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Candidate Number: 47159
Unit: POLI 31555
Supervisor: Am FriisKristensen
Word Count: 9, 991
DISSERTATION
Will China succeed in becoming a regional hegemon,
overcoming US supremacy in the region?
by
Jonathan Manning
Academic Year 2013/14
This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of BSc in Politics
This dissertation contains no plagiarism, has not been submitted in whole or in part for the award of another degree, and is solely the work of Jonathan Manning
Jonathan Manning
30/04/2014
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Abstract:
The focus of this dissertation is the question of whether China will achieve regional hegemony in East
Asia. This will be approached by using a framework derived from Robert S. Ross (2006) article, which
seeks to assess the impact of a rising power on a secondary-state. The two main elements of this
framework are measures of economic dependence and of strategic alignment. After placing this
research in a theoretical context in the literature review, the selection of Japan will is justified based
on it being the secondary-state in the region with the most hostile relationship with China. The hostile
relations with China make Japan the best candidate for the subject of this research. By applying the
framework to Japan, and comparing the results with the Ross case studies (South Korea and Taiwan),
judgments can be made about the existence, or not, of a pattern and the implications of these findings
can be used to make predictions about the future of the wider East Asian security environment.
Japan is in the early stages of complete economic dependency on China, and there is an indication that
the future of Japan’s strategic alignment will be moving away from the US, towards deeper
engagement with Asia.
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Contents
List of Figures 5
List of Abbreviations 5
List of Appendices 5
1 Introduction 6
1.1 Why is this research important 6
1.2 Research focus 7
1.3 Structure 8
2 Literature Review 10
2.1 Sino-US conflict 10
2.2 Secondary-state alignment 15
3 Defining Terms 17
3.1 Defining the region 17
3.2 Defining regional hegemony 17
3.3 Defining a secondary-state 18
4 Why Study Japan? 20
4.1 Historic hostility 20
4.1a Pre-Second World War 20
4.1b Second Sino-Japanese War 23
4.1c Present Day 25
4.2 US-Japan Alliance 28
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5 South Korea and Taiwan Accommodation 30
5.1 Economic Dependence 30
5.2 Accommodation 32
6 Japan and the Rise of China 34
6.1 Economic Dependence 34
6.2 Accommodation 36
7 Conclusion 4
Bibliography 43
Appendix A 49
Appendix B 50
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List of Figures
4.1 Japan and China: Impressions of Each Other’s Country
6.1 Japanese Export Destinations
6.2 Japanese Outward FDI Flows
List of Appendices
Appendix A: Original work
Appendix B: Unoriginal work
List of Abbreviations
EAC - East Asian Community
DPJ - Democratic Party of Japan
FDI - Foreign-direct investment
LDP - Liberal Democratic Party of Japan
PRC - People’s Republic of China
US - United States
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1. Introduction
Why is this research important?
In the recent past a huge number of books, scholarly articles, reports and newspaper
columns have been devoted to the so-called ‘rise of China’. This phrase refers to a number of
factors. In large part it is a reference to the extraordinary level of economic success China
has experienced in the last 30 years. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping introduced a series of reforms;
the economic modernization at the heart of the reform package is responsible for enabling
China’s rapid growth. Between 1978 and 2011, average real GDP growth was approximately
10 percent per annum (Haltmaier, 2013: 1). The extremely high and sustained level of
economic growth, taken into consideration along with China’s huge population, some 1.35
billion (UN Statistics Division, 2014), and its vast land mass, has resulted in China being
discussed as a new or potential superpower.
If the prediction that China will soon become a superpower is correct this will inevitably
affect the regional, and therefore the global, distribution of power. Since the end of the Cold
War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has enjoyed a period of global dominance
as the world’s sole superpower. The ‘rise of China’ refers to a general perception that China
is on the verge of achieving superpower status, and as such, is the country most likely to
challenge the global supremacy of the United States (US). This has led to vast attention being
paid to the question of potential conflict between the rising superpower and the established
superpower.
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However, much of this debate appears to be premature: China has yet to achieve regional
dominance. The US is still the prevailing great power in East Asia. If China does succeed in
altering the regional balance of power and replacing the US as the regional hegemon then
China would have become, or be extremely near becoming, a superpower. Consequently,
serious conflict between the rising power and established power would be a real possibility.
However, if China does not succeed in gaining regional supremacy, any potential conflict
would be at worst a medium-scale, local confrontation. Therefore, it is important to
determine whether China will succeed in acquiring the position of regional hegemon,
displacing US preponderance in the region.
Research focus
The aim of this research is to determine the likelihood of China reaching regional
hegemon status. The geographical regions over which China has historically possessed a
high degree of influence are the areas it is most likely to dominate in the future. Specifically,
Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Therefore, these areas will be the focus of the research. If
China is to become a regional hegemon, it is most likely that this is the area that its
hegemony will cover.
To assess the likelihood of Chinese regional hegemony this paper will examine the
relationship between China and a key secondary-state in the region. Studying the alignment
of a key secondary-states may give an indication of the probability for a power shift in the
region. The secondary-state that will serve as the primary focus for this research is Japan.
The logic behind selecting these countries is three-fold. Firstly, Japan has historically viewed
itself as a regional leader. Secondly, Japan has been an historical adversary of China, and a
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mutual hostility remains. Thirdly, Japan has enjoyed a close alliance with the US. This makes
Japan the least likely secondary-state to support a Chinese goal of regional hegemony. Thus,
if a shift can be detected within the alignment of Japan towards accommodation of China, or
movement away from the United States, it will be an indication that China wields power in
the region. Furthermore, it could be an indicator that it has made progress in altering the
regional power dynamic from one of US supremacy, to a bipolar balance-of-power, or even
to one where it is on the route to regional hegemony.
This paper will use the realism of Robert S. Ross (2006), and his writing on secondary-state
alignment, as a starting point for this paper. This framework will be applied to Japan to
compare the results with Ross’ own examples: South Korea and Taiwan, to establish if there
is a pattern. Questions that this dissertation shall attempt to answer include:
- What is the current great power alignment in the key secondary-states?
- Is there evidence of growing economic links between the key secondary-states and
China?
- Is there evidence that these economic links influence the secondary-states’
alignment?
- Is there an indication of these states changing their position, or actually
accommodating China?
- What does this suggest in relation to China’s chances of becoming regional
hegemon?
