A Savage and Romantic War, Spain 1833-1840, Part 1, The Course of the First Carlist War

8/13/2019 A Savage and Romantic War, Spain 1833-1840, Part 1, The Course of the First Carlist War

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26 ..ASAVAGE NDROMANTICWAR'sPArN1833-1840Part I: The Courseof the Fbst CadistWar

by Conrad CaimsPRELIMINARY NOTES

This lrstarticlesa hisloricalntroduction, ndwillbe ollowedby detailed xaminalionsflhe organhation,actics, niformsand weapons f boih sides,and, t is hoped,a pieceon theOriamendi ampaign f 1837n real ife andon the wargamesSome fthe materialhas ppeared efore. lthoughnratherdifferent form, in a senesof atriclesin TheForcignCoftespondpnr newsletter f the ConrinentalWarsStudyGroupof theV;ctorianMilitarySociety) nd n theVHS ournal,Soldiedo/

rr? Oxeer.To thosewho eel heyhave eent before, wouldsay bat hope heywillforgive epetition, ndunderstandthatit was mpossibleo presenthe newlyproduced artsofthesearticles y hemselvesn anysensibleashion. hosewhowouldlike further details, particularlyon uniforms, and fullerreferences, ill, I hope, refer to the earlier articles. Abibliographywill appear n a forthcomingedition of thispublicalion.Thesingularly pt ille s onewhich wish had hought pthe peoplewho did are the staff of the SpanishmagazinI would ike to thankRon Poulter or drawing heplate hatillustrateshisarticle. ndespecially alphWeaverfor elpandsupport hroughouton my Carlist researches.nd for theillustrationsf thewarriors fboth sides.

THEPARTIES

importantwings fthe Cristinos s heLiberales ndModeratos- borhofrhese itles,unlike Cnslinos",werewhat hegroupsused o describehemselvest the ime.Th Liberaleswere.sliberalsalways avebeen n spain. very different rom theirnam-sakesn France r Britain,although, salways.Britishliberalsmade iltle effort to understandhe diffrence. heirgreat nspirationwas he 1812Constitution. lengthyworkinspired y the Enlightenment, ritish.American nd Frenchrevolutionarydeas,as well as Liberal notionsof what waswrongwith Spain. t wasnot in forceuntil 1836,when t waspromulgatedy a violentand successfuliberalcoupd'etat.TheLiberales' erowasGeneralRiego.whohad edanearliermilitary ake-overn 1820, nd an hegovemmentntil t wascrushed y LouisXvlll s nvasionn 1823iheir mainpoliticalaim was o resist oyal absolutism ndwhat hey sawas theobscurantistowerof the Churchovcrall aspec ts f Spanishlife. Fewwere eal republicansihey ended o be strongernthe cities than in the counrryside, nd were particularlywell-representedn the regulararmy and, aboveall, in theNationalMilitia. Their alliancewith he Moderatos. howereon hewhole hepersonalupportersofCristinand sabel,wasuneasy:r couldbe argued hat the only thing hat preventedModerrro.al l l ing sr(h rhe Carl i . rron someocca.ion\.panicularlyafier the 1836 evolution.was h latter's igidrefusalo compromiser negotiate.The Carlisccalled hemselvesealirrdrroyalists),nd heircnemies ormallyspokeof them as he .itaccioror. he wordCarlist ones rom heir eader. r at least igurehead, arlos,brotherof Ferdinand ll. (To thosewhoregarded im as heIegitimatemonarch e wasCharles i the Habsburg mperorwecallby hat itlenasCharles ofSpain).WhetherCharles rlsabelwas the legitimate uler can be arguedither way.Womenmonarchs adbeenan ancientCastillian ndSpanishtradition. utduringtheeighteentheniurytheBourbonKingsintroduced. longwith manyother Frenchdeas, heso-calledSalicLaw. whichsayshat no$,oman anbe a queen egnant.whether or noi kabel could succeed erdinand epends nwheiherSalic awwas n force n 1833. conslilutionalssuehave o ntntion f discussing.why did it matter? During Fcrdinand's ong, generallyractionary. nd until 1830 hildless. eign. the hopesof asignificantroupof Spaniardsadbeen inked o theperson fDon Carlos. whose lliberal credentialswere impeccable.when. to rheir surprise nd horror. Ferdinand roduced nheir. their disappointment as bitter. as until tharpoint $ethrone would havepassedo Carloson Ferdinandsdeath.Facedwith the impossibility f obtaining owerby peacefulmeans. ndworriedby Liberal nfluence n the govemment.they urned o force:as heCristinos ontrolldhanny. heyraisedheirown ivalhosts.Carlist deology aschanged ver heyears, ut t is almostahlaysof a fairly extreme eactionary ature not until the1960\ could anythingapproaching left'wing Carlism befound.A Carlists win aimswere o uphold he Monarchy ndrheChurch. oth n theirmost raditional ndabsolutistorms.(Notablyabseni tom the pantheon f the earlyCarlistswaswhat was later to become he third immutableoblecl of

