6
32 ..A SAVAGE AIVD ROMANTIC WAR" sPArN 1833-1840 Part38: TheCarttst Army of theNorth (Cava1ry, Artl[etT, etc) Text by Conrad. Caim;.Illustrati.rtrc byRalphWeaver CARLISTCAVALRY The Carlists could matchandsometimes surpass the Cristinos in infantry,but not in any other arm- Their cavalry had to be started ftom scratch, and it never reached the state of the queen's honemen; the latter, after a weakstart,became very good indeed. This failing was due more to a lack of quaDtity rather than of quality, andthe missing numbers canin largepan beadributed to thefacrsthat mostoflhenorthem provincesare bad country for c-avalry and that their inhabitantsdo not have much of a tradition of mounted warfare. Zumalacarresui was nalurally keen lo concentrale on raising rheonlyarm e;senrial for mountain warfare, although he was well awarc of the advantages of having a few good squadrons. In the beginning the solemethodof obtainingmountswas to stealthemfrom the Libemles, ^nd the supply of horsefleshwas always a severe problem for a region of Spain which was not rich in horces. Sabres werealsoscarce - even the Cristinoshadbut a few at the beginning of the war - and this lack resulted in the Carlists adopting the lancebecause it was easy to make. By August 1834, ten months into the war, the Carlists had only200 men in three weak squadrons. At thetimeofthe death of ZlmalacSrreguithere werefour Navarrese andoneVizcayan squadrons; by early 1837 therc were 1,500 men in ten squadrons. Part of this lastforce mayhave been the "regiments" of Castiliancavalry, which existed for a time on paper, and the l2Gman Alavesesquadron.The arm seems to havebeenat its strongestin the summer of 1837. The royal expedition took almost all the effectives, in nine Navarese squadrons - no doubt the Basques and Castilians were included - two Aragonese squadrons, the Escu.a&6n dela Legitimidad andrhe moul]tred Guo iasde Horor. Some of the cavalry weresaidto be exc€llentsoldiers,but they were poo y mounted (Albi add Stampa, 246,256n) - The cavalry seems neverto have recovered ftom the hard campaigning of that summer; by rnid 1838, althoDghthe army had 26,0m men, only the following were mounted: 426 in four Navanese sqDadrons, 137 in the Alavese squadron (now known as rhe Htuarcs deA abAn)and 419i[a Guiprizcoan squadron. There was also a 62-man general's escort and a dismounted sq\\ dron (Escua&on de Desmonta- dor) with 136 officers, 246soldiers and two horses. It appears that uoits hadshort lives or w€re verysmall. One authority claims that the Carlists lost r,500 cavalry and 23 battalions during theii great expeditions, and some of these Iosses must have occurred in units such as the 2nd and 3rd Provisional Squadrons, with 180men, G6mez'smounted arm when he left on his epic joufiey h J]uIte 7836.'fte Gut ias de Honor 1nefe only 25 strong, and the Escua&6n de la Legitimi.lad may alsoha\e been small. The latter was formed hom Spanish andforeign officers(Carlos' armyhad a surplus of the latter) andmayhave beenthe same unit as the Escuddrdn de Iefesy Oficiabs, saidto havebeenrccruited ftom olficers and former bodyguards of Femando\all In addilion, the Carlistsmay havehad aid fiom the mounted forces of the Castilian priest J6ronimo Merino, but they probably did not depend on it. This old rascal had helped liberate his country 20years beforc, but although he was one of the fiIst to declarefor Ca.los he wasmotivated asmuch bv the goalsof the bandit as those of the soldier. His forcesnormally numbered 300or 400horse. The quality of the Carlist squadrons varied, andindeed the evidence about the prowess is cootladictory. lt is, however, fair to say that in the mainthey did very well, taking into ac.ount the difficulties they hadto faceandthe excellence of the queen\ riders. Their first fight, at Viana, wasa triumph. Atthough they at fint refused to charge, Zumalacdrregui's 200lancenthen met and broke the i ustrious Cazadorcs de la Guodia Real,lar$ely because the latter werefoolish enoughto rcceive the cha4e of the lancers when halted. The lancerswent on to overwhelma battalion of the Cart?Id Regimentand take its Colour. The Carlistswon partly because of bad leadership among the Cristinos;Henningsen believed that the Carlists werevictorious because of the terror they inspired rather than because of their abilities. He added that the Carlist cavahy only became truly professional after it had been refomed and retrained by one O'Donnell (Henningsen, I, 218). Given the nature of the ground and the war and the small numbers of the Carlist cavalry, it played a subodinate role in mostbatdes. and sometimes evenin its traditional duties of scouting andoutpostwork. Even whenthe cavalry did fight, the results could bedisappointing. Chiva (15 July 1837), oneofthe many battles of the royal expedition, was unusualbecause the Carlists had more cavalry than their enemy,13squadrons (four Navarese, four Castilian,one Alavese, two Aragonese andtwo ftom Cabrera's a.my) against four squadronsfrom the line reginents R€) arldR?!ra, threefrom the 3rd Light Cavalry,and a few lancen ald cazadoler fiom the cuard. The Cdstinos nevertheless gained the victory, in part be€ause of a sho(age of ammunition amongthe Carlist infantry - a Castilian battalion was reducedto throwing stones,and units of the AImy of the Centre shared their canridges with men of the Army of the North - but also because of cooperationbetweenthe Cristino Horse and Foot, whichwaslacking on the Carlist side. It is not surpising that the Carlist Horse would be panicked by Congeve rcckets, as indeed would any mounted troops which had not fac€d them. More difficult to excuse, if indeed they took plac€,\rere several defeats at the hands ofthe lancers of the British Auxiliary Legion. The mostdetailed desoiptions of these minor actions comeftom Henderson,an offrcer in the Legion. At the time oI the war hewasa bumptiousyoungman, terribly "sporting" and "horsy" in a uniquelyEnglishsense, and he provided the curiousspeclacle of a Briton trying to lecture others on the affain of cavalry! Yet he was not unintelligent, less prejudiced against Spaniards than many of his period and generallyfair towards ordinary Carlists. The most interesting skirnish he de$ribed occured on 4 December 1838 at Carascal, when the Carlistsattackeda convoy escorted by two full reginents (the 2ndLighr Cavalryandthe BorDdn "lancers", the latter in fact a line unit) and the rcmains of the Irgioo cavalry.The Carlists,Henderson wrote, hadfor several months been collecting horses in France and stmining their nervesto collect a goodfield force of cavalry, and thus had 12squadrons with which to attack the enemy.Their skirmishers wer€ ahead of the mainbody of lancen, andthe Cristino regiments drcw up to fac€the Carlists.But the Cdstinos then fled, leavingthe 180 British to lure the Carlistswith a feisned withdrawal and then