Structure
The paper will begin with a literature review to provide some theoretical context to the
research. It will highlight the various prominent perspectives, and their approach to the ‘rise
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of China’ issue. The next chapter will be used for describing the specific definitions of key
terms. It will detail exactly what ‘region’ we are discussing when referring to ‘regional
hegemony’. The term ‘hegemony’ will be defined along with the term secondary-state. The
fourth chapter will be concerned with justifying the selection of Japan as the secondary-state
of focus. The content will cover the historic animosity that exists between Japan and China
and the unusually strong US-Japan alliance, both of which make Japan a highly suitable
choice for this research. Chapter five will contain the framework drawn from Ross(2006),
with evidence that Taiwan and South Korea have begun accommodating China’s rise and
distancing themselves from the US. This section will attempt to show that the
accommodating of China is the occurring as the economies of Taiwan and South Korea
becoming heavily dependent on the Chinese economy. The heart of the research, applying
the framework derived from Ross to the secondary-state Japan, will be detailed in chapter
six. This will look at the economic relationship between Japan and China over recent years
and see if there is evidence of economic dependence. The seventh, and final, chapter will
state the conclusions derived from this study. Most significantly, it will attempt to provide
an answer as to whether there is a pattern of secondary-states becoming economically
entwined with China, and of this leading to accommodating security policies towards
China’s rise.
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2. Literature Review
As mentioned above, the ‘rise of China’ and the potential impact on the distribution of
power has been the subject of a vast amount of attention/speculation. There is a diverse
range of views as to what the future holds for Asia. This literature review will give a brief
summary of the positions taken by prominent proponents of the mainstream international
relations theoretical perspectives to position this research.
Shortly following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the eminent realist scholar Aaron L.
Friedberg wrote a seminal article for the journal International Security in which he argued
that Asia was a region likely to see instability and new rivalries form. One reason offered for
this judgement was the under-developed nature of the regional institutions compared to
Europe’s (1993: 22). Friedberg also said that a lack of a common culture in Asia made
regional cooperation less likely, and competition or conflict more of a possibility (1993: 24).
“Ripe for Rivalry” took a pessimistic view of the potential for peace in Asia. This article was
the beginning of a post-Cold War discussion within the international relations academic
community about the future of the regional power dynamics of Asia.
Sino-US conflict
By the end of the 1990s, the continuing poor performance of the Japanese economy and
persistently exceptional rate of economic growth experienced by China had led to an
evolution of the question; from one of a multipolar Asia, to one considering the consequence
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of the rise of China and the possibility of a Sino-US conflict. Friedberg also takes a negative
position on the specific question of the potential for conflict between the US and China:
“Optimistic realists who believe that China’s ambition will be limited (assuming, again, that
the PRC’s power grows), or who put their faith in the possibility that geography or
technology (or arms control treaties) can mute the security dilemma, are misguided and
perhaps should not even be considered realists”
(2005: 41).
Criticism is not reserved only for optimistic realists such as Charles Glaser (2011). In the
same passage, Friedberg expresses his opinion of the value of neo-liberal emphasis on
economic trade and international institutions. “As in the past, the liberal panaceas of
international trade and institutions will prove insufficient to keep peace between contending
powers” (2005: 41). From this realist perspective, there is a strong likelihood of security
competition, and perhaps conflict between the rising power, China, and the established
power, the US.
The offensive realism of John Mearsheimer takes this pessimistic view one step further.
According to this strand of neo-realism, conflict between the US and China is inevitable. In
offensive realism relative power is seen as the most important factor guiding decisions.
Mearsheimer claims that states that enjoy regional hegemon status, such as the US, will
attempt to block all other great powers from achieving regional hegemony (2001: 41).
Simultaneously, the theory claims in relation to China that any potential hegemon will strive
to become a fully-fledged regional hegemon, as this is “the best way for any state to
maximise its prospects for survival” (2001: 402). If both of these claims are true then
offensive realism suggests that, given the sustained economic success of China, it is likely
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that there will be some kind of clash between the rising and established powers.
Mearsheimer explains explicitly saying:
“China cannot rise peacefully…the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense
security competition with considerable potential for war”
(Brzezinski and Mearsheimer, 2005: 47).
However, many scholars strongly disagree with this pessimistic vision of Asia’s future.
Theorists from a neo-liberal institutional perspective have many assumptions in common
with neo-realism; but they believe that neo-realists focus disproportionately on competition,
and the potential for conflict (Lamy, 2011: 121). Neo-liberal scholars tend to have a more
positive outlook for the future of great-power relations in Asia. They view international
institutions as a stabilizing force, due to their belief that institutions encourage cooperation
between states, and can alter their strategic calculations (Acharya, 2008: 68).
Neo-liberal institutionalists, such as G. John Ikenberry, are much more optimistic that
Sino-US relations will not descend into conflict. One of the main reasons given by Ikenberry
for his optimism is the structure of the current international world system:
“…unlike the imperial systems of the past, the Western order is built around rules and norms
of non-discrimination and market openness, creating the conditions for rising states to
advance their expanding economic and political goals within it”
(2008: 29)
Due to the nature of the institutions that comprise the existing international system, China
does not need, in their view, to challenge the current system in order to increase its
economic and political power. In fact, Jia and Rosecrance (2010) go so far as to say that not
only has China accepted the world order, it actually has become a strong supporter of it.
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A second strand of the neo-liberal perspective focuses on arguments that promulgate the
notion that increasing levels of economic interdependence between nations makes conflict
less likely (Keohane and Nye, 2001; Papayoanou, 1999). Globalization and transnational
production mean that many economies are interlinked to such a degree, that initiating
conflict will be deterred due to the high cost of the loss of trade. Economic concerns have an
impact on a state’s preferences for the various options in balance-of-power politics
(Papayoanou, 1999: 7). Given the high degree of economic interdependence between China
and the US (Wang, 2005: 47-48), the accuracy and impact of this element of neo-liberal
institutionalism is of high importance. If the neo-liberal interpretation of economic
interdependence is correct it suggests that, due to mutual interest, conflict between the US
and China is unlikely.
However, neo-liberal institutionalism is not the only theoretical perspective that sees
institutions as positive. Social constructivism shares many neo-liberal beliefs about the
creation and role of institutions in the international system (Acharya, 2008: 68).
Constructivism is a social, rather than a substantive, theory of international politics (Barnett,
2011: 154). It views international interactions as shaped by more than simply money and
power. Constructivism is not a uniform perspective, but all agree on the importance of ideas,
norms, culture and identity in shaping states’ perceived interests (Acharya, 2008: 69). These
subjective factors are socially constructed, and consequently they evolve over time. The
degree to which a constructivist is an optimist or a pessimist, in relation to Asia’s future
security dynamics, is determined by their assessment of the dominant ideas, norms and
identities in various key states, and on their judgement of the direction in which these will
evolve.
