dust bowl when wecleared it. It will be awfulfor migrants.Still no word on whether we'll use theplace. ACOM wants to put it in care-taker [status]."

message. Recording the Commandant's visit in hisdiary, the general noted he was "proud of thetroops and their Work,"4

Back at Guantanamo, General Williams reflect-ed on the camp and its future. "Camp is ready,'he wrote, "but we made a dustbowl when wecleared it. It will be awful for migrants. Still noword on whether we'll use the place. ACOM [U.S.Atlantic Command] wants to put it in caretaker[status]."43 Caretaker status was shorthand forholding Grand Turk in reserve in case other facil-ities could not handle the flow. For planners, theerratic flow of migrants was puzzling: on one day,1,000 new migrants arrived and on the next therewere none. But the overall numbers appeared tobe dropping.

A few days later, as Lieutenant Colonel Redlichprepared to acknowledge the local government'senabling legislation, which was finally ready forsignature, General Williams asked him to preparefor two contingencies: migrant processing andcaretaker status. Reflecting on the kind of "mis-

sion creep' that occurred on Grand Turk—firstthere was a concept, then a survey, followed byinitial efforts which in turn called forth furtherefforts, costing money and manpower bit by bituntil the sum total was large, even prohibitive—the general noted: "I think I have been caught upin the emotion of the place: we built it, we'll useit. fBut] if the migrant flow doesn't pick up, wedon't need the place. [In any case] we ought topreserve the ability to open it." In a message toGrand Turk, he stressed his decision did notreflect a lack of confidence in Redlich and histroops. On the contrary, he went on record asbeing "immensely proud" of them.45

It was more than a little ironic that, at the campon Grand Turk on 19 July, the day after GeneralWilliams had told Redlich to prepare for caretak-er status, a group of dignitaries gathered in a tem-per tent—an innovative expeditionary tent thatwas usually air conditioned—to celebrate anothermilestone in the history of the on-island facility.The dignitaries included representatives from theDepartment of' State, their British counterpartsfrom the Foreign Office, and of course the press,though without Mr. Smith of The EveningStandard. Their purpose was to watch the ChiefIvlinister of Turks and Caicos, Oswald 0.Skippings, sign the Immigrant (Haitian MigrantTemporary Detention) Notice of 1994, whichoccurred with suitable fanfare. Recllich thenoffered a tour of his domain, which included ademonstration of the capabilities of the deploy-able mass population identification and trackingsystem, a computerized system for keeping trackof the migrant population through the use of irre-movable bracelets with embedded bar codes thatwere now an accepted and important part ofmigrant operations. Grand Turk was finally openand ready for business, but there were no cus-tomers.4

Much of the pressure on Grand Turk eased, butmembers of the task force did not sit idle, Someof the troops, especially the Marine infantrydetachment from 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, and agroup of Army military police used the time totrain, focusing on civil disturbance contingenciesand preparing to run a migrant camp. Othersfound new missions. Captain Suzanne Ainsworth,USAR, of Civil Affairs Direct Support Team 53,was a licensed veterinarian. Together with othervolunteers, she launched an animal health cam-paign, which included emergency surgery on acat that had somehow been impaled on a giantfishhook. The surgery occurred on a table outside


DVIC DN-ST-98-02139

H6'3 Jeff Mueller of the 2d Force Service SupportGroup s medical battalion gives a I-Iaitiain childher required shots at Camp McC'aila. Two tentswere set up to adminster the three immunizations.

a local restaurant with improvised instruments.Another of her projects was the castration of localstallions. Grand Turk was overpopulated withwild horses and donkeys, which roamed theisland freely, posing threats to motorisLs and eat-ing the little bit of greenery that managed to pushits way through the rocky soil.