TheFirstCarlistWarwas he irst of three ull-scale ivil warsthat Spainsuffered n a entury.and one of the bloodieslepisodesf the actionalismhat was he distinguishingeatureof political ife between he restoralion f Ferdifland II andthe riumphof Franco. ts causes ere. o a largeextent,alsothecausesf much f thestrifeof early wenrieth'ceniurypain.Although n 1840r appearedhat seven ears f struggle adendedn thevictory foneside.Carlismwas ar romextirpatedandwithina decadehe armyhadanorherCarlist evolton itshands.The contestantsre normallycalledCristinos nd Carlists.and an examination f these ames nd heir alternatives illserveo ntroduce ome fthe deas ndprejudicesthalnspiredthe sides.Thesupportersfthe Madridgovernment.heCristinos. wetheir name o Maria Cristina. ourthwife of Ferdinand Il.AfterFerdinand's eath n 1833 ristina ecame ueenRegenion behalfof th nfant sabel I (whogave he partya secondname, sabelinos). he Cristinoswere as any readerat allfamiliarwith twentieth-centurypanish istorywill have nodifficulty n apprecialing, eld ogether nly bydeterminationto defeat he Carlisis, y a desire o maintai. he Queen forfearof{indingsomething orse',andby hecircumstancehattheywre n ontrolof all rhenormalmachinery f the state.includinghearmyandnavy.As hisarticle sbasicallyaookatthenilitarysideofthewar,and willhave o keep hepolitical omplexitiesto minimum,I will grossly ver-simplify atters y describinghe wo most


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77adolationof many Spanish ightists, he army). They werehostiletoliberal odemityin ll ts orms,which hey aw snotonlypoliticalncorret, ut mpious swell, andeven nspiredby "Lutherans"andFreemasons.his setof mindgoes longway to explain heir ;nability o rnodify heir demands hencompromise ouldhavebenefittedheir cause,lheir requentatrocitiesalthoughhoseo{theCristinos ereperhaps t eastas bad), and suchpronouncementss he DurangoDecree,whichsaidall foreigneN aken n armsagainsthemouldbeexecuted. heywere onvincedsoreatlyofheirown ightnessthat heydidnotseemo considerheeffet uch ereesadonforeign opinion. The generalantipathyof the Portuguese,Bri l ish ndFrench ovemmenNo heCarl is lsasnora majorcause ftheir downfall, ut t certainly id hemnogood.Duringthe1820 raditionalistsadenjoyedmuchnfluencewith the government, nd so were able to organise largeprivatearmy of "RoyalistVolunteers" ll over he countrynaturally, his wasof value o the Carlists rhenthey foundthemselvesn urgent need of a real army. Despite thenation-widextent fthisorganhaiion. .d despitehe act hatin all parts of Spain people could be found who weresympa$etic o absolutismalthoughn manycities l wasnotsafe o air suchviews).Carlismwas not rally a nationalmovement. herewere wo Carlisthomelands. achwith itsownarmy,andalthough the.rCarlist orces xisted, ndeventhrivedor awhile-in La Mancha ndCatalonia,or example-once he armiesn the northand n Aragongaveup he CarlisiStatewasno more. t is conveniento treat he stories f theArmiesoftheNorthandofthe Centre eparately.