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The constructivist David Kang (2007) views Asia’s regional future as likely to be a largely
stable one, based on a return of a Sino-centric hierarchical system. Kang puts forward
evidence that secondary-states in the region have already begun bandwagoning, rather than
balancing, in response to the rise of China (2003: 82). His argument is essentially that Asia is
in the process of moving back to a modern version of the tributary trade order experienced
in the region prior to the nineteenth century. This position is supported by Shambaugh, who
notes that China’s engagement with its periphery has set it on a path leading towards
regional dominance (2008: 10). The old hierarchical trade system has been described as
producing a “long epoch of peace and prosperity” (Seldon, 2009). Kang believes this stability
will be replicated in the new hierarchical order. From this viewpoint, China will achieve
dominance of the region, maybe actual regional hegemony, without the intense competition
or conflict envisaged by realist scholars.
However, many constructivists strongly dispute Kang’s assessment (Acharya, 2008: 71).
A fellow constructivist, Amitav Acharya, has made a number of compelling criticisms of
Kang’s position. Firstly, Acharya disputes the notion that the historic hierarchical tributary
trade-order was a peaceful system, or one that Asians are naturally, culturally inclined
towards (2003: 164). He also disputes Kang’s assertion that states in the region are already
bandwagoning, that is, changing their alignment, to accommodate China. Acharya views the
ASEAN states as pursuing neither balancing nor bandwagoning, but what he describes as
“engagement” (2003: 152). This strategy seeks to bind both the US and China to the regional
power architecture through regional interdependence and institutions (Acharya, 2003: 153).
The goal is to moderate China by raising the costs of conflict, and to prevent the US from
measures designed to contain China, which ASEAN nations perceive as likely to be counter-
productive. If Acharya’s analysis is accurate, the benign hierarchy envisaged by Kang is not
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in the process of formation. Rather than a region dominated by China, Acharya’s
constructivist position seems to suggest a multipolar power structure where neither China
nor the US possesses regional dominance.
Secondary-state alignment
As mentioned above, this paper will seek to address the question of the likelihood that
China will achieve regional hegemony, by focusing on the alignment of a key secondary-
state: Japan. Robert S. Ross has contributed a lot to this specific area of secondary-state
alignment. Writing from a neo-realist perspective, Ross criticizes traditional and structural
realists for uniformly overlooking economic factors when examining state alignment (2006:
366). He also criticizes realist political economy literature for overlooking the role of military
power, and for emphasizing the independent role of economic power on alignment. Ross
sees a role for looking at economic power, as well as societal developments (2006: 366-68),
but it appears that, for him, military power is the most important factor in determining a
secondary-state’s alignment.
However, while Ross is correct that military power, economic power and cultural
influences (soft power) all play a role in a secondary-state’s alignment preferences, this essay
will argue that economic power is the most influential factor on alignment decisions. To be
more precise, the importance of economic links is minimized in Ross’ analysis. This paper
will examine the notion that economic links have the most influence on the alignment
preferences of secondary states. Ross himself has presented evidence that Taiwan and South
Korea are accommodating the rise of China (2006; 2010). As a neo-realist, the variation in
China’s military power is seen as the key factor determining alignment decisions (Ross,
2006: 379). The relative increase in China’s land-based military capabilities is distinguished
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from the lack of any relative improvement in their maritime military power-projection
capability (Ross, 2006: 372). The failure to develop military power over the maritime nations
of East Asia is interpreted as meaning that China lacks the capacity to coerce maritime East
Asian secondary states into accommodating its rise (Ross, 2010: 540-41). However, this paper
contends that the evidence presented about Taiwan and South Korean accommodation is
actually part of a pattern of economic power leading to alterations in the alignment
preferences of secondary states towards China.
This essay will examine the economic links between China and the key secondary state
that is the primary subject of this study: namely, Japan. It will seek to establish if the
experiences of South Korea and Taiwan are isolated cases whose accommodation has been
caused due to their geographical proximity to China, or if they are representative of a wider
pattern. After briefly outlining the evidence that Taiwan and South Korea have started to
accommodate the rise of China, the focus will shift to see if the same process is occurring in
Japan. First, an investigation of economic links will give an indication as to whether there
has been a deepening in the economic relationship between China and the secondary-states.
Second, if there has been a notable increase in the bilateral economic relationship between
China and Japan, this study will seek to assess whether there is evidence that closer
economic relations with China have led the secondary-state to soften its security stance
towards China, and/or away from the US. If Japan can be shown to have started to
accommodate China’s rise after a period of substantial increases in economic ties with
China, this will suggest that China’s economic rise is having a significant effect on
secondary-state alignment decisions.
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3. Defining Terms
Due to the variations in what scholars mean when using the same word, providing clear
and specific definitions of key terms at the beginning of a piece of research is very useful. A
few of the key terms used in this research will be defined so as to ensure there is no
confusion as to the exact meaning that is being employed within this text.
Defining the region
When addressing the question of whether China will become a regional hegemon the first
definition required is of what ‘region’ China may become hegemon. The region in question
is ‘East Asia’. The United Nations defines ‘eastern Asia’ as the countries of China (including
special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau), Japan, North Korea, South Korea
and Mongolia (UN Statistics Division, 2012). However, others challenge this definition of
East Asia. For David Shambaugh, Asia consists of five distinct sub-regions: Australasia,
Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Central Asia and South Asia (2008: 4). The UN’s definition
of East Asia is referred to as Northeast Asia in this way of labelling the continent.
Shambaugh’s approach is preferable: when this paper mentions ‘East Asia’ it is referring to
the combined sub-regions of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia (made-up of the ten ASEAN
countries). This is the region over which China is most likely to gain dominance, and hence
it is the focus of the question as to whether China will succeed in achieving regional
hegemon status.
Defining regional hegemony
The next definition required is that of ‘regional hegemony’. However, to define this term
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it is first necessary to define ‘hegemony’ on its own. “A hegemon is a state so powerful that
it dominates all the other states in the system” (Mearsheimer, 2001: 40). According to this
definition, a hegemon is a state that no other state has the military power to challenge; the
only great power in the system. Mearsheimer states that it is impossible, due to the vast
expanses of ocean, for any country to achieve true hegemony, which would be global
hegemony (2001: 41). He therefore distinguishes between global hegemony and regional
hegemony.
Goodin, Güth and Snidal (2005) have a similar definition, but their conception of
hegemony is less dominated by military power compared to Mearsheimer’s. According to
Goodin et al., “…hegemony does not mean total control but only substantial influence across
a wide range of areas and issues”. Goodin et al. draw the distinction between hegemony and
empire, in which the dominating power controls its subordinates through formalized and
hierarchical power structures (2005: 4). The nuance in this conception of hegemony away
from a realist focus only on military power allows it to acknowledge that hegemony is more
complicated than a simple case of who is militarily unchallengeable. Goodin et al. give other
dimensions of hegemony including economic hegemony. Defined in relation to production,
trade and finance, economic hegemony “provides powerful levers to influence less powerful
states (Goodin, Güth and Snidal, 2005: 4).