32 ..A SAVAGE AIVD ROMANTIC WAR sPArN 1833-1840 · beginning of the war - and this lack resulted in the Carlists adopting the lance because it was easy to make. ... squadrons; by

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32

..A SAVAGE AIVD ROMANTIC WAR"sPArN 1833-1840

Part 38: The Carttst Army of the North (Cava1ry, Artl[etT, etc)Text by Conrad. Caim;. Illustrati.rtrc by RalphWeaver

CARLIST CAVALRYThe Carlists could match and sometimes surpass the Cristinos ininfantry, but not in any other arm- Their cavalry had to bestarted ftom scratch, and it never reached the state of thequeen's honemen; the latter, after a weak start, became verygood indeed. This failing was due more to a lack of quaDtityrather than of quality, and the missing numbers can in large panbeadributed to the facrsthat mostoflhe northem provincesarebad country for c-avalry and that their inhabitants do not havemuch of a tradition of mounted warfare. Zumalacarresui wasnalurally keen lo concentrale on raising rhe only arm e;senrialfor mountain warfare, although he was well awarc of theadvantages of having a few good squadrons. In the beginningthe sole method of obtaining mounts was to steal them from theLibemles, ̂ nd the supply of horseflesh was always a severeproblem for a region of Spain which was not rich in horces.Sabres were also scarce - even the Cristinos had but a few at thebeginning of the war - and this lack resulted in the Carlistsadopting the lance because it was easy to make.

By August 1834, ten months into the war, the Carlists hadonly 200 men in three weak squadrons. At the time ofthe deathof ZlmalacSrregui there were four Navarrese and one Vizcayansquadrons; by early 1837 therc were 1,500 men in tensquadrons. Part of this last force may have been the "regiments"

of Castilian cavalry, which existed for a time on paper, and thel2Gman Alavese squadron. The arm seems to have been at itsstrongest in the summer of 1837. The royal expedition tookalmost all the effectives, in nine Navarese squadrons - nodoubt the Basques and Castilians were included - twoAragonese squadrons, the Escu.a&6n de la Legitimidad and rhemoul]tred Guo ias de Horor. Some of the cavalry were said tobe exc€llent soldiers, but they were poo y mounted (Albi addStampa, 246, 256n) - The cavalry seems never to have recoveredftom the hard campaigning of that summer; by rnid 1838,althoDgh the army had 26,0m men, only the following weremounted: 426 in four Navanese sqDadrons, 137 in the Alavesesquadron (now known as rhe Htuarcs de A abAn) and 419 i[aGuiprizcoan squadron. There was also a 62-man general'sescort and a dismounted sq\\ dron (Escua&on de Desmonta-dor) with 136 officers, 246 soldiers and two horses.