THENoRTHERNPRovtNcEs'ffi ifof thousandsffirst-classnfantry,overa thousandmore hanpassableancers. nda smallnumber f guns full detailswillappear n a later article. It was originally recruited romvolunteersrom he ourprovinces,ut heseweresoonoinedby others, otablyCastillians, ho desertedrom he Crislinoarny. marcheduomheirhomelands,rwerepickedupby heCarlists n their roving expeditions. ike lhe Basques ndNavarrese,he Castillians ereexcellent oldiers, ndcame oformone hird rohalfthearmy.All rhisis ettingatheraheadfevents. o return o 1833: n51hOctoberDonCarloswasroclaimed ing,andarmed andssprung p ro supporthim. Carlosappointed former egulargeneral,SantosLadr6n,commandeFin-hief,bulhis ' l l - traiforcesweredefeated t their int battle,LosArcos.andhewascaptured ndshot.Thiswasnot a totaldisastcrfortheCarlistslfor one hing, t taught hem hey couldnot stand n the openagainstrained roopsuntil they became oldiersior another,SanlosLadr6n'ssuccessorasTom6sZumalacarregui delmaz 1788-1835),colonel f regular nfantryand oneof thegreatestoldiers f hisage.Zumalacdrregui'sim was o producea completemodernarmy.butwithout orcing ts men o lose heirnaturalmilitarytalents. e suceeded.heCarlists' bility o move apidlyoverrhebrokenand.capef much I thenoahempro ince5 asnever equalled by most Cristinos,although he Queen'sinfantrymproved reatlyovertheourse fthe war n tsabilityto wageguerrillawarfare. TheCarlists lmostalways eliedmuchmoreon n{antrythan n anyotherarm,but hiswasnotaseriousimitation s ongasonewas ighting n the ourCarlisl

The first raskwas o build n the new battalions sDiritofself-confidencehilerraining hern.Zumalacdrregui'snswer';ias ostage series f battles, rambushes, hichheknewhismenwouldwin. or at east ot ose. foressed. ewouldbreakoffanddisperse;ifhe on,a regularopponentoundescapearmoredifficult.He keptaway romplains, speciallyinthearlymonths. ndhada habitofstarting fight ate n thedayso hattheC.istinos ad itdechanceo outflan or surround is orces.Henormallycommittednlya minorityofhis roops t hestartof an engagement,olding he rest;n reserven openorder.Lackof ammunition asa problem,and one hat he Carlistsneversold ompletely, espitehe setting pof manufacturers,soZunalactlregui nforced rigorousire'disciplineopreventhismen rom using p all he 0 or even4 rounds hat mightbeavailableer soldier.Carlists ften eservedheirfire until herangewas eryshort, nd lida ot on hebayonet.By theauturnn f 1834the arlist rmyhadwona numberofbaules nd.more mportantly, ada very ormidablenfantry,able to fight in line. column, and square,without havingsacrificedts men'sabilities o act asguerrilleros.ts strategicachievements ere less;mpressive.Many Cristino units,

