20

Gr€atmat Frockcoat Shell JacketCARLIST IMANTRY

..4 SAVAGE AND ROMANTIC WAR"SPAIN 1833-1840

Part 3A: The CarltstArmyoftheNorth (Infantry)Text by Conrad Caims. Illustratiorn by RalphWeaver

INTRODUCTIONThe first, and at leastuntil late 1838the most inportant, of rheCarlist armies was thatfounded in 1833 byTomdsZumalacdlre-eui y de Imaz (1778-1835), who died ofwounds received at thefiIst siege of Bilbao. After his death the command changedseveral times, as much because of intrigue at the court of DonCarlos as for military reasons. As described in part I of thisseries, the base of the army was in the provinces of Navarra,Vizcaya (Biscay), Alava and Guiprizcoa, the first three knowncolleclively as the Basque provinces.

The army left its lair for the royal expedition of 1837 andorherIaids and expeditions, sometimes in collaboration with theAnny of the Centre, which was based in Aragon. It was notbrought low by any great battle; th€ end came, after a year oIrelatively little fighting in the north, ar rhe "Embrace ofVergara" in August 1839. The Carlist leader, Maroto, madepeace with Espartero, leader of the CdstinoArmy ofthe North;Carlos naturally called Maroto atraitor, but since thebulk ofhisown forces had had enough ofthe war ther€ was little he coulddo. The Army of the Centre was at the heighr of its powers, butthe Lrbefalsr could now tum theirundivided attention to it. andits defeat became inevitable.

Zumalacdrregui did not have to build his army from scratch.In the years before the war, what was to become the Carlistparty had considerable influence in the govemment, ard iiwastherefore very easy to organise the so-called Royalist Volun-teerc, a semi-private army of all three arns. In Navara they

were poorly equipped, but in the Basque provinces there weresaid to be 60,000 Volunteen in 1833. The figure is very likelyexaggerated, but it shows that some sort of organisation wasalready in place.

Zumalacdrregui imposed a rigid discipline, which featuredthe death penalty for offences such as opening fire withoutorden or shouting demoralising cries; for the lesser crimes ofdisobeying orden the punishment was still severe: a man thusconvicted was beaten over a drum by six men with canes forthree minutes, and a second offence could result in dismissal.But Zumalaciirregui was always careful ofhismanpower. as hehad to be. ln the last census before the war, that of 1797, thefour provinces had only 120,862 men aged 16 to 50, althoughthere may have been more by the 1830s. Of these 9,538 wereclergy. The army was, however, soon reinforced, notably byCastilians, who would march from theirhomeland, be recruitedby one ofthe roving expeditions, desert, or change sides whencaDturcd. Castilians came to form between one third and onehalf of the Army of the North, and, Iike the Basques andNavarrese. madeexcellentsoldiers, a fact not always mentionedby foreign writers (Henningsen,Im 67, 183). The heartland ofCarlism, however, remained the four northern provinces, notleast because the army was neverstrong enough in cavalry andartillery to perform well on the plains ofCastile. According to aCarlist sympathiser writing early in the war, the Navarese wereth€ most daring and could only fight asguerrilleros (this last, ifever true, soon ceased), whereasthe Basqueswere steadierandcould {orm line. column andsquare (Honan,203-4).

zl

Zumalacdrregui was anxious to avoid recruiting disreputablecharacters. and he tumed down the servic€s of the notoriouscurate of Allio, who subsequently became a Cristino guedl-lero. He made sure that he could not be accused of leading anarmy of brigands. None the less, atrocities did take place,although noton the scale ofthose in otherprovinces. Regularstaken prisoner might expect fairly humane treatment, espe€iallysince the Carlists hoped to recruit them, but national militiawere senttowork in the mines. and even Carlists admittedthatmassacres occured (Henningsen, I, 251-52). The Carlists tookparticular offence at {oreigners, and the "Decree ofDurango"allowed their execution. Althoughmen of the BritishAuxiliaryLegion were shot, the Carlists very wisely accorded ratherbettertreatment to the rcgular {orces of william IV, such as thebarlalion of Ro)al Marines $hich dssisted the I egron.

Quite another matterwere the foreigners whodeserted to theCarlists. A battalion of450 ex-Argelinos was almost wiped outby the real French Foreign L€gion at the terrible battle ofBarbastro on the royal expedition campaign. The Legion itselfwas so badly damaged by the Carlist bayonets that it played nofurther important part in the war. There were also deserersfrom the British Legion, but they were of such poor quality thatthe Carlists preferred to depo( them rather then employ them.