The jTF's Roman Catholic chaplain,Commander Joseph R. Lamonde, USN, was simi-larly active, finding and ministering to a numberof outcasts on the island. These included a hand-ful of Haitian and Cuban migrants who hadalmost literally washed ashore and had remainedin legal and social limbo. The six Cuban migrantswere held in the detention facility at the northernend of the island. They had no legal status orprospects for a better future. Father Lamonde,sometimes accompanied by Captain Ainsworth inher civil affairs capacity, visited them often, pro-viding spiritual nourishment and health and com-fort items. There was another project that bearsmention. Lieutenant Colonel Redlich was luckyenough to have among his officers an excellentconmund historian, the cheerful, energetic, andathletic Captain Franz J. Gayl, who served asoperations officer on Grand Turk. Captain Gaylused the time to give life to an unusually com-plete and colorful command chronology, turningthe normally dry recitation of facts into a docu-ment that transports the reader to the island andlets him feel the dust and sweat and pride ofaccomplishment.48

When the day's work was done, there wassome unusual liberty, especially for those wholiked the water. The local boatmen would bringtheir boats onto the beach, and a Marine couldliterally step out of his uniform and into a marine

adventure of a different kind. Even the liberty onland was not bad—a few beers and a simple mealat a friendly establishment like the Kitina.49

By late July, Joint Task Force Grand TurkIsland was definitely on a downward glide path.Fhases I and II of the contingency plan for care-taker status began on 25 July. The air trans-portable hospital was redeployed, along with anumber of personnel. This caused some distressto the government of Turks and Caicos, whichsought reassurances the U.S. Government wouldcomplete the program of public works per theagreement. The local officials were even ready toagree the AMSF could be used as a safe havenand allow migrants to stay on island longer thanseven days,50

But there was ample room for migrants atGuantanamo, and the migrant facility on theisland continued to ramp down. The approach ofTropical Storm Chris, which appeared headed forGrand Turk in mid-August, accelerated the finalphases of the withdrawal. There was a surge of C-130 cargo aircraft and the USS Whidbey Island(LSD 41) appeared off shore, fortuitously empty.Through more hard work, the ship's companyand the rump JTF loaded most of its remainingasset.s and personnel, which numbered about 150at this point, onto the ship."

In the end, the storm did not hit the island, butthe U.S. Government kept most, if not all, of itspromises to the government of Turks and Caicos.Various facilities were upgraded, and even therequest to remove the elaborate plumbing facili-ties the Seahees had built was fulfilled. When thelast U.S. serviceman left, there was only an empty,dusty plain where the canip had been.52

The story of the small but accomplished JTFwas almost over. When there was a surge in thenumbers of Cuban migrants during August, plan-ners in Norfolk briefly considered ordering areturn to Grand Turk. But after all that had hap-pened, General Williams deemed this a "nuttyidea." Thankfully for him, it did not go very far.By 30 August it was almost forgotten. 1-lis profes-sional life full enough with one large migrantcamp, General Williams breathed a sigh of reliefand noted in his diary: "Heard that the TCI [Turksand Caicos Island] camp may not happen. Be stillmy heart."53

Back at Guantanamno Bay

Guantanamo remained a flurry of activity whileevents in Jamaica and on Grand Turk unfolded. In


May, Marines from the barracks were busypreparing Camp Bulkeley for possible use byHaitian migrants. They also administered thecamp for a handful of migrants who came ashoreat Guantanamo before the JTF took charge in lateJune. Guantanamo then became the temporaiyhome for the Marine support components of JTF

Guantanamo was directed primarily by the Armycomponent of the JTF under the command ofColonel Michael Pearson. The Army's job was toestablish and operate the processing center forscreened-in Haitians at Camp McCalla. Marinesprovided the external security outside the con-fines of the camps. Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th

ovic DN-ST-98-02151

This scene at Camp Mccalla in. the summer of 1994 is reminiscent of similar scenes two year eadier Liketheir predecessors, the new wav& of Haitian migrants adapted to camp procedures. Here they wattbehind concertina wire Jbr daily supplies.