ZUMALACARREGUINDTHERISEOFTHEARMYOFTHENORTH, $3.1835The irst.anduntilthe ate1830's ost mponant,Carlist egionwas he ourprovincesfvhcaya (Biscay).Guipfzcoq,Alava(all Basqueprovinces)and Navarra. In thse areas. hebackboneof the Carlist movementwas providedby thepeasantry.ndwhatmadeCarlot supporterso oyalwas otsomucb heabsolutistdeas frhe eadership ut rhat Carloswasseenas he protector f local relos (rights. aws.privilegetagainst he centralism f Madrid although he strength ftraditional eligionn hese rovincesaturally ho nlinedheinhabitantsowardsCarlism.Even n the four provinces,hCarlisistatewasnot unchallnged,owevr. he maincitiesB;lbao. San Sebastidn. amplona,Vitoria remained ngovernment ands.panly becausehey were heavilygarrisoned. arllybecauseheCarlists erenotvery killedat akinglarge owns. ut alsobecausche Carlists erenot veryskilledai aking arge owns, utalsobecauseome ftheirinhabitantsweregenuine ristinos.r sprobably ignificanthatanEnglishvisitor remarked hat in Santandorhat the bourgeoiswore-English (i.e.modernnternational)ashions. ndthecountrypeopleetainedSpanish drssHenderson,, 209).Notsurprisingly.riestsended o be Carlists. nd couldbeseen eadingrttacksn their splendid lackgarb,wavingargecrucifixes, ut herewereplentyofclergywhodid not supportCarlos- awyers ere lsosaid o be n favour f thePretender,perhaps ecauseheywereworried hat he 1812Constiturionsetup locall',?cer e c""d1ii?.id,,officialswhoseob was osettle isputes ndso educehenurnber f lawsuils.Don Carloswasaccompaniedy a large, ruffy, nd alhermobile ourt.withmore hanenough f thepeople ne mightexpecttofind courtiers, isplacedupportersromotherpartsof Spain. lace'seekers.oad'eaters ndpoliticians enerallybut the most mportant nd credirableartof theCarlislslatewas he Army of lbe North. (TheCristinosorce acing t borcthesame ame. ut o avoid onfusionwillonlvusethetermtoindicareheCdrl isr rm) .Thi\gre\a'omnorhingo:ome en\


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28particularlyn themounted rm,were n poorshapen 1833, othegovernmentost tschanceo crush he ebellionn the irstmonths,but it became pparenthat the Carlists ad imitedDowero influence vents utsideheir ourDrovinces.acticaldevelopmentsill becoveredn moredetaitin henextarticle,but tis well opointout herethatas arlistseamtthe irtues fregularraining, otheLiberales,athermoreslowly,leamt rre-leamt he methods f guerdllawarfare hat had beensoeffectiveng ndingdown he nvaderswo decadesefore. heSpanish oldier s oneof the oughest nearth whichwasustaswell,consideng the privations oth sides ad o endureand heLiberales' eterminationo put down he dsingh tooeasy o underestimate,he same tubbomness,ndrefusal ogiveupafterdefeats, hicheventuallydidorNapoleon'srny,in theendalso rushedheCarlists.Thegovemment trategy as o ontain he Carlist state",and o holdonto hemain ownsevenin arlist reas. hichwasundoubtedly wise ne. Its ritteringaway f forcesn holdinga multitude f lesser laces,whichcouldbe, and oftenwere,taken,wasprobablyess ensible)- ut althoughhisgave heCristinos uitable ases o launchoffensiveso endicate herevolt, this secondstageproved far more difficult. Onehandicap, speciallyn ihe earlyyears,was he fact that theterain worked o the Carlhts'advantage; notherwas hat ttook the Cristinos ome ime to produce eaderswith thenecessary ualities.The govenment had, moreover, heunfo(unate habit of sackinggenerals requently- one,Zumalacdrregui\ ld commanderQuesada, nly lasted tomFebruary o July 1834. n early 1835 he commandof thenorthemarmypassedo Franciso spoz Mina, he egendaryleaderin heWar oflndependencenda strongLiberal. s anex-guer lero he waswellawareof the virtue of light troops,anddid all hecould oraise hem.but hewas esssuccesstulasfieldcommander.n March1835 e aunched maiorattack.ntreezr gwearhe. from Pamplona.o ry anddestroy an of rheCarlist rmy hile Zumalacaregui, ith he bulkofhis forces,wasabsent. isplan a;led,largelyecausefthe extraordinarymobilityofthe Carlistarmy,and Minawasnearly uffoundedand destroyed. lthoughhe extricated is armywithoutveryheavy ossespartlyby forgingZumalacerregui'signature nanorderwhichhecontrivedo passo anotherenemyneral),and althoughsomeof his forces ought very well, Mina\reputationsuffered rreparable arm. He was replacedbyValdsn April1835.Theearlysummer f thatyearbrought etmorevictoriesothe Carlists, ot only in the field but againslminor Cristinogarrisons. t may have been these successeshat led thePretendero his firstgreaterror, o attackBilbaoagainstheadvie f Zumalac6rregui.aite^were alsonot hlped t thisjunctureby the act hat courtiers' ack-biting t themanwho