Foreign volunteer officers, mainly Frcnch, also served, butPrince Lichnowsky and Captain Henningsen, whose books areof su€h great value, were Prussian and Bdtish respectively.They were both lancer officers in the Army of the Nofih andappearto have believed in the cause ofCarlos. Apart from thepay, which was probablynotvery goodorvery forthcoming, theforeignen' chief reason for serving was no doubt their beliefthat by upholding the for€es of reaction in Spain they wereholding back the liberals throughout Europe.

The Arny of the North was (until the introduction ofconscription in 1837), in theory, raised by voluntary enlistment,but it came to include a very high proportion of the availablemanpowerof the fourprovinces, particularly because the majortowns of Sar Sebastidn, Bilbao, PamDlona and Vitodasuppo(ed the Cristinos. A volunteer army had advantages overone made up of conscript!. especially when aflairs were gorngwel l . but in the end rt was more vulnerable to the warwearinesswhich eventually caused Maroto's 'lreason". The Ca ists alsosuffered from homesickness, and considerable pressure wasbrought to bear on the royal expedition to return to its base inOctober 1837. In addition, Ca ist arcas were naturally placedunder strain by having a large proportion of their men awayfrom home. Because the army mainly fought in its own region,men lended lo ddft away in large numbers after a reverse orduring a period of inactivity and normally drifted back later.Sone, however, did not retum, and it was alleged that theywould be nade to do so by having theirrelatives beaten badly.At the beginning ofthe war, at least, wives followed their menon campargn.

Being based among its supporters, and d€pendent upon thehelp or at least acquiescence of the civilian population, theCarlist military naturally tried to devise a system of supplywhich would cause offence only when offence was intended.Such a system was in place by 1835. Underit, generals began bypaying for what they needed by bonor (paper money), whichwere made worthwhile by theirbeingredeemable only if Carloswon. Much more satisfactory, however, was the purchase ofcloth for uniforms from France or (through agents) ftomBilbao, or to have raiding parties bring it back from Castile. Th€army sent the cloth to towns and villages, which were each tomake a certain number of berets, trousels and coats; thosetowns and villages suspected ofliberal sentiments received thelargest amountofwork. The Carlists $ere ahvays eager to havetheir armywellfed, and they divided the Basque provinces intodistricts, appointing a commissary in each one. Every town and

S & A SCENICS

!E4_!E4S$4!EI!84!-9EEhr d cd rh ft drar l..d $i r ffi 6.ii b ryr o!'? Bc@ rlft rm,. fedi4i!!.dr..0t tribrFffi ^6 x4ue EtoMkh*id.Adtotrud

eitu'ard5d(c.ea.it.croi\6!drd*,6rc 6i,0:4stud1r*dkd

hn 0*d sd (,- edt: €r0{r i0 :lfu E r8rE,i,dd'dh,nd'd6t4d h46 rd l id d !d'n,'d n.dr r?s

hrsbdt trsiod3.4.cb 6agdEE,ed.drddlrdd&d.(

rhisb.drdlrr{GrdG.nl.cb 6Mdtrri1rc 6ltd.nidis,titnrrns

'hitureG'etur ch\ rc !p!d rrt. 12 iE s' ddnM d M t!

kr sre'i sd lDd sridi cdh 5 .sod h[ sFhc drddr!rk.6iHd

r$h du. si 0rd s.4: cldr r0.sqbd ie, 12 r*i 16 r Gs n d d itu, 6it . d i d l 0M j l * dsd f t

,5ansbd.rds.lc.EGrd)!cb,6addhb 3rc,d'ddrtu,6fr*d1

bn odu. s.lo,e oul.cr.s, r0 Md B e6 dddFbcdtu!i!tudhdo.d6sd'dliso{&it,rndn,$n05

hi srd'dsd0ldsdr chh 6.d!d lre,6 r.ri rc 6ndditud75d-

23ih D.ru. S.r lr!..n sd). cb. r0 :dd r'iG e tsh 6 r 0*!, 0it 0€d rn jdfu d 9

n u .d rr!. sE ld 2 x Fc) b .r ton |nlil. of od* d{. or 34in: !tb: tdd:ffi:Miq6adFdkh$i9',6

P rP: uKErPo t25r lhn! s addde dufis r:ic, s-ra c hn !d niimbrGonaBsl cuiorE:5r (nn f!00)

onER coumEr: 50( (m. rdm) Pb rro' t drr rd ddrry.

village was required to provide a ce(ain numberofrations eachweek; these numbers rose when troops were billeted in the area,but after they moved on the area was exempt fot a time. Adifferent system prevailed in NavaJrei famers $,ere comp€lledto hand in their crops, which were then ground, stored andeventuallv distributed.

