University of Zurich 5/03/07

Halting Deforestation: Reflections from the Air, on

the Ground, and in the Experimental Lab

Elinor Ostrom

Many Thanks to:• My Co-Author of PNAS article – Dr. Harini Nagendra*• IFRI colleagues in Nepal and India for contributions to

remote sensing studies• All IFRI Colleagues who have contributed to on-the-ground

data and to the communities who helped in these studies• All colleagues who helped conduct and analyze the lab

experiments reported herein • Funding from Ford Foundation, MacArthur Foundation,

NSF-USA, Branco Weiss Fellowship*Ostrom, Elinor, and Harini Nagendra. 2006. “Insights on Linking Forests,

Trees, and People from the Air, on the Ground, and in the Laboratory.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103(51): 19224–19231.

The Policy Debate• Since Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons”

(1968) big debates over how to avoid over-harvesting of forests (as well as fisheries, water resources, common-pool resources in general)

• Strong claims that government ownership, private ownership, or community control is “the only way”

• Policies too often a result of panacea thinking• Data used in policy making frequently highly

aggregated & not useful for planning and evaluation

The Advantage of Multiple Methods

• Remotely sensed images provide reliable measures of land-use changes within different management regimes, allow us to go back in time

• On-the-ground studies provide evidence on variables associated with forest condition, which can be associated with institution type and rules – with considerable investment can also trace over time

• Experimental studies enable measurement of explicit changes in carefully designed settings on micro-decision-making

Focus on South India: dense populations, high dependence, strong govt. protection

(India) decentralization (Nepal)

From the Air

• Remote Sensing – most frequently used method for over time studies of land cover change, and forest fragmentation

• In conjunction with GIS – institutional boundaries, market locations, roads, other drivers

• Increased data availability from the 1970s – enables us to go back in time – before and after studies of policy changes

• Landscape view – valuable complement to single-case forest studies

Multi-temporal Color Composites• Multi-temporal satellite color composites

provide a synoptic view of landscape level change from three dates in time

• Integrates information from the green bands of each image, correlated with vegetation

• Facilitates visual assessment of changes in vegetation extent, and degradation

• Complemented by detailed classification and fragmentation studies for each landscape

Methods - Interpreting multi-temporal color composites

Grey/Black – Stable forest

White –Stable open areas

Red/Yellow –Clearings

Green/Blue –Regrowth

Focus Today • Protected areas in India & recent

boundary & community forests in Nepal• Evaluate changes over time • Do government protected areas work?

Do community forests work? What factors explain stability, re-growth, and clearance of these forests?

• Lets first examine an understaffed tiger reserve from the air – Tadoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve

TADOBA-ANDHARI TIGER RESERVE

Interior villages

Multi-temporal Landsat color composite, 1972-1989-2001, landscape surrounding Tadoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve, India.

Regrowth

Clearing

Regrowth

Clearing

Stable forest

Multiple Patterns in TATR• Stable forests in the core• Park guards are not able to control

harvesting along sections of the borders • Complementary field studies find

– Consistent harvesting of non-timber forest products

– Existence of considerable conflict between guards and local people

Women harvesting thatch grass from within the TATR - while the forest ranger accompanying our research team looks on helplessly.

Cattle entering the TATR boundary (marked by the yellow topped pillar in the background) on their daily foraging beat.

Lets Examine Two More Protected Areas in India

• The Mahananda Wildlife Sanctionary (MWS) – a National park with a substantial budget – on the north of the next map

• Baikunthapore Reserve Forest (BRF) with a much lower budget – on the south

• Budget constraints associated with more clearing in the south

MAHANANDA WILDLIFE SANCTUARY

BAIKUNTHAPORE FOREST RESERVE

Regrowth

Multi-temporal Landsat color composite, 1977-1990-2001. Landscape surrounding MWS and BFR India.

Regrowth

Clearing

Electrified fence surrounding Mahananda Wildlife Sanctuary – keeping people out, and wildlife in!

Despite substantial human pressure from surrounding Despite substantial human pressure from surrounding villages, the reserve has maintained its forest covervillages, the reserve has maintained its forest cover

Bicycles and trucks confiscated from timber poachers stealing large logs

Lets Move to Chitwan Valley of Nepal

• Buffer zone forests located adjoining Royal Chitwan National Park—received substantial external funding

• Community forests recently established in the area with little external funding

• Both types of forests characterized by some regrowth and some clearing

• Forests characterized by regrowth are monitored by a combination of users and forest officials

Multi-temporal Landsat color composite, 1976-1989-2000, east Chitwan district, Nepal.

