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Elias Hellstrom

Dr. Heath White

PAR 317

23 March 2015

Reliability of Reliabilism

Justification is key when it comes to knowledge, and

reliabilism is key when it comes to justification. Reliabilism is

one of the most important approaches in epistemology, and has

brought many renowned philosophers to argue over its worthiness.

With its significance on the line, reliabilism must be judged on

many fronts. When evaluating reliabilism, strengths can be found

in its real world application and logic, while its weaknesses can

be found in its argued need for complete accuracy, even given

skeptical worlds. After many positions are considered, it can be

concluded that reliabilism is what the real world needs.

When it comes to knowledge, there are two approaches

epistemologists take; externalist and internalist theories.

Externalist theories base epistemic judgment on factors that hold

true for whoever knows it, but which does not need to be

psychologically known to them in forming a belief. Internalist

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theories, on the other hand, base knowledge and justification on

the knower's conception of the evidence and relation of evidence

for their belief (Pappas). Since reliabilism does not rely on the

conception of relation of evidence, but instead relies on factors

that hold true regardless of who knows it, it is considered an

externalist theory. This meaning brings about most of the

controversy surrounding reliabilism.

The greatest difference between most methods of knowledge

and reliabilism lies in that reliabilism does not require

awareness. Reliabilism requires a reliable system for belief

formation, but does not require any awareness or evidence of the

system's reliability or an awareness or evidence of the system's

level of the reliability.

There are many forms of reliabilism, but for the sake of

argument we will be focusing on the virtues and vices form of

reliabilism, most exemplified by Alvin Goldman. These virtues and

vices are comprised of ordinarily understood belief forming

processes that are held as being reliable (virtue) or unreliable

(vice) (Goldman 1992). When using Goldman’s version of

reliabilism, many strengths come to surface.

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Reliabilism’s strengths are largely contributed to its

logical evaluation, and normal world application. Normal worlds

are the worlds that are consistent with our beliefs about the

sorts of things and properties that exist in the actual world,

and about how the actual world functions (Goldman 1986).

Essentially, normal worlds are the worlds the majority of us

think we know. This is another example of a type of reliabilism,

because reliability in a normal worlds model would rely on what

we perceive our world to be. This version of reliabilism is a

good representative of reliabilism’s strengths as a whole. When

holding a normal world perspective, which is easy to comprehend

for most people, reliabilism is very effective in obtaining

useful knowledge. Knowledge is meant to serve a purpose, and this

purpose is only well served when it applies to what we can

obtain. However, reliabilism’s weaknesses appear when evaluating

peculiar situations.

Reliabilism’s weakness revolves around the fact that it is

an externalist theory. Two of the more formidable attacks on

reliabilism consist of the irrationality and evil demon

arguments. Both of these arguments rely on the fact that

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reliabilism is an externalist theory, and attacks the fact that

the knower does not know how reliable something is, and therefore

it does not seem to be reliable. These arguments do pose an

apparent weakness for reliabilism, and they are worth taking a

look at.

The irrationality argument seeks to show examples of

reliabilist theories, understood as justified or known beliefs,

that are obviously irrational from the believer's perspective

(BonJour 1980, Lehrer 1990, and Putnam 1983). For example,

suppose that a man, Mr. Naive, believes that his dog can predict

lottery numbers through howling. Unknown to Mr. Naive, his dog is

a perfectly reliable predictor of lottery numbers. However, what

Mr. Naive knows is that he has been presented with a lot of

scientific evidence stating dogs cannot predict lottery numbers.

Mr. Naive's belief that the lottery numbers will be 4, 8, 15, 16,

23, 42, satisfies the reliabilist definition of knowledge or

justification, but there is an obvious objection that Mr. Naive

clearly does not know or have justified beliefs (“Reliabilism”).

While this is a convincing argument against reliabilism, Goldman

attempts to heal this weakness.

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Goldman argues that such cases, irrationality cases, do not

count as counterexamples to his theory because Mr. Naive's belief

forming process in maintaining his lottery belief is an

intellectual vice (Goldman 1986). Goldman is saying that, because

ignoring exceeding amounts of scientific evidence is not

generally reliable, it would easily be recognized as a cognitive

vice (not a justification or knowledge creating process). Using

the virtues/vices version of reliabilism dissuades previously

convincing arguments. This still does not provide cause to

completely trust reliabilism as a form of justification, though.

There are still dilemmas similar to that of evil demon worlds.

Suppose we, human kind, lived in a world where all of our

experiences are exactly the same, but we are actually all being

deceived by an evil demon. In this world, all our beliefs are

actually false. However, since all of our experiences are exactly

the same, most philosophers think that our beliefs would still be

justified. Reliabilism, on the other hand, seems to dictate that

our beliefs would fail to be justified due to the low reliability

of our cognitive processes. For example, perceptual beliefs seem

justified even though we actually live in an evil demon world,

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since all of our perceptual experiences are exactly the same as

they would be in the world we believe to exist. Reliabilism

states that these beliefs lack justification since perception is

unreliable in the evil demon world. In this evil demon world, all

our beliefs are false. However, since all of our experiences are

the same, many philosophers would say that our beliefs would

still be justified. Contrarily, reliabilism seems to dictate that

our beliefs would fail to be justified due to the low reliability

of our cognitive processes. Again, this is an argument that has

convinced many to turn against reliabilism, but this still does

not prove reliabilism weak.

In his 1992 article, Goldman responds to the evil demon

argument by stating that perceptual belief formation would

actually be a cognitive virtue (a process that is perceived to be

generally reliable). This would mean that perceptual beliefs

would be justified in the evil demon case, because beliefs

created or maintained by a virtuous cognitive process are, in

fact, justified. Using virtues and vices as a measurement of

reliabilism puts to rest any argument like this. Given any world

we live in, whether it be The Matrix, an evil demon world, or

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brain-in-a-vat world, virtue/vice reliabilism creates a reliable

system for justification, and that just seems logical.

Like any philosophical theory, reliabilism has its strengths

and weaknesses. When it comes to practical usage and normal world

application, reliabilism is a very strong epistemological

approach to justification. However, due to it being an

externalist theory, reliabilism suffers the wrath of the evil

demon and irrationality arguments. Normally, the weakness of

reliabilism lies in the reliance of true accuracy, but it is

argued by Goldman that this is not necessarily true when

understanding reliabilism through virtues and vices. Like any

philosophical theory, one can only fight for the strengths and

defend against the weaknesses, but reliabilism seems to do a good

job of this.

Reliabilism deserves the attention it has received over the

years. As a form of justification, reliabilism has attractive

aspects. While it can be weakened in many hypothetical, other-

wordly situations, reliabilism serves as a great justifier for

real world application. When it comes down to it, reliabilism

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serves the purpose of justification in a practical and effective

way, and this is all that matters.

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Works Cited

BonJour, L. (1980). Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge"

in French, P., Uehling, T., and Wettstein, H. (eds) Midwest

Studies in Philosophy, vol. 5 Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press.

Goldman, A. (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press. Goldman, A. (1992). Liaisons:

Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences. Cambridge:

MIT Press.

Lehrer, K. (1990). Theory of Knowledge. Boulder: Westview Press.

Pappas, George, "Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of

Epistemic Justification", The Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta

(ed.), URL =

<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/justep-

intext/>.

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Putnam, H. (1983). "Why Reason Can't be Naturalized," in Realism

and Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

“Reliabilism.” California State University Long Beach. Web. 22

March 2015