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RECEIVED
MAR O 2 2021
FELTMAN EWING, P.S.
COL.i<r ,.>t n.1_;1.,~·.,....__
DI\ ISl0'-1 il' ST.'\TF or WASH!l',GTo,, Hi __ _
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
JEFFREY P . JONES and PETER C. JONES,
Respondents,
V.
RUSSELL K. JONES, Appellant.
) ) COA No. 37033-0-III ) SUPREME COURT No. __ ) ) ) ) ) )
PETITION FOR REVIEW
Russell K. Jones P.O. Box 4766 Spokane, WA 99220 509-534-0820 Appellant
99540-1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Cases ............. .................... .. ........ .... ... .... .... ... .... .... .. ............ .... ...... ... ..... .... .... ........... .... ii
Identity of Petitioner ... ......................... .... .............. .. .. ............. .... .... .. .................. ... .. ....... .. .......... 1
Citation to Court of Appeals decision ....... .. .... ........ ..... .. ..... ..... .. ... ... ..... ... ........ ........ ... ...... ..... .... .. 1
Issues presented for review ... .. .... ..... ... .. ....... .......... .. ...... .............................. .. ...... .. ..................... 1
Statement of case ...... ........ ..... ......... ... ...... ... .. ...... ....... .... ..... .... ................... ... .. .. .. ..... ................... 2
Argument. ..... ...... ... ......... .. ..... ....... ... ... ..... ............ .... .. ... .... .... ... .... ... ...... ............. .. ............... ....... . 4
Due Process ........ ..... .. ........... .... ....... .............. .... ........................ ... .......... .. ......... ............. 4
Timeliness ........ .... ... ..................... ... ........ .... ..................... .. .... ....... ... .. .... ............. ........ .. 10
Contempt ......... ............ .. ... ..... ... .. .... ........... .. ............................................. .................... 14
Conclusion ..... .. .. ... .. .......... ... ..... .. ... ... ..... ... ... ... .. ......... ............ .... ...... ..... ... .. ... .... ..... ............. .. .. .. 17
Certificate ... ... .......... ........... ... ....................................... ...... .... .... ...... ..... ... .... ...... ............. ......... 17
Appendix .. ............ ..... .... ..... .... ... .. ........ ... ............................ .... ..... ...... ...... ... .... ........... ... .......... .. 18
Court of Appeals unpublished opinion filed 9/22/20
Court of Appeals order denying reconsideration filed 2/2/21
RCW 4.56.210
RCW 6.17.020
TABLE OF CASES
Adams v. Ingalls, 30 Wn.2d 282, 191 P.2d 699 (1948) ........ ... ..................... ... ................ ..... .. .... 10
American Discount Corp. v. Shepherd, 160 Wn. 2d 93 , 156 P.3d 858 (2007) ................... ... ...... 13
Bates v. Lundy, 178 Wash. 9, 33 P.2d 664 (l 934) ...... .. ...... .. .... ..... .................. ..... .. ....... ............ .. 5
Brenner v. Port of Bellingham, 53 Wn.App. 182, 765 P .2d. 1333 (1989) ...................... ........... . 16
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, 416 U.S. 663, 40 L.Ed.2d 452,
94 S. Ct. 2080 (1974) ........ ............ .......... ...... .............. ............ ......... ........................................... 8
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 1, 111 S.Ct. 2105 (1991) ................ .......... .... ..... . 5
Application ofDowdall, 138 Misc. 269, 245 N.Y.S. 539 (1930) .................................. ............. 12
Esmieu v. Schrag, 88 Wn.2d 490, 563 P.2d 203 (1977) ................. ... .... ....... .... ... ... ...... ................ 9
Fuentes v . Shevin, 407 U.S . 67, 32 L.Ed.2d 556, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972) ............... ...... .. .. .... .......... 6
State ex rel Gough v. Superior Court, 137 Wash. 552, 243 Pac. 11 (1926) .......... ... ...... ... ... ..... .. 15
Harmon v. Hopkins, 116 Cal.App. 184, 2 P.2d 540 (1931) ............... ......................................... 11
Hatfield v. Greco, 87 Wn.2d 780, 557 P.2d 340 (1976) ..................... ............................ .......... .. 16
Lowenstein v. American Underwear, 11 FRD 172 (E.D.Pa., 1951) ........................................... 15
Marriage ofLeslie, 112 Wn.2d 612, 772 P.2d 1013 (1989) ............... .................................. ........ 9
Marriage of Mu Chai, 122 Wn.App. 247, 93 P.3d 936 (2004) .. .......... ... ............ .. ...................... 16
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed.2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976) ............... ............ ........ 7
Peralta v. Heights Medical Center Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 85, 99 L.Ed.2d 75, 108 S.Ct. 896 (1988) .. 11
Pryor v. Pryors, 56 Ariz. 572, 110 P.2d 229 (I 94 I) ................. .. ..................... .............. ........... .. 11
11
Royal Grocery Co. v. Oliver, 57 Cal.App. 278, 207 Pac. 61 (1922) ................ ............. ........ ..... . 11
Tacoma Hotel v. Tacoma, 122 Wash. 335, 210 Pac. 676 (1922) ..... ..... .. ... .... ..... ... ...... ............... 10
Statev. Turner, 98 Wn. 2d 731 , 658 P.2d 658 (1983) .. ......................... .......... ...... .... ............ ... .. 16
Van Blaricom v. Kronenberg, 112 Wn.App. 501, 50 P.3d 266 (2002) ..... .... .... ... ....... .. ... .... .. .. ... .. 6
Wynn v. Earin, 163 Wn.2d 361 , 181 P.3d 806 (2008) ... .............. .. .. ................... ........ ... ......... ... 13
RCW 4.56.190 ...... .......................... .... ..... .............. ..... ............... ........ ........ ..... ......... ....... ..... ....... 4
RCW 4.56.210 ....... .......... ..... ................... .... ........ ..... .. .. ....... ........ ... .......... ... ..... ... ..... .... .... ... ....... 4
RCW6.I7.020 ... .. ...... ............ ... .. .. ... .. .... .. ... .... ... .... .. ...... .. ........... .. ..... ........ .. ..... ........ ..... ... .. ...... .. 4
RCW 6. 17.160 .... .... .... ... ....... ...... ... ............... .... .. ... .. ...... .. ... ... ...... .... ....... .......... ............ ........ .... .. 6
RCW 6.32.010 ....................................... ..................... ....... ....... .... ..... ........ ... .... ....... .. ......... ...... 15
RCW 6.32.015 ......... .............. ... ............... .... .... .. .. .... .... ... .. ............. .... .. ....... ..... ..... ... ...... .... ....... 14
RCW 6.32.030 ... ........... .................... ............ .. .... ....... .. ...... ........ .. ...................... ...................... . 15
RCW 6.32.040 ... ..... ............. .. ..... ......... ... .. ..... ... ...... ......... .. ......... ...... ........ ........... ... ......... ........ . 14
RCW 6.32.050 ....... ....... ..... .. ..... .. ... .... ... ... .................. .... ...... ....... .... .......... ... ......... ........ .. ... ....... 14
RCW 7.21.010 . ................................ .... ... .. .... ...... ..... ... .......... .................... ...... ... ..... .. ..... ......... .. 14
CR 12(h)(3) .... .... ...... ........ ... .. .... ........ ....... ........... ............................... .... .... .. ............... ..... ........ 16
CR 60(b )(5) ... ....... .... ..... ...... ............ ... ........... .......... ..... .................. .. ..... ... ..... .... .... .. ... ...... ....... ... 7
FRCP 69 ........... .................. .. ... ................................................ ................................. .... ............ 15
Black' s Law Dictionary, Gamer, 11th Ed., Thomson Reuters (2019) ....... ....... ..... .... .. ... ..... ...... .. 15
Cambridge English Dictionary.org, Cambridge University (2019) .................. ........ ........... .. ..... 11
lll
Webster's New Third International Dictionary of the English Language,
Unabridged, Merriam (1981) .......... ... ....... .......... .... .. .............. .... .............. .. ....... ............ ..... .. ... . 11
Words and Phrases, Thomson-West (2008) ... ..... .......... ................................. ... ........ ................. 12
IV
IDENTITY OF PETITIONER
Russell Jones, appellant.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
Unpublished opinion No. 37033-0-III filed 9/22/20.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Issue No. 1. Is extension of enforcement of judgment, RCW 6.17.020(3), without
prior notice and opportunity for hearing to the judgment debtor, a deprivation of property
without due process of law?