Th'osh'ordsof typesusedby the BritishAutiliary Legion. Thetwo Lancet rcgimentr would haveprcbabry canied the 1822patten light cavaby sv'otd. (The specinen shoh'n is atooper's; officets' were ery similar). Inlanty officets cafiedthe1822pattem "Gothk Hilt" , somelimesn a sleelscabbardasherc, mote olten in a black eathetonewith brassmountt. TheSpanishanls would haw appearedon the hik, ratrcr thanthoseof the East ndia Companyon thisspecimen.The "pipeback" was an ingeniourfeaturc to stfun the blade ot thegave ope o theirpolitical mbitions addisgustedumalaqir-regui so much hat he had ried to resigncommandof the Armyof the North. Carlosdid not ac.ept, but it appeanthat, afterhhresignation, e no longer felt so rsponsibleor strategicdecisions,owentalongwithhesiege, hichheconducted ith14battalionsnd10guns. hegarrison,5,000enand30guns,won the greatestCristino victory to date, resisting he siegeandkillingZumalacdrregui,hodiedon 24th une.Neveragain idtheCarlists cquire eader*ithsuch combination ftactical,inspirationalndorganisationalbility.Hissuccessor,enienteGeneralGonz6lezMoreno, facedup to the Cristino field armyon 16thJuly (nowunderC6rdova), t Mendigorria, nd wasbadlybeaten.Had not C6rdova ailed o lauoch b necessarycavalry harge t heendofbattle, heCarlists ouldhave een

TIIE CARLISTEXPEDITIONS,1836-1837TheBilbaoaffairshowederyclearlysomeofheweaknessesoftheCarlists. hey acked hepoliorcetic xpertiseo takeevensomediocre fortress, nd he armyhadbeen orced nto thesiegeby non-militaryconsiderations.o have held Bilbaowouldhaveallowed he court o settledown n somethingikecomfort.andwouldalso. t wascalculated,aveenhancedhePretender'shances f receiving id from foreignmonarchssympathetico the cause freaction those fPrussia,Russia

Zumalacerreguiadwantedo attackViloria, asa irststep oan offensiveagainstMadrid. By 1836 t was obvious hatalthoughhe Crhtinosmightnot be able o crush he Army oftheNonh by main orce,Don Carlos ould loseby default fhecouldnot preadhe ightiflgbeyondhenorthern rovinces.sPretenderCarloshad to take the throie to win the warl asQueenRegent,all Cristinahad o do waspreventhim. TheQueen's rmiesweregainingn proficiency ll he ime,and n1835 adbeen einforced y lhiee substantialoreignegions,French,Portuguese, nd British. (The Carlistsenjoyed hesupportonly of individual aliens.molivatedby politicsoradventure.) here were Carlisl movementsn otherpartsofSpain, nd he Carlistsn Aragonwerebuilding p a omidablearmy of their own. but the country as a whole remainedCristino-n January1836 he Queen\ chiefminister,Mendi-zdbel,wonavoteofonfidencen theCortes, nd twashopedhewouldbe able o turn hisconsiderablealentsto einforcins

Two Spsni:h knivesof tlpes thatwouldhaveseen ervice n the1830's. Theplug bayonethad sutvived as a huntsmsn's ool,but theothet specimen, he navaja,k specifrcay fot fighting.The vicious, stabbing blade (herc shotrn held in its openpo'ition by asptind fold: up into the handle. The knife couldbewo st'tck nto asashwith only the end of the hih shoh'ing.