It appears that uoits had short lives or w€re very small. Oneauthority claims that the Carlists lost r,500 cavalry and 23battalions during theii great expeditions, and some of theseIosses must have occurred in units such as the 2nd and 3rdProvisional Squadrons, with 180 men, G6mez's mounted armwhen he left on his epic joufiey h J]uIte 7836.'fte Gut ias deHonor 1nefe only 25 strong, and the Escua&6n de laLegitimi.lad may also ha\e been small. The latter was formedhom Spanish and foreign officers (Carlos' army had a surplus ofthe latter) and may have been the same unit as the Escuddrdn deIefes y Oficiabs, said to have been rccruited ftom olficers andformer bodyguards of Femando \all

In addilion, the Carlists may have had aid fiom the mountedforces of the Castilian priest J6ronimo Merino, but theyprobably did not depend on it. This old rascal had helpedliberate his country 20 years beforc, but although he was one ofthe fiIst to declare for Ca.los he was motivated as much bv the

goals of the bandit as those of the soldier. His forces normallynumbered 300 or 400 horse.

The quality of the Carlist squadrons varied, and indeed theevidence about the prowess is cootladictory. lt is, however,fair to say that in the main they did very well, taking into ac.ountthe difficulties they had to face and the excellence of the queen\riders. Their first fight, at Viana, was a triumph. Atthough theyat fint refused to charge, Zumalacdrregui's 200lancen then metand broke the i ustrious Cazadorcs de la Guodia Real,lar$elybecause the latter were foolish enough to rcceive the cha4e ofthe lancers when halted. The lancers went on to overwhelm abattalion of the Cart?Id Regiment and take its Colour.

The Carlists won partly because of bad leadership among theCristinos; Henningsen believed that the Carlists were victoriousbecause of the terror they inspired rather than because of theirabilities. He added that the Carlist cavahy only became trulyprofessional after it had been refomed and retrained by oneO'Donnell (Henningsen, I, 218).

Given the nature of the ground and the war and the smallnumbers of the Carlist cavalry, it played a subodinate role inmost batdes. and sometimes even in its traditional duties ofscouting and outpost work. Even when the cavalry did fight, theresults could be disappointing. Chiva (15 July 1837), one ofthemany battles of the royal expedition, was unusual because theCarlists had more cavalry than their enemy, 13 squadrons (fourNavarese, four Castilian, one Alavese, two Aragonese and twoftom Cabrera's a.my) against four squadrons from the linereginents R€) arld R?!ra, three from the 3rd Light Cavalry, anda few lancen ald cazadoler fiom the cuard. The Cdstinosnevertheless gained the victory, in part be€ause of a sho(age ofammunition among the Carlist infantry - a Castilian battalionwas reduced to throwing stones, and units of the AImy of theCentre shared their canridges with men of the Army of theNorth - but also because of cooperation between the CristinoHorse and Foot, which was lacking on the Carlist side.

It is not surpising that the Carlist Horse would be panickedby Congeve rcckets, as indeed would any mounted troopswhich had not fac€d them. More difficult to excuse, if indeedthey took plac€, \rere several defeats at the hands ofthe lancersof the British Auxiliary Legion. The most detailed desoiptionsof these minor actions come ftom Henderson, an offrcer in theLegion. At the time oI the war he was a bumptious young man,terribly "sporting" and "horsy" in a uniquely English sense, andhe provided the curious speclacle of a Briton trying to lectureothers on the affain of cavalry! Yet he was not unintelligent,less prejudiced against Spaniards than many of his period andgenerally fair towards ordinary Carlists. The most interestingskirnish he de$ribed occured on 4 December 1838 atCarascal, when the Carlists attacked a convoy escorted by twofull reginents (the 2nd Lighr Cavalry and the BorDdn "lancers",