Issue No. 2. Does filing of a motion to extend enforcement of judgment "within
ninety days before the expiration of the original ten-year period", RCW 6.17.020(3),
mean "at a time not later than ninety days before the expiration", or "at a time between
ninety days before the expiration, and the expiration date"?
Issue No. 3. Does a Washington court have subject matter jurisdiction to hold a
judgment debtor in contempt for failure to produce documents in a supplemental
proceeding, RCW 6.32?
1
STATEMENT OF CASE
Respondents Jeffrey Jones and Peter Jones filed five motions to extend
enforcement of civil judgments against appellant Russell Jones. CP 1-2, 3-4, 9-10, 13-15,
19-21. A Spokane County Superior Court Commissioner ordered the extensions. CP 5-6,
7-8, 11-12, 16-18, 22-24. Each motion and order was ex parte, without prior notice or
opportunity for hearing to appellant. This is the routine practice to extend enforcement of
judgments in Spokane County.
Appellant filed a motion for relief from the orders of extension, arguing that the
orders were void for denial of procedural due process including lack of prior notice and
opportunity for hearing. CP 41. The Superior Court denied the motion. RP 48 . No written
order was entered at that time.
The motion for relief also argued that the motions for extension were untimely per
the extension statute, RCW 6.17.020 (3). CP 41. Each motion for extension had been
filed less than ninety days before expiration of the enforcement time limit. The Superior
Court denied the timeliness defense by written order. CP 82-83 . Both issues were denied
on reconsideration by written order. CP 85.
On a separate issue in the Superior Court, a court commissioner entered a finding
and judgment of contempt against appellant, RCW 6.32.180 and RCW 7.21, for failure to
produce documents in a supplemental proceeding, RCW 6.32, CP 25-34. Appellant filed
a motion for relief in the Superior Court, arguing that the commissioner did not have
2
subject matter jurisdiction to order production of documents in a RCW 6.32 supplemental
proceeding. CP 25-34, 35-36. The motion for relief was denied. CP 80-81.
Reconsideration was denied . CP 56-58, 67-70, 84-86.
On appeal in the Court of Appeals, Division III, the appellate court decided in an
unpublished opinion filed 9/22/20 that appellant was not entitled to prior notice and
opportunity for hearing on the motions to extend enforcement of judgment, that the
motions for extension were timely, and that the order of contempt was a mere error of
law, not without subject matter jurisdiction, which should have been timely pursued by
direct appeal. Attached.
Reconsideration was denied by the appellate court without comment. Attached.
This petition for review followed .
3
ARGUMENT
DUE PROCESS
This first paragraph reviews the statutes relevant to the issue of due process. RCW
4.56.190 states that a civil judgment is a lien on real property. A lien is an encumbrance
and cloud on title that deprives the judgment debtor of his ability to sell, gift,
hypothecate, or bequeath the property for the term of the lien. Thus a lien is a deprivation
of uses and value of property. RCW 6. 17. 020( 1) states that the term for enforcement of a
civil judgment is ten years. RCW 6.17.020(3) states that the term for enforcement may be
extended for an additional ten years on motion and order. RCW 4.56.210(3) states that
the judgment lien is also extended by the order of extension without further court action.
Thus the judgment debtor is deprived of the same uses and value of his property for an
additional decade.
This second paragraph offers an alternate solution to the due process issue before
the court. If an alternate solution is available, the constitutional solution will not be used.
RCW 6.17.020(3) states that extension of the term of enforcement is subject to defenses
of "timeliness, factual issues of full or partial satisfaction, or errors in calculating the
judgment summary amounts." If the judgment creditor could proceed ex parte in his
motion to extend, the statutory defenses would have no meaning, and would be surplus
words. A rule of statutory construction states that all words of the statute have meaning,
and must be made operative. Thus the legislature intended that the judgment debtor be
4
given prior notice and opportunity for hearing on the motion to extend in order to raise
his defenses.
This third paragraph begins the discussion of 14th amendment due process.
Appellant was not given prior notice and opportunity for hearing on motions for
extension of enforcement of judgments. In Spokane County, a motion for extension is
routinely handled in an ex parte hearing before a court commissioner.
This court has written in broad terms of what constitutes a deprivation of
property.
"The constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process oflaw may be violated without the physical taking of property for public or private use. Its capability for enjoyment and adaptability to some use are essential characteristics and attributes without which property cannot be conceived. Hence a law is considered as being a deprivation of property within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty if it deprives an owner of one of its essential attributes, or destroys its value, or restricts or interrupts its common, necessary, or profitable use, or hampers the owner in the application of it to the purposes of trade, or imposes conditions upon the right to hold or use it, and thereby impairs its value. These general principles apply not only to statutes enacted by the legislature but to the action of executive officers generally. ( citation).