Defining a secondary-state
The focus of this research, as mentioned above, is on influence of the rise of China on
secondary-state’s alignment decisions. This being the case, a brief definition of a ‘secondary-
state’ is required. Ross defines a secondary-state in relation to the concept of a ‘great power’.
There is a distinction between:
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“great powers, those states that can contend in a war with any other state in the system, from
secondary states, which cannot independently provide for their security against any other
state”
(Ross, 2006: 357)
The example given is that of Japan. Unable to defend itself against all potential threats, it is
natural for a secondary state to seek an alliance. Japan has enjoyed a strong alliance with the
US since the end of the Second World War. Most countries are secondary states. For
example, during the Cold War virtually all states in the world were secondary states with
the exceptions of the US and Russia (and possibly China).
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4. Why study Japan?
This section of the chapter will detail the reasons why Japan was chosen as the subject of
this research. The overarching question that this paper seeks to contribute towards
answering is whether China will succeed in becoming regional hegemon in East Asia; the
area defined as described above as a combination of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. A
decision was made to examine the strategic alignment of a key secondary-state to establish
whether there is evidence that the rise of China is resulting in the shifting of alignment away
from the US, towards a more accommodating position in relation to China. Japan was
selected as the secondary-state subject for two main reasons. Firstly, there has been an
historic animosity between China and Japan that has its origins over one hundred years ago.
Secondly, Japan has enjoyed an extremely close alliance with the US over the last sixty years,
being its most important ally in the region. These factors make Japan the secondary-state in
the defined region least likely to acquiesce and begin accommodating China. Therefore, if a
shift towards accommodation of China can be detected in this secondary-state, it will give a
strong indication that China has a high probability of achieving regional hegemony in the
future. If Japan succumbs to China’s rise, it is hard to see what secondary-states in the region
will not, in time, seek to accommodate China.
Historic Hostility
PRE-SECOND WORLD WAR
As stated, the first reason for selecting Japan as the secondary-state of focus for this
research was due to its unique relationship with China, which can be characterized as one of
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historic hostility. At present, much of the mutual animosity that exists between Japan and
China is attributed to the events and aftermath of the Second World War. However, to truly
understand this phenomenon it is necessary to look further back in Sino-Japanese relations.
The starting point for this fractious relationship can be found in the end phase of the
historical Sino-centric tributary trade order mentioned above in relation to David Kang’s
assessment of the future for the region. This regional international system endured for
centuries with China at the centre, achieving its classical refinement in the Ming and Qing
dynasties, between 1368 and 1911 (Kim, 2008: 38). However, the hierarchical trade system
was in effect destroyed by 1860 (2008: 40). The collapse of the Sino-centric tribute system
was, to a large extent, due to the actions of western powers; notably the British in the
‘Opium Wars’. Ironically, it was the same type of western gunboat diplomacy that
compelled Japan to cease its 200-year policy of seclusion from the outside world, which laid
the foundations for the Meiji restoration and the birth of Japanese imperialism with the
resulting regional dominance (Kim, 2008: 43).
The origin of the historic hostility was not the Second World War, but the First Sino-
Japanese War of August 1894 to April 1895. This conflict confirmed the demise of China as a
regional power whilst it simultaneously declared Japan’s ascension to the status of most
powerful nation in East Asia. A defeat by a western power could be explained away, but a
defeat by a much smaller nation of the Confucian world shattered the perception of China as
holding the head position within the regional order (Paine, 2003: 5). The removal of China
from the Korean peninsula at the end of the war symbolically removed its last tributary state
of the hierarchical trade order. However, a much more damaging consequence was the end
of Chinese sovereignty. The period directly following the war has been termed “the
scramble for concessions” as European powers raced to add whole provinces, not just major
ports as in the previous era, to their spheres of influence (Paine, 2003: 9). The First Sino-
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Japanese War, and the partition of China that followed, marked an incredible fall: from
regional superpower for hundreds of years, to a nation that no longer even controlled its
own territorial integrity. To many Chinese, Japan bore a great deal of responsibility for
China’s demise.
The war functioned as the breeding ground for the historic animosity which, exacerbated
by the events of the Second World War, is still evident today. According to Kim, the First
Sino-Japanese War was the culmination of an ideational change on the part of the Japanese,
which had begun with the Opium wars. Having once viewed China with admiration,
possessing great respect for its high culture, post-1895 the Japanese viewed the Chinese with
contempt (Kim, 2008: 42). Other scholars, support the view that the war caused attitudinal
changes that gave birth to the historic hostility:
“Sino-Japanese relations…prior to the war had been very cordial…During the war, Japanese
respect rapidly degenerated into contempt while the Chinese learnt to loathe the Japanese
(Paine, 2003: 7).
A succession of international events following from the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 served to
confirm Japan’s place as the dominant power in East Asia, and thus to confirm China’s
decline and status as a second-class power, fuelling the animosity.
The Boxer Rebellion of 1899-1901 saw Japan commit a large contingent of troops and
naval ships to the combined international effort to squash the rebellion. Japan was the only
non-European allied nation to contribute to suppressing the Boxer uprising. When this is
considered together with the brutality of the conflict with the Boxers and the negative
feelings still fresh from the First Sino-Japanese War, it is rational to infer that the mutual
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animosity will have been significantly increased as a consequence of the conflict. Another
event occurred shortly after which again will have heightened the mutual hostility. Japan
achieved a remarkable feat by defeating a European great power in the Russo-Japanese War
of 1904 to 1905. This was the first case of an Asian nation demonstrating military superiority
over a European great power. The consequence of this victory was a dramatic rise in Japan’s
international standing and a view that Japan was militarily the dominant power in the
region (Kowner, 2007: 33). Some scholars have suggested that the Russo-Japanese War was a
turning point for East Asia relations without which “a confrontation between a popular
imperialist Japanese nationalism and a popular anti-imperialist Chinese nationalism might
never have occurred and ultimately the East Asian crisis might have been avoided” (Duus,
1983: 157; Edström, 2002: 13). It is reasonable to assume that these events would have
contributed to China’s feelings of increasing insignificance and thus is highly likely to have
deepened feelings of animosity towards Japan for supplanting their traditional role as the
dominant power in East Asia.
SECOND SINO-JAPANESE WAR
The mutual hostility described previously was increased exponentially by the horrific
war crimes that occurred during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), which became
the pacific theatre of the Second World War. These atrocities are often given as the cause of
animosity between Japan and China and have been well documented, but this paper will
give a very brief overview of some of the worse practices. R. J. Rummel (1997: 39-47) has
estimated that from 1937-1945 approximately 3.9 million Chinese were killed as a direct
result of Japanese operations. There were a number of large massacres, the most well known
of which is probably the Nanking (Nanjing) massacre, commonly known as ‘the Rape of
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Nanking’. When the Japanese took the city, at the time the capital, a six-week period of serial
rape and murder of civilians ensued. The number of dead is unknown, figures given by
scholars range from 40,000 (MacDonald, 2005) to 300,000 (Wakabayashi, 2008).