The daily ration was supposed to be a pound of white bread, apound oI meat and a pint ofwine. Ifthe practice of the Cristinoarmy was followed, ofliceN would dine individually rather thanin a mess, and the men would divide into groups of about 12 witha large pot. Every man would have a wooden spoon and a lumpof bread. As he came to the pot he dipped in his spoon andretired, the process continuing untilthe pot was empty.

Like the Cristinos, the Carlists seem to have dwelt in billets orin the open. A British officer thought that Spain was an idealcountry for the transport of tents because there were so manyfirstrate mules, but apparently Spaoiards tended to do withoutsuch cover (Henderson, I,255-57). lt is also likely that theCarlists used runners and not horsemen to deliver messases.This practice was ob\erved by a British officer near Salarnaircain 1832, who stated that relays of men equipped with onlymuskets and cross-belts would run adoss country, travellingb€tween posts a league and a half or two leagues apart, and theywould convey despatches quicker than horsemen (Badcock,54). The fleetness of foot of Carlis. inJantry, their lightequipment and the rocky terrain of much of the northemprovinces would have added to the advantages of runners. lt isknown that Cabrem had a body of light infantry (zdaotes), whocould keep up with a dder over ter to twelv€ leagues, even whenthe lalter trotted for part of the way.

INFANTRYThe infantry was not formed into regiments but into indepen-dent battalions, which were said to be 600, 800 or, in the case ofunits from Guiprizcoa, 850 strong. The battalions, which of

course were frequently under strength, were organised much asin the Cristino army, with six companies of irrilelos, one ofsranaderos or canbinercs and orc ol cazadorcs or tiradorcs,;ith drums and bugles to relay orders. (In 1835 a capturedregimental band was recnrited, but after Zumalacirreguircalised that the band required a cart and two mules to carry itsinstruments he packed it off to royal headquarters, where itseems to have been plaing as late as July 1838.) Threebattalions formed a brigade and six to eight, depending on theprovince, a division. At least in battle, formations largerthanabrigade appear to have been of varying size. Battalions homdil ferenrprovincesfoughl iogetberon manyoccasion..

The rnajority of the troops were considered as line, eventhough Carlistsdidnot use the term, and there was also a groupof 6fite or special units. Apartftom the Gronadercs del Ejlr.ito.fomed in 1836 ftom voluntee^ previously in Femando \alll'sRoyal Guard, there were battalions of Navarrese and AlaveseGuides (Gl.&?r), independent companies of invalids on theborder with France, and customs guards (,4ducn?ros).

The Guias de Nava a, at fint said to be Navarese but laterlargely consisting of Castilians and Leonese deserters from theRoyal Guard, and the 3rd Navarese were reported ty oneCarlist to have been the best in the army;he also mentioned thatZumalacerregui\ favoured 6th Navarrese was not a particularlydistinguished unit (Henningsen, I, 128-29). Another renownedunit was the sth Guipfzcoa$,called Los Chapelzuis alre heitdistinctive white berets-

A popular Carlist song of the time records the raising of thefint four battalions of Navara in 1833. In it are mentioned Elpimero Ia ensalada (hodgepodge), El segundo la morena(brown, swarthy), El relcerc el reque6 and El cuatto Ia hiefiabt]€nd (good grass). The name of the third battalion is said tohave been a French hunting call used by panisans of Charles X,who fled to Spain to support the Absolutists after the 1830revolurion. In the last Carlist war. that of 1936-39, the word wasapplied genenlly to Carlist militia.