160, including Combat Service SupportDetachment 160 (CSSD-160) and elements of 2dBattalion, 4th Marines. From a deserted hangar atthe north end of McCalla Field, these unitsworked to support fellow Marines in Jamaica and,later, on Grand Turk. The living conditions wererudimentary at first, consisting of tents pitched inthe dusty sand around Camp Bulkeley. Later,when the Air Force added a modicum of civiliza-tion to the JTF, the units moved to air conditioned, air-transportable accordion shelters atPhilips Park, a more habitable community muchcloser to Mainside than the isolated CampBulkeley at the far reaches of the hase.5

While General Williams was in Jamaica,

Marines, temporarily attached to 2d Battalion, 4thMarines, trained continuously for that mission.nThe barracks Marines' primary mission was pro-tecting the base and they remained the securityforce of last resort at Guantanamo. They wereauthorized to use deadly force to protect vitalinstallations from external threats, which onceagain included migrants, and any assistance theycould lend to General \Villiams' JTF was second-ary. The JTF, of course, viewed the Marines' mis-sion priorities in reverse, a difference that wouldsurface in the coming months.

The Army's processing center for screened-inrefugees at Camp McCalla became more impor-rant as the operation in Jamaica waned and the


DvIC DN-sT-98-0071. I

LtGolRocinev L.Johnson, commander ef the US. Armyc 720th Military Police Battalion, talks to Haitianmigrants who fumped the concertina wire of Camp McGalla to stage a peaceful protest rally.

responsibility for processing all refugees shifted toGuantanamo Bay. By late June, General Williamswas referring to Guantanamo as "a major center"in its own right and a place that could accommo-date up to 12,500 migrants at any one time, a pre-viously unexpected figure.56 Guantanamo becamea sale haven in early July following a change inthe Clinton administration's policy, which gaverescued migrants only two options; return to Haitior go to a safe haven. Migrants could stay at a safehaven until the dangers at home had abated,however long that took. Even with the change ofpolicy, the Navy and Coast Guard still were res-cuing 2,000 to 3,000 migrants per day. Those notwanting to return to 1-laiti became guests of theJTE for an indefinite period.5

General Williams established a migrant policyat Guantanamo based on a common sense set ofpriorities that followed the theory of psychologistAbraham 1-1. Maslow's hierarchy of needs—that is,you do not care about shelter until you haveenough to eat, you do not care about recreationuntil you have shelter, and so forth. Once themigrants had been rescued from drowning, thefirst priorities would be simple: food and water,shelter, and a cot. Those were Williams' indispen-

sable minimums for every migrant. Once thoseneeds were satisfied, refinements such as sewageand bathing, hare necessities anywhere else, wereaddressed. These presented a real challenge forthe base because of antiquated water and sewagesystems. In one of his messages to Norfolk,Williams said he would "set up makeshift campswithout facilities," adding that conditions, whichhad never been particularly good, were "becom-ing very austere for the migrants."58

The desperate struggle to stay ahead of theflow of migrants continued throughout the firsthalf of July. Members of the JTF worked 14-hourdays, seven days a week, performing myriad tasksfrom pitching camps to patrolling perimeters toemptying portable toilets, often in stifling heat.The resulting living conditions did not improvefor some time. As one reporter described it: "Themigrants live in more than 1,500 tan and greentents that carpet an old runway and the tarmacalongside, consuming most of the available flatspace. ... Each rent is crammed with cots, and rollsof concertina wire wind through the vast encamp-ment dividing the refugees into seven communi-ties of 2,000 to 3,000 each."59

It was difficult just to feed everyone on time,


let alone to provide the appropriate Caribbeanfood. In one of the nearby hangars, U.S. officialssat behind rows of desks explaining to refugeeafter refugee the options of returning to Haiti orliving in a safe haven, possibly in another countryin the region. (The administration's diplomatic ini-tiative to find other countries willing to assist con-tinued.) Not surprisingly, relatively few, about 30percent according to one estimate, opted to returnhome. To the migrants, anything seemed betterthan living in their impoverished homeland undermilitary rule,6°

Often adding to the burden of running theoperation was the stream of visitors who came toGuantanamo, not always to help. Although theJTF had an open door policy and left the press todraw its own conclusions, one reporter pressedGeneral Williams to admit he was running "a con-centration camp."6' Very senior officers, includingrhe incumbent Chairnian of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, General John M. Shalikashvili, and theCommandant of the Marine Corps, GeneralMundy, came in droves and offered both supportand criticism/2

