Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
PUBLIC POLICY PERFORMANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
URBAN HOUSING POLICY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE NATIONAL SITES AND SERVICES AND SQUATTER UPGRADING
IN TANZANIA
by
Suma Clara Mwakitwange Kaare
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Canberra
July 1997
Abstract
This study contributes to the developing countries' public policy discourse by linking
outcomes of the past and present urban housing policies in Tanzania to both the
organisational structures and work methods of the state and to environmental factors.
By tracing the historical development of urban housing policy formulation and
implementation in Tanzania, the study provides a comprehensive and systematic
analysis of the factors responsible for the poor performance of urban housing policies
in Tanzania.
The study is also important because it locates the policy development within the
general literature of urbanisation and housing in the developing countries and within
theoretical debates relating to policy explanation in these countries. The study
documents a detailed case study of a specific project (the National Sites and Services
and Squatter Upgrading Project - NSSP) aimed at addressing urban housing problems
in Tanzania and uses this to identify a range of politico-administrative issues which
affect policy formulation and implementation in Tanzania. In pursuing this task the
study adds to the understanding of the factors affecting policy performance in
developing countries experiencing constraints and contextual variables similar to those
of Tanzania.
ii
Dedication
This thesis is dedicated to my parents Wilfrem Robert Mwakitwange and
Fi des Samwel Magombe for teaching me the value ofi knowledge
iv
Acknowledgments
Expressing one's indebtedness in a venture of this sort defies quick and easy
resolution. I therefore do not only want to thank those who have assisted me in the
research and writing of this thesis but to let them know that I am truly grateful. Space
limitation does not permit me to mention all of you, however, in particular I would
like to acknowledge my supervisor Associate Professor Mark Turner for carrying out a
strenuous task of not only helping me academically but also assisting me overcome
my fears and worries in the many times that I felt down. I am also grateful to my
fellow postgraduate students, Michele Rainger, Roselyn Hughes, Ekaphong
Lauhathiansind, Sonia Palmieri and Grant Jones, for their moral and intellectual
support.
Special thanks also go to John Laver and Dr. Bright Honu who not only read my thesis
with thoroughness and made numerous constructive suggestions but also inspired me
to persevere. Acknowledgment is given to all the academic and support staff of the
Faculty of Management at the University of Canberra for putting up with me and my
constant requests for help. To Di Skipper, Sheila Wood, Ian Brice, Mike Paterson and
Jacqui Gulliver, and family friends particularly Frank Sarni, Alicia Curtis, Margaret
Gray, Kanlaya Krongkew, Chris Acheampong, Anna Masculli, Rehema Tukai and the
staff of Kirinari Early Childhood Centre, I remain grateful.
Appreciation is also extended to the Australian Government for providing me with
financial support without which I would have not been able to pursue my studies at
the University of Canberra. My gratitude also goes to the Institute of Finance
Management in Tanzania for giving me permission to undertake this research. Special
thanks to Professor Kami Rwegasira and Dr Richard Kavura who encouraged me to
pursue my ambition. I thank Professor Gasper Munishi and Professor Bavu for
encouraging me to pursue further studies.
I would like to thank officials of the various institutions of government and
individuals in Tanzania without whose assistance this thesis would not have been
possible, especially to those officials who asked to remain anonymous, for their
V
willingness to provide valuable information in the hope that it will improve policy
performance in the area of urban housing. I want to express my sincere thanks to
James Kaare who spent extra ordinary time and energy in helping me collect data
while in Tanzania.
Finally, I thank my husband Bwire Maarwa Kaare and my son Timothy Maarwa Kaare
for putting up with me during the preparation of this thesis.
VI
Corrigenda
Suma Kaare (1997) Public Policy Performance in Developing Countries, PhD thesis, University of Canberra
Tables
pi3, 2.1 p21, 2.2 p22, 2.3 p32, 2.5 column pi20, 5.3
pi59, 6.9 p176, 7.1 p212, 8.3 p214, 8.3
Text
Population 2000, for Kenya, should be 32.8 For column heading, Total Population, add (Millions) Last column heading should be 1992 There should be another space between Morocco and Nigeria. The City will then be correctly aligned Last box on second row ot boxes should be deleted (Committee for Enforcement ... ) Column one, should read. 000-099 Last column, figure for Arusha should read 5,174 Last column, Regional Coverage, should read A pilot project fur Last column, next to last line, delete ~
p70, par 2, 15 principru for principle p73, par2,120 clientelism for clientalism p7 4, last line Insert performance ~ter poor p76, par2, 110 National for Nation pl08, par2, 116 Insert eventual before abolition; and change 1965 to 1972 pi 12, Insert de facto before a one-party pi 14, par2, 112 Delete the sentence beginning The President's influence,., pi 14, par3, 11 For Mwinyi change 1984 to 12.8.5. pi 18, pari, 14 .l.9.8j for 1984 p 122, pari, 11 Commence sentence with In 1985 p 124, par2, 116 p 125, par3, ls5&6
pl58, par3,18 p208, pari, 18 p211, parl, 11 p236, par2, 16 p25 l, par2, 12 p282, pari, 15
p282, par2, 18 p293, pari p299, pari, 15
Bibliography
Green, R (1979) Powell, J.D. (1970) Wallestein, I. (1974) p362
Delete sentence beginning For Example ... Insert: For example, following ~pendence the former nine provinces and the Dar es Salaam extra-parliamentar_y district were replaced in stag~ seventeen regiQfil.. Insert per month after 824.9 .81 for 81 Delete~ Inser per month atter 100 between for about Inser atter 154). Although formulation, implementation and evaluation were formal functions of} the PmlY, in reality the pm:ry lacked the capacity to perfonn these roles <see chap~ p.112). The executive <ie the president) exercised the fonctions .of.policy formulation, imlementation and supervision, 1985-90 for 1984-87 ~ for Those delete~ (second one)
Universaity ot Toronto Press for Tanzania Publishing House Clientelist for Clentalist w allerstein The Nationalist for The Nationa/i'sts
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract 11
Certificate of Authorship of Thesis 111
Dedication iv
Acknowledgments v
List of Abbreviations xv111
Chapter One: Introduction and Methodological Issues 1
Background to the Problems of Urban Housing Policies in Tanzania 1
The Research Problem 3
The Purpose and Importance of the Study 4
Methodology 5
The Structure of the Thesis 5
Chapter Two: Urbanisation and Housing Problems in Developing
Countries
The Salient Features of Urbanisation in Developing Countries
9
Factors Accounting for Urban Population Growth in Developing Countries 12
Natural Population Increase 16
Rural-Urban Migration 16
Reclassification of Boundaries and Areas 18
The Consequences of Rapid Urbanisation in Developing Countries 19
Urban Poverty 19
•unemployment 23
Housing 25
vii
Slums and Squatter Settlements
Urbanisation Process of Developing Countries: Explanations
Dependent Urbanisation
Modernisation Explanations
Urban Management Breakdown Explanations
Conclusion
Chapter Three: Urban Housing Policies in Developing Countries
Public Housing and Slum Clearance Policies
Public Housing and Slum Clearance in Industrialised Countries
Slum Clearance and Public Housing in Developing Countries
Slum Clearance
Public Housing
Government provided housing
Employer provided housing
Housing Financing
Urban Land Reform
Land Tenure
Land Use
Rent Controls
Building Materials and Building Industry
The Genesis of Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading
Approaches
S&S and SU in Practice
Conclusion
Chapter Four: Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Housing Policy
Performance • Society-Centred Explanations of Policy Failure
Class Bias
Page
30
33
34
36
37
38
39
40
40
42
44
46
46
50
51
53
54
56
59
60
62
65
68
70
70
70
viii
Rent-Seeking
State-Centred Explanations of Policy Failure
Decision Maker's Actions
Incrementalist State Actors
Bureaucratic Politics
Organisational Context of the State
Bureaucratic Processes
Institutional Incapacity
Conclusion
Chapter Five: The Environment for Public Sector Management in
Page
76
78
78
79
80
82
82
84
85
Tanzania 87
Geography, Demography and Culture 87
Features of Tanzania's Economy 89
Political and Administrative Framework of Tanzania 96
The Administrative System 97
The Central Government 97
Regional Administration 106
Local Administration 108
The Public Service 109
The Political System 112
The Party 112
The Presidency 114
The Parliament 121
Conclusion 122
Chapter Six: Urbanisation and Urban Housing Problems in Tanzania 124
Urbanisation in Tanzania 125 •
ix
Statistical Dimensions of the Urbanisation Process
Rates of Growth
Levels of Urbanisation
Factors Accounting for Urbanisation in Tanzania
Rural to Urban Migration
Natural Urban Population Increase
Urban Sprawl
Post-Independence Policies and Urban Development
Page
126
126
128
132
132
135
136
Strategies 136
Urban Housing Problems 140
Housing Shortages 140
Squatter Housing 143
Characteristics of Squatter Housing in Urban Tanzania 145
Household Density 145
Availability and Quality of Services 146
Sanitary Conditions 148
Physical Condition of Squatter Housing 150
Renters' Conditions 151
The Socio-Economic Characteristics of Squatter Residents 151
Employment 152
Characteristics of Informal Sector Employment in Tanzania 156
Conclusion 160
Chapter Seven: The State and Urban Housing in Tanzania 161
Colonial Urban Housing Policies 161
Post-Colonial Urban Housing Policies 166
Period 1 : Incrementalism and Radicalism in Housing Policy ( 1961-1966) 167
Incremental Urban Housing Policies 167
Radical Land Strategies 171
Radical Urban Management Policies 178
X
· Page
Period 2: The Arusha Urban Housing Strategies (1967-1972) 180
Socialist Town Plans 180
Socialist Urban Housing Policies 183
Period 3: Post-Arusha Urban Housing Policies (1972-1990s) 192
Reintroduction of Urban Management Structures 192
The New National Urban Development and Urban
Housing Policies 194
Urban Housing Strategies in the Era of Economic Liberalisation 198
Economic Recovery Policies and Urban Housing in Tanzania 199
Conclusion 201
Chapter Eight: The National Sites and Services and Squatter
Upgrading Projects (NSSP) Phase 1 202
Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading in Tanzania 202
The Making of the National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading
Project: NSSP 1, 1970-1977 204
Project Implementation Plan 217
Project Implementation Process 222
Project Outcomes 230
Conclusion 237
Chapter Nine: The National Sites and Services and Squatter
Upgrading Project (NSSP) Phases 2 and 3 239
Phase 2 of the National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading
Project (NSSP 2) 1977-1982 239
Policy Formulation 239
Project Objectives 240
Project Implementation Plan 243
Project Outcomes 251
Phase 3 of the National Sites and Services and Squatter 259
XI
Upgrading Project (NSSP 3) 1985-1990
Policy Formulation
Project Outcomes
Conclusion
Chapter Ten: The National Sites and Services and Squatter
Page
259
259
264
266
Upgrading (NSSP) in Tanzania: Analysis of Findings 268
NSSP Performance and the Theoretical Perspectives 268
Class Bias Explanations and the NSSP 268
Rent-Seeking Explanations and the NSSP 271
Incrementalism and the NSSP 272
Bureaucratic Politics and the NSSP 273
Bureaucratic Processes and the NSSP 275
Institutional Incapacity and the NSSP 276
The Political and Administrative Framework of Tanzania and the NSSP 281
Centralisation of Political Authority and Policy
Coordination
Centralisation of Authority and its Impact on
Consultation Within the State
Centralisation of Authority and Policy Consultation
Between the State and the Public
Sequencing and Institutional Separation of the Policy Process
Ineffective Feedback Mechanisms
Conclusion
Chapter Eleven: Summary and Concluding Remarks
Appendix A: Tanzanian Shilling Exchange Rate to US Dollar
References
Books and Articles
Monographs, Bulletins and Reports
281
284
285
287
289
291
292
304
305
305
344
xii
Official Documents: Government of Tanzania
Newspapers
Page
359
362
XIII
Figures Page
Figure 5.1 Tanzania in Relation to Neighbouring Countries 88
Figure 5.2 The Political and Administrative Framework of
Tanzania, 1965-1995 98
Figure 5.3 Internal Organisation Structure of the Presidents' Office 120
Figure 6.1 Tanzania's Urban Growth Decentralisation Strategy:
The Growth Poles 138
Figure 6.2 Urban Squatter Settlements (unplanned housing)
in Dar es Salaam 144
Figure 7.1 The Process of Land Use Control in Tanzania 172
Figure 8.1 NSSP 1 as a Section in the MLHUD Organisation Structure 223
Figure 8.2 NSSP 1 as a Division in the MLHUD Organisation Structure 224
Figure 9.1 Tanzania, Second National Sites and Services Project :The
Project Towns 242
Figure 9.2 A Summary of Role Relationships of Institutions Involved
in the Implementation of NSSP 2 247
xiv
Tables Page
Table 2.1 Trends in Urban Population Growth in Selected Developing
Countries 13
Table 2.2 People in Absolute Poverty in Selected Developing Countries 21
Table 2.3 Performance of Economies of Selected Developing Countries 22
Table 2.4 Percentage of Urban Population Without Access to Services in
Selected Developing Countries 29
Table 2.5 Percentage of Urban Population Living in Squatter Settlements
in Cities of Selected Developing Countries 32
Table 5.1 Average Annual Real Rates of Growth of GDP and Inflation
(Percentage) for Tanzania, 1965/70-1990 92
Table 5.2 Total Wage Employment in Tanzania by Economic Sectors
1964-1981 (per cent) 93
Table 5.3 Trend of Government Budget 1980/81-1986/87 (Tshs million) 95
Table 5.4 Regularity of Cabinet Meetings in Tanzania between 1959-1972 101
Table 5.5 The Growth of Central Government Employment in Tanzania
1961 and 1975 104
Table 5.6 The Pattern of Presidential Choice of Policy Consultation and•
Ratification Institutions 1962-1978 116
Table 6.1 Urban Population Growth Trends in Tanzania, 1948-1988 127
Table 6.2 Populations and Growth Rates of Principal Towns in Tanzania,
1948-1988 129
Table 6.3 Percentage of Migrants in the Populations of Ten Selected
Towns in the 1967 Census 133
Table 6.4 Growth in Number of Urban Households between 1978 and 1988 142
Table 6.5 Urban Housing Standards and Access to Services 1969 and 1976 147
Table 6.6 Water Supply, Consumption and Present Demand in Selected
Towns, 1986 148
xv
Page
Table 6.7 Economically Active Population in Urban Centres, 1967, 1978
and 1988 153
Table 6.8 Household Occupation in Six Squatter Settlements 1992 157
Table 6.9 Distribution of Wage Income by Area and Percentage of
Wage Earners in Dar es Salaam and in Dodoma in 1971 and 1976 159
Table 7.1 Requirements and Deficiencies for Housing Plots in Urban
Tanzania, 1967-1972 176
Table 8.1 Formally Prescribed Sequence for Policy Formulation in Tanzania 207
Table 8.2 Distribution of Funding Responsibilities between the
Government of Tanzania and the IDA for the NSSP 1 210
Table 8.3 Differing Perspectives of the NSSP 1 212
Table 8.4 Dividing the Tasks for NSSP 1 : The International Development
Association's (IDA) Specifications and the Tanzanian
Government's Interpretation 220
Table 8.5 Responsibility Matrix for NSSP 1 221
Table 8.6 NSSP 1 Performance as at 1982 232
Table 8.7 Dar es Salaam-NS SP 1 Project : Types of Loan Commitments ... to Project Beneficiaries (September 1979) 233
Table 8.8 Dar es Salaam NSSP 1 : Percentage of Beneficiaries who Paid
Land Rent and Service Charges 234
Table 8.9 NSSP l Project : A Comparison of Unit Costs of Service
Construction (Tshs) 235
Table 9.1 The Division of Financial Responsibilities in the NSSP 2
between the IDA and Government of Tanzania 244
Table 9.2 Planned Responsibility Matrix for NSSP 2 250
Table 9.3 Second National Sites and Services Project (NSSP 2):
Implementation of Physical Program 251
Table 9.4 In-Fillings in Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading
Areas in Dar es Salaam 255
xvi
Page
Table 9 .5 Government Expenditure on Housing 1965-1988 (Tsh m) 259
Table 9.6 A Summary oithe Performance oithe Sites and Services (SS)
Performance in Surveying and Allocating Plots
Table 9.7 The NSSP 3 Planned and Actual Compensation Plan
1986-1992 (in 1983 Prices)
263
266
xvii
ALAF
AoBA
Ardhi
AUHLS
BRALUP
BRU
CBK
cc CCM
CE
CIDA
csc DCs
DDA
DLDO
ECC
ERP
FFYDP
FTYDP
GDP
GNP
HDR
HOCs
HUDA
IMF
IMTC
JUWATA
KAMUS
LEDB
LG-Act
MECCO
MLD
List of Abbreviations
Aluminium Africa Company
Acquisition of Building Act
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development
African Urban House Loan Scheme
Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use
Planning
Building Research Unit
Kikao Cha Baraza la Mawaziri
Central Committee of the Revolutionary Party (CCM)
Revolutionary Party of Tanzania
Central Establishment
Canadian International Development Agency
Civil Services Commission
District Commissioners
Delhi Development Authority
District Land Development Officer
Economic Committee of the Cabinet
Economic Recovery Programme
First Five Year Development Plan
First Three Year Development Plan
Gross Domestic Product
Gross National Product
Human Development Index
Handing Over Certificates
Housing and Urban Development Associates
International Monetary Fund
Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee
Confederation of Tanzanian Workers
Special Appointments Committees
Lagos Executive Development Board
Local Government Act 1982 Tanzania
Mwananchi Engineering and Construction Company
Ministry of Lands Development
:\.'Viii
RoB
sec SFYDP
SIDA
S&S
SU
TANESCO
TANU
TECCO
THB UNCHS
UNDP
UNECA
UNECLA
UNFPA
UNESC
URLS
URT
UVT
UWT
WB
WDR
WFHDF
WHO
MLG
MLGCDM
MLHUD
MLSWD
MoFEAP
MoLGH
MoF
MoW
MoWENR
MPEA
M&SD
Registrar of Building
Scholarship Committee of the Cabinet
Second Five Year Development Plan
Swedish International Development Agency
Sites and Services
Squatter Upgrading
Tanzania National Electric Company
Tanganyika African National Union
Tanzania Engineering Construction Company
Tanzania Housing Bank
United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America
United Nations Fund for Population Activities
United Nations Economic and Social Council
Urban Roof Loan Scheme
United Republic of Tanzania
National Organisation of Youth in Tanzania
National Organisation of Women in Tanzania
World Bank
World Development Report
Workers and Farmers Housing Development Fund
World Health Organisation
Ministry of Local Government
Ministry of Local Government and Cooperative
Development and Marketing
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development
Ministry of Lands, Settlements and Water Development
Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning
Ministry of Local Government and Housing
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Works
Ministry of Water, Energy and Natural Resources
Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs
Management and Services Division of the Central
Establishment
xix
NCCR
NEC
NEDA
NEDCO
NGOs
NHC
NNHP
NISS
NPC
NSSP
NUDP
NUWA
occ OECD
PADCO
PHFCT
PIC
PPAL
PSBO
RCs
RDCs
RDDs
RDT
National Convention for Constitutional Reform
National Executive Committee
National Economic and Development Authority
National Design and Construction Company
Non-Governmental Organisations
National Housing Corporation
New National Housing Policy
National Informal Sector Survey
National Planning Commission
National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading
Project
National Urban Development Policy
National Urban Water Authority
Overseas Construction Company
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development
Planning Development Collaborative International
Permanent Housing Finance Company Limited
Presidential Implementation Committee
Project Planning Associates Limited
Planning, Servicing, Building and Occupation
Regional Commissioners
Regional Development Councils
Regional Development Directors
Regional Development Team
xx
Chapter One
Introduction and Methodological Issues
The aim of this thesis is to identify major factors critical to successful urban housing
policies for developing countries, which have to date been either ignored or
underestimated. With particular reference to the formulation and implementation
processes of the National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project
(NSSP) in Tanzania, the study intends to explain the factors which contributed to its
poor performance. In this study public policy performance refers to the extent a
government or state policy or program has actually impacted upon the problems to
which it was addressed (Palumbo, 1987; Vecchio et al, 1988). This chapter sets out
the background to the problems of urban housing policies, the methodology chosen
for the study and the structure of the thesis.
Background to the Problems of Urban Housing Policies in Tanzania
From 1961 to 1995 various housing policies and strategies have been introduced by
the state in Tanzania to address the urban housing problems particularly those
facing low income groups. See Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine for detailed
discussion of the policies. In general, the performance of the urban policy
experiments in Tanzania has not been satisfactory. One visible indicator of the
disappointing performance of the urban housing policies of Tanzania is the poor
social and physical conditions of housing obtained in its major cities and towns
(Stren, 1975b; Schmetzer, 1980; Mwakasendo, 1980; Halfani, 1987; Kulaba, 1989;
Lugalla, 1990). Overcrowding, lack of or inadequate water, and shortage of toilets
is characteristic of both planned and unplanned settlements in major towns of
Tanzania. According to the Household Budget Survey of 1991-92 the average room
occupancy rate in major towns of Tanzania was 3 or more persons per room of 9
square metres (Tanzania Bureau of Statistics, 1991-92). The issue of overcrowding
1
is important because of its impact on water usage and general hygiene and health
conditions. The prevalence of communicable diseases is a recurring theme in
overcrowded areas of Dar es Salaam and other urban centres (Ntukula, 1984: 53;
Lugalla, 1990: 252). Overcrowding is indicative of both the phenomenon of urban
population growth and the Tanzanian state's inability to manage that growth.
Perennial housing shortage for the low income families characteristic of the towns
and cities of Tanzania is yet another indicator of the poor performance of the urban
housing policies. Paucity of national aggregate data on both the urban housing and
overall national housing stock makes it difficult to delineate precisely the urban
housing crisis in the country. Based on the data from the National Housing
Corporation (NHC), a government-owned company, a partial estimation of the
quantitative dimension of the housing problem in urban Tanzania can be provided.
According to the NHC, in 1982-1983 the demand for housing in major regional
towns was 431,500 low cost houses, and 48,000 medium cost houses. At this time
Dar es Salaam, which is a primate city, needed about 90,000 low cost and 10,000
medium cost houses. By 1992 the estimated total demand had risen to 600,000
(MPEA, 1989; MLHUD, 1992).
To date, the official statistics on housing stock has relied on data supplied by the
National Housing Corporation (NHC) which up to 1984 was the de Jure sole
official residential housing producer and distributor. Despite its legal standing, in
practice, the NHC has never exercised a monopoly over residential housing
production and distribution in Tanzania. Initiatives by both individuals and
community groups have played a major role in residential housing provision and
distribution. For example, in 1976, Dar es Salaam had 40,000 houses in the squatter
areas, solely supplied through non-governmental initiatives (Tanzania Household
Budget Survey, 1977: 2). In addition, both private and government employers have
also been active in the production and distribution of residential housing in urban
Tanzania. Thus, the current data on both the shortage and stock of housing in major
towns are not exhaustive and cannot provide an accurate account of the housing
stock and shortages in the country.
The information above does however demonstrate the magnitude of the housing
crisis in Tanzania and is a clear indication that the policy experiments in urban
2
housing have met neither the state's expectations nor the needs of low mcome
populations. The logical question is then why?
The Research Problem
Available literature has attributed the poor performance of urban housing policies in
Tanzania to a number of factors. Authors have used these factors to provide
explanations of urban housing policies which lean towards either society-centred or
state-centred. Society-centred explanations have offered generalised statements
about the influence of dominant social classes on the state, and the consequent state
bias towards these social classes. In this regard poor performance of urban housing
policies is related to the bias towards satisfying the needs of the dominant classes
rather than to those of the urban poor. Society-centred explanations are useful in
demonstrating the influence of societal actors on the state. Nevertheless, their
treatment of the state, particularly its organisation structure and work methods, as
epiphenomenon limits the usefulness of these explanations in the study of public
policy in Tanzania. This is precisely because the state has consistently played a
dominant role in the social and economic arenas. The neglect of systematic analysis
of the organisational structures and work methods of the state in the urban housing
policy literature is not limited to Tanzania but pervades the public policy discourse
of developing countries (Batley, 1982: 108; Kiondo, 1990; Kean, 1994).
State-centred explanations have placed emphasis on the internal logic of the state,
particularly its decision makers and organisational structure, as major variables in
explaining poor performance of urban housing policy in developing countries. The
state in this study refers to that set of associations and agencies claiming control
over a defned territory and its populations. The main components of the state are,
decision-making structures including executives, parties and parliaments; decision
enforcing institutions including bureaucracies, parastatal organisations and security
forces; and decision-mediating bodies like primary courts, tribunals, and
investigatory commissions (Chazan et al, 1988: 37). Although the state-centred
explanations take the state as their point of convergence, their neglect of societal or
environmental factors such as interest groups, historical and cultural legacies, and
resource bases as constraints on state actions, limits their explanatory power.
3
The existing literature on the performance of: urban housing policies in developing
countries and particularly in Tanzania, insightful as it may be, is inadequate because
it tries to attribute cause to one factor rather than to a multiplicity of: factors which
may determine the performance of: the state in developing countries. Despite their
individual shortcomings the state-centred and society-centred explanations
encompass all the important factors which in combination explain the poor
performance of: urban housing policies in Tanzania. This study intends to explore
the factors which have contributed to the poor performance of: the urban housing
policies in Tanzania by combining the various elements of: the state-centred and
society-centred explanations. With particular reference to the NSSP in Tanzania, the
study explores the factors which influenced the actions of: both institutions and
officials of: the state and demonstrates how these factors have acted as major
impediments to effectively addressing housing problems of: the low income families.
The Purpose and Importance of the Study
This study attempts to contribute to the developing countries' public policy
discourse by linking outcomes of: the past and present urban housing policies in
Tanzania to both the organisational structures and work methods of: the state and to
environmental factors. By tracing the historical development of: urban housing
policy formulation and implementation in Tanzania, the study provides a
comprehensive and systematic analyses of: the factors responsible for the poor
performance of: urban housing policies in Tanzania. The study is also important
because it locates the policy development within the general literature of:
urbanisation and housing in the developing countries and within theoretical debates
relating to policy explanation in these countries. The study documents a detailed
case study of: a specific project aimed at addressing urban housing problems in
Tanzania and uses this to identify a range of: politico-administrative issues which
affect policy formulation and implementation in Tanzania. By doing so it is hoped
that the study will add to the understanding of: the factors affecting policy
performance in developing countries experiencing constraints and contextual
variables similar to those of:Tanzania.
4
Methodology
The field work for this dissertation was carried in Tanzania between October 1993
and June 1994. The background information for the study was obtained from
published and unpublished documents in Australia and Tanzania through the use of
libraries of the University of Canberra, the Australian National University, La Trobe
University and the National Library of Australia. In Tanzania, information was
obtained from the University of Dar es Salaam, Ardhi Institute, Centre for Housing
Studies Dar es Salaam, Central Library of Tanzania, the Institute of Finance
Management, the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development Tanzania,
the Planning Commission Tanzania and the Central Establishment Office.
In reconstructing (backward-mapping) the NSSP policy making and implementation
processes, officials directly or indirectly involved, were traced and interviewed.
Since the study's major interest was to gather information on what actually
happened in the formulation and implementation of the NSSP through officials' and
non officials' recollections of events, an unstructured interview method in which the
researcher's questions are guided by the interviewees responses was chosen. The
choice of the backward-mapping method was judged as appropriate because the
majority of the officials directly involved in the project had either been transferred to
other offices of the public service or retired. The unstructured interview was chosen
as a technique for data collection to enable the researcher to solicit views on a wide
range of issues from the interviewees. In order to gain more insights into the
housing problems of urban Tanzania, interviews with residents were held. A sample
of three localities that are densely populated was selected from Kinondoni district in
Dar es Salaam. A total number of 100 city residents from three localities,
Mwananyamala, Manzese and Sinza, were randomly picked and interviewed on
matters relating to housing problems, needs, affordability and options.
The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is organised into 10 chapters. Chapter Two provides a detailed
description of four related factors, rapid urbanisation, unemployment, urban poverty
and housing problems, that necessitated the introduction of urban housing policies
in developing countries. The chapter provides an understanding of the salient
features of, factors accounting for, consequences of, and available explanations of
5
the urbanisation process of developing countries. The chapter demonstrates that the
urbanisation process in developing countries has been rapid and argues that this
trend is irreversible in the foreseeable future, that the process is generally
accompanied by worsening socio-economic conditions including unemployment,
poverty and inadequate housing. The chapter critically examines whether dependent
urbanisation and modernisation approaches on their own are sufficient for
explaining the urbanisation process and its negative consequences in developing
countries.
Chapter Three examines various urban housing policy experiments in developing
countries. The chapter asks why they failed to generate the intended outcomes. To
answer this question the chapter looks at the socio-economic and political
conditions as well as the capacities of the state of these countries. The basic
argument advanced in this chapter is that the contents of the various urban housing
policy experiments of developing countries were incongruent with the objective
conditions of low income families in these countries as well as with the capacities of
the states of these countries. The chapter also attempts to explain why incongruent
urban housing policies were formulated and implemented by the states of
developing countries. A number of factors including socio-economic, political and
institutional incapacities are examined to demonstrate their responsibility for the
formulation and implementation of flawed urban housing policies.
Chapter Four critically examines the available literature on the poor performance of
the urban housing policies of developing countries. The chapter also sets out a
systematic body of knowledge dealing with the causes of poor performance of urban
housing policies in developing countries by classifying available writings.
Chapter Five examines the physical, socio-economic, and politico-administrative
framework of Tanzania. This chapter provides necessary context for the analysis of
the empirical data in subsequent chapters. It shows the extent to which the physical
conditions in Tanzania, together with the structure of the economy, influenced the
state in its choice of a centralised administrative and political framework as the
viable option for the economic and social development of the country. The basic
argument presented in this chapter is that the centralisation of political and
administrative authority, though perceived appropriate by the political leadership,
compounded problems of policy making and implementation, consequently limiting
6
the state's capacity to pursue the socio-economic development objectives it
envisaged, including urban housing.
Chapter Six provides a detailed account of urbanisation and of housing problems in
Tanzania. The chapter links the longstanding housing crisis experienced in Tanzania
to the pattern of urbanisation found in developing countries. It looks at the effect of
rural-urban migration, high natural population growth rates, and urban sprawl on
urban population growth and the urban housing crisis. The chapter reveals that
Tanzania's rapid urbanisation process, like that of other developing countries, is
accompanied by worsening socio-economic conditions including unemployment,
housing poverty and poverty. The chapter also examines the social and physical
conditions of the housing stock in major towns and cities of Tanzania. The basic
argument presented is that the urban poor who constitute the majority of the urban
population are at present unable to improve their housing conditions due to their
poor social and economic conditions.
Chapter Seven provides a historical account of various urban housing policy
experiments in Tanzania. This chapter shows how and why both colonial and post
independence states' urban housing policies failed to address the housing problems
of the urban poor in Tanzania. The chapter investigates the reasons for the failure of
these policy experiments paying particular attention to the relationship between
policy design and objective conditions obtaining in urban Tanzania. The chapter
examines attempts by the state to address these objective conditions and assesses
whether the institutional framework created to formulate and implement the urban
housing policies was congruent with objective conditions obtaining in Tanzania
including the poor resource base of the state and the presence of non-state centres
of power involved in the distribution of resources such as land.
Chapter Eight comprises a detailed account of the phase one of the National Sites
and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project (NSSP 1), including its origin and
outcomes. The chapter reveals that the idea of Sites and Services and Squatter
Upgrading was introduced into Tanzania by the World Bank and goes on to
investigate the role of the state in influencing and modifying the World Bank policy
to suit the conditions obtaining in the country. One question pursued is whether in
the process of that modification, the state through its political and administrative
structures and work methods influenced the content and ultimately the outcomes of
7
the sites and services and squatter upgrading schemes. The chapter examines and
classifies the formulation process for NSSP 1 and assesses the success of the
scheme in addressing the housing problems of the urban poor of Tanzania. The
chapter further investigates serious flaws in the design ofNSSP 1 and the degree to
which they were the result of lack of consultation between government agencies
responsible for formulation and implementation of the project and the various
stakeholders. It also investigates whether this lack of consultation is an outcome of
the inadequacy of the institutional framework and work methods in Tanzania?
Chapter Nine discusses phases 2 and 3 of the National Sites and Services and
Squatter Upgrading in Tanzania. It shows that, being a continuation of NSSP 1,
NSSP 2 and 3 did not go through lengthy formulation processes. The major
principles of Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading were retained under NSSP
2 and 3, although changes were made in the implementation framework. The
chapter examines the success of the two later phases in addressing the housing
problems of the urban poor of Tanzania and concludes that neither NSSP 2 nor 3
actually addressed those problems.
Chapter Ten sets out a detailed discussion of the factors assessed as accounting for
the poor performance of all three phases of the National Sites and Services and
Squatter Upgrading Project (NSSP). The chapter relates findings of the discussion
with the theoretical perspectives presented in Chapter Four and the general
problems of urbanisation and urban housing in Tanzania. The chapter argues that
the poor performance of the three phases of NSSP was a result of several inter
related factors in the politico-administrative system as well as environmental
conditions such as continuing poor performance of the economy, budget deficit,
rapid urban population growth and threats of national disintegration.
Chapter Eleven presents a summary of the major arguments raised in the thesis. It
also provides concluding remarks, identifying the causes of the housing problems of
cities and towns of developing countries, the magnitude of the problem and the
policies and the factors accounting for poor performance of urban housing policies
of developing countries. The chapter ends with a list of the factors to be addressed
to improve the performance of these policies.
8
Chapter Two
Urbanisation and Housing Problems in Developing Countries
This chapter provides a description of the contextual variables necessitating
state intervention in the form of urban housing policies in developing countries.
Four related factors are discussed: rapid urbanisation, unemployment, urban
poverty and housing problems. Before discussing these factors it is necessary to
establish the meaning of developing countries as used in this thesis. Developing
countries comprise a group of nations which, together with common features
such as relatively high rates of population growth, significant proportions of
their populations with low incomes, and relatively high incidence of poverty,
also exhibit considerable economic, social and political diversity both among
and within themselves. They include all countries which fall into the World
Bank's categories of 'low income' and 'lower middle income' and some countries
which have an 'upper income' classification (Light, 1983: 125-6; Cadman and
Payne, 1990: 5; Hulme arid Turner, 1990: 8; Lewellen, 1995: 7-12; Gugler,
1996: 1).
One major feature of all developing countries is rapid urbanisation. The term
urbanisation in this study refers to the process of growth of towns and cities
through increase in their populations. Such population growth tends to be
concentrated in a limited space (Castells, 1977: 8; : 14). Urbanisation in the
poor and middle income developing countries has two dimensions. Firstly, the
process has been rapid for the past 50 years, and this trend is irreversible in the
foreseeable future (Payne, 1977; Salas, 1986; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1990;
Hulme and Turner, 1990; Harris, 1992; Lewellen, 1995). Secondly, this
urbanisation process is accompanied by worsening social, economic and
physical conditions in cities and towns of these countries (Castells, 1977: 24;
Drakakis-Smith, 1987: 79; Reitsman and Kleinpenning, 1989: 192; Cairncross,
1990: 5-10; Lewellen, 1995: 174). One highly visible impact of this pattern of
urbanisation is the housing crisis (Abrams, 1964; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982;
9
\
Potter, 1985; World Bank, 1992a). The following section examines major
features of the urbanisation process in developing countries.
The Salient Features of Urbanisation in Developing Countries
From the 1950s to the 1990s developing countries experienced unprecedented
growth in their urban populations. Prior to the 1950s cities and towns of
developing countries like those of the developed world showed relative stability
in growth rates (Breese, 1978: 16). Urban growth which slackened during the
war years rapidly accelerated thereafter and the 1950s was a decade marked by
rapid urbanisation. The share of urban population of the developing countries of
Asia, Latin America and Africa in total world urban population rose from 3.2
per cent in 1900 to 14 per cent in the 1950s (Breese, 1978: 20-22; United
Nations, 1989a; Tesfaghiorghi, 1993: 42). In 1960, the share of developing I
countries' urban population in total world urban population of 590 million rose
to 17 per cent (Breese, 1978: 33). In 1995, of the total world urban population
of 2.6 billion, developing countries' share was 36.5 per cent. It is projected that
in the year 2025, the urban population of developing countries will account for
over 61 per cent of the world urban population of 6.13 billion (United Nations,
1989b: 47, 1990; Harris, 1992: 212; (World Bank, 1992b); Jones, 1993: 2).
Another indicator of rapid urbanisation in developing countries is the increasing
number of cities of more than one million people, generically termed 'urban
concentrations'. The pattern has been similar among the three regions of Latin
America, Africa and Asia (Palen, 1975: 4; Hay, 1977; Breese, 1978; Gugler,
1996: 5). In the 1970s, there were 62 cities of one million people in the world
(Fong, 1980: 3). By 1985, the number of such cities had increased to 100. Of
these, 40 were located in the more developed regions and 60 in the developing
countries. It is estimated that by the year 2000 the number of these cities will
have increased substantially with more than half of them to be found in the
developing world (UNFPA, 1980; UNDP, 1988; United Nations, 1989b; 1992).
Urban concentration is found throughout the developing world but is more a
phenomenon of Asia and Latin America. In 1993, Asia had more than 100 cities
with populations over one million, 14 of them being 'mega-cities' with
populations in excess of five million, while Africa had 24 cities with
populations over 1 million (United Nations, 1985; Shubert, 1993: 25;
Tesfaghiorghi, 1993: 43). Furthermore, it is estimated that in the year 2000
10
/
there will be about 30 mega-cities globally, of which 23 will be in the
developing countries, including Beijing and Tianjin in China, Mexico City in
Mexico, Sao Paulo ,in Brazil, and Calcutta and Delhi in India (Richardson,
1993; Lewellen, 1995: 174; Sridharan, 1995: 386; Gugler, 1996: 5).
Of greater significance regarding the pattern of urbanisation of developing
countries, at least up to late the 1980s, was the tendency of one very large city
to grow faster than other cities in the same country (Kingsley and Golden, 1954;
Ginsburg, 1955; UNSEC, 1957; Mehta, 1969; Breese, 1978; Drakakis-Smith,
1981; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982: 30; UNECA, 1989). Such cities are referred to
as primate cities. For example in 1982, Lima-Callao in Peru had ten times the
population of Arequipa, the country's next largest city; Kingston, Jamaica had
twelve times the population of Montego Bay; Guatemala City eighteen times
the population of Quezaltenango; and Bangkok fifty times that of the second
Thai city, Chiangmai (Drakakis-Smith, 1981; Findley, 1993; Chen and Parish,
1996; Mohan, 1996). In developing countries primacy in urban hierarchy is
associated with the concentration of social, economic and politico
administrative infrastructures in a single locale - the primate city. This
concentration is linked to the unequal spatial development policies of both
colonial and post-colonial governments (Castells, 1977: 50; Drakakis-Smith,
1981: 5; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982; Lewellen, 1995: 173; Gugler, 1996).
More recently, a study by Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1990: 75) on urbanisation
trends in Latin America, Asia and Africa suggested that since the early 1980s
the growth rate of primate cities has in many cases been decreasing relative to
some of the smaller cities. For example, since the early 1980s, Cairo in Egypt,
Lagos in Nigeria, Buenos Aires in Argentina, Sao Paulo in Brazil, Calcutta and
Bombay in India over this period have all grown much more slowly than their
suburban rings or smaller cities. Even so these mega-cities have maintained
their primate city status in their respective countries (Gurgler, 1996).
The statistics above clearly testifies that a significant and rapid urbanisation has
occurred in developing countries. However the pattern of that urbanisation is
different from that experienced by developed countries during their peak
periods of urbanisation between 1850 and 1950 when it required 75 years for
populations to double (Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 5; Light, 1983: 131; Cadman and
Payne, 1990: 5; Gugler, 1996: 5). This was, for example, the case for the cities
of Manchester and Liverpool in Britain (Light, 1983: 81). Although developed
11
countries now require 80 years to double their populations, developing countries
double their urban population in about 25 years (Light, 1983: 130).
There are manifest differences in urbanisation patterns and factors accounting
for the unprecedented rate of urban growth between developing countries. An
examination of such differences provides insights on certain distinctive
characteristics of these developing country region.
Latin America has higher levels of urban population compared to Asia and
Africa. As Table 2.1 shows, despite variations between countries in Latin
America, in 1992 more than 75 per cent of that continent's population lived in
urban areas (Tesfaghiorghi, 1993: 41). By contrast, in 1992 only 37.9 percent of
Africa's population lived in urban areas, while in Asia only 32.2 per cent lived
in urban areas. Higher levels of urban population in Latin America are
attributed to earlier colonisation as well as greater levels of industrialisation, a
process which was particularly evident in the 1930s and 1960s when the
expansion and consolidation of industrial centres intensified rural-urban
migration (Southhall, 1973: 246; El-Shakhs and Obudho, 1974; Gilbert and
Gugler, 1982: 15; de Oliveira and Roberts, 1996: 254-257).
However, despite past and present lower levels of urbanisation in Africa and
Asia, the high annual urban population growth rates together with high natural
annual growth rates experienced by some countries of Asia and all countries of
Africa (ie Table 2.2) provide a clear indication that in the near future the two
continents will have similar or even higher levels of urban population than
those of Latin American (Drakakis-Smith, 1981; Stren and White, 1989).
Factors Accounting for Urban Population Growth in Developing Countries
Three major factors have accounted for rapid urbanisation in developing
countries generally: natural increase, rural-urban migration and reclassification
of geographical boundaries (Renaud, 1981: 16; Salas, 1986). The extent to
which each of the three factors has contributed to rapid population growth in
specific countries varies among the three regions of developing countries (viz
Africa, Asia and Latin America) and also within countries in the same region.
Furthermore, the importance of these factors has been changing since the 1950s
(Gugler, 1996).
12
Table 2.1: Trends in Urban Population Growth in Selected Developing Countries
Region Population (Millions) Average Annual Urban Population Urban Population Population Growth as a% of Total Average Annual
rate Population Growth rate
1960 1994 2000 1960-92 1992-2000 1960 1992 1960-1992 1992-2000
SUB SAHARA AFRICA
Cameroon 5.3 13.0 15.3 2.6 2.8 14 42 6.5 5.7 Ethiopia 24.2 59.4 67.2 2.5 3.0 8 13 4.8 5.8 Ghana 6.8 16.6 20.2 2.7 2.9 26 33 3.9 4.6 Cote d'lvoire 3.8 13.8 17.0 3.9 3.5 23 42 6.5 5.5 Kenya 8.3 26.0 2.8 3.5 3.3 9 25 7.7 7.0 Madagascar 5.3 13.1 16.6 2.8 3.2 15 25 5.6 6.0 Mozambique 7.5 15.5 19.4 2.2 3.2 5 30 9.5 7.2 Nigeria 42.3 108.0 147.7 2.7 5.1 17 37 6.3 5.4 Sudan 11.2 26.7 33.2 2.8 2.7 13 23 5.4 4.8 Tanzania 10.2 27.9 35.9 3.2 3.3 5 22 10.3 7.5 Uganda 6.6 18.7 23.4 3.3 2.8 7 12 6.1 6.6 Zaire 15.3 40.0 51.0 3.0 3.1 26 29 4.8 5.0 Zambia 3.1 9.2 10.7 3.2 2.7 23 42 7.1 5.5
Table 2.1: Trends in Urban Population Growth in Selected Developing
Countries (Continued)
Region Population (Millions) Average Annual Urban Population Urban Population Population Growth as a% of Total Average Annual
rate Population Growth rate
1960 1994 2000 1960-92 1992-2000 1960 1992 1960-1992 1992-2000
ASIA
Bangladesh 51.4 117.9 144.3 2.7 2.4 5 18 6.8 6.2 China 657.5 1,187.4 1,309.7 1.9 1.2 19 28 8.2 4.9 India 442.3 880.1 1,018.7 2.2 1.8 18 26 3.6 3.9 Indonesia 96.2 190.4 218.0 2.2 1.7 15 30 4.7 4.4 Malaysia 8.1 19.7 22.3 2.6 2.1 25 45 4.5 4.4 Pakistan 50.0 126.3 154.8 2.9 2.7 22 33 4.3 4.6 Philippines 27.7 67.0 76.1 2.7 2.0 30 44 3.9 3.6 Sri Lanka 9.9 17.9 19.4 1.8 1.2 18 22 2.5 2.5 Thailand 26.0 58.0 61.2 2.4 1.1 13 23 4.6 4.0
-Ui
Tahic 2.1: Trends in Urban Population Growth in Selected Developing Countries (Continued)
Region Population (Millions) Average Annual Urban Population Urban Population Population Growth as a% of Total Average Annual
rate Population Growth rate
1960 1994 2000 1960-92 1992-2000 1960 1992 1960-1992 1992-2000
LATIN AMERICA
Argentina 20.0 34.2 36.1 1.8 1.5 74 87 2.0 1.4 Brazil 72.6 159.1 172.8 2.4 1.5 45 77 4.2 2.5 Chile 7.6 14.0 15.3 1.8 1.5 68 85 2.6 1.8 Colombia 15.9 36.0 37.8 2.3 1.6 48 71 3.7 2.5 Cuba 7.0 10.8 11.5 1.4 0.8 55 75 2.5 1.5 Mexico 36.5 88.5 102.6 2.8 1.9 51 74 4.1 2.6 Peru 9.9 23.2 26.3 2.6 2.0 46 71 4.1 2.7 Venezuela 7.5 21.2 23.6 3.1 2.0 67 91 4.3 2.6
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 1994, Human Development Report, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.22-3; The World Bank, World Development Report 1996, From Plan to Market, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.188-9
Natural population increase
Natural population growth, defined as the difference between births and deaths,
is still, with the exception of China and some countries of Latin America, the
major element in urban growth in developing countries. Natural population
increase has resulted from both a decline in mortality, particularly infant
mortality, and a rise in life expectancy due to improved medicine, hygiene and
nutrition in developing countries (Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 6). In developing
countries the rate of population growth through natural increase is relatively
high and this has contributed to rapid growth in both rural and urban
populations (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1990: 80). By United Nations standards
the natural population growth rate is low if it is below 1 per cent (United
Nations, 1989a: 12). Although the rate of natural increase in total population
over the period 1960-1992 rose in some African countries while declining in
Latin America and Asia, (see Table 2.1) the relatively high natural population
growth rates have contributed to the rapid growth of urban populations in these
countries. The current urban mean rate of natural increase of 2.1 per cent in
developing countries, may lead to their urban populations doubling in less than
25 years (World Bank, 1994; Jones, 1988; 1993: 3; Cadman and Payne, 1990:
5).
