Resolving Kashmir: imperatives and solutions

SAGELos Angeles,London,New Delhi,Singapore,Washington DC

Race & Class Copyright © 2014 Institute of Race Relations, Vol. 56(2): 66 –80 10.1177/0306396814542918 http://rac.sagepub.com

Resolving Kashmir: imperatives and solutionsNooR AhmAD BABA

Abstract: The Kashmir problem has existed for over sixty years, since the British colonial rulers left and the subcontinent was partitioned between Pakistan and India, yet the issue continues to be unresolved. The promised plebiscite for the people of Kashmir to decide their future was never held. Various complexities borne out of the continuation of the dispute and divergent claims and positions on the issue still demand urgent attention. For many years, India and Pakistan squared up to one another, testing nuclear arms, amassing troops on the border. But post-Cold War developments, in tandem with their regional implications and a recognition that security threats are changing, have created conditions for rethinking the India-Pakistan relationship and the ‘problem’ of Kashmir. Today, generally, the traditional preoccupation with national security is giving way to a new discourse of human security and hard borders are giving way to soft borders and development in terms of regional co-operation. on the economic front, China is challenging India and its regional support, whilst India’s trade route westward is hampered by lack of access through Pakistan. And these developments, argues the author, could create space for readjusting relations and addressing the future of Kashmir and its people, thousands of whom have lost their lives as a result of the conflict. Since 1947, a variety of solutions from plebiscite and condominium status to a Northern Ireland-style Good Friday Agreement have been put forward, as yet to no avail. Frameworks prepared in the abstract cannot be applied to a complex problem like Kashmir. But there may be lessons to

Noor Ahmad Baba is Professor of Political Science at the University of Kashmir, Srinagar and for-mer Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences.

542918 RAC0010.1177/0306396814542918Race & ClassBabaresearch-article2014

Baba: Resolving Kashmir: imperatives and solutions 67

draw on from resolutions of similar conflicts, even if the Kashmir solution has to have its own particular parameters. The challenge for the region is to maximise current opportunities. In this, the international community and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have a role in encouraging the peace process.

Keywords: autonomy, demilitarisation, hard borders, India, Jammu, Kashmir, Line of Control, Pakistan, peace process, plebiscite, SAARC, secluded periphery, self-determination, soft borders

For over six decades, Kashmir has been one of the world’s most contentious prob-lems. There are many reasons, some internal to Jammu and Kashmir while others are reflections of the relationship between India and Pakistan.1 People across the subcontinent and the world over recognise the existence of the Kashmir problem and the need for its resolution. But differences surface as soon as it comes to iden-tifying the contours of what constitutes this problem and the elements that could contribute to its solution. For most people in Kashmir the problem is rooted in certain identifiable, historical, objective causes, in its internal dimensions and also in relation to India and Pakistan.2

While the Indian claim to all the territories ruled over by the Dogras stems from maharaja hari Singh’s signing of the Instrument of Accession with the Indian Union, this did not carry legitimacy with the people of Kashmir since his own right to rule was in question for the majority of his subjects.3 It was because of the non-representative and unpopular character of the maharaja’s rule that the government of India offered to refer the decision about the final dispensation of the State to its people.4 The government of India made the bold commitment, that the State’s future would ‘be settled by a reference to its people’.5 UN Security Council resolutions endorsed the position that the final dispensation of Kashmir would be made according to the will of the people ascertained through a plebi-scite.6 Popular mistrust was accentuated by the fact that the special position that was secured by the State within the Indian constitution (under Article 370) was eroded through regimes which had no base of popular support among the peo-ple.7 It was in this context that Sheikh Abdullah who, as a leader of the dominant party in the national movement in Kashmir, was supposed to endorse the acces-sion to India, tried his utmost to delegitimise the whole process by campaigning from 1953 to1975 for Kashmir’s right to self-determination.8 Electoral rigging, non-functional democracy and continued repression by the State only helped to reinforce the discontent and helped buttress the people’s desire for the right to self-determination.9 The continued division of the State and its people between the Indian- and Pakistani-controlled parts, the persistent struggle between India and Pakistan and the international recognition of the disputed nature of Kashmir served to reinforce the legitimacy of this claim for self-determination.10

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We have, then, a two-dimensional issue: internally, the problem for its people has tangible political, psychological, economic and moral bases rooted in his-tory.11 But it is simultaneously an international dispute between India and Pakistan with a degree of recognition from the international community.12 Internally, the people of Kashmir have been bearing the brunt in the worst pos-sible manner; externally this problem has also afflicted the subcontinent for more than six decades, when the two countries used their resources – diplomatic, polit-ical, military and economic – to undermine each other in any way they could.13 They remained so obsessed with each other that each ignored the more danger-ous security challenges from within and without.

India and Pakistan: from border conflicts to soft borders

Since the countries of the Indian subcontinent gained independence in 1947, the international context and order have undergone fundamental changes. The Kashmir issue, among other things, was also largely borne out of the security predicaments characteristic of pre-Cold War times to which India and Pakistan remained committed. Then security was almost exclusively seen in terms of securing borders against external threats. This notion of security sanctified bor-ders above human life and subordinated citizens’ concerns to state power. Securing one’s borders was achieved by ensuring the vulnerability of the state on the other side. This position continues in international relations even today. however, in recent decades, more specifically since the end of the Cold War, under the pressures of deepening democracy and the realisation that new and more serious challenges came from within and far beyond, and not necessarily across, borders, there have been pressures for rethinking this notion of security. Accordingly, the concept of security is being broadened to include a host of new issues which present common challenges for a community of countries and call for common rather than individual responses.

This has implications for Indo-Pakistani relations. By the same logic, a number of new issues are becoming central to security concerns for both states: state secu-rity and development cannot be judged purely in military terms but in their capacity to ensure people’s security. New challenges require planners to address environmental issues, energy, disease, terrorism, food security, water, and so on.14 Such changes broaden the context within which relations between and among states are conducted.15 The people of the region yearn for a better life. They want bread, medicine, water, education, shelter and peace, not weapons of mass destruction, violence and terrorism. The popular urge for good governance, decent living and healthy fulfillment requires a drastic shift from the prevalent national security paradigms.16

Pakistan and India need to collaborate so as to benefit from inter-regional trade and co-operation. This is particularly important for India, with its expanding economy, which needs access to resource-rich regions for its expanding energy


requirements and for general trade.17 Because of mutual mistrust and instability on the Pakistan border, India accesses Central Asia through a distant route via Iran18 – hardly viable in the long run. The relationship between the two most important countries of the region is vital for the whole of South Asia. All over the world we are witnessing countries of different regions coming closer, and regional co-operation rapidly gaining ground.

There are now a large number of regional organisations that work as conduits for effective co-operation.19 In South Asia the Association for Regional Cooper-ation (SAARC) was formed in 1985. however, it could not evolve as an effective mechanism to consolidate co-operation as it was undermined by bilateral prob-lems amongst the nations of this region, particularly between India and Pakistan.20 In order to benefit from the opportunities that are available in Central and West Asia and even in East and the South East Asia, the two countries need one another. For India, a friendly Pakistan will go a long way to ensure its energy security by developing viable links to energy-rich regions of Central and West Asia.21 The expanding influence of China adds to imperatives for India to cultivate its neighbourhood.22

Today the challenge for the two countries is to undermine borders as dividing lines and soften them so as to promote peace, co-operation, human development and dignity for all people and communities across the region. For us, the people of Kashmir, the softening of borders has a greater relevance. Kashmir was pushed into geopolitical seclusion in 1947. The division of the subcontinent, the de facto division of Jammu and Kashmir and the placement of its two parts under the actual control of two different and hostile states, and the resultant hardening of borders, pushed the Valley of Kashmir and its surrounding regions into a num-ber of social, psychological, political and economic disadvantages. These devel-opments not only separated different parts of the State in different countries, but different regions within the State, and even regions on each side of the Line of Control (LoC) were cut off from one another. 1947 pushed Kashmir from centre to isolated periphery.23 Almost all its major connecting points were blocked and Kashmir became dependent on a highway that had never been considered reli-able in comparison to the roads that historically connected it with the rest of the world. This seclusion had psychological and economic implications for the peo-ple of Kashmir;24 even families were divided on either side of the LoC. In 1947, the countries of the region were erecting borders in terms of the prevalent hatred.25 Then, we were conditioned by the notion of aggressive nationalism and hard borders defining national interest. Today, interdependence and softer borders are defining advantages for countries. movement in this direction would recon-nect the subcontinent to the silk route and, through that, to East, Central and West Asia and Europe by land.

Nuclearisation in India and Pakistan in 1998 proved a turning point, as open warfare became a practical impossibility. It showed the region that eye-ball to eye-ball conflict was no longer practicable. They had no option but to talk. This realisation dawned at substantial human and material cost. (Not that there was


no-one on either side with the vision to understand it then. There were people like Atal Bihari Vajpayee and mian Nawaz Sharief who had an inkling of the new situation.) But it is hard to change mindsets. Since 1998, the two countries went for tit-for-tat nuclear explosions that made this region one of the most dangerous in the world. It was followed by the emotional euphoria of peace-building at Lahore, again to be scuttled through the Kargil incursions.26 The failure of the Agra summit (July 2001) was followed by the developments of 9/11 that changed the strategic scenario globally with implications in and around the region. The December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament led the two countries almost to the brink of war. Following the attack, India and Pakistan created mas-sive troop build-ups along the border. Then the 26/11 (2008) mumbai attacks saw the prospect of peace crumble almost completely. But after every such situation of conflict, realisation dawns about the limitations of such stand-offs. Every time, after a while, the two realise the need to go back to the table for talks.

The positive trends towards sustained dialogue and co-operation need to be supported and sustained by an informed, enlightened and vigilant civil society across borders in the countries of the region. It needs to be rooted in the fast-changing regional context – not the post-9/11 strategic equations created by out-side powers. Recently, there has been some recognition of this inevitable change in the context around us and we need to boldly make it part of public discourse. China has taken and continues to take tremendous strategic advantage of the prevalent mistrust in South Asia; the Indian subcontinent needs to realise this and correct its behaviour in its own interest. India and Pakistan must see the need for a new relationship in South Asia in which the two have a central role; Afghanistan has the potential to become the basis for a co-operative workout in the light of larger regional relations.

Economic strength is the bedrock of security, be it human or national. The lead-ership on both sides needs to realise this reality and exhibit the necessary strength to work in this direction with sufficient resolve. The extremist forces in both countries that are inimical to this process need to be marginalised. Under the same logic, terrorism as a phenomenon must be completely uprooted and dealt with effectively, particularly inside Pakistan.

Understanding militancy

Any serious attempt at resolving the dispute should begin with a realistic appre-ciation of all its important dimensions including that, with the passage of time, such a conflict becomes an integral part of the collective subconscious. The pres-ent problem in Kashmir is not basically that of militancy. In fact militancy is the outcome of the Kashmir problem. The source of all protests is some sort of serious dissatisfaction with the existing political arrangement. It takes a violent form only when the normal and peaceful channels for expressing dissent get blocked.27

however, whatever its causes, its consequences are harmful to society. The eruption of militancy in Kashmir in the late 1980s was spontaneous and confined


to a committed group of young men dedicated to the cause of independence. But the violence went out of control, leading to the emergence of a very large number of militant groups with little coordination, working for different ends. our expe-rience shows that the eruption of militancy and violence resulted in the deploy-ment and large-scale mobilisation of security agencies (military and paramilitary forces), with enormous and arbitrary powers granted under provisions like the Public Safety Act, Armed Forces Special Powers Act, Disturbed Areas Act, and various other such acts applied nationally from time to time (like the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act) which expose ordinary people to oppression and risk. The problem is accentu-ated by the fact that most of the security personnel operating in such situations will be chosen from a different ethnic group and therefore have little sensitivity towards or empathy for the local population and its concerns, making the situa-tion more complex and potentially dangerous.28 The situation became worse as, under greater pressure from security forces, the less politically committed cadres and criminal elements among the militants changed sides to become ‘pro-govern-ment renegades’. These renegades, who were under the control of state forces, caused the greatest suffering to ordinary Kashmiris. They stand accused of ‘mur-der, rape, kidnapping, extortion and smuggling’ and became a convenient con-duit of corruption, extortion and repression for the security agencies; the latter manifestation being the Special operations Group (SoG). According to estimates, from 47,000 (official figure) to over 100,000 people (unofficial figure) have lost their lives in the turmoil in Kashmir.29 There have been custodial killings, civilian disappearances and the suffering of women and children. This is in addition to the tremendous economic, social, psychological and material loss that the people have suffered. There is probably no family in Kashmir which has not been adversely affected by the continuing conflict. Naturally, in this situation of inse-curity, mutual mistrust and universal fear, there is no section of society in Kashmir that has remained unaffected. This is even true about the security forces operat-ing there. There have been credible reports of personnel suffering from depres-sion and other psychological disorders, resulting in a growing number of suicides and the killings of colleagues.30

The late 1990s brought a new brand of militants from within and without, with ideology and programmes that had little or no link to people’s aspirations in Kashmir. Some of them embraced a sort of pan-Islamic agenda, with little con-cern for common Kashmiris’ aspirations, and militancy became delinked from Kashmiri society.31 ordinary people’s distancing from the militancy did not mean, though, a change of heart on the basic issues of the movement. In fact, greater repression by state agencies and indiscriminate human rights violations further alienated the people from the existing political set up. In this situation, even the ‘elected’ governments from 1996, working under a number of con-straints, could not deliver anything worthwhile that could help to change the situation on the ground in any meaningful way. operationally, such govern-ments had been subordinated to security imperatives.32


Today’s state has tremendous repressive capacity with enormous coercive machinery at its disposal to handle all private violence with more comprehensive and superior violence. In the context of the total state, even peaceful dissent is dif-ficult.33 It is the defenceless and vulnerable civilian population that suffers most.

For a country like Kashmir, demilitarisation makes a lot of sense. With such a concentration of military and paramilitary forces, in a relatively small area, its ecology – both social and physical – has been rendered highly vulnerable.34 The parties concerned now need to ensure the end of the cycle of violence to facilitate the demilitarisation of J&K, and its transformation into a zone of peace that allows bridges to be built across India and Pakistan so as to address more serious chal-lenges to their security and development. The two need to arrive at some com-mon basis for addressing Kashmir. Until then, we need to promote conditions that ease the burdens on ordinary people: the scrapping of all repressive laws; the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners; and the promotion of conditions which allow free political discourse. Today, in the words of former Prime minister A. B. Vajpayee, ‘In our search for lasting solutions to the Kashmir problem, both in its internal and external dimensions, we shall not traverse solely on the beaten track of the past. mindsets will have to be altered and historical baggage jettisoned.’35

As already noted, the hard borders dividing the two parts of Kashmir have served, socially and economically, to strangle its people. historically, Kashmir was at a civilisational, social and economic crossroads. It had very close trade and cultural relations with places in China, Tibet, a number of cities in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, not to speak of close connections with areas of the North and North-western Indian subcontinent. The Jhelum Valley Road via muzaffarabad connected the Valley of Kashmir with the rest of world. The 1947 division of the subcontinent and de facto division of Jammu and Kashmir and the placement of its two parts under the actual control of two mutually hostile states, pushed Kashmir to a ‘secluded periphery’ status.36

In this context, the starting of the bus service on 7 April 2005 was a small but symbolically significant step.37 hopefully, the Jhelum Valley Road will allow fre-quent travel, and a free flow of goods, which would have a tremendously posi-tive impact on the economy, because of the relative advantages of security, distance and smoothness.38 Allowing trade through the Srinagar-muzaffarabad route will make Kashmiri goods more competitive internationally. however, the greater barrier for Kashmiris in relating to the outside world, particularly Pakistan and Pakistan Administered Kashmir, has been, and still is, the problem of secur-ing travel documents, which is why the opening of Srinagar-muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakot roads has not inspired many people in Kashmir.39

For its people, ‘the Kashmir problem’ is more than just that of a territory divided between two states. And that has to be taken into account for any viable and durable peace process. The commitment to resolve all its dimensions requires imagination. But to add to the credibility of the process, we must immediately initiate confidence building measures that make a positive difference to lives.


This should allow us to: reach an understanding/undertaking between and among all the concerned parties that violence is immediately stopped from all sides; decrease and remove military/paramilitary forces from all residential areas as part of the broader understanding to resolve the issue; release all political pris-oners immediately and unconditionally; allow human rights groups, including Amnesty International, free access to people within the state; remove all repres-sive laws that restrict freedom of movement, discussion, debate, mobilisation so that people/parties of all shades of political opinion have full freedom for politi-cal debate and mobilisation and discussion across regions, communities and eth-nic formations; encourage free movement and interaction across the LoC; facilitate dialogue across regions and communities to find common ground.

Such a programme is not an end in itself but a means to creating the right atmo-sphere for a final resolution. The problem has to be addressed seriously and fra-ternally so as to bring communities from different regions in South Asia together. Any solution has to undo the division of the State about which people on both sides of the LoC feel so strongly. In view of its heterogeneous character, a political framework has to be drawn to accommodate the plurality within and across regions. And any evolving political entity should be completely demilitarised so as to promote unity rather than discord across South Asia. Conflict resolution has to be imaginative and we may benefit from looking to other examples of resolu-tion in similar situations.

There are a host of predicaments from the past that continue to overshadow the present. These among other things include: the government of India’s commit-ment to accession being subject to popular approval; UN Security Council resolu-tions on a plebiscite; a series of regimes which were unrepresentative; organised electoral vote-rigging; the continued division of the country and its separately controlled parts; international recognition of the disputed nature of Kashmir; pop-ular disaffection with the present political dispensation; state repression.

These are the reasons why, despite greater legal integration over more than half a century, the State’s political standing within the Indian Union remains so fragile and uncertain. Democracy became the victim of this dispensation. Elections were a farce, particularly in the Valley. State authority rested on continuous repression, leaving little elementary civil and political liberty to the people.40 For a long time resistance manifested itself in a peaceful way. however, as peaceful channels were blocked or could not give vent to the intensity of the discontent, resistance broke out as violence. The first group of young men who took to vio-lence comprised many who had actually worked during the 1987 elections for the muslim United Front. They were subjected to severe torture for their association with the opposition alliance. The objective situation thus provided the golden opportunity for Pakistan to get involved in Kashmir.41

Contours of a Kashmir solution

As seen above, the multidimensional Kashmir problem has many roots. The first step in resolving a problem is to admit its existence and understand its


dimensions. Fortunately, today, people across the subcontinent and the world admit to the existence of the Kashmir problem and the need for its resolution. Differences between the peoples of Kashmir, Pakistan and India surface when it comes to the contours of this problem and the elements that could contribute to its solution. In spite of some progress, the mindsets on all sides have not changed with the changing scenario of peace-building and the growing imperative for co-operation. much has to be done before some acceptable solution is agreed. This is not because there have been no suggestions and formulas for addressing the issue. From the very beginning, a variety of frameworks have been presented for workable solutions: the plebiscite framework, the Dixon formula, condominium status, Kashmir study group proposals, autonomy/self-rule proposals and the drawing of inferences from similar conflict resolution mechanisms like the Good Friday Agreement (in Northern Ireland). But let us admit that there can be no readymade, handy solutions available to a complex problem like Kashmir; its solution must evolve from within its own complexities. Therefore, we need to work out the validity of the above such frameworks in dealing with the different aspects of the Kashmir issue.

The plebiscite framework was first offered by India, in the context of Partition with regard to places like hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir, as a mechanism to allow the people of a State to determine whether they would like to stay with India or opt for accession to Pakistan. In principle this was accepted by Pakistan and endorsed by the UN Security Council through its 1948–1951 resolutions.42 however, as it later turned out, the offer was only made by India and accepted by Pakistan in order to consolidate their respective positions in the State and not to allow a free choice to its people. Both tried their best to extend and consolidate their physical control of the State to whatever extent each could through open conflict till this reached a position of a stalemate that pushed them to agree to a UN-mediated ceasefire in November 1949. This practically divided Jammu and Kashmir into two portions controlled by the two contending states.43 The two failed, in spite of UN mediation, to agree to the modalities of holding the plebi-scite. meanwhile, after the removal of Sheikh Abdullah from power in 1953, India lost the main constituency of support for winning the plebiscite. That is why, after some initial years of the commitment towards the middle of 1950s, it cate-gorically withdrew from any such commitment on a pretext that had nothing to do with the people of the State. Thereafter, despite the insistence of Pakistan and the strong plebiscite movement in Kashmir, nothing could make India agree to honour its initial commitment to the Kashmiri people. But a large number of peo-ple in Kashmir and in Pakistan continue to consider it the main framework for resolving the Kashmir issue. (Though it should be noted that one of the limita-tions of the plebiscite idea, as conceived in the late 1940s and early 1950s, is that it restricts choice to only being part of India or of Pakistan while Kashmir has an ever increasing constituency for independence.)

With the failure of the two parties to agree on the logistics for conducting the plebiscite, the UN representative for India and Pakistan, owen Dixon, offered an alternative ‘more realistic’ middle-of-the-road solution to the problem in 1950. In


view of the plurality of the state, he based his formula on the ethno-regional and ethno-psychological dimension of the problem that, in a way, suggested different options for the three broad divisions of the state. In spite of some initial positive signals, even his suggestions failed to inspire the parties to agree to its modali-ties.44 Despite this failure, the initiative’s influence can be felt in some of the recent suggestions concerning the solution to Kashmir, including proposals after the period of militancy.

After the failure of the UN, some people including Sheikh mohammad Abdullah, toyed with the idea of a confederation or condominium status for Jammu and Kashmir in relation to India and Pakistan.45 This formula might gain greater purchase if SAARC started playing a more active role. It could open new possibilities of addressing the Kashmir issue in a manner that people have not so far visualised. The urgency for a solution arose after the start of militancy in 1989. In the heightened tensions between India and Pakistan, a number of formulas were developed, the most important of which came from the US-based Kashmir Study Group (KSG) floated by a concerned Kashmiri expatriate, Farooq Kathwari. on his initiative, the KSG, consisting of twenty-five members, formulated a series of three studies offering inputs for what it referred to as a Way Forward in Kashmir. In its initial proposals in 1998, it recommended that the ‘portions of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir be constituted as a sovereign entity or entities short of international personality’. But in its somewhat revised position Kashmir – a way forward – 2005, it suggests that ‘portions of the former princely state of J&K be reconstituted into self-governing entities enjoying free access to one another and to and from both India and Pakistan’. It recommends the establishment of five autonomous entities of Kashmir, Jammu, Ladakh (in Indian Administered Kashmir), Azad Kashmir and northern areas (in Pakistan Administered Kashmir) and also the creation of an All-Kashmir body with representatives from each of the five entities as well as from India and Pakistan to coordinate areas of broader interest such as regional trade, tourism, environment and water resources. ‘Each of the new entities would have its own democratic constitution(s) as well as its own citizenship, flag and legislature that would legislate on all matters other than defense and foreign affairs’. All the entities would be demilitarised but India and Pakistan would be responsible for defence and financial arrangements and nei-ther would place troops on either side of the LoC.46 President musharraf’s four-point proposal to identify regions that need a solution for determining their status, demilitarise the identified region/regions while curbing militant aspects of the freedom movement, introduce self-rule in these and develop a joint mecha-nism with India, Pakistan and the Kashmir to oversee self-government and deal with residual subjects common to all identified regions,47 smacks of the influence of the KSG and Dixon plans.

Sajjad Gani Lone, chairman of a faction of the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples’ Conference, in a 268-page ‘vision document’ Achievable Nationhood took insights from various conflict resolution examples and new ideas propounded in relation


to Kashmir. he envisages an economically single boundaryless Jammu & Kashmir Economic Union with India and Pakistan jointly managing defence and foreign affairs in their respective portions of Kashmir. It draws on the idea of borders being made irrelevant – without actually changing them – similar to points made by Indian Prime minister manmohan Singh and in musharraf’s four-point for-mula. Achievable Nationhood talks about shared sovereignty between India, Pakistan and Indian and Pakistan Administered Kashmirs; that both sides of the J&K State will have independent relationships with each other, making it ‘a neu-tral, peace zone’, that there will be a J&K Economic Union, Joint Immigration Control for movement of Residents within the State, Joint management of Natural Resources, and Sector Specific Cooperation, Coordination and Consultation. New institutions will be created to coordinate affairs among the four entities (India, Pakistan, Indian and Pakistani Administered Kashmirs).48

President musharraf’s suggestion of identifying region/regions that need solution can have varied interpretations and applications, and could imply the treatment of different regions of Kashmir on different bases, depending on ‘eth-nic, political, and strategic considerations dictating some give and take’ and pro-viding for different placement of certain region/regions in relation to one another in future political dispensations modelled on some kind of federal arrangement. Today, working out a mechanism whereby constituent units of a state can join at different levels and layers of federal relationship, is possible. With ingenuity, it should be possible to arrive at such an arrangement. (In fact it was reported that by 2007/8 India and Pakistan had come quite close to evolving an acceptable framework for addressing the Kashmir issue by means of ‘back channel’ diplo-macy for a non-territorial solution to Kashmir under Prime minister manmohan Singh and then Pakistani President Pervez musharraf.)49

Clearly there are threads here that are essential to any solution: reconnecting the two sides of Jammu & Kashmir; empowering the respective regions; demili-tarisation and converting the state into a zone of peace. Kashmir has the dubious distinction of having the largest concentration of military and paramilitary forces presence within civilian areas anywhere in the world.50 This gravely dispropor-tionate military and paramilitary presence has very serious implications not only for the people, but also for the country’s ecology. The very presence of such forces seriously undermines the physical, moral, psychological, cultural, economic and political development of the people. We need to work for conditions which make the discourse of violence completely irrelevant so that Kashmir as a zone of peace assumes the status of Asia’s Switzerland in a political sense as well.

Self-government in essence would mean that the government in place decided all important socio-economic, cultural and political aspects. Joint management can have different forms and manifestations. And instead of looking at that solely as a negative factor, in the contemporary context it could be made into an oppor-tunity. If properly worked out, it could extend options to people who have been pushed to what I call the ‘secluded periphery’. Today, the idea of a nation state


with hard borders is passé. Sovereignty is not only being undermined but con-sciously compromised in an evolving world order which is defined by growing interdependence among nation states at different levels. A mechanism such as joint management could be an opportunity to link to a larger entity like SAARC and bring to Kashmir the advantages of what was traditionally referred to as a confederational arrangement.

People have suggested that the Kashmir issue could be addressed along the lines of Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement.51 In both cases there is an internal and external dimension to the disputes. The plurality of perspectives within the disputed zones is also comparable to some extent.52 But the two dis-putes are not identical. The cultural and regional contexts of the two make the conflicts fundamentally different. In practice, replicating the Good Friday Agreement might not be that easy or workable.

There are political forces that talk about self-rule, and restoration of the auton-omy granted to the State within the Indian constitution under Article 370, but that was substantially eroded, after Sheikh Abdullah’s removal from power in 1953, by governments that lacked democratic credibility. The restoration of 1950s’ special status cannot in itself be a solution to Kashmir, unless linked and modi-fied to contemporary realities. In 1950, autonomy was evolved for Indian Administered Kashmir as a mechanism for addressing an internal situation. But today any solution dealing with the internal dimension of the issue needs also to address its external dimension. That means it must relate to Pakistan Administered Kashmir and Pakistan as a party to the dispute as well.

other models, too, have been proposed and they may have some significant lessons. But no blueprint prepared in the abstract can be applied to a complex problem like Kashmir. There can be no readymade, off-the-peg solution. Kashmir’s solution must evolve from within. history can provide lessons and inspiration on which to draw, but progress requires us not to get stuck in the past. We need to realise that today’s world has opened up new and ingenious ways of addressing issues. SAARC under its own logic and due to the impera-tives of globalisation, has to promote a different order in South Asia. Today, the old discourse of national security is being supplanted by a discourse of human security which could redefine relationships in the region. It places the intelli-gentsia, the academic community, human rights groups and people interested in peace-building and human security, the business community across the region and environmental groups, the media and, most particularly, the politi-cal leadership as the agents of change in the region’s paradigm shift. much depends on us and our capacity for seizing the opportunity – a challenge for people and leadership inside Jammu and Kashmir too. Instead of being seen as only passively toeing the line created by an outsider, they need to exhibit their capacity to launch their own peace offensive and thereby help create conditions to resolve the Kashmir issue and secure a place of honour, dignity and security for its people.


References 1 Sumantra Bose, The Challenge in Kashmir (New Delhi, Sage, 1997); Robert G. Wirsing, India,

Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (New York, St. martin’s Press, 1994). 2 Noor Ahmad Baba, ‘origins and dimensions of Kashmir crises’, in Shri Prakash and Ghulam

mohammad Shah, eds, Towards Understanding the Kashmir Crises (New Delhi, Gyan Publishing house, 2002), pp. 51–61; Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the unfinished war (London, I. B. Tauris, 2010).

3 The Instrument of Accession was signed by a deeply unpopular ruler against whom a popular uprising was in full swing. In 1931, Kashmiris launched an organised uprising that soon spread to other parts of the princely state for the establishment of a popular order, culminating in the Quit Kashmir agitation in 1946. See G. h. Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir: 1931-1940 (New Delhi, Light & Life Publishers, 1980). For a comprehensive account of the nature of the Dogra rule and the movement against it, see Prem Nath Bazaz, The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir (New Delhi, Pamposh Publishers, 1954); m. Y. Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom (Lahore, Ferozsons Ltd., 1977) Vol. I; see also, mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects (New Delhi, Permanent Black, 2004).

4 See the text of Governor General’s Letter of 27 october 1947 to the maharaja of Kashmir in response to his offer of accession to the Indian Union, in P. L. Lakhanpal, Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute (New Delhi, International Publishers, 1958), p. 56. The Government of India reiterated this position on a number of occasions within the country and at the UN.

5 See Wirsing, op. cit., pp. 54–56. 6 For a list of UN Resolutions on Kashmir, see ‘UN Resolutions on Kashmir’, in Philosophy and

Social Action (Delhi, Vol. 20, nos. 3–4, July-Sept.-Dec., 1994), Part II, pp. 1–39. 7 Noor Ahmad Baba, ‘Kashmir special status: myth and reality’, in V. R. Raghavan, ed., Conflict

in Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi, Vij Books, 2012), pp. 191–208. 8 Sheikh mohammad Abdullah, ‘Kashmir, India and Pakistan’, Foreign Affairs (Washington,

April 1965). For the politics of the plebiscite, see also Abdul Jabbar Gockhami, Kashmir Politics of Plebiscite (Srinagar, Gulshan Books, 2011) and David E. Lockwood, ‘Sheikh Abdullah and the politics of Kashmir’, Asian Survey (Vol. 9, no. 5, 1969), pp. 382–96.

9 Noor Ahmad Baba, ‘Democracy and governance in Kashmir’, in Nyla Ali Khan, ed., The Parchment of Kashmir (New York, Palgrave macmillan, 2012).

10 As a result of the Karachi agreement of 1949 that created a ceasefire between India and Pakistan under the supervision of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir got divided in de facto terms between what is known as Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmirs. As a result of this, out of the total area of 222,236 sq. kms of what constituted Jammu and Kashmir, 36 per cent came, and is under, the control of Pakistan and the rest, about 54 per cent, remained under the control of India till 1962 when the Chinese, through aggression, occupied about 18 per cent of the State’s territory leaving only about 46 per cent under Indian control. ‘Some facts and figures about Jammu and Kashmir’, Manthan (New Delhi, october 1991).

11 Bose, op. cit. 12 Wirsing, op. cit. 13 See Cost of Conflict between India and Pakistan (mumbai, Strategic Foresight Group, 2004). 14 Kalevi J. holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,

1996), pp. 15–20. 15 A secure society must therefore ‘promote a viable ecosystem while at the same time working

towards the elimination of both physical and structural violence’, an elimination that requires ‘dismantling hierarchical boundaries between women and men, rich and poor, and insiders and outsiders which have contributed to an exclusionary divisive definition of security’. mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 9.


16 See Editorial, ‘Whither South Asia’, South Asian Journal (Vol. 1, 2003), pp. i–ii. 17 For the Pakistan factor in India’s energy security, see Bhupendra Kumar Singh, India’s Energy

Security: the changing dynamics (New Delhi, Pentagon Energy Press, 2010), pp. 152–59. 18 Noor Ahmad Baba, ‘Contextualising Indo-Iranian relations’, World Focus (Vol. 34, no. 6, 2013),

pp. 18–28. 19 Noor Ahmad Baba, ‘International Governmental organisations: relevance in the contempo-

rary world’, in B. C. Upreti, ed., SAARC: dynamics of regional cooperation in South Asia (New Delhi, Kalinga Publications, 2000), pp. 21–30.

20 masood Ali mir, ‘Impact of Indo-Pak conflict on the working of SAARC’ (Unpublished m.Phil. dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of Kashmir, Srinagar, 2007).

21 The mistrust between the two has hampered the full potential of India’s relations with the energy-rich regions. Singh, India’s Energy, op. cit., n. 15.

22 Baba, ‘Contextualizing Indo-Iranian relations’, op. cit. 23 Noor Ahmad Baba, ‘Peace process and imperative of resolving Kashmir problem’, in Amitabh

mattoo, Kapil Kak and happymon Jacob, eds, India & Pakistan: pathways ahead (New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2007), pp. 209–18.

24 Ibid. 25 In the context of the death and destruction of 1947, it is estimated that up to one million peo-

ple were killed during Partition, with the Punjab suffering the highest death toll. See Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: unravelling the 1947 tragedy through secret British reports and first-person accounts (oxford, oxford University Press, 2012) and Sarah Ansari, Life after Partition: migration, community and strife in Sindh: 1947–1962 (oxford, oxford University Press, 2005).

26 The Kargil War began with the infiltration of Kashmir militants and, it later transpired, Pakistani soldiers.

27 See Ved marwah, Uncivil Wars: pathology of terrorism in India (New Delhi, Indus, 1995), p. 72. See, for further details, Baba, ‘origins’, op. cit., pp. 51–60.

28 Verghese Koithara, Crafting Peace in Kashmir (New Delhi, Sage, 2004), p. 71. 29 Quoting Shri S. S. Kapur, the Chief Secretary of the State, Reuters in November 2008 reported

an official estimate: ‘death toll from nearly two decades of insurgency in Kashmir to more than 47,000 people’, which included 20,000 civilians, 7,000 police personnel and about 20,000 mili-tants. According to the same report, Kashmir’s main separatist group, the All Parties hurriyat (Freedom) Conference, said more than 100,000 people had died since the insurgency broke out in 1989 (available at: http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/11/21/idINIndia-36624520081121). Since then, the death toll in the conflict will have gone up further. See also Randeep Singh Nandal, ‘State refutes claims of 1 lakh killed in Kashmir’, The Times of India (20 June 2011).

30 The State Observer, ‘Report’ (27 February 2014) and Greater Kashmir (9 August 2012). 31 The insurgency began in 1989 as a local, poorly armed movement. The massive Indian military

response led hundreds of young Kashmiri men to cross the Line of Control to receive train-ing and weapons. The favourable context also gave Pakistan the opportunity to get involved in Kashmir as never before and support militancy. The two principal Kashmiri groups were the secular Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and the religious Islamic hizb-ul-mujahidin (hm). Their ideological differences were exploited by Indian forces to promote internecine conflict among the militant groups. The number of militant deaths peaked around 1996. The gap in militancy was filled by foreign groups with few links to local Kashmiri people. At the same time, the dreaded category of ‘renegade militants’ was created by Indian forces. The ‘renegades’ were surrendered militants who, motivated through torture or bribes, were organised into pro-India groups, armed and trained by the army and operating from their camps inside, or next to, army camps. Their reign of terror lasted over a decade. In 1996, the JKLF gave up arms in favour of political struggle for independence.


32 The unrest that converged into mass protest during the summers of 2008, 2009 and 2010 vindi-cates this reality.

33 haley Duschinski, ‘Destiny effects: militarization, state power and punitive containment in Kashmir Valley’, Anthropological Quarterly (Vol. 82, no. 3, 2009), pp. 691–717.

34 Shubh mathur, ‘Life and death in the borderlands: Indian sovereignty and military impunity’, Race & Class (Vol. 54, no. 1, 2012), p. 42.

35 Prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, ‘Time to resolve problems of the past; time to move on towards a better future’ (1 January 2001), available at: http://www.indianembassy.org/ special/cabinet/Primeminister/pm_january_01_2001.htm.

36 Noor Ahmad Baba, ‘Kashmir bus: small but a step in the right direction’, Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (New Delhi, IPCS,19 April 2005).

37 Ibid. 38 For example, the apple produced in the Sopore area has had to cover only about 250 kms to

reach Islamabad/Rawalpindi compared to about 1,000 kms of difficult track to reach Delhi. The situation worsened after the emergence of militancy in the late 1980s. See also Noor Ahmad Baba, ‘Kashmir bus’, ibid.

39 Noor Ahmad Baba, ‘Reconnecting Kashmir, need for reopening traditional routes’, Epilogue (Jammu, September, 2008), pp. 39–40.

40 Baba, Governance, op. cit and Bose, op. cit. 41 Sten Widmalm, Democracy and Violent Separatism in India: Kashmir in a comparative perspective

(Uppsala University, 1997). For an account of unopposed elections and electoral malpractices, see also P. S. Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads (New Delhi, Vilas, 1994).

42 UN Resolutions, op. cit. 43 ‘Some facts’, Manthan, op. cit. 44 For more on the Dixon plans, see Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: a study in India-Pakistan relations (New

Delhi, Asia Publishing house, 1966), pp. 17–23. 45 m. J. Akbar, Kashmir: behind the vale (New Delhi, Roli Books, 2002), p. 167. 46 The Kashmir Study Group (New York) presented three reports: 1947-1997: the Kashmir dispute

at fifty (New York, 1997) and Kashmir: a way forward, published in 2000 and 2005. 47 A. G. Noorani, ‘The four point solution’, Dawn (5 october 2012). 48 happymon Jacob, ‘Ideal versus the achievable’, Greater Kashmir (20 February 2008). 49 That India and Pakistan had, through ‘back channels’, agreed to a non-territorial solution

to Kashmir under Prime minister manmohan Singh and then Pakistani President Pervez musharraf, was revealed in a WikiLeaks cable. According to the US embassy cable – dated 21 April 2009 – Singh confirmed this to a visiting US delegation, led by then house Foreign Affairs Committee chairman howard Berman in April 2009, saying that the solution included free trade and movement across the LoC.

50 Conservative estimates of their presence are 500,000, see mathur, op. cit., p. 42. 51 A. G. Noorani, ‘Irish lessons for Kashmir’, Frontline (Vol. 20, no. 7, 2003), available at: http://

www.frontline.com/fl2007/stories/20030411000507400.htm. 52 Ibid.

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