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~ N T I O N L

w ~ s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

ustralian Government

STATEMENT OF REASONS UNDER SECTION 40 5) OF THE ARCHIVES

CT

1983-INCLUDING DECISION ON ACCESS

Record Series:

A14039

Control symbol:

6826

Title: Soviet Technical Security Activity Australian Total number of folios i.e. equivalent separate

Embassy, Moscow pages) on the record: 12

1. Decision

After examining this record I have decided to open it for public access except for certain

material which is identified below.

2.

Basis for

decision

I have taken into account:

the content of the record requested;

the relevant provisions of the Archives Act 1983 the Act ;

policy

and

guidelines of National Archives of Australia

that

relate to the access

examination of

ommonwealth

records; and

information

provided by

the

Department

of Foreign Affairs

and

the

Department

of

Defence

on

which I have relied in formulating my decision.

3. Material withheld

Category of material withheld Total number of folios per

List each folio separately

category

by

category of

material

withheld

Partially exempted folios 11

1, 2, 3,

4,

5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11

certain parts of the text

have

been

expunged)

Wholly exemp

ted

folios 0

Folios

not

within

the open 0

access period as defined in s3

7) of the Act

Folios

withheld pending 0

agency examination and advice

Statement

o

Reasons page no. 1

o

3

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Annexure

Table A Material exempted by folio number and grouped by the application of exemption provisions

Relevant legislative

Folio Findings of fact

Reasons for Decision

provision invoked

under

number

33 of the Act

S

33 1)

a) - information

1 2 3

These records are partially exempt as they contain: The disclosure of this information could lead to

or matter the disclosure

4 5 6

compromise of past and current procedures and

of which unde r this Act

7 8 9

Intelligence information of continuing sensitivity which

could reasonably be expected to cause damage

could reasonably be

10,11

remains properly security classified .

to the security defence and international

expected to cause

relations of the Commonwealth.

damage to the security

defence or int ernational

relations of the

Commonwealth.

Statement of reasons page no 3 o 3

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Title

Minister

Purpose/Issues

1

ation to

st ing policy

Sensitivity Criticism

leg islation

involved

Urgency:

itical/significant

..

tes

1sultation:

Min

isters/Depts

consulted

Is there

agreement?

Timing/handling

of

announcement

Cost

liHDIIU

J IIV l iUi l i : : I :

A

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I

FOR CABINET

TOP

S . t : . R E f

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copy

No. -

.

SOVIET TECHNICAL SECURITY ACTIVITY

AUSTRALIAN

EMBASSY, MOS OW

Senator the

Hon Gareth Evans

QC,

Minister

for

Foreign

Affairs

and

Trade

t tention to the

possibil i ty

that a

was

plac

of the

in

Moscow

agencies.

To

recommend

that

the Australian Federal

Police

investigate the possibi l i ty that

an

Australia-based

off icer

or former officer of

the

Embassy was suborned.

The

Prime

Minister s Directive

on

Guidelines

for

the

Management of

the

Australian Government

Presence Overseas

states that the Department of

Foreign

Affairs and

Trade

DFAT)

is

responsible

for a l l

aspects

of physical,

technical

and

personnel

security

at

missions

overseas and

for securi ty

policy affecting

Australian missions.

Yes Were

information

about

the possible

compromise

of

Embassy security and/or the

Federal

Police investigation

to leak, i t would doubtless at t rac t

keen

domestic

interest . As is

customary

the Government and

DFAT

would

refuse to

comment on

matters of

security.

t

is

possible

that

an

offence

may

have

been

committed

under

the

Crimes

Act

1914

AFP investigation should commence as soon as possible.

Senator

Evans proposed

to the Prime Minister that the

matter be

treated

as

a

closed agenda item

of

the Security

Committee and no consultat ion with departments on this

Submission

has taken place.

N/A

N/A

Fin

Yr

Fin Yr

Fin Yr

I

I

I

I

)

I

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CABIN E r r::

C O ~ ~ ~ ~

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2. TOP SE RET

USTEO

In April 1989

in

the course

of

work being undertaken in

t

enclosure

of

the

Moscow

Chancery

an unexplained

wire

la te r identified as

a

l ikely

, was found by Australian

technical

officers

working

in

the

area

concerned. Preliminary

forensic

analysis by the

Defence Materials

Research

Laboratory has failed to clar i fy

with any certainty the origin

or

age

of

the But

technical

tes ts

of

the have

shown that

i t is very

capable of acting as an

effective

conduit into and out of

the

2. Completion of forensic examination of a l l related

communications equipment may s t i l l be some months off . I f that

examination proves

f rui t less the exact

nature

and purpose

of

the may

always remain

a

matter

for

conjecture.