Inman v. Sandvig, 170 Wash. 112, 119, 15 P.2d 696 (1932). Inman considered an
administrative rule change on apple packaging without prior notice or opportunity for
hearing to growers.
In Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 1, 111 S. Ct. 2105 (1991) a
private homeowner' s real property was attached in a prejudgment ex parte procedure to
secure payment of any future judgment in a tort claim brought by another private party.
Attachment of real property is a lien on real property. Bates v. Lundy, 178 Wash. 9, 11 ,
5
33 P.2d 664 (1934) ("the lien of attachment"); RCW 6.17.160(1) (real property attached
by recording the writ of attachment with the county auditor, creating a lien). While
Doehr involved an attachment lien, and the present case involves a judgment lien, the
procedure by which the lien arises does not change the consequences of the lien. There is
a deprivation of property in both cases. The Doehr court found a deprivation of property.
"We agree with the Court of Appeals that the property interests that the attachment affects are significant. For a property owner like Doehr, attachment ordinarily clouds title; impairs the ability to sell or otherwise alienate the property; taints any credit rating; reduces the chance of obtaining a home equity loan or additional mortgage; and can even place an existing mortgage in technical default where there is an insecurity clause."
Doehr, supra, 501 U.S . at 11.
The present case parallels Doehr. Appellant is a private homeowner. Respondents
are also private parties. There was an ex parte proceeding in which an additional lien on
real property was entered. There was a deprivation of property without due process
including notice and opportunity for hearing. See VanBlaricom v . Kronenberg, 112 Wn.
App. 501 , 50 P.3d 266 (2002) (Washington follows Doehr on attachment lien.) And for
emphasis, notice and opportunity must precede the taking. Fuentes v. Shevin., 407 U.S .
67, 81 , 32 L. Ed.2d 556, 925 S. Ct. 1983 (1972) ("If the right to notice and a hearing is to
serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the
deprivation can still be prevented.")
At this point, the Court of Appeals introduced an argument on its own motion that
appellant may not relitigate issues resolved in the original trial, citing the Uniform
Registration of Foreign Judgments Act and cases decided under the Uniform Act.
Unpublished opinion, page 5-6. In response to the Court of Appeals, appellant is not
6
attempting to relitigate issues resolved at trial, but to litigate issues arising post trial
including due process in the post trial motions to extend enforcement. In further response
to the Court of Appeals, appellant may do exactly as he is doing because this court said
so in adopting CR 60 (b)(5), void judgment, and as the Washington legislature said so in
enacting RCW 6.17.020(3), "The application shall be granted as a matter of right, subject
to review only for timeliness, factual issues or partial satisfaction, or errors in calculating
the judgment summary amounts."
Returning to Doehr, the court used a three factor analysis from Mathews v .
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed.2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976) to determine whether the ex
parte procedure abridged due process.
" ... first, consideration of the private interest that will be affected by the ( ex parte) measure; second, an examination of the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures under attack and the probable value of additional or alternative safeguards' and third ... principal attention to the interest of the party seeking the (ex parte) remedy, with, nonetheless due regard for any ancillary interest the government may have in providing the procedures or foregoing the added burden of providing greater protections."
Doehr, supra, 501 U.S. at 11.
wrote,
Concerning the first element above, private interest of the homeowner, the court
"We agree with the Court of Appeals that the property interests that attachment affects are significant. For a property owner like Doehr, attachment ordinarily clouds title ... our cases show that even a temporary or partial impairment to property rights that attachments, liens, and similar encumbrances entail are sufficient to merit due process protection. Without doubt, state procedures for creating and enforcing attachments, as with liens, are subject to the strictures of due process."
Doehr, supra, 501 U.S. at 11-12. Here, a lien is at issue.
7
Concerning the second factor in the three factor Mathews analysis above, risk of
erroneous deprivation by an ex parte process, the Doehr court referenced situations in
which "the risk of error was minimal because the likelihood of recovery involved
uncomplicated matters that lent themselves to documentary proof" Doehr, supra 501
U.S. at 15. Examples of documentary proof included payments on a retail sales contract,
and medical records. In contrast, the present case does not tum on documentary proof
Issues in the present case involve the 14th amendment, statutory interpretation of a filing
deadline, and contempt in a supplemental proceeding, issues of first impression which
cannot be resolved by reference to uncomplicated business records.
Concerning the third Mathews factor above, respondents' interest in the real
property, these respondents had no extended interest in the real property before the ex
parte extensions. Doehr, supra, 501 U.S . at 16.
The Doehr court went on to question whether a deprivation of property without
prior notice and opportunity for hearing can ever be constitutional.
"Nor do we suggest that the statutory measures we have surveyed are necessarily free of due process problems or other constitutional infirmities in general."
Doehr, supra, 501 U.S . at 18. The only firm exception to prior notice and hearing is an
exigent circumstance. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, 416 U.S. 663, 40
L.Ed.2d 452, 94 S. Ct. 2080 (1974). No exigency is alleged in the present case.
Each of the Mathews factors weighs against the ex parte process in the present
case, and in favor of prior notice and opportunity for hearing. The present orders of
extension deny due process. Denial of due process makes the orders of extension void.
8
Marriage of Leslie, 112 Wn.2d 612, 620, 772 P.2d 1013 (1989); Esmieu v. Schrag, 88
Wn.2d 490, 497, 563 P.2d 203 (1977).
As a last point, due process does not require that a party also show a viable
defense. Peralta v. Heights Medical Center Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 85, 99 L.Ed.2d 75, 108
S.Ct. 896 (1988). But the statutory defense of timeliness does apply in the present case.
9
TIMELINESS
RCW 6.17.0202(3) states that a motion for extension of enforcement of judgment
must be filed "within ninety days before the expiration of the original ten-year period and
ends with expiration of the original ten-year period." Appellant contends that the statute
requires filing at a time not later than ninety days before the expiration date. In contrast,
the Court of Appeals decided that " ... the 90-day period ... begins 90 days before the
expiration of the original 10-year period and ends with expiration of the original 10-year
period." Unpublished opinion, page 9-10. The present motions for extension were filed
between ninety days before, and the expiration date.
Looking at the actual words of the extension statute, the legislature has enacted a
filing deadline for the motion to extend. RCW 6.17.020(3) (" . .. a party in whose favor a
judgment has been filed ... may ... .rum.lY to the court . .. for an order granting an additional
ten years.") The legislature then gives instruction on how to find the deadline,
specifically to count back 90 days from the expiration date, " ... ninety days before the
expiration of the original ten year period." Thus the statute establishes a single deadline,
and not a span of dates. If filing was to be in a span of dates, the statute would read
"between" or "from ... to". But neither these words nor any equivalent appear in the
statute.