the latter in fact a line unit) and the rcmains of the Irgioocavalry. The Carlists, Henderson wrote, had for several monthsbeen collecting horses in France and stmining their nerves tocollect a good field force of cavalry, and thus had 12 squadronswith which to attack the enemy. Their skirmishers wer€ aheadof the main body of lancen, and the Cristino regiments drcw upto fac€ the Carlists. But the Cdstinos then fled, leaving the 180British to lure the Carlists with a feisned withdrawal and then

l3tum and desrroy all but two of the enemy squadrons. TheIegjonarier. who bore their foe! a grudge fir a previousmassa.re. drd nol rake prisoners. Thar was rhe end ofthe miehrvCarhst mounted force. Hender.on added rhat the Cartisrs;er;brave and dashing, but what little dill they hadwasofrhewrongson. He slaled rhal a lancer had ro have a masrerv of hir mounr.a srong seat. a "good hand . a shon slirrup and a horse whichwas well broken, and the Carlists were deficient in evervqual i ty. He bel ieved rhar the tance war probabty the leasi\uirable weapon for such men ( Henderson. i. 285-86. . Ib- 17,104-18_ r46)

_ The Carlists nay in truth have been at a disaqvanrage agansrBrirish cavalr'. if onty because ot rhe \uperior si,,e o;t E;gtishand lr ish horses. In several 6ghrs. hosever. lhe) sho\redlhatlhey could achieve impressive fears. Towards rhe end ofHerrera (26 August 1837), the battle after Chiva (in which theCristinos were admittedly outnumbered), all that remained onthe field of the queen's host were a couple of battalions and aweak squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry. The Ca ist Horsefomed in two columns in order to attack the 5th. which bv aheroic charge slopped lhe pretender s rroops tor a rime bef;rererinng "decimated . The Carlist cavatry rhen charged rhe rwoDartalrons In square, se!en t imes ir i \ \a id. The tancers 6na vbroke lhe enemy infanlry after the later had been softened upby pistol and carbinefire.

Although the Carlist lancers'defeat of Cristino horse. whichincluded the Grcnaderos a Crrdllo, ar the gates of Madrid wasachieved by Cabrera's men against an outnumbered enemy, thefeal did show lhar rhe Carlisls could break even the he;viestcavalry- One of the fi$t units to intercept c6mez on his longmarch was a brigade of cuards (100 men of rhe Coraceros anitwo battalions of Provincial cuards), which met hin on 30August 1836 at Bujalero. The two provisional squadrons (180Iancers) of the Carlists defeated the €lte cuimssieri anal pursuedthem lor some miles: only tour e\caped. The rwo b;tationswere captured entire. On 24 May 1837, ar Huesca, theCoraceros again performed badly. A squadron drove backCarlist skirmishers, bur was then repulsed by fire fuom infantrvregularly drawn up. The Cordcefor ch a rged again.,uppo ed bylwo squadrons ol Lhe Rorbo, regrmeni and lhe tan\er,quadronofthe French Foreign Legion, but the horsessankro theirchestsin wet ground. According to a Carlist witness, the 120 Coracelormet the Alavese squadron of 60 men, and in two minutes thelatter broke the cuirassien and killed 40 without loss tothemselves. The Alavese retumedtocamp wearing the armour,helmets and swords ofthe guardsmen. After the battle InfanteDon Sebasli6n, the nephew of Don Carlos, consideredequipping a squadron with the captured gear. This idea wasrqected by the cavalrymen, who did not want to arraythemselves in heavy material. The ,,beautifut English cuirasses"were tumed inLo cooking po!s. (AIbi and Siampa, 248-q;Lichnowsky. l . I24-5r Pnaln. I I . 25-6r.

It would be churlish and not perhaps very reterant ro makemuch of tbe repon of a Brilish offrce' five years earlier rhalalthough the cuirassiers underslood their dury well enoughwhen rhrowing oul guards and nankers during a mdrch. rhairhorles trere in wrelched condition and nol strong enough rocarry their intended load (Badcock,27-28, 65).

were large and noisy, with a rowel ofironandadiscofcopperonthe same spindle. The sword belt and pouch belt weie thenormal style for cavalry of the period; th;y could be black orwhite, although black was perhaps more common.