But

the likelihood that i t

was

implanted ei ther by

or at their direction is real

especial ly

since there has been a history

of

on

our

Moscow Embassy most

recently in

November

1988

when

the

positioning

of

a

l l

outside

the

Chancery

probably

containing VHF intercept equipment

could have no other innocent

explanation. Further detai ls are in Attachment

A

3. The area in the Chancery where the was

discovered

was las t inspected thoroughly

by

Australian

technical

officers in September

1983. Those

involved

are

adamant

that the

was

not in posit ion a t that

time.

This

suggests

that placement took

place

subsequently to

September 1983. Alternatively of course despite

their

disclaimers the

wire

may have

been

inadvertently

l e f t in the

enclosure by the

technical

off icers in

1983 -

in

which case a l l

speculation around

i t

could be dismissed.

4. But

the

point is that we have

to go

with what we have and

on the evidence

available

two disturbing

possibi l i t ies

emerge.

Firs t

that

the

sometime af t e r 1983.

AuSTE

0

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~ C B I N E T I N C O N I D N t :

U

EO

3.

TOP

SE RET

or that the

was implanted by an A-based member of the Embassy s taff or

an off icial Australian visi tor at

the

behest of

5. Physical inspection of the

Embassy

in July

1989

indicates

that unassisted

covert penetration

is only

a

remote

possibi l i ty. The only feasible route would involve high r isk

of detection

given

the physical

security

measures including

permanent A-based

guard

presence

in

place

in

the

Moscow

Embassy.

This leads inevitably to

the

possibi l i ty of covert

entry assisted by an

A-based

member of staff or of an

A-based

s taff

member or vis i tor

himself/herself placing

the

t

is estimated that

i t would

take less than

two minutes to

secrete

the wire in the vent. Thus a l l A-based

officers who

have or have had

access to

the

during working hours or who have

had

the

combinations

to the

locks

permitting such access af ter

hours

are to

be

seen as

potent ia l ly

capable

of

having

implanted the

Furthermore this would

apply

to

vi tual ly

al l

serving and

former

A-based

s taff

of

the Embassy since

September

1983 and many

of

the off icial vis i tors since

that time as well. Interviewing

a l l

these persons

would clearly

be

a daunting task.

6. One

option therefore would

be to take

no

further

investigative action but to ensure the t ightening of any

remaining

gaps

in the

physical

and

technical

security

of

the

Embassy Attachment B refers . But

this

is

not

a

happy

option. f there is some circumstantial information

indicating

the

possibi l i ty

of

be investigated.

The

alternat ive

and

favoured option therefore

is

to

have

the Australian Federal Police conduct such

investigation.

This will entai l

interviewing

a l l DF T

technical s ta f f who have worked

in

Moscow and a l l serving and

former

A-based s ta f f

of

the

Embassy

since

September 1983.

t

3

1

ot c o n s i d c A M N

E T ? ~ e ~ C ~ ~ ~ N ~ f

l J S r E

0

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C B NET R B J ca CON

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4. TOP

SE RET

A USTEO

visi tors

who

would

theoretically

have had

access

to

the area

as

well.

7.

There

is an indication that the ABC correspondent in Moscow

has already deduced

that

a

111111 of

some

sort has

been

located

in the

Embassy.

Also once any Federal

Police investigation is

under way there

would

be r isk of leak

by some

of those

interviewed. f the investigation becomes public knowledge

there

will be

some

fal lout , though

perhaps

not

much

affecting

USSR/Australia relations. Pending the

conclusions

and results

of

any

investigation

the

Government

should adopt

i t s

customary

/

practice of declining to

comment on

security issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. I recommend

that

Cabinet

a)

note the possib i l i ty that

there has been compromise

of

Australian classif ied information at the Australian Embassy

in Moscow

b) invite the

Minister

for Just ice

to

have the

Australian

Federal Police investigate the possibi l i ty that 11111111

was placed in the Australian Embassy premises in Moscow

by

with from a member

30

October

GARETH EVANS

CAB 1NET

-IN O

N

L L ~

TOP SE RET US O

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ATTACHMENT A

SOVIET TECHNICAL ATTACKS :

CHRONOLOGY

The Australian Embassy to the USSR has occupied

since

1959

a two-storey

mansion with outbuildings.