At the time of the death of Zumalacrrregui the army hadglown to about 30,000 men. The infantry was organised in 35battalions - 12 line and one of guides from Navarra, five line andone of guides from Alava, five line from Guipfzcoa, seven fromVizcaya and foul ftom Castile (Barado, 226; Albi and Stampa,222. Henningsen,l, ix, gives slightly different figures). By 1837there were 2|4 battalions. The Navarese were down to 1l line,but the Guipfzcoans and Vizcayans had eight each. There wereaho two each of Aragonese and Valencians (formed fromrecruits collected by G6mez on his mid), the foreign battalion,the Gnnaderos del Ei'rcilo, and last the Madrid Volunteers, aunit of poor quality (Lichnowsky, I, 68; Pirala, IV, 29-31 , gives46battalions in February 1837). At a laterdate Navarra had 14battalions, Vizcaya nine and Alava seven, apparently the mostwhich were raised in theseprovinces. By mid 1838 the army haddeclined to 26,000 (Bacon, 108; Albi and StamPa, 277). Onework (Apalategui, 90) claims that there were 24 Castilianbattalions in the summerof 1837. This figure seens unlikely tohave been dttained, although no doubt some short-lived unitswere raired in the wake ol lhe royalexPedi l ion

It must not be forgotten that Zumalac6rregui'sgreatplanwasnot to make bis army a replica of the regular forces (althoughthese soon became much more competent at light warfare thanmosi othe$ in Europe) nor to leave it as a guerrilla band. Hewanted to combine the best of both worlds and build a regularlydisciplined, organised and supplied army which would retain itspower to move freely and rapidly over a types of terain. lf thearmy did not venture onto the open plains very frequently, thisfailurewas not the resultofits inability to meet the Cristinos inopenbaitle, but mther because of difficulties of supply in oftenhostile lands, homesickness, and the lack of a strong cavalry.The Carlists were, nevertheless, at a $eat advantage over the

British regulars and Auxiliary l-egion and at a lesthe rcgular Cdstinos in that they couldmove at amazing sPeedover rocky and mountainouslandscape, and they never lost thisadvantage.

As stated in the previous adcle, in the early days the mainaim of Zumahcaregui was to build up the spidt ofhis soldiels,and he therefore fought his battles in chosen and favourableterrain in order not to expose his forces to more than a minimumof risk. If threatened by an outflanldng manoeuwe hewithdrew. Zumalacdrregoi also had a trick of stadng a fight latein the day in order to prevent outflanking movements and toallow his men to slip away more easily if need be. Normally hewould at first commit only a nino;ty of his force, holding therest in resefle in open order. The lack of ammunition wasalways a problem for the Ca ists. Zumahceregui ordered histroops not to load until they were actually in battle, and sincethey might have only ten, or even four, rounds a man for a fight,they were rigorously trained in self control. The infantryfrequently opened fire at very short range, and itwas taught torely on the bayonet.

Not surprisingly, the earlyCarlists were reluctant to stand thefire of a formed line, but Zumalacdnegui trained them untilthey were as steady as any other infantry. They often launchedbayonet charges, although they probably frequently failed tomake contact. As anyone who has studied earlier wars in thisarea will know, when a bayoiet attack look place in the open,oneofthesides almost always broke before the clash ofsteel. Bethat as it may, the Cristinos lost very heavily on the plains ofSalvatierra (also known as Alegria) near Vitoria on 27 and 28October 1834 when their lines were broken by a Navaresebayonet assault, and as a result they took to moving in largecolumns, which the Carlists de€lined io charge.

Even it did not hit ihe enemy, a mass assault by the Carlhtswas still a fearsome event. It was especially fiightening if itsparticipants shouted, as did the Basques at night. One witnessdescribed the latter as starting like a hone, changing "to a wolfsho$,I, and finally (ending) with the shake like the expiring notesof a jackass's bray" (Bacon, 380; Bolleart, II, 290). Anotherperson oD the receiving end of a Carlist attack, at Oriamendi (16March 1837) described vividly how, after along, wailing soundof bugles, "a mighty cloud of ski.mishers, fo owed by a densecolumn of Navarrese infantry" rushed down from a mountainand in 20 minutes were overrunning enemy lines and swarmingover hils in their thousands in skinnishing order. The authorrecently visited the site of this charge and can state that he wouldnot have been able to cover the ground in that time today, evenwithout being shot at (HenningseD, ll, 19-20). The Carlistforces involved were, however, probably two Alavese, threeGuiprizcoan, and two Aragonese battalions).