The extension statute also specifies "within ninety days before." In Washington,
"within" introduces the last date on which an action may be taken. Adams v. Ingalls, 30
10
Wn.2d 282, 284-286, 191 P.2d 699 (1948); Tacoma Hotel Co. v. Tacoma, 122 Wash.
335, 210 Pac. 676 (1922). Applied here "within" introduces the last date on which a
motion to extend may be filed, that date being "ninety days before the expiration."
Referencing standard English dictionaries, "within" has two different meanings ,
first, when used to describe time, and second, when used to describe space. "Within" time
means "not later than", as in "within the statute of limitation." "Within" space means
"inside", as in "within the curtilage" . CP 72-78 . Cambridge English Dictionary.org;
Webster's New Third International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged,
Merriam, (1980) ("not longer in time than"). The Washington authorities above are
consistent with standard English dictionaries.
Concerning cases from other jurisdictions on "within" time,
Pryor v. Pryors, 56 Ariz. 572, 1 IO P.2d 229, 233 (1941). A statute for giving
notice of claims at a time "within three days before the sale" was correctly followed by
notice given six days before the sale. The court wrote that "within" when used with
"before" means "not less than" or "at any time not less than."
Royal Grocery Co. v. Oliver, 57 Cal. App. 278, 207 Pac. 61, 62 (1922) "Notice
of intention to exercise ... renewal of this lease within 90 days prior to expiration of this
lease" means "lessee should give the lessor at least 90 days' notice of its intention to
continue the tenancy. To hold otherwise would be giving the option an unreasonable and
unjust interpretation."
Harmon v. Hopkins, 116 Cal.App. 184, 2 P.2d 540, 542 (1931). A statute read,
"Trial by jury may be waived ... (5) By failing to deposit with the clerk, within ten days
prior to the date set for trial, a sum ... " The defendant argued that the statute meant "at a
11
time less than ten days." The court, "We do not regard the contention as having any
merit", noting that the clerk needs time to call a jury.
Application of Dowdall, 138 Misc. 269, 245 N .Y.S . 539, 541 (1930). A statute
authorizing removal of an election officer "within one week before" the election required
a request at least one week before the election. The court, "It is doubtful if this could be
accomplished in so short a time (less time) without resulting in great confusion at the
polls and perhaps the disenfranchisement of many electors."
These cases appear in Words and Phrases, volume 46, Thomson - West (2008),
"within". Words and Phrases does not contain any contrary authority.
Appellant also cited the Court of Appeals to cases from Virginia, New Mexico,
Alabama, and Texas, all consistent with California, Arizona, and New York above.
Neither the Court of Appeals nor respondents have cited contrary authority. The Court of
Appeals only says that their reading ofRCW 6.17.020(3) is "reasonable" . Unpublished
opinion, page 10.
Concerning a flaw in the Court of Appeals decision, the decision allows the order
of extension to be entered after the expiration date. This scenario conflicts with another
statute:
"RCW 4.56.210 (1) ... after the expiration often years from the date of the entry of any judgment heretofore or hereafter rendered in this state, it shall cease to be a lien or charge against the estate or person of the judgment debtor. No suit, action, or other proceeding shall even be had on any judgment rendered in this state by which the lien shall be extended or continued in force for any greater or longer than ten years."
Surely the legislature did not intend a conflict between two statutes. Wynn v. Earin, 163
Wn.2d 361 , 371 , 181 P .3d 806 (2008). (legislature presumed to know the law in the area
in which it is legislating) . The Court of Appeals decision also conflicts with this court:
12
"Thus, under RCW 4.56.210, the judgment ceased to be a lien or a charge against Shepherd once the 10 year period for executing United' s judgment had expired; and no suit, action, or other proceeding could be brought against Shepherd once the time for execution expired. Therefore, the judgment lien and United's right to bring a claim under the judgment were extinguished in 1996."
American Discount Corp. v. Shepherd, 160 Wn. 2d 93, 156 P.3d 858, 862 (2007). The
Court of Appeals decision is unworkable.
Concerning a reasonable and workable reading of the extension statute, the
judgment creditor must give the judgment debtor prior notice and opportunity for hearing
on the motion to extend. The time for response must be enough for the judgment debtor
to prepare his defense. And the court needs adequate time to schedule, hear, and rule on
the motion to extend. These things must all be accomplished before the expiration date.
So the legislature enacted a 90 day window of time before the expiration date to take care
of the work. This is the practical reason for "within ninety days before the expiration of
the original ten-year period". Here, respondents' motions to extend were filed after the
statutory deadline, and were untimely.
13
CONTEMPT
Appellant was held in contempt for failure to produce documents in a RCW 6.32
supplemental proceeding. Appellant contends that contempt requires a lawful order, that
there is no production of documents in a supplemental proceeding, that the order to
produce documents was unlawful, and therefore there was no contempt. Further, the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order production, and therefore the order to produce
was void. A motion for relief from a void order may be brought at any time. Here, the
motion for relief was timely.
Statutes provide:
"RCW 6.32.180. Disobedience .. . A person who refuses, or without sufficient excuse neglects to obey an order of a judge or referee made pursuant to any of the provisions of this chapter. .. may be punished by the judge of the court out of which the execution issued, as for contempt."
"RCW 7.21.010. Definitions ... (1) "Contempt of court" means intentional .. . (b) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, decree, order, or process of the court . .. "
On production of documents in a supplemental proceeding, statutes provide:
"RCW 6.32.015 .. . judge may by order served on the judgment debtor, require such debtor to answer written interrogatories under oath ... "
"RCW 6.32.040. An order requiring a person to attend and be examined, must require him so to attend and be examined .. . "
"RCW 6.32.050. Upon examination made under this chapter the answer of the party or witness much be made under oath . .. "
14
"Interrogatories" are written questions. "Examination" is "the questioning" of a witness
under oath." Black's Law Dictionary, 11th Ed., Thomson Reuters (2019). Question,
answer; question, answer. Neither procedure is production of documents.
In federal practice, the word "examine" did not include production of documents.
Lowenstein v. American Underwear, 11 FRD 172, 173, (E.D.Pa., 1951). Historically,
Lowenstein arose in 1938 to 1970 federal practice under former FRCP 69(a). (The
present case arises under RCW 6.32, a different procedure.) . In 1970, "examine" was
changed to permit the broader "discovery". Washington has not picked up the FRCP 69
change.
In another RCW 6.32 supplemental proceeding case, a person other than the
judgment debtor was a witness who could not be summoned to appear for examination
more than 20 miles distance. The legislature had to amend RCW 6.32.030 to make a third
person a llfil:!Y who could be summoned statewide. It was necessary by separation of
powers that the legislature, and not the court, add the new word. State ex rel Gough v.