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29the army.C6rdova uilt for.ified inesaround beArnyoftheNorth's erritory,with the aim ofcutting t off from he restofSpain, r{orcing tontotheplainsofCastille,here ehoped odestroy t. Although C6rdova'swinteroffensive t Arlaben,whichwassupponed y the BritishAuxiliaryLegion,was essthan otallysuccessful,n March 1836BanolomeoEspartero.the risingCristino tar,won an elegant icloryon theplainsofOrduna.The Carlistsattempted o break oul of this siruationbysendingExpeditions"all over Spain, o '\how the lag" and.they hoped, ead and inspire heir sympathisers, ho, theybelieved,would rise up and orm armies ndgovernmentsftheirown once he Liberalarmyandmilitiaweredrivenaway.Thiswasnot o be.WhetherbecauseoreSpaniardsthanheyrealisedwerehostileor apathetico their cause, r whetherbecausenceoneofthe powerful xpeditionsadpassedn tswayanypartizans ho "cameout" wouldbe eft either o bestampedupon by the government r reduced o a life ofbanditry, hey set up no major bodiesof active Carlists.Although he nilitary success f the expeditionsmor thanalarmedhc Cristinos. ot even he act hatMadridandothercities nderwent violenlLiberal evolulion n thesummer f1836gaveny ealadvantageo theCarlists.Nevertheess,heexpeditionserevery mpressivexanplesof the military an. The greatestwas hat of Miguel G6mezDamas,which set out on 3rd June with 5 battalions, wosquadronsnd woguns. nd eturned, rather tronger ue olocal ecruiting),on 20th December,o find the main armyengagedn its second ttempton Bilbao anotherailure.Hisoriginal missionwas to raise insurrectionn AsturiasandGalicia, ut rom Santiago eComposlellaemarchedhroughLeon and Castille o Aragon.At Bujaleroon 30thAugusthefoughtandcapturcd wo battalions f RoyalGuards.Despitebeingrouted ndmauled tVillarrobledo month ater,hewasstrongenough o take C6rdobacity on lst October. n all,G6mezcovered bout2.800miles n six months, raininghisrecruits she marched.By the beginning f 1837 oth northemarmieswere ed by.iore than competent enerals. spartero aving akenover

cOMEz'sMARCH1836

Thk diagrltm shows, n sinplified fom, the llryout of requtarinla try colours (the Prcvincial rcgimentsand Gua s oftenhad differcnt logr. Thiswas he a war n which SpanLthrcgula\ fouBht undet the rasged nss of Bursundr, rcd onIn the comero|als, which weresutroundedby baped fkgs orlaurel Meaths, were he arms oJ the regiment for exanple 3ye otr flew-de-lys on bLueor Borbon. The clov'ns weresoldand red, t|ith nulti colourcd ewels. Thefiilt battalion ofeachregi e t borc the ColoneL's otour, vhich had superinposedon the abo|e an e[aborate,crcwned. anrs ol Spain, ofEnsnrrcunded y ordercon chains.The oldest reginent in the atny, El Rey, had a uniquedistinction - the backqroundb its flags was not h'hite, but

fromC6rdobaa far from despicableommanderimsel0andthe Infante Don Sebasti6n, ephew o Don Carlos,being ncharge fthe Carlist orces. n March heCristinos ttemptedgrand hree-prongedttack: heBritishgeneral e LacyEvans\{as o advancerom the fortress f SanSebastidn,y now asemi-permanentome o the BritishAuxiliaryLegion,Espar-tero fiom Bilbao, and SaNfield,whose orces ncluded heFrenchForeignLegion, from Vitoria. The plan was over'ambitious, nd eliedon heenemy eing nable o co-ordinatea de[ence gain5lhreecolumn\ a foolishassumptioniventhat the Carlistswere operatingon interior ines, and theirrvonderfuspeed fmovement, othstrategicallynd actically.A full desciptionofthe campaign ustawaita fu(her article,but sufficet to say hat Sarsfieldet himselfbe efeated y heweather. nd EsDaneroetiredwhenhe heardof the disasterthat befell Evanson the heightsof Oriamendi,outsideSanSebasti:in.Almost at onceCarlos aunched is maior offensive f thewar.ThePretender imself ccompaniedheRoyalExpeditionof16 battalions. lmost ll hecavalryadozen q adrons), ndsome unners ithoutpieces. here ssome ncertainty bouttheprecisc urposcsofthis xpedition, bout rom heobviousonesof "reinforcingsuccest'and iving he nhabitantsftheCarlislprovinces break rornsupplying o argean army.butclearlyCarloswasmakinga serious id for power. f ever heCarlistswere to take Madrid by fore, this was the time.especiallywhen the Army of the No h joined wilh theAragonese rny of thc Centre.Thcy may also havebeenhopingto apjtalisendesertionsinheCristino anksfollowingthe1836evolutionwould a display f Carlist ower ersuade