In order to guard against such attacks, both sides made greatuse of field fortifications, entrenchments and fortified houses. Itis not diffi€uft 1o convert a Basque farmhouse into a smallstronghold by digging ditches around it and loopholing thewalls. Much bitterfightingtook place arcund such strongpoints,which rhe Carlisls proved able ro caprure on many occasions.Where they failed was in attacks on majortowns. Notonly wastheir artillery often insufficient, but it also appearc that theinfantry may not have been ove y keen to form the closecolumns needed to assault a breach, An Englishman who livedthrcugh bothsieges ofBilbaobelievedthat an English or Frenchgeneral would have attacked and accepted the 1,000 or socasualties which would have occuned, but that the Carlists wereunable to do so (Bacon.338).

Like the Cristinos, the Carlists were exceptionally frugal andhad great powers of patience and endurance. They were alsomost careful not to lose any weapon in battle, for muskets w€rehard to come by. One of their advantages in this respect wastheir superior mobility, which allowed them to keep hold of

23

th€ir weapons iJ they had to flee, something not always possiblefor the regularforces.

The Carlistscommonly plundered everything usable from t}leenemydead except stocks and shakos, even looting under heavyfire. It also was their habit to try to prevent the enemy fromtaking the bodies of their own dead. If they were defending aposition they dug a trench, and just before the Cristinos wereupon them stripped the bodies of anything of value and buriedthem, Peasants with wooden stretchers sometimes carriedCarlist wounded ftom the field.

The Carlists may have formed battalions rathet thanregiments because they preferred the flexibility of the smallerunits, although in fact the company and battalion were thenormal tactical formations on both sides. Zumalac6rregui alsoensured that his units had an unusually high propotion ofNCOS in order to allow them to be divided into small groupswithout loss of control. Apart from these changes, however, thesoldien were apparently drilled in the common tactics of theperiod, no doubt at times with the aid of the 1791 Frenchregulations which were still standard for the government army.Carlist battalions could and did form square against cavalry,reserving their fire until the last moment.

According to the r€port of an observer with the Crislinoforces written at the end of 1834. the Carlists moved forwardand retreated in Derfect order. whetherinclose column or line.The observer added that the Carlists were better skimhhersthan the Cristino light infantry and that their officeN werecovered in scars from the war of lndependence (Duncan,14).

Itis clearthatthe Carlists, like the Frenchrevolutionaries andthe Cistinos, would use entire battalions as skirmishers. Acommon tactic was to have a battalion en grefr,Tla, supported bytwo or morc in close order. Zumalacdneguiemployed thistacticat Salvatiera./Alegria, where a skirmishing battalion wasbacked by two others er, bdral/d and a fourth in reserve; cavalryguarded the flanks. At the Carlist victory o{ Villar de losNavarros (24 August 1837) the right wing had a Navaresebattalion in skirmishing order, and behind it other Navareselunits, the Granaderos del Eillciro and two Aragonese batta'lions. The centre was composed of the artillery (four guns) andthe left consisted of four Alavese battalions in the first line andCastilians in the second. The cavalry appears to have beenlurkingin ambush, and itdebouched to greateffect.

Notwithstanding the Carlists' lack of ammunition andfondness for the bayonet, they would sometimes deliverpropery volley fire. At Segura (2-3 January 1835), Zumalacer-regui, in order to halt a Cristino offensive, decidedthat his armywould for once have to suffer h€aly losses. When attackingtheenemy columns on the march, the Carlists delivered a rollingfire and then a fire by platoons, and Henningsen found itsregularity and order surprising for what he still (probablyunfairly) rhought.o be half-disciplined troops (Il,45-6,60). Ata tat€r peiod in the battle th€ 1st Navarese and Gulas deNdrdlrd "opened left and right" to allow the general's squadronof escorting cavalry to charge through at the gallop, a veryconsiderabls feat of drill. This manoeuvre does not. however.seem to have donethe horsemen much good, since the Ptncrperegiment, drawn up three deep, halted themwith itsfire.