Some of the most appalling acts occurred in the area of chemical, biological and medical
research. Lieutenant Colonel Ishii Shiro founded the chemical and biological section of the
Imperial Japanese Army. The units in this section, notably Unit 731 and Unit 100, carried out
live human experimentation. These exercises included exposing captives to a huge range of
diseases including plague, smallpox, yellow fever, cholera and anthrax to name just a few
(Harris, 1992: 30). Throughout Manchuria, from 1935 to 1942, Ishii performed field
experiments covertly releasing numerous pathogens into civilian populations through
various delivery-methods including contamination of wells, aerial-spraying of crops and
dropping small ordnance containing infected fleas (Harris, 1992: 34). In one example, in 1940
in the seaside resort Ning Bo, Unit 731 distributed 70 kg of typhus rickettsia, 50 kg of cholera
bacteria and 5 kg of plague-infested fleas among the local population over a five month
period. This caused simultaneous epidemics and led to further plague outbreaks in 1941,
1946 and 1947 in a previously plague-free area (Harris, 1992: 34).
Another particularly horrific practice performed by Unit 731, and other army units,
included vivisections of live prisoners, which they would perform without any anesthetic
(Bryd, 2005: 30; Beam, 2003: 489). These experiments became routine in parts of China
occupied by the Japanese (Bryd, 2005: 34). This is just a minuscule sample of the litany of
barbaric tests that were carried out by Imperial Japan on unwilling human participants. This
also included testing venereal disease in women forced into sexual slavery, known as ‘the
comfort women’ (Beam, 2003: 489). Prisoners identified as having syphilis were forced to
have sex with healthy prisoners to study the developed of the disease. After a certain period
25
of development live vivisections took place to study the effect of the disease on vital organs.
The events that occurred before and during the Second Sino-Japanese War caused the
historic hostility that had built up to increase dramatically, and evolve into bitter mutual
hatred. While many years have passed since these events, a strong historic hostility and
mutual suspicion remains.
THE RECENT PAST
In the recent past, there has been evidence that this mutual hostility is still an active
component of Sino-Japanese relations. A number of scholars have noted Japan’s inability to
remove the burden of history from its foreign relations (Green, 2008: 185/6; Cossa, 2008: 322;
Calder, 2006: 132/3). This is especially true in relation to China. A number of issues have
reignited tension over the Second Sino-Japanese War. One issue that has provoked much
criticism from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) concerns the visits of the Japanese
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to the Yasukuni Shrine during his tenure, from 2001 to
2006. (Calder, 2006: 134; Deans, 2007: 270). The shrine is where Imperial Japan’s war dead
are enshrined and includes fourteen Class-A convicted war criminals, as well Class B and C
category convicts. The Yasukuni visits stirred up concern among the leaders of China and
anger among their population, in part, due to the shrine’s association with historical
revisionism prevalent among some sections of the Japanese population. The Yushukan
museum is part of the shrine and presents a revisionist view with regards to the events of
the Second World War and Imperial Japan (Deans, 2007: 280). Revisionist nationalism seeks
to reject the significance and existence of Japanese war crimes including the Nanking
Massacre and the practice of sexual slavery (Deans, 2007: 283-4). For example, in January
2007 Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s cabinet made the statement that no evidence
26
could be found of forceful recruitment of ‘comfort women’ (Mikyoung, 2014: 91). The
attempts to create a separate historical narrative that denies Japanese war crimes is highly
offensive to China, and has served to exacerbate the historic animosity.
In recent times these incidents, in combination with others such as those surrounding the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute, have produced a large increase in the hostility. Anti-
Japanese sentiment in China is at record levels. In 2013, the Pew Research Institute
conducted a survey in which 90% of Chinese respondents had an unfavourable opinion of
Japan (Pew Research Center, 2013a: 5). According to the poll, 78% of the same respondents
did not believe that Japan has apologized sufficiently for its military actions of the 1930s and
1940s. These results are supported by other polls. A separate poll in 2013 states that 92.8% of
the Chinese population has an unfavourable impression of Japan (Genron NPO and China
Daily, 2013: 4). As shown in Figure 1, in recent years there has been a steady increase in this
view from 2005, when just over 60% of respondents had an unfavourable view of Japan.
When asked the reasons behind the unfavourable view, 63.8% cited the lack of a proper
apology and remorse from Japan for its invasion of China (Genron NPO and China Daily,
2013: 4). A larger group, 77.6%of respondents stated that Japan is to blame for the territorial
dispute concerning the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands. However, as Figure 1 shows, anti-Chinese
sentiment among the Japanese population has also risen substantially.
A number of factors have resulted in anti-Chinese sentiment increasing by a considerable
amount at the same time as, and perhaps in part due to, the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment
in China described previously. The latest Genron NPO and China Daily poll records the
level of the Chinese population that have unfavourable impressions of Japan as 90.1% (2013:
4). Figure 4.1 demonstrates how rapidly anti-Chinese popular opinion has risen in Japan. In
2005, just fewer than 40% of respondents had an unfavourable view of China. A separate
27
poll put the number of Japanese participants who have a favourable opinion of China at
only 5% (Pew Research Center, 2013b: 24). When asked to give reasons for negative
impressions of China, 53.2% mentioned the confrontation over the Senkaku Islands (Genron
NPO and China Daily, 2013: 5). Almost half (48.9%) gave the reason that China mainly
criticizes Japan over historical issues. This indicates apology fatigue, which is particularly
prevalent among the young. 73% of those aged 18 to 29 believe that Japan has apologized
enough or need not apologise at all for its imperial military actions. These figures
demonstrate that the historic hostility still exists, and has increased significantly in recent
years.
Many factors have contributed to the recent rise of anti-Chinese feeling in Japan. Part of
this can be attributed to the anti-Japanese protests that occurred in China in 2012 and 2005.
Protests against Japan are not a new phenomenon in China, having also occurred in 1996,
1985 and before (Reilly, 2013). However, the recent protests have coincided with, and are
linked to, a period of escalation in the Senkaku Island dispute. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the
huge increase in mutual hostility since 2005. The dispute has reached a dangerous phase and
many Japanese would see Chinese actions as provocative. Chinese military surveillance
vessels have been sent to patrol the area surrounding the Islands. Fourteen Chinese
surveillance ships accompanied hundreds of Chinese fishing boats and entered Japanese
territorial waters (Ross, 2012), in what is hard to determine as anything other than a direct
provocation. Last year, China sent a two-vessel fleet to patrol the area (Torres, 2013). The
anti-Japanese demonstrations and the actions of China in the Senkaku Islands dispute are
two of the explanatory factors behind the substantial increase in the Japanese hostility
towards China.