General Shalikashvili increased the heat on the

JTF by speaking in terms of handling 28,000migrants, which represented. another massiveupward shift in numbers. Adding to the pressureof such high-level scrutiny, General Williams clis-covered a few days later that one of his own offi-cers was jumping the chain-of-command and call-ing the White House directly with problems. Theofficer was immediately relieved. Along similarlines, a well-meaning but misdirected offer from alawyer at a nationally recognized law schooloffered to send. 50 lawyers to Guantanamo towork with migrants. The JTF, pointing out that itsproblems did not stem from a shortage of lawyers,politely rejected the proposal.63

Throughout the process, General Williams andhis subordinates worried about the security of thecamps. They remembered the challenges andmigrant demonstrations General Walls had facedand wanted to avoid similar outbreaks, especiallysince the current operation was so much largerand more complex. Fortunately, the initial distur-bances were relatively minor; complaints aboutthe food, some heated words and arm-wavingabout inaction by the U.S. Government, and athreat to go on a hunger strike if the U.S. did not

Dvtc DN-ST-98-00709

Surrounded by military police in riot gear, migrants chanted and danced to deliver their message. Therewas no violence.


DV1C DM-ST-97-01836

The "disruptive" Haitians are surrounded by military police from the 402st and 64th Military Policecompanies, loaded onto buses, and taken to an isolation camp where they were closely monitored.

invade Haiti.64 As time went on, conditions didimprove somewhat. In the second half of themonth, there actually were days when the migrantpopulation did not increase. The numbers hov-erecl around an increasingly manageable 20,000,and the JTF was able to make progress in turningthe camps from makeshift shelters into small com-munities complete with village economies, a sem-blance of self-government, elementary schools,preventive medicine programs, and, ultimately, aCreole-language radio station and newspapers.The migrants themselves learned how to run thekitchens and helped cook the food to their owntaste, which eliminated one obstacle.6

Near the end of the month, the JTF and thebarracks Marines met to define their respectiveroles in case of a disturbance, an ever-presentpossibility despite the improving conditions. AsGeneral Williams commented in his diary, therewas "no question that it will get ugly if we can'tcontinue to show continuous improvement."66 Hiscomment applied mostly to living conditions onthe base, but he also considered a solution to thepolitical stalemate and ambiguous immigrationpolicy as one of the needs of the migrant popu-

lation. After all, the U.S. Government was essen-tially detaining a large group of Haitian migrantsin a hot, boring place for an indefinite period.

Two days after General Williams made his pre-diction, there was a peaceful protest in the camps.Army troops contained the disturbance withoutmuch difficulty, but it was a harbinger of things tocome.67 On 1 August, there was a more threaten-ing disturbance during which migrants bran-dished, hut did not use, a variety of homemadeweapons. According to intelligence officers,Haitians leaders, particularly Jean-Claude Petit,were organizing the migrants and focusing theirefforts in Camps 1 and 3. General Williams notedthe "camps [are] clean, but political activists areintimidating [the] rest of the population."6

Pressures came to a head on the morning of 13August when several camps "came out of thewire" in a near riot. More than 100 of the migrantswho escaped dove into the bay next to CampMcCalla and began to swim to the leeward side ofthe base thinking they were swimming to Cuba,from which they might have a better chance ofmaking it to the United States. The barracks react-ed by deploying to quell the disturbance. Marines,


fully camouflaged and heavily armed with bayo-nets fixed on their rifles, lined the leeward shorealong the fence that separated the base fromCuba. The sight of the barracks Marines terrifiedthe unfortunate migrant swimmers, most of whomturned around and started to swim back to CampMcCalla, which was no small feat considering thecamp was a mile away and they were swimmingagainst the current. As they came ashore, securityforces from both the JTF and the base put plasticflexicuffs on the wrists of the escapees andreturned them to custody. The incident was overby 1300. General Williams was satisfied with theperformance of his troops, noting they had done"a fantastic job of keeping their cool under toughcircumstances." But the apparent overreaction bythe base and the barracks during the incident leadthe general to seek to "clarify [the] boundarybetween [the] base and [the] JTF." 59

The camps were quiet the following day, butthere was a challenge from another quarter. The

o\Oc DM-ST-94-02618

Loaded with more than 2,600 Cuban migrantspicked up at sea in the waters between cuba andthe Florida Keys, the dock landing ship USSWhidbey Island (ISD 41) heads Jbr the camps atGuantanaino Bay.

Norfolk-based U.S. Atlantic Command askedGeneral Williams to explain what caused theunrest. He wrote a somewhat wry unofficialanswer in his diary, which states the unrest was"the proximate result of putting 1.5.000 people ona hot runway in Cuba for two months in thesummer."7° Three days later, Williams and his stafffaced yet another challenge as die first hurricaneof the year began to form in the Atlantic,Although hurricanes generally bypassedGuantanamo, the potential danger was real, andmany staff officers turned their attention to con-tingency planning for bad weather. If the hurri-cane struck the base, the JTF could be faced witha very bad situation. The plan, in a nutshell, wasto find hardened shelters for as many migrants aspossible, and to evacuate the rest, assuming thatAtlantic Command could surge enough shippingand aircraft to Cuba to do the job in rime. GeneralWilliams reflected it was "a good plai, hut there[was] ... no way to make it anything hut ugly."71

Fortunately, the weather did not create a sig-nificant problem. l-Iowever, a storm, albeit a figu-rative storm, did strike the base. It was as thoughthe JTF was on a training exercise and the con-trollers were pushing to see how well the forcecould. perform. Just when it seemed. the JTF wasgaining on the challenge posed by the Haitianmigrants, there loomed the mind-numbing specterof thousands of Cuban migrants.

Stressing the System with CubanMigrants

Partly in response to a degree of unrest athome, and partly to rid himself of malcontents,Cuban President Fidel Castro decided in mid-August not to detain would-he Cuban migranrsdetermined to float to Florida. Accompanying hisdecision was a press campaign stating die UnitedStates was encouraging illegal immigration byenforcing the trade embargo and allowing allarrivals to stay, whether they came with a visitor'svisa on a chartered airplane or simply wadedashore in the Florida Keys. This might not havebeen the Immigration and. Naturalization Service'sdescription of its policy, but it did reflect reality:few Cuban migrants had ever been turned away.But, as if to spite Castro, the Clinton administra-tion changed that policy. Janet Reno, the AttorneyGeneral, broadcast a message to the people ofCuba who were contemplating migration, saying,"You will not be processed—not he processed—for admission to the United States." She added, in


DVlC DN-ST-98-00715

While the cuban migrants were enroute to Guantanamo, Marines worked hard to set up tents to housethem. TheJ7F also erected tents to house the personnel who would care for the Cuban migrants once theyarrived.

a phrase that likely gave General Williams pause,"You are going to Guantanama"72 *

No one in Cuba seemed to believe the messageat first, and a cottage industry sprouted on Cuba'snorth shore: non-recreational rafting. Therefugees assembled a bizarre assortment of rafts,often by lashing together inner tubes, lumber, anda wide variety of other materials to create moder-ately seaworthy products. Some of the rafts badsails; recycled motors powered others. Many hadnothing but makeshift paddles. Asked by anAmerican reporter about his intentions, a Cubanmigrant on the beach pointed to his raft and said,

More than one commentator noted the inconsistencybetween U.S. policy on Haitian migrants (who were usuallyencouraged to rettirn home) and cuban migrants (almost allof whom were welcome to stay in Florida once they arrived).In this case, however, the clinton administration wanted tocontrol the flow of cuban migrants to prevent a recurrence ofthe so-called Mariel l3oatlift of 1980, when castro had alloweda large number of undesirables to leave Cttha and make theirway to Florida. See, for example, J. A. Pitts, "MigrantsResettlement Operations" (Miami: southcom unpublishedMantiscript, Supplement Nr. 2 to U.S. Southcom History,31Jan98).

"Of course, I would rather go in an airplane, butthis is the way Cubans get to the United States."73That is how thousands of migrants set sail fromCuba's north coast. Most would be intercepted atsea by the Coast Guard and the Navy and takento Guantanamo, perhaps not the last place onearth they wanted to go, but probably a closecontender for that distinction."

Told to prepare for up to 10,000 Cuban

" It did not take long for the JTF to learn just how much thecubans did not want to go to Guanranamo. Rescued by thefrigate uss cloth (FF0 11) in late August, some 500 cubanstold the crew they would resist, by force if necessary, landingin Cuba. Ltcol Douglas C. Redlich tasked Ltcol John R. Allen'sbattalion, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, with defusing the situa-tion. Ltcol Allen planned a show of force on the pier and sent

one of his officers, Capt William R. Costantini, along withchaplain Joseph R. Lamonde of Grand Turk fame, in a Bostonwhaler out to meet the ship and report on the situation. Onceon board the clark, Lamonde changed into his cassock andclambered into the tipper works of the ship, literally appear-ing to the migrants from on high in his flowing black robe.The tactic worked. The migrants shifted from anger to respectand listened to the priest who, through his presence ot mindand grace under pressure, averted what might have been anugly fight. (Allen Memoranclctm)


DVIC DN-ST-97-Ol.840

More than 600 Cuban.s on hoard the Guided Missile Cruiser USS Vicksburg (CG 69) arrive atGuantanarno Bay on 23 August 1994. They were the first to arrive after the US. Navy assumed theresponsibility of transporting Cubans from the US. Coast Guard.

migrants, General Williams rapidly redeployed hisforces, deciding in short order that Camp McCallawould house the Haitian migrants, who wouldcome under control of the Army component ofthe JTF. Lieutenant Colonel Redlich's Marines,who had been preparing the overflow site onnearby Grand Turk Island, would care for Cubanmigrants in and around the inhospitable CampBulkeley a few miles away. The Marines soonbecame the core of Joint Task Group Bulkeleywith the same commander and the same missionand reinforcements from other Services.

General Williams' policy was to keep the1-laitians and the Cubans apart while makingevery effort to treat the two groups equally.5 Tomeet the demands of the two-pronged mission,

Although Camps McCalla and Bulkeley were miles apart, theCul,ans presence did not escape the Haitians' notice. Be-forelong, the Haitians were protesting that Cubans were receivingbetter treatment. Gen Williams' response was to bus l-laitianrepresentatives to the Cuban camps and let them see for thcni-selves that the newcomers were, in Fact, worse off, living industy camps without plumbing, and eating MREs (meals readyto eat—the latter day combat meals). (Williams inrvw)


DVK DN-ST-98-00730

Lcpl Charles ('riscione from Company J 2d Battalion2 6th Marines; passes out bottled water to Cubanmigrants waiting for Deployable Mass Population Identification and Tracking Systems braceleis.

the joint task force would have Io grow dramati-cally. General Williams' initial estimate, whichproved to he conservative, called for the additionof about 3,800 military personnel. Those alreadyon board would have to pull double duty untilreinforcements arrived. After finishing their regu-lar jobs, they put up tents and surrounded themwith concertina wire to create camps. When theCubans began to arrive, virtually everyone,including new arrivals and old hands, workedaround the clock to unload the ships and keeppace with the flow.

The first loads of migrants came ashore at 0300on 22 August. Their numbers exceeded 9,000 by25 August and grew to 14,000 by 27 August. Evenwhen the flow slackened on succeeding days, theJTF continued to build an infrastructure for a pos-sible total of 45,000 and then 60,000, a staggering

new number put into play by Atlantic Command.To make room for the migrants and generallyreduce the strain on the resources at hand,Norfolk ordered the evacuation of non-essentialGuantanamo base civilians and dependents bythe end of the month.