UMFORMS, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENTAlthough no dress regulations survive, the Carlists did try touniform their forces, and a vaguely consistent appearance isshown in most €ontemporary paintings and prints. The systemof manufacturing uniforms has already been described; inaddition , unifoms were purchased from France. Even so, therewas seldom enough clothing to go around, and Carlists worewhat they stripped from friend and foe, even the red coats of theBritish Auxil'ary Legion, which they wore underneath their

great€oats,The one univeNal feature of Carlist uniforms was the Basque

and Navarese beret, called the boina in Castilian and the,.rapela in Basque. The beret was large, 157a'or d)cm across(larger in sorne cases), and it made the Carlists impossible tomistake (exc€pt that the Cristino crap?lSorrir also wore it seepart 2). Moreover, because of its size and the fact that it wasmadeftomthick, waterproof €loth, itcouldserve as an umbrellaor sunshade asconditions demanded. Most berets had a centralcloth roundel, in a contrasting colour to that ofthe rnain body,and a tassel. Internal hoops were €ommon in ordettomaintainthe shaDe. and some berets had metal "secrets", whichprotected the head from sword strokes. Except for the greenboindr wom by Portuguese volunteers, berets were red, blue orwhite. The original system of colour was apparently for inJantryto wear blue berets and regimental oficers red, but Cristinosha+shooters appear to have been the only ones to haveapproved of this scheme, and genenlly all ranks in a unit woreb€rets of the same colour. Officers, especially senior ones,tended to have gold or silver tassels.It has been suggested thattassels were red for 8rdndderos, yellow for cazadofer and whitefori6/e/or, but the only units where such a system definitelyprevailed were the Tortosa battalions of Cabrera's army, andhere the coloun were different. The flank companies of at leastone battalion were drcssed better than their comrades in thecentre companies, and were composed of older soldiers.Infantry pioneen appear to have worn red bercts at least until1837, and they also ltore full beards and could have the a\es andequipment of their equivalents in th€ Cristino forces. TheCarlists,like some Cristinos, sported beards and moustaches inplenty, and theywere also noted for their long hair.

The coat was normally a double-breasted frock which fell tojust above the knees, but single-breasted shell jackets anddouble-breasted greatcoats (the latter sometimes hooked backlike those of the Cristinos) were alsowom. All three had open,standing collars. The offi€ial dress of the line was a grey lrock

IEIDALEIBOTEBAIGE

teoe eb sPtuE tr $Pl

ttudiNqRlk' I

leio c$s lror I

I:@ Nde s'a I.r.t I

l:ei6 h€aHdn. 4,c I

MACIC TIIE GATI'ERING

F&Ellig

Hercss Miniarurss

s30 2sY

lus. ad---------__llFrtbbs M.dt, mdrhE I1908 Norrh Y stur I

lr"dr,,*|1 r"-r 5or2s

I

$rtuq!ttu,+od.ocrGci4!@!!(&Gsoot

.r@etu@!to6@!.d!a*|l&(Bd6lLleoq

P@fuiB}d<.dldjdq!uK.qhtfu@odc.bd

*"ut, tt " "opa", ,"hi.t ,ras cut down frcm a Crisuno grealcoalIt was to have had collar patches of several colours rvhichdenoted the provinces, but onlythe red ofGuipfzcoa is known.Brown coats and iackets were also worn, and blue ones, madeftom captured garments, must also have been common.Trousen were supposed to have been red in winter andwhite insummer, and were sometimes rolled up for ease in marching.Buttons appear to have been brass. The blue of th€ beret wasfairly bright, with probably a yellow roundel and a white tasselin its centre. The G iar de,4/dva had a red beret and the 5thGuipdzcoans were known as Los Chapelzuri: (white-caps).witnesses described one battalion as rolling its greatcoats andwearing them across their bodies, and another in greygreatcoats and blue berets, except for the officers and NCOS,who wore all coloun. An officer of the British Auxiliary L€gionv/ith a great deal of experience, which ended with the sight ofthe army drawn up at vergara, said that the Carlist foot wore ashort,loose blue tunic. redtrcusers, and a beret ofred, white orblue if they were from Navarra, Vizcaya or Guipdzcoarespectively. A drummer-boy was seen in a rcd jacket and whitetrousers, and one obsefler commented that other drummerswere badly clad in various colou$. He described adrum majoras "the least impressive personage of that rank I had hithenoseen" (Honan, 68, 98i Henderson, I,334,II, 165;Henningsen,t,14142).

Some of the special units wore distinctive uniforms. Thee\le(Eghtilg Guias de Nava./a, which at one stage rose to I ,000men, dressed first in grey coatees with y€llow tails, collan, andsouare-ended chest bars: $ousers were red. As this costumewore out, the men equipped themselves from the dead; laterthey wore blue jackets with red "binding" and grey trousers.