The

f i r s t

storey

houses the

Ambassador s

office, the

poli t ical

off icers and the

secure area incorporating the classif ied regis t ry and a

been guarded

24

hours per

day

since 1960 by

Australia-based

personnel. The

ground

floor

serves

as

the Ambassador s

Official

Residence.

What

is

cal led

the

Chancery

annex

occupies

the

outbuildings

and

here are

located

the Embassy s

administrative,

consular and

t rade s taff

2.

In 1976

f i re

broke out in the Residence underneath the

communications area,

spread throughout

the secure area

and was

put out by Soviet

firemen.

During the subsequent refurbishment

was

discovered

in 1978

where workmen from the

were

repairing plaster work

in

the Chancery.

Further

invest igat ions revealed

similar

3.

In

1979 a new

provide

information

within

information in the

was

a means of containing

a controlled and

secure volume.

of

This

provide a habitable environment for the users of such

provision

must

be made

for

ingress/egreses,

air

and

power supplies.

The most

practicable

means of providing

the

required

a i r

supply is via

an

attenuating window/vent coupled

with

an

acoustic

f i l t e r

i e an

attenuvent

CABIN :

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C A D l N E T - I N a C O N F I D : ~ : : : U TEO

6.TOP SECRET 0

TT CHMENT

A

4.

In August 1986 the combination

lock

which had been f i t ted

to the

secure area

entrance class B door was replaced and

returned to Canberra for inspection.

concluded that an

attack

had taken

place

on

the lock

whilst

the

Melbourne Defence Material Research Laboratory

was

of

the

opinion that an attack could

not be ruled

out.

6. This and incidents at five other Australian

missions

indicating

physical penetration of

sensitive

Chancery areas led

Cabinet

to approve in 1987

{Minute

9778 {SEC)) a

project

-

known

now as

the

time delay access

control

system

TD CS -

to

upgrade the locking and

intrusion

alarm

systems a t the 30 posts

with the highest technical

security threat

from HIAs.

7. - In 1987 the

instal lat ion

of

a new P BX encountered

technical

diff icult ies

caused

by

A technical

Security

Officer was

sent

from

Canberra

to investigate and was

harassed

to a

greater

)]I extent than has previously

been

experienced.

A team was

sent

in and instal led a

secure

earth

rod

for the communications and

P BX

instal lat ions.

8.

A

resident

technical

security officer position

has been on

our Moscow establishment since 1984. June 1988

by

that officer revealed

evidence

of a marked deterioration in

the performance of the and i t was

decided

to

remove

communications to

a

small

new

temporary

unt i l the could be completely

refurbished. The communications equipment was moved to the Ill

on

October

1988

and

five days l ter a

caravan

commonly

used

by

Russian

work

personnel

on

construction

projects)

was

parked

5-6

metres

from the Embassy

boundary

C BSNET

IN-CONFIDENCE

A uST O

TOP

S F l R f = ~ ~

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CABUNi:T aN

CONFID5NC :Au

srEo

1

TOP SE RET

r

ATTACHMENT A

wall. Subsequent

analysis

of the

at our

Embassy

emanating

from the

These

stopped

on 2 November and were

replaced

by

an

from the Novosti

press agency

building a t

the rear

of

the Chancery annex.

The high levels of

measured precluded

any

innocent origin. t

seemed that

the Soviets

were ei ther trying to verify the

new

location

for

our

Soon after the l l

appeared representations were made to

the

Foreign

Ministry

about the reasons

for

i t and

i t

was removed on 3 November.

we know l i t t l e about Soviet

crypto

intercept

DSD advised

DFAT on 29 March 1989

various

recommendations

on

search

and

securi ty

procedures.

In

the l ight of this

information i t

was decided to

replace

completely

the large

t J

A

common parti t ion wall

of similar

the enclosure creating two rooms

of

a

siamese

configuration.

10. On 8 April 1989 during the

dismantling

of the enclosure a

piece of wire

was found folded through

copper core black

insulated electr ical

wire formed

an

approximate 2 mm diameter loop on the inside of the

The two ends protruded

airconditioning ducting.

into

the

external

11.