Superior Court, 137 Wash. 552, 554-555, 243 Pac. 11 (1926). Here, "production of
documents" would add three new words to RCW 6.32 by judicial legislation.
On subject matter jurisdiction, a supplemental proceeding is a special proceeding.
RCW 6.32.010 (" . . . special proceeding ... special proceeding"). Contempt is also a special
proceeding. RCW, title 7 ("Special proceedings").
"The procedure involved herein is a special proceeding provided by statute ... The rule is that, when a remedy is purely statutory in character, the methods of procedure provided in the statute are exclusive and mandatory, and are to be strictly construed. We said in Big Bend Land Co. v. Huston, 98 Wash. 640, 643, 168 Pac. 470 (1917): "This is a special statutory proceeding, summary in its nature, and in derogation of the common law. It is an elementary rule of universal application in actions of this character that the statute conferring
15
jurisdiction must be strictly pursued, and if the method of procedure prescribed by it is not strictly observed, iurisdiction will fail to attach and the proceeding will be a nullity."
Hatfield v. Greco, 87 Wn.2d 780, 782, 557 P .2d 340 (1976). An order without subject
matter jurisdiction is void. CR 60(b)(5); Leslie, supra at 618; Esmieu, supra at 497. A
motion for relief from judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be brought at
any time. CR 12(h)(3). A void order does not become valid by passage of time. Leslie,
supra at 618; Brenner v. Port of Bellingham, 53 Wn. App. 182, 188, 765 P.2d 1333
(1989) (16 years)
Contempt must proceed from a lawful order. A lawful order is part of the
procedure in a special proceeding, and therefore is jurisdictional. An order to produce
documents in a RCW 6.32 supplemental proceeding is not a lawful order. As a result,
jurisdiction has failed to attach in the present case, and the order to produce is a nullity.
There is no contempt in the present case. State v. Turner, 98 Wn. 2d 731 , 738-739, 658
P.2d 658 (1983).
A judicial act without subject matter jurisdiction is void. A court has no discretion
but to grant a motion for relief from a void order, and "must vacate as soon as the defect
comes to light." Marriage of Mu Chai, 122 Wn.App. 247, 254, 93 P .3d 936 (2004). The
motion may be brought at any time. CR 12(h)(3); Leslie, supra at 618. Here the motion
for relief from the void order was timely.
16
CONCLUSION
The petition for discretionary review should be granted.
CERTIFICATE
I certify under penalty of perjury by the laws of Washington that on this date I
mailed this motion first class postage prepaid to Peter Jones, 3246-62°d Ave. S.W ..
Seattle, WA98116.
Date#
17
APPENDIX
Court of Appeals unpublished opinion filed 9/22/20.
Court of Appeals order denying reconsideration filed 2/2/21 .
RCW 4.56.210
RCW 6.17.020
18
FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2020
In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appea ls, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE ST ATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
JEFFREY P. JONES and PETER C. JONES,
Respondents,
V.
RUSSELL K. JONES ,
Appellant.
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
No. 37033-0-III
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SIDDOWAY, J. - Russell Jones appeals the trial court ' s denial of his motion
challenging the extension of five money judgments and its refusal to vacate orders
finding him in contempt and imposing sanctions and attorney fees on account of the
contempt. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Between November 2004 and June 2005 , Jeffrey Jones and Peter Jones obtained
three judgments against their brother, Russell , 1 which we refer to hereafter as "Judgments
1 through 3." All arose out of litigation over the parties ' mother ' s estate.2
1 Given the common last names, we refer to the brothers by their first names, intending no disrespect.
2 This is Russell Jones's fourth appeal. See In re Estate of Jones, 116 Wn. App. 353 , 67 P.3d 1113 (2003) (Jones I), rev 'd, 152 Wn.2d 1, 93 P.3d 147 (2004) (Jones II) ; In re Estate of Jones, noted at 140 Wn. App. 1022, 2007 WL 2452725 (Jones III); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Jones , 182 Wn.2d 17, 338 P.3d 842 (2014) (Jones IV).
No. 37033-0-III Jones v. Jones
In aid of collection, Jeffrey and Peter initiated a supplemental proceeding in the
spring of 2006, obtaining an order requiring Russell to produce financial records. When
the records were not produced, they moved the court to continue the supplemental
proceeding and hold Russell in contempt. On May 11, 2006, a court commissioner
entered the requested order, continuing the supplemental proceeding to June 15 and
ordering Russell to produce the financial records.
When the records were again not produced, a further order was entered on
June 15, 2006, continuing the supplemental proceedings to July 13 and requiring Russell
to appear and produce the financial records at that time. Russell persisted in refusing to
produce the records, and supplemental judgments awarding sanctions and fees were
entered in 2006, which we refer to hereafter as "Judgments 4 and 5."
As the five judgments approached their 10-year expiration, Jeffrey and Peter
moved ex parte to extend them, obtaining the following orders extending the judgments
for another 10 years:
• Judgment 1, entered November 19, 2004, was extended by an order entered October 30, 2014,
• Judgment 2, entered November 19, 2004, was extended by an order entered October 30, 2014,
• Judgment 3, entered June 8, 2005 , was extended by an order entered on June 5, 2015,
• Judgment 4, entered September 25, 2006, was extended by an order entered September 20, 2016, and
2
No. 37033-0-III Jones v. Jones
• Judgment 5, entered November 22, 2006, was extended by an order entered October 28, 2016.
In August 2018, almost two years after the last extension order, Russell moved
under CR 60(b )( 5) for relief from the 2006 orders of contempt and Judgments 4 and 5,
arguing that the court commissioner had lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order the
production of documents in a supplemental proceeding. In November 2018, he moved
for relief from the 2014, 2015, and 2016 orders extending the five judgments. He argued
that the judgments were extended without personal jurisdiction, subject matter
jurisdiction, or procedural due process. Among his arguments was that RCW 6.17.020(3)
requires that an application to extend a judgment be brought more than 90 days before the
expiration of the original 10-year period, and Jeffrey's and Peter's applications had been
made too late.
The trial court heard argument of the motions and orally denied the requested
relief. Written orders were later entered. Addressing the motion to vacate the orders of
contempt and Judgments 4 and 5, the trial court reasoned that supplemental proceedings
are equitable in nature, a court's equitable powers apply, and at a postjudgment
deposition permitted by CR 69(b ), a deponent can be required to produce documents in
accordance with civil rules. As an alternative basis for denial, it found Russell's motion
untimely.
3
No. 37033-0-III Jones v. Jones
Addressing Russell's challenge to the extension of the judgments, the trial comt
found RCW 6.17.020(3) to be plain on its face, allowing a valid judgment to be extended
within the 90 days preceding expiration. It found the statute to be self-executing,
permitting the judgments to be extended on the basis of an ex parte application.