Buffer zone forestsCommunity forests

B1

B2

B3

B4B7B5 B10B8 B11B9

B6B12

C1

C3C5

C4

C7

C6

C2

C8

Regrowth

Clearing

Clearing

Findings from the Air• Some government parks with good budgets are

better managed, while others are degrading• Some community forests are better managed while

others are degrading • Neither management approach is a panacea• Regular monitoring appears to be a significant

factor influencing the nature of forest change• When monitoring is undertaken by the

government, potential for conflict; when by the community, may be effective even in conditions of substantial change

Now Lets Get Down on the Ground

• International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Research Network– Collaborative research centers (CRCs) in

Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, India, Kenya, Mexico, Nepal, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda & the U.S – initiated in 1992

– Developed & use a common set of research protocols

• Forest mensuration • Governance and socio-economic factors

Is Formal Designation as a Protected Forest Associated with

Higher Vegetation Density?• Tough question to answer across ecological

zones since forest mensuration data is not meaningful across zones

• The forester or biologist who leads an IFRI team in each site is asked to evaluate forest density AFTER completing a random sample of forest plots in a forest

• Asked to evaluate vegetation density of this forest compared to other forests in this region

Comparison of Forester’s Field Evaluation of Vegetation Densities in 163 Parks and Non-parks

Vegetation density

Very sparse

Some-what

sparse

About average

SomewhatAbun-dant

VeryAbun-dant

Officially designated parks (N = 76)

13% 21% 36% 26% 4%

Non-parks (N = 87) 6% 22% 43% 26% 3%

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z score = 0.472, p = .979. No significant difference. Source: Adapted from Hayes and Ostrom, 2005, p. 607.

If Formal Designation Does Not Make a Difference – What Does?

• Monitoring by users themselves – Cross-sectional study of 178 Forest User

Groups (Gibson, Williams & Ostrom, 2005)

– Group interviews asked users about regularity of their own monitoring the rule conformance of other users

• Strong statistical relationship between regular monitoring and forest density: controlling for formal organization, dependence on forests, & social capital

Other Findings from IFRI studies• Batistella et al. (2003)

– In Brazil, rubber tappers acted as unofficial monitors for 16 forest reserves, reducing forest clearing

• Ghate and Nagendra (2006) – In India, local enforcement was most effective

when initiated by the community, with better regeneration

• Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe (2000) – In Uganda, when local people monitor private or

government forests, illegal harvesting is lower

Measuring Illegal Uses on the Ground in Uganda Forests

• International Forestry Resources & Institutions (IFRI) team measured illegal uses (grazing, firewood, pit-sawing, farming)

• In randomly selected forest plots in five forests– Private forest: evidence of illegal uses in less than 20% of

plots– Government forest where indigenous community monitored

forest use: evidence of illegal uses in less than 15% of plots– Three government forests, relying on own officials, had

evidence of illegal uses in 66% of forest plots– Source: Banana and Gombya-Ssembajwe (2000)

Number of sample plots with evidence of illegal consumptive disturbance (N = 30 per forest) (1 private forest and 4 government forests in Uganda)

Name of Forest Charcoal Pitsawing Commercial Firewood

Grazing Farm No Illegal Consumptive Disturbance

Namungo (P) 1 2 2 0 0 25

Lwamunda (G) 3 8 10 0 0 9

Mbale (G) 10 1 5 22 4 4

Echuya* (G) 0 0 3 1 0 26

Bukaleba (G) 0 0 12 2 5 11

P = privately owned forest; G = government-owned forest

*Additional monitoring provided by the Abayanda community who live in forest.

Source: Banana, Abwoli, & William Gombya-Ssembajjwe. 2000. “Successful Forest Management: The Importance of Security of Tenure and Rule Enforcement in Ugandan Forests.” In People and Forests: Communities, Institutions, and Governance, ed. Clark Gibson, Margaret McKean, & Elinor Ostrom, 87-98. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

New Findings from Repeat Visits to Same Forests

• Now can use forest measures (Basal area, Diameter Breast Height, Number of Stems, etc)

• 42 IFRI forests now visited for 2nd time – India – 5 forests– Kenya – 3 forests– Nepal – 10 forests– Uganda – 18 forests– USA – 6 forests

• Not a random sample of forests but based on a random sample of plots inside each forest and first study of this type

Percent Forests With Significant Change in Forest Measures Between First and Second Site Visits

(t test, p<0.1)

Dependant Variable

Government Forests (N = 22)Lower Same Better

Community Forests (N = 15)Lower Same Better

Private forests (N = 5)Lower Same Better

Basal Area

40% 55% 5% 20% 53% 27% - 100% -

DBH 23% 68% 9% 20% 53% 27% - 80% 20%

Stems 50% 45% 5%

40% 33% 27% 40% 60% -

Tenure Type and User Monitoring

• Given importance assigned to type of formal management in current policy debates it is important to– Assess relative strength of ownership type

on changes in DBH, Basal Area & Stem Count

– Assess strength of regular involvement of user groups in monitoring rules on same forest measures

Impact of Formally Designated Tenure and Forest Monitoring on Changes in Forest Condition:Assessment using ANOVA

Independent Variables

Change in DBH

Change in Basal Area

Change in Stem Count

Ownershipa F = 0.89 F = 2.52 F = 1.00

Involvement of User Groups in Monitoring Rulesb

F = 0.28 F = 10.55** F = 4.66*

A Government, community, privateb At least one user group is involved in regular monitoring of rules of forest use* Significant at .05 ** Significant at .01

Field Results Puzzle: Why Do Users Monitor Others?

• Voluntary effort to produce a “public good” of rule conformance

• Game theoretic predictions – no one will voluntarily contribute to provide a public good

• Earlier findings from field studies of farmer irrigation systems led to a series of laboratory experiments at IU

Harvesting Common-Pool Resources in the Lab

• In a baseline experiment of complete anonymity and finitely repeated game– Game theoretical prediction is of substantial over-

harvesting– This prediction supported in the lab

• Adding the capacity to communicate – does not change prediction – in a social dilemma communication is only CHEAP TALK

• Subjects make good use of opportunity for cheap talk – especially when repeated

• They use it to agree on joint harvesting strategy & for verbal sanctions of unknown over-harvesters

Aggregate Results of CPR ExperimentsExperimental Designs using 25 Token Endowments

Average Net Yield as % of Maximuma

Average Net Yield Minus Fees & Fines

Defection Rate (%)

(A) Baseline Experiment:No Communication (3)

21 - -(B) One-shotCommunication (3)

55 - 25(C) RepeatedCommunication (6)

73 - 13(D) Imposed SanctioningInstitution (8)

37

9

_

(E) One-shot Communication & Imposed Sanctioning Institution (3)

85

67

1

(F1) One-shot Communication Endogenous Choice of Sanctioning Institution - None Chosen (2)

56

-

42

(F2) One-shot CommunicationEndogenous Choice of Sanctioning Institution – Sanction Chosen (4)

93

90

4

aNash equilibrium for all designs is a net yield of 39% of maximum (Adapted from: Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992: p. 414)

Farmers Quick to Monitor,Repair, and Sanction

After Observing Users Sanctioning Each Other in the Field

• Designed experiment where subjects could pay a fee to fine another subject

• Game-theoretical prediction – no one will voluntarily sanction others– Since they would be paying a cost to produce a

benefit shared by everyone?• Prediction not supported in our lab or other labs!• Subjects do sanction one another – too much!• Imposed sanctioning system – counter-

productive unless they can at least agree on a joint strategy through communication

In the Field – Users Make Their Own Rules

• Design enabled subjects who had experience with imposed sanctions to decide whether or not to make agreement about harvesting levels AND about whether & how large sanctions they would use

• Groups who decided against crafting their own sanctioning system – started with low harvesting rates but cooperation collapsed over time

• Groups who made their own rules – achieved very high levels of conformance and very high payoffs.

What Have We Learned Overall?• Protecting forested land in developing world

through an externally imposed institution is feasible, but

• It is costly!!!!!– May be strongly resisted locally– May deprive people who have been stewards of

the land of the fruits of their past investments– May not protect forest & may reduce trust in

Government & cooperation more generally– May be “appropriate” for large tracts of relatively

isolated forests or to protect valuable sites (e.g. 2 of the Indian Forests shown above & Tikal National Park in Guatemala in Dietz, Ostrom & Stern, 2003)

Other Means to Protect Forested • Involvement of local users is also feasible

– Takes time & resources to craft appropriate institutions for a given ecology, economy & social relationships

– Building trust & reciprocity is essential • If locally evolved institutions were ignored in

recent past, may be difficult to regain trust• External financial incentives may reduce

over-harvesting – but must be sustained overtime and monitoring is necessary

The Big Lessons• Beware of assuming that changing formal

tenure is a sufficient policy change to affect harvesting practices in the field

• Need to study success and failures to develop better theory and to craft better policies

• Multiple empirical methods help to provide a fuller explanation of complex human-environment relationships

• Lab experiments are an important research method

Findings Consistent NRC Synthesis of Lessons Learned

• Formal tenure tends not to be effective at halting over-harvesting unless: – Shared knowledge of boundaries and rules– Agreement on their legitimacy (or

expensive fences and patrolling)– Monitoring of rule conformance (by users

as well as officials)• The above are necessary but NOT sufficient to

halt deforestation » NRC (2002) The Drama of the Commons

May I Answer your Questions??