Long, sleeveless, caped cloaks were alsowom, in light bluishgrey with red collals; rrumpeters had red cloaks. Bridles wereblack leather. The saddle was usualty coveJed in a black orwhite sheepskin which was sometimes edged in cloth ,,hound'steeth". If valises were used, they were normally in the colour ofthecoat, with round endstrinmed in the facing colour., The bulk of the ho$e - in other words, the Navanese,Castilian and Vizcayan squadrons-had a red berer with a whiterasseland a mid green jacl ,erwfhredcol larpalcbesandpointedcults. Un one occasion several trumpeter -bonowed. lhecostumes of a troop of actors in order to indease thedistinctiveness of their appearance. The Alavese squadron hada red boma wirh yel low roundet and $hjte rassel, a;d a skv btu€jacket with,red collar palches. turn-back\ on lhe raih and prpingto the cuffs; the overalts were grey, or red wirh a pal; Ltu;stripe. The Guipizcoan squadron had red berets and a redhussaF\iyle pelisse wilh black lirr and frogging. O\eraUs $eregrey wilh a red slripe. The Aragonese squadrons had a red bererand overalh; the jacket may have been brown.

The H^arcs de A abin, about whom little is kno\ln. wore aful lhus\ar uniform. with a red berel wirh vel los roundel andwhite tassel. The dolman and pelisse were white with blue andred braidl Lhe dolman bore sky btue tacings. the pehsse blacklur. Eells were black. and since lances were noL carried theshoulder belt may have been doubled in order to suDDon acarbine. Overalh were red wilh a sky btue srripe. Benealh lbesheepskin (black. edged in s[] blue I was a red shabracque. wirhthe white crowned royal monogram CV in the rear comer. Thesabretache and the rounded valise were in the sam€ colours.ahhough lhe lauer lacked rhe monosram.

The Guard squadrons (cua ias-de Honorstarid dEscortal]d Escua&6n de lefes t Orqc,?&r) had blue or red berets anddark blue jackets edged red. The trousers were sky blue withred stdpes. The first unit may, however, have had silver striDesirhey did have rhe siller epaulelres. co ar atrd cuff lnm andaiguillettes ofthe royal cua ia de Corys, aunir \'thich did not

Typlcalotficer

IJNIFORMS, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENTAll cavalry wore the borrd, sometimes over a headscarf whichhadbeenknotted at the back ofthe neck. The overalls were rcd.gre) or bluish gre). somerimeswith a red \!npe, and were ofte;lined and "booted" almost to the knee in black leather. Thesingle-breasted, waisflength jacket had an open, standingcollar, andsometimes short tails, which could be tumed back inthe facing €olour. Buttons appear to have been white. Spurs

Trooper in cloak

fight and has not therefore been examined in the s€ction on theCristino almy. The pouch belts would be red or white with brassstuds, or red or blue with silver squares.

There seerns to have been some variation from the aboveunifoms. Picturcs show a Guiprizcoan lancer wearing thestandard green jacket, another laDcer in a red j acket fac€d darkblne and a Lancero de Zuntaragua in a pale blue jacket withwhite facin8s, red frogging and white epaulettes with redftinges. A plain blue jacket was also rccorded, wom over a chestpad. The latter was said to be used by soldiers in order to give animpression of fullness, altftough such a piec€ of folly would havebeen aldost unknown in wadme (Thompson, 144).

Merino's g1elr,,lleror had yellow j ackets, perhaps taken fromthe Cristino line cavalry, and red berets. Their old chief, whowas said to get by on little food, ddnk and sleep, nomally *orea black pelisse, waislbelt, sash and trousers, long spurs and atall, pointed, velvet Castilian hat. His sabre had an immenselywide blade and weighed "20 pounds", and he also carried aniron-shod staff shaped like a crutch (Lichnowsky, I, 265 [who isprobably correct about the sabre, imprcbable as it may seem,since Merino bequeathed the sabre to the Prussian in the case ofhis deathl).

Except for the units noted above, the cavalry carried lances;at least one ofEcer, who sported carbine, sword and trumpet,also did so. Licbnowsky stated that all should have had twopistols a that half a squadron slrculd have had a carbine orblunderbuss in plac€ of the latrc€, but this Foponion wasdoubtless achi€\€d only rar€ly. He added that the larc€s werewel made and of a Polish nodel (I, 70-71), which statenentcontradicts that of his felow cavalrynan HeDningsen, whoreported earlier in tfie war that th€ lanc€s w€re "enormous,

hea\T, unwieldy". At a later date lances were (pahted?) red (I,217; II, 185). The lance had an undoubted advatrtage in r€achover the sword ad Carlist sucless with th€ weapon was verylikely the reason for the Cristino cavalry's adoption of it in 1835.Pennons were red and yellow, except for th€ lancen of Merino,who used black and red, f,efiaps to reflect their leader's statusas pdest and warior or perhaps to reprcsent the fire and bloodwith which he waged war- AII ranks should also have carried asword. Many of the last were no doubt captured or l€ft overftom the War of Independence.