Russell moved for reconsideration, which was denied. He appeals.
ANALYSIS
Russell makes three assignments of error. We address them in the order
presented.
I. A POST JUDGMENT PROCEDURE FOR EXTENDING THE LIFE OF A JUDGMENT NEED
NOT PROVIDE FOR ADVANCE NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
Russell first argues that because a judgment is a lien on real property and an
extension of a judgment extends the lien, an order extending a judgment constitutes a
deprivation of property that requires due process. He asks us to apply Connecticut v.
Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 115 L. Ed. 2d I (1991), and hold that before a court
extends a judgment, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Doehr was a specific application of prejudgment attachment principles established
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331-33, 96 S. Ct. 893 , 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), and
Mathews is the more relevant authority. In Mathews, the United States Supreme Court
reiterated, "' [D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.'" Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 ,
4
No. 37033-0-III Jones v. Jones
481 , 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972)). "More precisely," it observed,
our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government ' s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
id. at 334-35.
Courts applyingposljudgment enforcement procedures such as Washington' s
extension of judgment procedure have recognized that when a creditor' s interest in
collecting a valid judgment is balanced against the debtor' s interest in keeping property
that has already been protected by prior notice and hearing, due process does not require
prior notice and an opportunity to be reheard. E.g. , Gedeon v. Gedeon, 630 P.2d 579, 583
(Colo. 1981 ). A number of state courts have held that the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act, which allows creditors to file foreign judgments without
affording the judgment debtor prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, does not
violate due process. In Gedeon, for example, the Colorado Supreme Court found no due
process violation where the debtor ' s only notice that a New Mexico judgment had been
filed in Colorado was notice upon filing, by mail to his last known address. The
Colorado Supreme Court rejected the debtor's argument that the procedure of entering
the judgment without formal notice or the requirement of a hearing was an
5
No. 37033-0-III Jones v. Jones
unconstitutional taking of property without due process oflaw. Id. at 582-83. The Iowa
Supreme Court agreed in Wells Fargo Equipment Finance, Inc. v. Retterath, 928 N.W.2d
1, 10 (Iowa 2019). So did a New Jersey appellate court, which held that "neither Fuentes
[v. Shevin3] nor [ Connecticut v.] Doehr apply here because those cases dealt with pre
judgment remedies and the procedure at issue here is a post-judgment process." Enron
(Thrace) Exp!. & Prod. BVv. Clapp, 378 N.J. Super. 8, 19,874 A.2d 561 (App. Div.
2005); and see accord Nix v. Cassidy, 899 So. 2d 998, 1002 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004).
Applying the Mathews factors, a debtor has no significant interest in the extension
of a judgment, since Washington statutes contemplate upon entry that a judgment can be
extended. There is little risk of an erroneous deprivation: the debtor ' s due process right
to contest liability was protected before the judgment was entered, and the limited risk of
an i1Tegular extension is adequately protected by the debtor's right to bring a
postextension challenge. Finally, the court extending a judgment will review whether the
extension appears regular, meaning there will seldom be a need for anything more than
an ex parte procedure.
Russell argues there was a "second deprivation of property" because the orders
extending the judgments changed his status from that of a 10-year judgment debtor to that
of a 20-year judgment debtor. Washington statutes treat judgment debtors as 10-year
3 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972). Russell also relies on Fuentes. Br. of Appellant at 7 n.2.
6
No. 37033-0-III Jones v. Jones
debtors subject to their creditor's election to extend the judgment for another 10 years.
Russell's status did not change.
No due process violation is shown.
II. RUSSELL SHOWS NO FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RCW 6.17.020(3)
Russell next argues that the judgments were extended in violation of
RCW 6.17.020(3). We review the trial court's application and interpretation
of a statute de novo. Sessom v. Mentor, 155 Wn. App. 191,195,229 P.3d 843 (2010).
A judgment creditor has 10 years to execute, garnish, or use another legal
process to collect or enforce a judgment. RCW 4.56.210(1 ); RCW 6.17.020(1 ). Under
RCW 6.17.020(3),
[A] party in whose favor a judgment has been filed ... may, within ninety days before the expiration of the original ten-year period, apply to the court that rendered the judgment ... for an order granting an additional ten years during which an execution, garnishment, or other legal process may be issued.
The statute further provides that "[t]he application shall be granted as a matter of right,
subject to review only for timeliness, factual issues of full or partial satisfaction, or errors
in calculating the judgment summary amounts." Id.
Russell's first argument that the judgments were extended in violation of
RCW 6.17.020(3) is easily rejected. Although the statute does not require advance
notice to the debtor and an opportunity to be heard, Russell argues that we should imply
those procedural requirements since they are constitutionally required, and the legislature
7
No. 37033-0-III Jones v. Jones
is presumed to know the law in the area in which it is legislating. We have already held
that those procedures are not constitutionally required.
His second argument focuses on the phrase "within ninety days before the
expiration of the ten-year period" and asks us to apply cases that have held, construing
different statutes, that "within" fixes the tennination of the period.
One of the cases he cites, Adams v. Ingalls Packing Co. , 30 Wn.2d 282 , 282-83 ,
191 P.2d 699 ( 1948), concerned a manufacturer who sold a piece of equipment to a
packing company in Auburn under a conditional sales contract. Because conditional
sales can create the appearance that the purchaser has title, a statute provided that a
vendor would not be protected from the claims of bona fide purchasers or the vendee's
creditors, "' unless within ten days after the taking of possession by the vendee, a
memorandum of such sale ... shall be filed in the auditor ' s office of the county. "'
Id. at 284 (emphasis omitted) (quoting the statute). Several months passed between the
packing company' s purchase of the equipment and its delivery. Shortly before, rather
than after the packing company took possession, the manufacturer filed the required
memorandum with the county auditor.
At issue was whether the language "within ten days after the taking of possession
by the vendee" defined the exclusive 10-day period within which the memorandum could
be filed, or whether-since an early filing provided bona fide purchasers and the
vendee's creditors with the same protection- an early filing would be effective. The
8
No. 37033-0-III Jones v. Jones
court relied on a decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that as applied to a
particular subject matter, ·'' the fair and reasonable interpretation '" of a time frame for
giving notice might be to fix only "' the tem1inus ad quern, the limit beyond which the
notice shall not be given, "' and not to fix the "'terminus a quo, or the first point of time
at which the notice may be given.' " Id. at 285-86 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Davies v.