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30happy retreat; ndeed, r probablyma.kedthe start of anirrevenible ecline. ike all volunteers,hemenof theAJmyoftheNorthhada tendencyto ip away omewhen heredidnotseemo be anyprospect I success,lthoughhistendency asnodilied by severe iscipline nd a willingnessf soldiersoretum othe colourswhen heysaw ome oint n fighting. hefailureofthe RoyalExpeditionwasa severe low o thebeliefthat Don Carlos would ever be a real king, and thewar-wearinesshat was o bring peace t last dates rom theauturnn f 1837. he ordinaryCarlist oldier ad urned n hisusualexcellent erformance, ut casuakies ad beenheavy,speciallyn thecavalry.Norcould hesoldiers ave eenmuchedifiedby the dissentn the high connand, panicularlyharbetween he generals. nd Carlosand his civilian advisors.Worstof all, this disseflt ontinued fler he Army's elum tothe our nonhernprovinces, ithmanyofficers illing o iry acompromhepeace.ebastidnassacked;lthough iseventualsuccessor,afaelMaroto, he astcommanderfthe Armv o{the NorLh.wasa goodenough enerdl.he wasLopur oiherthings efore isloyalty o thecause.

THE DIIDOF THE ARMYOFTHENORTH,1838-r$9The esloflhe war n the northwasnotunmarked y ncidenr,but canbe relatedairly briefly.A final argeexpedition, iththesame imas hoseof1836, etout n March1838, ndertheCountof Negri. t consisted{ 9 battalions, ll Castillian.womountain unsjand four full squadrons irh cadresor twomore.Thestrong eliance nCastillians ayhave een ecausethe Basques nd Navarrese n the Royal Expeditionhadcomplainedboutbeingawayfromheil homelandor so ong.Negri took Segovia. ut his expediiion, acking ood andfoolwear.hen ellback na miserableerreat- sDarterocaushti l o n 27lhApri l . heCrrl isr oot ormed quare,urcould orf i reontheCrist inocavahyasitspowdeiwassoakedyrain,and

the armysurrendered n rnasse. nly Negri and he cavalryescaped. n 22ndJuneEspanerodeleatedhe mainCarlistarmy, leading o the fall of the nearby Carlist rown ofPe6acerrada.nd he replaceme.l f the thencommander-in-chiefby heabove,mentionedaroto.Marolo\ aim was o rebuild rhe army, and especiallytsmountedarm, into a force hat could defeatEspartero n a

A rcpresentative Carld infantrynan and lancer,.biwn bf RonPoulter.Thecawlrynan sflanboyant haiis typiLot.White heo inatj Spania was fat fton clop-headed, Ca bts had areputation for haniness. Zunalacliffegui, it is said, hadbatbers accompan his amy so the solrliers did no hove tocatt shdv ng-e uipnent.

someModeldror o forsakehe Liberaladministrationor theabsolutists?After twovictories t Huesca ndBarbastro.erociousffairsevenby the standards f thiswar, and a defeatat Orr. theExpeditionpassedhroughpartsof Catalonia eld by localCarlists,and headed outh o join the Army of the Centre.Anotherdefeatat Chiyadenied he Carlhrsan opportunityorecuperate n the fertile area around Valencia.and thecombined arlist orces. erhaps 6.000oot and2,000 orse,advanced0withina fewmiles {Madrid.Carlos everorderedthe assault despite rging rom Sebastidnnd rornRam6nCabrera,he eader fthe Aragonese. evera decisive an,hehadon hisoccasionlentyofreasonsorcaution. headvancehad beenso slow rhat he governmentorceshadhad ampletime to prepare he capiral or artack.Carloswasno doubtunwilling o r'sk what wasperhapshe greatestieldarmy hecouldgathern a typeof warfare twhich r wasnot eiperti hewasno loverof bloodshed; wouldhavebeendisaDpointedlhat o iewot hispeoplehad aken p arm' o uppon neExpedition; nd,while duringearlierstages f his ourneyhehadbeenn secret ommunicationithCristinawithaview o anegotiated eace, ll suchcorrespondenceadeased y rhis