Rural-urban migration
Rural-urban migration has been identified as another major factor for urban
population growth in developing countries. This is particularly so in the
developing countries of Asia (including China) and of sub-Saharan Africa
where about two thirds of the population remain rural (Todaro, 1976; Hardoy
and Satterthwaite, 1981: 164; Harris, 1992; Lewellen, 1995). For example,
between 1940 and 1960, rural-urban migration added 100 million people to
urban populations of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (UNSEC, 1969; Hardoy and
Satterthwaite, 1990). During 1950-60 the contribution to the growth of the
urban population by rural-urban migration in Africa was over 60 per cent
(UNECA, 1989). Rural-urban migration accounted for the upsurge of urban
populations in Malaysia and the Philippines in the 1970s (NEDA, 1974-5;
Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 13). In the 1990s, rural-urban migration accounted for
over 40 per cent of urban population growth in developing countries of Asia
and sub-Saharan Africa (Kasarda and Crenshaw, 1991: 474; Findley, 1993: 16;
Lewellen, 1995: 171). A 1987 survey in China found that rural migrants
16
constituted 45.2 per cent of all immigrants in cities and towns. It should also be
noted that although rural-urban migration is no longer the major factor for urban
population growth in Latin America, it was during the peak periods of
urbanisation in these countries in the 1930s and 1960s (Gutkind, 1969: 390;
Hance, 1970; Stren and White, 1989; Cadman and Payne, 1990; Hardoy and
Satterthwaite, 1990; Gugler, 1996).
Rural-urban migration in developing countries is primarily the consequence of
both the absolute and relative poverty of rural areas in comparison to the cities -
a contrast which, it has been alleged by Lipton (1977) and Lewellen (1995), is a
direct consequence of urban bias in economic, social and political policies. It
should be noted, however, that despite urban bias, in some developing countries
many urban dwellers have been found to be relatively poorer than. populations
in rural areas (WHO, 1989; Tabibzadeh et al, 1989; Hardoy et al, 1990: 14).
The relatively superior social and economic development of urban areas of
developing countries pulls rural people to these areas, while rural poverty and
lack of opportunity pushes rural people to urban areas (Payne, 1977: 26; Gilbert
and Gugler, 1982; Gilbert, 1994; Parnwell, 1993). Inequality between rural and
urban areas in developing countries can be considerable. For example, in the
1970s rural incomes as a proportion of urban income were only 41 per cent in
Thailand, 33 per cent in West Malaysia; 40 per cent in Indonesia and 43 per
cent in Mexico (UNECLA, 1971; Friedman and Douglas, 1976). Although
directly comparable figures are not available for the 1980s and 1990s, rural
urban inequality has remained characteristic in developing countries including
those with higher economic growth rates like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia
(Hugo, 1996: 134; Lewellen, 1995).
The type of migration and characteristics of rural migrants of developing
countries have added further strain to the urban services in these countries. With
regard to characteristics of rural migrants, there are variations between
developing countries. In Indonesia, India, the Arab states and sub-Saharan
Africa the majority of migrants are young men who are relatively educated
(Gugler, 1996: 6). In Latin America, the Caribbean, the Philippines and
Thailand, young women are the group most represented among migrants
(Gilbert and Gugler, 1982: 59; Zlotnik, 1993). One of the reasons why women
move in such numbers is that industrialisation in these countries has generated
employment opportunities characterised by repetitive processes, part-time
working, and low pay, for which women rather than men are preferred. The
17
majority of such female migrants are young, sometimes unmarried, and have
few skills (Smith, 1964; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982; Potter, 1985; Zlotnik, 1993).
There are different types of migration characterising developing countries
(Aldrich and Sandhu, 1995: 23). In China migration is mainly temporary
commonly known as floating population. A temporary migrant in China is a
person who has moved to their current residence without an official change of
registration and has been living there for less than a year (Li and Hu, 1991: 7;
Goldstein, 1993). Temporary migration is also prevalent in Bangkok in
Thailand and Jakarta in Indonesia. However, in these countries temporary
migration constitutes a small proportion of total migration. In sub-Saharan
Africa permanent migration is the predominant choice of migrants (Gugler,
1988). Apart from the differences in duration of stay by migrants, in all three
regions (Asia, Africa and Latin America) migrants have tended to move straight
to the primate cities or largest cities. This is a different pattern from that of
developed countries where the population movement was often incremental,
moving in stages from smaller to larger cities (Hugo, 1996).
Reclassification of boundaries and areas
Reclassification of boundaries and areas is the third factor contributing to
higher apparent levels of urbanisation in developing countries. There is a
number of ways in which reclassification of boundaries occurs in developing
countries (Salas, 1986; Gugler, 1996). One way is through extension of urban
boundaries to incorporate surrounding rural areas (ie urban sprawl). For
example, growth of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania is also explained by its overspill
in the surrounding areas of Tegeta, Kisarawe and Kibamba (Comoro, 1984: 38;
Campbell, 1990a). Also the growth of Jakarta in Indonesia is associated with its
overspill into the surrounding West Java areas of Boger, Tangegerand and
Bekasi (McGee, 1991; Firman, 1992; Hugo, 1993: 46). Similarly, the growth of
Bangkok in Thailand is partly explained by its incorporation of the surrounding
central plain region (Jones, 1993: 3).
A second form of reclassification of boundaries that has contributed to apparent
urban population growth in developing countries relates to government policies
of setting up new towns and cities. In such cases hitherto rural areas are
assigned new economic, social and political roles and hence acquire an urban
status. This process accounts for the increase in numbers of urban centres in
18
African countries where hitherto rural areas have been converted into politico
administrative centres. Prospects of employment in the political and
administrative institutions attract large numbers of people from surrounding
areas thus transforming these newly designated urban areas into major centres
of population (Gilbert and Gugler, 1982: 47; Comoro, 1984; Stren and White,
1989; Hugo, 1996) . . ,
The Consequences of Rapid Urbanisation in Developing Countries
Rapid urbanisation in developing countries has produces a range of problems
including poverty, unemployment and inadequate housing. While similar
conditions are also found in rural areas of developing countries, their
manifestation in urban areas is distinctive and sometimes worse due to the
large, dense and rapidly growing populations of towns and cities (Hardoy et al,
1990: 11). This section provides a detailed description of the social and
economic conditions obtained in urban areas of developing countries.
Urban poverty
In this study the term poverty is used to refer to a condition of life so degraded
by disease, illiteracy, malnutrition, and squalor as to deny its victims an
adequate supply of basic human necessities such as water, shelter and food
(Chenery et al, 1974: 12; Lewellen, 1995: 74). The majority of the urban
population of these countries is living at or below subsistence levels (Gilbert
and Gugler, 1982: 81; Hurley, 1990: 3; Cadman and Payne, 1990: 5; Lugalla,
1990: 100). Although there are variations between developing countries on the
level and extent of poverty amongst urban populations, Table 2.2 shows that
poverty is pervasive throughout them all. The extent of poverty is demonstrated
by the inability of large proportions of urban populations to obtain access to
wage employment, adequate diets, land for housing, clean and safe water
supply, adequate sanitation system and social facilities such as educational or
health services (Rakodi, 1990a: 111; Cadman and Payne, 1990: 229). In 1990,
the urban poor numbered 600 million or 40 per cent of the urban population in
developing countries (Padmini, 1993: 7). As projected by the World Bank, the
number of urban poor will swell by more than half in cities and towns of the
developing countries by the year 2000. The urban poor will then be 90 per cent
of the total urban population in Latin America, 45 per cent in Asia and 40 per
cent in Africa (World Bank, 1988a; Harris, 1992: 213; Pugh, 1995: 36-37).
19
The physical manifestations of urban poverty are evident in all cities of
developing countries. In African cities the dimension of poverty is vividly
captured by Simon:
Just as the &littering tower block has become a metaphor for modernity, progress and wealth, so the bedraggled beggars propped against its marble facade symbolise alienation, despair and poverty. Gnarled and wizened men '·and women, aged before their time, compete with wideeyed, pleading children and vendors of every kind for the fleeting attention and prized coins of the waBenzi and foreigners (1992: 103).
WaBenzi is a derogatory Kiswahili term (the Mercedes Benz people) which
emerged after Kenyan independence to identify the new indigenous elites with
their predilection for spending on imported luxury items such as Mercedes Benz
cars. Equivalent and frequently more derogatory terms exist in many languages
and areas; for example, waserauta (the sell-outs) refers to those Namibians
profiting politically or economically from South Africa's attempts to install a
neo-colonial regime during the late 1970s and 1980s (Abrahams, 1982).
The highly visible face of poverty in cities and towns of developing countries is
exhibited by increasing numbers of street kids who live on begging,
prostitution, pick-pocketing and scavenging rubbish bins (Hart, 1973; Hardoy
and Satterthwaite, 1981: 205; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982; World Bank, 1985a;
Onimode, 1988; Lugalla, 1990; O'Connor, 1991).
20
Table 2.2: People in Absolute Poverty in Selected Developing Countries
Country Total Urban as People in Absolute Poverty Population Percentage of. ,
Total Population
% of Total Rural Urban
1992 1980-1990 1980-90 1980-90 1980-90
AFRICA
Cameroon 12.2 42 37 40 IS Ethiopia 53.1 13.5 60 63 Kenya 25.3 25 52 55 10 Ghana 16.0 35 42 54 20 Mozambique 15.1 30 59 65 40 Nigeria 115.9 37 40 51 21 Tanzania 27.9 22 58 60 10 Zambia 8.6 42 64 80 47
ASIA
India 880.1 26 40 42 33 Indonesia 191.2 30 25 27 20 Malaysia 18.8 45 16 22 8 Pakistan 124.9 33 28 29 26 Philippines 65.2 44 54 64 40 Sri Lanka 17.7 22 39 46 15 Thailand 56.0 23 30 34 17
LATIN AMERICA
Argentina 33.1 87 16 20 15 Mexico 88.2 74 30 51 23 Venezuela 20.2 91 31 58 28
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 1994, Human Development Report 1994, New York: Oxford University Press, p.18.
Urban poverty has been intensified by the economic stabilisation and structural
adjustment policies implemented by the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and by
Latin American countries such as Mexico, Brazil and Costa Rica. These
policies have resulted in the reduction and sometimes withdrawal of state
subsidies to social services such as water, transport, health, energy and
education (World Bank, 1990; Pugh, 1995; Aldrich and Sandhu, 1995). Such
cut-backs have a disproportionately greater effect on the urban poor, the group
21
which is most vulnt}rable. By contrast, the high economic growth achieved by
Asian countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia from
the late 1970s, has reduced the proportions of population in absolute poverty in
these countries (Table 2.3).
Table 2.3: Performance of Economies of Selected Developing Countries
Country
Africa Kenya Nigeria Tanzania Uganda Zambia
Asia India Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Latin America
Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico
Total GNP US $ GNP per Capita Billions Annual Growth
rate %
1991 1980-91
8.6 4.1 3.7 1.4 2.8 2.0 3.2 5.9 3.4 0.7
290.4 5.5 116.6 5.8 47.3 5.6 47.6 1.2 88.1 7.8
92.3 -0.2 452.7 2.5 29.2 3.4 267.1 1.5
Average Annual Inflation rate(%)
1965-80 1980-91
3.1 0.3 4.2 -2.3 0.8 -0.8 -2.2 -1.2
1.5 3.2 5.2 3.9 4.7 2.9 3.2 -1.2 4.4 5.9
1.7 -1.5 6.3 0.5
1.6 3.6 -0.5
1960
1.4 2.6 1.8 3.0 7.6
6.9 180 -0.2 5.8 1.9
21.8 46.0 32.9 3.5
Source: The World Bank, 1980, World Development Report 1980, Washington, DC; United Nations Development Programme, 1994, Human Development Report, New York: Oxford University Press ..
For example, in Indonesia from 1970 to 1990 urban poverty was reduced from
60 per cent to 20 per cent of the population (Pugh, 1995: 40). However, the
poverty situation is still worrying considering that 20 per cent (ie 11.5 million
people) of Indonesia's urban population live in absolute poverty. Even so the
economic growth of some of these Asian countries has been achieved in part by
paying low wages that maintain conditions of poverty for large numbers of
workers. The exploitation of female and child labour prevalent in India,
22
1980-92
25.1 48.4 28.2 43.7 67.4
10.1 6.2 4.4 7.8
4.1
15.4 991.4 13.8 14.7
Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand is illustrative (Lewellen, 1995; McGurn,
1997).
Unemployment
From available information it is estimated that open urban unemployment (ie as
those actively seeking work) in developing countries is under 10 per cent
(Lewellen, 1995: 175). This information which puts developing countries'
unemploym~nt at comparable levels to that in developed countries is
misleading. This is because the unavailability of unemployment benefits
provides no incentive for the unemployed to register. Hence, information on
open unemployment is either scarce, highly unreliable or non-existent. Some
specific studies suggest that unemployment in urban developing countries is
prevalent and higher than is the case in developed countries (Turnham, 1970;
Berry and Sabot, 1978; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982: 47; ILO, 1982; Harris and
Sabot, 1982; Chandra, 1992: 2). In 1977 unemployment exceeded 30 per cent in
major African cities (Payne, 1977: 44). In Nigeria, urban unemployment stood
at 23 per cent in 1983 (Onibukun, 1989: 71). In urban Indonesia, 62 per cent of
young people aged between 15 and 19 years with a high school education were
looking for work in 1986 (Vatikiotis, 1988: 39; Hugo, 1996: 136-7; Mohan,
1996: 102).
Lack of employment opportunities in the formal urban economy has forced
urban dwellers, particularly the poor, to seek alternative means of survival
(Simon, 1992: 103; Thomas, 1992: 52; Pugh, 1990, 1995). This involves
unregulated activities generically termed 'informal sector' economic activities.
The informal sector also referred to as the parallel economy includes all social
and economic activities operating outside of state regulation (Hart, 1973;
Santos, 1979). The socio-economic activities of the informal sector of
developing countries are many including street vending, hawking, shoe shining,
repair work, domestic work, trishaw driving, garbage picking, and unskilled and
temporary labouring (McGee, 1971; Castells, 1977; Pugh, 1995).
The informal sector of developing countries is difficult to measure because it is
unregulated. This is demonstrated by the paucity of information on the
proportion of the informal sector in the urban labour force in developing
countries. Despite the difficulties, estimates for cities in six Latin American and
two Asian countries in the 1970s suggested that between 39 and 69 per cent of
23
the urban labour force worked in the informal sector (Souza and Tokman, 1976:
358; Mazumdar, 1976: 659; Ekpenyong, 1985). In Africa in 1984, the informal
sector accounted for between 25 per cent and 50 per cent of total urban
employment (Simon, 1984). The informal sector accounted for 30 per cent of
total urban employment in Guatemala, 48 per cent in Managua, 28 per cent in
San Salvador and 23 per cent in San Jose in 1989 (de Oliveira, 1996: 283).
However, the two economies - regulated and unregulated - are structurally
linked because they are interdependent (Harold, 1975; Bromley, 1978: 1034;
Bromley and Gerry, 1979; Dewar and Watson, 1981). For example, through the
social relationships of kinship, ethnicity or religion the poor have managed to
obtain financial support from kin employed in the formal sector. The financial
assistance is invested in activities of the informal sector. On the other hand, the
informal sector provides markets for workers in the formal sector and vice versa
(McGee, 1971; Pugh, 1995: 38). Increasingly public servants of developing
countries have come to rely on the informal sector to supplement their declining
wages and salaries which have been affected by high inflation rates and the
wage restraint policies implemented by their governments.
As observed by Simon (1992), and Pugh (1995), the informal sector is
characterised by fluctuating and generally below subsistence-level incomes. The
insecure and low incomes provided by informal sector activities give its
workers limited, often inadequate, resources to spend on shelter, education and
health needs. For example, until the late 1980s the very poor in India, spent
between 80 per cent and 85 per cent of their household budgets on food, while
the not- so-poor had to spend 60 per cent of their household budget on food
(Pugh, 1995: 39). Consequently very little is left for shelter forcing the poor to
economise on housing expenditure by dwelling on pavements, crowding into
rented tenements and building makeshift housing on low cost or no-cost land.
Apart from the insecure income opportunities provided by the informal sector,
its continued existence is currently in doubt due to economic stabilisation
policies and the impact they have had on public expenditure in the formal sector
from which the informal sector draws its funding (Ekpenyong, 1985;
Rasmussen, 1990). This is particularly so with the retrenchment and redundancy
policies implemented by the governments of developing countries pursuing
policies of structural adjustment. These measures have reduced income transfers
from the formal sector to the informal sector (Simon, 1992: 82; Pugh, 1995).
24
Moreover, official attitudes and policies have at times threatened the existence
of the informal sector in developing countries. Although from the end of the
1980s state attitudes and policies towards the informal sector have been more
benign or facilitatory than in the past, direct repression of particular activities or
all informal operators still occurs quite frequently using a wide range grounds to
justify such actions (ILO, 1982; Ekpenyong, 1985; Rasmussen, 1990). These
include ideological postures which see such activities as reflecting badly on the
state; perceived competition with politically powerful commercial interests;
supposed threats to public health posed by the uncontrolled sale of foodstuffs
and the activities of garbage pickers; and congestion caused by pavement
traders or trishaw riders (ILO, 1982; World Bank, 1985; Rasmussen, 1990).
One area which has been affected by the meagre and insecure incomes earned in
the informal sector is that of housing those persons who gain their livelihood
from this sector.
Housing
There has been a longstanding housing crisis in the towns and cities of
developing countries. This crisis, recently termed 'housing poverty' by the
World Bank (1990), is linked to the problems of unemployment and poverty
that characterise towns and cities of developing countries. The existing housing
poverty of developing countries is demonstrated by the inadequate and poor
conditions of existing housing of the majority of urban dwellers of these
countries. Housing poverty is found throughout the cities and towns of
developing countries with the low income families or the poor as the hardest hit
(Pugh, 1995: 37).
Reliable estimates of housing shortage and the number of people affected in
towns and cities of developing countries are not available (UNCHS, 1992).
Therefore, data on housing shortage in this section must be treated with caution.
The amount and proportion of inadequate housing varies from country to
country and between regions because each nation has its own unique, complex
mix of economic, social, political, ecological, and demographic characteristics
that influence the form of urbanisation as well as the types of housing problem
that emerge (Van Vliet, 1987; WHO, 1988). Using the difference between the
annual increase in the number of urban households and the annual increase in
the number of house units, it was estimated that in the 1970s Egypt had a deficit
of 150,000 housing units, while Bolivia had a deficit of 20,000 housing units
25
(Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981: 252). In 1977, Costa Rica had a housing
deficit of 130,000 units, affecting 1.3 million inhabitants (Biesanz et al, 1979).
Although information on the actual number of housing units required for all
developing countries for the period between 1980 and 1990 is not available, it is
estimated that in this period inadequate housing affected between 25 per cent
and 80 per cent of the population of most Asian developing countries, and
between 33 per cent and 90 percent of the population of most African cities
(Murphy, 1990; Parmar, 1991). In India, the estimate of urban population
affected by inadequate housing for the 1980s was as high as 20 to 25 percent
(Nagpaul, 1988: 265). These examples demonstrate the inadequacy of housing
in urban developing countries and clearly indicate that the pace of urbanisation
in these countries surpasses their ability to cope with the growing demand for
social services including housing. Why this is so will be addressed in the
subsequent sections.
The appalling conditions visible in the cities and towns of developing countries
is another indicator of the magnitude of their housing crisis (Kirkby, 1985: 168;
Nagpaul, 1988: 268; Pugh, 1995: 19). Although criteria for judging housing
conditions in developing countries have been criticised for being ethnocentric
and ignoring differences in cultural, social and environmental factors, the levels
of service provision, household density and physical quality of the settlements
for the majority of urban population fall short of satisfying conditions necessary
for guaranteeing adequate human development (Gilbert and Gugler, 1982: 81;
Aldrich and Sandhu, 1995:19; Pugh, 1995: 39). With regard to household
densities, more than 60 per cent of the urban population of developing countries
live in overcrowded rooms with more than 3 persons sharing a room of about 10
m2 (Martin, 1980: 11). The United Nations (1968) defines the size of a
habitable bedroom to be about 10m2. However, there is international variation
in defining a habitable room. For example, in Zambia a habitable room is about
7.4m2, in Hong Kong 4m2; in Tanzania 10m2; and in Britain 6.6m2.
There are also variations between developing countries in the levels of
household population densities, with those of Asia having as high as 4.4
persons in one room of about 7.4 m2 with many other people sleeping on
pavements at night, and those of Africa having 3.3 persons sharing a room of
10m2 (Ramachandran, 1974; Bhooshan and Misra, 1979: 58; Hardoy et al,
1990: 97; Gugler, 1996). Regional differences in room densities between Asia
and Africa are attributed to differences in population sizes, with the Asian
26
region containing the most the heavily populated nations, for example Indonesia
(191.2 million people), Bangladesh (119.5 million), Pakistan (124.9 million)
and India (880.1 million people (UNDP, 1994: 175; World Bank, 1996a: 188-
9).
There are also variations in levels of overcrowding between developing
countries. In Bombay, India, in the 1970s, more than 77 per cent of the urban
households occupied a single room, with an average of 5.3 persons per room.
Overcrowding has continued to plague cities and towns of India in the 1990s
(Mohan, 1996: 122). The worst recorded case of overcrowding is that of
Calcutta where, under a system called 'hotbed', bunks are stacked one above the
other in tiny rooms and these are available for rent by the hour, with two or
more persons renting the bed within any twenty-four hour period (Hardoy et al,
1990: 8). In the developing countries of Africa, in the 1970s room densities for
the cities of Kumasi, Takoradi, and Kumasi in Ghana ranged from 2.5 to 3.2
persons (Hinderrink and Sterkenburg, 1975). Overcrowding remained one of the
major indicators of housing poverty in the major cities of Ghana in the 1990s,
with the majority of their households (each household constituting five persons)
occupying only one room - 47 per cent in Accra and 73 per cent in Kumasi
(HUDA, 1990; Malpezzi et al, 1990). In Nigeria's cities average room
occupancy was more than 3 persons (Salau, 1991: 56). The worst case of
overcrowding was that of Metropolitan Lagos in Nigeria where in the late 1980s
an average household of five or more persons lived in a 2.4 by 1.8 metre room
(Hardoy et al, 1990: 75). In Mexico City up until the early 1980s, more than
half of the urban population lived in one-room dwellings with about 5.6 persons
per room.
The most important aspect of overcrowded conditions, with far-reaching
implications for the urban residents, is the nature and state of basic services and
facilities including toilet facilities, bathrooms kitchens, water supply, and
drainage and sewerage (Hardoy et al, 1990: 76). In the majority of overcrowded
low income settlements many such facilities and services are not available.
When they are available the pressure on them in terms of number of users
leaves much to be desired. In Mexico, 50 per cent of the urban population live
in settlements with few basic services. In India, 64 per cent of the urban
population are not connected to a sewerage system (Gilbert and Gugler, 1982;
Misra, 1990). In the Philippines, in 1981 half of the urban population had no
access to piped water, while a quarter of them had access only to an open pit or
27
no toilet at all (Satterthwaite and Hardoy, 1981: 71; Hardoy et al, 1990). In
Klang Toey, Thailand, in the late 1970s only 3 per cent of the population had
direct access to a water supply, while sewerage and rubbish disposal facilities
were virtually non-existent (Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 73; Hardoy et al, 1990).
Until the late 1980s, about one-third of the population of Bangkok in Thailand
had no access to public water and had to obtain water from vendors. Only 2 per
cent of the population was connected to a sewerage system; human wastes were
generally disposed through septic tanks and cess pools; and their affluents, as
well as waste water from sinks, laundries, baths and kitchens were discharged
into stormwater drains or canals. During the same period (ie late 1980s) 3
million squatter residents in Calcutta in India lived in housing which lacked
potable water, endured serious annual flooding and had no systematic means of
disposing of refuse or human wastes. Similarly, 1.8 million people in Manila, in
the Philippines, lacked adequate water supplies as well as sanitary services and
means for disposing of domestic wastes (Cairncross et al, 1990: 5).
Efforts by international aid development agencies such as the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP), and the World Health Organisation (WHO) to
improve the provision of basic facilities of some towns and cities of developing
countries did generate some progress (Hardoy et al, 1990: 109). For example,
through the World Health Organisation's International Water Decade program
(1980-1990), the number of urban dwellers with access to water in developing
countries, increased to more than 300 million, a rise of over 70 per cent from
1975 levels.
28
Table 2.4: Percentage of Urban Population Without Access to Services in Selected Developing Countries
Region/Country Total Urban % Urban Population Without Access Population Population as to Services
a Percentage of 1994 Total
1994
Sanitation
AFRICA
Kenya 26.0 27 31 Nigeria 108.0 38 70 Tanzania 27.9 24 26 Uganda 18.6 12 37 Zambia 9.2 43 25
ASIA
Bangladesh 117.9 18 37 India 880.1 27 47 Indonesia 190.4 34 36 Malaysia 19.7 53 06 Philippines 67.0 53 22 Thailand 58.0 20 20
LATIN AMERICA
Brazil 159.l 77 11 Colombia 36.3 72 16 Mexico 88.S 75 30
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 1994, Human Development Report 1994, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 10; The World Bank, 1996a, World Development Report, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 204-205; World Health Organisation, WHO, 1987, The International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade-Review of Mid-Decade Progress, Geneva: World Health Organisation.
However, the towns and cities of the developing countries had grown so rapidly
that by 1985, 25 per cent of their population still lacked adequate access to
water (Cairncross 1990). In 1990, at least 1.3 billion urban dwellers lived in
housing with inadequate provision for water, sanitation and other basic needs
(Hardoy et al, 1990: 2). Again, as Table 2.4 shows, the situation needs further
attention because even in 1992 a considerable proportion of urban dwellers
lacked access to safe water and other basic services.
29
Water
26 19 35 57 30
32 4 15 11
OS
19
The inadequacy or lack of basic facilities in overcrowded urban housing in
developing countries has generated severe health problems in squatter
settlements of these countries. The spread of diseases such as tuberculosis,
influenza and meningitis is related to such conditions (Stren and White, 1989;
Hardoy et al, 1990: 7; Harris, 1992).
In the late 1980s, respiratory illnesses, gastrointestinal complaints and child
malnutrition were common phenomena in squatter settlements of Pacific cities
(Bryant, 1993: 17). In Manila, diarrhoea among the urban poor was observed to
be twice as common as in the rest of the city in the late 1980s (Sinnatambay,
1990: 128). In Nigeria, until the 1980s acute water shortages in the
overcrowded cities of Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna contributed to frequent
occurrence of cholera, typhoid fever, and dysentery (Onibokun, 1989: 83). Both,
child malnutrition and airborne diseases were found to be the major causes of
infant mortality in Dakar in Senegal and Sao Paulo in Brazil in the late 1980s
(Sinnatambay, 1990).
Slums and Squatter Settlements
It is important to define the term slums and squatter settlements as used in this
study. The term slum refers to housing which is dilapidated and falls below a
certain level of established standards considered appropriate for guaranteeing
human development (Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 83; Aldrich and Sandhu, 1995:
19). The term 'squatter settlements' refers to housing that has been built on land
which has been either illegally occupied or developed without authorisation
(World Bank, 1992b). Housing problems in developing countries are further
demonstrated by the large proportions of urban dwellers residing in slums and
squatter settlements. Such housing is identified with housing poverty in
developing countries because it has generated major environmental and health
problems (Gilbert and Gugler, 1982: 81; Hardoy et al, 1990: 128). It is
estimated that in the towns and cities of developing countries, between 30 and
60 per cent of the population live in slums and squatter settlements (Aldrich and
Sandhu 1995; Lewellen 1995). There are variations between towns and cities of
developing co1.mtries in the proportion of population living in squatter
settlements. Recent information on the importance of squatter settlements for
urban housing in developing countries are difficult often impossible to obtain.
However, figures are available for 1975 and 1980 for selected developing
30
countries and these clearly show that squatter settlements are a major element of
urban housing. The scant information so far available for the 1990s shows that
the situation has not changed. For instance, 1997 figures for the Philippines,
indicate that in Manila squatters number 3.5 million and account for a third of
the city's population (McGurn, 1997: 36).
In most towns and cities of developing countries slums have been formed out of
both public and private housing whose physical condition has deteriorated due
to neglect and the process of infilling of space resulting in overcrowding.
Generally, such areas are in the older central parts of cities (Nagpaul, 1988).
Slums in developing countries function as receiving centres for rural migrants
while they look for employment and alternative housing (Turner, 1967;
Drakakis-Smith 1981). As will be shown in Chapter Three, in most cases slum
formation is the result of insufficient returns on private housing investments
resulting both from government policies such as rent-controls and government
inability to enforce these policies. Examples of slums in developing countries
include tenement buildings in Colombo, Sri Lanka; the Ikoyi, Yaba and Ebute
Metta residential areas of Nigeria; and the Kinondoni and Magomeni quarters of
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 87; Ayeni, 1981: 134;
Lugalla, 1990).
With regard to squatter settlements, since the first squatter settlements appeared
in Latin America in the 18th century, they have become a common phenomenon
throughout developing countries and have become identified by a multitude of
local names such as Barriadas in Peru, the Favelas in Brazil, Bustees in India
and Pakistan, Bidonvilles in Algeria or Shanty Towns in British Colonial Africa
(Mangin, 1967: 91; Potter, 1985: 84; World Bank, 1992b).
Squatter settlements of developing countries vary in their conditions, the
regulations guiding their development and the characteristics of their occupants.
In India, squatter may consist of low-income and low-status persons who have
been forced to live outside the bounds of tenured land-holding in order to
survive in an urban setting (Nagpaul, 1988: 266).
31
Table 2.5: Percentage of Urban Population Living in Squatter
Settlements in Cities of Selected Developing Countries
Region/Country Year City % Population
AFRICA
Angola 1980 Luanda 70 Cameroon 1970 Doula 87 Kenya 1980 Nairobi 33 Malawi 1974 Blantyre- 56 Morocco 1971 Lilongwe 60 Nigeria 1971 Casablanca 75 Senegal 1971 Ibadan 60 Tanzania 1980 Dakar 60 Togo 1970 Dar es Salaam 75 Tunisia 1980 Lome 50 Upper Volta 1972 Tunis 52 Zaire 1970 Ouagadougou 60 Zambia 1980 Kinshasa 45
Lusaka
ASIA
Bangladesh 1973 Dacca 18 India 1971 Delhi 36 Indonesia 1972 Jakarta 26 Malaysia 1971 Kualar Lumpur 37 Pakistan 1980 Karachi 40 Philippines 1980 Manila 37 Sri Lanka 1972 Colombo 44 Thailand 1974 Bangkok 15
LATIN AMERICA
Argentina 1970 Buenos Aires 5 Brazil 1980 Brasilia 41
1970 Rio de Janeiro 30 Sao Paulo 32
Colombia 1980 Bogota 59 Chile 1980 Santiago 17 Guatemala 1970 Guatemala City 30 Honduras 1973 Tegucigalpa 25 Mexico 1980 Mexico City 40 Peru 1980 Lima 33 Venezuela 1980 Caracas 34
Sources: United Nations, 1976, World Housing Survey 1974, Geneva: United Nations; Drakakis-Smith, D., 1981, Urbanisation, Housing and the Development Process, London: Croom Helm; United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, UNCHS, 1987, Global Report on Human Settlements, New York: Oxford University Press.
32
In Tanzania, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines the squatter population
consists of low-income (and occasionally medium income and high-income)
gro~ps who have chosen to live in such areas in order to gain access to desirable
land (Yap, 1995). Regardless of the economic background of their residents,
most squatter settlements of developing countries are self-contained settlements
providing housing as well as other socio-economic services such as shops,
factories, mosques, churches and temples. Also, often through illegal
connections squatter settlements have been recipient of government services
such as water and electricity (Aldrich, 1988; Hardoy et al, 1990; Gugler, 1996).
The conditions obtaining in slums and squatter settlements of developing
countries demonstrate the magnitude of the housing poverty in these countries
(Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988; Hardoy et al, 1990; Aldrich and Sandhu, 1995).
Although there are variations, such housing is strongly correlated with poverty
and as a result with appalling conditions. Low-income slums and squatter
settlements which comprise the majority of these settlements in developing
countries do not have adequate services such as sewerage, sanitation, clean and
safe water and transport networks. The physical conditions of such housing
include mud huts, and huts with cardboard carton roofs standing on stilts over
stagnant sewage, and/or overflowing septic tanks and pit latrines. Squatter
settlements of Klong Toey in Thailand, West Kingston in Jamaica, Korogocho
in Nairobi in Kenya and Vingunguti in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania are illustrative
of these poor living conditions (Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 73-5; Potter, 1985;
Kulaba, 1989: 224; Yap, 1995: 263). Other noticeable and enduring problems
are the absence of open space for access roads for services such as ambulances,
and the likelihood of fire affecting large numbers of dwellings crowding close
together (Fox, 1975: 57).
Urbanisation Process of Developing Countries: Explanations
How can this phenomenon of rapid urbanisation and the consequent worsening
social and economic conditions in towns and cities of developing countries be
explained? This section reviews existing theories and in so doing demonstrates
how such explanations have influenced the urban policy experiments,
particularly in the field of housing, adopted by governments of developing
countries. The three leading explanations are dependent urbanisation,
modernisation and urban management breakdown.
33
Dependent urbanisation
Dependent urbanisation explanations trace problems of urban development in
developing countries to colonialism. The problems are perceived to have
resulted from the unique growth patterns of cities as service centres for
extracting economic surpluses for the metropole. Thus, these urban centres
unlike their counterparts in Europe were not a result of industrialisation but
rather were created to fulfil the aims of colonial expansion. Such a role denied
these cities the opportunity to develop the level of industrialisation 'normally'
required to absorb the surplus labour created by large numbers of rural-urban
migrants and thus generated urban unemployment. Inadequate industrialisation,
considered to be a necessary feature of economic development, is said to have
resulted in a lack of services including housing for the new urban masses
(Castells, 1977: 57; Light, 1983; Portes, 1985).
As a result of this historical development, cities in developing countries have
become centres of uneven development within those developing countries. The
major urban centres become nuclei of advanced capitalist economies
surrounded by poor, backward hinterlands. These centres while attracting
migrants from relatively poor hinterlands do not provide adequate employment
opportunities for the rural migrants.
According to this paradigm, patterns of urban economy created by colonialism
were inherited and extended by post-independence regimes which became
highly dependent on foreign capital. Foreign capital whose major interest is in
profit did not invest in programs (ie housing) of direct benefit to the urban poor
of developing countries (Timberlake, 1985). Developing countries' dependence
on foreign aid, together with the activities of multinational corporations have
left no room for these countries to develop substantial and relatively
autonomous manufacturing industries of their own. The form of
industrialisation, predominantly import-substitution, adopted by developing
countries of Latin America and Africa still revolves around the exchange of
high-priced manufactured goods (and technology) originating from the
metropolitan countries for cheap agricultural and mining exports of developing
countries. This arrangement stifles the autonomous industrial urbanisation of
developing countries could develop (Snyder and Kick, 1979; Light, 1983: 146).
These forms of dependency have in fact exacerbated the pattern of urbanisation
set in motion by colonialism.
34
In the dependent urbanisation explanation, dependency on foreign aid
particularly from multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF is
associated with deepening and involutional urban crisis in developing countries
of Latin America and Africa. Seeking to meet the requirements of international
creditors and wanting new investments, highly indebted countries of Latin
America, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, from the late 1970s, were forced by the
World Bank and the IMF to enact austerity measures. Markets were liberalised,
tariff protection reduced, state-owned companies privatised, and restrictions on
foreign investments eased (Taylor, 1983: 200; Helleiner, 1989: 23). The
resultant economic restructuring altered the political as well as the economic
balance in these countries. The most dramatic signs of the impact of economic
restructuring in these developing countries manifested in the 1980s when
standards of living further declined as a consequence of the withdrawal of the
subsidies of various kinds together with a general reduction in government
expenditures. Whereas the reduction in government expenditure resulted in
general crisis in the provision of welfare services in these countries, in urban
areas this was further manifested in terms of violence, frequent protests against
price rises, outbursts of looting, and the proliferation and resurgence of street
begging and street sellers of all kinds (de Oliveira and Roberts, 1996: 256).
Clearly, the dependency paradigm places central emphasis for the plight of
urbanisation in developing countries on externally generated factors. As such,
dependent urbanisation explanations question the ability of states and state
policies in developing countries to act as instruments for re-organising space
and population (Horrowitz, 1977: 764; Hermassi, 1980: 252). As indicated in
Chapter One, individual state policies have definitive ramifications on the very
nature and character of urbanisation. However, the assumption that states in
developing countries tend to be subservient to foreign aid and other external
factors seriously obscures actions within individual states. As will be
demonstrated in Chapters Five, Seven, Eight and Nine, constraints set by
colonialism and dependence on foreign aid and capital are inadequate
explanations of the complex problems of urbanisation in developing countries.
The view in this thesis is that internal dynamics in individual developing
countries, particularly their political and administrative processes, and societal
factors are absolutely vital in explaining the urbanisation process of these
countries.
35
Modernisation explanations
Modernisation explanations, in contrast with the dependency paradigm,
emphasise internal factors in developing countries as causes for urban
problems. Unemployment, housing poverty and other undesirable urban
characteristics are attributed to the persistence of traditional cultures and to
domestic elites acting to inhibit economic development. Traditional values such
as beliefs in big families and extended families, and traditional institutions such
as tribal or religious leadership are identified as the central culprits that cause
economic retardation of developing countries. Most of these factors are
indigenous to developing countries and existed before colonialists ever
appeared. Modernisation theorists often regard excessive population growth as
the major contributor to all other difficulties and recommend that people in
developing countries adopt a modern two-child family (Light, 1983: 147).
Underlying the approach of the modernisation school is the belief that the
emergence of modern cities and log-linear city size systems along western lines
improves conditions for the population of poor countries. It is the divergence
from this pattern in the form of squatter settlements, primate cities, or inflated
informal sectors that slows the process of economic development and lowers
the welfare of third world populations (Gilbert and Gugler, 1982: 23).
This paradigm, dominant in the 1960s and 1970s, influenced developing
countries' policies by identifying the eradication of traditional non-western
features as a key to creating the desired urban environment. These modernising
policies included slum and squatter settlement clearance and the provision of
high rising buildings to replace substandard housing.
The weakness of the modernisation paradigm as a conceptual and analytical tool
lies in its failures to appreciate the fact that the so-called traditional values and
institutions are an important element of the environment of the state in
developing countries. As elements of the environment they influence the actions
of the state in these countries. It is demonstrated in Chapter Three that, urban
slum and squatter clearance policies which were mainly influenced by
modernisation theories failed to solve the housing problems of developing
countries because they ignored the realities obtaining in these countries.
36
Urban management breakdown explanations
The urban management breakdown explanations of Lea and Courtney ( 1985),
Gilbert and Ward ( 1985), Stren and White ( 1989), Turner ( 1990) and Rakodi
(1990b) acknowledge the roles of colonialism, new forms of dependence and
traditional values and institutions in creating the form of urbanisation obtained
in developing countries. This view has the advantage of awarding the state in
developing countries a significant role. This is a view endorsed by this study.
The urban management explanations demonstrate how the various forms of
urban management system experimented with by independent states of
developing countries were and still are inappropriate to deal with the
consequences of rapid urbanisation in these countries. The concern for
maintaining social control and legitimacy resulted in central governments of
almost all developing countries curtailing autonomy of urban authorities and
consequently of the urban dwellers which these authorities represented. The
urban dwellers responded by ignoring central state rules. Curtailment of urban
authorities' autonomy in generating their own resources and decision making on
priorities for investments has contributed to their inability to deal with their
social and economic problems including housing, urban unemployment and
poverty. Also, urban dwellers have reacted by ignoring central state rules thus
weakening the ability of the state in enforcing its rules.
It is further argued that concern for maintaining social control and legitimacy
resulted in central governments of developing countries weakening or
eliminating civil-society institutions. These were institutions such as the
cooperative unions, farmers and builders associations, and various other
professional associations which articulated and presented member's interests.
According to this view, the state's decision to weaken or eliminate the civil
society institutions denied members in urban areas the opportunity to articulate
and represent their interests. The various forms of state initiated and controlled
channels for community participation, such as urban development councils in
India, Tanzania and Sri Lanka of the 1960s and 1970s, were inappropriate
because they articulated and represented interests of the state rather than those
of the community. The new forms of community participation in which
community-based organisations and non-governmental organisations rather than
state agencies act as mediators between the people and government look more
promising in dealing with the challenges of rapid urbanisation of developing
countries.
37
The three explanations provided above are useful in that they help us
understand the background to urbanisation in developing countries and also
identify the factors which perpetuate its particular character. However,
dependent urbanisation and modernisation theories have weakness in their
omission and by implication their denial of the role of the individual states in
developing countries in determining the organisation of space and population in
their urban areas. The urban management breakdown explanations are more
useful for the purpose of this study because they not only appreciate the role of
the state in developing countries in shaping the urbanisation process but also
incorporate the various factors that constrain the state's actions in developing
countries.
The preceding discussion has demonstrated the features of urbanisation in
developing countries. Explanations for urbanisation in developing countries
were also reviewed. What is clear is that the urbanisation process of developing
countries is rapid and that this trend is irreversible in the foreseeable future.
Furthermore, the urbanisation process of developing countries is accompanied
by worsening social, economic and physical conditions in cities and towns of
these countries. One of these conditions is that of inadequate and poor housing.
Conclusion
The discussion has also shown that the weaknesses of some of the leading
explanations of rapid urbanisation which have influenced urban development
policies in developing countries. One of the explanations, the urban
management breakdown thesis, by emphasising the important influence of state
actions in perpetuating rapid urbanisation and its consequent problems provides
a more plausible explanation of the Tanzanian situation. It is argued in Chapters
Eight and Nine that state actions in Tanzania (particularly the curtailment of
autonomy of urban authorities, and the inability to clarify the functional and
authority relationships between urban authorities and Regional Commissions)
contributed to the National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project's
(NSSPs) failure to recover the projects' costs and to achieve objectives of
providing housing to the low income groups.
38
Chapter Three
Urban Housing Policies in Developing Countries
This chapter provides a critical review of the major urban housing policies
implemented by developing countries between 1950 and the 1990s. The review
is important because it assists our understanding of why the housing crisis
discussed in Chapter Two has continued in the cities and towns of developing
countries to the present. During that period governments of almost all
developing countries experimented with a variety of urban housing policies to
alleviate their housing problems, particularly those affecting the urban poor.
However, the results of those efforts fell far below expectations and needs. Not
only did the policies fail to increase the housing stock for the urban poor, but
the high costs involved and the manner of their implementation raise further
questions about their effectiveness in dealing with the housing crisis. As already
pointed out in Chapter Two, in the 1990s more than 60 per cent of the total
urban population of developing countries still live in overcrowded slums and
squatter settlements lacking basic services such as water, sanitation and
drainage.
Urban housing policies in developing countries have taken different forms at
different time. Despite these variations, it is possible to make some
generalisations on the trends in policy emphasis: public housing and slum
clearance policies in the 1950s and 1960s, and sites and services, and squatter
upgrading policies in the 1970s and 1980s (Yeh and Laquian, 1979: 63; Stren
and White, 1989: 20). While in practice the above approaches have overlapped,
in this study they are treated separately in order to delineate their particular
emphases.
39
Public Housing and Slum Clearance Policies
Historically the provision of public housing and slum clearance in developing
countries was inspired by the experiences of industrialised countries. Thus a
review of the history of public housing and slum clearance in industrialised
countries is basic to understanding why the achievements of such approaches
encouraged governments of developing countries to follow suit.
Public Housing and Slum Clearance in Industrialised Countries
The introduction of public housing and slum clearance policies marked the
beginning of state intervention in housing as a response to widespread housing
crisis in the 1930s in industrialised countries particularly in Northern Europe
(Fuerst, 1974; Couch, 1990; Smith and Mallinson, 1996: 340). This housing
crisis was a result of unemployment and general decline in standard of living of
the majority of urban dwellers following the great depression of the 1930s
(Gide and Rist, 1967: 86). Lack of income prevented the unemployed from
accessing basic services such as housing, health care, electricity and water. This
lack of access to basic welfare services for large sections of the population was
heavily criticised by socialist movements such as the Fabian Society in Britain,
trade union movements, political parties and other civil society institutions
which pushed for the state to intervene and undertake all activities desirable to
promote the welfare of the economically weak (Mill, 1970: 349-50; James,
1989: 8).
With reference to housing, two related factors necessitated such state
intervention in developed countries. These were the needs, first, to assist the
economically marginalised by giving them access to basic welfare services and
second to eliminate insanitary conditions in dilapidated housing in the growing
industrial towns (Murie et al, 1976; Wynn, 1984). In the period of the 1930s,
1940s and 1950s industrial towns in industrialised countries were experiencing
epidemics of diseases such as cholera (Murie et al, 1976; Wynn, 1984). These
diseases were caused by the appalling conditions in the substandard housing
widely used by low income groups in almost all major towns and cities of
developed countries at this time (Couch, 1990). Britain, for example, had about
1 million dilapidated houses and more than 2 million overcrowded houses
(Burnett, 1978: 237). The insanitary conditions were addressed by government
40
legislation directed at demolishing offending properties and prohibiting further
substandard housing. Complementing such regulation low cost housing was
provided by government to the families and individuals affected by the
demolition (Fuerst, 1974; Balchin, 1981).
State intervention in the provision of housing to economically marginalised
groups in developed countries involved a wide range of measures and
mechanisms to control the demand for and supply of low cost housing.
Intervention in demand involved financial assistance programs which provided
income in the form of cash social security benefits to enable groups at risk of
falling into poverty to meet their needs for food and housing (Pugh, 1980: 54).
Other programs such as housing funds and housing credits were specifically
introduced to assist families to pay rents and/or purchase houses. For example,
France introduced a subsidy to individuals who had difficulties in meeting their
housing costs (Castells, 1977: 162).
Government intervention also included direct construction of housing, as well
as regulation of access to the means for housing such as building materials,
labour resources, land and credit (Pugh, 1980; Wynn, 1984). In Britain and
France, for example, between the 1930s and 1950s state intervention in housing
supply involved the national government providing subsidies to local councils
to construct and administer low cost housing. France also introduced rent
control. In Britain, state intervention also involved the control and licensing of
access and distribution of building materials, giving local authorities preference
over non-governmental institutions (Ashworth, 1957: 37; Balchin, 1985: 108).
Other measures to ensure a supply of low cost housing in Britain involved
regulating rents to assist tenants meet their housing costs (Wynn, 1984).
There were variations between the public housing policies of industrialised
countries at that time. For example, in Britain and France, public housing
involved national governments financially assisting municipal councils in
providing low cost housing. In Sweden and Germany on the other hand, public
housing involved national governments assisting non-governmental institutions,
such as cooperatives and trade unions, to provide low cost housing (Fuerst,
1974; Wynn, 1984).
Policies to improve the living conditions of economically marginalised groups
were pursued through public funding of urban renewal or slum clearance
41
programs. Slum clearance programs involved the demolition of slums to acquire
land for the building of new housing as well as for other development programs
such as those for recreational facilities and commercial buildings. The new
housing was allocated either to the displaced ('cleared') persons or to other
economically weak groups. The 'cleared' were either allocated housing in the
same place (Burnett, 1978), or provided with financial assistance to give them
access to standard housing. For example, in Britain in 1930 the Housing Act
(the Green Act) provided subsidies to local authorities for slum clearance and
rehousing the persons displaced (Ashworth, 1957; Balchin, 1981). The
displaced persons were rehoused in local authority housing at subsidised rents.
To maintain standards in low cost public housing, measures were put in place to
prohibit overcrowding through the provision of subsidised housing to
households living in overcrowded conditions (Murie et al, 1976: 96; Pugh,
1980: 54).
Slum Clearance and Public Housing in Developing Countries
The achievements of the public housing and slum clearance policies of
industrialised countries appealed to the political leadership of developing
countries (Abrams, 1964; Turner, 1969; Castells, 1977; Drakakis-Smith, 1981).
Three related factors influenced developing countries to draw inspiration from
the urban housing policies of industrialised countries in the 1950s and 1960s.
The factors were lack of administrative and economic capacities; elitist attitudes
of the government officials; and legacies of colonialism (Drakakis-Smith, 1981,
123). When many developing countries, particularly those of Africa, attained
political independence they inherited weakness in the capacity to run the state.
They had neither adequate numbers of indigenous skilled and professional staff
nor the economic resources to deal effectively with all the emerging socio
economic problems including urban housing. As a consequence they had to rely
on foreign advisers. For example, foreign staff provided by industrialised
countries under technical assistance programs comprised the majority of the
highly skilled staff in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s and mid 1970s (Lea and
Courtney, 1985; Rakodi, 1986: 215). Shortage of skilled staff was more
apparent in the field of housing where for example, in 1964, Zambia had only
two indigenous town planners, and one indigenous civil engineer (Rakodi,
1986). The experts and technical advisers on whom governments were forced to
rely were rarely familiar with situations obtaining in developing countries and
based their advice on the experiences of their own countries (Zetter, 1984). The
42
cases of Senegal, Tanzania and Zaire are illustrative. The first development
plans of all the three countries after independence were prepared by special
missions from France (Tordoff, 1967; Mbuyi, 1989; Ngom, 1989).
With regard to economic capacity, in the 1950s and 1960s most developing
countries and particularly those of sub-Saharan Africa, were economically
dependent on funding from former colonisers, and bilateral and multilateral
donors. The sub-Saharan countries and Latin American countries were the
major recipients of such foreign capital flows. For example, at the end of 1966
OECD countries had invested almost US$ 30 billion in the less developed
countries of which 16.4 per cent went to Africa and 52.2 per cent went to Latin
America (Stallings, 1972: 14). Dependence on foreign funding went hand in
hand with dependence on certain types of economic models obtaining in donor
countries (Simon, 1992: 175). In the field of housing, the industrialised
countries' public housing approaches were seen as appropriate and were funded
by bilateral and multilateral donors.
Legacies of colonialism influenced the urban planning, housing and land
policies of newly independent countries. This may have been responsible for the
continued use of colonial urban planning systems, institutions, laws and
practices after independence. The inherited housing standards relating to
physical structure, residential area location, density regulations and building
systems were used as benchmarks in housing programs of newly independent
states (Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 123; Rakodi, 1986: 214). Furthermore, the
capital-intensive building systems of the colonial era were continued in the
construction of public housing despite the fact that it made the housing
expensive and unaffordable to low-income groups.
Elitist attitudes in relation to housing design also influenced the adoption by
developing countries of public housing and slum clearance policies that
prevailed in industrialised countries. The professional training of planners and
architects from developing countries at independence and immediately after was
largely conducted in the industrialised countries. This tended to make the newly
trained planners follow the planning and housing approaches found in the
industrialised countries', and explains why the planners and architects of
developing countries supported the adoption of the industrialised countries
public housing and slum clearance policies (Potter, 1985: 155; Zetter, 1981).
43
Slum Clearance
In developing countries slum clearance programs were widespread in the 1950s
and 1960s. They involved demolition of slum and squatter settlements which
had developed outside the government planning system (Abrams, 1964; Gilbert
and Gugler, 1982: 100). The slum clearance programs involved mainly slums
and squatter settlements located in the central business and commercial
districts. The intention was to replace the demolished slums and squatter
housing with standard housing. Craving the modernity exemplified by cities of
the developed countries, the political leadership of developing countries
perceived squatter and slum housing as signs of backwardness and a drag on the
urban economy. Moreover, slums and squatter buildings were classified as
threats to public health (Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 120; Devas and Rakodi, 1993:
80).
Political rhetoric aside, slum clearance may have provided a politically safe way
of forcing away from cities and town centres that section of the urban
population considered a threat to the peace of city life. This explains why slum
clearance programs in some developing countries were accompanied by laws
requiring the unemployed to return to their rural villages. Cases in point were
the vagrancy laws of Tanzania, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, which were
intended to force the unemployed out of cities and towns of the respective
countries. This view is supported by Stretton (1979) and Syagga and Kiamba
(1991).
Different varieties of slum clearance programs were undertaken by developing
countries. In Malaysia, Thailand, Brazil and the Philippines slum clearance
programs were accompanied by alternative housing for victims in public
housing located in urban fringes far away from former residences and
employment activities (Drakakis-Smith, 1981; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982).
Classic examples of alternative housing for displaced persons have involved the
high rise blocks of Caracas and Guiara in Venezuela, and of Rio de Janeiro, the
Petaling J aya resettlement town, 10 kilometres southwest of Kuala Lumpur, and
the walk-up blocks of Din Daeng 10 kilometres from the centre of Bangkok
(Sen, 1973; Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 125-133; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982). Owing
to its distance from workplace and social networks, the alternative housing
rather than alleviating the housing problems of the victims added economic and
44
social stress by distancing those relocated from their economic and social ties in
the city centre.
It is also possible that the physical designs of the alternative housing did not
necessarily meet the space requirements of the demolition victims or other
members of the urban poor. Yusoff (1993) reported the case of one-bedroom
houses provided for Malaysian demolition victims whose household size
constituted more than four persons. Further, alternative housing was expensive
compared to the incomes of the rehoused persons with the consequence that the
majority of slum clearance victims had to sell their residential rights to middle
and high income groups (Drakakis-Smith, 1981; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982).
In other developing countries, such as Tanzania and Kenya, slum clearance was
undertaken without alternative housing resettlement programs (Grohs, 1970;
Stren, 1975b). In 1970, in Kenya squatter settlements surrounding areas of
Mathare Valley and Kibera in Nairobi were demolished and residents were only
provided with new building sites (Gilbert and Gugler, 1982). Provision of new
building sites to slum clearance victims did not solve their housing problems
because their incomes were too low to enable them to build houses that would
meet the conditions imposed by building regulations and land use policies. This
could have been the reason for squatter clearance victims selling their lots to
more prosperous individuals. In fact, there was a report in Weissner (1976) and
Mitullah (1985) of squatter demolition victims required to move to new sites in
Kariobangi in Kenya selling their lots to more prosperous applicants.
Hollnsteiner (1977: 313) reported a similar situation in Manila, the Philippines,
where 59 per cent of the 5,975 squatter families relocated to Sapang Palay (35
kilometres from the inner city) sold their lots to middle and high income groups.
The inescapable conclusion from the preceding discussion is that demolition
without rehousing intensified the housing problems of the urban poor. Since the
victims had limited options they sought accommodation in other existing
squatter settlements or established a new squatter settlement as was the case of
clearance victims in Kenya and Tanzania (Stren, 1975b). Where demolition
victims sought accommodation in other squatter settlements they compounded
the problems of overcrowding in the receiving squatter settlements.
45
Public Housing
Public housing policies encompass a wide range of legal and administrative
decisions taken by governments of developing countries to address their urban
housing problems (Drakakis-Smith, 1979; Haywood, 1986). Public housing
policy measures have included direct construction of houses by governments
(public housing); and actions compelling employers to provide housing for
employees (institutional housing). They have also meant providing low income
groups access to the means for housing such as land and credit and control of
housing prices and rents. In some case there has been control of supplie and
prices of building materials (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981; Aldrich and
Sandhu, 1995).
Government provided housing
Provision of public housing involves government funding of the construction
and management of houses for rent or tenant purchase. As an urban housing
policy, public housing gained importance in the 1960s and 1970s when public
funded houses for rent or tenant purchase were built in many developing
countries; for example, San Salvador (Grimes, 1976), Bogota (Hardoy and
Satterthwaite, 1981), Rio de Janeiro (Portes, 1979; Valladares, 1978), Mexico
City (Cornelius, 1975), Lagos (Aradeon, 1978), Kuala Lumpur (Wegelin,
1977), Manila (Hollnsteiner, 1977), and Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (Stren,
1975b).
Despite differences in the political and administrative systems among
developing countries a common tendency was to create semi-autonomous
institutions to construct and manage public housing. These were institutions
like the National Housing Corporations of Kenya and Tanzania; the National
Housing Commission of Papua New Guinea; the Federal Housing Authority of
Nigeria; the Housing and Development Board in Singapore; and the National
Housing Institute of Brazil (Stren, 1975b; Stretton, 1979; Hardoy and
Satterthwaite, 1981). These institutions were funded through public finance
using a variety of methods. For example, the National Housing Institute of
Brazil was funded through a 2 per cent payroll tax and by a 0.7 per cent sales
tax on industrial products (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981). Similarly the
Federal Housing Authority of Nigeria received its funding from the Federal
46
Exchequer (Ozo, 1986). In Colombia, public housing construction was financed
through index-linked savings plans (Gilbert and Gugler, 1982: 102).
The public housing institutions were given administrative, legal and economic
authority to build, allocate, and manage public housing. For example, the
functions of public housing agencies such as those of Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya
and Brazil included land acquisition, development and disposal; provision and
administration of housing loans to persons or institutions involved in or under
government housing programs; and construction, and management of
government housing. In countries like Papua New Guinea, the National
Housing Commission was also responsible for the production and distribution
of building materials (Stretton, 1979).
Government housing schemes in developing countries took a number of
different forms ranging from high-rise buildings or 'super blocks' of sixteen
storeys in Caracas and Guiara in Venezuela, Singapore and Hong Kong, to
seven storey buildings and detached and semi-detached houses in Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania, and Manila, Philippines (Potter, 1985: 140; Hardoy and
Satterthwaite, 1981 ). Despite the variety of forms the units all tended to be built
to accommodate the nuclear family as found in developed countries. In Nigeria,
for example, two types of houses were built under the Federal Government
Housing Programs. These were the one-bedroom and the three-bedrooms semi
detached houses. Both types of house were self-contained with a sitting room,
their own internal plumbing and water supply, water closet toilet facilities and a
kitchen (Ozo, 1986: 57). Similar types of houses were built in Tanzania, Kenya
and Brazil.
The public houses were either for tenant purchase or for renting, with emphasis
in the majority of developing countries on rental housing. Substantial subsidy
was included in public housing with the objective of making the dwellings
accessible to the low income groups. The subsidy was provided in different
forms ranging from below market price rents to interest free or soft loans given
to public housing institutions (Yeh and Laquian, 1979; Hardoy and
Satterthwaite, 1981; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982).
However, it is widely recognised that overall these public housing initiatives
were not a success (Drakakis-Smith, 1981; Potter, 1985; Devas and Rakodi
1993; Pugh 1995). For example, with the exception of Hong Kong and
47
Singapore, the public housing schemes of developing countries did not achieve
the objective of providing low cost housing to low income groups. Almost all
public housing agencies in developing countries constructed less then the
estimated number of houses. 'Moreover, public housing programs were
producing only a small proportion of housing compared to the annual growth in
needs. For example, in Egypt, the public housing target for 1977 was 34,000
units while its actual needs stood at 150,000 units. In Bolivia, public housing
bodies produced only 1300 units a year against the needed 20,000 units per
annum (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981: 252). Finally, public housing in
developing countries was often obtained not by the intended beneficiaries but
was captured by middle and high income people through their links with
housing officials (Gilbert and Gugler, 1982: 101).
A number of factors have contributed to the inability of public housing schemes
to meet the housing needs of low income groups. These include flaws in the
design of the associated programs, and corruption and inefficiency in the public
institutions implementing those housing programs. With regard to flaws in the
design of the public housing programs, the choice of capital intensive
technology for the construction of houses (as well as the adoption of high
architectural standards) generated housing too expensive for the low income
groups (Haywood, 1986). The cases of the Philippines, Nigeria and Tanzania
are illustrative. It is reported by Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1981) that in the
Philippines in 1972 the price of National Housing Corporation houses was
beyond the paying capacity of 84 per cent of all Filipino families. Similarly, in
Nigeria, 88 per cent of the population could not afford the price of the one
bedroom owner-occupier house of the Federal Housing Program (Ozo, 1986:
61). In Tanzania, 80 per cent of adult male employees in urban areas earned less
than the Tshs 340 (ie US$ 18, see currency exchange rates in Appendix A) per
month which was the required level of monthly wage of to buy a low cost house
under the national housing (NHC) tenant purchase scheme (Binhammer, 1969).
With regard to rental housing, the only way that low income groups in urban
developing countries could afford rental public housing (paying rent and
maintenance charges) was by sub-letting (Potter, 1985: 142). Where sub-letting
occurred, it resulted in overcrowding thus exacerbating the social problems of
high-density living discussed in Chapter Two. In countries where low income
groups were forced into public housing, they frequently failed to pay their rents.
Examples of tenants in the public housing not being able to pay their rents
48
abound in Caracas, Venezuela, and Penang, Malaysia, where by the late 1970s,
75 per cent of the tenants of the Georgetown public housing estate were in
rental arrears and consequently faced eviction from the housing estate
(Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 128).
Other flaws in the design of public housing policy concern the unsuitability of
the houses built in relation to household size, location and the cultural values of
targeted populations. The one-bedroom houses which were meant for low
income groups were mostly incompatible with the sizes and structure of the
extended family characteristic of the urban poor in developing countries. For
example, it is unlikely that the one-bedroom houses could provide adequate
space needs for households of more than 4.1 persons in Malaysia or 2.2 in
Nigeria (Ozo, 1986: 59; Bruce, 1989; Rakodi, 1990a; Yusoff, 1993: 35). With
regard to location, public housing was usually situated on the urban periphery
where land was easily available and at low cost (Drakakis-Smith, 1981; Gilbert
and Gugler, 1982; Potter, 1985). However, decisions to locate public housing
on the urban fringes imposed severe financial problems on the intended
residents most of whom had close economic and family ties to the inner city.
For example, the Jave/a residents in Rio de Janeiro relocated to public housing
on the urban fringes were forced to shoulder the additional cost of the journey
from their new home to their established inner city work place (Perlman, 1976).
This added strain to their meagre family income putting them in permanent
arrears in their rent payment. Those who could not afford paying for transport
were forced to walk for three to four hours per day between centrally located
work areas and peripheral homes (Gilbert and Gugler, 1982: 92). In cases where
the poor had been forcefully transferred to public housing, such as in Caracas, it
was not surprising that the financial strains forced them to sell their subsidised
housing to middle and high income groups (Gugler and Gilbert, 1982: 101;
Potter, 1985: 142).
Another shortcoming in the design of public housing programs included
structural faults in buildings, and lack of adequate and accessible social and
physical facilities. Major structural faults often indicated haste in the building
design and construction schedule. Other problems included the absence of
elevators in nine storey buildings of Ilala in Dar es Salaam, and the six storey
buildings of Dien Daeng in Bangkok. In government housing where elevators
were provided, as in Caracas, they frequently broke down due to poor
maintenance (Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 124-30). In the majority of the public
49
housing estates social facilities such as schools, health centres, markets and
transportation termini were rarely considered. Where they were considered,
they were often inadequate to meet the needs of residents. For example,
educational facilities provided for the super blocks of Caracas in Venezuela
could only accommodate half the estimated school population (Drakakis-Smith,
1981: 131).
There were also problems with the allocation processes for public housing.
Despite apparently strict bureaucratic allocation procedures, in many
developing countries allocation of public housing was influenced by affective
social ties such as kinship, religion and tribe. For example, in Manila's Bagong
Barangay housing scheme the mayor's instructions gave priority in housing
allocation to municipal employees (Laquian, 1969). In Papua New Guinea, the
National Housing Commission (NHC) officials' conduct with regard to
allocation of housing was influenced by pressure applied to them by co-ethnics
known as wantoks (literally 'one talk') thus distorting the application of NHC
policy rules for allocating housing to low income groups (Stretton, 1979: 5). As
a result, public housing of developing countries generally came to be occupied
by government workers, or those with appropriate political links and not the
intended beneficiaries (van Huyck, 1971; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982: 101).
Employerprovided housing
Policies compelling employers to provide housing for workers involved the
state passing or reviewing employment legislation to impose such obligations.
The Kenya Regulation of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act is an
example of such legislation (Wakely et al, 1976: 41). Similar laws were passed
in Tanzania, Zambia and Papua New Guinea (Stretton, 1979). In some other
developing countries employer provided housing became a major supply of
public housing. This was the case in Malaysia between 1956 and 1965, where of
the total 46,676 government built housing units 49.8 per cent were for civil
service employees (Yeh and Laquian, 1979; Yusoff, 1993: 67). Elsewhere
,special housing funds for government employees were established to provide
cheap housing credit for public employees who wanted to purchase a house.
This was the case for Tanzania's revolving loan fund for government employees
established in 1968. The revolving loan fund drew funds from a 2 per cent levy
on government employees' salaries and from a subsidy from the central
government (Ndjovu, 1980; Temba, 1983; Mosha, 1995).
50
Overall, employer provided housing had only a marginal impact on the housing
problems of developing countries because it benefited only that small
proportion of the urban population employed in the formal wage sector
(Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 168). This type of housing reached a small group of
people who were in formal employment and it could be argued that the housing
generally went to people who were not most in need of government assistance
(Aldrich and Sandhu, 1995; Gugler, 1996).
Another factor which militated against the employer provided housing approach
was related to inadequate funding from government. Employers, the majority of
which were government institutions, were structured to rely on funding from
national governments or international lending agencies for their employees'
housing. As a result the housing programs had to compete for government
funding with many other priorities such as agriculture, education, health and
communication infrastructure (Sicat, 1979: 81; Amis and Lloyd, 1990). Since
housing was perceived to be a consumption good of no direct benefit to
economic development, it received relatively small financial allocations from
government (Drakakis-Smith, 1981; Haywood, 1986). This lack of adequate
funding from national governments probably forced employers (mainly
government and quasi-government institutions) to abandon their housing
programs. This created acute housing shortages for the rapidly growing public
services of developing countries, forcing public servants to compete for the
limited housing mainly available in the squatter settlements (Haywood, 1986;
Simon, 1992 ).
Housing Financing
As already pointed out government intervention m financing housing in
developing countries was deemed necessary to assist low income groups and
urban poor access housing credit. The public financial systems of the 1950s and
1960s did not have adequate resources to finance national priorities, and as
housing was not accorded priority status it received little attention from public
financial institutions. Private financial institutions considered low cost housing
an investment less attractive than other commercial activities because it tied up
large amounts of capital for the long-term. As a result, private institutions
interested in profits devoted only a small proportion of their resources to
housing loans. Even then, the private financial institutions' housing loans were
only for the middle and high income groups. This was because the lending
51
requirements attached to the loans offered were beyond the financial reach of
the low income groups. It was against this background that the political
leadership in developing countries intervened and created special housing credit
schemes for low income groups (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981 ).
Various specialised public housing finance schemes and agencies were created
to provide soft loans (ie offering lending rates lower than market rates) for
housing to individuals and institutions involved in low income housing
programs. The public housing finance schemes of developing countries
included the National Housing Fund of Egypt, the Home Financing
Commission of the Philippines, the Hong Kong Building and Loan Agency
Limited, the Housing Trust of Malaysia, the Housing Finance Corporation of
Kenya, the National Housing Bank in Brazil, the Permanent Finance
Corporation (later the Tanzania Housing Bank) of Tanzania, and the Integrated
Subsidised Housing Scheme of India (Binhammer, 1969; Yeh and Laquian,
1979: 81; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981: 88; Simon, 1992: 99). Special credit
schemes were also created to provide cheap loans for the purchase of building
materials: for example, the Urban Roof Loans Schemes in Kenya, Tanzania,
and Nigeria (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981: 39).
Government intervention in housing finance failed the low income groups and
the urban poor. The majority of the beneficiaries of such schemes were from the
middle and high income groups because the lending conditions and procedures
of specialised government housing credit schemes prevented low income
groups and the urban poor from accessing these loans. For example, emphasis
on property ownership (legally owned land or house) as collateral for mortgage
loans denied the majority of the urban population (who did not own such
properties) access the state-controlled housing credit (Hardoy and Satterthwaite,
1981; Drakakis-Smith, 1981).
The requirement for collateral coupled with conditions such as short repayment
periods and large equity deposits discriminated against low income groups and
the unemployed who generally had irregular incomes and minimal capital. In
Jakarta for example, in 1970, the repayment period for a housing loan from a
government housing bank was only three years at interest rates of 2 per cent per
month (Sicat, 1979). In Kenya, the government housing loan had a maturity of
less than five years, as was also the case in Malaysia. Short repayment periods
not only constrained the low income groups from obtaining loans but it is
52
possible that they also militated against private institutions' efforts in producing
low income housing because they felt that low income groups would not be able
to pay high house rents or purchase prices necessary to cover short-term loans
(Simon, 1992: 99; Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 182).
According to Sicat (1979) and Drakakis-Smith (1981) conflicting objectives of
government housing credit schemes also contributed to their inability to reach
low income groups. In many of the developing countries where government
housing credit schemes were created, the agencies responsible for their
administration were expected to generate sufficient profit to enable them to
reinvest in more low cost housing schemes. The expectation was untenable
because the rent restrictions imposed on these institutions limited their profits.
As a consequence, only a small proportion of the funds for public housing
finance schemes was invested in low income housing. In the Philippines and
Malaysia, accumulated funds from employers' provident funds which were to
constitute a major source of housing finance for low income groups tended to
be directed towards more profitable investments projects, such as medium and
high income residential houses (Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 194). Further,
insufficient budgetary support from national governments to the public housing
finance institutions also prevented them from realising their stated targets thus
forcing them to extend loans to mainly middle and high income groups.
Urban La,nd Reform
The urban land ownership and land use control systems of the developing
countries in the 1950s and 1960s were perceived by some analysts such as
Casanova, et al (1979: 101) Baross (1987: 37) and Devas and Rakodi (1993:
106) as major obstacles to improving the housing conditions of low income
groups. It could be argued that the freehold and long-leasehold tenurial systems
were incapable of meeting increasing demands for land resulting from rapidly
growing populations because both systems concentrated land ownership in the
hands of a few individuals and institutions, and this prevented governments
from implementing public housing programs. The condition may have been one
of the major causes of land speculation and consequent spiralling land prices
(Gilbert and Gugler, 1982: 81; Simon, 1992: 120; Devas and Rakodi 1993: 106-
111). These prices prevented the poor from obtaining land for housing. For
example, in Venezuela the total land value of the central 5.4 million square
53
metres of Caracas increased four-fold from 1938 to 1951 (Lander and Funes,
1975: 322).
La.nd tenure reform was undertaken by governments of developing countries,
soon after attaining their political independence. Reform to land ownership
included legal measures to allow land acquisition by public authorities, and
taxation of land and property. Land acquisition by public authorities was seen as
necessary to enable governments to make land prices affordable for low income
groups and also to make land available for public housing schemes (Lichfield
and Darin-Drabkin, 1980). In its extreme, land acquisition took the form of
nationalisation as happened in Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Zaire where all urban
land was nationalised (Nwaka, 1979; Da'vila, 1990: 105: Nuru, 1990: 187).
It appears that the underlying assumption for the nationalisation of land was that
government ownership would ensure equity and efficiency in its use. There
were variations among developing countries in the management of the
nationalised land. In Tanzania it was placed under a ministry which had a
monopoly over its planning, development and disposal. In Guinea Bissau urban
local authorities assumed responsibility for land management, while in Nigeria
and India independent statutory bodies, the Lagos Executive Development
Board (LEDB) and the Delhi Development Authority (DDA), were created to
acquire, develop and allocate urban land (Okpala, 1979; Sarin, 1983; Misra,
1986: 264; Mattingly, 1993: 109 ). In Zaire nationalised urban land could to be
leased against payment of an annual ground rent (Mbuyi, 1989: 154-8).
In countries where land nationalisation was not politically feasible, reforms
involved passing or reviewing existing laws to enable governments to acquire
land for public purposes such as roads, schools and housing. This was
particularly the case in Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia
where strong opposition of land owners to land nationalisation existed. In these
countries, in the 1950s and late 1960s, varying forms of land acquisition acts
and land speculation acts were introduced (Casanova et al, 1979: 101). The
methods for government land acquisition differed in these countries. In
Malaysia land acquisition entailed the federal government buying land directly
from the proprietor or requesting a state government to acquire land
compulsorily through the La.nd Acquisition Act. In Indonesia the government
just abolished the land rights of owners whose land it wanted for both public
and private development. Countries which used land acquisition acts to effect
54
their land reforms employed a variety of different institutional frameworks and
mechanisms to plan, acquire, develop and dispose of the land. In Singapore
management of public land was vested in a single statutory authority. In Sri
Lanka two public institutions, the Land Reform Commission and the Land
Commissioner's Department, were created to acquire, plan, develop and allocate
land (Casanova et al, 1979).
Other reforms to land ownership involved enacting laws designed to prevent
land hoarding and speculation, such as taxes on land and property. For example,
in Malaysia Land Speculation Act was introduced to levy a 50 per cent tax on
any gains from the resale of land within 2 years of its purchase for properties
valued at M $ 100,000 or more. In the Philippines, a tax of 2 per cent of land
value on idle private land as well as a transfer fee of 1.5 per cent of the selling
price was introduced. Similar measures were introduced in Sri Lanka where a
wealth tax covering land and all other movable property and a land transaction
tax were introduced (Yeh and Laquian, 1979; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981:
33; Misra, 1986). In Colombia and other Latin American countries, a betterment
tax was introduced in the 1950s and 1960s to recover for the public purse the
windfall gains resulting from changes of land use or from provision of
infrastructure (Grimes, 1974: 17). In other developing countries such as Hong
Kong laws were passed to limit land hoarding for speculative purposes. In Hong
Kong in the late 1950s a building covenant was introduced requiring a certain
investment in the land within a stated time and prohibiting resale until the
covenant was fulfilled. Similarly, Sri Lanka and India introduced Land Ceiling
Acts which limited the amount of land holdings for individuals and institutions
(Sarin, 1983; Misra, 1986).
We can see that reforms to land ownership in developing countries enabled
governments in these countries to obtain land for public programs including
urban housing. Through such reforms government agencies and institutions
such as the National Housing Corporation in Tanzania, the Lagos Executive
Development Board in Nigeria, the Delhi Development Authority in India, the
Land Reform Commission and the Land Commissioner's Department in Sri
Lanka, and the urban local authorities in Guinea Bissau acquired large portions
of urban land for their urban housing schemes. However, as already indicated in
this chapter, the urban housing policies which were adopted, including those of
public housing, provided housing which did not match the economic capacity
55
and social needs of the urban poor. Accordingly, these land reforms had
minimal impact on the housing needs of the low income groups.
Land use reform was seen as necessary by governments in virtually all
developing countries to meet the increasing demand for land resulting from
rapid population growth. This was because the existing land use policies were
largely responsible for the mushrooming of squatter settlements in the central
business district areas and in the urban fringes (Stren and White, 1989; Baross,
1990). Accordingly, from the 1950s a number of developing countries either
revised or adopted urban development planning aimed at regulating land use. In
Nepal a Town Development Committee Act was introduced to guide urban
development. In Zambia the Town and Country Planning Act was introduced in
1961 (Rakodi, 1986). In other developing countries reform to urban
development plans involved revising urban master plans. In Tanzania a new
master plan for Dar es Salaam was prepared in 1968 and in Sudan a revised
master plan for Khartoum was prepared in 1959 (El-Samman et al, 1989: 257;
Kironde, 1990). These reform in land use policies emphasised a pattern of land
development which sequenced the land development activities. In this regard,
land development was to proceed from planning to servicing, allocation,
acquisition and finally to building (Baross, 1987, 1990). In addition, the
reformed land use policies reintroduced residential land use regulations
specifying building configurations, sizes of rooms, materials used in
construction, and penalties for not adhering to standards. Such regulations were
seen by governments as necessary to improve the health and safety of the
general public through control and possibly prevention of squatter settlements.
Overall the urban land reforms of the 1950s and 1960s in developing countries
had only a marginal impact on the housing problems of the urban poor
(Courtney, 1978; Rivkin, 1978; Wigglesworth, 1982; McAuslan, 1985; Stren
and White, 1989; Baross, 1990; Simon, 1992; Harris, 1992). This is because
lack of access to land as well as lack of legal right to occupied land are still
major factors contributing to the housing problems of low income groups in the
urban areas of developing countries (Devas and Rakodi, 1993: 116-120: Aldrich
and Sandhu, 1995). Moreover, governments in developing countries are still
unable to meet the demands for housing land (serviced and unserviced) created
by increases in population and land for associated social and economic
activities such as mosques, churches, shops, and restaurants (Devas and Rakodi,
1993: 121).
56
What are the factors contributed to the poor performance of urban land reforms
in developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s? The main factors include a
misconception of the land problems of the urban poor, inappropriate land use
policies, and unsuitable institutional frameworks for carrying out the reforms.
Policy-makers and planners associated the land problems of the urban poor with
unavailability of land and high land prices. This was a misconception because,
for the majority of urban poor residing in squatter settlements, their land
problems had to do rather with obtaining security of tenure for the land they
were illegally possessing, mainly in or adjacent to central business district areas.
This view is shared by Baross (1987, 1990). Land remained legally inaccessible
to the urban poor even after the land reforms of the 1950s and 1960s. This is
because, even though the land reforms enabled governments to acquire land in
the central business district areas, high architectural standards and strict
building codes imposed by urban development plans prevented low income
groups from access to or officially endorsed use of such land (Laquian, 1983:
13).
Other problems of the land reforms of the 1950s and 1960s relate to the
inappropriateness of the introduced land use policies particularly the sequencing
of land development. The laws required residential land use to be preceded by
planning, servicing and allocation stages. Such development policies and
practices have always borne and still have little relationship to the housing
needs and resources of the urban poor and to the resources available to the
governments of developing countries. It is well known that throughout
developing countries the provision of urban services lags far behind urban
development (Baross, 1987; Stren and White, 1989: 58; Simon, 1992: 146).
This inability of governments of these countries to plan, service and allocate
land according to demand has forced the urban population to use land without
due regard to existing laws (Wigglesworth, 1982). For example, in 1980 it was
estimated that in Jakarta only 17-20 per cent of all new construction had the
required building permits (Devas, 1983: 211). In Nigeria in 1980 only about 20
to 40 per cent of all physical developments in its major cities were directly
regulated by the government (Okpala, 1984). This unplanned development
compounded the other problems leading to the deterioration of the fabric of
cities and towns of developing countries exacerbating their housing problems.
It should be noted however, that land use policies have been successful in some
developing countries. Land use control policies are successful in guiding urban
57
development in South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and China. These
successes are in part the result of effective enforcement of the policies under
political systems showing elements of authoritarianism, such as in Seoul, South
Korea, and partly due to a decline in urban growth rates due to the enforcement
of policies restricting population mobility and the size of families, as has been
the case in China (Cell, 1980; Lai, 1995; Chen and Parish, 1996: 65).
Institutional structures and procedures created to implement the land reforms of
the 1950s and 1960s further contributed to their poor performance. Despite
variations on the choice of institutional framework for the implementation of
the land reforms, the general tendency was to segment the various activities of
land management through the creation of specialised institutions. This led to
fragmentation and lack of coordination among such institutions which in turn
adversely affected the urban poor and private developers due to the
complexities of the procedures and to the transaction costs of having to deal
with a variety of institutions responsible for the land management activity
(Stren, 1982: 82; Mbuyi, 1989: 155). The cases of the Philippines, Nepal, Sri
Lanka and Tanzania are illustrative. In the Philippines, three different
institutions were responsible for land purchasing, land use regulation and land
use planning. In Sri Lanka, implementation of the various aspects of land
reform policy was shared between the Land Reform Commission and the Land
Commissioner's Department. The Land Reform Commission was responsible
for acquiring and regulating development of private holdings exceeding the
owner's legal limits, while the Land Commissioner's Department was
responsible for administration of leaseholds of the acquired land (Yeh and
Laquian, 1979; Misra, 1986). In Nepal, a variety of institutions which were
hierarchically linked in a single chain of command, was created to implement
the land reforms (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981: 85). A similar situation was
reported by Hardoy and Satterthwaite ( 1981) and Nuru ( 1990) in Tanzania,
where implementation of land reforms was placed in a department of the
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD) which had to
work through its field officers at the local level. However, the government did
not clarify the roles of local authorities and later regional development
directorates which also had responsbilities for aspects of the land management
function. For example, effectiveness of the MLHUD's land use plan depended
on the willingness and resources of the local authorities which had functional
authority to enforce the building codes.
58
In addition to the problems of fragmentation and lack of coordination between
various implementing agencies, these organisations also lacked the institutional
capacity to perform effectively. In both Tanzania and Nepal, field officers
lacked records of who owned or had what rights to what land. The institutions
also lacked experienced and fully trained staff to undertake duties effectively
(Hardey and Satterthwaite, 1981; Nuru, 1990).
Rent Controls
Another group of measures aimed at providing low income groups access to
housing involved rent controls. The general goal of rent control is to protect low
income tenants from unscrupulous landlords by providing them with security of
tenure and affordable rents (Deshpande and Arunachalan, 1981: 201; Wang and
Tan, 1981: 249). A number of developing countries introduced such rent
controls in the 1950s and 1960s, including Egypt, India, Malaysia, Singapore,
Tanzania and Nigeria (Pacione, 1981; Potter, 1985). Despite the governments'
good intentions, rent controls did very little to address the housing problems of
the majority of the urban population of developing countries. This was because
these people could not afford public housing even when offered at low rents. In
cases where they took up public housing either because they were forced to as
in Caracas, Venezuela, or through their own volition, as in Malaysia, they
frequently failed to pay the rents even though they were highly subsidised
(Drakakis-Smith, 1981; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982; Potter, 1985). Therefore,
public housing benefited middle and high income groups whose members could
afford to pay the rents.
Furthermore, the rent controls adversely affected the supply of housing. To
implement rent controls, public housing institutions had to offer their houses at
rents below market rates. Such rents prevented the public housing institutions
from meeting their recurrent costs, forcing them to suspend important functions
such as follow-up on rent defaulters, construction of more low cost housing and
maintenance of rented properties. Classic examples are the National Housing
Commission in Papua New Guinea and the National Housing Corporation in
Tanzania whose rents were reported by Stretton (1979) and Temba (1983) to be
too low to meet even their recurrent costs. By 1976, the level of rental arrears
for tenants of the National Housing Commission of Papua New Guinea had
reached staggering proportions affecting more than 86.1 per cent of tenants
(Stretton, 1979: 60). Low rent rates and rental arrears of tenants prevented the
59
public housing agencies from continuing with their housing construction
programs. With less public housing being built, there quickly developed long
waiting lists.
Low rents also resulted in poor maintenance. By the early 1970s most of the
public houses in cities such as La Paz, Cairo, Calcutta and Dar es Salaam lacked
maintenance such as repairs to drains and sewers (Hardoy and Satterthwaite,
1981: 260; Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 86-7). This neglect together with
overcrowding contributed to the dilapidated status of the majority of public
houses in developing countries. In some instances, such as Bombay, lack of
maintenance even led to house collapses (Deshpande and Arunachalan, 1981:
206). The problem was not dissimilar for other public housing agencies of
developing countries, with the exception of Singapore and Hong Kong
(Drakakis-Smith, 1981; Potter, 1985).
Despite rent controls, private landlords were often able to charge illegal high
rents because of the inability of governments in developing countries to enforce
the controls either because of corruption or lack of resources (Gilbert and
Gugler, 1982). This corruption and lack of resources to enforce government
regulations were major factors explaining why agencies responsible for
implementation of rent controls failed to discharge their duties as required by
law (Choguill, 1985; Stren, 1990: 40). Ndjovu (1980) and Temba (1983) noted
that in Tanzania, for example, the ministry responsible for enforcing rent
controls did not have vehicles to carry inspectors to private houses to ensure
that the law was being implemented.
Building Materials and Building Industry
In the 1950s and 1960s, supplies of building materials (cement, iron sheets and
glass) in many developing countries were controlled by the private sector which
was itself often dominated by non-indigenous nationals. This situation was used
as justification for intervention by governments of developing countries
(Drakakis-Smith, 1981; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982). In countries such as
Tanzania and Guinea Bissau where the government took direct control of
building materials intervention involved nationalising private sector companies
and placing them under government management (Mabogunje et al, 1978: 43).
In this way these governments were able to control the production and
60
distribution of building materials by introducing rationing which accorded
priority in the allocation of building materials to public housing schemes.
Nevertheless, government intervention in the production and distribution of
building materials did not achieve the intended objective of increasing the
availability of building materials to low income groups. In part this was due to
the limited public resources to support government-controlled building
materials industries. This prevented the expansion of their activities (Matern,
1986; Nuru, 1990). As a consequence, shortages of building materials came to
characterise those developing countries which opted for control of the building
materials industry. The shortages led to higher prices making the building
materials unaffordable to low income groups. By the 1980s, Gilbert and Gugler,
(1982: 92) reported that cement, glass, bricks and steel prices were rising much
more rapidly than the salaries of most low income workers. Such real price
increases slowed the housing production process. Higher building materials
prices also slowed down the pace of housing construction by public housing
agencies.
Mismanagement of government-owned, building materials industries, as was
the case with most public sector enterprise in Tanzania, was partly to blame for
the shortages of materials such as cement and iron roof sheeting. Shortages
created long queues which in turn led to favouritism in the allocation processes.
For example, from the 1960s to the 1980s Tanzania Portland Cement, a
government-owned company was the only cement manufacturing company in
the country. To purchase its cement one needed a permit from the government.
For ordinary people, who did not understand the official procedures, it is likely
that these procedures prevented them from buying cement and other building
materials.
As has been demonstrated in the previous sections of this chapter, the policies
adopted by developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s for slum clearance,
government housing, land ownership and land use, rent control, and building
materials industry control did little to alleviate the housing problems of their
urban populations, particularly those of the poor. By the end of the 1960s, it had
become apparent that the prevailing urban housing policies were too great a
drain on resources, and were not able to meet the needs of an ever growing
urban population (Potter, 1985; Haywood, 1986). Faced with the evidence of
their failure, governments of developing countries supported by international
61
development agencies such as the World Bank responded by seeking alternative
urban housing policies.
The Genesis of Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Approaches
The most favoured solutions to the housing problems of cities and towns in
developing countries which emerged in the 1970s were sites and services (S&S)
and squatter upgrading (SU) policies (Potter, 1985; van der Linden, 1986;
Devas and Rakodi, 1993). Although their adoption in developing countries is
associated with the Allotment Gardens and urban renewal programs of Europe
and North America (Pasteur, 1979: 21; van der Linden, 1986: 40), it was after
the studies of squatter settlements in Latin America by Charles Abrams (1964),
William Mangin (1967), John Turner (1968) and Elizabeth and Anthony Leeds
(1970) that the S&S and SU approaches came to be accepted as the new
orthodoxy of housing policies and practices in developing countries. Allotment
Gardens in Europe were initiated on charity grounds to provide aid to the poor
by turning them into property owners. In contrast, the policies of urban renewal
in Britain in the 1960s entailed clearance, replanning, and improvement of all
slum areas by providing them with physical, social and economic infrastructure
as well as housing (DCIA, 1969; Couch, 1990).
The S&S and SU approaches emerged as practical responses to the problems
encountered with the public housing policies of the 1950s and 1960s. There
were five fundamental problems: (i) misconception of the housing needs of the
poor, (ii) weakness of the institutional framework for the production of housing,
(iii) misunderstanding of land problems of the urban poor, (iv) excessive
government involvement in housing production, and (v) lack of appreciation of
squatter land development processes. The fundamental problem of the previous
urban housing policies was their conception of housing in terms of its physical
characteristics rather than its meaning to those who use it. Such misconception
led governments to provide what has been termed by Turner (1972a) as
'oppressive' housing whose physical characteristics had no meaning to the
intended beneficiaries, the low income groups. Poor physical designs of public
housing was demonstrated in initiatives such as the construction of one
bedroom houses or of sixteen-storey buildings.
With regard to weakness in the institutional framework for the production of
housing, clients had to deal with large organisations which operated on the
62
principle of 'procedural universalism' which requires standardised procedures
and products. The principle of procedural universalism eliminates the majority
of individuals from public housing and does not take into account changing
needs and priorities in relation to family cycle or stages in migrants' lives in the
city. This situation is summed up by Turner:
the bureaucratic, heteronomous system produces things of a high standard, at great cost, and of dubious value, while the autonomous system produces things of extremely varied standard, at low cost, and of high use value. In the longer run, the productivity of centrally administered systems diminishes as it consumes capital resources, while productivity of locally self-governing systems increases as it generates capital through investment of income (1976a: 82)
Regarding excessive government involvement in housing construction, it could
be argued that it was inappropriate for the government to build houses for the
people, because it did not have the resources, and also its institutional
framework which emphasises rules and procedures tended to produce housing
incompatible with the users' needs. It follows from the above argument that the
role of government in housing should be limited to planning, building and
maintaining communal goods such as traffic lights, sewage plants and roads to
service the housing estates because individuals lack the incentive to contribute
to such tasks. The government's role in housing production should be to set the
rules according to which the housing process is conducted. In this respect, the
government should formulate proscriptive laws that define the limits to what
people and local institutions may do, rather than prescriptive laws that tell them
what they should do. Also, the government should provide and actively protect
access for the users to the elements of the housing process such as land,
building materials, tools, credit and know~how.
Concerning land problems of the urban poor, one could argue that access to
land in squatter settlements was not a problem because the informal land market
enabled the poor to obtain land illegally. What was lacking was the legal right
to land already possessed. In this regard, an appropriate role for the government
in S&S and SU programs should be to provide security of tenure to squatter
residents. Once obtained, security of tenure is likely to set in motion housing
construction and improvement processes in the squatter settlements.
The problem with the sequence of land development adopted in the public
housing policies of the 1950s and 1960s was that the process was incompatible
with the incomes and housing needs of the urban poor. The government
63
sequence of land development which starts with planning and servicing, and
goes on on to building and occupation was the reverse of the sequence found in
informal settlements. The squatter sequence was occupation - building -
servicing - planning which was an appropriate response by low-income groups
to their housing problem. The implication of this argument is that public
authorities should have recognised and adopted housing processes and land
development processes found in informal settlements (Turner, 1972).
The S&S and SU approaches officially adopted for funding by the World Bank
encompassed two related housing solutions: sites and services (S&S) programs
and squatter upgrading (SU) programs. S&S involve extending public services
such as roads, water, sewerage, drainage, electricity, schools and hospitals to
newly surveyed sites (usually on vacant and undeveloped land) in preparation
for house construction. Ideally, the developed land is allocated to families from
low income groups looking for building plots. The emphasis in S&S programs
is to provide maximum benefits and amenities to the largest number of people
at the minimum cost (Grindley and Merrill, 1972; Saini, 1978: 89).
Squatter upgrading (SU) programs also involve the extension of public
infrastructure and social services by the government. However, here the services
are provided to an already settled community with the objective of improving
living conditions. Moreover, they include legalisation of land ownership to
encourage house consolidation and improvement. An added element of squatter
upgrading program's is the relocation of populations displaced by new services
such as sewers, water systems and roads in the upgraded areas. The displaced
population from SU programs is relocated on serviced sites under S&S
programs. As a housing approach the SU program is considered to have several
advantages over the S&S program. The first advantage is that it preserves
existing economic systems and opportunities for those most in need, the urban
poor. Secondly, it preserves a low-cost housing system usually at advantageous
locations thus enabling the inhabitants to retain the maximum disposable
income. Thirdly according to Martin (1983: 53) it preserves a community which
has many internal linkages to safeguard the interests of the individual family
and the group.
Housing construction and consolidation in both S&S and SU programs are
organised and carried out on a self-help basis by the individual and/or the
community collectively. It has been noted for example by Doxiadis (1976) that
64
self-help housing tends to be characterised by a progressive, often incremental,
building process. The communal approach is necessary in situations where there
is a lack of public finance for housing for low-income households. Self-help has
the added advantage of utilising in housing construction the large amounts of
unemployed or underemployed labour found among low income urban
populations (Turner, 1976a; Diacon, 1991).
The role of government in the housing consolidation and improvement process
is to provide the means for housing, such as security of land tenure, housing
credit and building materials. The costs involved in the extension of public
services to S&S and SU are to be recovered from the beneficiaries through
various forms of user charges. Government's role in this respect is to ensure that
these user charges take into account the levels of income of project beneficiaries
(Keare and Parris, 1982).
S&S and SU in Practice
By the late 1970s, about 55 developing countries were being assisted by
international development agencies to implement S&S (sites and services) and
SU (squatter upgrading) programs (Potter, 1985; van der Linden, 1986: 47). The
international development agencies probably believed these new approaches
offered ways of improving housing for the poor at realistic cost.
The way S&S and SU policies were actually implemented differed between
developing countries. In Zambia, and Tanzania they was adopted as components
of urban housing policies. In India, S&S policy was a special program to
accommodate evicted squatters. There were also differences between
developing countries in the forms of S&S and SU programs adopted in regard
to standards, institutional frameworks for designing and implementing the
programs, and rights and duties of project beneficiaries. For example, the Tondo
S&S project in the Philippines offered a plot size of 45m2, while in Lusaka in
Zambia an S&S plot was 300m2 (Laquian, 1983: 18). Again, in the S&S and
SU projects of Zambia and El Salvador, project participants (beneficiaries) were
obliged to participate in mutual-aid work for community projects such as
schools, and health centres. In Tanzania, community services in S&S and SU
projects were the responsibility of various government institutions. For
instance, the Ministries of Health and Education were responsible for
65
construction and provision of health centres and services, and of schools and
educational services.
Despite differences between developing countries, the tendency was for the
S&S and SU programs to emphasise high standards on safety and health
grounds (Laquian, 1983: 75). Such emphasis was achieved through the
construction of model houses in almost all S&S and SU projects, to
demonstrate what housing standards should be adhered to. Although the model
houses were not binding on project participants, evidence from various S&S
and SU projects shows that many families tended to conform to such models,
believing them to be preferred by the authorities (Skinner and Rodell, 1983).
The institutional frameworks and procedures for formulating and implementing
S&S and SU policies also differed. In Tanzania, S&S and SU programs were
formulated and implemented by a central government agency, while in Lusaka,
Zambia, S&S and SU programs were formulated and implemented by a local
authority - the Lusaka city council (Pasteur, 1979; Matern, 1986). This approach
differed from that adopted in El Salvador where the Salvadorean Foundation for
Development and Minimal Housing (FSDVM), a non-governmental
organisation, was responsible for implementation of the S&S and SU programs
in the capital city, San Salvador, and in four other urban centres (Laquain, 1983:
20).
Unfortunately, since their adoption in the 1970s, the impact of S&S and SU
programs on the housing problems of the urban poor in developing countries
has been disappointing. In most cases the actual beneficiaries have again tended
to be from middle and high income groups (Baross and van der Linden, 1990).
Evidence from S&S and SU projects in Kenya, Senegal, the Philippines and
Tanzania confirms this. In Kenya, the beneficiaries of S&S schemes were
earning more than Kshs 1200 a month whereas the income of the intended
target groups was to be between Kshs 300 and Kshs 1200 per month (Bathily
and White, 1978: 6). Similarly, in the Kisumu SU scheme in Kenya, higher
rents resulting from introduced service charges pushed out low-income tenants
and resident landlords while attracting absentee landlords and middle and high
income tenants (Mitullah, 1985: 8). In Senegal, S&S and SU project
beneficiaries were again middle and high income groups, as illustrated by the
presence of expensive villas built on the S&S and SU project areas (Rodell,
1983: 24-5).
66
The poor record of S&S and SU approaches in reaching the urban poor in
developing countries is well summarised in a report for the World Bank and
International Development Research Centre which stated that:
in both sites and services and squatter upgrading projects, the participating populations span a wide range of incomes and tend to be more representative of median income groups than of the poorest urban households (Keare and Parris, 1982: 12).
Furthermore, S&S and SU initiatives have had marginal impact on enabling the
urban poor to gain access to land for housing in developing countries. This is
because the majority of squatters are tenants rather than house owners or land
owners (Baross and van der Linden, 1990). As a consequence, security of tenure
mostly benefited the squatter land owners rather than the tenants. Only in the
Philippines and El Salvador were legal measures incorporated into S&S and SU
projects ensure that both tenants and resident landlords benefited from the
projects, and even in these countries, the legal measures have been easily
circumvented (Reforma, 1977).
The presence of services such as schools, water, drainage and electricity in
unplanned settlements has tended to raise the market value of the settlement
areas making them attractive to middle and high income groups (Atman, 1975;
Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 141). This has had three major impacts. First, lucrative
financial gains from a market in the upgraded land has induced the poorest
families who have acquired security of tenure to sell their plots to middle and
high income groups and move on to other unplanned settlements (Ozo, 1986;
Matern, 1987). Second, some landlords have opted to subdivide their land
illegally to obtain similar gains from that market (Laquian, 1983). Since this
illegal subdivision of land has in most cases led to higher population density, it
is possible the available services have been over-stretched. Third, increases in
land values have pushed up house rents hus forcing the poorest tenants out of
their accommodation (Keare and Parris, 1982).
The discussion on the experiences of S&S and SU above, demonstrates that the
two housing approaches, S&S and SU, have had only a marginal impact on the
housing problems of the urban poor who comprise the majority of the urban
population in developing countries. Moreover, even if they had been successful,
their effectiveness in addressing those problems would have affected only a
small proportion of the urban poor, given the rapid rates of urbanisation and the
67
scale of urban housing problems that have characterised developing countries in
the past few decades.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the genesis, contents and performance of various
urban housing policies employed by developing countries to address their urban
housing problems, and especially those of the poor who comprise the majority
in their major towns and cities. Discussion has focussed on two major urban
housing policies: that of public housing and slum clearance in the 1950s and
1960s, and that of sites and services and squatter upgrading in the 1970s and
1980s. It has been shown that public housing and slum clearance approaches in
developing countries were inspired by the experiences of industrialised
countries, while sites and services and squatter upgrading (although promoted
by the World Bank) were inspired by the research of Latin American scholars.
In examining the results of the two sets of policies the chapter found that neither
policy has been successful in addressing the housing problems of the low
income groups for whom the various projects were intended. For both policies
the actual beneficiaries have tended to be middle and upper income groups.
This chapter has identified two related factors as the reason for this poor
performance: flaws in the design and implementation of the policies. The
policies of the two periods were both flawed in their design in that their various
components prevented low income groups from accessing the anticipated
benefits of new or improved housing. While land reforms did enable the
governments concerned to acquire land for public housing programs, the land
was used for public housing which did little to address the housing needs of the
low income group as it was too expensive for that group. Public housing rents
(though highly subsidised) were still too high compared to the incomes of the
low income group. Similarly, credit conditions for government subsidised
housing loans (such as security of employment and deposits for mortgages)
could not be met by the majority in the urban low income groups. There were
also flaws in the design of sites and services, and squatter upgrading schemes.
Emphasis on high building standards (which required substantial finances for
the building material) forced low income groups to sell land to middle and low
income groups. Moreover, land rents and service charges in squatter upgrading
areas raised housing rents and increased land values forcing low income groups
68
to seek cheaper housing elsewhere. Landowners who were low income earners
sometimes could not afford to pay land rents and service charges and had to sell
their land to middle and high income groups.
With regard to implementation problems, the chapter identified several factors -
including the fragmentation of institutional responsibility (resulting in a lack of
coordination between implementing agencies) and cumbersome and complex
bureaucratic procedures - as the major causes of the poor performance of the
urban housing policies of developing countries.
By identifying flaws in policy design and implementation as the major factors
contributing to the poor performance of the urban housing policies of
developing countries, this chapter explains why the housing crisis discussed in
Chapter Two has continued to characterise cities and towns of developing
countries in the 1990s.
69
Chapter Four
Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Housing Policy Performance
There is no systematic body of knowledge dealing with the causes of poor
performance of urban housing policies in developing countries. This chapter
follows Grindle and Thomas (1989) by classifying urban housing policies
according to whether they are state-centred and society-centred. This chapter
reviews the poor performance of urban housing policies in developing countries in
the light of these models.
Society-Centred Explanations of Policy Failure
Society-centred explanations of poor performance of public policies in developing
countries (including those of urban housing) are many and vary in their emphasis.
Broadly, society-centred explanations relate the poor performance of developing
countries' urban housing policies to factors and forces in the wider society. The
principle foci of concern have been class bias and rent-seeking behaviour of public
officials.
Class bias
In class bias explanations, urban housing policies are portrayed as the outcomes of
the legal, institutional and ideological hegemony of the dominant class. This class
determined the 'official' policies of the state (Alavi, 1972; Shivji, 1973; Stren,
1982; Burgess, 1977; Mgullu, 1978; Saul, 1979; Gilbert, 1984; Lugalla, 1990). The
dominant class, the argument goes, derives its power from its economic bases
including land and capital. There are, however, differences amongst society-centred
theorists on the nature and composition of the dominant class in developing
70
countries. In countries where a strong indigenous propertied class (bourgeoisie)
does not exist, as was the case in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1960s and 1970s, the
dominant classes comprised the state personnel, politicians and foreign investors.
The state officials have been described as the governing class and foreign investors
as the ruling class with the governing class defending or articulating the interests of
the ruling class (Shivji, 1976: 85; Sarnoff, 1974: 207). In countries where different
categories of indigenous dominant class as well as foreign capital existed, such as
in Pakistan and the militarised countries of Latin America, the state acted on behalf
of the group of classes rather than for a single class (Alavi, 1972; O'Donnel, 1979).
Class bias explanations contend that various components of the public housing and
the S&S and SU approaches in developing countries were deliberately designed to
meet the needs of the economically well-to-do in these countries, including• state
officials and, in some instances, foreign investor. Studies by Burgess ( 1977),
McGee (1977), Mgullu (1978), Barnes (1982), Stren (1982), Hansen (1982), White
(1985), Campbell (1990a) and Lugalla (1990) document how the bureaucratic
procedures for many of the S&S and SU schemes were consciously designed to
serve the needs of the economically well-to-do (ie petty bourgeoisie) rather than the
low income residents for whom the schemes were explicitly intended. Burgess
(1977: 50-9) and McGee (1977), representing one variant of the class bias
explanations, show class bias in the choice of various components of S&S and SU
programs as well as in the choice of self-help policies by states of developing
countries. It could be argued that self-help policies were introduced as cheap means
of labour reproduction in which the poor were left to provide their own housing
thereby relieving the state of its responsibility of providing low income housing to
the urban poor. Furthermore, the legalisation of squatter housing under the SU
programs was one other way for the state to enhance the interests of the dominant
classes and especially the landed, industrial and financial classes. This is because
by introducing standards and building codes in squatter upgrading the state in
developing countries was acting in the interests of industrial, financial and landed
capital, as the imposed standards forced low income groups to purchase building
materials or acquire housing loans which were controlled by the capitalist class.
The result of this was expulsion of the poor who could not afford the standards of
their self-help settlements. This explains why the actual beneficiaries of S&S and
SU schemes have been from middle and high income groups (Burgess, 1978, 1982;
Pradilla, 1979; van der Linden, 1986: 32).
71
Mgullu (1978: 74), also pursuing a class bias view, argued that phase 1 of the
National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project (NSSP 1) in
Tanzania was designed to benefit both the petty bourgeoisie class in Tanzania
and its collaborator the World Bank. The formulation of NSSP 1 coincided
with the shortages of housing following growth of the public service
immediately after independence in 1961. Thus, sites and services and squatter
upgrading schemes were a response by the state to the housing needs of the
petty bourgeoisie who were mainly state officials. One conclusion that could be
drawn from this is that the requirement for demonstration of income-earning
capacity as a condition for obtaining housing construction and improvement
loans under NSSP 1 was a strategy adopted by the petty bourgeoisie in
Tanzania and its collaborator (the World Bank) to prevent low income groups
from gaining access to the project benefits. Moreover, the involvement of
numerous institutions in the implementation of NSSP 1 is an attempt by the
petty bourgeoisie to create a complex bureaucratic network which among other
thing could exclude the low income groups from participating in NSSP 1.
Campbell ( 1990b: 165) provided another class bias explanation in which the
NSSPs in Tanzania were not planned initiatives to alleviate housing problems
but were pragmatic actions of the state to contain growing working class unrest
at that time. According to this view, sites and services were conceived as one
means of achieving greater direct control over the urban population by
redeveloping squatter areas in such a way as to facilitate greater access by the
police and military. Lugalla (1990), like Campbell, describe the dismal
outcomes of NSSPs as manifestations of the politics of class containment
adopted by the state in time of crisis.
The views of Burgess, Mgullu, Campbell and Lugalla are useful in
demonstrating the extent to which urban housing policies in developing
countries have benefited certain classes and neglected others. The idea of
dominant class interests in developing countries influencing or determining
policy in their favour highlights the heterogeneous nature of society and the
associated conflicting class interests which can be identified. Such
understanding allows us to question the efficacy and equity of urban housing
policies which while addressing the housing needs of one social group ignore
those of others. The strength of the class bias explanations lies in their
72
acknowledgment of the fact that environmental factors, such as the existence of
economically well-to-do classes in society, have a bearing on the actions of the
state. The importance of environmental factors on the actions of officials has
been widely recognised in the general literature of organisation studies. See for
example Bums and Stalker (1961), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Thompson
(1967), Aldrich (1979), Meyer and Scott (1992) and Stoner et al (1994).
Whereas the general literature of organisation studies identifies various
environmental factors, the class bias explanations have only focused on one
aspect of the environment, namely the existence of economically well-to-do
groups (ie dominant classes). Despite its apparent strengths empirical evidence
raises critical questions about many aspects of the class bias explanations.
Some authors, such as Grindle and Thomas (1989), Esman (1996), Smith
(1996), suggests that the idea of the state being a captive of dominant classes
does not explain sufficiently the actions of state institutions and officials in all
developing countries. Contrary to the view held by class bias protagonists,
factors other than class have contributed to influencing the actions of state
officials in developing countries. State officials in these countries have through
clientalism and kinship networks formulated and implemented policies that
distributed policy benefits to social groups not necessarily from the dominant
class. Clientalism is described as a form of unequal political exchange whereby
state rulers offer public services to friends, co-ethnics, and relatives in return
for political support, personal services, loyalty and obedience (Powell, 1970:
412-13; Cammack et al, 1993: 59; Smith, 1996: 216). In Papua New Guinea,
for example, ethnicity rather than class was the major criterion used by state
officials in allocating benefits of the housing renewal programs in the 1970s
(Stretton, 1979). The Philippines is another example where criteria other than
class were used by some state officials to distribute the benefits of urban
housing policies. In one case, in order to obtain political support, the mayor
directed the housing agency in charge of Manila's Bagong Barangay housing
scheme to grant priority in housing allocation to municipal employees from
various classes (Laquian, 1969). Furthermore, clientalism rather than class
explains why despite their class position some middle and high income groups
reside in squatter settlements which are perceived to be locations for low
income groups (Halfani, 1987: 176)
73
The suggestion by authors such as Mgullu (1978) and Burgess (1977), that
urban housing policies in developing countries were pursued to enforce the will
of local dominant classes and their foreign allies does not seem to apply to
countries where the presence of foreign businesses was insignificant. This is
particularly the case for countries like Tanzania where at least from 1962 to
1984 the major foreign interests that could be identified were international aid
giving organisations like the World Bank, bilateral donors such as the Swedish
International Development Agency (SIDA) and non-governmental aid agencies
like Oxfam (Nyango'ro, 1989; Campbell, 1990b; van Donge, 1992). As such, it
is difficult to characterise the state as agent or actor promoting the general
interests of foreign capital, unless aid organisations are perceived as paving the
way for foreign capitalist interests.
The over-emphasis on the state as a captive of dominant classes also ignores the
fact that some states of developing countries, especially in East and Southeast Asia,
have in some instances acted autonomously against particularistic interests and
engineered policies that have led to profound improvements in living standards
(Horowitz, 1989; Liddle, 1992; Lewellen, 1995: 107; Turner and Hulme, 1997).
Moreover, other studies, for example, McDougall (1982), Gilbert (1984: 226),
indicate that state officials in some countries pursued policies which acted against
the interests of the well-to-do dominant groups in favour of the poor. Examples
from S&S and SU schemes in Lusaka (Zambia) and Santiago (Chile) illustrate this
point. In the Lusaka project, the city authorities acted in collaboration with the poor
residents to constrain the local leaders and landlords who tried to allocate plots or
evict people according to their own whims and interests (Pasteur, 1979). Similarly
in Chile, the Frei government in 1970 assisted poor people to invade and occupy
land, including centrally located areas held by landed capitalists for speculative
purposes (Portes, 1976: 84; Castells, 1982: 264; van der Linden, 1986: 82) .
Class bias explanations also suffer from their depiction of the government (state) as
an internally cohesive and monolithic unit. In these explanations the state is
presented as a group of institutions acting in unison to preserve and even extend
clearly identified class interests. However, tensions and conflicts between and
within various agencies of the state are characteristic in developing countries and
have contributed to poor, an observation confirmed by case studies of S&S and SU
74
projects. There are in fact conflicts over domain control between state officials and
institutions and even within institutions. These conflicts have adversely affected
project planning and implementation (van der Linden, 1986: 54; Halfani, 1987).
Stren (1982), in his study of S&S and SU in Tanzania, concluded that conflict
between generalist administrators and specialist technical staff within the same
government agency frustrated efforts to revise rules and procedures which
prevented low income groups from accessing land. The view of this study, reported
in detail in Chapters Eight and Nine, is that in Tanzania conflict over domain
control between and within state agencies hindered any prospects of formulating
and implementing an S&S and SU project which would address adequately housing
problems of the urban poor.
Therefore, the fundamental weakness of the class bias explanations is their
inattention to the actual conduct of the state as it supposedly pursue the
interests of the dominant class. Apart from providing a simplistic view of the
state as the derivative of class actions, none of the class bias explanations cited
above has attempted to focus on the actual policy process and its influence on
policy outputs and outcomes (O'Brien, 1975: 23; Seers, 1981; Batley, 1982: 79;
Halfani, 1987: 169; Marcussen, 1990: 38). Class bias explanations ignore the
fact that the organisational arrangement and work methods of the state can
contribute to poor performance of urban housing policies. The importance of
such factors is emphasised by Halfani:
When certain technical organisational imperatives are neglected a 'bureaucracy' controlled by any class will definitely falter and impair the achievement of intended goals (1987: 169).
Fong (1980: 122) and Castells et al (1990: 329-333), lend support to Halfani's
argument about the effect of the organisational structure and work methods of the
state on the performance of urban housing policies. The successes of the public
housing programs in Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1950s and 1960s were in
large part a result of appropriate political administrative frameworks adopted by the
leadership of these countries.
75
Rent-seeking
Rent-seeking explanations perceive public policies as by-products of mutual
exchange between state officials and organised interests in society (Colander, 1984;
Grindle and Thomas, 1989). Individuals, mainly from economically well-to-do in
society, create interest groups and through them seek to acquire access to public
resources (rents) from state offices and officials to protect or advance particular
interests common to their members. These interests are usually economic, but
groups also form around shared concerns for neighbourhood, ethnicity, religion,
values, region, or other issues. The rents sought by societal groups involve more
than housing and may range from logging concessions, public tenders, access to
credit, subsidised housing and grants of public land to protective measures such as
tariffs on imported goods (Buchanan et al 1980; Srinivasan, 1985; McCoy, 1994;
Turner and Hulme, 1997). Complementing the interests of organised groups in
capturing favoured status in the distribution of public resources are individual state
officials, elected and non-elected who seek to use their office for private purposes
including remaining in power, support for increased bureaucratic salaries, prestige
and increase in budgetary allocations. Public policies emerging from rent-seeking
activities fail because of their furtherance of narrow interests (Bates, 1981; Brock
and Magee, 1984; Bagchi, 1993).
Explanations identifying rent-seeking as the major cause of poor performance of
urban housing policies contend that many of the state-sponsored housing programs
in developing countries were implemented to favour certain groups in society in
exchange for their political support (McGee, 1977). This view is confirmed by a
study by Leeds and Leeds (1970) of sites and services and squatter upgrading
schemes in Brazil which shows how vote-seeking political parties, and housing
services-seeking urban poor bargained for a policy which offered rewards to groups
and individuals in exchange for votes. Lugalla (1990) indicates how pressure for
improved housing from supporters of the nationalist movement, the Tanganyika
African Nation Union (TANU), in Tanzania in the 1960s inspired the government
to embark on a public housing scheme which only benefited the few who could
afford the price. In Lugalla's view the independence government bowed to such
pressure because it needed the support of this group to ~ustify its holding of power.
Wirsing (1973), and Michaelson (1979) contend that municipal councillors in India
76
implemented policies that heavily subsidised housing programs of cooperative
societies because these were their major political supporters. Cleaves (1974) and
Drakakis-Smith (1981: 110) claim that the Frei government implemented the
famous project which allowed squatters to seize land in Santiago, Chile, in
exchange for votes from the land-seeking squatter residents. Payne (1977: 63)
shows how the Congress Party in India contravened the Indian master plan for
town planning and implemented improvements to the physical environment of low
income areas in the cities in return for votes. Rent-seeking explanations conclude
that it is the furtherance of narrow interests and not the public interest in urban
housing policies of developing countries which has contributed to their poor
performance.
The rent-seeking explanations alert us to the influence of informal practices in
government actions in developing countries (Sandbrook, 1985; Grindle, 1991: 56).
With regard to urban housing policies in developing countries, rent-seeking
explanations help us to understand why despite their dismal performances in the
1950s and 1960s, public housing policies are being re-implemented in the 1990s in
countries like the Philippines Malaysia and Mexico (Mohamed, 1980; Drakakis
Smith, 1981; Malpezzi, 1990; Shidlo, 1994; Lewellen, 1995; Honesto, 1996). In
the case of the Philippines it is argued that the re-introduction of public housing
programs in 1992-94 was a product of bargains and compromises between the
government and organised groups of landowners, developers, contractors and raw
materials suppliers, banks and other housing financiers, and developers (Honesto,
1996).
The major weakness of the rent-seeking explanations however is the depiction of
the exchange relationship between societal actors and the state as equal. Empirical
evidence suggests that in many developing countries, at least until the 1980s, the
state was the more powerful actor because it controlled the means of coercion,
enjoyed monopolistic access to foreign aid, served as gatekeeper for foreign
investment and trade, and did not ordinarily depend on public support through
periodic competitive elections (Myrdal, 1968; Clapham, 1982; Lewellen, 1995:
135; Smith, 1996: 216). The unequal relationship between the state and societal
actors in developing countries is demonstrated by the manner in which the state in
some if not all cases has relied on its instruments of coercion including the police
and the army to secure compliance with its policies, including those relating to
77
urban housing (Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 139). For instance, in April 1983 in Sama
Sama in Quezon City, Philippines, the police shot dead six people who were
resisting eviction from a squatter area earmarked for construction of low-cost
housing (Vendiola, 1996). Cases of forced eviction of squatter residents by state
police have been characteristic of almost all sites and services and squatter
upgrading experiments of sub-Saharan Africa (Simon, 1992).
The idea of the existence of organised interests in society as propagated by the rent
seeking explanations until the 1980s had very limited application to developing
countries, and in particular to those of sub-Saharan Africa. This is because the
political leadership of many countries of sub-Saharan Africa did not encourage or
allow the formation of diverse and politically active interests groups (Chazan et al,
1988: 44; Lewellen, 1995: 141; Turner and Hulme, 1997). Even where organised
interests existed, as in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, their
dependence on the state for existence and survival (in the form of licensing and
registration) has constantly limited their actual influence in policy-making.
State-Centred Explanations of Policy Failure
State-centred explanations focus on the state officials and/or the organisational
structure and decision making processes of the state as the major variables in
explaining policy performance in developing countries (Grindle and Thomas, 1989:
219-20). There are various perspectives under state-centred explanations including
those which focus on the decision maker's actions and those which focus on the
organisational context of the state.
Decision makers' actions
There are two major state-centred explanations which identify policy or decision
maker's actions as the major cause of failure of urban housing policies in
developing countries. These are incrementalist actions and bureaucratic politics
explanations.
78
lncrementalist state actors
Explanations which associate poor performance of policy in developing countries
with incrementalist actions of its policy makers contend that policy makers
introduce only marginal changes to their policies to reduce uncertainty, conflict and
complexity in their environment (Saasa, 1985). The policies adopted are not
fundamentally different from the past and this explains their failure. With regard to
the urban housing policies of ex-colonial developing countries, incrementalism is
associated with the continuation of colonial urban housing policies by independent
states. Examples include urban planning laws such as urban zoning and building
codes (Turner, 1972; Mabogunje et al, 1978: 78; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981;
PADCO-World Bank, 1981: 10; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982; Laquian, 1983: 71;
Rakodi, 1986; Stren and White, 1989; Amis and Lloyd, 1990; Simon, 1992: 145).
The same logic is extended to countries which were not ex-colonies such as
Thailand which are perceived to have adopted from developed countries urban
housing policies which are fundamentally not different from the existing situation
(Drakakis-Smith, 1981). In ex-colonial countries it is argued that the incremental
urban planning laws have failed to address urban housing problems because they
were originally developed to address the housing requirements of the colonists
which were different from those of the people of independent developing countries.
The incrementalist state actor perspective focuses on the marginal changes in
policies exposing their inadequacy for addressing problems of the magnitude of
urban housing. With regard to urban planning laws, incrementalism shows why the
continuation of inherited colonial urban planning laws in developing countries is
inadequate in situations of rapid urban population growth as currently experienced
by developing countries. The major shortcoming of incrementalist state actors
explanations, however, is failure to acknowledge that the poor performance of
urban housing policies is not restricted to incremental policies but also applies to
policies which appear to be radical. These are policies such as legalisation and
upgrading of squatter housing which are fundamentally different from the inherited
colonial urban planning laws. Neither does incrementalism explain the basis of
policy makers' incremental actions. Incrementalism assumes policy makers have
enormous autonomy and capacity for making their choices. This is not the case.
Much evidence indicates that actions of policy makers in developing countries are
79
constrained by many factors including lack of resources, and fear of opposition
from individuals and groups in society (Migdal, 1981; Liddle, 1992: 796).
Bureaucratic politics
Explanations associating poor performance of urban housing policy with
bureaucratic politics depict the various officials of the institutions of the state, both
elected and non-elected, as being embroiled in constant political conflict to
determine which policy options are selected and how they are to be implemented.
They build coalitions, bargain, compromise, co-opt, guard information and devise
strategies in order to fulfil their personal or organisational objectives. The
bureaucratic competition encountered in the policy-making arena also recurs
among agencies at the implementation stage. Such competition has left policy
makers and implementors highly divided over policy priorities consequently
limiting cooperative effort (Cleaves, 1974; Grindle, 1980: 94).
Several studies of urban housing policy in developing countries identify
bureaucratic politics as one of the major causes of poor performance. Rothenberg
(1980: 153-4) shows how conflict over domain control between an executive
mayor and the municipal councillors, in Cali in Colombia, prevented the realisation
of the 1969-1970 housing program objectives. Studies by Rosser ( 1971: 249) on
Calcutta, India, Sanyal et al (1981) on Zambia, Angel (1983: 115) on Turkey, and
Mendiola (1983: 492) on the Philippines, show how competition between various
state institutions and also within these institutions resulted in poor performance of
sites and services and squatter upgrading schemes in those countries.
Studies citing bureaucratic politics as the major cause of poor performance of urban
housing policy identify the organisation structure and work methods of the states of
developing countries as the sources of conflict (Rothenberg, 1980; Walton, 1984;
Swan et al, 1983; van der Linden, 1986). Rothenberg (1980: 157) clearly shows
how the devolution of authority to a politically fragmented municipal council failed
to generate the cooperation needed to speed up the pace of implementation of
housing programs in Cali municipality. She further demonstrates how the funding
procedure in Colombia, which allowed the national government to provide funding
(subsidies or loans) directly to the semi-independent statutory bodies of the
80
municipal council without going through the mayor, exacerbated fragmentation of
power and led to conflict between the mayor and the governing boards of the semi
independent bodies. The existence of excessive numbers of hierarchical levels in
the structures of implementing agencies combined with centralised decision
making processes were cited as major causes of bureaucratic politics and hence
poor urban policy performance in other developing countries (Stren, 1982; Swan et
al, 1983: 122-3; van der Linden, 1986: 52-3; Halfani, 1987).
Explanations focusing on bureaucratic politics as one of the major causes of poor
performance of urban housing policy in developing countries provide a useful
perspective which dispels the lingering myth of the state as an internally cohesive
and monolithic unit acting in unison to preserve class interests. The explanatory
power of the bureaucratic politics explanations derives from its examination of the
micro-processes of decision making. Its focus on the organisation structure, work
methods and internal political processes enable this mode of explanation to
examine competition and conflict between state agencies and within state
institutions in these countries. The major weakness of the bureaucratic politics
perspective however, is the tendency to project state officials and institutions as
autonomous actors constrained only by 'the power and bargaining skills of other
state actors and by their own hierarchical position of power, their political skill, and
the bureaucratic and personal resources available to them' (Grindle and Thomas,
1989: 220). This, is an oversimplification of the realities of policy making and
implementation in developing countries. The general literature on the state in
developing countries has confirmed that the actions of policy makers and
implementors of these countries are constrained by factors other than those
emphasised by the bureaucratic politics perspectives (Smith, 1996; Turner and
Hulme, 1997). To ignore such factors as the bureaucratic politics explanations have
done is to simplify the reality of policy performance in developing countries.
81
Organisational context of the state
Explanations centring on the organisational context of the state have been
concerned with the internal organisation and operational processes of state
institutions in developing countries (Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 142; Stren, 1982: 79;
Kaitilla, 1990: 59). Theoretical perspectives which identify the organisational
context - structure and work methods - of the state in developing countries as the
major cause o_f poor performance of urban housing policy in these countries are
many. In this section two major views that have been widely applied in the
discourse of urban housing policy of developing countries are considered. These
are bureaucratic processes, and institutional incapacity.
Bureaucratic processes
Explanations focusing on bureaucratic processes as the cause of poor performance
of urban housing policies in developing countries contend that the state in
developing countries is centralist in its structuring and mode of operation. Such a
state relies on behavioural and decision-making processes which are bureaucratic in
character to formulate and implement urban housing policies. Two elements of a
bureaucratic structure are singled out by bureaucratic processes scholars as the
major causes of poor performance of urban housing policies. These are the
existence of multi-layered hierarchical structures and a reliance on cumbersome
procedures, rules and regulations in the conduct of state business.
For example, in explaining the failures of the urban housing policies of the 1960s in
the developing countries of Asia and Latin America, Turner (1972) concluded that
the hierarchical administrative structures of these countries were inappropriate for
formulating and implementing urban housing policies because hierarchical
structures relied on inflexible set procedures to conduct activities. In Turner's view
set procedures had the shortcoming of oversimplifying peoples' housing needs and
they also tended to ignore the dynamics within societies that shape those needs. For
Turner, the inability of low-income groups to access government-built housing in
Latin America signified the limits of centralised governmental structures in
formulating appropriate housing policies for the urban poor.
82
Studies by Stren (1982), van der Linden (1986) and Devas and Rakodi (1993)
demonstrate further the inappropriateness of bureaucratic structures in dealing with
housing problems of the urban poor. In these studies attention is on the pathologies
of a bureaucratic structure. The pathologies associated with the marginal impact of
S&S and SU programs in developing countries include obstinacy, excessive legality
and complexity of bureaucratic process; inefficient and uneconomic operations;
over-centralisation; and excessive secrecy (Stren, 1982; Kai till a, 1990).
With regard to the complexity of bureaucratic processes, Stren (1982: 81) shows
how an applicant for a building plot under the S&S and SU scheme in Tanzania had
to wait for 300 days to receive a legal right of occupancy. Similarly, van der Linden
(1986: 53) and Devas and Rakodi (1993: 95) show how complicated bureaucratic
procedures associated with the planning of S&S and SU schemes in Zambia,
Malawi, Chile, and India prevented community participation and concentrated the
activities in the hands of technical experts. The poor were thus prevented from
contributing their resources (ie time, effort and money), seen as integral to the
success of S&S and SU schemes. Halfani (1987), referring to Tanzania, shows how
centralisation of planning and implementation of S&S and SU programs into one
governmental agency excluded other stakeholders (eg governmental agencies and
affected communities), whose support was essential for project success.
The explanations focusing on the organisational context of state bureaucracy are
useful in that they underscore the importance of taking the structure and operation
of the state seriously to facilitate our understanding of public policy performance in
developing countries. The review of performance of urban housing policies in
developing countries in Chapter Three, and in Tanzania in Chapters Five, Eight and
Nine, confirm that the organisational context of the state did have influence on the
performance of these policies.
The approach does have its weaknesses. Like many other state-centred
explanations, bureaucratic centralism suffers from reductionism which ascribes the
conduct of state officials to formal structures and processes. This can result in an
over-deterministic view of the conduct of state officials and institutions in
developing countries. The general literature of development management confirms
that the conduct of state officials and their offices is a product of more factors than
83
the structures, norms, rules and traditions of their institutions (Rockman, 1992:
157). Studies by Riggs (1973), Huntington (1968: 1), Migdal (1988), Lewellen
(1995: 141) and Smith (1996) provide evidence of the extent to which official
conduct in developing countries has been guided by kinship ties and other
personalistic relationships rather than by bureaucratic structures and procedures.
These studies also point to the fact that in developing countries state legislations,
bureaucratic procedures and work-processes have rarely been followed or enforced.
As Chapters Eight and Nine of this thesis show, official conduct with regard to the
formulation and implementation of the three phases of sites and services and
squatter upgrading policies in Tanzania rarely followed the established rules,
regulations and traditions.
Institutional incapacity
Institutional incapacity explanations associate the poor performance of urban
housing policies in developing countries to inadequacy in organisational attributes
of states. In these explanations, states in developing countries are seemingly unable
to incorporate, foster and protect normative relationships and actions, patterns, and
also perform functions and services which are valued in the environment (Esman
and Bruhns, 1966). Representing the institutional incapacity explanations are the
two international development agencies, the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) and the World Bank. Both UNDP and the World Bank identify lack of
administrative capacity as the major cause of poor performance of urban housing
policies of developing countries. From the UNDP and the World Bank point of
view lack of institutional capacity for urban planning and management refers to
shortages of qualified town-planning technicians and land surveyors; inadequate
incentives to the few qualified personnel; and lack of funds for research on
demographic trends and local building materials (World Bank, 1983; UNDP,
1991a; Rondinelli, 1992). Similar views as those of the UNDP and the World Bank
have been expressed by Stren (1982), Rodell (1983), Comoro (1984), van der
Linden (1986), Kaitilla (1990), Kironde (1992).
Institutional incapacities are associated with flaws in the design of urban housing
policies formulated and implemented by developing countries. The UNDP, World
Bank and scholars like Skinner and Rodell (1983) relate design flaws of urban
84
housing policies of developing countries to lack of physical and human resources
necessary for planning. With regard to planning, the institutional incapacity
explanations contend that scarcity of resources has forced policy makers in
developing countries, specifically urban planners, to rely on information which is
in most cases obsolete and incomplete. Although the situation has improved in
some countries particularly those in the middle income category like Thailand, the
Philippines and Malaysia, it has worsened in many others over the last IO to 15
years (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1990; Simon, 1992). Obsolete and incomplete
planning information has forced state officials and institutions in these countries to
formulate policies which are incompatible with the conditions obtained in these
countries (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974: 176; Halfani, 1987; Smith, 1996; Turner
and Hulme, 1997).
A major problem with awarding too much explanatory power to the perspective of
institutional incapacities is that it ignores the fact that in most cases lack of
institutional capacity is a matter of conscious action by the policy makers. For
instance, starving an institution with funds and qualified personnel is sometimes a
calculated choice made by policy makers because the policy being implemented is
not perceived by them as sufficiently important to warrant resource allocation
(Grindle and Thomas, 1989).
Conclusion
Despite their individual shortcomings, the explanations for urban policy failure in
developing countries reviewed above each encompass certain strengths. Although
each of the above explanations focuses on particular aspects of causes of poor
performance of urban housing policies in developing countries, they are not
mutually exclusive and rather serve to give analytical insights through different but
complementary frames of reference. The class bias explanations underscore the
influence of societal actors (and specifically dominant classes) on the actions of
state officials but overlooks both the state's potential for relative autonomy and the
importance of micro-processes. Rent-seeking explanations highlight the exchange
relationships between the state officials and organised societal actors but neglect
the inequality in the relationship and its influence on policies. The focus on the
incrementalist behaviour of state officials underscores the inadequacy of
incremental urban housing policies but does not explain the basis of policy makers'
85
actions. Explanations focusing on bureaucratic politics elucidate the influence of
bureaucratic competition and conflict on policy performance but they overlook the
effect of societal factors on state officials' conduct, including choice of
organisational structure and work methods that generate bureaucratic politics. The
focus on bureaucratic centralism examines the internal organisation and work
methods of the state but neglects the effect of societal factors on the conduct of the
state and its officials. While the institutional incapacity explanation does highlight
the undoubted problems of trying to make and implement housing policy without
the necessary technical skills, it often omits consideration of the wider
environment; a notable absentee is politics. Institutional incapacity explanations
assume that a technical fix will lead to the required improvement in housing policy
making and implementation, but this underestimates the importance of politics and
other environmental features in influencing the policy process.
This study adopts an approach which combines elements of the various
explanations discussed above, maximising the strengths of particular approaches
while remaining aware of their weaknesses. By so doing the study will have the
conceptual and theoretical tools which will enable exploration of the factors which
have contributed to the Tanzanian government's inability to address the housing
problems of the urban poor. Particular attention will be paid to bureaucratic
behaviour, that is the behaviour of both institutions and officials of the state in
Tanzania, as this has been an area of academic neglect. The factors which
influenced official actions will be explored and the ways in which these factors
have acted as major impediments to effectively addressing housing problems of the
urban poor will be identified. Thus, a concern with bureaucratic behaviour (state
centred) will be complemented with a recognition of the environmental factors
(society-centred) which impinge on and influence that bureaucratic behaviour.
86
Chapter Five
The Environment for Public Sector Management in Tanzania
Organisation theory has devoted considerable attention to the influence of
environmental factors in determining patterns of decision-making (Bums and
Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Aldrich, 1979; Meyer and Scott,
1992; Robbins and Barnwell, 1994). Authors on development management
have also indicated the influence of the environment in shaping the policy
process (Kiggundu, 1989; Hulme and Turner, 1990; Brinkerhoff, 1991; Juma
and Clark, 1995; and Turner and Hulme, 1997). Consistent with these
observations, this thesis argues that the environment influenced the nature of
Tanzanian urban housing problems and policies. This chapter accordingly
identifies and analyses the major environmental factors which influenced
urban housing matters in Tanzania. This is done firstly by examining the
geographical, cultural and demographical features of the country. Secondly, the
salient features of the country's economy are looked at. Finally, the chapter
delineates the country's political and administrative framework.
Geography, Demography and Culture
The nation state of Tanzania is located on the east coast of Africa and
comprises both part of the African mainland and also the island of Zanzibar
(since 1964). The country lies between 1 and 11 degrees south latitude, and
between 29 and 39 degrees east longitude. It is bordered by the countries of
Kenya and Uganda in the north; Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi to the west,
Malawi and Zambia to the south-west; Mozambique to the south; and the
Indian Ocean to the east (see Figure 5.1). The country has a population of
about 28 million (1994) and covers an area of 945,000 sq.km., of which 59,000
sq.km is made up of lakes and rivers.
87
., J
Figure 5.1: Tanzania in Relation to Neighbouring Countries
Lake Victoria
TANZANIA
Lake· Malaivi
Source: Globetrotter Travel Map, Tanzania: New Holland.
88
There are also 800 kms of coastline along the Indian Ocean. Fifty-six per cent
of the land is uninhabited or difficult to cultivate because of the ravages of
tsetse fly or unreliable rainfall (World Bank, 1996a: 204). The population of
Tanzania is unevenly distributed with Dar es Salaam and the Lake Victoria
regions having high population densities of about 610 and 170 persons per
sq.km. respectively (Berry, 1971: 114, 1990; Nuru, 1990: 181). At the other
extreme the drier western and central regions of Dodoma, Singida and the
southern part of Arusha have low population densities estimated at 2 persons
per sq.km.
The populace comprises 125 tribes each with different languages, customs,
folklore and myths. Swahili, which is the official language, and culture have
played major roles in unifying the 125 tribes into one nation. This is, however,
not to suggest that tribal identity and affiliation do not exist in Tanzania.
Tribalism continues to be one of the major sources of identity, and of influence
in political decision-making. This is illustrated by the 1995 multi-party
elections when a large proportion of the votes scored by each of the four
presidential candidates was from their place of origin. For example, both
Mkapa the ruling party candidate, as well as Mrema, the candidate of the
National Convention for Constitutional Reform (NCCR) opposition party,
received more than 90 per cent of the total votes cast in their respective areas
of origin (Heko Newspaper, 16 March 1996). Moreover, tribal affiliations
have played a major role in providing protection against loss of income earning
abilities, illness and other personal crises in both rural and urban Tanzania
(Bossert, 1987; Bakari, 1988). People rely on the 'affective' relations of kinship
for support and security rather than on the state (Hyden, 1983). Paucity of
information makes it difficult to demonstrate the extent to which affective
relationships have played a major role in the provision of low income housing.
However, evidence from studies of the squatter settlements of Hananasif in
Dar es Salaam suggests that low income dwellers have relied on affective
relationships to finance their housing (Lugalla, 1990).
Features of Tanzania's Economy
The relationship between the state of a country's economy and its urban
housing policy performance has been well documented in the housing
discourse (Engels, 1969; Stren, 1975b; Castells, 1977). There is a consensus
that the poor performance of the economies of developing countries has
89
militated against their governments' efforts to provide housing for low income
groups (Aldrich and Sandhu, 1995; Gugler, 1996). In Tanzania, the nation's
lacklustre economic record can be associated with the poor performance of its
urban housing policy though it is not a sufficient explanation of such
performance. However, an annual growth rate in GNP per capita which has not
exceeded 1 per cent from the beginning of the 1960s does not provide an
environment which is conducive to marked progress in housing the urban poor.
Tanzania is classified by the World Bank as a low income economy and has
been consistently located in the bottom half of this category making it one of
the world's poorest countries. The economy is dominated by agriculture with
the sector accounting for around half of GDP from the mid-1960s (World
Bank, 1985a and 1996a). Since 1967, agriculture's share of GDP has been
declining although the sector's growth rates have generally been higher than
those of the population. Table 5.1 shows average real rates of growth in the
agriculture sector fluctuating between 6.7 per cent each year in the period
1965-70 to -1.7 per cent in 1978. Agriculture has maintained its dominant
place in employment accounting for 88 per cent of the country's labour force
in 1985 declining marginally to 84 per cent in 1990 ((World Bank, 1985a and
1996a). However, in terms of wage employment agriculture is considerably
less significant falling from 47 per cent of total wage employment in 1964 to
21.7 per cent in 1982 (see Table 5.2).
Manufacturing is a small sector in terms of its contribution to gross domestic
product and its contribution to urban employment. Specifically the sector
accounted for 9 per cent of GDP in 1970 rising to 11 per cent in 1980 but
declining to 8 per cent by 1990 and less than 4 per cent of the labour force in
1965 rising to 6 per cent in 1980 but falling to 5 per cent in 1990 (World Bank,
1985a and 1996a). Although an import substitution industrialisation program
was launched after independence it foundered after early 'easy' gains and
failed to provide the sustained growth necessary for achieving developmental
objectives. Impressive early annual growth rates in manufacturing of between
6.7 per cent and 8.8 per cent in the late 1960s up to the mid-1970s were
followed by years of negative growth until the late 1980s since when there has
been good growth, albeit from a very low base (see Table 5.1).
For the burgeoning urban population it has been the tertiary or service sector
which has provided the employment opportunities. The tertiary sector's share
90
of formal employment increased from 23 per cent in 1972 to 35 per cent in
1982. Much of this growth derived from extensive job creation in public
administration and public enterprise as the state expanded its activities and
institutions both in number and size. The state's share of GDP grew from an
annual rate of 7.9 per cent between 1965 and 1970 to 20 per cent in 1982
(Sunny, 1986; Biermann, 1990: 130). Employee numbers in the public service
rose from 37,273 in 1961 to 127,150 in 1975 and 535,945 in 1981. This
employment explosion in the context of extreme scarcity of resources meant
that the bulk of government expenditure was increasingly consumed by the
salary and wage bill and inadequate amounts of money were available for
investment in development projects and programs (Coulson, 1982: 194;
Lugalla 1990: 174). And by extending the scope of government activities
there were increasing numbers of official institutions competing for official
resources.
Informal activities in the tertiary sector necessarily provided employment for
many migrants and the poor in Tanzania's growing urban centres. The sector
includes such activities as traditional crafts, petty trading, small-scale repaair
services, construction works and domestic services of various kinds. The
informal sector operates outside of legal controls and like the informal sector
in other developing countries is characterised by low wages, occupational
instability and the absence of a social welfare system (Mabogunje, 1980;
Malyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990). Informal activities are extremely difficult
to measure and have often been overlooked in official statistics despite the
enormous contribution to employment of informal activities. There are no
employment figures for urban informal activities. Estimates obtained by
comparing the growth of urban population with that of formal sector
employment suggests that the contribution of informal activities to urban
employment grew substantially between 1961 and the 1980s (Segal, 1988).
In the post-independence era Tanzania's economy has been subject to a range
of shocks and stresses which have contributed to an environment which is not
conducive to investment in urban housing especially for the poor.
91
Table 5.1: Average Annual Real Rates of Growth of GDP and Inflation
(Percentage) for Tanzania, 1965/70-1990
Over- Agriculture Manufactur- Public Real Per Inflation all GDP ing Admin. Capita Rate
GDP GDP GDP Income (% Change in NCPI,
1977=100)
1965-70 5.7 6.7 8.8 7.9 2.5
1970-76 5.1 4.5 6.7 13.2 1.9 11.1
1976-79 1.8 1.0 0.6 11.7 1.0 14.9
1980-85 1.2 3.0 -4.3 1.9 -1.6 30.6
1986-89 3.7 4.8 2.7 -1.0 0.9 27.6
1977 0.4 1.2 -6.1 6.6 2.4 11.6
1978 2.1 -1.7 3.4 20.0 -0.7 19.8
1979 2.9 0.8 3.3 8.6 0.1 13.3
1980 2.5 3.9 -4.9 -2.1 -0.3 36.0
1981 0.5 1.0 -11.2 11.4 -2.3 22.7
1982 0.6 1.4 -3.3 -0.1 -2.2 32.6
1983 -2.4 2.9 -8.7 -0.2 -5.2 19.2
1984 3.4 4.0 -2.7 0.2 0.6 44.0
1985 2.6 6.0 -3.9 1.9 -0.2 29.2
1986 3.3 5.7 -4.1 -10.8 0.5 33.2
1987 3.9 4.4 4.2 0.6 1.1 29.2
1988 4.2 4.5 7.0 3.1 1.4 28.2
1989 3.3 4.6 7.7 3.9 0.5 25.5
1990 3.6 2.9 7.8 2.2 0.8 20.0
Sources: National Accounts of Tanzania (various issues); Tanzania, The Central Bank of
Tanzania, Tanzania Economic Trends Vol. 3, No. 4, Dar es Salaam: Government
Printer.
92
Some of the external shocks to the economy include changes in the
international terms of trade, increase of oil prices, extra military bill in the
1978 Tanzania-Uganda war and the collapse of the East African Community
(Sunny, 1986: 9; Malyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990; Bagachwa, 1992: 23).
Table 5.2: Total Wage Employment in Tanzania by Economic Sectors
1964-1981 (percent)
Sectors 1964 1971 1972 1976 1977 1981 1982
1. Primary 49 38 29 28 26 22.7 11.9
Agriculture 47 36 28 27 25 21.7 10.9
Mining 2 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
2. Secondary 23 32 39 40 41 38.5 40.85
Manufacturing Industry 7 9 14 16 17 17.5 18.69
Public Utilities 1 2 3 3 3 3.2 2.29
Construction 8 12 13 10 10 8.1 5.59
Transport & Communication 7 9 9 11 11 9.7 14.29
3. Tertiary 28 30 32 32 33 38.8 47.78
Trade 5 6 6 8 6 6.3 7.20
Finance
Services 23 24 26 24 27 30.2 35.39
Source: Sunny, G., 1986, 'Policies and Strategies for Economic Recovery: Some pre-requisites
for better economic performance in Tanzania in the Eighties', unpublished paper
presented to Economic Policy Workshop, University oi Dar es Salaam, February,
p.10.
Internally the country pursued policies which adversely affected both the
agricultural and industrial sectors. In the agricultural sector for example, a
villagisation program forced most peasants to move to unplanned communal
production centres causing immense disruption to existing patterns of rural
93
settlement and forms of social organisation. The result as noted by many
studies, for example (Ergas, 1980; Stren, 1981; and Nindi, 1990: 68) was
decline of agricultural output.
There was also excessive government intervention in the economy especially
in the form of quantitative restrictions on all categories of imports. These
caused unnecessary shortages leading to skyrocketing prices of agricultural
inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides, and hence to black marketeering.
Centralisation of purchasing and distribution in government, through the
creation of marketing boards and cooperative unions, generated inefficiencies
which were passed on to farmers in the form of lower producer prices. This
forced them either to sell their products on unofficial markets which offered
more attractive prices or to withdraw from agricultural activities (Amani,
1992: 118). For example, withdrawal of farmers from production of cash crops
was the major cause of decline in agricultural productivity in the Kilimanjaro
region in the 1970s where farmers, disappointed by the marketing boards'
failure to pay them on time, uprooted coffee trees and planted food crops
which could be sold outside the state controlled system (Maghimbi, 1990: 89).
The symptoms of the long-standing economic crisis experienced by Tanzania
have manifested themselves in the form of budget deficits, increasing rates of
inflation, commodity shortages, and rising costs of living (ILO, 1982: 15-19;
Mulokozi et al, 1990: 190). Since the 1970s, the deficit in Tanzania's
government budget has been on the increase forcing the government to rely
heavily on external loans, grants and borrowing from the domestic banks to
fund its budget (Chachage, 1990: 256; World Bank, 1996a). There are no
available figures for the 1970s, although, figures for the 1980s in Table 5.3
show clearly the magnitude of budget deficit problems experienced by the
Tanzanian government.
During the 1970s and 1980s, standards of living fell substantially because of
high inflation rates. For instance, the minimum wage, which was actually less
than the living wage rose in nominal terms from Tshs 380 in 1977 to Tshs
2,500 in 1990. In real terms this was roughly Tshs 113 at 1977 prices (Kulaba,
1981; Mbilinyi, 1981; Mtatifikolo, 1992: 65).
These factors have consequently acted as major constraints to the provision of
housing both by the government and private sector for the rapidly growing low
94
Jtal
income populations of Tanzania's urban centres. In the period between 1961
and 1990 government spending on urban areas, particularly in housing, has
declined substantially. Government spending on urban areas, as a proportion of
total national budget declined, from 1.62 per cent in 1978-79 to 0.31 in 1986-
87 (Kulaba, 1989: 234). Similarly, central government subsidy to the National
Housing Corporation (NHC) has been declining since the 1970s. In 1985-86
the NHC received from the central government only 23 per cent of the
expected subsidy of Tshs 50.5 million and in 1986-87 period, only 8 per cent
of the expected subsidy of Tshs 64.5 million (Tanzania-NHC, 1990).
Inadequate funding to the NHC from the national government rendered it
unable to address effectively the urban housing crisis in Tanzania. Yet the
government had established the NHC and structured it to tackle such problems.
Table 5.3: Trend of Government Budget 1980-81 - 1986/87 (Tshs million)
1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86
cvenue 8742 10101 11819 13995 14809 18855 18920
::ital xpenditure 14370 19182 18442 20886 25520 25699 27561
ap -5628 -9081 -6623 -6891 -1044 1 -6844 -8641
Source: Tanzania, Ministry of Finance, Budget Speech June 1979, Dar es Salaam: Government
Printer; Tanzania, Ministry of Finance, Budget Speech June 1985, Dar es Salaam:
Government Printer; Tanzania, Ministry of Finance, Budget Speech June 1986, Dar
es Salaam: Government Printer; and Tanzania, Ministry of Finance, Budget Speech
June 1987, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer ..
95
1986-87
20160
27403
-8641
Political and Administrative Framework of Tanzania
At independence in 1961, Tanzania adopted a centralised political and
administrative system in line with what the political leadership of the day
considered necessary for rapid nation-building and socio-economic
development. The leaders of the post-independence state felt that they had an
obligatory mission to mobilise the economic and social resources available to
the country for speedy development. Indeed, as the first president of the post
independence state succinctly put it: 'Tanzania must run while others walk'
(Hyden, 1975). To achieve this, the post-independence state moved to
centralise political and administrative power in the position of the president.
This section investigates the proposition that this centralisation process created
problems in policy formulation and implementation thus limiting the
government's ability to pursue the envisaged socio-economic development
objectives including those involving urban housing.
The centralised system of government in Tanzania has its origin in the colonial
era, when in the early 1890s for the first time the 125 tribal groupings were
brought under one single authority by the German colonial government
(Kimambo and Temu, 1969: 14-33; Sperber, 1970; Kimambo, 1991: 30;
Hyden, 1995: 164). A system of government was introduced with different
territorial levels linked into a single chain of command. Three tiers of
government were created: central, territorial and native authorities. The first
tier, central government, comprised two institutions: the Governor's Council
and the Executive Council. The Governor's Council, comprising the Governor
and heads of department, was responsible for day-to-day administration of the
colony. The Executive Council, comprising official and non-official members
all appointed by the Governor, was mainly an advisory body. The second tier,
territorial administration, comprised district and provincial officers who were
directly responsible to the Governor in the capital city, Dar es Salaam. The
third tier, native authorities, comprised traditional systems of political
administration which were directly responsible to the district and then the
provincial officers.
At independence in 1961, the Westminster model of government, which
separated authority between the Parliament, the Crown and the Executive, was
adopted. Although the nationalist leaders accepted the proposed Westminster
system to secure early independence, its incompatibility with their aspirations
96
led them to abandon it only a year after attaining independence. The
independence leaders perceived the Westminster system, particularly its
principle of separation power, as potentially divisive and likely to undermine
the desired national integration (McAuslan and Ghai, 1966; Friedland, 1967;
Pratt, 1982; Mwaikusa, 1995: 36). Thus, from 1962 to 1995 when the country
held its first multi-party elections, Tanzania reverted to a centralised political
and administrative system, characterised by a multitude of political and
administrative institutions all linked into a single chain of command (Figure
5.2). Although each of the various institutions had defined roles and authority,
it was the President who controlled all political and administrative actions.
Indeed, this thesis argues that this excessive degree of centralism adversely
affected the performance of the political and administrative system of
Tanzania. Accordingly a review of the institutions of politics and
administration in terms of coordination and relevance for housing policy is
presented in the following sections.
The Administrative System
The administrative system in Tanzania was also organised into three tiers;
central, regional and local. The three tiers were linked in one continuous
hierarchy of government command.
The Central Government consisted of a number of ministries, independent
commissions and parastatal organisations all directly responsible to the
President. The cabinet represented the peak body of the central government
and was made up of the President and portfolio ministers appointed by the
President from the parliamentarians. Under the one-party system the cabinet
was assigned the two roles of formulating and implementing administrative
decisions, and implementing the political policies of the party. It also
controlled the national planning and budget processes and held a monopoly
over information and expertise.
97
\0 00
Chairperson Chairperson
Central Committee Parliament
President
Second Vice President
Chair• President
1st Vice President &President
Zanzibar
-·--·-·--- ------
Court of Appeal
National Conference
National Executive 1-----------------------1 Committee
Cabinet of Ministers
High Court
Chairperson I
Regional Conference
I Chairperson
District Conference
Chairperson I
Branch Conference
Key
Regional Secretary
Regional Executi Committee
ve
District Secretary
District Executiv Committee
Chairperson
e
• . • • • • · · · Branch Executiv e
Overlapping membership - Indicates posts held by the same p erson
Ministry of Local ,-Government
Urban Councils
Ward Committees
Chair• President I
National Planning Prime Minister &
Treasury ·- Minister Regional Commission
Adminstration District Courts
I Chairperson Regional Commissione
Regional Regional
Development Administration
Other Ministries Committee
I I Primary Courts
Chairperson District Commissioner
District District
Development Parastatals & .. Administration
Independent Committee
Departments I Chair~erson
Village Development
I Committee
District Councils ·'
Source: Drawn by the author based on information from various sources incl uding; Baguma, R., overnment 1992, 'Towards Realization of an optimal size of Government: A Review of G
Functions and Structures', Unpublished Report, Dar es Salaam: Civil Servic Mwaikusa, J.T., 1995, 'Towards Responsible Democratic Government: Exec
e Reform Programme, utive Powers and
Constitutional Practice m Tanzania 1962-1992', Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of London.
Despite the cabinet's formally prescribed authority in the policy process it has
been suggested by Pratt (1971) and Mwaikusa (1995), that its influence on
policy making was undermined by the centralisation of power in the President.
They argue that his approval and not that of the cabinet was the critical matter
in policy making. For the ministers, the President's approval was not only
important in getting their policies adopted but also for obtaining the support of
other ministers. As a consequence, the four cabinet committees created for
making policy decisions in reality were merely fora for rubber stamping
decisions already approved by the President. These committees were: Foreign,
Defence and Security (NU); Community Development (M); Constitutional and
Cabinet (K); and Economic and Finance (ECG)
Cabinet's effectiveness in policy making was also undermined by a lack of
coordination and cooperation amongst its members. Three inter-ministerial
committees were established in 1972 and 1984 to improve coordination
between different central government agencies. These were the Presidential
Implementation Committee (PIC) in 1972, the Inter-Ministerial Technical
Committee (IMTC) in 1984, and the Cabinet Implementation Committee
(CBK Kikao cha Baraza la Mawaziri) in 1984. The PIC comprised the
principal secretaries of all the central agencies including the President's Office,
the Prime Ministers' Office (PMO), Treasury, the National Planning
Commission (NPC - then ( 1980) Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs
MPEA), the Central Establishment and the Deputy Attorney-General.
The PIC was chaired by the Chief Secretary and had secretarial services
provided by the Management and Services Division (M&SD) of the Central
Establishment. The IMTC, whose major function was to provide technical
professional recommendations for cabinet policy proposals before submission
to cabinet, had all principal secretaries as its members. Like the PIC, the IMTC
was chaired by the Chief Secretary. The CBK was not a decision-making
structure but rather was an ad hoc internal working committee of the cabinet
comprising all portfolio ministers and regional commissioners. The CBK was
mainly a forum through which ministers and regional commissioners could
brainstorm on implementation and matters relating to the general conduct of
government business. The Prime Minister presided over the CBK.
The existence of the three inter-ministerial coordination committees did not
improve policy coordination in the Tanzanian cabinet structure. In practice
99
ministers and civil servants tended to seek approval for their policies from the
President rather than from the cabinet. This centralisation of power
discouraged collective action in the cabinet (van Donge and Liviga, 1986:
634). Ministers and civil servants preferred to work outside the three inter
ministerial coordination committees. This individualistic approach resulted in
ministries initiating and implementing policies which conflicted with or
duplicated the activities of other government agencies. For example, in 1994
the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) and the Ministry of Lands, Housing
and Urban Development (MLHUD) came into conflict over the allocation of
land earmarked as open for recreational purposes. The MLG made a decision
to allow the Dar es Salaam City Council to allocate the land for commercial
use, while the MLHUD insisted on maintaining the land's recreational
designation (Family Mirror, 23 August 1994). This conflict between MLG and
MLHUD was caused by a lack of consultation and coordination between the
two agencies which resulted in turn from the dysfunctionality of the cabinet
coordination mechanisms.
Other problems that have affected cabinet's policy-making role resulted from
the multiplicity of the decision-making structures of the cabinet, and the
demands put on the time of ministers and civil servants. They had to devote
considerable time to numerous cabinet decision-making structures such as the
three inter-ministerial coordinating committees and the four cabinet secretariat
committees. The number of meetings was excessive, generating a need for
delegation. As a result, many policy matters did not gain the degree of political
attention that would be the case if the ministers or principal secretaries
themselves had attended the meetings. Since the delegates lacked the authority
to make decisions, they perceived these meetings as matters of ritual rather
than occasions for determining directions in policy.
Irregularity of cabinet meetings also encouraged cabinet members to rely on
the President rather than the cabinet for approval of their policies. This was
particularly the case between 1965 and 1972 when the process of centralisation
of political and administrative authority was gaining momentum in the
country. Table 5.4 shows how few cabinet meetings were held between 1965
and 1972.
100
Table 5.4: Regularity of Cabinet Meetings in Tanzania between 1959-1972
Year No. of Meetings
1959-64 Every Thursday
1965 6
1967 6
1968 11
1969 11
1970 8
1971 14
1972 12
Source: Compiled by the author from interviews with various officials in the President's Office,
1995.
Policy coordination in the cabinet was further affected by the political and
administrative reforms which started in 1961. A particularly important change
was the replacement of the Provincial and District Commissioners, who were
civil servants, with politically appointed Regional and Area Commissioners.
The Regional and Area Commissioners, in addition to their administrative
powers, were also secretaries of the ruling party in their respective areas. It has
been argued by Dryden (1968: 23) that the creation of a politically appointed
local administrative officer diminished the importance of the ministry and
minister as a communication channel. This was because the new Regional and
District heads (ie Regional and Area Commissioners) had similar status to
ministers in the central government, and like ministers had direct access to the
President. This enabled them to formulate and implement policies without
consultation with the responsible minister or ministry or the relevant cabinet
decision-making structure. Under these circumstances it was very likely that
the ministries and the local administrative units each would perform their own
separate functions with limited coordination. This was the outcome observed
by Mckinsey and Company (1974), Kisumo (1983), Mmari (1987), Baguma
101
(1992) and Hyden (1995). In one instance Regional and Area Commissioners
ignored the central government's (ie Central Establishment Division) policy on
recruitment, promotion and training in implementing KAMUS - a government
decision allowing Regional and District Commissions and sectoral ministries
to recruit employees of common cadre (lower middle management and
clerical) from Ministry Service 2 salary scale (then Government Service 9) and
below. Regional and District Commissions were supposed to exercise this
authority und~r the supervision of the Central Establishment Division but this
did not happen in practice. Lack of coordination between the Central
Establishment Division and Regional and District Commissions in
implementing KAMUS led to unprecedented growth in the number of lower
middle management and clerical staff in the government (Nsekela, 1987;
Barkat, 1994: 40).
Problems of coordination between various agencies of the central government
were further compounded by the proliferation of political and administrative
institutions from 1967 when the state adopted ujamaa (ie socialist) policies.
The number of ministries increased from nine at independence to 20 in 1992
(Baguma, 1992). Within ministries the number of departments, divisions, and
sections also increased. There are no available figures on the number of central
government departments, divisions and sections between 1961 and 1990. But
by 1992 there were 300 departments/divisions and 374 sections as well as 55
units, each headed either by a Director or Commissioner and a Principal
Officer and a Senior Official (Baguma, 1992: 183; Barkat, 1994: 40). Also,
new ministerial levels were created for the positions of deputy ministers,
private secretaries to ministers and deputy principal secretaries. The number of
public enterprises (parastatals) increased from 43 in 1962 to 425 in 1992
(Mbele, 1992; Wangwe, 1992).
Although the proliferation of central government agencies was seen as
necessary to extend the scope of government and improve policy
implementation, in practice the growth in institutional numbers actually
compounded problems of coordination in the public sector. There were many
cases of duplication and overlapping of functions between various agencies
and levels in the central government. Such situations often led to inefficient
resource utilisation and a fragmented approach to development. By pitting
agencies or even organisational positions against each other, the country's
major power-holders ensured none of the agencies or developed into strong
102
centres of power (Stren, 1982). The creation in 1972 of a new position of
private secretary which duplicated some of the functions of principal
secretaries is illustrative. Conflict over domain control emerged because the
former duplicated functions of the latter. Such conflict was more pronounced
where the private secretary rather than the principal secretary had a
professional background in one of the ministry's core functions.
The need to coordinate the growing number of central government agencies
became a significant concern for the political leadership in Tanzania between
the 1960s and 1980s. As a result, a number of coordinating agencies were
created including the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (now
the National Planning Commission - NPC) in 1964, the Central Establishment
(CE) in 1964, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in 1966, and the Prime
Minister's Office in 1972. The fiscal policy coordination capacity of the
Treasury was also strengthened in 1964. The years following the creation of
these central agencies were characterised by constant reforms in their structure
and working aimed at improving their performance in coordinating the
activities of the state.
However, neither the creation of central coordinating agencies nor the
subsequent reforms to their structures and workings did much to improve the
coordination of central government activities. Duplication and overlapping of
functions between the coordinating agencies and also between them and
sectoral ministries and the conflicts so created continued. One notable case
was the duplication of human resource management functions, especially
recruitment, by the Treasury, the Presidents' Office, the Central Establishment
and various sectoral ministries and regional administrative units. In practice,
the Central Establishment, which was the main coordinating agency for
recruitment in the public sector, was only responsible for 22.6 per cent of the
total employment in the public sector (Mmari, 1987: 62). The remaining 77.4
per cent was controlled by sectoral ministries, regional administrations and the
Civil Service Commission. No single agency could claim authority over
recruitment of civil servants in Tanzania's public sector. Thus, this function
lacked cohesion and remained highly fragmented resulting in unprecedented
growth in the public service (Nsekela, 1987; Barkat, 1994: 40). It should be
noted that this unplanned growth in central government employees resulted in
overstaffing in some areas and understaffing in others. Table 5.5, which
presents information on the growth of civil service employment in central
103
government in Tanzania between 1961 and 1975, shows that the high growth
of the central government employment was matched by equally high growth in
the wage bill.
Table 5.5: The Growth of Central Government Employment in Tanzania
Between 1961 and 1975
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Employment
37,273
64,432
52,823
59,053
52,925
56,177
62,002
69,517
75,444
77,961
80,809
87,468
106,454
137,539
127 150
Wage bill in million Tshs
191.1
200.9
205.6
224.0
246.6
254.0
278.7
294.2
336.1
349.3
384.2
571.0
1200.0
971.0
* Growth rates calculated by the author using compound rate method.
Source: Tanzania, Central Establishment, Civil Service Census Report CSC, 1991, Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer.
Capacity limitations faced by the majority of central coordinating agencies
adversely affected their ability to perform their role. For example, the PMO
experienced problems with its organisation structure as well as with its
location in the political and administrative structure. This was because the
104
PMO organisation structure was characterised by unclear allocation of
functions and responsibilities and uncertainty about spans of control and
reporting channels. As a consequence, accountability and coordination were
adversely affected. The tendency of the PMO to duplicate functions of other
central agencies, such as in the national planning process, brought it into
constant conflict with these agencies making it ineffective in providing
coordination. Furthermore, the PMO was not informed of the operations of the
regional administrations and of some of the ministries that it was supposed to
coordinate and supervise. For example, despite the requirement for Regional
Administration plans to be formulated and submitted to the Treasury and the
NPC through the PMO, Regional Development Directors (RDDs) by-passed
the PMO and negotiated with sectoral ministries and Treasury without
involving the PMO (van Donge and Liviga, 1986).
The Treasury was another central agency whose performance in coordinating
government activities was impaired by capacity problems including
fragmentation of the resource allocation function, shortage of staff and
physical resources, and the presence of politicised accounting officers. The
Treasury shared its resource allocation function with the NPC. The NPC was
responsible for the development plans while the Treasury dealt with the
recurrent plan. Attempts to coordinate the activities of the Treasury and NPC
through the appointment of the Minister of Finance (Treasury) as an ex-officio
member of the NPC failed to achieve cooperation between the two
organisations. These institutional weaknesses of the Treasury also rendered it
ineffective in providing realistic and timely budgetary projections to the NPC
needed for effective policy formulation and monitoring (Mmari, 1987: 119).
This was perceived by the NPC as a demonstration of uncooperative attitudes
by the Ministry of Finance.
The budgetary process in the country is another factor responsible for
weakening Treasury's capacity to provide coordination in government. Due to
the shortage of staff and other physical infrastructure the budget process was
always conducted in haste and sometimes without some of the required
information from other government agencies (Kisumo, 1983; Mmari, 1987). In
such circumstances the budget did not reflect the real choices of state
institutions but represented guess-work by the Treasury. Unrealistic budgets
forced government agencies to use alternative channels of communications to
top decision makers to obtain financial resources outside the Treasury's
105
established framework. As a consequence resources were allocated in a
somewhat ad hoc and unpredictable fashion (Mmari, 1987; Baguma, 1992).
One other factor which contributed to Treasury's weakness in providing
coordination on resource allocation was the presence of accounting officers
(Principal Secretaries and RDDs) who were politically appointed by the
President. Although the Principal Secretaries and RDDs were mainly people
with technical skills appropriate for their ministries, in most cases they were
not career civil servants. The political nature of their appointments provided
them direct access to the President who was their appointing officer. This
enabled them to obtain funds outside the normal budgetary process, by-passing
cabinet discussion and Ministry of Finance scrutiny. Such behaviour distorted
the budgetary process and hence Treasury's capacity to coordinate the central
allocation of the state's resources (Mmari, 1987).
As will be seen in later chapters, the problems of coordination resulting from
massive growth in the number of national government institutions in the
country, adversely affected the institutions dealing with urban housing.
Regional Administration in Tanzania performed by regional commissions was
to provide an institutional framework to enable people at the regional, district
and village level to participate in the formulation and implementation of
development policies, including those for urban housing for low income
groups. However, the structure and operational processes of these
administrative units limited their ability to perform these functions.
Until 1995, there were 25 regional administrative units divided into districts,
divisions, wards, villages or, in the case of urban areas, streets. The Regional
Commissioners (RCs) had the dual role of administering the regional
government and representing the ruling party in the region. They were also
responsible for coordinating the activities of central government ministries in
their areas and had some supervisory responsibility for local authorities. Day
to-day activities of the government in the region were the responsibility of the
Regional Development Director (ROD) who was also the Regional Accounting
Officer and head of all central government agencies at the regional level
(Kulaba, 1989: 220). Thus, all central government functionaries at the regional
level were responsible to the RDD.
106
Regional Commissions in Tanzania did not have independent legal existence
but rather were under the control of the central government. This control was
exercised in various ways including the appointment of Regional
Commissioners and the Regional Development Directors, and the provision of
planning guidelines and financial resources. The adoption of a decentralisation
policy in 1972 resulted in the establishment of Regional Development
Councils (RDCs). The RDCs were established to promote the participation of
people in government activities and as such they were supposed to be
popularly elected bodies. However, until 1995 the membership of RDCs was
dominated by functionaries of the ruling party in the region. The efficacy of
RDCs in representing local preferences in the planning process was further
challenged by a centralised national planning process which required RDCs to
prepare plans and implement them under the tutelage of the National Planning
Commission.
Furthermore, the efficacy of Regional Commissions (RCs) in providing
coordination was limited by central government agencies in the regions having
a primary responsibility to their ministerial headquarters in Dar es Salaam.
There is evidence to suggest that lack of cooperation between the RCs and
central government functionaries in the regions following the 1972
decentralisation policy hindered the ability of the former to perform their
prefectorial role (Mmari, 1987: 6; Max, 1991: 86; Kulaba, 1989: 221). Low
status and salaries awarded to central government staff in the regions,
compared to the staff of the RCs, left the former disenchanted and with little
interest in taking part in the regional consultative process. Quite often, central
government functionaries in the regions did not participate in the regional
consultative bodies such as the Regional Development Team (RDT) which
included technical staff from the regional administration and officers of
various sectoral ministries in the regions (Max, 1991). As technical
consultative bodies, the RDTs were to provide professional advice to the RCs
on the running of government affairs at the regional level.
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that central government control of
regional administration in Tanzania limited the latter's ability to facilitate the
participation of people in formulating and implementing development policies
which directly affected them. Such control resulted in central government
imposing development policies which could not be sustained by regional
administration. It also resulted in stifling regional administration's support of
107
development projects imposed by the central government. This had far
reaching implications for urban housing policies which were essentially
initiated by the central government to be implemented by regional
administration. The case study of the National Sites and Services and Squatter
Upgrading Project (NSSP) in Chapters Eight and Nine illustrates this point.
Despite the MLHUD demand that RCs take full responsibility of NSSP project
activities in their regions, RCs did not allocate funding for such activities.
Local Administration in Tanzania comprised urban 1 and district councils
generically known as local government. Urban and district councils were
introduced for the first time in Tanzania in 1926 by the colonial government.
The district councils were mainly made up of traditional institutions such as
chieftainships which were integrated into the colonial administration. The
limited functions and powers of the colonial district councils were determined
by the central government. On the other hand, colonial urban councils were
elected entities and had powers to raise revenue and perform functions which
were seen fit by them. At independence, democratic local government
institutions were introduced throughout the country. Unlike the colonial
councils whose membership was restricted to Europeans, Asians, traditional
leaders and well-to-do Africans, membership of the post-independence local
government institutions was open to all citizens (Max, 1991). Nevertheless,
four years after independence, these autonomous local government institutions
were perceived as a threat to central power by the national government which
moved to abolish them in 1965. The abolition of local authorities in 1965
resulted in the deterioration of services and management of local areas forcing
the central government to reintroduce urban and district councils in 1978 and
1982 respectively (Kulaba, 1989: 231; Max, 1991: 180).
The re-introduced councils were elected bodies with powers to raise revenue
and allocate expenditure subject to approval by the central government through
the Ministry responsible for Local Government. The local governments were
charged with the responsibility for almost all social and economic
development activities in their areas of 1urisdiction, including health services,
sanitation, agriculture, roads, primary school education, sewerage, building
control, fire fighting and refuse disposal (Tanzania-LG Act, 1982a). To
safeguard local governments from arbitrary abolition, the constitution of the
United Republic of Tanzania was amended to incorporate the local authorities
as permanent institutions (Max, 1991: 111).
108
Despite being popularly elected and having a constitutional existence local
authorities in Tanzania were controlled by the central government. This control
adversely affected their performance. The central government's authority over
councils was exercised through the Minister responsible for Local Government
who had powers to establish, abolish and demarcate boundaries of local
governments. The minister was also vested with powers to approve local
authorities' tax rates, budgets and certain other activities (Max, 1991: 130).
Further control over local authorities was exercised by the ruling party which
had power to approve candidates for local council elections.
The performance of local government was hampered further by the lack of
clarity in functional and power relationships between it and regional
administration institutions (RCs and DCs). This was especially the case in
urban areas after 1978 when urban councils were reintroduced and allocated
functions and powers similar to those of the RCs. This resulted in the
duplication of functions and consequently in conflict and competition over
domain control between the urban councils and regional administrations. The
public was adversely affected. This is not only because they did not understand
the distribution of functions, they also received conflicting information and
encountered contradictory patterns of decision making. This was particularly
so in the area of land delivery where both urban councils and Regional Land
Development Officers (under the RCs) were involved in land allocation. One
plot of land could be allocated to two different people by two different
institutions. At another level, the coexistence of RCs and urban councils added
to central government expenditure on urban administration as it had to finance
70 per cent of the councils' budgets as well as all RC activities (Mmari, 1987;
Baguma, 1992: 4).
The Public Service in Tanzania comprised one of the major elements of the
administrative system because it was responsible for the day to day activities
of the state. The size, composition and values of the public service in Tanzania
were immediately reoriented following the political leadership's decision to
centralise political authority in 1962. This reorientation included, politicisation
of the public service; changing the composition of the public service so that it
was representative of all social and ethnic groups in the country; and the
suspension of the bureaucratic code of conduct (Nyerere, 1968: 208; Mmari,
1987: 14; Baguma, 1992: 4). As will be seen later in this section, despite their
109
good intentions these reforms generated certain negative consequences which
adversely affected the formulation and implementation of urban housing
policies in Tanzania.
As part of the civil service politicisation process, civil servants were allowed
to join the party and were also made eligible for transfer from the public
service to political positions. Until 1992, civil servants, including army
personnel, could be nominated for membership of the parliament, appointed as
cabinet members, or appointed as regional or district commissioners (Bienen,
1972: 222-3; Munishi, 1982; Baguma, 1992; Mwaikusa, 1995). Politicisation
of the public service was further achieved through filling some strategic
administrative positions in the central, regional and local administrations with
political appointees (Dryden, 1968). Thus, in the ministries the positions of
principal secretaries, commissioners, and directors became presidential
appointments. Politicisation of the public service, deemed necessary to
increase the public service's responsiveness to the state party policies, had the
opposite result in practice and created an institution characterised by lobbying,
rumour-mongering and behind-the-scenes manoeuvring (Mulokozi, 1978;
Said, 1983: 44; Kidiro, 1991: 254; Hyden, 1995: 169). Such features reduced
its level of performance.
The inherited colonial bureaucratic code of conduct which emphasised
adherence to rules, regulations and general orders was consciously de
emphasised (Baguma, 1992; Hyden, 1995: 165). The political leadership
believed that the inherited colonial rules and regulations hindered civil
servants' responsiveness to the party's policies. There was particular antipathy
towards the colonial government's emphasis on rank and status. In President
Nyerere's view this contradicted the post-colonial state's intention of creating a
united nation undifferentiated by class and creed (Mwaikusa, 1995). To replace
the undesirable elements of the colonial bureaucratic code, various party
guidelines were introduced to direct the public service. Of particular
importance was the Mwongozo of 1971. Among other things, the Mwongozo
introduced a special code of conduct for the public service, particularly its
leaders, defined as those who earned more than Tshs 1,000 per month.
Moreover, the Mwongozo vested in the state party the responsibility for
supervising the conduct of the public service. To accomplish this, branches of
the party were opened in all government offices (Mwansasu, 1979; Mihyo,
1986; Kidiro, 1991). One example of the complete break from the colonial
110
bureaucratic code is evident in the findings of the 1987 Nsekela Commission,
which established that most government officers had no clearly defined job
descriptions (Nsekela, 1987: 17).
A representative public service was perceived to be a necessary condition for
development, and for the achievement of national integration. It should be
responsive to the desires and needs of the broad public as compared to a highly
stratified colonial-style public service. Representation was sought in the
process of localising public service jobs held by expatriates (Munishi, 1982).
In the initial year of independence the emphasis was on the creation of an
African civil service through Africanisation of all positions (Miti and
Mutahaba, 1988). This was particularly important given that at independence
Africans constituted the minority in the public service. For example, only 12 of
the total 4378 established middle and senior posts had African incumbents in
1963 (Mutahaba, 1989). Later reforms emphasised changes in recruitment,
training and pay policies to allow all tribal groupings equal access to the public
service. To achieve this the inherited colonial Public Service Commission was
abolished in 1964 and its functions were placed under the President's Office. A
special department, the Central Establishment, was established and located in
the President's Office to deal with the human resource management functions
(Kisumo, 1983; Mmari, 1987; Baguma, 1992).
Overall, the reforms in the public service in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s
increased the number of personnel to unsustainable levels. As already shown
in Table 5.5, the number of employees in central government rose from 37,273
in 1961 to 137,539 in 1975. The increase could not be sustained due to slow
growth in the country's economy. For example, between 1961 and 1987 the
number of public servants grew by 267 per cent (an average of 10 per cent per
annum) while the economy was growing slowly at only 1.22 per cent per
annum (Barkat, 1994: 36). Such economic performance subjected the bloated
public service to poor working conditions creating problems of low morale and
corruption (Nsekela, 1987: 26; Doriye, 1992). One of the debilitating
conditions affecting civil servants was that of low income resulting from
declining real wages and salaries. For example, the 1975 real minimum wage
was 36 per cent below that of 1961 (Nsekela, 1987; World Bank, 1995).
Moreover, civil servants had to work with inadequate resources due to under
funding throughout the public service. The case of the Ministry of Lands,
111
Housing and Urban Development is illustrative. While the ministry employed
70 personnel secretaries it only had 57 typewriters. Similarly, the ministry had
75 drivers but only 61 vehicles (Said, 1983). The shortage of resources within
the public service created tension and competition over the distribution of
these resources (Stren, 1982). The discussion of the thesis case study in
Chapters Eight and Nine suggests this situation still continues.
The Political System
The Party
Tanzania had a one-party political system from independence in 1961 until
1992, when its constitution was amended to introduce multi-party politics. In
principle, the-party whose name changed in 1977 from the Tanganyika African
National Union to the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (CCM) was
responsible for preparing party policies, scrutinising the policy proposals of
other institutions of the political and administrative system and supervising the
public bureaucracy and party leaders in the conduct of government business. It
also had the responsibility of controlling recruitment to political office through
the approval and scrutiny of candidates in presidential and parliamentary
elections (McAuslan and Ghai, 1972: 204-206; Okema, 1990; Mwaikusa,
1995: 36). Despite its good intention to forge national unity through
consolidation of political power into a single authority, the one-party state
political system compounded problems of policy co-ordination in government.
Both the organisational struct1:1re of the party and the centralisation of power in
the presidency adversely affected the party in performing its roles (Bienen,
1972: 175; Cliffe, 1972: 270; Okumu, 1979: 49; Miti and Mutahaba, 1988:
14). The party lacked the capacity to exercise its supposed supremacy in
policy-making and supervision because of lack of resources. It has been
suggested by Bienen (1970: 191-193) that between 1961 and 1975 the National
Executive Committee (NEC) of the party which was its major policy making
body had neither the qualified staff nor adequate funds to perform its policy
functions. Efforts to build the party's capacity such as introducing a structured
salary and wage schemes for tenured members of the NEC standing
committees, and transferring qualified civil servants from government to serve
as support staff in various NEC standing committees - could not be achieved
112
due to lack of funding resulting from a growing government budget deficit
(Msekwa, 1977: 56-7; Mwansasu, 1979: 181-2; Mwaikusa, 1995: 166).
Furthermore, the party was not effective in performing its policy supervision
role because of the nature of the policies that it formulated. The party's
populist strategy of trying to respond to all political demands at once led it to
formulate policies without attempting to determine the range of possible
consequences· such as costs and benefits or the capabilities of implementing
institutions. This resulted in vague and ambiguous policies (Mayaya, 1978;
Hyden, 1979; Moses, 1986). For example, the 1974 irrigation policy, the 1976
closure of private shops, and the 1976 transfer of the capital city from Dar es
Salaam to Dodoma were all made with little analysis of their viability. The
1974 party policy on irrigation was not accompanied by the establishment of
implementation arrangements in the Ministry of Agriculture. Neither were
there funds for the activities identified. Vague and ambiguous policies left
room for multiple or differential interpretation by stakeholders in the
implementing agencies resulting in activities and outcomes at variance with
the original policy objectives set by the party. It also created avenues for
corruption.
The effectiveness of the state party in policy-making was also impaired by the
absence of a system of communication to link it with those institutions charged
with implementing policy. This meant that monitoring and control were
limited evaluation was little practised, and feedback to policy-makers (to
improve the quality of their policy-making) was at best fragmented. This
problem originated in the country's constitution in which the lines of
communications between the party and the government were not clearly
stipulated. This shortcoming was acknowledged in March 1984 by the late
Prime Minister Sokoine, when he issued a directive informing both state party
and government institutions on the communication system to be followed. He
ordered that party policies were to be communicated to his office (PMO) and
from there to other relevant government agencies (PMO Directive, March
1984). Similarly, reporting from government agencies to the state party
institutions was to go through the PMO. His aim was to construct a
coordinating mechanism which would facilitate the transition of party policies
into the government process. Despite Sokoine's attempt to clarify and make
effective the mode of communication between the policy-making and
implementation organs, communication of state party policies to implementing
113
agencies continued to be a problem because the appointment of the PMO as a
communication channel between the party and government did not close other
existing channels. As such, rather than speeding up communication it actually
confused matters thus slowing down effective communication (van Donge and
Liviga, 1986: 635).
The Presidency
The Presidency in this section refers both to the President as a person and to
his office - commonly known as the state house. In the Tanzanian political
system the Presidency had political authority and control over all other state
institutions and actors, particularly in policy-making (Hopkins, 1971; Bienen,
1970; M wansasu, 1979: 186; van Donge and Liviga, 1986: 636; Miti and
Mutahaba, 1988: 35; Hartmann, 1991; Mwaikusa, 1995: 172). This influence
over policy was an outcome of the process of political centralisation which
began in 1962 and was consolidated in 1977. Until 1984 neither the ruling
party (CCM) nor the parliament took any policy initiatives. Indeed, policies
such as the National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project
(NSSP) - the main focus of this thesis - were initiated by President Nyerere.
The President's influence on the political system was at its height from 1984
until 1987 when the two roles or President and chairman of the party were
separated (Kiondo, 1990b: 39). Between 1961 and 1995, major decisions, such
as the agreement between the Tanzanian government and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1986, were made without the involvement of the
parliament or the state party (Kiondo, 1990b: 40). The centralisation of power
in the Presidency, rather than achieving the envisaged unity of purpose in the
management of development, compounded the problems of policy
coordination in the political and administrative system of the country.
Until 1995, Presidents Nyerere (1961-1984) and Mwinyi (1984-1995)
exercised enormous powers such as the appointing senior civil servants and
cabinet members, commanding the armed forces, and controlling the
parliament, the judiciary and the ruling party. These powers were used to
dominate the policy-making process as well as the administration of the
country (M waikusa, 1995). Both Presidents developed policy making
strategies which deliberately ignored the established political and
administrative framework. Such strategies were very clear in Nyereres'
Presidency when he made use of any institution of the Tanzanian political
114
system, including the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party, the
Central Committee (CC) of the party, the cabinet and the parliament or
National Assembly to give formal ratification of his policies. Table 5.6 is a
summarised version of the pattern of the President's choice of policy
consultation and ratification between 1962 and 1982. While President Nyerere
justified the adoption of such strategies in terms of a need to create a unified
and stable government, the strategies can be interpreted as attempts by the
President to _ prevent any of the policy-making institutions, except the
Presidency, from developing a strong power base. In their choice of which
institutions to consult, both Presidents relied on those policy institutions from
which they anticipated greater levels of support and isolated those which they
felt would oppose their policy initiatives (Stephens, 1968: 167; Pratt 1972; van
Donge and Liviga, 1986; Kiondo, 1990b).
There were differences between Presidents Nyerere and Mwinyi in terms of
preferred policy-making institutions. Under Nyerere the NEC was the most
preferred choice for consultation or ratification of his initiatives. Not
surprisingly, the NEC showed very strong support for the President's policy
initiatives. The cabinet was the least consulted policy-making institution
during his reign because he perceived it to be a potential centre for
divisiveness, instability and challenge to presidential supremacy in policy
making (Biennen, 1970: 202; Sperber, 1970: 60; Pratt, 1972: 235, 1976; Miti
and Mutahaba, 1988: 34). This was especially the case for the 1961-65 cabinet
whose members were people with strong independent power bases in the trade
union movement, the cooperative union, and economically advanced tribes
(Pratt, 1972: 234). They brought to government demands from their
constituencies. For example, cabinet members with constituencies in the trade
union movement exerted pressure for the speedy Africanisation of the civil
service. Such demands were perceived as potentially disruptive by the
President who envisaged a gradual Africanisation process. Moreover, many
cabinet members differed ideologically from the President. For example, while
the President was advocating self-sacrifice and African Socialism, as
appropriate development ideologies for Tanzania some cabinet members were
either propounding capitalism or Marxist-Leninist socialism (Tordoff, 1967;
Pratt 1972).
115
,-t
;5
56
i6
57
72
72
12
Table 5.6: The Pattern of Presidential Choice of Policy
Consultation and Ratification Institutions 1962-78
Policy
Africanisation of the civil service
Cessation of discrimination against non-Africans in the civil service
Union with Zanzibar
Break of Diplomatic Relations with Britain
Making Tanzania a One Party State Democracy
Abolition of Cooperative Movement
Affiliation of the Trade Union movement into the structure of the State Party
Creation of Cooperative Villages (Ujamaa Villages)
National Sites and Services Policy
Decentralisation Policy
Politics Is Agriculture Policy
Policy Initiator
Cabinet
President
President
President
President
President
President
President
President
President
President
Policy Consultation Centre
Presidential CommissionAfricanisation Commission
NEC
NEC
NEC
Presidential Commission on One Party State
Presidential Commission
Presidential Commission
National Conference (NC-CCM)
Cabinet
Cabinet
NEC
Policy Ratification
National Assembly
President
National Assembly
President
NEC and National Assembly
NEC and National Assembly
NEC and National Assembly
NEC
Cabinet
National Assembly
NEC
116
Table 5.6: The Pattern of Presidential Choice of Policy
Consultation and Ratification Institutions 1962-78
(Continued)
Policy Policy Policy Consultation Policy Ratification Initiator Centre
Irrigation Policy President NEC NEC
The Musoma Resolution on President NEC National Assembly Education
Re-location of Government President NEC National Assembly Capital to from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma
Decision to go to war with President President National Assembly Uganda
rce: Compiled by the author from various sources including, Tordoff W., 1967, Government and Politics in Tanzania, Nairobi: East African Publishing House 1967; Biennen, H., 1970, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press; lllife, J., 1979, A Modern History of Tanganyika, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hartmann, J., 1988, 'President Nyerere and the State', in Hodd, M., Tanzania After Nyerere, London: Pinter, 165-174; Mwaikusa, J, T., 1995, 'Towards Responsible Democratic Government: Executive Powers and Constitutional Practice in Tanzania 1962-1992', unpublished PhD Thesis, University of London.
117
Unlike his predecessor, President Mwinyi preferred the cabinet over other
policy-making institutions for consultation and ratification of his policy
initiatives. The separation of the leadership of the party from the leadership of
government which occurred between 1984 and 1987 divided political loyalties
between the President and the chair of the party who also chaired the NEC.
It was this division of political loyalties and high degree of opposition towards
liberalisation policies by NEC members that forced President Mwinyi to rely
on the cabinet rather than the NEC for support of his policies during the 1984-
1987 period and even after that when the leadership of the party and that of
government were once again merged (Kiondo, 1990b). Mwinyi's reliance on
the cabinet even when the President was simultaneously the party chair is
attributed to continued opposition to liberalisation policies within the NEC.
There were other strategies adopted by Presidents Nyerere and Mwinyi to
strengthen their technical capacities in policy-making and coordination. One
strategy involved the transfer of a number of important ministries to the
President's Office. These were the ministries of Defence, Planning and
Economic Affairs, and the Central Establishment. The location of these
ministries increased the number of ministers of state in the President's Office.
For example, in Nyerere's reign the number of ministers of state in the
President's Office increased from one in 1962 to five in 1982 (Kisumo, 1983).
The President could then more easily use and direct them for policy
formulation purposes. A further strategy involved the merger of the roles of
Principal Secretary to the President's Office and Secretary to the Cabinet and
Head of the Civil Service into one position.
President Nyerere relied on either the services of his office (ie the state house)
or the secretariat of the state party to prepare his policies. However, inadequate
staff, inappropriate structures and processes, and a lack of physical resources
limited the ability of both the party and President's Office to improve the
President's performance in the policy process. For example, throughout
Nyerere's reign the President's Office suffered from problems of under
staffing. Increases in staff numbers from about twelve in 1966 to 312 in 1980
did little to improve the policy making capacities of the President's Office
because the increase in staff went hand in hand with an increase of functions
resulting from the transfer of several ministries and commissions to the Office
(Kisumo, 1983: 6; Mmari, 1987). A similar situation of staff shortages
118
characterised President Mwinyi's time in office. As Figure 5.3 shows, the
majority of staff were concentrated in functions related to the up-keep of the
state house rather than in activities relating to policy as the Cabinet Affairs
Division is small compared to the other divisions which deal with routine
administrative tasks (Mmari, 1987: 22).
The strategies used by Presidents Nyerere and Mwinyi to exert greater control
over the policy process created problems of conflict and competition and
consequent lack of cooperation between the various institutions of the
Tanzanian political system. The system was characterised by conflict over
domain control between the state party institutions and the cabinet, and
between civil servants and politicians. Under Nyerere for example, the cabinet
felt it was the appropriate institution to be consulted because of the monopoly
it claimed to have over information and expertise on various policy matters
(Pratt, 1972: 235; Hartmann, 1988: 165).
Both Presidents Nyerere and Mwinyi were less than effective in their exercise
of control and sanctions. The problems emanated from the overload of tasks
resulting from centralisation of power in the Presidency. This created
dependence on the Presidency for approval and support of almost all political
and administrative actions (Tordoff, 1967; van Donge and Liviga, 1986;
Mmari, 1987; Baguma, 1992). This overload forced them to delegate authority
to other political and administrative officials. The two Presidents relied on
Principal Secretaries or the various Ministers of State in their office to attend
to various policy matters. It was only those political decisions and activities
that were important to the Presidents that remained their personal prerogatives
(Hartmann, 1990; Mwaikusa, 1995).
Reliance on delegation of authority is a normal phenomenon in growing
centralised organisations as upper level officials become unable to cope with
increasing numbers of decisions which are funnelled through to them.
119
1--'
Iv 0
United Republique
I I I I
Security and Anti-corruption
Permanent Committee for Committee for Intelligence Civil Service Commission of Enforcement of Enforcement of Department
Squad Commission Enquiry Leadership Co_de Leadership Code
Principal Secretary to the President and Secretary
to the Cabinet
I I I
Presidential Affairs Cabinet Secretariat Deputy Principal
Division Secretary to the
- Finance and Economic President Private Secretary
Committee Deputy Principal
- Legal and Parliamentary Secretary - Private Office Committee (Capital Development) - Personal Assistants - Social Services Committee - Press Secretary - Foreign Defence and Security -ADC Committee - Household I I
Civil Service Manpower Development
Source: Mmari, D.M.S., 1987, 'Organisation of Administration Division and Administration Division
the Government: Salaries and other Terms and Director Director Conditions of Service for the Public Service', I I United Republic of Tanzania, Inter-ministerial
- Supervision, Control and - Policy and Planning Task Force on the 1987 Salaries Review Establishments
- Personnel - Lands and Transfers
Commission Report, December, unpublished - Regulatiuons and Pensions - Administration - Engineering
report, p.22 - Discipline and Complaints -Training
However, the effectiveness of such delegation depends on the establishment of
mechanisms to maintain control or coordination of the delegated authority
(Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Child and Mansfield, 1972; 1984: 136-17; Marsh,
1992). Mechanisms for maintaining control of delegated authority include:
rules and procedures, clear and rapid lines of communication, clear knowledge
of shared ideology, and conflict resolution mechanisms (Boston, 1992: 89).
Delegation of presidential authority in Tanzania became problematic because
of the absence of such control mechanisms (Tordoff, 1967; Mayaya, 1978;
Baguma, 1992). As observed by Tordoff (1967), Bienen (1970: 282) and
Mmari (1987) excessive delegation by the President gave the ministries,
departments or individuals responsible autonomy over a number of policy
issues leading to problems of policy coordination (Miti and Mutahaba, 1988).
A further problem with the delegation of presidential authority was that
officials who exercised this authority rarely had the political weight to impose
their decisions on other ministries. This was demonstrated by the tendency of
other ministries to resent the decisions of the Presidents' delegates (Tordoff,
1967; Pratt, 1976). This was particularly the case with the First Five Year
Development Plan of 1964-69 when the Ministry of Agriculture resented
proposals by the Ministry of Planning regarding the adoption of new
agricultural approaches. Similarly, directives on matters of office procedures,
training and recruitment from the Principal Secretary of the Central
Establishments (CE) were resented by other ministries or departments. This
attitude was reflected in ministries and government agencies implementing
their own organisation structures without consulting the CE (Mmari, 1987:
13).
The Parliament
Between 1961 and 1995 the parliament - also known as the legislative or
national assembly - did not have legislative authority but rather was used to
legitimise the policies of the government (Pratt, 1976: 210-211; Miti and
Mutahaba, 1988). Despite periodic elections, presidential representatives,
nominees or appointees comprised 33 per cent of the parliament (Pratt, 1976:
210-211; Okema et al, 1990). Although this number was small compared to
that of elected members, it provided an effective control mechanism through
monitoring the behaviour of non-conforming parliamentarians. Moreover, the
President, as the chair of the NEC, exercised control over the choice of
121
candidates in the parliamentary elections. Of the 219 members of parliament in
Tanzania, 25 were Regional Commissioners representing the President or the
government in the parliament, and 14 were members elected by the assembly
itself from a list of nominees submitted to it by the major national institutions
of the party such as the Confederation of Tanzania Workers (JUWATA),
Tanganyika Parents Association, the National Organisation of Women in
Tanzania (UWT) and the National Organisation of Youth in Tanzania (UVT).
There were also 17 members nominated by the President directly, 7 of them
Zanzibaris and 10 from the mainland. Seventeen members of the Zanzibar
Revolutionary Council were assembly members. Through such control
mechanisms, the President ensured that only demands and issues in support of
the government would be raised in the parliament. This moderated the
demands and paralysed nearly all political opposition in Tanzania. As a
consequence, the parliament did not serve as a means by which urban and rural
people, through their representatives, could effectively make demands on the
political system (Tordoff, 1967; Mwaikusa, 1995).
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the physical, social, economic and in particular, the
politico-administrative environment of Tanzania to set out the context in
which the government policy process takes place. Despite having a large land
area only 44 per cent of land in inhabited, the remainder being uninhabited
either due to tsetse flies or unreliable rainfall. The limited opportunities
presented by such physical features have in some areas accelerated rural-urban
migration. Despite attempts by the political leadership to forge a united nation
by such means as introducing a common language, ethnicity still bears
considerable influence on political decision making.
Analysis of the Tanzanian economy in the independence era has shown a
picture of slow economic growth with the country slipping back on the World
Bank's international tables of GNP per capita. The country is amongst the
poorest in the world. The economy remains predominantly agrarian with only a
small industrial sector. Growth in the tertiary sector has been through public
sector expansion and a burgeoning non-formal economy in urban areas. In
general, the economic conditions of Tanzania have not been conducive to an
urbanisation process which can provide adequate facilities such as housing and
services to its population. Poor rural economic conditions have exacerbated the
122
situation by encouraging a substantial flow of migrants to urban areas where
jobs in the small formal sector are rare and where government budgets for
essential services have been extremely tight.
Review of the political and administrative structure highlights the process of
centralisation which has dominated the independence era. Although ostensibly
undertaken to make the drive for national development more rapid and to
achieve efficiency and effectiveness in use of scarce resources, this simply has
not happened. Indeed, the good intentions of centralisation have produced
disappointing results with a host of inefficiencies plaguing the politico
administrative system and providing a context in which poor policy
performance has been both typical and inevitable.
123
Chapter Six
Urbanisation and Urban Housing Problems in Tanzania
This chapter provides a detailed account of urbanisation and urban housing
problems in Tanzania for the period 1961-1990. Such contextual information is
important for understanding the conditions which led to the formulation of the
National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project (NSSP). The
chapter begins with a review of urbanisation in the country and a discussion of
how the process generated a housing crisis and ends with a detailed description
of those problems.
A starting point in this review is to establish the technical criteria used in this
thesis to describe urban areas in Tanzania since there is no consistent, written
official definition (Temba, 1983: 3). For example, in the 1978 population
census, areas were designated as 'urban' by the government if they had
populations of 5,000 or more, whilst in the 1988 census, areas with 3,000
people were designated as urban (Tanzania Bureau of Statistics, 1988: 133-
137). The Urban Authority Act 1982 defined urban areas as those with at least
9000 residents. Such variation in the definition of urban areas is also found
within the government machinery where each government ministry has its own
criteria for classification. The absence of a uniform definition of 'urban' has
adversely affected government efforts in establishing a coordinated approach in
dealing with urban housing problems in the country. These issues are discussed
in detail in Chapters Eight and Nine). This competition over such basic issues
held negative implications for establishing a coordinated and integrated policy
process for urban housing. This thesis focuses on those towns and cities with
high population densities of about 160 and 610 persons per sq.km and also with
relatively high annual population growth rates.
124
Urbanisation in Tanzania
The process of urbanisation in Tanzania commenced prior to colonialism, and it
dates from to the late 1800s when a few coastal settlements with urban features
were established as a result of sea-borne trade with Arabia, India, and Portugal
(Mascarenhas, 1966; Claeson and Egero, 1971; Sutton, 1979; Comoro, 1984;
Campbell, 1990a). Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam are examples of such pre
colonial urban centres. Through trading activities, these two settlements became
entrepots for the transhipment of commercial articles such as slaves, ivory and
copra (Illife, 1979; Comoro, 1984). With colonisation, first by the Germans
from 1890 and later by the British from 1918, several other settlements with
urban characteristics were created, mainly as centres of colonial administration
(Brain, 1979; Coulson, 1982).
Colonialism introduced economic, political and social structures which, among
other things, led to the rapid migration of indigenous people from rural to urban
areas. One imposed colonial economic measure was the introduction of a
monetary 'hut tax' in 1897 which required payment of 3 rupees per annum for
each male Tanzanian (Brain, 1979: 12; Coulson, 1982: 35). The hut tax made it
necessary for Africans to engage in the cash economy, such as through wage
employment, to be able to pay the tax. This required many Africans to migrate
and to find work in the domestic employment, transportation and
communication networks, in the colonial state bureaucracy or in the European
run plantations. Such migration resulted in the increasing concentration of
people in urban centres (Sandbrook, 1982: 38). To illustrate growth in urban
areas, Dar es Salaam the headquarters of successive colonial governments, had
a population of only 5,000 at the beginning of colonisation in 1890, but grew
rapidly to 18,000 by 1900 and then to 50,000 by 1948 (Sutton, 1979: 19;
Campbell, 1990a: 155)
The already high urban population growth rates increased even further in the
post-independence period. At independence there was a tremendous rush to
towns as people sought to seize the real or imagined employment prospects
offered by the new state (Hayuma, 1979; Mosha, 1995). Various decisions of
the post-independence government, accelerated the process. For example, in
1962, the eight colonial administrative provinces were abolished and replaced
with 20 regional administrative centres (Dryden, 1968; Kulaba, 1981; Kaitilla,
1987; Halfani, 1987). The elevation of the administrative status of some smaller
125
centres, together with accompanying socio-economic infrastructure also
attracted rural migrants thus increasing the number of large agglomerations of
population in these centres. Other factors which have contributed to rapid
urbanisation in post-colonial Tanzania include the urban population and
industrial decentralisation programs of 1964 and 1969, the decentralisation of
government in 1972 and rapid natural population growth (Hayuma, 1983;
Collier et al, 1986: 15). Improvement of transportation may have also facilitated
the movement. These factors are now discussed in detail.
Statistical Dimensions of the Urbanisation Process
Rates of Growth
High rates of urban growth in Tanzania were experienced in the years leading
up to independence in 1961. For example between 1948 and 1957 the average
annual urban population growth rate was 6.8 per cent. Independence saw an
accelerated rate of growth with an average rate of increase of 10.3 per cent per
annum from 1960 and 1992, one of the highest figure in the world (see Table
2.1 in Chapter Two). Although there were variations in the growth rate during
this time, it always remained high. Between 1967 and 1978, the figure stood at
10.8 per cent but declined to 7.5 per cent in the period between 1978 and 1988
(See Table 6.1).
This rate was still higher than that of other sub-Saharan African countries (see
Table 2.1 ). The annual urban population growth rate rose substantially to 12 per
cent per annum during the 1988-1994 period (Tanzania Central Statistical
Bureau, 1967; Tanzania Bureau of Statistics, 1978; Kulaba, 1989: 209; UNDP,
1994: 22-3; World Bank, 1996: 204). It is likely that these rates were higher
than the country's capacity to produce food and other social services, a view
confirmed by Sandbrook and Stren (1983) and Malyamkono and Bagachwa
(1990). The gap between urban requirements and the country's capacity meant
there was a consistent and perhaps expanding deficiency in such infrastructure
for the population which it is expected to service. Housing, especially for the
urban poor, has been one area of infrastructure shortfall.
126
Table 6.1: Urban Population Growth Trends in Tanzania, 1948-1988
Census
1948
1957
1967
1978
1988
1994
Total Population
7,480,429
8,788,466
11,958,654
17,048,329
21,700,000
27,900,000
Urban Population
197,300
364,100
685,092
2,257,921
4,462,038
6,417,000
Per cent Urban Annual Urban Growth Rates
2.6
4.1 6.8
5.7 6.3
13.8 10.8
17.6 7.5
23.1 12.0
Source: Tanzania Central Statistical Bureau, 1967, National Population Census Report, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer; Tanzania Bureau of Statistics, National Population Census Report, 1978 and 1988, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer; United Nations Development Programme-UNDP, 1994, Human Development Report, New York: Oxford University Press.
There are considerable variations in the degree of urbanisation between urban
centres in Tanzania. As indicated in Table 6.2, Dar es Salaam has grown faster
than all other centres. In 1988 Dar es Salaam accounted for almost 51.9 per cent
or 2,315,847 of the total urban population of 4,462,038 million people
(Tanzania Bureau of Statistics, 1988). Because of its higher growth rate Dar es
Salaam has become a primate city because it ranks considerably higher in terms
of population size than other urban centres in the country. The next largest
urban centre, Mwanza, had a population of only 223,013 in 1988. The primacy
of Dar es Salaam in the Tanzanian urban system may be attributed to the
concentration there of Tanzania's large-scale modern activities, social and
political infrastructure, and decision-makers (Banyikwa, 1985). Although in the
1970s the government decided to divest Dar es Salaam of its political and
economic dominance, the city has continued to enjoy more official investment
in social, economic and political infrastructure than other urban centres
(Kaitilla, 1987; Lugalla, 1990). These factors, have always tended to attract
industries and other economic activities to Dar es Salaam. For example, by
1974, of the 905 industries employing more than 10 people in Tanzania, 53 per
cent were located in Dar es Salaam. (Tanzania-SFYDP, 1969-74: 18). Of the 30
127
major industries established in 1975, 20 were located in Dar es Salaam
(Jambiya, 1987: 161), and also of the 444 new industries established between
1969 and 1979, 226 (ie 51 per cent) were located in Dar es Salaam (Lugalla,
1990: 213). It is this industrial development and the accompanying availability
of transport, port facilities, related industries and the nation's largest consumer
market which have contributed to the higher rates of urban population growth in
Dar es Salaam.
The other urban centres with high levels of urban population are Mwanza,
Tanga, Mbeya, Morogoro, Tabora, Dodoma and Arusha. In 1988, these urban
centres contained 24.9 per cent (ie 1,112,819) of the total urban population of
4,462,038 (Table 6.2). Except for Dodoma, which is the new capital of the
central government, these towns served as centres of regional administration
during the colonial period (Berry, 1990: 1009).
Levels of urbanisation
While its urban growth rates are high, Table 2.1 shows that the country has
lower levels of urban population when compared to many other developing
countries particularly those of Asia and Latin America. Nevertheless, urban
population growth rates since 1948 have increased the proportion of urban
population in total population at an alarming rate. As Table 6.1 shows, in 1948
urban population made up only 2.6 per cent or 197,300 persons out of the total
population of 7,480,400. Since then the proportion of urban population as a
percentage of total population has risen dramatically.
By 1957, urban population constituted 4.1 per cent (ie 364,100 people) of the
total population of 8,788,500. In the first post-independence population census
of 1967, urban population constituted 5.7 per cent (ie. 685,092 people) of the
total population of 11,958,654 (Tanzania Central Statistical Bureau, 1967). In
the 1978 population census the urban population accounted for 13.8 per cent (ie
2,257,921 people) of the total population of 17,036, 499. By 1988, the urban
population constituted 17 per cent (ie 3,689,000 people) of the total 21.7
million people (Tanzania Bureau of Statistics, 1978; 1988).
128
....... ,,,,\..,,,. __ JI. ,1l""''"''L1 .. , .... ~ .............. , .................. • - - .. - - .. I -··· --- ..
Population Average Annual Growth rate percentage Urban Pop. as % of Total Regional Population
1948 1957 1967 1978 1988 1948-57 1967 1978 1988
Arusha 32,452 88,155 134,708 10.0 3.9 3.8 9.96
Bondeni 5672
Bukoha 77,022 47,009 4.0 2.7 3.54
Bunda 7870 27,550
Dar es Salaam 69,277 128,742 272,821 851,522 2,315,8 7.1 7.6 8.2 4.8 96.0 47
Dodoma 23,559 158,577 203,833 4.9 2.9 2.4 16.5
Iringa 21,746 57,182 84,860 7.3 2.7 2.7 7.0
Itigi 6729
Lindi 13,352 27,308 41,587 2.4 2.1 2.0 6.4
Kaliua 5429 12,366
Kidatu 9965 29,991
Kigoma/Ujiji 21,369 58,788 84,647 2.7 2.9 2.8 9.9
I--'
tv \.0
Table 6.2: Populations and Growth Rates of Principal Towns in Tanzania 1948-1988 (Continued)
Population Average Annual Grow th rate percentage Urban Pop. as% of Total Regional Population
1948 1957 1967 1978 1988 1948-57 1967 1978 1988
Kilwa Kivinje 5443 11,823
Kimamba 6225 8898
Kongwa 8557 10,968
Mahuta 6668 11,150
Makambako 7971 26,888
Mbeya 3,179 6,932 12,479 78,111 152,844 9.1 7.5 3.3 3.1 10.4
Mombo 5944 11,330
Morogoro 8,173 14,502 25,262 74,114 117,760 6.6 6.1 2.9 2.6 9.6
Moshi 8,048 13,726 26,864 52,223 96,838 6.1 6.5 3.0 2.1 8.7
Mtwara/Miki- 20,413 48,510 76,632 2.7 2.0 1.4 8.6 ndani Musoma 15,412 43,980 68,536 9.1 2.6 2.9 7.1
Mwadui 10455 21736 ...... (.;,)
0
...... u.) ......
Table 6.2: Populations and Growth Rates of Principal Towns in Tanzania 1948-1988 (Continued)
Population Average Annual Growth rate percentage Urban Pop. as % of Total Regional Population
1948 1957 1967 1978 1988 1948-57 1967 1978 1988
Mwanza 34,861 169,660 223,013 6.1 2.9 2.6 11.8
Shinyanga 68,746 100,724 3.6 2.9 5.6
Singida 55,892 80,987 2.7 2.5 10.2
Songea 49,303 86,880 3.4 11.0
Sumbawanga 57,802 91,972 4.3 13.2
Tabora 12,768 15,361 21,012 67,392 93,506 2.1 2.7 4.5 2.4 9.2
Tanga 20,619 38,053 61,058 143,878 187,155 4.8 5.9 2.7 2.1 14.5
Source: Compiled by the author from various sources, Berry, L., 1990, 'Tanzania: Physical and Social Geography', in Africa South of the Sahara, 20th ed., London: Europa Publications, p. 1009; Stren, R.E., 1975, Urban Inequality and Housing Policy in Tanzania: The Problem of Squatting, Berkeley: University of California, p.23; Kulaba, S. M., 1989, 'Local Government and the Management of Urban Services in Tanzania, in Stren, R. E., and White, R. R., eds, African Cities in Crisis: Managing Rapid Urban Growth, Boulder: Westview University Press, p.210)
Although the 1990s national population census is yet to be conducted, the
UNDP estimate that in 1992 the urban population of Tanzania constituted 24
per cent, 6.5 million of the total 27.9 million population (UNDP 1994; World
Bank, 1996). Projections by the World Bank show that by the year 2000, the
country's urban population will constitute 40.5 per cent of the estimated total
population of 33 million people (World Bank, 1992). It should be stressed that
this rapid rate of urbanisation is taking place within a context of a rapid natural
population increase. Thus, in terms of absolute numbers it can be seen that
Tanzania's urban population has been growing at an extremely fast pace.
Factors Accounting for Urbanisation in Tanzania
The significant growth of the urban population in Tanzania is the direct result of
four major factors. These are rural-urban migration, natural population increase
of the urban population, a change in the geographical boundaries of urban areas,
and post-independence urban development strategies including decentralisation
of industrial development from Dar es Salaam to selected growth centres and
the transfer of the capital of government from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma
(Hayuma, 1983; Collier et al, 1986; Comoro, 1990; Kaitilla, 1987; Halfani,
1987; Kulaba, 1989; Lugalla, 1990).
Rural to urban migration
Rural-urban migration has been the major factor contributing to urban
population growth in post-independence Tanzania up to the 1970s. In 1967,
rural migrants represented 60 per cent of the total urban population. The 1967
population census showed that in all major towns,· migrants from rural areas
constituted the majority of the urban population. As Table 6.3 shows, in Dar es
Salaam, migrants constituted 67.5 per cent of its total 275,821 population. In
Tanga, migrants constituted 73.1 per cent of the total urban population. The
1978 population census indicated that 70 per cent of the urban population had
migrated from the rural areas (Tanzania Bureau of Statistics, 1978). A similar
situation was observed in the 1980s in studies by Comoro ( 1984: 78) and
Kulaba (1989: 211). The study by Kulaba conducted between 1984-86 for the
six major towns in Tanzania showed that 80 per cent of the population in major
towns were migrants, that is, people who were not born in the towns under
study. Also, Comoro (1984) in his study of squatter settlements in Tanzania
132
concluded that migrants comprise the predominant population of squatter
settlements.
Table 6.3: Percentage of Migrant in the Populations of Ten Selected Towns
in the 1967 Census
Town Total Population Percentage Migrant to Total Urban Population
Arusha 32,452 70.0
Dar es Salaam 272,821 67.5
Dodoma 23,559 73.1
Iringa 21,746 60.1
Mbeya 12,479 68.4
Morogoro 25,262 68.0
Mtwara/Mikindani 20,413 61.5
Mwanza 34,861 59.2
Tabora 21,012 59.6
Tanga 611058 73.1
Source: Claeson, C., and B. Egero., 1971, 'Movement to Towns in Tanzania: Tables and Comments', BRALUP Research Notes No. 11: I, Dar es Salaam: BRALUP, p.91.
Rural to urban migration in Tanzania is a result of both pull and push factors.
Pull factors are those which attract people from the areas outside the urban
centres. Push factors are those which force people to move to the urban areas.
With regard to pull factors, the perceived presence of social and economic
opportunities in urban areas has attracted people from rural areas to migrate to
urban areas. The social and economic factors in urban Tanzania that have pulled
rural migrants include employment opportunities, family already there,
relatively good quality educational and health facilities, and the presence of
higher per capita incomes as well as higher standards of living.
133
Decline in agricultural output and significant falls in rural income have been
major factors pushing rural dwellers to urban areas. From the mid-1960s,
Tanzania's rural economy has experienced difficulty and has been declining due
to factors such as the adverse terms of international trade for the major cash
crops and vagaries of nature such as drought. These factors have been
complemented by the disincentives generated by burgeoning bureaucratic
overheads and operational inefficiencies, and the global recession of the early
1970s (Harris, 1984; Halfani, 1987: 8; Mulokozi et al, 1989: 192-194). The
difficulties experienced by the rural economy adversely affected rural incomes
consequently widening the gap between rural and urban dwellers with respect to
income, and access to education, health, water and other social services (Green,
1979). For instance, from 1969 until 1975 the rising income gap between rural
and urban workers reached a ratio of 1 :3 in favour of the latter. Even the urban
minimum wage was higher than a small-holder's average income by as much as
63 per cent. By 1975, an urban wage worker earned more than twelve times the
cash income of an average small-holder (Clark, 1978: 97; ILO, 1982: 175;
Collier and Sabot, 1982; Harris, 1984).
The extent of inequality in incomes and standard of living between rural and
urban Tanzania is demonstrated by the presence of a large percentage of rural
dwellers living in poverty. Between 1980 and 1990, 60 per cent of rural
dwellers lived in poverty compared to 10 per cent of urban dwellers (UNDP,
1994: 165). In the same period, a large percentage of the rural population did
not have access to water, basic services and reliable transport networks (Collier
and Sabot, 1982; UNDP, 1994: 149). Rural Tanzania is still characterised by
poor transport and limited availability of even the most basic goods and services
(Collier et al, 1986: 128). It is this high incidence of poverty characterising rural
Tanzania that has encouraged migration to urban areas.
The rural-urban migrants in Tanzania, tend to be mainly young and relatively
educated people with at least primary school education. A large proportion of
the migrant population in urban Tanzania was in the age group of 20-34 years
(Collier and Sabot, 1982). Also migrants are predominantly males of age 20-34
years who constituted 59.2 per cent of the migrant population, while women in
the same age group constituted 39.2 per cent (Stren, 1975a; Temba, 1983: 15).
A similar pattern was observed in a 1980s study of 660 urban households
reported by Kulaba ( 1989: 209).
134
The age and educational characteristics of the migrant population have a
number of implications for urban development and urban poverty. Since a very
high proportion of the migrant population fall under the Tanzania defined
biologically fertile age group (ie 20-34), their migration to urban areas
contributes to further population growth and consequently to more pressure on
housing problems by increasing the demand for more dwellings. Also, the
educational qualifications of the rural-urban migrants are usually insufficient for
entrance to the formal wage sector in urban Tanzania where skilled labour and
those with secondary education and above are required (ILO, 1982: 111-2;
King, 1984 ). As a consequence, the majority of migrant are forced into menial
and casual employment which quite often offer very low wages compared to the
cost of urban living.
Natural urban population increase
The natural growth in population (ie the excess of births over deaths) is another
factor contributing to urban population growth in the country. The average
annual population growth rate is not only high but has been increasing since the
1950s. The annual growth rate of the country's total population rose from 3.0
per cent over the 1948-57 period to 3.3 per cent in the 1988-1994 period, and
the upward trend is likely to continue. The main causes of natural growth in the
country include the increase in life expectancy, the decline in infant mortality,
and high fertility rates (Sembajwe, 1983; Kulaba, 1989: 209; Tanzania Bureau
of Statistics, 1991-92). Improvements in medical facilities, access to education
and other social services such as water, have raised the life expectancy at birth
in Tanzania from 40 years in 1960 to 51 years in 1994. Relatively good quality
medical facilities in urban areas have reduced the infant mortality rates
compared to those of rural areas (Mbago, 1975; Sembajwe, 1985).
The persistently high fertility rate (6.5 children per woman in 1988, and 6.8 in
1992) is a major reason for the rapid rate of natural increase. This is partly due
to the fact that 51 per cent of the female population is in the reproductive age
group of 15-44 years (Tanzania Bureau of Statistics, 1991-92; UNDP, 1994:
175). High fertility rates in Tanzania obviously have an impact on the urban
population. Taking Dar es Salaam as an example, high fertility rates have
contributed to it recording birth rates of about 90 to 100 births per day (Kulaba,
1985a).
135
High natural population growth rates have resulted in the country's population
doubling in the 28 years between 1960 and 1988 (Tanzania Bureau of Statistics,
1988). Such rapid increase of the total population has had a major impact on
urban population growth by giving it a considerable boost. For example, in the
period between 1970 and 1975, the share of urban growth resulting from natural
population increase was 36 per cent (Kulaba, 1989; Lugalla, 1990). Even
without rural-urban migration, natural population growth would have doubled
the urban population approximately every 30 years.
Urban sprawl
Urban sprawl is another major factor contributing to urban growth in Tanzania.
This has occurred through extension of urban boundaries and by according rural
areas urban status. Extension of urban boundaries in Tanzania has contributed
to the rapid growth of cities like Dar es Salaam, Mwanza and Mbeya. In the
case of Dar es Salaam, the gradual expansion of its boundaries which began in
the late 1950s, increased its area from 543 to 1,223 square kilometres. The
expansion of boundaries brought into the area more than 50 villages with a total
population of 300,000 people (Comoro, 1984: 97; Armstrong, 1987).
Extension of urban boundaries into their surrounding rural areas has had a
number of implications with regard to land and services in Tanzania. One result
of the urban sprawl has been the incorporation of the traditional or customary
land ownership and management systems of surrounding rural areas into the
urban area thus making urban land management problems even more complex
(Kaitilla, 1987; Kironde, 1992). The traditional or customary land tenure
systems have become the dominant mode of land allocation in the expanded
urban areas making it difficult for the state to effect its urban land use policies.
Furthermore, large numbers of people brought within urban boundaries by their
extension into rural areas, have added strain to the limited resources at the
disposal of the urban areas (Kulaba, 1989).
Post-independence policies and urban development strategies
The post-independence urban strategies in Tanzania were greatly influenced by
the socialist policies adopted in 1967. The Second Five Year Development Plan
(Tanzania-SFYDP), promulgated after the pronouncement of socialist policies,
136
contained strategies which envisaged the eradication of various inequalities
between rural and urban areas, and within and between urban areas. To remove
inequality between rural and urban areas, the government incorporated a
'growth-pole' strategy in the Tanzania-SFYDP. The objectives of this strategy
were to restrain the overall rate of urban population growth and to reduce
dependence on major cities such as Dar es Salaam by distributing urban
population and industrial growth among urban centres to maximise their
development impact on rural areas. An attempt was also made to maintain a
general level of well-being in towns consistent with the requirement of an
equitable urban-rural balance and satisfactory work performance by the urban
community (Tanzania-SFYDP, 1969: 176; Armstrong, 1987: 30). The nine
towns of Arusha, Dodoma, Mbeya, Morogoro, Moshi, Mtwara, Mwanza,
Tabora, and Tanga were identified as centres for industrial growth (See Figure
6.1). Consistent with this policy, in 1973 the government decided to transfer the
central government capital to the centrally located town of Dodoma (Gambishi,
1983: 3).
Seven of the nine growth-pole towns experienced an increase in the number of
industries following the implementation of the strategy. For example, the
number of industries in Arusha and Morogoro had increased to 35 and 23 by
1975 from 6 and 3 respectively between 1961 and 1969 (Gambishi, 1983: 15).
However, the overall picture was one of uneven industrial development
experienced by the seven towns resulting from the unequal allocation of
industrial development investments by the state.
137
re 6.1: Tanzania's Urban Growth Decentralisation Stratei=Y, The Growth Poles
UGANDA
. ma .· ... ,...,..__ .. ~..,,,,.-:_• ~
r• .. ·" ..... :1
• ny" Mpanda
~\\_, n a
'.AIRE\\. .... ·-~· :•
Z.Al'-!6IA
LEGEND
Q Growth Poles • Other Towns •·· Roi.iway
Road
nqa A ~
KENYA
rnbo
z1bor
mayo \<bJ.'r\~
\._ ... -Mafia lringa tJ
Nac.hing,11ea
MOZAM81QUE
o 100 200 Joo 400 r,oo Km
111rce: Tanzania, Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (iYILHUD), 1976, Surveys and Mapping Division, Dares Salaam; iYILHUD
138
This unevenness had a number of implications for the prevailing socialist
urbanisation strategy. In towns like Arusha and Morogoro the strategy resulted
in a rapid increase in the number of industries, and hence employment
opportunities. The presence of these employment opportunities attracted
immigrants who created pressure on housing and other services. The ensuing
failure of these towns to provide the required services was manifested in the
growing number of squatter houses near the industrial estates. These areas
include Msamvu and Kichangani in Morogoro; Unga Limited, Sinoni and
Ngarenaro in Arusha; Nyakato in Mwanza; and Mwanjelwa in Mbeya (Lugalla,
1990: 211). Thus, rather than restraining urban population growth, the growth
pole strategy in Tanzania initiated a 'premature' or 'over' urbanisation (Potter,
1985: 12). Premature urbanisation refers to a situation 'whereby rural-urban
migration leads to a less than optimal allocation of labour between the rural and
the urban sectors and also where rural-urban migration increases the cost of
providing for a country's growing population' (Gugler, 1982: 173-174).
Moreover, by favouring certain growth-pole centres in the allocation of
industrial development investments the government created unequal regional
development not just between the privileged growth-pole centres, but also
between the growth-pole centres and other towns which were not included in
the strategy. This created inequality rather than reducing it which was an
objective of the growth-pole policy.
The major weakness of the growth-pole strategy was its failure to enhance
development in rural areas surrounding the nine growth-pole towns. According
to the SFYDP the growth-pole towns were to stimulate economic and social
development in their rural hinterlands by creating demands for rural produce
and extending investments to these areas, thus reducing rural-urban migration.
The trickle-down effect envisaged under the SFYDP could not be realised
because investments tended to concentrate in town centres and did not
necessarily stimulate rural production. In the SFYDP the trickle down process
was to be automatically initiated by increased economic activity at the growth
poles. The plan did no spell out the modality of achieving the trickle-down
effect should it not happen automatically. This failure contributed to the
inability of the growth-pole strategy to enhance rural development.
139
As already mentioned in earlier chapters, other measures taken by the post
independence government such as the decentralisation of government in 1972,
and the transfer of the capital of government from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma in
1976 also had a telling effect on urbanisation. The transfer of the capital of
government from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma in 1976 contributed to rapid
urbanisation of Dodoma and its surrounding areas. Between 1967 and 1978 the
population of Dodoma grew at 13 per cent per annum, its population growing
from 23,500 people in 1967 to 203,800 in 1988, making it the third largest town
in the urban hierarchy of Tanzania (see Table 6.2).
It can be therefore argued that the overall post-independence growth-pole
strategy adopted by the government did not achieve its intended objectives of
decentralising urban population and industrial growth from Dar es Salaam
(Brain, 1979; Banyikwa, 1985). This is because Dar es Salaam continued to
grow faster than the growth-poles (see Table 6.2). The rapid and considerable
population growth in urban Tanzania greatly increased the demand for social
services such as housing, surface water drainage, sanitation and sewerage
(Stren, 1975a; Kulaba, 1985a; Lugalla, 1990; Kironde, 1992; Mosha, 1995).
Since housing -is the focus of this thesis, the following section will concentrate
on the resulting housing problems in urban Tanzania.
Urban Housing Problems
Tanzania like many other developing countries has had a longstanding housing
crisis in its towns and cities. This is exemplified by housing shortages and the
appalling social and physical conditions of housing in the country's major
regional towns noted in many studies such as Mascarenhas (1973), Stren
(1975), Mascarenhas and Mascarenhas (1976), Mgullu (1978) Mghweno
(1979), Hayuma (1979), Schmetzer (1980), Gabrielsen (1981), Kulaba (1981),
Kalabamu ( 1985), Matern ( 1986), Halfani ( 1987), Lugalla (1990), Kiron de
( 1992) and Mosha ( 1995).
Housing shortages
A wide gap exists between the need for housing and its availability in urban
areas in Tanzania producing a housing shortage of staggering proportions. A
number of indicators is used by the state agency responsible for housing, the
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD), to measure
140
housing shortages in urban areas. The most common ones include (i) the
difference between the increase in the number of households per annum, (ii) the
increase in the number of public housing stock per annum, (iii) the number of
existing housing units awaiting replacement, (iv) the number of people applying
for public housing, (v) the number of people applying for building plots, and
(vi) the number of people applying for housing loans. There is limited
information on urban housing shortage indicators with data available only for
the increase in number of households per annum and the increase in the number
of public housing stock per annum.
Available information indicates that he supply of housing units by public
housing institutions has been increasing at a very slow pace compared to the
increase in the number of urban households. A household as used in this section
refers to a group of two or more persons who occupy the whole or part of a
housing unit and share their consumption. Usually this will be the husband,
wife and children. Other relatives, boarders, visitors and persons should be
included as members of the household if they pool their resources (Tanzania
Bureau of Statistics, 1991-92). In the period between 1967 and 1978, 11,867
housing units were constructed by public housing institutions (Matern, 1992:
11-12). During the same period the number of urban households increased from
190,303 - ie at 3.6 persons per household) to 537,600 - ie at 4.2 persons per
household - (Temba, 1983: 57). As Table 6.4 shows, all major towns recorded
substantial increases in the number of households between 1978 and 1988. As a
result of these increases it was estimated that at least 347,297 (537,600 less
190,000) new housing units were required from the public housing institutions
compared to the 11,867 actually provided (Tanzania Central Statistical Bureau,
1967; Tanzania Bureau of Statistics, 1978; Kulaba, 1981: 22).
141
Table 6.4: Growth in Number of Urban Households Between 1978 and
1988
Town
Arusha
Dar es Salaam
Dodoma
Iringa
Mbeya
Morogoro
Moshi
Mtwara/Mikindani
Mwanza
Tabora
Tanga
1978
15,001
188,852
9,279
12,622
17,486
15,260
13,251
11,883
26,316
15,432
24,369
Number of Households
1988
31,496
533,103
244,684
248,479
297.636
227,705
205,302
198,726
42,722
180,129
40,722
Source: Tanzania Bureau of Statistics, 1978, National Population Census Report, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer; Tanzania Bureau of Statistics, 1988, National Population Census Report, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer.
The housing shortage worsened in the 1980s. According to MLHUD's
estimates, between 1982 and 1983 the demand for housing in the major regional
towns of Tanzania was for 479,500 units of which 431,500 were of the low-cost
type and 48,000 were medium-cost. Dar es Salaam alone needed 90,000 low
cost housing units and 10,000 medium cost (MPEA, 1989; Mosha, 1995).
Housing shortage is still a major problem for towns in the 1990s. MLHUD's
estimates for urban housing requirements in the 1990s show that in 1992 Dar es
Salaam needed 600,000 houses (Daily News, 8 October 1991; Kulaba, 1989:
226). Projections for the year 2000 suggest that at least 2.2 million new housing
units will be required to meet the needs of the urban population (Kulaba, 1981:
23; Mosha, 1995: 341).
142
Squatter housing
The shortage of new public housing has made the private sector and particularly
squatter settlements the major sources of housing for the majority of the urban
population. By 1992, squatter housing constituted 60 per cent of all housing
units in urban areas and accommodated approximately 85 per cent of the urban
population (MLHUD, 1993: 1). The proportion of squatter housing to other
forms of housing varies between towns. For instance, in Dar es Salaam squatter
housing constituted more than 80 per cent of all housing units in 1995 (Business
Times, 15 December 1996). To understand the extent to which squatter housing
has contributed to urban housing in the country, trends in squatter housing
development in urban Tanzania are now discussed.
Since independence in 1961, squatter settlements m Tanzania have been
growing rapidly. While the growth of squatter settlements was less than 2 per
cent per year in larger urban areas like Dar es Salaam in the 1950s, the growth
rate rose after independence (Ndjovu, 1980: 71). A 1969 study of Dar es Salaam
counted 14,720 squatter houses, a number which had increased to 27,981, 40
per cent of the population by 1972 (Stren, 1975b: 49). In 1976, the number of
squatter houses had increased to 40,000. By 1990, the number of squatter
settlements in Dar es Salaam had increased to 42, accommodating more than 70
per cent of its total population of about 2.5 million people (Misigaro, 1994).
Figure 6.2 demonstrates the extent of squatter housing in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania's primate city. Other major towns like Dodoma and Mwanza have also
experienced growth of their squatter settlements as well as increases in the
percentage of population living in such settlements. In 1980, over 20,000
people, approximately 20 per cent of Dodoma's population, were living in
squatter housing (Sunday News, 25 November 1987). In 1987, between 40 and
50 per cent of the total population of Dodoma of about 203,833 were squatters
(Tanzania-CDA, 1987).
143
Fieure 6.2: Urban Squatter Settlements (Unplanned Housine) in Dar es Salaam
·.· .
LEGEND
!z'm .......... UNPLANNED HOUSING
I/-':! ........ OTHER BUILT-UP
- . , ••.•• , MAJOR ROA OS
-t-t+t- , . , . , , . RAILWAY LINES
~- ••••• ,, CITY CENTRE (CBO)
0 4Km. ---=~-~=l
2 J
Indian Ocean
Source: Tanzania, Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 1990·, Town Planning, unpublished material. Dar es Salaam
144
In 1975, there were 72,500 squatter housing units m all the major towns,
accommodating about 1.7 million people at an average of 20 persons per
housing unit (Stren, 1979: 196). It is estimated that at least 60 to 80 per cent of
the total urban population lived in squatter settlements in the period between
1980 and 1990 (Gabrielsen, 1981; Stren and White, 1989; Comoro, 1984: 56;
Matern, 1986: 121; Mosha, 1995).
Characteristics of squatter housing in urban Tanwnia
Squatter housing contributed to Tanzania's housing problems because its
condition fails to meet the basic requirement to promote human development.
Gilbert and Gugler (1982: 82) have warned that judgements on housing
conditions need to take into account the cultural, social and environmental
conditions of the country under diSClJSSion. Nevertheless, the levels of
household density, service provision and physical quality of the squatter
settlements in Tanzania leave much to be desired even in terms of the country's
aspirations for a healthy and safe living environment. The following sections
are devoted to discussing some of these issues.
Household density
Squatter settlements in the major towns of Tanzania have been and still are
densely populated. There are no nationwide figures, but those available for Dar
es Salaam are illustrative. In 1967, Manzese - Dar es Salaam's then largest
squatter area - had an average density of 85.9 persons per acre, increasing to
160 persons per acre in 1978 (Tanzania Central Statistical Bureau 1968; PPAL,
1968; Schmetzer, 1982: 500-502). Since Dar es Salaam's population has
continued to grow rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s it is likely that the population
density in the squatter area has also continued to increase.
The population density of 160 persons per acre is not a problem if the type of
housing in these squatter areas was of the high-rise type found in places such as
Hong Kong or Singapore (Yeh and Laquian, 1979). The population density of
610 persons per sq.km is a problem in the squatter settlements of Tanzania
because buildings in these settlements are typically single-storey housing units,
which are densely populated, inadequately serviced and with little space
between them (Matern, 1986; Lugalla, 1990). For example, in 1971 Manzese,
Dar es Salaam's largest squatter settlement area, had 6,869 houses with a total
145
of 28,850 rooms or dwelling units. These accommodated about 63,470 people,
at an official occupancy rate of 2.4 persons per habitable room of IOm2. The
high population density per land area as well as per housing unit which
characterises the squatter settlement areas of Tanzania, resulted in high degrees
of overcrowding. While studies of the 1970s and 1980s such as (Kulaba, 1981;
Matern, 1986) indicated that in these squatter areas more than 2.4 persons
shared a room, a more recent study of Lugalla (1996: 17) in the squatter
settlements ar_eas of Kinondoni-Hananasif and Vingunguti in Dar es Salaam
shows that overcrowding had intensified. The majority of poor families in these
squatter areas had four people living, eating and sleeping in one room.
Such overcrowding has been associated with health problems including malaria,
respiratory diseases, scabies, diarrhoea, tuberculosis, influenza and meningitis
(Ntukula, 1984; Kahama, 1986; Lugalla, 1996). Although information on the
extent of these health problems for the 1960s and 1970s is sparse, the 1993
figures show that the incidence of diarrhoea and malaria among children in
urban areas was as high as 19 per cent of children under the age of 5. These two
health problems together with cholera were associated with high rates of infant
mortality and deaths of children below five years of age (Tanzania Bureau of
Statistics, 1988).
Availability and quality of services
The condition of services in squatter settlements shows that population increase
has been greater than the ability of the government or individual urban dwellers
to manage the situation. These squatter settlements have inadequate services for
such items as water, sanitation, surface water drainage, and garbage collection
(Mascarenhas, 1973; Kulaba, 1989; Kironde, 1992). The number of urban
residents without piped water in their houses or access to immediate sources
outside their houses increased from 9 per cent in 1969 to 17 per cent in 1976.
This compares with 64 per cent of households in all urban areas which do not
have access to piped water in their houses but public water standpipes available
in the neighbourhood see Table 6.5.
146
Table 6.5: Urban Housing Standards and Access to Services 1969 and 1976
1969 % 1976 Households Households
Access to piped water: Inside 16,631 21 31,974 19
Outside 55,234 70 105,021 64
None 6,914 9 28,208 17
Electricity 22,484 29 43,085 26
No Electricity 54,417 71 122,118 74
Wall materials
Permanent 27,156 35 44,585 27
Semi-Permanent 51,510 65 120,641 73
Source: Schmetzer, H., 1980, 'Housing in Dar es Salaam,' A Case Study, unpublished Conference Paper, March, Dar es Salaam, p.15.
Access to water continued to be a problem for urban residents in the 1980s. In a
Dar es Salaam study (1984-87), Kulaba (1989: 242) found that, out of the 2.6
thousand households surveyed, 47.1 per cent did not have a piped water supply
either inside or immediately outside their houses. Another 32 per cent reported
a shared piped water supply. Only 20.9 per cent of all the households surveyed
had a private piped water supply. Of the households without a piped water
supply, 67.2 per cent bought water from their neighbours, while 25.7 per cent
drew their water from public kiosks or standpipes. The situation does not seem
to have improved much in the 1990s. Lugalla (1996; 18), found that, in the 400
households of Kinondoni-Hananasif and Vingunguti, 47.6 per cent did not have
piped water in their houses and relied on their neighbours for their supplies;
23.6 per cent drew their water from open wells; and 15.2 per cent obtained
water from public kiosks.
147
%
It should be noted that lack of availability of water in urban areas of Tanzania is
not limited to squatter settlements. Table 6.6 shows that by 1986 water supplies
in all major towns of Tanzania were far below the estimated requirements. As a
consequence, shortages of water have become common with many towns and
cities doing without water for several hours a day or even for days at a time.
Sanitary conditions
The squatter settlements in urban Tanzania are characterised by poor sewage
disposal. The household budget surveys conducted by the government in 1969,
1977 and 1991-92, and the studies of Schmetzer (1980 and 1982), Kulaba
(1989) and Lugalla (1990) confirm this. Schmetzer (1982: 506), in his analysis
of the 1969 household budget survey for Dar es Salaam, found that 87 per cent
of the 6.2 thousand households surveyed were using pit latrine toilets, the
common type of toilet system in squatter settlement areas as well as in public
low-cost housing which did not have piped water attached. Despite this lack of
water, the pit latrines were also used as bathrooms and garbage pits.
Table 6.6: Water Supply, Consumption and Present Demand in Selected
Towns, 1986
Urban Area Water Actualt Actual Estimated Demand Supplied (m ) Consumption (m3) inm3
Dar es Salaam 182,000 182,000 264,000
Mbeya 7,430 n.a 23,587
Morogoro 28,275 n.a n.a
Moshi 12,600 10,710 15,600
Tabora 10,000 10,000 18,500
Tanga 221500 21!602 26!100
Source: Kulaba, S., 1989, 'Local Government and the Management of Urban Services in Tanzania', in Stren, R. E and White, R. R., eds., African Cities in Crisis: Managing Rapid Urban Growth. Boulder: Westview Press, p.164.
148
Similar appalling sanitary conditions were found in the late 1980s. In his study,
Kulaba ( 1989) found that in Dar es Salaam 88.9 per cent of the 660 houses
surveyed had simple pit latrines dug into the ground and with no piped water.
Another 5.6 per cent had ventilated improved latrines while only 4.5 per cent
had toilets connected to either septic tanks or a sewerage multiple system.
Families sharing a single toilet or latrine accounted for 60.7 per cent of those
surveyed. Findings from Dodoma are not dissimilar to those of Dar es Salaam.
In Dodoma, 67 per cent of the total housing units had pit latrines with no piped
water (Kulaba, 1989: 220).
Poor sanitary conditions are still prevalent in squatter settlement areas of urban
Tanzania in the 1990s. The household budget survey conducted in 1991-92
showed that in Dar es Salaam 83.16 per cent of households in squatter
settlements had pit latrines which did not have piped water (Tanzania Bureau of
Statistics, 1991-92: 25). In other towns about 81.3 and 93.2 per cent of
households used pit latrines dug into the ground even in the 1990s (Lugalla,
1996). Results reported in Lugalla ( 1996) were based on a survey of 400
households. The survey found that the persons per household was 5.2 in the two
densely populated squatter areas of Kinondoni-Hananasif and Vingunguti in
Dar es Salaam. Around 84 per cent had pit latrines, 9.4 per cent had flush
toilets; 5.2 did not have any toilet, and 0.2 did not respond. Furthermore,
approximately 59 per cent of the households with pit latrines used them as
bathrooms as well as garbage pits.
The high percentage of squatter residents using pit latrines without piped water
needs to be taken seriously because of its adverse impact on hygiene conditions.
Studies of Schmetzer (1980 and 1982), Kulaba (1989) and Lugalla (1996)
reveal that in most cases the pit latrines were not properly cared for. Most have
been observed to be overflowing due to excessive use and because they (64 per
cent in Dar es Salaam) do not receive cesspit emptying services as the
households could not afford to pay the city council. Even those who could
afford cesspit emptying services could not actually use them because the Dar es
Salaam city council was unable to provide trucks for emptying the pit latrines
(Kulaba, 1989: 224). The rise in the water table during the rainy season further
compounded the problem of overflowing pit latrines. Such overflowing has
tended to contaminate shallow sources of water supply as well as open pit wells
from which people draw water for washing and cooking. In most cases, pit
149
latrines' holes are not covered by lids, allowing easy movement of flies from
latrines to the kitchen to food stalls and elsewhere.
Physical condition of squatter housing
The physical condition of housing in squatter settlement areas of Tanzania
demonstrates further the magnitude of the urban housing problems. Although
the Swahili housing design which constitutes 90 per cent of the housing in the
squatter settlements is compatible with the culture of accommodating extended
families, the type of building materials used for construction and also the layout
of such houses leaves much to be desired (Benjamin, 197 la: 3; Lugalla, 1990
and 1996). A Swahili house, using a variety of different materials and built to a
variety of standards, contains 4-6 rooms on either side of a 5 feet wide central
corridor. Across the enclosed yard at the rear will be a kitchen and toilet,
usually apit latrine, and probably further accommodation in the outside adjacent
to the toilet. A lot of cooking is done in the yard itself. Overall sizes vary but
rooms average about 120 sq.ft.
The household budget surveys of 1969, 1977 and 1991-92 indicate that most of
the housing units in squatter settlement areas of urban Tanzania are built out of
simple and semi-permanent materials like mud, sticks, poles, mangrove trees,
thatched grass and old recycled metal materials. In Dar es Salaam in 1969, of
the total 83,400 households recorded in the city, 57.4 per cent resided in semi
permanent structures, 5.7 per cent were in other structures, and only 34.8 per
cent were in permanent structures (Tanzania Central Statistical Bureau, 1969).
The 1991-92 household budget survey indicates substantial improvement with
regard to the use of concrete cement rather than earth as flooring materials for
housing in urban areas. This improvement is shown by only 0.47 per cent of
housing units having earth floors in Dar es Salaam. The percentage was 42.37.
in other towns. Also, the use of poles, branches and grass had declined from the
earlier surveys, while the use of poles and mud, and mud blocks had increased.
However, such improvements have occurred mainly in upgraded areas, which
constitute a small proportion of squatter settlements. In some squatter areas the
situation with regard to poor structure has remained unchanged in the 1990s.
This is confirmed by Lugalla (1996) in a study of two major squatter areas in
Dar es Salaam, which found that 77 per cent of the total 400 households
150
surveyed were living in housing units built out of simple and impermanent
materials.
While housing built from semi-permanent materials might be compatible with
the low incomes of their dwellers, such housing is vulnerable to the vagaries of
bad weather and could be washed away in rains storms as was the case in May
1993 when about 20 houses constructed with poor building materials and
accommodating approximately 416 people in Dar es Salaam were washed away
by heavy rains (Daily News, 6 May 1993).
Renters' conditions
The most common feature of the squatter housing in Tanzania is the absence of
contracts or any written agreements between renters and landlords. This absence
of contract has subjected renters to harsh living conditions such as eviction
without notice and invasion of privacy (Ndjovu, 1980; Mwakasendo, 1980).
The issue of conditions of tenancy in squatter housing is extremely important
because renters have over a period of time constituted the majority of residents
(Tanzania Bureau of Statistics, 1988). Taking Dar es Salaam as an example, in
1967, renters constituted 62.5 per cent of the total households. It must however
be noted that there are variations in the proportion of renters to owners. For
example, in the squatter area of Kinondoni-Hananasif in Dar es Salaam renters
constituted only 40 per cent of the total population of 12,000 inhabitants
compared with 62.5 per cent in Dar es Salaam (Comoro, 1980; Kyessi, 1990;
Misigaro, 1994).
The discussion on housing conditions in squatter settlement areas of urban
Tanzania has clearly demonstrated that housing in these settlements is of poor
quality reflecting conditions of abject poverty and squalor. To understand why
squatter housing in Tanzania is of poor quality it is pertinent to review the
social and economic characteristics of squatter residents. Such a review also
helps us to contextualise the NSSP in terms of the broader features of
Tanzania's urban society.
The Socio-economic Characteristics of Squatter Residents
There are various socio-economic characteristics of squatter residents in
Tanzania which are relevant to their poor housing situation. These include
151
employment and informal sector employment. These characteristics are
discussed in the following sections.
Employment
Information on employment and unemployment for urban Tanzania is sparse.
This is because statistics provided by the Tanzania Bureau of Statistics and the
Ministry of Manpower Development are unreliable as they do not include
persons employed in informal sectors and certain categories of employees such
as domestic workers and seasonal workers like sugar-cane cutters and coffee
and tea pickers. Moreover the statistics are not available annually and are in
most cases dated. For example, the most recent statistics on employment and
unemployment are for the pre-1984 period. Notwithstanding their shortcomings,
lack of availability of other sources of information on employment and
unemployment makes the above sources useful for the purposes of this study.
Information in Table 6.7 shows that the majority of squatter residents in urban
Tanzania eke out a living from irregular activities which generate very low
incomes. Between 1967 and 1988, the majority of the economically active
urban population were engaged in the informal sector either as self-employed or
as employees. This group was rising as a proportion of the total labour force
between the three census years. Furthermore, the figures in Table 6.7 show a
large proportion of the economically active urban population is hired on either a
temporary or casual basis. The inclusion of both casual and temporary
employment under formal sector employment as was done in the two census
years of 1967 and 1978 means that overall employment figures need to be
viewed with caution. Due to the irregularity of their employment, casual and
temporary workers are either forced to supplement their incomes by operating
in the informal sector or remain unemployed until they get another job.
The employment profile in urban Tanzania has changed little in the 1990s. The
1991 informal sector survey conducted jointly by the Planning Commission and
the Ministry of Labour and Youth Development found that of the total 9.2
million rural and 1.7 million urban labour force, 22 per cent (2.3 million) were
engaged in the informal sector. And of the total informal sector labour force, 56
per cent (1.3 million) were in urban areas (Madihi, 1991: 1-5). The informal
sector constituted approximately 75.8 per cent of the urban labour force, that is
1.3 to 1.7 million people.
152
Table 6.7: Economically Active Population in Urban Centres, 1967,
1978 and 1988
Sector
Formal
Informal
1967 (Economically Active in 12 major Towns)
Classification
Regular Employment (Permanent and Temporary)
Casual
All
1978
Number of eo le
104,500
23,500
71,000
(Economically Active in 12 major Towns)
Percentage
48
11
34
Sector Classification Number of Percentage eo le
Formal Permanent 400,811 40
Temporary 100,683 10
Casual 28,285 3
Informal Own Account 380,426 38
Unpaid Family Worker 91407 9
153
Table 6.7: Economically Active Population in Urban Centres, 1967,
1978 and 1988 (Continued)
1978 (Economically Active in 12 major Towns)
Sector Classification Number of Percentage eo le
Formal Employer 33,197 1.09
Employee 630,873 20.8
Informal Own Account 1,079,328 35.55
Unpaid Family Worker 39,734 1.31
Not stated Others 14,175 0.466
Not stated 1238,777 40.8
ource: Tanzania Central Statistical Bureau, 1967, National Population Census Report 1967, Dar es Salaam: Government; Tanzania Bureau of Statistics, National Population Census Reports 1978 and 1988, Dar es Salaam: Government.
154
The 1991 labour survey needs to be taken with caution because unlike the
national population census its definition of informal sector ignores the
complexities and dynamics of the sector and its participants. The National
Informal Sector Survey (Tanzania-NISS) defines the informal sector as:
constituting of urban and rural, non-farm, small scale, self employed activities, with or without hired labour. Typically they operate with low level of organisation, low capital, low technology and often on temporary premises. They usually are not supported by formal financing institutions, and are not usually measured in official government statistics (1991: 3-7).
The NISS definition does not include certain categories of informal sector
employees such as domestic workers and sex workers (Gilbert, 1991: 3-9). Sex
workers, commonly known as prostitutes in Tanzania, are not officially
acknowledged by the Tanzanian government because the law (see Section 176
of the Penal Code) describes them as idle and disorderly persons putting them
in the same category as criminals. However, they have contributed to the local
economies of their areas (Mbah, 1979; Lugalla, 1990). The Kondo area of
Kunduchi in Dar es Salaam is a classic case of an area whose popularity and
development have emerged from among others the activities of the tourist
hotels and the sex industry. In Kondo area, sex workers constitute a large
proportion of landlords, renters and owners of small businesses such as food,
drinks and vegetable kiosks (Lugalla, 1990).
In addition, by excluding farming activities the NISS definition fails to
appreciate their importance in urban areas of Tanzania. For example, that
commercial vegetable growing in Dar es Salaam has been the major source of
livelihood for certain categories of low income groups is demonstrated by the
number of individuals who have invaded open spaces along the major city roads
and turned them into commercial vegetable gardens (Lugalla 1990; Kironde,
1992).
To understand why the housing conditions of the urban poor in Tanzania have
continued to deteriorate despite their participation in the informal economic
activities it is important to review the characteristics of the activities, incomes
and conditions of work in the informal sector. It should be noted that the
presence of a large proportion of urban dwellers participating in the informal
sector would not be a problem if the incomes and the activities were regular and
covered the cost of living in urban Tanzania.
155
Characteristics afiinformal sector employment in Tanzania
Lack of comprehensive statistics on employers and employees in the informal
sector, as well as data on the complexities of the informal sector organisation
make it difficult to come to any definitive conclusions. However, information
from Halfani (1987), Lugalla (1990), and Malyamkono and Bagachwa (1990)
makes it possible to draw some general observations on the characteristics of
informal sector activities in Tanzania.
These studies show that the majority of participants in the informal sector are
employees who are mainly unskilled and uneducated. Taking the case of six
squatter settlements studied by Lugalla to illustrate the point, as shown in Table
6.8, unskilled labourers on irregular jobs and repair jobs constituted the
majority of workers in the study areas: 44.5 per cent of the households in
Arusha; 38.9 per cent in Dodoma; 34.0 per cent in Dar es Salaam and 40.0 per
cent in Mbeya. These types of employment provide earnings that are too low to
cover the cost of living of an average family of five people (Tanzania Central
Statistical Bureau, 1977).
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive information on the incomes received
for each type of informal sector activity. However, figures from a study
conducted by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development on the
distribution of wage income in two squatter areas of Dar es Salaam and
Dodoma serve to illustrate the relationship between types of informal activity
and their financial returns. As shown in Table 6.9, the majority of households in
the two squatter areas earned not more than Tshs 599. This was lower than the
minimum wage earned in the formal sector which was Tshs 3,500. Table 6.9
proves the point that low earnings are characteristic of the type of economic
activities in which the majority of the squatter residents are engaged.
156
Table 6.8: Household Occupation in Six Squatter Settlements 1992
Arusha Dodoma Dar es Salaam Mbeya
No. of No. of No. of No. of H.holds % H.holds % H.holds % H.holds %
Petty Traders 10 13.3 8 11.1 21 10.2 13 17.3
. Internal sector :aftsmen 17 2.27 13 18.1 39 18.9 13 17.3
. Unskilled labourers )n irregular jobs) 16 21.3 11 15.3 35 16.99 17 22.7
. Unskilled labourers Jepair jobs) 18 24 17 23.6 34 16.5 10 13.3
. Skilled workers lrmation section 4 5.3 18 25 27 13.1 12 16 ow income)
. Skilled workers in )rmal sector (middle 7 13 13 6.3 nd high income)
. Landlords 3 4 23 11.2 5 6.7
otal 75 83.2 67 93 192 93.2 70 93.3
ource: Lugalla, J., 1995, Crisis, Urbanisation and Urban Poverty in Tanz.ania: A Study of Urban Poverty and Survival Politics. Lanham, MD: University Press, p.90.
157
With regard to complexities in the organisation of the informal sector activities,
Lugalla ( 1990) showed that many of the street vendors in Dar es Salaam who in
official records appear as owners of the activities, in reality were fronting for
the true owners, mainly public servants and major Indian shop owners. For
example, the boys who were selling clothing and electrical items in the streets
were employed by the big shop owners of Samora A venue and Kariakoo.
The study also found that many of the informal sector enterprises were financed
and owned by people who were either employed in the formal sector or owned
licensed business activities. The 1971 leadership code prohibiting public
servants from engaging in and obtaining income from more than one source was
likely to be the major factor for public service employees to use their relatives
and friends to operate their informal activities.
The low incomes provided by the majority of informal sector activities have not
kept pace with the rise in the cost of living in Tanzania. Since the early 1970s,
the cost of living in Tanzania has been rising faster than wages. In the absence
of comprehensive statistics on squatter incomes, a comparison of trends in
increases of the minimum wage and consumer price index is illustrative of the
growing gap between the cost of living and the real value of wages in Tanzania.
For example, in 1978 a family of five (2 adult males, 1 adult female and 2
children) needed a total of Tshs 824.9 on food, drinks, rents, clothing, health
care and household operations. In December 1989, the household needed Tshs
14,767.7 per month to obtain the 1978 level of goods and services (Tanzania
Bureau of Statistics, 1991-92).
158
hie 6.9: Distribution of Wage Income by Area and Percentage of Wage Earners in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma in 1971 and 1976
Dar es Salaam Dodoma
ige Group per Wage Earners 1971 Living in Squatter Wage Living in ,nth in Tanzanian % Settlements % Earners Squatter hs. 1976 Settlements
% %
1)-009 3.8 5.6 !.1
1)-199 17.5 23.1 1.3 2.6
0-299 33.6 38.4 3.1 61.3
0-399 18.5 18.3 56.3 27.7
·0-499 6.4 5.4 17.1 4.8
10-599 4.3 2.7 4.6 1.0
·0-699 3.5 2.1 2.8 0.4
10-799 2.4 1.4 1.9 0.2
)0-899 1.1 0.6 1.5 0.6
)0-999 1.0 0.4 3.4 0.2
)00-1499 3.8 0.4 5.1 0.2
~oo+ 4.1 4.1 1.6 0.05
1urce: Netherwood, A., and R. Netherwood, 1979, 'Low Cost Housing Projects in Dodoma', Report for Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, May, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, p.5.
159
Conclusion
The discussion above has revealed that Tanzania's urban population has been
growing at a consistently rapid pace since 1957 due to one or more of the
following factors: rural-urban migration, natural growth in population and
government political and economic policies. It was further revealed that a large
proportion of Tanzania's urban population resides in squatter settlements
characterised by inadequate services such as water, sanitation and surface
drainage. Finally, the majority of urban dwellers participate in the economy
through informal sector activities which provide incomes which are inadequate
to meet the cost of living in Tanzania. Inflation has exacerbated the situation
with rises in the cost of living exceeding wage and income increases. Such low
incomes combined with rising costs of living explain the inability of urban poor
to improve their housing conditions in Tanzania.
160
Chapter Seven
The State and Urban Housing in Tanzania
Having discussed problems of urbanisation and housing in Tanzania, we now
have the context in which to examine policies which have been introduced to
address these problems. This chapter describes and analyses past and present
urban housing policies in Tanzania. The chapter begins with the description and
analysis of the colonial urban housing policies. It then proceeds with the
discussion of the post-colonial urban housing policies except for the sites and
services and squatter upgrading policies.
Colonial Urban Housing Policies
The colonial state's concerns about housing in urban Tanzania were motivated
primarily by political and health factors. The growing insanitary squatter
settlements adjacent to European and Asian residential areas posed a health risk
to their residents prompting the colonial governments to take action.
Furthermore, pressure from the organised Asian and African working class,
particularly those in the public service forced the colonial state to introduce
urban housing polices in favour of that class. These policies had very little to do
with improving the housing conditions of the growing urban poor and a lot to
do with safeguarding the privileges of those in already advantaged class
positions.
Concerns about the health threat posed by the presence of Africans in the urban
centres in colonial Tanzania began in the 1890s when the German colonial
government introduced an urban land policy and subsequent town planning
laws (Segal, 1988; Armstrong, 1987). The colonial land policy declared all
urban land under customary land tenure to be crown land and also introduced
freehold titles giving absolute ownership of land. From the colonial state's view
this policy was necessary not only to enable it to appropriate land for the
161
development of economic, social and political infrastructure but also to
determine the pattern of land use development in its towns and cities.
These colonial town planning laws identified three land uses, namely business,
residential and industrial. Since the concern of this thesis is with housing, the
discussion is limited to the effect of colonial town planning laws on residential
areas. The laws introduced three racially based residential areas: for Europeans,
Asians and Arabs, and Africans. The residential areas were also differentiated
by level and quality of services provided, population densities, and building and
health standards (Iliffe, 1979: 385; Schmetzer, 1980). The differentiation in
level and quality of services decreed for racially based residential areas marked
the beginning of not only inequality in the provision of urban services but also
overcrowding in African residential areas.
Residential areas for Europeans commonly known as uzunguni had lower
population densities compared to the Asian and African residential areas. For
example, the population density in the late 1940s in the European residential
areas of Oyster Bay in Dar es Salaam, Kijenge in Arusha, Isamilo and Capri
Point in Mwanza, Mlimani in Dodoma, Loleza in Mbeya, and Gangilonga in
Iringa was 4 persons per acre. In Asian and African residential areas population
densities were 16 and 40 persons per acre respectively (Brain, 1979: 27;
Comoro, 1984).
There was inequality in the provision of services. Residential areas for
Europeans received adequate and good quality services such as water,
electricity, surface and storm water drainage, sewage connections, well
maintained streets and street lights. The next residential area on the urban
hierarchy was that for Asians and Arabs (Uhindini). The services in the Asian
and Arab residential areas were of lower quality compared to those in the
European residential areas. Residential areas for Africans were the most poorly
serviced, and in most cases were without piped water, electricity, street lights
and sewage systems. In 1944, for example, there were only 24 street lights and
16 water kiosks available to the 56,800 Africans then in Dar es Salaam. There
were also different levels and quality of social services such as schools,
churches, mosques, temples and hospitals for each type of residential area
(Illife, 1979: 386). Again, the African areas received the lowest level and
quality of such services.
162
Different building and zoning laws were imposed for each residential area, with
high standards for European and Asian residential areas. As a result, housing
built out of impermanent materials such as mud-wall, and earth floors were
never allowed in areas designated for Europeans and Asians. It could be argued
that the higher building standards for these areas were aimed at both achieving a
superior quality health environment and also to exclude Africans, the majority
of whom could not afford such standards.
Colonial urban housing policies after 1900 were mainly formulated in response
to pressure from salaried Asian and African workers after a series of strikes by
these two groups forced the colonial state to take an interest in their housing
problems. Various policy measures were introduced, including the Rent
Restriction Act ( 1945) which froze urban rents at 1938 prices in all buildings
constructed before 1945. The act also imposed, a rent ceiling for all rental
properties (Brain, 1979; Campbell, 1987, 1990a). The Rent Restriction Act was
specifically meant to control the Asian business class which had seized the
opportunity created by the housing shortage resulting from the Depression and
the Second World War to force African renters out of the African residential
areas. This was especially so in Dar es Salaam where Asian numbers were
increasing rapidly due to immigration following the British colonial policy of
encouraging wealthy, educated and skilled Asians (mainly from India and
Pakistan) to migrate to the territory. Asian capital was seen as necessary to
boost the territory's economy while educated Asian migrants provided the
colony with a pool of skilled labour, clerks and artisans, previously not
available (Mangat, 1969; Illife, 1979). Many of these new migrants were
illegally renting rooms or entire houses in Kariakoo, an African zone.
The colonial state's housing strategies also involved government intervention in
the land market by acquiring land for residential purposes. This was particularly
the case in Dar es Salaam where three areas (Msasani, Magomeni and Temeke)
which were outside the municipal boundaries were acquired for residences for
Europeans and salaried African workers. The state also became directly
involved in the construction and management of public housing for Asians and
salaried African workers. Thus, in Msasani a complete community of low
density, large European-style single family dwelling units was developed along
the beach. In Changombe, a medium density area, several hundred housing units
were built for mostly bachelor Asian government employees. At Magomeni and
Temeke, between 700 and 900 housing units based on higher densities attained
163
through small, row-type houses were built for Africans under a tenant purchase
scheme (Campbell, 1987; 1990a). This was followed by the provision of
building plots intended for better-off Africans to purchase. However, the higher
land rents and construction costs prevented many Africans from buying the
plots, thus allowing Asian capital owners to dominate the housing market in
these residential areas earmarked for Africans. This was particularly the case in
Magomeni where 150 plots of the total 500 plots were acquired by people of
Asian origin who owned houses elsewhere (Illife, 1979: 386-7; Lugalla, 1990:
144) ..
Two other important colonial urban housing policies were implemented
between 1955 and 1960. These were the construction of public housing for
purchase by tenants and the introduction of African housing loan schemes. Two
of the loan schemes, the African Urban House Loan Scheme (AUHLS) and the
Urban Roof Loans Scheme (URLS) were designed to enable middle and high
income Africans to afford new public houses. The state sponsored housing and
the two housing loans schemes were financed from a revolving fund established
by the colonial state. The rates of interest on AUHLS and URLS varied from
4.5 to 6 per cent which were lower rates than those charged by building
societies. The repayment period was long, up to 20 years. Like the public
housing programs, the two housing loan schemes were administered by urban
local authorities (Bienefeld and Binhammer, 1969; Ndjovu, 1980;
Mwakasendo, 1980).
Despite good intentions, both the AUHLS and the URLS did little to solve the
housing problems of the African urban poor. This was because the requirements
of the loan schemes could not be met by the majority of African urban residents.
Both the A UHLS and the URLS schemes required borrowers to have a
relatively high level of income and security of employment. Moreover, they
required borrowers to provide collateral in the form of property ownership for
the provision of mortgages. Such conditions excluded the majority of Africans
because their incomes were less than the minimum required by the loan
schemes. Also, the majority of Africans did not have secure employment, a
further condition necessary for obtaining the loans. With regard to the levels of
income of the majority of Africans, it is estimated that in the 1950s, 60 per cent
of the employed Africans earned less than Tshs 15 a month. Consequently many
of those Africans who managed to obtain the loans were faced with repayments
beyond their means and they, therefore, often failed to repay the loans, leaving
164
the schemes in permanent arrears. For example, of the total loans of Tshs 2.4
million under the URLS by the end of 1960, there were arrears of nearly Tshs l
million (Binhammer, 1969: 3).
The neglect of the housing problems of poor African urban dwellers could be
blamed partly on the dominance of the European and Asian urban dwellers in
the colonial urban management structures and in the economy. Until 1949, the
membership of township authorities utilised by successive colonial powers to
manage urban areas was confined to ex-officio and non-officio members
appointed by the central state authorities (Max, 1991: 21). Although the law
establishing the township authorities did not stipulate council membership
eligibility criteria, general practice leaned toward nominating members who
were prominent businessmen or formally educated. The introduction of multi
racial and 'popularly' elected local councils in 1949 did not change this bias
towards business and formal educational qualifications (Sperber, 1970: 38). As
the African poor did not possess such characteristics, the township authorities
further institutionalised a stratified socioeconomic and political system.
Rather than providing policies to remedy the housing problems of the African
poor the colonial urban authorities passed draconian measures aimed at
discouraging Africans from residing in urban areas. These measures included
legislation tying workers to employers (Masters and Servants Ordinance) and
the pass laws known locally as the kipande system, which required urban
residents to carry identification cards. Another measure involved levying higher
taxes on urban households as compared to rural households. These measures
ensured that the rural migrants who came to towns met with extremely poor
housing conditions and economic hardships (Campbell, 1990a: 155). The
kipande system not only deterred many rural dwellers from migrating to urban
areas but also forced African urban dwellers without identification cards to
return to rural areas.
The township authorities' urban policies were implemented forcefully in the
planned areas which included residential, commercial, and industrial areas. No
effort was exerted by the township authorities to implement the policies in
unplanned settlements bordering their areas of jurisdiction. Indeed, a high level
of tolerance was demonstrated towards breaching town planning laws in
African residential areas (Stren, 1975a; Comoro, 1984: 29). A number of factors
accounted for such laxity. African squatting in outlying areas was accepted by
165
the urban administrators because it did not put strain on their authorities'
resources. Moreover, the African squatter settlements provided cheap labour to
the urban colonial economy (Campbell, 1990a; Lugalla, 1990). This laxity on
the part of township authorities to enforce their policies together with declines
in rural incomes resulting from the drought, the Depression and World War II,
accelerated rural migration to urban areas which resulted in severe housing
shortages and compounded existing problems of overcrowding and dilapidation
of African residential areas.
Post-Colonial Urban Housing Policies
The independent Tanzanian state inherited an urban system with severe housing
problems for the poor, the vast majority of whom were Africans. It also
inherited an urban African population which was in large part unskilled and
unemployed or undermployed. An additional legacy was an urban land tenure
system which concentrated land ownership in the hands of a small number of
wealthy Europeans and Asians. It was therefore not surprising that the newly
independent state was under intense pressure from various organised African
interest groups, such as the trade union movement, to deliver its independence
promises which included improved housing conditions (Sogga, 1979). As a
result of these pressures there was concern by political office-holders over the
growing influence of Asian capital in the urban housing system (Campbell,
1990a). There were also fears about the increasing number of squatter
settlements and the possibility of political challenge to the newly independent
state by disgruntled squatter residents. The state's fears of political unrest
became reality with increases in trade union strikes and an army mutiny in 1964
(Bienen, 1972).
The above concerns prompted the independent state to adopt various urban
policies, including housing, to address these problems. In discussing these
policies it is possible to distinguish three periods. Although these overlap, there
were substantial shifts in the agenda, and the approach taken to issues on the
agenda during each period. The first period ( 1961-66) was one of paradox in
which both incrementalism and radicalism prevailed. This period saw the
continuation of the colonial urban housing strategies. However, these were
accompanied by the introduction of major changes in urban land ownership.
The second period (1967-1972) was one of major shift in the state's perception
of urbanisation and its accompanying problems. During this period the state
166
assumed a direct and central role in guiding and determining the country's
pattern of urban development, including housing. The third period ( 1980s and
1990s) was one of reassessment in which the state tried to overcome the
deficiencies of the previous urban development approaches (Stein, 1985). The
discussion presented in this section is limited to major urban housing policies
falling within the three distinctive historical periods except for the sites and
services and squatter upgrading approach which is the principal case study of
the thesis and is presented in detail in Chapters Eight and Nine.
Period 1: lncrementalism and Radicalism in Housing Policy (1961-1966)
Incremental urban housing policies
The policies of this period emanated from the adoption of the first three-year
development strategy (1961-64) which was prepared by the colonial state. State
policy on urban housing as stipulated under the 1961-64 strategy, was:
... to provide low-cost housing for renting in the urban areas where private enterprise does not meet the demand; to encourage urban dwellers to own their own houses by means of an experimental tenant purchase scheme; to assist house owners by means of loans, to improve their houses by the construction of roofs in permanent materials (Tanganyika-FfYDP, 1962: 92).
Various strategies including direct production and distribution of low cost
housing, and also provision of low cost housing credit were pursued by the
independent state to achieve the urban housing policy objectives of the FfYDP.
A statutory body, the National Housing Corporation (NHC), was created in
1962 to construct houses or other buildings, to carry out approved housing
schemes and to undertake slum and squatter clearance programs in order to curb
the further spread of squatter settlements and unhygienic housing conditions.
The NHC was also empowered to lend or grant money to local authorities for
the purpose of approved housing schemes to be undertaken by the local
authorities and also to give loans or guarantee loans for any person or body of
persons, for the purpose of enabling such a person or body to acquire land on
which to construct approved houses or other buildings or to carry out approved
housing schemes (NHC, 1962).
The NHC started its first slum clearance program in 1962. Dwellings below the
established technical standards were to be removed and replaced by
standardised low-cost houses (Sheriff, 1985: 11; Grohs, 1972; Nuru, 1990). The
167
slum clearance and resettlement program was concentrated in the city of Dar es
Salaam where many slums were located, and where housing shortage was most
critical (Temba, 1983: 58). In line with its mandate, the NHC pulled down all
housing units which did not fit building regulations in the city centre and
planned areas of Magomeni, Ilala and Kinondoni. In their place flats of four to
six rooms for family occupations and two-room flats for single persons were
built. While records do not provide data on the number of houses demolished, it
is estimated that only 4,429 houses were built to replace the massive clearance
of substandard housing (Binhammer, 1969: 13; Campbell, 1990a: 161). Thus,
this slum clearance program did not increase the number of housing units but
rather reduced the housing units available to low income groups.
The housing units built under the slum clearance program like all other NHC
low cost programs were unaffordable for the majority of the victims of the slum
clearance programs because the rents or prices of the new houses were beyond
their financial reach. The average cost of NHC housing units built under the
slum clearance program was Tshs 15,400 or US$ 3600 in 1969. The monthly
repayment for these houses if purchased under the tenant purchase schemes
over a 20 years period stood at Tshs 103 (US$ 15). Rents ranged between Tshs
64 and 127 per month (Grohs, 1972; Campbell, 1990a: 162). A monthly wage
of at least Tshs 340 was required for buying or renting a low cost house under
the tenant purchase scheme or any other NHC low cost housing program, on the
assumption that a purchaser would not allocate more than 15 per cent of their
income to housing. Approximately 80 per cent of adult male employees in
Tanzania had monthly salaries lower than this, which meant they were unable to
benefit from the NHC programs.
Together with units built under the slum clearance program between 1963 and
1968, the NHC was expected to build a total of 27,800 houses worth Tshs 360
million. Of the Tshs 360 million, 100 million were to be provided by the state
while the remainder, and indeed the bulk of the money, was to be raised from
outside sources including insurance companies and provident funds. In the plan
period, the NHC received only Tshs 69.4 million from the state and only Tshs
19.4 million from outside sources (Kulaba, 1981; Matern, 1992; Mosha, 1995).
At the end of the plan period (ie 1969) the NHC had managed to build only
6,327 housing units, leaving a deficit of 21,000 houses (Halfani, 1987: 65). Of
the 6,327 houses 70 per cent or 4,429 were replacements for the demolished
168
squatter housing, and only 30 per cent or 1,899 houses were additional housing
units. Of the 6,327 houses built by the NHC between 1963 and 1968, 90 per
cent were of minimum standard costing between Tshs 7,700 and Tshs 15,400
per unit, and the rest were medium standard, costing between Tshs 15,460 and
Tshs 35,000 (Bienefeld and Binhammer, 1969: 12). The NHC performance
figures presented above clearly indicate that the corporation was unable to meet
its housing construction targets.
To pursue its other objectives of providing and guaranteeing housing credit for
individuals and institutions involved in low cost housing, the NHC took over
the administration of the two housing loans schemes, the African Urban House
Loan Scheme (AUHLS) and the Urban Roof Loans Scheme (URLS). Even
these two schemes failed to create effective demand from middle income
Africans because of shortages of funds and had to be abolished by the mid-
1960s. This lack of finance was mainly due to the inability of the NHC
borrowers to repay the loans. By the mid 1960s the African Urban House Loan
Scheme, and the Urban Roof Loans Scheme had arrears amounting to Tshs 700
thousand, and Tshs 1 million respectively (Bienefeld and Binhammer, 1969;
Matern, 1992).
Borrower's inability to repay the NHC loans was caused by the corporation's
weakness in its assessment of the social, economic and physical conditions of
the targeted groups as well as their housing. Frequently, loans were made
without adequate assessment of borrower's capacity for repayment (Bienefeld
and Binhammer, 1969). Moreover, housing loans were often directed to housing
which was beyond repair. For example, the physical condition of the housing
units targeted for the Urban Roof Loan Schemes (URSL) were frequently too
poor to support the type of roofing materials stipulated under the scheme. This
led to the collapse of some structures after they were re-roofed with the result
that borrowers were reluctant to repay loans for assets which by then had little
value (Bienefeld and Binhammer, 1969; Ndjovu, 1980).
Other incremental urban housing policies of the 1961-1966 period focused on
reducing state responsibility for providing subsidised housing for civil servants,
by limiting the provision of housing to only certain categories of middle and
senior staff. At the same time, in 1964, the state established a Revolving House
Loan Fund to assist civil servants provide their own housing. The fund was
169
dependent on money from the state and in its initial years it received Tshs 12
million (Bienefeld and Binhammer, 1969; Ndjovu, 1980; Mwakasendo, 1980).
The Revolving House Loan Fund and policies to reduce state responsibility for
providing subsidised housing for certain categories of civil servants did little to
increase housing stock for the growing public service in Tanzania. One reason
for this was that the measures came at a time when a large number of local
officers had been promoted to levels entitling them to public housing. The
usefulness and popularity of the Revolving House Loan Fund was short-lived
because the introduction of the Leadership Code in 1967 prohibited leaders
(civil servants and politicians) from having more than one source of income.
This effectively meant that the Revolving House Loan Fund was restricted
solely to housing for owner occupation.
One final incremental urban housing policy measure taken by the newly
independent state in the 1961-1966 period was that of rent control. In 1962, the
state enacted the Rent Restriction Act which was amended in 1966. The aim of
the Act was twofold: first, to control and restrict rent chargeable by landlords to
a level considered appropriate by the government; and second, to provide
renters with security of tenure. The 1962 Rent Restriction Act fixed rents at 14
and 18 per cent of the initial construction or replacement costs for residential
and commercial premises respectively. A House Rent Tribunal with regional
branches throughout the country was established in the Ministry of Land,
Housing and Urban Development to administer the Rent Restriction Act.
Despite its good intentions the benefits of the Rent Restriction Act were limited
to the renters of public housing where it could be easily implemented. And
since such housing accounted for only a minority (less than 10 per cent) of the
total urban population its contribution was minimal. The majority of the
population rented from the private sector where rents continued to rise and at
times consumed more than 50 per cent of low income earners' wages. For
example, in the 1960s a room in a house featuring such things as cemented
walls and floor, electricity, pit latrine and water was rented for between Tshs
20-40, (US$ 5-10) a month per person, excluding water and electricity bills.
The difference in cost depended on the geographical location of the squatter
area (Ndjovu, 1980: 36). The rent for such a room was between Tshs 40-70 a
month in 1979, Tshs 500-700 in 1988, and between Tshs 1,000-1,500 in 1990s
(Lugalla, 1990: 280; 1996: 17).
170
The Rent Restriction Act also failed to improve tenancy condition for the
majority of urban dwellers since they rented in the private markets where the
Rent Restriction Act was not effective. For example, in Dar es Salaam even to
this day it is not unusual for a renter to be evicted at the landlord's will without
any notification, with landlords taking advantage of the fact that most of the
renters especially in squatter areas, do not know their rights under the Rent
Restriction Act (Ndjovu, 1980: 35). Even if they did, lack of availability of
housing and the state's incapacity to implement the Act continues to force them
to accept whatever tenancy terms are offered by the landlords.
While hardly affecting private housing, the 1962 Rent Restriction Act had a
negative impact on public housing. This was particularly where controlled rents
were reviewed often enough for the rents to keep pace with the rising costs of
building and maintaining the houses. The first review of the NHC rent rates was
in 1984, 22 years after they were first set in 1962. While the NHC's rent rates
remained constant, its costs of production and maintenance of houses had been
rising substantially. For example, construction costs rose at 10 per cent per
annum between 1962 and 1966, and at 13 per cent per annum between 1966 and
1970 (Tanzania National Economic Survey, 1976: 81; Nuru, 1990: 189). At the
same time land rents and service charges rose at an annual rate of 10 per cent
(Kulaba, 1981: 50). The gap between rent and production and running costs
resulting from the Rent Restriction Act financially incapacitated public housing
institutions from continuing with their programs.
Radical land strategies
Radicalism in urban policy in Tanzania commenced in 1963 when the newly
independent state, through the Urban Leasehold Act, terminated the colonial
freehold titles giving absolute ownership of land to private individuals and
organisations, and introduced government leaseholds which vested ownership
of all urban land in the state (Nuru, 1990; Kironde, 1992; Devas and Rakodi,
1993: 110). Previous land owners were obliged to pay rent to the government
and to fulfil the land development conditions. In 1967, the government
introduced the Land Acquisition Act which gave the government a right to
acquire with compensation any land it needed for public uses including low cost
housing, roads and schools (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981: 175). The land
reforms were concluded in 1968 with government's nationalisation of all urban
171
land. The main aim of these land reforms was to eliminate the formal land
market and replacing it with an administrative allocation mechanism to enable
easy access to building land and to facilitate the state's land acquisition for
social and developmental uses such as low income housing (Mwita, 1978;
Potter, 1985; Kaitilla, 1987: 55). The land reforms were also aimed at curbing
land speculation. While the land reforms continued to recognise the customary
land rights of villages around the boundaries of urban areas, they gave powers
to urban planning authorities to enforce planning requirements and to acquire
land held under customary tenure for public use should there be a conflict
between customary tenure and urban authorities (Nuru, 1990: 187; Kironde,
1992: 1; Mosha, 1995: 343).
In implementing the land reforms a centralised land delivery system was
introduced. All land acquisitions, developments, and allocations were placed
under one new state institution, the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban
Development (MLHUD). Within the MLHUD, divisions were created to deal
with land use planning, land development and land management, while regional
and district land officers answered to the central ministry headquarters in Dar es
Salaam. Paradoxically, the centralisation of the land delivery system into one
institution did not clarify the position of the town councils which were
previously responsible for the acquisition, development and allocation of land,
as well as the enforcement of the land use ( or town) plans. The urban authorities
exploited this situation and continued with their previous land management
functions.
The centralisation of the land delivery system was accompanied by the
introduction of a land development model which organised the various land
use-control activities into a strict sequence of steps. The model is commonly
known as Planning, Servicing, Building, and Occupation (PSBO) (Baross,
1983, 1990). Figure 7 .1 shows the process. As shown in Figure 7 .1 the process
was and still is divided into nine closely linked tasks or activities: identification
and declaration of planning or development areas; preparation of land use plans;
compensation of existing users if necessary; surveying the areas; provision of
infrastructure such as water, drainage system and electricity; notifying the
public of availability of land; land applications; processing applications and
allocation of land; registration of land; and development (Kironde, 1992: 15).
172
The land application and processing, allocation and registration activities
involve a number of procedures which require individuals or institutions
applying for plots of land to fill in a form provided by an urban authority (Path
A) or town planning division of the MLHUD (Path B) showing their income
and also showing that they do not possess another plot elsewhere. If the
applicant decides to lodge his/her application with the urban authority, the
application form will have to be taken to its planning committee which meets
once a month (Mghweno, 1984).
Upon approval by the land allocation committee, the council sends the list of
successful applicants to the District Land Development Officer (DLDO) who
issues a letter of offer. After receiving the letter of offer, an applicant shows
acceptance by paying the charges indicated on the offer within 30 days from the
date of issue. The letter of offer attached with receipts of payments are then
delivered to the land office (ie MLHUD) for the issuance of a certificate of land
title.
When urban authorities were abolished in 1972, the procedure for land
application became unclear and remained so after 1978 when urban authorities
were re-introduced. Land applications channelled through the town planning
division of the MLHUD do not have to go through lengthy committee
procedures as in the process of the urban authorities. The choice of which
institution to use is mainly guided by many factors including affective ties with
the individual officers involved, as by using such ties the applicant is more
likely to achieve the desired results in a shorter time.
The 1961-67 policies did have an impact on housing in that they enabled public
institutions (including those involved in urban housing) to obtain land at a
subsidised price for housing purposes. However, as will be demonstrated later
the houses built on these lands were unaffordable to the low income groups. As
such, despite their radicalism the 1961-1967 land reforms had limited impact on
low income housing.
173
Figure 7.1: The Process of Land Use Control in Tanzania
Land use for housing etc. should begin (subject to meeting building codes ofrespective uman authorities)
0 l\ll,HUD issues title deed or right ofocctqiancy
PAlHA
Pu])lic apply for plot to
Applications considered by Land Allocation Committee
PAlHB
0 Land Allocation Committee l\fi,HUD identifies and declares chosen sends list of successful land as a planned or development area
applicants to District Land f?'\i Development Officer (DLDO) V DLDO issues letterofoffer to succesful applicants
l\ll,HUD prepares land use plan
7b ------------4 DLDO sends letter ofoffer to l\ll.HUD
l\ll,HUD receives and processes applications for title deeds from all those issued with letter of offer
C, MLHUD issues land offer to successful
applicants ~
l\ll,HUD processes applications
G l\ll,HUD receives applications for land
l\ll,HUD compensates existing land users/occtqiant!. if necessary
0 l\ll,HUD notifies public on availability ofland (normally gazetted notification)
0 l\ll,HUD surveys and provides infrastructure including water and drainage system; other govemm.ent institutions provide services such as electricity
Furthermore, these land reforms did not achieve the intended objective of
improving access to urban land for low income earners, and neither did they
completely curb land speculation (Kironde, 1990; Devas and Rakodi, 1993:
110). By 1967, it was obvious that the number of building plots allocated by the
MLHUD could not keep pace with the needs of the rising urban population.
MLHUD plot allocation figures before 1967 are not available. However, as
shown in Table 7.1, between 1967 and 1972 in almost all major towns the
number of plots issued were far less than the increase in the number of
households. As a consequence urban dwellers of all income categories and
social backgrounds were forced to obtain land by informal means. The informal
land delivery mechanisms have included purchasing land illegally from land
officials or those to whom plots have been allocated; invasion of vacant planned
and unplanned land; and purchasing vacant (planned and unplanned) land from
acknowledged but otherwise illegal land supply authorities such as the ruling
party leaders at the local level or owners with customary rights (Kironde 1992;
Mosha, 1995: 344). Although informal land markets have mainly affected
vacant land in unplanned areas, in some instances vacant land in planned areas
has also been affected.
Another indicator of the state's inability to provide adequate numbers of
building plots is the increasing number of households occupying land without
title deeds or rights of occupancy. A study conducted by Smit-Hoek (1990) in
the late 1980s on land tenure in Dar es Salaam, found that 52 per cent of
households occupying land in the surveyed area did not have title for right of
occupancy. A similar study conducted by Kironde in the early 1990s confirm
that only 35 per cent of land development in urban Tanzania is occupied legally
(Kironde, 1992).
175
Table 7.1: Requirements and Deficiencies for Housing Plots in Urban
Tanzania, 1967-72
1967-1972 Inclusive
Increase in Right of Occupancy Deficiency in Plots Household Granted Issued
Town
Arusha 5,900 726 5,175
Bukoba 1,740 554 1,186
Dar es Salaam 42,200 6042 36,158
Dodoma 2,170 2165 5
Iringa 2,840 1380 1,460
Kigoma 1,250 1566
Lindi/Mtwara 2,340
Mbeya 1,875 1017 858
Morogoro 2,310 1,346 964
Moshi 3,730 1,377 2,353
Musoma 2,060 885 1,175
Mwanza 4,960 3079 1,781
Tanga 4,860 2,508 1,452
Source: Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD), 1980, 'Urban Housing Needs', unpublished Report of Land Di vision Statistics, Dar es Salaam.
The 1963-67 land reforms also failed to curb land speculation in urban
Tanzania (Leslie, 1963; Mwita, 1978; Kaitilla, 1987: Mosha, 1995). Excessive
public demand for urban land has been exploited by government and state party
officials directly connected with the supply of land to sell land illegally. In
addition, there have been instances of government and state party officials
allocating plots to themselves and hoarding them for speculative purposes. The
presence of undeveloped but surveyed plots whose allottees' personal identities
are invisible and not easily revealed is illustrative. For example, in 1980 in
176
Dar es Salaam, only 18.2 per cent of the total 4,000 sites and services plots had
complete developments several years after allocations were made (Kulaba,
1981: 31; Stren, 1985: 71).
Lack of administrative capacity, and inadequate operational procedures and
administrative structures of the MLHUD and the public bureaucracy generally
in Tanzania were and still are the major factors contributing both to the inability
of the state to_ meet the land needs of the rapidly growing urban population and
also to increasing land speculation in urban Tanzania. With regard to the
administrative capacity of the MLHUD between 1963 and 1966, the ministry
had inadequate funding and staff to carry out the massive development
(planning, surveying, mapping and servicing) of urban land on a timely basis.
For example, between 1963 and 1967 there were only six cartographers in the
MLHUD to serve 25 regions of Tanzania (Said, 1983; Halfani, 1987). The six
cartographers could not even provide mapping services on time for Dar es
Salaam, the government headquarters and the fastest growing city, let alone the
other regions.
The inadequate operational and administrative structures of the MLHUD also
contributed to its inability to meet the objectives of the 1963 land reforms. The
lengthy and complicated procedures of the MLHUD prevented urban dwellers
from obtaining land. For example, studies commissioned by the government in
the 1970s indicated that one needed up to 280 days for an application to be
approved. But even when an approval was granted, before building could start,
a building permit had to be obtained from the town authorities (Stren, 1975b).
These operational procedures and the administrative structures implementing
them prevented many urban dwellers from benefiting from the 1963 land
reforms. Many people did not have the resources, patience or ability to
understand and navigate the system. The situation worsened in the 1980s and
1990s when shortages of staff, funding and other physical resources lengthened
still further the operational procedures for land delivery. Studies conducted in
the 1980s and 1990s found that, if one were to follow the normal procedure and
depending on one's influence and connections, it would take from between 3
and 6 months up to 2 and 5 years for an approval to be granted (Despande and
Masebu, 1986; Smit-Hoek, 1990; Kironde, 1992; Mosha, 1995).
Duplication of functions and lack of clarity in the distribution of functions
between and within various institutions of public bureaucracy have also
177
inhibited the state from achieving the objectives of the 1963 land reforms.
Despite the allocation of the land use planning (town planning), land
development (surveying, mapping, and servicing), and land delivery (land
officer-registrar) functions in different divisions of the MLHUD, lack of clarity
in the delineation of their functional responsibilities still created duplications
amongst the three divisions. For example, it was and still is common in
Tanzania for a plot to be allocated from the town planning lay-out proposals.
This has brought considerable problems in land delivery as surveyed plans have
not always matched town planning drawings. On many occasions this has
created a situation where surveyors can vary the number of plots earmarked by
the town planning division and, as a result, the town planner, the surveyor and
the land officer have all found themselves allocating land (Kironde, 1992: 15).
Similarly, lack of clarity of functions between the MLHUD, urban authorities
and local institutions of the state party have found all three institutions involved
in land allocation in urban areas. This has resulted in the double allocation of
plots and hence subjected plot owners to costly litigation. No studies were
conducted on the impact of the urban land delivery system for the 1960s and
1970s but in the period between 1983 and 1989, 11 per cent (ie 1,408) of the
total of plots allocated in Dar es Salaam were double allocations. The
involvement of local institutions of the then state political party (ten cell
leaders) in the allocation of land compounded the problems of land delivery in
urban Tanzania. By assuming land allocation functions, the state party officials
were and still are able to allocate land in planned and unplanned areas to friends
and relatives (Hayuma, 1979). From 1963 to the 1990s, it was common for
party officials to allocate land reserved for the development of open space,
playgrounds and other social facilities to friends, relatives and others. For
example, while there are no figures available for the 1960s and 1970s, in 1988,
17 per cent of all plots in the sites and services scheme area of Sinza in Dar es
Salaam were found to be the illegal creations of state officials, including those
from the ruling party (Masembejo, 1980; Nnkya, 1980; Kironde, 1992: 7).