The arrival of large numbers of Cubanschanged the security equation and added sometroublesome new questions. Was there now bothan internal and an external threat? Did the Cubangovernment somehow intend to coordinateaggression from the fence line by instigating abreakout from one or more of the camps? For thenewly arrived commander of the barracks,Colonel John M. Himes, this was a definite possi-bility, and he requested reinforcements to enablehim to fight effectively on two fronts: to hold thefence line and to protect the base's vital installa-


tions from rampaging migrants. To hold the fenceline, Colonel Himes deployed his troops forward,shifting the emphasis from manning guard towersto a kind of mobile defense with active patrolling.The shift in tactics would, Colonel Himes thought,make it easier to cope with the influx of Cubansover the land border while minimizing the clan-gers to migrants who tried to make their way tofreedom through the Cuban and American mine-fields along the fence line. Accordingly, most bar-racks Marines moved to the field for a workweekunder austere, near-wartime conditions. If theywere able to return to the barracks on the week-end, they would spend the time on standby in theevent migrants took advantage of a slightlyrelaxed routine on Saturday or Sunday.5

The barracks did not simply wait for the worst-case scenario to occur, but exercised for the con-tingency. On 10 and 17 August, Colonel Himesconducted tactical exercises with troops of thebarracks' migrant defense operations plan, final-ized in late July. The exercises, one for CampMcCalla and another for Camp Bulkeley, wererealistic, though somewhat pessinlistic in assump-tions. The plans assumed JTF security forces hadbeen unable to contain hordes of migrants, someof whom were preparing to set fire to GeneralWilliams' headquarters while the remainder werestreaming toward the heart of the base. The objec-tive was to cut migrants off before they reachedany vital installations. Every Marine rehearseduntil he knew his role by heart, as well as the all-important rules of engagement?6

General Williams, meanwhile, saw things dif-ferently. While the Marine barracks was on anear-wartime footing, JTF 160 was on a humani-tarian mission in an ambiguous siruation with ill-defined threats. For General Williams, the securi-ty missions of the barracks Marines and the JTFwere distinct, and it concerned him to hearColonel Mimes say his troops were authorized touse deadly force. The general wanted to ensureeveryone understood the authorization was tiedstrictly to the defense of certain vital installationson base, not to containing any disturbance bymigrants that might pose a threat to the base lateron. He did not want anyone to use excessiveforce against the migrants, and thereby create aninternational incident. Nor did he see a height-ened external threat. Rather, the general contin-Lied to focus on the kind of internal disturbanceshe (and Generals Walls before him) had alreadyfaced, and he rejected the suggestion the JTFshould assume responsibility for the security of

DvIc DN-ST-98-00731

LC'pi Sabata Mixon and SrAJennfer Brown use arivet gun to attach an identification and trackingbrave/ct to a cuban child. Young or old; a/ICuban migrants recevied bracelets.

the base and of the camps.77 Although the base,rhe barracks, and the JTF would continue toexchange liaison officers and discuss contingencyplans, General Williams intended to rely primari-ly on JTF assets for security. This meant its Army

Gen Williams outranked the base commander, a Navy cap-tain who also commanded the JTF's small Naval Force(NavFor), which was made up largely nf base personnel. Inthat capacity, he reported directly to the general. Playing thetwo roles was, at times, difficult for the captain because thebase's long—term interests often clashed with those of the JTF,which was a shott-term but very demanding tenant capable ofruining a lot uf real estale.


and Marine components, soon to be augmentedby the rest of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, underColonel Allen, which had performed so well inJamaica and would become the core of Joint TaskGroup Bulkeley's external security element. It

also meant the general did not intend to rely onguns and wire alone. As he commented on 27August, "I can lower frustrations by 50 percent ifI can get showers and adequate water for thepeople. "78

Most of Lieutenant Colonel Allen's battalionhad spent the intervening weeks back at CampLejeune. Allen and his staff, especially his opera-tions officer, Major John F. Stone, knew theymight have to re-deploy to the Caribbean foranother migrant operation. With that prospectlooming, they used the time at Camp Lejeune toevaluate the lessons learned on the comfort offJamaica and to study the history of an uprising ata U.S. Army prisoner of war camp that heldChinese soldiers duting the Korean War. MajorStone concluded that the rules of engagement forcivil disturbances had to he "ironclad." Like thebarracks Marines, everyone in 2d Battalion, 6thMarines, had to know how much force could heused and when to use it. Since it was likely theJTP would deploy the battalion over a wide area,the small unit leaders needed to be comfortableapplying the rules of engagement and makingdecisions on their own.79