'ft,e Gmnadercs del Ejarciro wore dark blue capotes or shelljackets, with white rard,nerar on the cuffs and bars on the collar.Buttons were white, trousers red, berets blue with a yellowroundel and white tassel. The Madrid Volunteers. who were toguard the Cantabrian coast, had blue caporer with brassbuttons, grey trousers and red berets. There was also a smallbodyguard known as rhe Alaba lercs de k Gua ia de kPersona del ReJ and later ^s the Gua ias de Honor. Yo,rngmen sened in the company, which was a sort of militaryacademy, andleftwith therank oflieutenant. The first uniformwas a sky blue fro€k coat with red cuff flaps, rdl.lir?errr, collarbars, and poinlended chest bars. The coat later became grey(dark blue for officers) with black cuffs and collar patches andwhite rardrnerdr. Trcusers were red, later grey. Buttons werewhite, beretsblue with ayellow roundel and white tassel.

The deserters from the Portuguese Legion began in their oldunifom (see part 2 ofthis series) with green bercts; they latertook up the grey coat and red trousers of the line infantry. TheOsna Battalion may have worn a "Napoleonic" type ofuniform, with a tailed coat cut like the French iart, withcut-away red lapeh which revealed a *hite waistcoat, red collarand cuffs, yellorv epaulettes and bnss buttons. Trous€N werered with a blue stripe, the beret white wth ayellow roundel andgrey tassel. Not all the customs guards worc uniform, but thosethat did had a short brown jacket, of typical Spanish style butnot much wom in the Army of the North. The jacket had fourrows of silver buttons down the front and five buttons on thecuffs. lt was wom open in order to display a multi-buttonedbrown waistcoat and a red sash. Trousers were brown i the beretwasbluewith a yellow roundel and white tassel.

The unifom of officers was by and large the same as that oftheir men. Some officen, especially generals, wore epaulettesand red sashes, and it has been speculated that regimentalofficers showed their rank by one or two rings of meta ic braidaround th€ cuffs, either straight (lieutenant-colonels, captainsand second lieutenants) or pointed (majors and lieutenants).

Sergeants rnay have worn gold chevrcns on the lower arm, theirpoints facing up, with one for a second sergeant and two for afirst sergeant; corporals may have had the same system, but inred and on the upperarm. One additional and popular item wasthe zanafta, a plain black tur (sometines wolf fur) pelisse withabout three toggles on the chest, a simplified version of thewel-known hussar jacket.

Generals wore what they pleased, but their uniJorm usuallyincluded a blue coat and a red or white beret. Trappings of ranksuch as embroidered saddle-cloths and holsters. orders. andeven jackboots and aiguillettes could b€ seen on generals andstaff officers, although it is doubtful they were used in the field.At Vergara the Carlist leaders were dressed much more soberlythan Espartero a;rd his train.

Ofle of Zumalacdrregui's officers wrote that the general, whowas knolvn familiarly as €l rio ?onds (Uncle Thomas), alwaysrode a white horse. He added that Zumalacirregui alwaysdressed the same way (although this statement is conradictedby several pictures): a red beret with a silver tassel, blackzarnalra lined with white fur and with red velvet edging and giltclasps, grey trousers and large Spanish spurs (Henningsen, l,90).

It appears that the canrir€rff (vivandiares in French), whoac€omoanied battalions into battle. drcssed much like the men.This conclusion can be drawn by the fact that the ofJicer of theBitish Auxiliary Legion who rescued the wounded c4l.tin€ra ofthe 5th Guiprizcoa Battalion and who later married her at firstrnistook the young, cigar-smoking Frenchwoman for a man.She was wearing a white beret, white cashmere vest, embroidered waistcoat, overcoat, a red sashwith gold ends, similar tothat wom by "many Carlist officers," and a large amount ofjervellery (Henderson, I, 337-44, forher story).

The Carlists sometimes wore boots or shoes, especially inwinter, but their normal footwear was the rope-soled sandal(d/pdgara), which was also rnuch used by the queen's troopsand indeed by Spaniards genemlly for a long time b€fore andafter the war. The sandal was ideal for rushing over mountainsbutnotsogood in thewet, and itwasthen at times replaced bythe abdlca, a leather brogue. Some soldien were not used toand did not take to any "closed" shoe since sandals were naturalto them. Even though sandals were more easily made thanshoes, the lack of any footwear was frequently a problen.