After some hesiration. nd because large force underEspartero asbearing ownon rhem, he CarlistsetrearedCabrera o Aragon, hArmy of the North o irshome.beingpursued y Esparterowho beat t at Reiuerta- t wasnor a

This sketch nnp shows he sinkttion in the s nner of 1837,with the route of the Rolal Eryedition. Dotled arcoswercunder Carlistcotlrol. (Bilbao, Vibtia, SanSebostidn ndPamplona wele Oisino). The hatchedarca s thepa of LaMancha i fested bj Ca ist iteg la^.


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contibution heArmy ofthe Centre ouldhavemade owardsCarlistvictory aso co,operate ith heRoyalExpedition. swe have seen,Cabreraand some of his men did join theexpedition, nd he Aragonesehieftainwasoneof thosewhourged nassaulton adrid.He seemsto ave een isgustedyCarlos'sefusal o risk an attack, or he then retired o theMaestrazgo,nd hereafterook a ineevenmore ndependentfrom heCourt.A surprise ssault n henightof 25126 anuary1838 y a Catalanieutenant nd75 men ook Morella,whichCabrera adbeenbesiegingor two monrhs.Morellawas,andis. a wonderfully uggd and spectacular astellared ity,although y no meansa modern ortress n the 1830t, andCabrera umed t into the capitalof his virtuallyautonomousviceroyalty,.he headof a widely-spreadivil and military

TheCristinos oulddo little o stop he establishmentfthisramshacklearlht state: heir orceswereover-stretcheds twas, avingto ealnotonlywithverywidespreadanditryfrornwellarmedandnominally arlist orsemenn La Mancha, ut.moreseriously,he iseofanothr,snaller,semi-independentCarlist rea n Catalonia.Thearmyof rheCatalanCarljsts asbeingdisciplinedor rhe filst time by the brutal but efficientex-regulareneral,he Condede Espafra, nd t was ortunatefor the Liberaleshat the Condewasassassinatedefotehisforcescouldbecomea serious hreat.) Nor did it help theCristinoshat heyhad o defendandgarrison o nany townsandplaces gainsthe ever-mobile nitsofCabrera's rmy. nthe atesummerof1838 he Cristino eneralMarcellinoOrra,anotherex-guerrillerowhoadserved nderMina n heWarofIndependence,ssembled2battalionsndperhaps 5guns otakeMorella.AlthoughOriiawasinsomeways nable oldier,the siegewasmarkedby the incompetencef the Cdstinoadllery, supply.and command-Oda's army was ucky toescape ithout ossesmoreserioushan hose t receivd. ustover a month ater, on 1stOctober1838.Cabreranflictedaserious efeatn the ieldat Maella.1839 awCabrra rying to protcthis 'kingdom' by buildingfixed fortifications, which would alsoserveasbases ut of whichto raid Cdstinoareas,whilesimultaneouslyeducing iberalstrongpoints n what he regarded as his own territory. It isremarkable hat asCarlos'sown forceswere disintegrating,hislieutenantshouldhavebeenconstructing orts more omidablethan the fieldvorks, barricades,and trenchesso popular withthe Army of the North,and apparentlyntendingo defy herestof Spain..He ouldnot reallyhavebetievedhat with his16,000oot,2,000horseand r08gunshe could esist ot onlythe Cristinoswho had been acing hirn for years,but also, afterAugust1839,Espartero's .my. The latter 34 battalionsnfour divisions,six battedesand 3,000cavalry werevictorious,confident, high-classroops.As nthe north, he inalcampaignin ragonwasone-sided.TheLiberaleslookCabrera'sfortsandeathismen n the ieldlin May S40Moreliafell ftera eeble efence. he astbattle fthewar.Berga, n4thJuly1840, asa rout,and wo dayslaterCabreraqas one ot rhou.ands t retugee.who crossedheborder nto France.Cabrerawould etum o SDain. ut that sanotherstory,ndanotherwar.

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Documents

A Savage and Romantic War, Spain 1833-1840, Part 1, The Course of the First Carlist War