Within hours of its return to Guantanamo on 26and 27 August, the battalion faced the first in along series of challenges. Men of 2d Battalion, 6thMarines, waited on the pier to escort Cubanmigrants to the rifle range, an overflow campnorth of Camp Bulkeley that was literally builtaround them overnight. This became Camp Mike.Under the command of First Lieutenant ThomasM. Mirande, the Marines did a superb job not onlyof building the camp in the physical sense, but ofmaking it into a working community. In the daysto come, the payoff for Lieutenant Mirande's goodwork at Camp Mike would he realized, as it

became one of the few camps where there wereno uprisings.80

Apart from Camp Mike and Camp Bulkeleypropet, Joint Task Group Bulkeley built, main-tained, and ran other camps. One of thecamps, the Radio Range, was located nearbyalong the coast and comprised a long-range radioantenna farm. The other camp was a few milesnorth at the golf course.

By now the process was becoming routine forGeneral Williams' troops. They erected concertina

wire around the individual camps, each holding2,000 to 3,000 migrants living in general-purposetents, and built cyclone fences around groups ofcamps. Small trailers with water tanks, known aswater buffaloes, and portable toilets were broughtin while the camps waited for better plumbing.The evolution was successful in large partbecause the migrants organized themselves andpitched in to help. But it was still difficult to over-come the inherent limitations of the place.81 WhenGeneral Williams inspected the Radio Range, hefound the camps were built on "two to three feetof dust" and commented the Cubans at the golfcourse were in "the least harsh place."82

General Williams also noted the presence of anumber of troublemakers among the migrants,including what he called the "gang bubbas," ahardcore criminal element that traveled with thevan of the migrants, perhaps by Cuban govern-mnent design. According to one estimate, this lotmade up five percent of the migrant population.Immigration and Naturalization Service agents,who watched them disembark, already knewsome of them. A few were on first name termswith the agents from previous encounters such asthe Mariel Boatlift incident when Castro emptiedmental hospitals and prisons in a challenge to thePresident James E. Carter, Jr., administration morethan a decade earlier. Others were recogniza-ble from their tattoos; one of the more interestingJTP documents was a field guide to decipheringthe meaning of Cuban tattoos. Immigration offi-cers recommended those with certain tattoos beidentified and segregated. The JTF agreed andinstituted a requirement for all young males tostrip to the waist for a tattoo check. If tattooed,they were segregated from the rest of the popula-tion.83 In the days to come, Genera] Williamsmaintained the policy of trying to separate thegood guys from the bad guys, especially sincemany of the bad guys were very assertive andtried to take over some of the camps. It was apolicy that made eminent sense.84

By the beginning of September, there weresome 20,000 Cubans from all walks of life—fromwhite-collar professionals to blue-collar workersto criminals—in the Marine area of operations atGuantanamo.83 The JTF met the demand for foodand water most of the time, but in Major Stone'swords, "it was a logistical nightmare." 86 When theJTF was unable to keep everyone fed andwatered, the Cubans reacted. There might be afew placards, some chanting, and threats to prop-city or personnel. In response, the Marines would


deploy a reaction force and contain the demon-stration by talking and working with the migrants.On 6 September, for example, a crowd of 500Cubans started throwing rocks at soldiers in oneof the camps and then vandalized a nearby vehi-

cle. The arrival of a reaction team from the exter-nal security force quickly stabilized the situation.It was a generally successful approach as long asthe Cubans believed their patience would eventu-ally earn them passage to Florida.

Documents

A Skillful Show of Strength U.S. Marines in the … Skillful Show...The Camp at Grand Turk The most exotic sidelight in the history of Marines in the Caribbean in the 1990s was the