Miller, 130 U.S. 284, 288-89, 9 S. Ct. 560, 32 L. Ed. 932 (1889)). The only other
Washington case that Russell cites on this issue, In re Improvement of Cliff Ave., reaches
a similar result. 122 Wash. 335,339,210 P. 676 (1922) (appeal of an ordinance was
timely even though filed within 10 days after its passage rather than 10 days after its
effective date, and therefore arguably prematurely).
From these and other cases, Russell argues that under RCW 6.17.020(3), the
period within which to apply for an extension ends 90 days before the expiration of the
original I 0-year period. What distinguishes RCW 6.17.020(3) from Adams, Cliff Avenue,
and other cases on which Russell relies, however, is that one can conceive of two periods
of time suggested by RCW 6.17.020(3), and they have different termination dates. One,
and the period on which Russell relies, is the almost 10-year period between entry of the
judgment and the date 90 days before the expiration of the original 10-year period. If that
is viewed as the pertinent period, then, as Russell argues, 90 days before expiration is the
"terminus ad quern." But another period suggested by the statute-and more logically
suggested, given the statute's purpose-is the 90-day period that begins 90 days before
9
No. 37033-0-III Jones v. Jones
the expiration of the original 10-year period and ends with the expiration of the original
10-year period. If that is the relevant period, then the "terminus ad quern" is the
expiration of the 10-year period.
" A statute is ambiguous only if susceptible to two or more reasonable
interpretations, but a statute is not ambiguous merely because different interpretations are
conceivable." Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d 416, 423 , 103 P.3d 1230 (2005). Russell
conceives of an interpretation under which 90 days before expiration of the original 10-
year period is the "terminus ad quern," but it is not a reasonable interpretation. Jeffrey' s
and Peter's applications to extend their judgments were timely under the only reasonable
plain reading of the statute.
III . RUSSELL WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER CR 60(b )(5)
Finally, Russell contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion for relief
from the May 11 and June 15, 2006 contempt orders and Judgments 4 and 5 imposing
sanctions, fees and costs. He argues that supplemental proceedings do not allow for the
production of documents, and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to sanction
a lawful act.
Under CR 60(b )(5) , a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order on
the grounds that " [t]he judgment is void." "A void judgment is a 'judgment, decree or
order entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter, or
which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved. '" State ex
10
No. 37033-0-III Jones v. Jones
rel. Turner v. Briggs, 94 Wn. App. 299, 302-03, 971 P.2d 581 (1999) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Dike v. Dike, 75 Wn.2d 1, 7, 448 P.2d 490 (1968)). "An appeal
from denial of a CR 60(b) motion is limited to the propriety of the denial not the
impropriety of the underlying judgment." Bjurstrom v. Campbell, 27 Wn. App. 449, 450-
51 , 618 P.2d 533 (1980). "The exclusive procedure to attack an allegedly defective
judgment is by appeal from the judgment, not by appeal from a denial of a CR 60(b)
motion." Id. at 451.
A trial court ' s decision to grant or deny a CR 60(b)(5) motion to vacate a void
judgment is reviewed de novo. Ahten v. Barnes, 158 Wn. App. 343, 350, 242 P.3d 35
(2010). We may affirm the trial court on any basis supported by the pleadings and the
record. LaMon v. Butler, 112 Wn.2d 193, 200-01, 770 P.2d 1027 (1989).
Superior courts in Washington have subject matter jurisdiction over all types of
cases unless jurisdiction is vested exclusively in another court. WASH. CONST. art. IV,
§ 6. Among cases in which the Washington Constitution explicitly provides that superior
courts have jurisdiction are "all matters of probate" and "such special cases and
proceedings as are not otherwise provided for. " Id. The superior court had subject
matter jurisdiction of the supplemental proceeding.
Russell argues that because a supplemental proceeding is a statutory proceeding in
which statutory procedure controls over court rules, the trial court erred by concluding it
had the authority to order the production of documents. Washington has long recognized
11
No. 37033-0-III Jones v. Jones
the principle that a mistake of law will not support vacation of a judgment. Bjurstrom, 27
Wn. App. at 451. Even if we assume that the trial court made a mistake of law when it
ordered the production of documents in a supplemental proceeding, Russell's remedy was
to appeal the resulting judgments. The judgments are not void and he was not entitled to
have them vacated under CR 60(b)(5).
IV. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
Citing RCW l l .96A. l 50 and RAP 14.2, Jeffrey seeks an award of attorney fees
and costs on appeal. Alternatively, he asks us to impose sanctions against Russell under
RAP 18.9 for a frivolous appeal.
A party may recover attorney fees on appeal if authorized by applicable law.
RAP 18.l(a). While RCW 11.96A.150 gives courts broad authorization to award
attorney fees, it applies to "proceedings governed by [Title 11 RCW], including but not
limited to proceedings involving trusts, decedent ' s estates and properties, and
guardianship matters." RCW 1 l.96A.150(2). While the underlyingjudgments Jeffrey
and Peter sought to collect and extend were entered in probate matters, the supplemental
proceeding and extension of judgments were not governed by Title 11 RCW.
We have discretion under RAP 18.9(a) to order a party or counsel who files a
frivolous appeal to pay terms or compensatory damages. An appeal is frivolous if it
presents no debatable issues on which reasonable minds could differ and is so lacking in
merit that there is no possibility of reversal. In re Marriage of Foley, 84 Wn. App. 839,
12
No. 37033-0-III Jones v. Jones
847,930 P.2d 929 (1997). A civil appellant has a right to appeal under RAP 2.2, and all
doubts as to whether the appeal is frivolous should be resolved in favor of the appellant.
See Streater v. White, 26 Wn. App. 430, 434-35 , 613 P.2d 187 (1980).
Russell ' s arguments on appeal lack merit, presenting no possibility of reversal.
We award Jeffrey his reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal subject to his timely
compliance with RAP 18.l(d).
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040 .
WE CONCUR:
Q. Pennell, C.J.
Jt. ' c.. :t:'
13
FILED FEBRUARY 2, 2021
In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division Ill
COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION III , STATE OF WASHINGTON
JEFFREY P. JONES, and PETER C. JONES ,
Respondents ,
V.
RUSSELL K. JONES ,
Appellant.
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
No. 37033-0-111
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
THE COURT has considered Appellant 's motion for reconsideration of the court 's
opinion of September 22 , 2020 , and the record and file herein , and is of the opinion the
motion for reconsideration should be denied . Therefore ,
IT IS ORDERED , the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied .
PANEL: Judges Siddoway, Korsmo , Pennell
FOR THE COURT:
Chief Judge
10/17/2019 RCW 4.56.210: Cessation of lien-Extension prohibited-Exception.
RCW 4.56.210
Cessation of lien-Extension prohibited-Exception.