ARTILLERY AND ENGIIIEERSThe two major dif6culties facing the Cadist gunneE were a lackof matedal and, more sedous, a lack of training. Guns andgunpowder could be manufactured or captured, but the supplyof ammunition was, as with the inJantry, a problem. In October1836, when the Carlists attacked a position at Ametzaga6a,near San Sebastian, their artillery exhausted its shot, grape andc-anister by midday. lt then 6red stones, the head of asl€dge-hanmer, and finaly blaDls, all without avail, add it wasforc€d to retire. Don Carlos obtained his ftst gunrcrs frordpdsonen ftom the adilery of the Royal Guard; former Cristinoand French Foreign l-egion soldien werc always imponantsources of supply.

Neither the quantity nor the quality of the artilery was veryhigh, although improvements w€re mad€ in the middle yean ofthe war by Joaquin de Montenegro, the director gen€ral,perhaps with the assistance of some volunteer Frcnch offrce$.

By the time of the death of Zumahcenegui there were twocompanies of gunnen and two of sappers; by the end of 1835there was a battalion of six companies (two of them permanent-ly in garrison), two train companies and one company of each ofsappe$, aisenal worken and cade6. ID 1837 this forc€appaiently declined to two companies of gunners and two oftrain, to serve zl0 guns. What a.rtillery exisled was often not used- G6mez's expedition took only ten gunners and two mountain

Not surprisingly, in major sieges the Carlist war machine didnot sho* itself to best advantage. The s€cond failue of theCarlists to take Bilbao, which was rclieved on Chdstmas Day1836, cost them 22 of their precious guns. The Carlists also triedto drive a mine, but National Guards countermined successfirl-ly, smoked the Ca ists out, fought them with pistols andblunderbusses and blocked the mine.

One siege where the Carlist artillery did overcome theCristinos was that of Plencia in November 1836. The Carlistadllery dismounted most of the 13 guns which deiended thefort, forcing it to surrender.

Carlist sapper and olticer

35

C S G PTIBLICATIONS

PRESENT

' 'WELLINGTON IN INDIA''A WARGAMf,RS GUIDI

BY

C S GRANT AIID S A ASQT'ITH

Ar outline ofthe campaigns with bNttle sccouDts,detrils ofthe British, Ealt Idir ConprDy,

Mthratta! and Mysore Armi€s. Trctics of.he period,scenarios Dd wargrne ru1e5.

Maps and line drrwings.A 4 Sia md approlinrtely E0 Prges.

f8.50

pr6 41,00 rchg. {d prctdng tor uK lnd BFpoEurcp. t1.50. USA St.00

Prrndt ..epd vi! UK ch.quc f,uah€L P6ht O.d.r or IMOFoEi.n dEqG shoutd b. n Sh.ti4 ud prd,L .tuoush . b.nt h trK

Wuathirc SN9 6BQ

SaPPer

The Carlists were better at taking small defended points,from fortified villages to €hurches and "picket-houses", *hichlatter played such an important role in the war, aod theirengineers could build trenches, field fortifications and bad,cades as well as any othen. Once the Carlisls employed two4-pounder mountain guns to blow in the door of a church.Mortars were also used to set fue to roofs; the walls of evenfairly humble buildings where the war was fought tended to bestrong. The Carlists also employed "one of the most cruelexpedients resorted to in Spanish warfare", which was thesetting fire to bags of red pimentos in order to pmduce anunbearable smoke which would flush defende* fiom buildinss.

CarLjsl eDgineers were nolhing if nor ingenious. They buili afloating bddge over the Tagus River and a floating battery toatta€k a post on a bridge. The latter was made of two boats andcould carry a l2-pounder cannon and up to 200 men. After thebattery failed to cany the post, the engineers exploded aso-.alled infemal machine, but it appears to have killed onlyCarlists.

The chief beast of transport was the mule. Not only was muchaftillery a lono, mountain equipment which dismantled inorder to go on the backs of mules, but because of the largenumbers of mules in Spain they were at times used to draw gunswhich would otherwise have been pulled by horses. Mules couldalso carry two boxes of 1,000 rounds of ammunition, aod sotrreinfantry battalions therefore possessed a rcse e of ammunitionwhich could tnvel to the same places as a foot soldiet.