28
This section has demonstrated that there is an historic hostility between China and Japan.
Contrary to popular belief, it began prior to the Second Sino-Japanese War, but was certainly
increased significantly by its events. A mutual animosity and suspicion has remained ever
since, but in the last decade tensions have risen dramatically, in large part due to unresolved
historical issues and the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Another factor is apology fatigue. The
historic hostility described above suggests that Japan would be very apprehensive about
changing its strategic alignment to accommodate China. This is one of the qualities that
makes Japan the most suitable secondary-state to study for an indication of whether China is
likely to succeed in becoming regional hegemon.
US-Japan Alliance
The second reason for selecting Japan as the secondary-state subject for this research is due
to the extremely close alliance that has existed between the United States and Japan since the
end of the Second World War. This will receive further attention in the ‘Accommodation’
section of chapter five1, which will examine Japan’s strategic alignment past and present to
establish whether there has been movement towards accommodation of China. However,
since the end of the Second World War, the US has had military personnel stationed in
Japanese territory. The Alliance really began on 8 September 1951 with the Treaty of Peace,
which restored sovereignty over Japan and its territorial waters to the people of Japan after
occupation (Reed, 1983: 6). The same day a security treaty was signed beginning the alliance.
Since then a series of treaties and agreements have been signed, and despite small
fluctuations the alliance has remained strong for decades. The exceptionally close security
relationship Japan has experienced with the US makes it a particularly useful secondary-
state to study for this research. Japan is the state in the region least likely to change its
1 See p30.
29
strategic alignment and accommodate China, due to the historic hostility mentioned above,
and the strong nature US-Japan alliance. Therefore, if evidence is found which suggests that
Japan has altered its strategic alignment, it will be a more significant indication that it is
probable that China will achieve regional hegemony in the future.
This chapter has described the logic behind selecting Japan as the secondary-state to be
the focus of this research. The following chapter will outline the Ross framework to measure
a rising power in relation to a secondary-state that has been applied to China (rising power)
and Japan (secondary-state) in this chapter 6.
30
5. South Korea and Taiwan Accommodation
In his 2006 article, Ross presented evidence that South Korea and Taiwan had begun to
accommodate China. Both secondary states had become economically dependent on China.
Despite previously being strong adversaries of China, Ross holds that economic
dependence, coupled with the improvements in Chinese land-based military capabilities, led
to a position where South Korea and Taiwan have altered their strategic alignment to be
more favourable towards China. Due to the geographical location of Japan and Indonesia,
the relative improvements in Chinese land-based military capabilities do not affect these
maritime nations. As such, I will apply the economic dependence and strategic alignment
measures of this framework to the analysis of the rise of Chinese power on the secondary-
state Japan. If this maritime secondary-state can be demonstrated to have developed a
similar economic dependency and to have taken similar steps to alter its alignment,
accommodating China, then the Ross’ view that the rise of military power is the most
important factor in explaining alignment decisions (2006: 379), would appear to be incorrect.
However, first, the evidence provided by Ross on South Korea and Taiwan’s economic
dependence and accommodation will be briefly detailed. This will allow comparison with
the secondary-state that is the primary subject of this research to determine whether there is
a pattern.
Economic Dependence
Two indicators are given by Ross to measure a rising economic power, in the context of
secondary-state alignment: secondary-state export dependence and secondary-state foreign
31
investment dependence (2006: 367). He gives further explanation by providing two
conditions that must be satisfied:
“First, a rising economic power challenges the status quo economic power by replacing the
status quo power as the primary target of a secondary-state’s exports and foreign direct
investment.
Second, the rising economic power must attract sufficient secondary-state investment and
exports so as to enable it to control the fate of the secondary-state”
(2006: 367)
This conception of a rising economic power requires possession of both types of economic
leverage.
The economic relationship between South Korea and China meets the requirements of
secondary-state export and foreign-direct investment (FDI) dependence. Ross notes that in
2002 the combined China-Hong Kong market became South Korea’s largest export market
(2006: 374). Foreign direct investment (FDI) also demonstrated China supplanting the
traditional position the US had enjoyed since the Second World War of being South Korea’s
most important trading partner. The US had once been the primary destination of South
Korean outward FDI, but by 2003 it accounted for only 15% of total investment. In contrast,
by 2003 China received 50% of outward FDI (Ross, 2006: 375). These figures appear to
support the view that China meets both conditions of a rising economic power in relation to
South Korea. Not only is China the primary target for export and foreign direct investment,
but the share it enjoys of each leads one to conclude that it meets the second condition also.
That is to say that China can control the fate, at least economically, of the secondary-state.
Ross made the same observations in relation to whether Taiwan’s economic relationship
with China meets the two conditions mentioned above. In 2001, China reached two
32
milestones, becoming the main destination for both exports and outward foreign-direct
investment from Taiwan (Ross, 2006: 375-76). This fulfilled the first condition that a rising
economic power should supplant the existing status quo power as the main target for
exports and outward FDI. In terms of the second condition of having a sufficient share of
exports and FDI to control the fate of a secondary-state, China also appears to fit this
description with regard to Taiwan. In 2003, the percentage of Taiwanese exports destined for
China was 35% (2006: 375). While this is relatively significant, it appears that China
possesses even greater coercive capability with respect to Taiwanese foreign investments. By
2006, China enjoyed a 70% share of total Taiwanese outward foreign direct investment.
Accommodation
The attention now shifts to indications that South Korea and Taiwan have made changes
to their strategic alliances with the United States in favour of being more accommodating
towards China. Ross lists a number of traditional measures of alignment. A secondary-
state’s position on arms exports, defense planning and the provision of military facilities all
imply a strategic alignment (2006: 368). Another measure is a secondary-state’s policy on a
great power’s strategic interests with regard to third parties.
There have been a number of indications from South Korea that they are shifting their
alignment to accommodate China. The 1994 nuclear crisis saw South Korea support US
policies that threatened war (Ross, 2006: 380). However, since then Seoul has been reluctant
to support the US position in relation to North Korea. For example, in 2003, South Korea’s
president publicly opposed the US threat of economic sanctions (2006: 381). Seoul has also
resisted elements of the US post-Cold War defense planning that could lead to South Korean
territory being used for a conflict with China. President Roh Moo-hyun explicitly declared
33
that South Korean bases could not be utilized by the US in the event of a Taiwan conflict
(2010: 530). These are just two examples given by Ross as evidence of South Korea shifting
alignment to accommodate China.