No doubt captured crcss-belts, packs and cartridge boxesweresometimes used, butthe standard infantry equipment *asmuch lighter and consisted of only two items. First was thesa.r-rro'al, also taken up by the Cdstinos, a light, white canvaspack held in place by straps und€r the arms. In it the soldier hada shirt, sparc alparyata: , and food for day. Few pictures showCarlists with canteens; no doubt they also kept their waterbottlesin their packs. Around the waist, sometimesworn over aredsash, wasablack belt which held a canana or belly box. Thebox had 20 tin tubes, each for a cartridge, and two pockets, eachcontaining two packeas of canridges, the whole covered by ablack leather flap. There were many advantages to this system.It was more comfortable to wear than a traditional box. whichbounced on th€ right hip (although the Cristino practice ofwearing a waistbelt reduced the movement o{ the latter); it leftthe upper haff of the body ftee (although if leather "braces"

were added to the box this was less true); it was more difficultfor the soldier to lose rounds in his confusion; it allowed fornore rapid fire. Belly boxes had been wom by British andAmerican light troops in the American War oflndependence,but it wasclaimed thatthe British and French objectedto theiruse by soldie^ formed in line because they were more likely tobe ignited by the fire of the man in front (HenniDgsen, I, 10G7;Lichnowsky, I, 70). The French Foreign l-egion, however,adopted the beuy box in Spain and used it for years after the

25

NORTHEAST MILITAIRE 95Saturday 4th March 1995at the REDCAR BOWL10.00a.m. to 4.00p.m.

[INIATUNES WARGAUING

BOABDGAI'ING

FANTASY BOLE

PLAYII{G GAUES

rFAOE STANOS

REfREStII'ENIS

BRING & BUY STANDPARNC|PATION AND DEI'ONSIRA'ION GAIES

The 1{orlheast's own Wargames Gonrenti0nAdults t1.50 O.A.P'3 e1.00 Chlldren 50D

YORK WARCAMES soCrETy

SATURDAY4TN FEBRUAXY 1995Admhsim f L50 Adulr 50plunior

& PARTICIPATIONGAMES

. {LOCAL & NATIONAI)

COMPETITION GAMES{lnvitation,lnterClub knock.our)

RE.ENACTMENT SOCIETIESTRADE STANDS

BRING & BUY STALL

The bayonet was normally wom on the right of the canaM in ablack leather frog, with the socket angled to the front. Whenscabbards were not to hand, soldiers at times made holes in theirbelts and stuck the bayonets through them. Officers' sword beltswere of the nomal sort, of black, or occasionally white, leather,with two slings. They could be wom undemealh the frock coat.

Officers caried any swords they could obtain; th€ menlikewise used a variety of types of muskets. Zumalacdneguiestablished musket factories at Eulate and Segrara, and rheCarlists also held the old factory at Eybar for the fiIst 18 monthsof the war. The mw materials and cnftsmen were available,although at limes the necessary machinery was not. French,German and British models were common. The Soaniards likedlheir banels ro shine. but rbe Brilish praclice ofduUjng banelswould have been an advantage in mountain warfare, where theglint of polished steel *ould give away a position.

The Cadists seem to have had a few rifles. A sniDer hit aCdstino marine officer at the rao8e of 300 or 400 yards aftermany attempts, but this feat could have been perfomed with a(very) lucky shot with a nusket (Far, 120). The Alradelos had"English carbines" with long sword-bayonets (Bueno [198,4],16). Like the weapons of the Cristino light regiment Re,'laGobenadoru, the!tr, mlust have been Baker.ifles. Some Carlistrnuskets were described as "about 3 or 4 inches longer (thatr aBdtish musket), nuch nanower in the muzzle, and very light;they carry a ball to a geat distance, doing ex€cution for beyonda mile." Skimishers sometimes loaded with two bulets("Voluntee/', 21-22).

Where can I Jind 2000 Military Books?ln the

KEN TROTMAN Catalogue

UNIT 11, 135 DITTON WALK CAMBRIDGE,cBs 80D

Ken Trotman Ltd

Fine and Rare Bookson Military Hismry

and Weaponry

of course!

tor attee catabgue novlMail order is our speciality.

KEN TROTMAN LTD.