Perhaps the first cannon of the Army of the North was an iron36pdr found half buded on a beach and kno*n as E/,4brelo("grandfather" or "old man"). This weapon was in allprobability the gun taken on5 May 1836bythe British AuxiliaryIrgion and said to have been one of a pair of experimental

Bristol's Wargames Convention

Doon open loan to Spm

*:v*ill: gs. ha.Ie Stonds .

-B ng & BUJ.

Compurer Games .

Societies.

BRISTOL UNI!'ERSITY STUDENTS' UNIONQUEENS Rd., CLIFTON, BRISTOL.

soe MooE, 1 wittoughby Ctos, Bisrot, Bs13 7NL. Tet 0272 782701

36

pieces madein the reign of Femando vII and discarded becauseof excess weight and unmanoeuvrability. The gun was mountedon a clumsy carriage which was daubed with the initials CV intar or black powder. Although a 36pdr appeaN in the Carlistarmoury in a report of 17 June 1836, the unwieldiness of thisweapon would have made it of very limited utility.

To acquirc useful guns was also not easy for the Carlists. Byearly 1835 they had three pieces, and a professor of chemistryhelped them to make two howitzers from brass objects collectedfiom the population. But since there was not enough brass tomake the howitzels, ttuee mountain guns were cast in theirplace. By the time ofthe first siege of Bilbao in the early summerof the same year the Carlists could field five cannon, twohowitze$ and a mortar. The 1836 report lists 64 pieces of 17types eight battery guns and nine fixed guns (the latterconsisting of four 4pdrs, two 8pdn, and three Tpdr howitzen),19 pieces inthree forts, six in the anenal and22hidden (Pirala,Il, 683; Vig6n, Ill, 90-91).

The Artillery Museum held a bronze, Iong-barrelled howitzerand three large and five small mortars of the same metal; thesmall mortan were probably used to defend breaches. In ironthere was a l2pdr, ttuee 6pdr howitzers (13.3cm or sva"), andfour 5" (12cm or 47a') mountaiD howitzers (assuming that thecompilels of the catalogue had neasured the bores accurately;these dim€nsions indicate that the Spanish inch was not of aconsistent length, at least among Carlist gunners). Themountain howitzen were named after the Carlist Drovinces.and were casl on 18 November 1838 at Oiate. In the samemaDner as an iron mortar and other pieces in the collection,they displayed the monogmm of Carlos; the mortar also borethe arms of Vizcaya and the tree of Guemica. Olher Carlist lightguns had names such as Soberuno, Marques de Valdespina andZunslac'inesui.

Until 1836 the Carlist gunners wore the same dress as theCristino foot anilery, but with a red beret with a black tassel.Later the first company of the battalion had a blue coatee with ablack co[ar piped red and bearing yellow grenades, red coattailswith yellow grenades, and a red patch and piping on the cufh.Buttons were brass, trousers white; the beret was blue with ayelow rcundel and blacktassel. The other gunners wore a greyfrockcoat with brass buttons and a black collar bearing yellowgrenades, and the same beret. Some artillerymen appear tohave wom crcss-belts and hangers like those of the Cristinoartillery; since many ofthem had formerly been on the Cristinoside the practice is not surprising. Engineen wore red beretswithout tassels and sky blue frockcoats, whose red collan borewhite castles. Buttons were white.

TLAGS

size as carried in the infantry, had embroided in gold ytva laRelieionlviyalcaios Vo. An infantry flag survives in the royalpalace in Madrid; it is oblong and of a swallowtail shape. On theobverse is ahe Madonnain natural coloun; on the revers€ Dior,Parria, R€y in gold. The field is crimson.

TABLE A: THE ARMY OF THE NORTH AT TIIEEND OF 1E36

Capitin General en Jef€: Do Sebastiad Gabriel de Borb6n,accompanied by aides-de-camp, geneml staff, adjutants, vicargeneral, surgeon general and the like.

Royal Corps of ArtillerJ: one battalion of six companies, two ofwhich were permanently garrisoned in Navarra and Guiprizcoa;two tran companres; one sapper company; one arsenal

Royal Colps of Engin€€rs: one (undemanned) battalion; twopermanent garrison companies fone in Vizcaya. one inGuipfzcoa).

Navarre!€ Division: two conandan4s generules (one frrst, onesecond); three bdgadie$; 12 battalions (ofwhich the 3rd was ElRequ eti and the4th prisoners ofwar), numberedconsecutively;one battalion of guides.