Ross provides similar evidence that Taiwan has also begun shifting its alignment. From
the early 1970s through to the end of the 1990s, Taiwan was pushing the US to provide it
with advanced weapons systems. In 2001, President Bush agreed to the sale of Kidd-class
destroyers, diesel submarines, anti-submarine reconnaissance aircraft and licensed the sale
of the Patriot III missile. However, after many years of pressing for these weapons, Taiwan
waited two years and only purchased four 1970s Kidd-class destroyers (Ross, 2006: 383). At
the time of writing, the Taiwanese government had not allocated any more funds to procure
advanced US weapons. The reduction in the defense budget also suggests a strategic
decision by the Taiwanese government to accommodate China, rather than to defend the
island militarily. In 2003 Taiwan’s budget was the lowest since 1996; the 2004 budget was
20% lower than the defense budget of 2003 (2006: 383). These are two of the indicators that
Ross provided to demonstrate that Taiwan, like South Korea, had begun to accommodate
China.
34
6. Japan and the Rise of China
The pattern of economic dependency and shifting strategic alignment has been
documented with regard to South Korea and Taiwan (excluding Ross’ third factor of
increasing land-based military capabilities). This paper will now use this framework to
study the effect on the secondary-state Japan of the rise of Chinese power in the region
(which due to its maritime geography, does not involve the third factor of increasing land-
based military capabilities). The intial focus will be on economic dependence, followed by
an assessment of Japan’s alignment position and whether it has recently altered.
Economic Dependence
To measure the economic relationship between Japan and China we will use the same
measure mentioned above: secondary-state export and foreign direct investment
dependence. Firstly, Japanese export data was gathered from the MIT media lab project:
‘The Observatory of Economic Complexity” (2013). The data originates from the United
Nations Statistical Division (COMTRADE database)2. The range of the export data is from
1995 to 2011. This data was then processed into the graph ‘Figure 6.1’, located in the
Appendix A, as part of this research3. This graph clearly shows that China has replaced the
US as the primary destination for Japanese exports. The United States accounted for 26.76%
of total Japanese exports in 1995. This share of total exports had decreased by 2011 to only
14.84%. Meanwhile, the Chinese share of total Japanese exports increased from 5.13% in
2 For website and reference, see ‘Data Sources’ section, p 49. 3 See p42.
35
1995, to 19.24% by the end of the data set in 2011. China has not only overtaken the US as the
largest target for Japanese exports, but the trendlines in Figure 6.1 suggest that this gap will
continue to widen. China will acquire an escalating percentage of total Japanese exports,
while the US will receive an ever-diminishing share. According to this data, the rising power
has succeeded in supplanting the status quo power as the largest recipient of the secondary-
state’s exports.
The next step was to determine whether the second part of the first condition was also
supported by evidence: namely that the rising power (China) has overtaken the status quo
power (US) as the primary target for the secondary-state’s (Japan) outward foreign direct
investment. The data for Japanese outward FDI was sourced from the Japanese External
Trade Organization (2013)4. The original data comes from the Japanese Ministry of Finance
balance-of-payment statistics. The range of the outward FDI data is 1990 to 2012. This raw
data was processed into percentages of total outward FDI and presented as Figure 2. in the
Appendix. A similar, but less advanced, trend appears in the outward FDI data. Though
China has yet to overtake the US as the primary recipient of Japanese outward FDI, Figure 2.
shows that it has made significant progress in achieving this goal. The share of total outward
Japanese FDI located in the US has dramatically fallen from 53.27%at the beginning of the
data sample in 1990, to 26.13% in 2012. Simultaneously, China has increased its percentage
of the total outward FDI from 0.85 in 1990, to 11.02 in 2012. This gap appears even smaller
when noting that in 2010 the US enjoyed only 16.07%, compared to China’s 12.67%. The
trendlines in Figure 2. indicate that China is on course to overtake the US as the largest
target of Japanese outward FDI. The graph predicts that China will eclipse the US as the
largest recipient of outward FDI in 2022.
4 See ‘Data Sources’, p49.
36
The first condition of a rising economic power has not been reached. China has succeeded
in becoming the largest recipient of Japanese exports but has not yet overtaken the US as the
primary target of outward Japanese FDI. Consequently, the second condition has also not
been met. China does not enjoy enough of a percentage of exports or FDI to control the fate
of Japan. However, Figure 3.2 suggests that the FDI component of the first condition will be
met in the near future. China is highly likely to succeed in overtaking the US as the primary
target of both Japanese exports and outward FDI. The rate of China’s sustained economic
growth over the last thirty years, when taken into consideration with the economic trends of
Japanese exports and outward FDI documented above, leads to a conclusion that it is likely
that China will succeed in meeting the second condition in the long term. That is to say, it is
likely that China will go on to enjoy a sufficient enough share of Japanese exports and
outward FDI that it can control the fate of said secondary-state.
Accommodation
This section will examine Japan’s strategic alignment to see whether it has been affected
by the rise of China. Japan’s alignment will be reviewed to establish if there is evidence that
it has altered, or is in the process of altering, its position. As stated above, the measures of
strategic alignment specifically noted by Ross (2006: 368) include a secondary-state’s
position on arms exports, defence planning and the provision of military facilities. For the
reasons set out in Chapter Three, Japan is the regional secondary-state least likely to
willingly accommodate China. Therefore, it is unlikely we will find evidence of a radical shift
in policy at this stage. However, it is possible that there will be signs indicating that the
process of shifting alignment has begun.
The post-war security relationship between Japan and the US was based on the so-called
37
‘San Francisco system’ of trans-Pacific relations. This system saw Japan provide military
bases, and after the late 1970s financial support, to the US military stationed in Japanese
territory (Calder, 2010: 22). Japan gained the security of an American military presence and
access to the American market and western financial institutions. The US-Japan alliance has
been a key feature of the East Asia security environment for decades. However, there is
some evidence that at least some sections of Japan want to change their strategic alignment
in response to the changing security environment, particularly due to the rise of China. That
is not to say that there is advocacy of a full-scale shift in policy to accommodate China.
However, there do appear to be indications that Japan may be seeking to shift alignment
away from the US.
The security environment in which Japan operates is in a state of flux. This is in large part
due to long-term economic trends that have long-term geo-strategic consequences. The
biggest change is undoubtedly the rise of China. Japan enjoyed the status of ‘Number 1
Asian economy’ from 1968 to 2010 (Lam and Purnendra, 2013: xvii). China’s economy
overtook Japan’s to become the largest economy in Asia due to its exceptional and sustained
rate of growth over recent decades. The economic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping in
1978 have resulted in the Chinese economy growing by an average rate of 9.4% ever since
(Zheng, 2005: 18). The strategic landscape is shifting; Japan is concerned about the effects of
the rise of China on its position, particularly in the context of declining US influence in the
region (Lam and Purnendra, 2013: xviii-xix).