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, after the expiration of ten years from the date of the entry of any judgment heretofore or hereafter rendered in this state, it shall cease to be a lien or charge against the estate or person of the judgment debtor. No suit, action or other proceeding shall ever be had on any judgment rendered in this state by which the lien shall be extended or continued in force for any greater or longer period than ten years.
(2) An underlying judgment or judgment lien entered after *the effective date of this act for accrued child support shall continue in force for ten years after the eighteenth birthday of the youngest child named in the order for whom support is ordered . All judgments entered after *the effective date of this act shall contain the birthdate of the youngest child for whom support is ordered.
(3) A lien based upon an underlying judgment continues in force for an additional ten-year period if the period of execution for the underlying judgment is extended under RCW 6.17.020.
[ 1995 c 75 § 1; 1989 c 360 § 2; 1979 ex.s. c 236 § 1; 1929 c 60 § 7; RRS §§ 459,460. Formerly RCW 4.56.210 and 4.56.220. Prior: 1897 c 39 §§ 1, 2.]
NOTES:
*Reviser's note: This act [1989 c 360] has three effective dates. Sections 9, 10, and 16 are effective May 12, 1989, section 39 is effective July 1, 1990, and the remainder of this act is effective July 23 , 1989.
Entry of judgments- Superior court- District court- Small claims: RCW 6.01.020.
https ://app. leg. wa . gov/RCW /default.aspx?cite=4 .56 .21 0 1 / 1
10/17/2019 RCW 6.17.020: Execution authorized within ten years-Exceptions-Fee-Recoverable cost.
RCW 6.17.020
Execution authorized within ten years-Exceptions-Fee-Recoverable cost.
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4) of this section, the party in whose favor a judgment of a court has been or may be filed or rendered, or the assignee or the current holder thereof, may have an execution, garnishment, or other legal process issued for the collection or enforcement of the judgment at any time within ten years from entry of the judgment or the filing of the judgment in this state.
(2) After July 23, 1989, a party who obtains a judgment or order of a court or an administrative order entered as defined in RCW 74.20A.020(6) for accrued child support, or the assignee or the current holder thereof, may have an execution, garnishment, or other legal process issued upon that judgment or order at any time within ten years of the eighteenth birthday of the youngest child named in the order for whom support is ordered.
(3) After June 9, 1994, a party in whose favor a judgment has been filed as a foreign judgment or rendered pursuant to su?section (1) or (4) of this section, or the assignee or the current holder thereof, may, within ninety days before the expiration of the original ten-year period, apply to the court that rendered the judgment or to the court where the judgment was filed as a foreign judgment for an order granting an additional ten years during which an execution, garnishment, or other legal process may be issued. If a district court judgment of this state is transcribed to a superior court of this state, the original district court judgment shall not be extended and any petition under this section to extend the judgment that has been transcribed to superior court shall be filed in the superior court within ninety days before the expiration of the ten-year period of the date the transcript of the district court judgment was filed in the superior court of this state. The petitioner shall pay to the court a filing fee equal to the filing fee for filing the first or initial paper in a civil action in the court, except in the case of district court judgments transcribed to superior court, where the filing fee shall be the fee for filing the first or initial paper in a civil action in the superior court where the judgment was transcribed. The order granting the application shall contain an updated judgment summary as provided in RCW 4.64.030. The filing fee required under this subsection shall be included in the judgment summary and shall be a recoverable cost. The application shall be granted as a matter of right, subject to review only for timeliness, factual issues of full or partial satisfaction, or errors in calculating the judgment summary amounts.
(4) A party who obtains a judgment or order for restitution, crime victims' assessment, or other court-ordered legal financial obligations pursuant to a criminal judgment and sentence, or the assignee or the current holder thereof, may execute, garnish, and/or have legal process issued upon the judgment or order any time within ten years subsequent to the entry of the judgment and sentence or ten years following the offender's release from total confinement as provided in chapter 9.94A RCW. The clerk of superior court, or a party designated by the clerk, may seek extension under subsection (3) of this section for purposes of collection as allowed under RCW 36.18.190, provided that no filing fee shall be required.
(5) "Court" as used in this section includes but is not limited to the United States supreme court, the United States courts of appeals, the United States district courts, the United States bankruptcy courts, the Washington state supreme court, the court of appeals of the state of Washington, superior courts and district courts of the counties of the state of Washington, and courts of other states and jurisdictions from which judgment has been filed in this state under chapter 6.36 or* 6.40 RCW.
(6) The perfection of any judgment lien and the priority of that judgment lien on property as established by RCW 6.13.090 and chapter 4.56 RCW is not altered by the extension of the judgment pursuant to the provisions of this section and the lien remains in full force and effect and does not have to be rerecorded after it is extended. Continued perfection of a judgment that has been transcribed to other counties and perfected in those counties may be accomplished after extension of the judgment by filing with the clerk of the other counties where the judgment has been filed either a certified copy of the
https://app.leg. wa .gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=6. 17.020 1/2
·1 U/1 1/LUl ~ Kt.;VV 0.1, .ULU: t:xecutron autnorrzed wrtnrn ten years-1::xceptions-t-ee--Kecoverable cost.
ordt,'-l' extending the judgment or a certified copy of the docket of the matter where the judgment was ext'ended .
(7) Except as ordered in RCW 4.16.020 (2) or (3), chapter 9.94A RCW, or chapter 13.40 RCW, no judgment is enforceable for a period exceeding twenty years from the date of entry in the originating court. Nothing in this section may be interpreted to extend the expiration date of a foreign judgment beyond the expiration date under the laws of the jurisdiction where the judgment originated.
(8) The chapter 261, Laws of 2002 amendments to this section apply to all judgments currently in effect on June 13, 2002, to all judgments extended after June 9, 1994, unless the judgment has been satisfied, vacated, and/or quashed, and to all judgments filed or rendered, or both, after June 13; 2002.
[ 2002 C 261 § 1; 1997 C 121 § 1; 1995 C 231 § 4; 1994 C 189 § 1; 1989 C 360 § 3; 1987 C 442 § 402; 1980 c 105 § 4; 1971 c 81 § 26; 1929 c 25 § 2; RRS § 510. Prior: 1888 p 94 § 1; Code 1881 § 325; 1877 p 67 § 328; 1869 p 79 § 320; 1854 p 175 § 242. Formerly RCW 6.04.010.]
NOTES:
Rules of court: Cf. CR 58(b), 62(a), and 69(a); JCR 54.
*Reviser's note: Chapter 6.40 RCW was repealed in its entirety by chapter 363, Laws of 2009. Later enactment, see chapter 6.40A RCW.
Application-1980 c 105: See note following RCW 4.16.020.
Entry of judgment: RCW 6.01.020.
https://app.leg.wa .gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=6.17.020 2/2
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