Guipfizcoan Divison: rwo comandantes generules (one fnst, orcsecond); three brigadiers; eight battalions (of which the 5th wasLos Chapelzutis), r rmbered consecutively.

Vizcayan Division: two comandantes Eenerales (one first, onesecond); two brigadiers; eight battalions, numbered consecu-lvery.

Alaves€ Division: one comandanv generaL t\'to big die.'st sibattalions, numbered consecutively.

Cantabrian Division: one coman hnte genetul; t\ ro battalions,numbered consecutively.

Crstifian Division: one jefe orysnizador; one brigadier, 1stRegiment of Cavalry; 2nd Battalion Rerna; 3rd BattalionP ncipet 4th B^tt^lion Princesa; Grenadercs del Ejetcitt).

Aragon€se.Val€ncian Division: one brigadier; lst AragoneseBattalion Infante Don Jugr; 2nd Aragonese Battalion lntdrreDon Sebastiin; lstValencialBattabo'n Infank Don Femando.

Calal,.lt one comandante general; two brigadiers; lst Reglmentof Navanese Lancers (four squadrons)i 2nd Regiment ofNavarrese Lancers (four squadrons, of which the lst was theAlavese squadron and the 6th dismounted at the depot); 3rdRegiment of Navarese Lancers (four squadrons, of which the3rd and 4th were being organized); 4th Regiment of NavarreseLancers (four squadrons); Aragonese c.avalry (in course offormation) ; Guiprizcoan squadron (in course oI formation).

The normal Carlist flag appean to have been black. This nagwould never have been mistaken for a Cristino resimentalcolour or for rhe red.gold-red flag which fle* over-Cristuroforts, although during the second siege of Bilbao the Cristinosraised a couple of black flags to indicate their detennination toresist to the last.

The Carlistfl agscouldbearaskull andcrcss-bones;the Cdarde Navafta used smaller versions of this sinister banner asmarker flags.

The Navarrese lancers caried a flag which w.s presented tothem in 1835 and which had been embroidercd by the PrincessofBeira. tts design is unknown, but wouid have been religiousin tone because it was dedicated to Our Lady of Affliction.

The royal standard was made in 1833, and had rich goldembroidery and fringes. The reverse was white, with a colouredimage of the Madonna in the centre; the obverse was red withthe arms of Spain. The staJf was topped with a gildedfleur'de-lis. Another flag lrom the early days, this time of the

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AlaYa Sqn. Merino cuipuzcoa

CARLIST CAVALRY

Artill€ry

Also an invalid ba(alion for each providce; the ForeignBattalion was being organised.

Totsl: 32,000 bayonets, 1,500 lanc€s.

Each battalion consisted of eight companies (one of whi€hwas gmnaderc or carabinerc . one cazador or tirador). ea.h wirhfive offic€rs, who included a primero conandante, a segundocomanclante. an adj\ttanr and a Colour bearer_ The organisationof the cavalry was variable.

(Adapted from Pirala, III,616-19. The tabte does not agree€ompletely with the descriptions of the afifly which are given inthe aniclesi forexample. the Gtriar deAlava seem to nave beenlisted as a line battalion. No listing of the Carlist army can,however, be completely reliable. )

ADDITIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHYJ- AIbi de la Cuesta. "The Carlist cavatry duringthe First CarlistWar" , in Tradition. 67 .I.F. Covedale, The Basque phate of Spain's First Ca ttWa\Princeton. 1984. (This useful work came to my aitention onlyafter complering the above articles.)T. Farr, A Traye et's tombling rcminiscenses of the SpanishIvdl, London, 1838.M. Ferrer, D.Tejera, J. Acedo, Histo a del TadicionatbmoErpatol, I-XVIII, Seville, 1941,60.Justo Garate Aniola, El Calisrno de los yarcor, San Sebastidn,1980.C.L. Gruniesen. Slercrpr oJ Spain and th? Spauards du nBrheCar16r Ciui/ 'val, London, 1874.R. Henderson, Ii? So/di€r of Thrce Queens,Londor�,1866.[C.W. Thompson] "An Officer of the Ninrh Regimenr", n e/r?Months in the British Legion, London, 1836."AVolunteerin the Queen'sService", A concise accountof theBritish Auxiliary Legion, Scarborough, 183?.N.B. All references ro Pimla, Hittoria de Ia Guefta Civit, aretothe Tumer/Hhtoria edition, Madnd, 1984.