A

preliminary

report

on

forensic analysis

of that

device

by

the Defence Materials

Research

Laboaratory

cannot clarify

with

CAD IN

1 : r

r ~

C O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ :

B t o

T P SE R

El tl4

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~ : ;

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any certainty i t s

country of

origin or age of

Technical tes t s of have shown that i t is very

capable of

acting as

an effective conduit

into

and

out

of the

I t s

exact

purpose

s t i l l remains unknown.

I t

may be connected

with some

other

device

in returned

communications

equipment from

Moscow but completion of forensic

examination of

that

equipment

is

s t i l l

some months

off.

I f

that

examination proves

frui t less and unless our opposite

numbers

in

technical security services overseas

in response

to

our recent enquiry}

confirm

that

they have encountered a

i t s

intent may

always

remain

a

matter

for

conjecture.

C B

J

NET

-IN

ONFIDEM J

T P

S R TAUSTEO

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~ U

T

EO

9 TOP SE RET

~

ATTACHMENT

B

MOS OW ACTION PLAN FOR REMEDYING SECURITY

SHORTCOMINGS AS AT

18

OCTOBER

1989

Recommendation

Comment

Rl Replace

type

with

improved Completed

May 1989

R2

Carry

out forensic

examination

of old

R3

t s t new

communications

ins ta l la t ion to

be

instal led in Moscow

R4 Replace

communications

system Moscow

RS

t s t

of typewriters and

FACIT

tape

punch

returned

from Moscow

Carry

out

forensic

examination

R6 t s t of communications equipment

returned from

Moscow

and carry

out

forensic

examination

R7

Upgrade CCTV

coverage

both internally

and externally

to

ensure

no

gaps in

coverage

R8 Upgrade alarm system by provision

of

video motion detection

and

the improve-

ment

of

mimic panels

Completed

June

1989

Completed

September 1989

Completed

October

1989

Commenced

ugust

1989

Commenced

October

1989

Completed

October 1989

Equipment

forwarded to

Moscow

October

1989

R9 Replace uninterruptible power supply for

Equipment ordered

alarm

system

awaiting

delivery

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C O

It:E i IN -

C O ~ l ? I D

N C i)Tf 0

lo TOP SEC

\o

Recommendation

RIO

Instal

f i re alarms

in secure area

Rll

Instal door in

basement to res t r ic t

access during functions

Rl2 Instal

secure

telephone system STUll)

R13 Replace padlocks and combination

locks

on gr i l les vault

doors,

secure doors

and

containers

Rl4

Instal

time delay access

control system

on

vault door

and

secure entry

doors

Rl5

Replace

enclosure a i r

conditioning

system

Rl6 Carry

out forensic

inspection of motor

alternators

sent from

Moscow to U

Rl7 Test and

recal ibrate

Rl8

Rl9

used

to

protect

equipment

and

to photograph

a l l

parts

TT CHMENT B

Comment

Proposed

January 1989

Completed

To be installed

in January 1990

Completed

August 1989

To be installed

in January 1990

Under

design

consideration

Awaiting advice

from FCO

Completed

September

1989

Commenced

September

1989

Awaiting

availabi l i ty

of

equipment

from

U Government

C

B I N E T I N C O ~ F D E N C

TOP S E C R E

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Recommendation

R20 Implement a

ctivi ty

R21

Provide

new

X-ray equipment

to

post

R22 Carry

out

non-destructive

NOT) test ing

of outer Chancery walls

R23 Inspect anomalies in outer Chancery

walls

R24

Carry out

NOT

of

selected

load bearing

inner walls

R25 Carry

out inspection of

wooden flooring

on ground

and

f i rs t floors

R26

Inspect

ut i l i t i e s

for

anomalies

R27

Inspect basement

for surrepti t ious

entry points

R28

Trench

dir t

floor

beside

main

load

bearing

walls

R29

Inspect

roof and

t t ic for egress of

any wired system

CAB N

s r

N

c o t ~ F i r t : N

~

Comment

Quotes being

obtained

Completed

Completed

October 1989

Currently in

p r o r ~ s s

Proposed

1990

Proposed

1990

Completed in

previous

inspections

Proposed

1990

Proposed

1990

Has

been done

progressively;

will continue

1990

TOP SE RETAUSi O

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