Some sections of the Japanese population are supportive of repositioning Japan in the
East Asian security order. After a prolonged period of one-party rule in Japan by the
conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), August 2009 saw the leader of the Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) – Hatomaya Yukio - elected to the office of the prime minister of Japan.
38
Hatoyama and the DPJ campaigned for a loosening of the alliance in order to give Japan
freedom from alliance obligations and draw closer to its Asian allies (Pyle, 2010: 3; Leheny,
2013: 143). The former DPJ leader, Ozama Ichiro, was a central figure behind the party’s
desire to move away from the US in terms of strategic alignment. He has stated that Japan is
excessively dependent on the United States (Funabashi, 2009: 114). Pyle neatly summarizes
Ozama’s position: “He sees the triangular U.S.-Japan-China relationship as becoming an
equilateral triangle and does not want Japan to be held hostage to U.S. policy toward China
and North Korea or to U.S. global strategy” (Pyle, 2010: 9). The DPJ leadership were clearly
committed to altering their strategic alignment to move away from the US and towards
closer relations with its Asian neighbours, including China.
The government headed by Prime Minister Hatomaya demonstrated their commitment to
an altered strategic relationship with the US in a number of ways. For example, in January
2010, the Japanese government ended a long-standing refuelling mission to the Indian
Ocean to resupply American military forces (Tatsumi, 2010: 36). Despite repeated American
protests, the DPJ government stopped the arrangement that has been resupplying American
troops in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001. This appears to have been a clear signal that
Hatomaya was determined to change Japan’s strategic situation. Another sign that the
Hatomaya government was serious about keeping its commitment to reposition Japan
further away from the US strategically can be seen in the support Hatomaya gave to the
formation of an East Asian Community (EAC), which would re-orientate Japanese foreign
policy to focus more on Asian allies (Brooks, 2012: 121). His vision of the EAC was one that
excluded the US (Pyle, 2010: 3; Brooks, 2012: 125). The DPJ’s support for this regional
organisation, especially without US membership, is a further example of the shift in strategic
alignment that occurred.
39
Further evidence that the strategic alignment of Japan has begun to shift can been seen in
the Hatomaya government’s approach to the presence of the American military in Japanese
territory. The DPJ campaigned in the 2009 election for the removal of the US bases from
Japan. Hatomaya made a specific promise to relocate a marine airbase situated in Futenma,
Okinawa (Brooks, 2012: 121). Once in power, the DPJ government attempted to keep their
campaign pledge and worked to relocate the base (Brooks, 2012: 127; Tatsumi, 2010: 37).
Ozama has expressed the view that American bases in Japan are unnecessary and that the
US Navy‘s Seventh Fleet is sufficient to protect US and Japanese interests (Funabashi, 2009:
114). The actions of the DPJ government to remove US military facilities was a deliberate
attempt to loosen ties with the US and reposition Japan closer to its Asian neighbours.
Hatomaya’s term in office demonstrates that a change in Japan’s strategic alignment in
the near future is certainly a possibility. It is true that Hatomaya failed to keep his campaign
promise to relocate the Futenma Marine Air Base, and resigned as a result of that failure
(Brooks, 2012: 121). However, the fact that Hatomaya was elected despite such an explicit
intent to advance policies to alter the strategic alignment of Japan away from the US is a
testament to Japanese public opinion’s support for this approach. At the very least, it is
evidence that the issue is not important enough that voters elected opponents that
supported maintaining the status quo. This means the population is open to a repositioning
strategy. While Hatomaya’s successor reversed much of the policy changes that served to
move further from the US strategically (Brooks, 2012: 128), in Hatomaya’s very short term in
office it is possible to see indications of the long-term trajectory of Japan’s strategic
alignment position. That trajectory is one that moves away from the US.
This chapter has sought to assess the impact that the rise of China has had on the
secondary-state Japan, and whether it has acquired the power to compel accommodation.
40
China has supplanted the US as the primary target of Japan’s exports. Furthermore, China is
on course to overtake the US as the largest destination for outward foreign direct investment
in the next decade. There will be another period of time after that before China possesses
sufficient proportion of Japan’s exports and outward FDI to control its fate. However, the
indications are that China will reach that milestone in the near future. Similarly, there are
indications that Japan may be in the early stages of shifting its strategic alignment away
from the US. Therefore, while China may not yet have reached the position where it can
compel accommodation from Japan, this paper suggests that this is most likely to become
the state of affairs in the future.
41
7. Conclusion
This study has sought to address the question of whether China will become regional
hegemon in East Asia. The approach has been to study the effects of the rise of China on a
secondary-state: Japan. For a number of reasons Japan was the most suitable candidate
because it is the nation least likely to willingly accommodate China. The hostility that exists
between the two nations due to negative history is one factor that makes Japan unlikely to
accommodate China. Another is the long and very stable US-Japan alliance. Another is
Japan’s status as the second largest economy in Asia. All these reasons make Japan the
nation in the region that should be most opposed to the rise of China.
However, there is evidence that Japan is in the early stages of shifting its strategic
alignment. In terms of economic dependence, the data shows China has made huge ground
in supplanting the US as the economic power in the region. The examples from Ross (2006)
of South Korea, Taiwan and the new findings in this study of Japan, show China is gaining
significant economic power across the region. China appears to be on its way to economic
hegemony. Similarly, like South Korea and Taiwan, Japan has made steps to alter its
strategic alignment. During the prime ministerial term of Hatomaya the Japanese
government was strongly committed to repositioning away from the US, and toward Asian
allies. While there is not evidence of actual Japanese accommodation of China yet, the
repositioning fits in with the other examples and implies that there is a region-wide
movement to reposition in preparation for a China-dominated East Asia. Despite the
reversal of Hatomaya’s policies, his period in office leave two lessons. Firstly, Japan’s
population are open to realignment. Second, there are indications that, even if Japan’s
current politicians are currently opposed, in the long-term the likelihood is that Japan will
42
seek to shift its strategic environment away from the US. China’s ability to influence Japan
suggests China will succeed in becoming regional hegemon in the future. If the secondary-
state Japan cannot resist China’s rising power, it is unlikely that many other states in the
region will escape its sphere of influence.
43
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Appendix A
The content of this appendix are original graphs produced as part of this research.
Figure 6.1
Figure 6.2
Data Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity (2013) [Original data from BACI Trade Database]
Data Source: Japanese External Trade Organization (2013) [Japanese Ministry of Finance Statistics]
50
Appendix B
This appendix contains graphs that are not created as part of this research.
Figure 4.1 Japan and China: Impressions of Each Other’s Country
Source: Genron-NPO and China Daily (2013) 9th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll
