1f Statcon Reviewer_06132014v2

STATCON REVIEWER[for June 13, 2014]

A. Legal System and Judicial Interpretation

Article VI. The Legislative DepartmentSECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Article VII. The Executive DepartmentSECTION 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Article VIII. The Judicial DepartmentSECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (Mendoza, N.)GR No. L-45081 | July 15, 1936 | [Laurel]

Plaintiffs: Jose A. AngaraDefendant: The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, Dionisio C. Mayor

DOCTRINE: (These case has multiple doctrines that are “ IMPORTANT”.) Separation of Powers Principle - The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in

our government. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.

System of Checks and Balances - Each branch of government (Legislative, Executive, Judiciary) has its own system - provided for by the Constitution - to check if the other branches are acting within their jurisdiction. The Constitution provided a balance between the three so as to prevent one branch of government from being too powerful or weaker than the other, as they are “co-equal branches”. An example is when the President can veto laws that are passed by Congress (but the Congress can pass the law upon its return to both houses provided that it reaches a ⅔ vote from each house) and while the President needs the consent of the Senate in order to be a part of a treaty. The Judiciary through the Supreme Court, is the final arbiter of acts and laws promulgated by both branches.

Judicial Supremacy - Also known as the power of Judicial Review, states that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Constitutionality of acts committed by both branches of the government.

Necessary Implication - It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred.

FACTS:Jose A. Angara filed a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission from taking cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua. Angara, Ynsua, Castillo and Mayor were candidates for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. Angara was declared the winner and he took his oath thereafter. On December 3, 1935 (important date to remember), the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the winners of the election and that no other protests may be filed afterwards. On December 8, 1935 (important date too), Ynsua filed a motion of protest to the Electoral Commission (EC). On Dec. 9, 1935, The EC adopted a resolution that the commission will no longer consider any protest on or before Dec. 9 - the commission’s actual first meeting (This means that Ynsua’s protest made it according to the resolution of EC). Angara filed for a writ of preliminary injunction to the SC arguing that the Consti. confers the National Assembly the jurisdiction with regard to contests in election proceedings.

ISSUE:1. WON the SC has jurisdiction over the EC and the subject matter of the controversy.2. WON the EC acted in GADALEJ

HELD/RATIO:

1. YESThe SC is the only constitutional mechanism devised to finally resolve conflicts and allocate constitutional boundaries. Judicial supremacy also dictates that SC, in exercising judicial review, has the power to adjudicate actual and appropriate cases and controversies in order to see that no one branch or agency of the government trancends the constitution.

2. NOThe EC is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Nat’l Assembly. The consti also transferred all powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests in elections, returns, and qualifications to the EC. The said power of EC is full, clear and complete and carried with it the necessary powers (not conferred, although implied powers) to prescribe rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests

STATCON CASE DIGESTS | BLOCK 1F | T1 AY2014-2015 1

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B. Definition of Statutory Construction

CALTEX v. PALOMAR (Nierra, M.)18 SCRA 247 | September 29, 1966 | CASTRO, J.

Plaintiffs: CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC.Defendant: ENRICO PALOMAR (In his capacity as The Postmaster General)

DOCTRINE: Definition of Statutory Construction (MEMORIZE THIS!)“Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1).”

FACTS:In 1960, Caltex undertook a promotional campaign dubbed as the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest.” The object of the contest was for people to guess how many liters were dispensed by a hooded gas pump during a specified period. The contest was open to all “motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers.” In order to participate in the contest, all those who were qualified to participate merely had to get entry forms and submit their guesses. Participants were not required to purchase any Caltex product or pay any fee to join. There were 3 stages to the contest. The first stage consisted of all participating Caltex dealerships. Three persons would then be chosen and be given prizes. Those who placed first would then move on to the second, the Regional stage. 3 winners would then again be chosen. The 7 regional first-placers would then head to Manila for the final round. In order to achieve the success of the promotion, Caltex foresaw that it had to use the Postal Service. The Caltex met resistance from the office of Postmaster General based on Article 1954 of the Revised Administrative Code, among others:

1954. Absolutely nonmailable matter. —No matter belonging to any of the following classes, whether sealed as first class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:

(a) Written or printed matter in any form advertising describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or

chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."

ISSUE: Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee (Caltex) is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law

HELD/RATIO:

No. According to the Court the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” does not fall within the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law, particularly with regard to the issue of lottery. In “El Debate” Inc. vs Topacio, the court ruled that lottery consists of three elements: consideration, prize and chance. In the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest,” 2 of the three elements are clearly present: prize and chance. Consideration, on the other hand, that is the necessity of foregoing something of value in order to enjoy the chance of winning, is absent. Hence, the Contest cannot be deemed a lottery. It is instead a “gratuitous distribution of property” which does not fall under Article 1954 of the Revised Administrative Code.

“Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain.”

The Court decided the case based on the Spirit of the Law, that is, the intent which the authors of the law had although such intent may not be easily gleaned from the letter or wording of the law.

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C. When Does Statutory Construction Come In?

(1) NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL) v. EISMA (Uy, M.)GR L-61236 | January 31, 1984 | [Ponente]

Plaintiffs: National Federation of Labor, Zambowood Monthly Employees UnionDefendant: J. Eisma, Zamboanga Wood Products, et al

DOCTRINE: In labor matters, the Labor Arbiter, NOT THE COURT, has jurisdiction to entertain it. Examples of issues include complaints for damages by an employer against his/her employees as a result of a strike, problems with wages, benefits, employee-employer relations, collective bargaining agreements, and the like.


FACTS: (For a better understanding, just imagine why/how strikes happen and how companies usually react to them)

The NFL, being the collective bargaining representative of the Zambowood employees’ union, went on a strike together with the employees against the company for underpaid wages, illegal termination (of the union president), unfair labor treatment, among many others. The company filed a suit against the labor union for obstruction of private property and disrupting business operations due to road blockages. The petitioners retort with a motion for dismissal citing that the Labor Arbiter, not the Courts, has jurisdiction over their case, under Article 217 of the Revised Administrative Code and BP 130. Nonetheless, Judge Eisma on July 20, 1982 denied the petitioner’s motion and ordered the restraining of all persons involved in the strike citing BP 227, which has provisions against violence, obstruction, and disturbance of strikers.

ISSUE:WON the Court has jurisdiction to handle cases for damages between employers and employees.

HELD/RATIO: NO (petition for certiorari granted, previous decision by respondent Judge nulled)● Under Article 217 of the Revised Administrative Code along with its subsequent

amendments in PD 1691 (1980) and BP 130 (1981), places exclusive jurisdiction on Labor Arbiters for issues of damages between employee-employers, wages, benefits, employee-employer relations, collective bargaining agreements

● The judge was applying an outdated law in PD 1367 wherein the courts had jurisdiction to entertain moral damages arising from unjust employer-employee relations.

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(2) PAAT v. CA (Ongtenco, K.)GR 111107 | January 10, 1997 | Torres, J.

Plaintiffs: Leonardo A. Paat (in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge, Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2) and Jovito Laguyan, Jr. (in his capacity as Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR))

Defendant: Court of Appeals, Hon. Ricardo A. Baculi (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan), and Spouses Bienvenido and Victoria de Guzman

DOCTRINE: “In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.”

FACTS:May 19, 1989: The truck of Victoria de Guzman, which was en route to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan was seized by DENR personnel in Nueva Vizcaya, as the driver of the vehicle could not present the documents pertinent to the forest products hidden inside the truck. Jovito Laguyan, the CENRO officer of Aritao, Cagayan seized the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. The current respondents brought a petition to the RTC, Branch 2 of Cagayan and the RTC granted their petition and wrote a writ for the current petitioners to return the truck to the (private) respondents. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss; denied by RTC.

Respondents claim that “only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products,” pursuant to Sec 68 of PD705, as amended by EO277.

ISSUE:WON the DENR has the power to seize and forfeit the truck under the law

HELD/RATIO:YES, the DENR has the power to seize and forfeit the truck. The respondents, in claiming that only the court is authorized to confiscate, restricted “the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduce[s] the other provision of Section 68-A,” which reads:

“SEC. 68-A.Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.”


Sec 68 should be read with 68-A, which was added upon amendment of PD705 with EO277.

In relation to the doctrine: The object of the statute is for environmental protection, the success of which is what the statute must advanced. It should, then, suppress all acts to the contrary; that is, in this case, the extension of DENR’s administrative authority to inclusion of vehicles (conveyances) used to aid in committing the illegal act.

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(3) PEOPLE V. MAPA (Mendoza, L.)GR L-22301 | August 30, 1967 | Fernando, J.

Plaintiffs: People of the PhilippinesDefendant: Mario Mapa Y Mapulong

DOCTRINE: The first and fundamental duty of the courts is to apply the law. “Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.” If a certain law is already clear and explicit in itself, the court does not have any power to set aside the mandate of a statutory provision.

FACTS:Mario Mapa Y Mapulong, a secret agent of Hon. Leviste (Gov of Batangas), was accused of violating the provision on illegal possession of firearms. On or about August 13, 1962, in Manila, Mapa willfully and unlawfully possessed and controlled one home-made revolver, Cal. 22 without serial number with six rounds of ammunition, without any license or permit. On the September 3, 1963 hearing, Mapa admits that he did have possession of the revolver and its ammunition on Aug 13, 1962. In the hearing, 4 exhibits were shown to prove Mapa’s appointment as secret agent of Hon. Leviste. On November 23, 1963, Mapa was convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition were confiscated by the government.

4 exhibits (just in case): 1. June 2, 1962 document2. Document directing him to go to Manila, Pasay and QC on a confidential mission3. Oath of office as secret agent4. Certificate dated March 11, 1963 that he is a secret agent of Leviste

ISSUE:

WON being a secret agent of a provincial governor is sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition

HELD/RATIO:

NO. Being a secret agent of the governor is not a defense to illegal possession of firearms.The law is explicit that it shall be unlawful for any person to possess any firearm or ammunition, detached parts of firearms or ammunition, etc. The next section of this law provides a list of people who are excused when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their duties and this list does not include secret agents. Thus, Mapa is still guilty of illegal possession of firearms.

(List includes officers, soldiers, sailors, marines, Phil Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial and municipal treasurers, mayors, guards of provincial prisoners and jails)

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(4) PARAS v. COMELEC (Ah, Y.)264 SCRA 49 | November 4, 1996 | FRANCISCO, J.

Plaintiffs: DANILO E. PARASDefendant: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition.

Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for


barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election.Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

ISSUE: WON the SK election may be construed as a local regular election

PROVISION:

"SEC. 74.Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence(b)No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election."

HELD/RATIO:

NO. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with

reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office.

● It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted

in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to “enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum.”

● Petitioner’s too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

“We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in ‘the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth.’

● In statutory construction it is the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.

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(5) DEL MAR v. PAGCOR (Ongtenco, K.)346 SCRA 485 | DATE HERE | Puno, J.

Plaintiffs: Raoul B. Del MarDefendant: Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), Belle Jai-Alai Corporation, Filipinas Entertainment Totalizor Corproration (FILGAME)

DOCTRINE: “When a statute is vague or ambiguous: That the statute admits of different interpretations is the best evidence that the statute is vague and ambiguous. It is widely acknowledged that a statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses. [...] Sutherland tells us that a statute is "ambiguous," and so open to explanation by extrinsic aids, not only when its abstract meaning or the connotation of its terms is uncertain, but also when it is uncertain in its application to, or effect upon, the fact-situation of the case at bar.”

FACTS:PAGCOR is a GOCC organized and existing under PD 1869, enacted 11 July 1983. PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice, inquiring about whether or not the PAGCOR Charter allows them to operate jai-alai frontons in the country. The Secretary of Justice furnished PAGCOR with his opinion on 15 July 1996, which stated that PAGCOR’s authority to maintain and operate games of chance or gambling “extends to jai-alai.” In addition, he mentioned that the PAGCOR Charter amounts to a legislative franchise for that purpose. PAGCOR also sought the opinions of the Office of the Solicitor-General and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel who, in turn, gave favorable remarks for PAGCOR’s project.

Del Mar filed a petition against the respondents, claiming that KRISTINE!!!!!! Where did you go? Are you still up?

ISSUE:WON PAGCOR’s charter includes the franchise to operate jai-alai frontons

HELD/RATIO:

3. [YES/NO.][Insert Rationale here]


4. [YES/NO.][Insert Rationale here]

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D. Statutory Construction vs. Judicial Legislation

(1) FLORESCA v. PHILEX MINING (Ah, Y.)GR L-30642 | April 30, 1985 | MAKASIAR, J.

Plaintiffs: PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S.FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA; LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO, JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ; SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA, SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA; LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR; DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR., all surnamed LANUZA; EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA (Just remember FLORESCA) :p

Defendant:PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila

DOCTRINE: Statutory Construction vis-a-vis Judicial LegislationTo declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has been, is judicial. However, the courts “do and must legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law. The Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of the existing law and jurisprudence. FACTS:Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried

them in the tunnels of the mine. A special committee report indicated that PHILEX failed to provide the miners with adequate safety protection.

Petitioners filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance (CFI) Manila based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages arising out of negligence. Philex contends that the action was based on an industrial accident based on the Workmen’s Compensation Act (WCA) and therefore CFI has no jurisdiction, and that the work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under the WCA and not the Civil Code. The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. This is a petition raised to the SC to review the decision of the CFI.

PROVISION(S):Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, reads:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.—The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury ... SEC. 46. Jurisdiction — The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, ...

ISSUE: 1. WON the action of an injured worker (or that of his heirs, in case of death) under the

WCA is executive, selective, or cumulative --SELECTIVE2. WON the SC, in determining the action to be selective, is guilty of judicial legislation --

NO

HELD/RATIO:1. SELECTIVE. The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument that the action

is selective (i.e. that the injured worker or his heirs have the choice of remedies, but that they cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and balance the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen’s Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. It further held that the petitioners who had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court, as the choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice, but that upon the success of such bids before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.


2. NO. The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the Court does not legislate but merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, amongst other sources of law. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs. Licera: that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system.

It argues that the application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law since the Court’s application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. Yet, the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that “No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.” Thus, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the court “do and must legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.

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(2) SALVACION v. CB (Penilla, I.)278 SCRA 27 | August 21 1997 | Torres, Jr., J.

Plaintiffs: Karen E. Salvacion, minor, through Federico N. Salvacion, Jr. and Evelina E. SalvacionDefendant: Central Bank of the Philippines, China Bank Corporation, and Greg Bartelli

DOCTRINE: Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro - “When the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.” In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

FACTS:This is in relation to a previous case of Karen E Salvacion filed against Greg Bartelli. On February 4, 1989, Salvacion was a kidnapped and raped by Greg Bartelli, an American tourist/ transient. He lured her to go with him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue, and there he held her captive for 4 days and raped her 10 times. Plaintiff was able to ask for help, and after being rescued, the Salvacion family sued Bartelli. The latter was ordered to pay the former an amount of more than P 1 Million, for moral and exemplary damages (with

preliminary attachment). Bartelli was charged with 4 counts of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention, and was detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. However, on February 24, 1989, on the same day of his scheduled hearing for petition for bail, Bartelli escaped from jail.

In order to receive the damages they’ve been awarded (and which they fully deserve), the Salvacion family needs to gain access to Bartelli’s dollar deposit in China Bank, but they cannot because his account is being protected by Sec 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and the Foreign Currency Deposit Act.

In the case at bar, the Salvacion family filed a petition for declaratory relief, with prayers for the following: (1) an order restraining the respondents from applying and enforcing Sec 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, (2) declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents, (3) adjudging the said circular no. as contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and hence, void.

ISSUE:1. WON this Court may entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction

in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court.

2. WON Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by Pres. Decree No. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act, be made applicable to a foreign transient.

HELD/RATIO:1. YES. This court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a case that involves a

petition for declaratory relief, however, this case may be an exception. Salvacion’s case may be treated as one for Mandamus because it has with it immense implications and questions that ought to be resolved.

2. NO. it should not be made applicable to a foreign transient. Central Bank Circular No. 960 states that, “Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.” It was raised by Central Bank that this was actually just carried over from a portion of R.A. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Furthermore, China Bank also issued in one of their comments that, as much as they want to empathize with the Salvacion family, they are restrained from doing so, in view of the said laws.

In the assessment of the case, it was held that the Central Bank Circular No. 960 and R.A. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246 were “designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors.” Given that Bartelli is a mere transient who only deposited his money for the purpose of safekeeping during his temporary stay, he shall not be “entitled to the protection


of Sec 113 of CB Circ. No. 960 and P.D. 1246 against attachment, garnishment, or other court processes.”

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(3) REPUBLIC v. CA and MOLINA (Wenceslao, C.)GR 108763 | February 13, 1997 | [PANGANIBAN, J.]

Plaintiffs: Republic of the PhilippinesDefendant: CA and Roridel Olaviano Molina

DOCTRINE: Psychological Capacity must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Psychological Capacity must be characterized by: a) Gravity; b) Juridical Antecedent; c) Incurability

FACTS:The case involves the declaration of nullity of marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo Molino on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The said couple got married on April 14, 1950 at the San Agustin Church. After a year, Roridel gave birth to their son named Andre Molina. While the child is growing up, Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity” and “irresponsibility” as a husband and a father. Instead of attending his duties as a husband and father, he squandered his money with his friends and was never honest with his wife regarding his finances. Eventually in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved from his job and Roridel had been the sole breadwinner since then. Their relationship was estranged. Roridel went to live with her parents together with her son, and Reynaldo totally abandoned them. In the pendency of the declaration of the nullity of their marriage, Roridel and Reynaldo no longer lived with each other for three years. They agreed upon a Pre-Trial Conference that Roridel will have the custody of their son and that she will no longer need financial assistance from Reynaldo in raising their child. BOTH RTC AND CA declared the marriage VOID. However, due to Family Code’s effectivity the issue at hand (regarding marriages declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity) was being assailed.

ISSUE:WON the CA erred in the interpretation of psychological incapacity as provided in Art. 36 of the Family Code

HELD/RATIO:

YES. In Santos vs CA, Psychological incapacity had been defined as a mental (not physical) incapacity. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity to give meaning and significance to marriage. Moreover, psychological incapacity must be present at the time the marriage is being celebrated or prior thereto. Psychological incapacity (Justice Vitug) must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.

The mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” is not enough to constitute a ground for psychological incapacity . Even if the married couple do not intend to live with each other anymore and the failure to meet their duties and responsibilities as husband and wife still is not a valid ground. HENCE, THE MARRIAGE IS STILL RENDERED VALID.

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(4) ATONG PAGLAUM v. COMELEC (Ah, Y.)GR No. 203766 | April 2, 2013 | CARPIO, J.

Plaintiffs: ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan IgotDefendant: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

DOCTRINE: Statutory Construction vis-a-vis Judicial LegislationIn statutory construction it is the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.

FACTS:52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. COMELEC, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” their nominees do not come from a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress. Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of the petitioners’ application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the rest.

ISSUE:1. WON COMELEC committed GADALEJ in disqualifying the petitioners in the coming May

2013 party-list elections


2. WON the criteria for participating in the the party-list system as laid down by Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC be applied in the coming May 2013 party-list elections

HELD/RATIO:

1. NO, COMELEC did not commit GADALEJ.

2. NO, the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters for the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system. WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the discussion then among its framers. Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

“Section 5.(1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5 (1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

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Documents

1f Statcon Reviewer_06132014v2