Radical urban management policies
In the area of urban management, the period between 1961-1966 was
characterised by radical reforms. During this period the political leadership
introduced a number of sweeping changes to the administrative and political
organisation of the state. These changes adversely affected the capacity of urban
178
management to deal with its problems including housing. As discussed in
Chapter Five, the tendency towards the centralisation of political power which
began immediately after independence in 1961 culminated in local government
councils losing some of their important administrative functions and authority
to central government and single purpose public corporations (Halfani, 1987;
Kulaba, 1989). In the area of urban housing for example, public housing
programs and housing credit schemes under urban authorities were transferred
to a newly created public housing body, the National Housing Corporation
(NHC).
Similarly, in 1963, urban planning functions, and particularly land delivery,
were transferred from urban councils to the central government. This
centralisation of council functions went hand in hand with the transfer of
qualified staff to the central government institutions and public corporations
(Max, 1991). Such centralisation created uniformity in dealing with urban
problems which were specific and unique to each local area.
The expansion of state responsibilities in the provision of welfare services such
as health, education and clean water which occurred immediately after
independence also added strain to the financial capacity of local government.
Although in many cases central government institutions were responsible for
financing capital expenditure of the welfare services, local councils were
responsible for the recurrent expenditure. This increase in local government
responsibilities saw both rural and urban councils' recurrent expenditures more
than double in the five years after independence, with education and health
alone consuming more than 50 per cent of their budget (Max, 1991: 52).
However, the income base of local councils remained more or less static placing
great financial strains on them. This rendered them unable to perform
adequately the new and existing implementation tasks which were their
responsibility.
Further incapacitation of the urban management structures occurred in 1965
following the establishment of a one-party state. Under the one-party state
system, urban management structures (ie urban councils) were integrated into
the national party apparatus by the nomination and inclusion of a few party
officials into urban councils. The state party took effective control of the
management of councils by replacing the elected council chairperson with an
ex-officio chair who was also the district party chairperson. In addition, the
179
state party assumed direct control of local political recruitment through
screening all candidates aspiring for council seats. Increasingly, state party
functionaries rather than elected councillors came to dominate councils
(Tordoff, 1967: 126; Dryden 1968; Max, 1991: 60-61). On many occasions
state party officials at the local level committed councils to activities which
were beyond their financial capabilities. For example, state party leaders
initiated projects such as the building of a school or teacher's house without
consulting the councils (Max, 1991: 67).
Overall, inadequate funding from central government, and lack of autonomy,
were the major factors which contributed to the poor performance of local
councils in the period between 1961 and 1966. Their poor performance
contributed to the poor record of urban and housing policy implementation at
this level (Kilembe, 1989; Kulaba, 1989; Max, 1991).
Period 2: The Arusha Urban Housing Strategies (1967-1972)
In 1967, the political leadership in Tanzania promulgated the Arusha
Declaration as a guiding ideology for the country's social and economic
development. The Arusha Declaration's focus on socialist rural development
through egalitarian and self-reliance policies entailed a reorientation of the
country's urban policies including those for housing. Through the Second Five
Year Plan - SFYDP - (1969-1974), which was associated with the Arusha
Declaration, a number of specific urban housing strategies were introduced and
these are discussed in detail in the following sections (Hayuma, 1987; Kaitilla,
1987).
Socialist town plans
Following the Arusha Declaration the political leadership in Tanzania decided
to reform its town plans with a view to removing inequality between different
social groups in urban areas. In 1968, the state introduced a new master plan for
Dar es Salaam, then the capital and centre of government activities. The major
emphasis was to remove the legacy of colonial town plans which emphasised
racial and income barriers. Instead, socialist town plans emphasising equality in
provision of services to all residential areas were introduced (Armstrong, 1987:
141). Under the socialist town plans residential areas were to be categorised on
the basis of level and quality of services to be provided. Three standards of
180
residential areas - high, medium and low - were delineated. High standard areas
were to contain high priced private and public housing, paved roads, street
lights, adequate water and electric power supply; medium standard areas were
to contain medium priced private and public housing, and medium level
services; and low standard areas were to contain self-built houses, unpaved
local roads, pit latrines or septic tanks and electric power in the main streets
only (Doherty, 1975: 5).
The plan proposed the reduction of the population density in high density areas
(and the infilling of low density areas) from the prevailing ratio of 45 persons
per acre to 33 persons per acre, within the space of only 2 years. The plan also
proposed the creation of communities or housing clusters based on a ten-cell
unit which constituted 10 households. On the other hand, traditional features
were to be incorporated through relaxing building standards and encouraging
the construction of traditional dwellings (PPAL, 1968: 72). Under the 1968
plan, 25,000 new residential housing plots were to be created for this
development program, at a rate of 5,000 per annum. The affected areas were
Kijitonyama, Tabata, Sinza, Old Airport and the land to the south of the
Ubungo Industrial Area. These new residential areas were to provide alternative
housing for the overspill population from the high density areas (PPAL, 1968;
Doherty, 1975).
Squatter housing was viewed as a cancerous tumour on an otherwise healthy
city and so the 1968 master plan proposed strict control of squatter housing in
the capital city (Grohs, 1972; Lugalla, 1990: 230). The proposed draconian
measures included the employment of a staff of enforcement officers; removal
of emergent squatter areas and those which conflicted with the plan; and denial
of compensation for disturbance and resettlement of demolition victims. The
1968 master plan did not indicate the sources of implementation finance,
leaving the state to decide on the matter at some future date (Armstrong, 1987:
142).
Despite its declared objective of removing social inequality among urban
dwellers, the 1968 master plan had a number of shortcomings. The creation of
residential areas on the basis of level and quality of service perpetuated existing
social inequality. The level of income became the major factor in determining
the choice of a residential area. If anything, the 1968 Dar es Salaam master plan
has been responsible for promoting the development of residential areas
181
differentiated on the basis of income and social class. Thus, the settlement areas
of Msasani, Masaki, Mikocheni and recently Mbezi have become
characteristically high income areas, while areas like Buguruni, Ubungo
Kisiwani and some parts of Temeke exemplify low standard areas and are
populated by low income families (Armstrong 1987; Lugalla, 1990: 229).
Moreover, the plan's proposed measures against squatter housing were
unrealistic given the fact that by 1968 squatter housing provided
accommodation for more than 70 per cent of the population of Dar es Salaam.
The unrealistic nature of the plan was even more pronounced in its failure to
suggest sources of development finance. The plan's silence on this issue was a
tacit acceptance of the traditional sources of development capital, external
grants and loans, which however were not forthcoming (Lugalla, 1990: 233;
Halfani, 1987: 123). The only alternative for funding the 1968 plan would have
been through government. This was unrealistic because at that time government
priorities were in the rural areas. The economic crisis the country was going
through disrupted further the implementation of the 1968 master plan and by
1978 few of the 1968 master plan programs had been implemented (Doherty,
1975; Mesaki, 1982; Armstrong, 1987; Hayuma, 1987).
Disappointing results from the 1968 Dar es Salaam master plan, together with
the decision to transfer government headquarters to Dodoma led the
government to develop further master plans for Dodoma and Dar es Salaam. In
1978 and 1979, a Canadian planning firm (Marshal Macklin Monaghan Limited
of Toronto) prepared these plans with an emphasis on the physical framework
to accommodate the process of urban growth in whatever manner it might occur
(Halfani, 1987: 122). The plans' solution to urban housing was to be found in
expanding urban boundaries and the creation of new residential for each income
group (ie low, medium and high). These self-contained residential areas each
had their own schools, medical care facilities, playgrounds, shops and small
farms.
The squatter problem was treated in a superficial manner. In both plans, squatter
housing was viewed as a temporary phenomenon to be solved by the provision
of new residential areas. Even so, the 1979 Dar es Salaam plan projected that by
the mid 1980s, out of the 205,000 people who would be housed in new
residential areas, only 2 per cent would be squatters. Unlike the 1968 Dar es
Salaam master plans which proposed the demolition of squatter housing, the
182
two new plans proposed the deprivation of infrastructural facilities such as
roads, schools and water to squatter settlements as an appropriate way to
prevent further squatter growth. The two plans also emphasised greater
participation of national and local state institutions in formulating and
implementing specific urban housing programs. However, they failed to specify
either appropriate forms of participation or sources of financing for specific
programs.
Both the 1978 Dodoma and 1979 Dar es Salaam master plans have had minimal
impact on the urban landscape of Tanzania. First, the proposed plans required
investment expenditures which could not be met by the central government or
local authorities (Gibbon, 1980; Mesaki, 1982). For example, the
implementation program required five times the level of expenditure than that
spent by the Dar es Salaam city council on all development projects over the
previous five years, and the new plan was produced at a time of increasing
economic hardship and stringency. The fundamental weakness of the two plans
was their perception of squatter housing as a temporary phenomenon in urban
Tanzania. This was a misconception given the fact that at this time squatter
housing constituted the major form of housing. What is evident from the two
master plans is that the planners concern with the physical designs of the towns
led them to neglect the major factors that were contributing to urban housing
problems. Such leading issues as rapid urbanisation amidst declining state
expenditure on urban planning, growing squatter housing, urban poverty and
weakness in urban management system were treated superficially by the
planners who were influenced by developed world town planning approaches
which were mainly concerned with establishing an urban form that would
portray an image of modernity. Such concerns ignored the objective conditions
obtaining in urban Tanzania. The failure to operationalise the plans resulted in
unplanned development continuing to be the dominant urban housing process in
major Tanzanian towns (Halfani, 1987; Lugalla, 1990).
Socialist urban housing policies
In pursuing its socialist objectives, the Second Five Year Development Plan
(SFYDP) 1969-74 delineated alternative urban housing strategies. The
strategies involved the review of NHC housing policy, nationalisation of rental
properties and housing finance, promotion of self-help housing, and dispersion
183
of industrial development. These strategies are discussed in detail in the rest of
this section.
Under the SFYDP, NHC's pricing and construction policies were reviewed to
keep them in line with the socialist ideals of the political leadership. It was
perceived by the state that NHC pricing and construction policies were
promoting social inequality by denying the poor access to public housing. To
remove this inequality the SFYDP recommended the lowering of NHC housing
standards and consequently housing prices. In this regard, the NHC abandoned
the Swahili four to six bedroom house design in favour of one, two and four
bedroom single family units (Kulaba, 1981: 46; Campbell, 1990a: 162). The
prices for NHC minimum cost houses were lowered from Tshs 11,000 and Tshs
15,400 to Tshs 6,000 and Tshs 7,700 respectively (Bienefeld and Binhammer,
1969: 14). Finally, the NHC was given the task of building 2,000 low cost units
per annum (Halfani, 1987: 65). Similarly, monthly rentals or payments on
tenant purchase agreements went down from to Tshs 50 and Tshs 92, from Tshs
64 and Tshs 127.
Despite the good intentions of these reforms, particularly the emphasis on one,
two and four bedroom houses for single family occupation, they failed to
address the housing needs of the low income groups. Under the previous
Swahili design (consisting of four to six bedrooms) three to five families or
individuals shared rent payment thus lowering the financial burden of the
renters. Insistence on one family accommodation for one, two or four bedroom
houses under the Arusha reform policy placed a greater burden for rent payment
on to the one family.
The decision to lower NHC's house prices, although consistent with the Arusha
egalitarian objectives encountered implementation difficulties. Without
adequate financial backup from the state the NHC was inhibited from meeting
its housing production targets. This was because the decision to reduce NHC
prices was made at the time when building construction and materials prices in
the country were rising and thus increasing the costs of building houses. For
example, the cost of building a single house rose from Tshs 7,700 in 1966 to
Tshs 13,000 in 1969-70 (Tanzania-NHC, 1991). The monthly rent per room
rose from Tshs 65 in 1966 to Tshs 150 in 1969.
184
The revision of NHC pricing policy and its adverse effect on the corporation's
income negatively affected its performance as was demonstrated by the
reduction in the number of houses constructed by the NHC. In the period
between 1969-71, NHC constructed fewer units at higher costs compared to the
period 1967-69. At the earlier time it cost the NHC only Tshs 37,261,077 to
construct 3,854 housing units. Due to rising construction and building materials
costs, in the period 1969-71 NHC had to pay Tshs 52,717,679 to construct
2,213 units an_ increase of more than 60 per cent per unit. As a consequence the
NHC failed to increase the housing stock in line with the increasing demand
(Grohs, 1972; Matern, 1992). By 1974, the waiting list for NHC units in Dar es
Salaam had 19,000 names on it as compared to 5,000 names in 1968 (Kikenya,
1975: 76; Halfani, 1987: 66).
In 1971, the state nationalised all rental buildings worth Tshs 100,000 and
above. Nationalisation of these properties was seen as necessary to stop the
exploitation of tenants by landlords, as well as to end the dominance of the
Asian landlord class in urban housing (Campbell, 1990a). Some 2,900
properties valued at (£32.5 million) were nationalised. The government
continued to acquire more properties and between 1973 and 1978 it nationalised
a further 203 houses (Ndjovu, 1980: 23). A new public corporation was created,
namely the Registrar of Buildings (RoB), whose major functions were to
manage the nationalised properties and to engage in housing construction. By
1987, the RoB had constructed 616 houses of which 92 per cent (ie 565) were
medium and high cost residential units and 8 per cent ( ie 51) commercial
premises (Kulaba, 1989; Matern, 1992: 12). The tenants of the RoB's houses
like those of other public institutions enjoyed subsidised rents through the Rent
Restriction Act. Since the RoB 's houses were mainly of medium and high costs
they could not be afforded by low income groups and the advantages of the
subsidies accrued to upper income groups. By the time of its dissolution in
1990, the RoB 's major tenants were diplomatic missions, international
organisations and big business firms.
Nationalisation of rental properties benefited a significant group of urban
inhabitants through rent subsidies. However, by targeting medium and high
costs residential properties the policy contradicted its declared objectives of
providing affordable housing to low income earners. Moreover, although the
policy managed to remove the domination of the Asian landlord class in urban
housing, the imposition of low rents eliminated the participation of the private
185
sector in low and medium price housing development except for sale to the
wealthy. Coupled with the low level of supply of public housing this resulted in
very slow expansion of the formal housing stock, thus leading to double or even
triple occupancy in existing dwellings and the rapid spread of squatter housing
(Kaitilla, 1987; Matern, 1992; Nuru, 1990; Lugalla, 1990). Furthermore, the
failure by the state to increase the housing supply ensured that private interests
could still dominate the allocation of existing stock either through bureaucratic
controls or indirectly through unofficial contacts.
There were further attempts to create equality with regard to access to urban
housing in Tanzania. These included review of rent subsidies for public
servants, and imposing obligations on employers to provide housing for their
employees. In 1973, to remove the barrier to gaining access to public housing
for public servants, a graduated rent system which pegged rent to income was
introduced. The graduated rent system established three different rent levels for
low, medium and high income public servants at the rent rates of 7.5, 10 and
12.5 per cent of income respectively (Kulaba, 1981: 51; Halfani, 1987: 125).
In a situation of acute housing shortage the rent review of 1973 benefited few
civil servants. While there are no available figures for 1973, a national study
done in 1979 showed that only 14,659 (ie 7 per cent) of the total 204,064 public
servants paid the graduated rent, which was much lower than the market rent
(Halfani, 1987: 125). The graduated rent system discriminated against low
income earners because low cost housing imposed a high financial obligation
on the part of the employer in the form of subsidy. For example, to enable an
employee earning less than Tshs 800 per month to rent a Tshs 3,000 per month
house, a subsidy of up to 96 per cent or Tshs 2,900 was required from the
employer (Ndjovu, 1980; Tanzania-NHP, 1982: 11-12; Halfani, 1987: 126).
Quite often employers tended to avoid housing such low income earners. As a
consequence employer based housing tended to favour medium and high
income earners neglecting those in the low income category.
The Arusha period also saw increased state intervention in housing
construction, and the manufacture and distribution of building materials. Prior
to 1967, these authorities were controlled by foreign companies and local Asian
traders. For example, between 1963 and 1967, there were two major
construction companies the Mwananchi Engineering and Construction
Company (MECCO), owned by a Dutch firm with the Tanzanian government
186
holding a minority share through the Overseas Construction Company (OCC);
and the German Company of Munich (Wells, 1972: 21). In 1967, on
nationalistic grounds and for the ideological objectives of removing exploitation
of nationals by foreigners, the state intervened and took over all the shares and
held full ownership of the Dutch and German construction companies. The two
companies were merged to form the Mwananchi Engineering and Construction
Company (MECCO), which became a public company (Burgess, 1970; Temba,
1983: 167). Moreover, the state introduced various measures such as heavy
taxes to limit private individuals and institutions from engaging in housing
construction and the manufacture and distribution of building materials
Apart from MECCO and the NHC, whose major function was to construct
houses, other statutory bodies were also created to construct houses,
manufacture and distribute building materials, and to research housing and
building technology. The production, pricing and distribution policies of these
institutions were fixed by the state. To enable them to offer cheap and
affordable services the statutory bodies received substantial subsidies from the
state (Chachage, 1980; Nuru, 1990: 194). The institutions included the NHC,
the National Design and Construction Company (NEDCO), Mwananchi
Engineering Construction Company (MECCO), the Building Research Unit
(BRU), the Aluminium Africa Company (ALAF), Tanzania Portland Cement,
and Regional Trading Companies.
The creation of these statutory bodies was done at the time when the state in
Tanzania was facing financial constraints due to the withdrawal of financial aid
by major international donors. Since all the above institutions relied on state
funding for their operations, the withdrawal of foreign financial aid meant that
the few available resources had to be spread thinly among the many statutory
bodies. For example, the NHC, which received only Tshs 88.8 million out of its
budgeted Tshs 360 million, had to share its meagre allotment with its three
subsidiary companies created to construct houses and produce building
materials (Temba, 1983: 168; Lugalla, 1990: 275).
Shortages and rises in prices of building materials that followed the Arusha
Declaration bear witness to the negative impact of the form of state intervention
in housing and the building materials industry by the political leadership in
Tanzania. For example, immediately after the Arusha Declaration prices of
building materials increased substantially. A 50 kg. bag of cement which sold
187
for Tshs 8 in the 1960s, was priced at Tshs 36 by the late 1960s. The price of
corrugated iron sheets (26 feet and 32 feet) stood at Tshs 11.75 and Tshs 19.90
respectively in the 1960s, but in the early 1970s their price went up to Tshs 20
and Tshs 30 (Ndjovu, 1980: 18-19; ILO, 1982: 127). By 1973, shortages of
building materials became severe leading to black marketing and sky-rocketing
prices (Ndjovu, 1980; Temba, 1983; Lugalla, 1990). The shortages and
consequent rise in prices of building materials resulted from the state's inability
to provide adequate funding to its building materials manufacturing and
distribution agencies. Having transformed commercial companies into
dependent state bureaucracies and created additional ones, the state did not
allow these organisations to function effectively.
The egalitarian ethos of the Arusha period was extended to the housing finance
sector. It was perceived by the state that housing finance (which was controlled
by foreign capital at that time) was inappropriate because it did not cater for the
housing needs of the poor. For example, the only housing credit institution then
in the country, the Permanent Housing Finance Company Limited (PHFCT),
which was jointly owned by the Tanzanian government and the Commonwealth
Development Corporation, operated on a commercial basis, charging 8.5 per
cent interest rate per annum (Binhammer, 1969: 5; Temba, 1983: 131). Such
rates were unaffordable by both low income groups and the private and public
institutions interested in low income housing schemes like the NHC (Chachage,
1983: 37). It was against this background that in 1972, the Tanzania Housing
Bank (THB) was established to replace the PHFCT and take over the NHC's
financial responsibilities for funding low cost housing schemes. In addition to
its banking activities the THB had the financial responsibility to implement the
government's policy on housing and building.
To implement its tasks the THB depended on public deposits (including loan
repayments), share capital, foreign borrowing, and the Workers and Farmers
Housing Development Fund (WFHDF). The WFHDF was established in 1974
to provide a financial pool for house building that could be drawn upon by low
income urban workers as well as by people living in the rural areas. The source
of WFHDF income was a levy of 2 per cent on the wage bill of every employer
of ten or more persons in the country. The money was collected by the income
tax authorities on behalf of the government and given to the THB which acted
as a custodian of the fund (Tanzania-THB, 1972; Ndjovu, 1980; Temba, 1983).
188
In implementing government housing policies the THB, through its subsidiary
company the Tanzania Engineering Construction Company (TECCO),
embarked on the construction of residential housing. Between 1972 and 1980
TECCO constructed a total of 457 houses in the major towns of Tanzania
(Ndjovu, 1980: 22). Like all other public housing institutions THB's houses
were of medium and high cost and hence not affordable by low income groups.
The creation of the THB provided public housing institutions easy access to
cheap mortgage finance (Loxley, 1970: 31). However, its lending terms
discriminated against low income earners. Lending conditions such as legal title
to land, secure income and a deposit of 5 per cent of a total loan as a security for
obtaining the loan prevented low income groups from getting THB loans. As
was shown in the previous sections, many of the urban dwellers in Tanzania
were and still are squatters who do not have legal titles for their plots.
Moreover, a large proportion of the urban population are renters and as such do
not possess land let alone legal titles. The demand for legal titles to land as a
security for obtaining THB loans also ignored the weakness of the land delivery
system which forced urban dwellers to undertake building before obtaining
legal titles. In Tanzania it takes between 3 months and 5 years for a legal title to
land to be obtained (Stren, 1982; Kaitilla, 1987; Lugalla, 1990).
Furthermore, the demands for secure income as a condition of loan eliminated
the majority of urban dwellers as many were and still are employed in informal
activities which quite often provide irregular and relatively low incomes
(Temba, 1983; Halfani, 1987; Lugalla, 1990; Kironde, 1992; Alder, 1992;
Matern, 1992; Mosha, 1995). In the end, the THB concentrated on medium and
high cost housing rather than on its fundamental objective of providing loans
for low income urban dwellers. For instance, between 1973 and 1978 a total of
Tshs 349.0 million were loaned for medium cost housing compared to 203.3
million Tshs for low cost housing (Temba, 1983: 140).
The THB also had problems in meeting the loans requirements of public
housing institutions and other private developers. Although the public housing
institutions and private developers were borrowing large sums of money for
construction of low cost housing, the THB treated their loan requirements as
commercial carrying a high interest rate of 10 per cent per annum with a short
repayment period of 10 years. Such costly loans could only be afforded through
raising rents or prices of the newly built houses. The option of raising rents to
189
service the THB loans was not available to public housing institutions operating
under the Rent Restriction Act. Thus, the only way that the NHC could access
such loans was by obtaining grants from the central government (Chachage,
1983: 36). However, such grants were inadequate to fill the gap between the
NHC's primary income and its actual need. Between 1969 and 1974, central
government grants to the NHC declined from a high of £1,070,000 in 1970-71
to £125,000 in 1973-74 (Stren, 1975a: 46). The decline was a result of the
deficit in government spending caused by the withdrawal of funding by major
bilateral donors. The NHC's inability to borrow from the THB for low cost
housing was reflected in declining loan figures. Between 1973 and 1978, the
NHC managed to borrow only Tshs 7 .9 million of the total Tshs 681.6 million
that was made available for housing by the THB (Tanzania National Economic
Survey, 1978-79). The NHC's financial unsoundness made it an unattractive
borrower to the THB.
Another urban housing policy of the Arusha period was that of self-help
housing which required individuals to construct and finance their own
accommodation. This was seen as a necessary substitute for government
funding of urban housing. Self-help housing in Tanzania was to be achieved
through the creation of housing cooperatives. The justification for the
cooperative approach was that it enabled groups to pool limited resources and to
organise the acquisition of land, construction of houses, acquisition of finance
and continuing organisation of community services (Ndatulu and Makileo,
1989; Alder, 1992: 24).
In 1968, a law was passed to allow housing cooperatives to operate in urban
Tanzania. Two types of housing cooperatives were introduced: employer-based
and mutual ownership housing. The two were and still are differentiated by
right of occupancy to the land and dwellings. In mutual ownership, a
cooperative has the right of occupancy to the land and the dwellings. Society
members are owners of all houses of the society (and tenants of their individual
dwellings) and hence share rights like other tenants (Ndatulu and Makileo,
1989: 28). The employer-based cooperative required at least 75 per cent of its
members to be employed by the same employer. The employer guaranteed
provision of certain services such as transport to the cooperative and also acted
as a guarantor to the housing finance institutions. In this latter role the employer
was also responsible for any financial losses of the cooperative caused by its
190
employees. All housing cooperatives required advance deposits from the
members as capital formation for a housing loan.
The housing cooperatives in Tanzania did little to promote the spirit of self-help
promulgated in the Arusha Declaration. This is because the Arusha cooperative
societies (including those of urban housing) were modelled to be financially and
technically dependent on the state (Benjamin, 1971b; Magembe and Gashumba,
1982; Nuru, 1990: 189). This dependence was embodied in the cooperative
society legislation of 1968 which stated that housing cooperatives were to
receive serviced land at a subsidised cost from the government. Also, they were
to rely on soft loans (at 5 per cent interest rate) from a THB administered credit
facility for housing, the Workers and Farmers Housing Development Fund
(WFHDF). Housing cooperatives' dependence on state funding in Tanzania is
demonstrated by the fact that of the 72 housing cooperatives that were
established between 1971 and 1979 the only successful ones were those which
received financial and technical assistance from the state and the World Bank
(Temba, 1983: 153).
Another weakness of the Arusha model of housing cooperative was in the
conditions of financing. The THB lending regulations which required housing
cooperative members to demonstrate proof of income to obtain loans eliminated
the majority of urban dwellers who were employed in irregular activities in the
informal sector and earning meagre incomes. Amongst employed urban
dwellers, employer-based housing cooperatives attracted those in medium and
high income categories. Of the 72 housing cooperatives in Tanzania in 1989,
only one (the Mapinduzi housing cooperative) had low income groups as a
majority of its members. The rest had more than 60 per cent of their members
earning more than the minimum wage (Ndatulu and Makileo, 1989: 67). The
case of Mapinduzi cooperative has to be taken with caution because even
though the majority of the members were considered to be casual labourers
earning minimum wages, employment in the Prime Minister's Office provided
them with a guarantee for membership of a housing cooperative which was
established and supported by the Prime Minister himself to demonstrate the
appropriateness of the housing cooperative policy in Tanzania (Alder, 1992:
25).
191
Period 3: Post-Arusha Urban Housing Policies (1972-1990s)
Reintroduction of urban management structures
Even though the post-Arusha urban housing policies were implemented after
the adoption of the NSSP program (the case study), the review of such policies
is important to understand the role of these policies in undermining the
implementation of that program. The post-Arusha period was a time of
reassessment when the state tried to overcome the deficiencies of the previous
socialist-oriented approaches. In this period, the state limited its direct role in
the production and distribution of housing and rather adopted a facilitative role.
State concern moved to holistic development of the urban areas as a means to
achieving other more specific objectives such as housing. The urban
development policies that were implemented during the post-Arusha period are
discussed in detail below.
The post-Arusha period, particularly after 1975, saw increased state concern
over the management of urban areas. There was an acknowledgment on the part
of the state that the abolition of local government which occurred during the
Arusha period was responsible for deterioration in urban services such as water
and power supply, sewage disposal, refuse and garbage collection, roads, fire
protection and malaria control (Kulaba, 1989). Such realisation led to the re
introduction of urban authorities in 1978. In the area of housing, the
improvement of urban services resulting from the reintroduction of urban
authorities was ultimately expected to lead to improved housing conditions in
these areas.
Despite the good intention, the reintroduction of urban authorities has done
little to improve urban services let alone housing conditions in urban areas. A
number of factors have been responsible for the urban authorities' failure to
achieve their intended objectives. The factors are: inadequate funding from the
central government; lack of coordination between urban authorities and central
government; and centralisation of power within the urban authorities.
With regard to inadequate funding, between 1978 and 1995, urban authorities
whose operations and functioning relied on funding from the central
government, received inadequate funding from the that government. For
example, in 1978, urban authorities were allocated only 1.62 per cent of the
192
total development budget of Tshs 5,823,600. The situation worsened in the late
1980s when urban expenditure stood at only 0.31 per cent of total government
budget of Tshs 78,667,800 (Kulaba, 1989: 234-5). The amount was
disproportionately low considering the economic importance of urban areas and
the fact that both the 1978 and the 1988 population censuses showed that 13.7
and 27 per cent respectively of the population lived in urban areas.
Lack of clarity in urban authorities' functional and authority relationships with
Regional Commissions-Res (see Chapter Five for details) also contributed to
their poor performance. When the urban authorities were reintroduced in 1978,
the state did not clarify their functional as well as authority relationship with the
Regional Commissions (Max, 1991). Two separate lines of authority existed for
the urban authorities and the RCs. The urban authorities were and still are
responsible to the Ministry of Local Government and Cooperative Development
and Marketing (MLGCDM), while RCs were and still are responsible to the
Prime Minister's Office (PMO). These separate lines of authority frustrated
attempts to create unity of purpose between the two institutions thus generating
problems of coordination at the local level. On many occasions the two central
government agencies (PMO and MLGCDM) have issued conflicting directives
to their respective local institutions. As will be shown in Chapters Eight and
Nine, problems of land management in urban Tanzania have been compounded
by lack of cooperation between various state institutions at the local level
(Matern, 1986; Halfani, 1987; Kironde, 1992).
Duplication of functions between Regional Commissions and urban authorities
has also been responsible for the urban authorities' failure to improve their
performance. Quite often Regional Commissions have continued to perform
functions which by law (ie the Local Government Act 1978) fall under the
jurisdiction of urban authorities. This has led to competition, suspicion and
conflicts over domain control. The most outstanding case of conflict between
the urban authorities and RCs was that between the Dar es Salaam City Council
and the Dar es Salaam Regional Commissioner's Office in 1992 over control of
refuse collection. Legally, refuse collection is the responsibility of the Dar es
Salaam City Council. However, due to fiscal constraints, the council failed to
remove refuse from the streets even after receiving an ultimatum from the
President. Having monitored this, the Regional Commissioner eventually
mounted a city cleaning campaign which attracted the support of the city
193
residents (Mwananc'h~ 20 July 1992). This effort was perceived by the city
council as interference with its legal function by the Regional Commissioner.
The New National Urban Development and Urban Housing Policies
In the mid 1970s, the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development
(MLHUD) began to argue for comprehensive policies combining both housing
and urban development in Tanzania. Although housing policy was always
incorporated into the National Development Plans, the MLHUD believed this
approach was inadequate because it treated housing in isolation from its broader
context of urban development (Temba, 1983: 223; Nuru, 1990: 192).
Inadequate attention to housing and urban development in Tanzania's national
development Hanning was demonstrated by the absence of a unit specifically
dealing with construction, housing and urban development in the then Ministry
responsible for planning - the Ministry of Finance and Planning (Temba, 1983:
223).
Moreover, the MLHUD felt that the national development plans fragmented the
housing responsibilities, by allocating functions to too many government
agencies. This created problems of coordination amongst the various
institutions. According to the MLHUD, a comprehensive national housing
policy was required to coordinate the various housing efforts in the country
(Temba, 1983; Nuru, 1990). It was against this background that the New
National Housing Policy (NNHP) began to be formulated in 1977 and was
completed and adopted in 1981.
The National Housing Policy recognised the housing sector as a positive
contributor to the country's economic growth. The policy's major objectives
were: to improve urban and rural housing conditions in qualitative and
quantitative terms by constructing more low cost houses and rehabilitating
existing ones through strengthening major housing institutions - NHC, RoB,
THB and BRU; to introduce new housing programs for income groups earning
below Tshs 1,000 per month and to ensure that these new houses would remain
affordable to their intended occupiers; to increase government assistance to
individuals building or buying houses, especially through providing easy access
to land, loans and building materials; and to promote the production of local
building materials and integrate this production into the urban development
194
process to reduce house construction costs and to avoid the use of foreign
exchange (Temba, 1983; Halfani, 1987: 127-128).
The 'New National Housing Policy' compelled all employers with staffs of more
than 20 people to provide houses and related facilities for their workers. In
addition, before any industrial establishment could commence operation, it had
to include concrete plans for the provision of housing for all its workers. At the
same time, the New National Housing Policy asked financial institutions such
as the Tanzania Housing Bank, the National Provident Fund, the National
Insurance Corporation, and the National Bank of Commerce to establish
lending facilities for housing development.
Despite stipulating general directions for housing in Tanzania, the 1981 New
National Housing Policy remained unclear and in some cases silent on a number
of issues. For example, it was not clear in the policy how the decision to shift
the burden for provision of workers' housing to employers was going to be
achieved, given that the largest employer - government itself - was facing severe
financial problems. Similar financial problems were being experienced by
parastatal organisations which were the country's second largest employers.
Even if employers had such financial resources, subsidised employer-based
housing would benefit only a small number of Tanzanians. This is because at
the time the policy was adopted wage earners numbered only 535,945 or 7 .3 per
cent of the total labour force of 7.4 million (Tanzania Bureau of Statistics,
1981).
The New National Housing Policy remained silent on the weakness of the
institutional framework for housing production and distribution in Tanzania,
particularly the institutional weakness of the NHC. The policy failed to
acknowledge the fact that the bulk of the government's resources allocated to
housing (directly and indirectly) were devoted to recurrent expenditure. This is
demonstrated by the fact that while the number of housing units constructed per
year by public housing institutions had been declining, the number of their
employees had increased. For example, in 1962-63 the NHC had only 10
employees and managed to construct 51 houses, while in 1980-81 the
corporation had 1070 employees but constructed only 100 houses (Daily News,
6 August 1983; Lugalla, 1990: 273).
195
Since its adoption in 1982, the NNHP has never been followed up with any
specific programs simply because it was un-implementable. Also, it was
superseded by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund-sponsored cost
reduction programs which attracted all government attention.
In addition to the New National Housing Policy, there was the National Urban
Development Policy (NUDP) whose preparation began in 1984. The NUDP was
prepared by the Directorate of Town Planning in the MLHUD as the ministry's
response to the problems of urbanisation in the country. The NUDP proposed
the rationalisation of the urban settlements structure in national social and
economic development through the establishment of a hierarchy of settlements,
employment opportunities and services distributed to achieve the balanced
growth of towns in all regions (Tanzania-NUDP, 1987: 40). Moreover, the
NUDP proposed that central government make available adequate resources for
urban development as well as ensure equitable distribution of the resources
amongst all regions in the country (Tanzania-NUDP, 1987: 41).
With regard to urban housing, the NUDP advocated self-sustaining
development of urban areas by encouraging the spirit of ujamaa (brotherhood)
and self-reliance and by the promotion of sites and services schemes (Tanzania
NUDP, 1987: 43). Finally, the NUDP advocated enhanced urban control by
enforcing planning principles, and building and land-use standards, arguing that
by so doing irrational use of land would be avoided. The NUDP was not
sympathetic towards squatters who were perceived to be financially capable of
contributing to the services including the land that they were occupying
illegally. To this effect, the policy advocated the establishment of appropriate
levies on users of public services and taxation on land and landed properties to
get funds for the provision, operation and maintenance of local roads, storm
water drainage, sewerage services, water supply and similar facilities (NUDP,
1987: 44).
The objectives of the NUDP replicated the strategies of the 1961-66 and the
1967-72 periods such as the promotion of sites and services programs,
decentralisation of industrial development and increasing government
expenditure on urban development. These proposals were impractical bearing in
mind the fact that such strategies had been implemented with limited success in
the past. The NUDP's recommendations for squatter settlements which housed
196
70 per cent of the urban population in Tanzania made the policy completely
divorced from the prevailing realities of urban Tanzania.
The weaknesses of both NNHP and NUDP plans are a reflection of the top
down approach used in their formulation. The two plans were formulated by
officials of the town planning division of the MLHUD without the involvement
of other interested or affected parties within the state machinery or the
community. T_he idea for the formulation of the NNHP began in 1977 during the
Ardhi (ie MLHUD) annual conference. The Ardhi conferences were annual fora
organised and financed by the MLHUD, and drawing more than 70 participants
from all central and local government institutions involved in housing and
urban development. The conferences' main objectives were to coordinate
housing and land activities in the country by bringing together all the
responsible institutions. However, from 1978, due to budget constraints, Ardhi
annual conferences were seen as a burden on the part of the MLHUD. The
MLHUD appealed to respective institutions to sponsor their delegates to the
conference. The appeal did not get support from other institutions which were
also experiencing financial constraints. As a consequence, the 1978, 1980 and
1981 Ardhi conferences which were to act as consultative fora for NNHP were
poorly attended. In the end, the NNHP came to represent the views of the town
planning division of the MLHUD rather than those of other parties in the state
machinery.
Lack of consultation was also another feature in the formulation of the NUDP.
The formulation of NUDP began after 1984 when the Ardhi conferences had
already ceased. Since the Ardhi annual conferences were the only fora which
allowed consultation between various state institutions involved in housing and
urban development, the absence of such conferences between 1983 and 1986
denied these other interested parties the opportunity to participate in the
formulation of the NUDP (MLHUD, 1980 to 1987).
The top-down approach used in formulation of the NNHP and NUDP is further
demonstrated by lack of participation of the urban communities in the planning
process. In both the NNHP and NUDP no attempts were made by the MLHUD
to consult the affected communities. The whole policy formulation process was
seen as a technical matter to be handed by the officials in the town planning
division of the MLHUD.
197
Urban Housing Strategies in the Era of Economic Liberalisation
The economic liberalisation policies adopted in 1984 necessitated changes in
the public housing institutions. These changes have made public housing in
urban areas further removed from the economic reach of the urban poor. They
opened up the economy by allowing the participation of the private sector in
economic activities hitherto dominated or controlled by the state. This removed
the privileged_ access to credit and protected markets previously enjoyed by
public ·corporations (Malyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990; Bagachwa, 1992: 28).
With the notable exception of major public utilities such as the Tanzania
National Electric Company (TANESCO) and the National Urban Water
Authority (NUW A), most other parastatals were compelled to operate in a
commercial way.
As a consequence of the economic liberalisation policies, and under pressure
from public housing institutions, particularly the NHC, the state reviewed the
Rent Restriction Act to allow public housing institutions to fix economic rents.
Following the 1985 rent review, the NHC raised the monthly house rent of its
units by between 200 per cent and 600 per cent, and the RoB raised its rent by
between 350 per cent and 600 per cent (Sunday News, 18 January 1987). There
is no doubt that the NHC and RoB made large increases in their rents to fill the
financial gaps arising from their high overhead costs. However, such rents were,
and still are, not in favour of the urban poor who had no means of affording
such rents and were therefore excluded from this market (Lugalla, 1990: 274).
Moreover, a law was passed in 1990 to allow the NHC to operate on a
commercial basis including selling some of its houses and vacant plots. By
1990, the NHC had been able to sell 88 units, all of which were purchased by
public institutions including ministries and other parastatal organisations (NHC,
1991: 5). In 1992, the NHC decided to sell some of its residential units to
existing tenants. The NHC's decision to sell its properties was well received by
the public. However, the below-market prices offered to the would-be buyers as
well as favouritism in the choice of individual buyers raised outrage from the
general public. This was particularly the case in Dar es Salaam where the
decision to sell and the process of selling some residential flats in Ilala was not
made open to the public (Daily News, 12 April 1993).
198
Furthermore, in 1985 the Acquisition of Building Act (AoBA) which allowed
the President to acquire private buildings for public interests was amended to
remove these powers. The amendment of the AoBA was seen as necessary to
provide incentives to private developers to engage in housing construction. It
was followed by the liquidation of the RoB in 1990 in order to remove the
duplication of functions between itself and the NHC. RoB assets and liabilities
were passed over to the NHC (Matern, 1992) but did little to improve the
performance of the NHC. Until 1992, the NHC was facing severe financial
strains resulting from servicing undeveloped land, cuts in government funding,
increases in development and recurrent costs, and growing rent arrears. With
regard to rent arrears, in 1989-90 the NHC managed to collect only Tshs
286,390,749 (ie 41 per cent) of the expected Tshs 694,467,848 (NHC, 1991: 8).
Government financial commitment to the NHC was budgeted at Tshs
861,190,210 for the period 1985-90. However, the corporation received only
Tshs 303,714,473 (ie 35 per cent) of promised funding in the period (NHC,
1991: 9). This received amount was too low to finance the activities of the
corporation and its six subsidiary companies.
Economic Recovery Policies and Urban Housing in Tanzania
Pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
resulted in the Tanzanian state adopting an Economic Recovery Program (ERP)
in 1986 in response to an ongoing national economic crisis (Tanzania-ERP II,
1990; Malyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990; Bagachwa, 1992: 19-43). The ERP
attributed the economic crisis to the structure of government spending which
favoured non-productive against productive sectors. Thus, the ERP suggested
the reduction of government expenditure in non-productive areas with priority
in government spending directed to agriculture, transport and communications,
industry, mining and energy (Tanzania-ERP II, 1989-90).
Under the ERP, five basic social services were included in the government
spending priority list: health, education, water supply, food security, and
employment and incomes. However, unlike in the productive sectors,
government spending on the five priority social services areas was dependent on
contributions from the public through various forms of user charges. Housing
and urban development infrastructure were not included in the government
spending priority list because they were not identified as productive areas.
199
The adoption of the ERP led to another decline in government spending on
housing and urban infrastructure. Inadequate funding of housing and urban
infrastructure incapacitated further the ability of the MLHUD and urban
authorities to deal with the housing crisis in urban Tanzania. As will be shown
in Chapter Nine, the implementation of phases 2 and 3 of the National Sites and
Services and Squatter Upgrading Project (NSSP) was adversely affected by
inadequate government funding resulting from the ERP. Their dire financial
situation led to the MLHUD and urban authorities withdrawing from certain
urban activities including housing. Fortunately, government withdrawal was
occurring at the time when non-government organisations (NGOs) were
beginning to emerge in Tanzania as part of the political democratisation
process. The NGOs together with international development agencies such as
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) forced the state in Tanzania to renew its interest in urban
issues.
The crisis in state finances and pressure from the World Bank for privatisation
and smaller government made the Tanzanian government more amenable to
alternative service delivery agencies such as NGOs. Against this background, in
1990 the state officially recognised the role of NGOs in urban development, and
in 1992 the government allowed the private sector to take part in the land
surveying function, thus removing the MLHUD's monopoly over this function.
Similarly, beginning in 1992 the MLHUD adopted an enabling approach as its
strategy in dealing with urban problems. The approach has taken different forms
including the MLHUD opening up its policy formulation process to the public
by incorporating private citizens and NGOs. This was seen in the preparation of
the Tanzanian agenda for inclusion in the United Nation Organisation's 1996
Habitat 2 conference held in Istanbul. There are, however, mixed feelings on the
extent to which the enabling approach has addressed urban housing problems in
Tanzania. With regard to privatisation of land surveying services, this study
found that very few urban dwellers can afford to hire a private surveyor. Even
the MLHUD cannot afford the services of private surveyors. Also, mixed
feelings were expressed with regard to the processes used to incorporate private
citizens and NGOs in the MLHUD's policy formulation process. It was felt by
some officials that the incorporated NGOs were mainly dominated by the elite
and did not represent the urban poor.
200
Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter has identified three distinct periods in housing
policy in Tanzania. Each period was characterised by distinct policy initiatives
although a consistent theme has been their relatively poor performance in
addressing Tanzania's housing needs, especially those of the poor who represent
the majority of the urban population. The radical changes in land ownership
introduced by. the state between 1961 and 1966, although enabling government
to own land, did little to improve the housing conditions of the poor. The
housing schemes benefiting from the land reforms were not accessible by the
low income groups. Even where attempts have been made to enable low income
groups gain access to land, the institutional framework created to implement the
land policies was inappropriate and acted against the interest of the low income
groups. The changes made to the urban management systems in Tanzania
curtailed their autonomy, rendering them incapable of dealing with the leading
urban problems including those of housing.
Regarding housing, the various housing strategies could meet neither the
government's expectations nor those of the intended beneficiaries because they
did not address the problems of those beneficiaries. It was clear that the
government structures and working procedures in the areas of land delivery,
housing construction, and production of building materials contributed to the
failure of the various colonial and post-colonial urban housing policies.
The discussion in this chapter has revealed that the post-Arusha period urban
housing policies, mainly geared toward promoting self-help, participation of the
private sector and non-governmental organisations in urban development
including housing, have had little impact in solving the urban housing crisis in
Tanzania. Lack of participation of stakeholders in the formulation and
implementation of urban policies has been identified as the major factor
contributing to the dismal performance of the post-Arusha urban housing
policies.
201
Chapter Eight
The National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project (NSSP) Phase 1
This chapter describes the formulation and implementation of phase one of the
Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project (NSSP) in Tanzania. The
project was undertaken by the Tanzanian government with financial assistance
from the World Bank. It starts with a brief discussion indicating how the sites
and services and squatter upgrading approaches were placed on Tanzania's
urban policy agenda. The chapter continues with a description of the processes
and institutions that were involved in the formulation and implementation of the
first phase of the National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project
(NSSP), and concludes with a description of the NSSP 1 outcomes in relation to
its objective of addressing housing problems of the urban poor in Tanzania.
Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading in Tanzania
Sites and services and squatter upgrading, as alternative approaches to urban
housing problems, can be traced back to the post-independence government's
First Five Year Development Plan (FFYDP) 1964-69. In the plan document it
was stated that:
The Ministry of: Lands, Settlement and Water Development is to be allocated pound sterling one (1) million for development expenditure for both industrial and residential land during the period of: plan. The lumpsum is to cover the costs both of: compensation to the squatters for removal and resettling them on new plots (Tanzania-FFYDP, 1969: 187).
The inclusion of sites and services and squatter upgrading ideas into the plan
was due to the influence of the British government on the affairs of its former
colony. Britain's influence was made through Sir Ernest Vasey who was
appointed by President Nyerere as Minister of Finance from 1962 to 1965. The
202
President's respect and confidence in Vasey's advice was reflected in the wide
powers that the Ministry of Finance was accorded under Vasey's leadership
(Tordoff, 1967; Babu, 1990: 119). His belief in the urban renewal programs that
had been implemented in Britain in the 1960s influenced his advice to include
sites and services and squatter upgrading into the independence government's
first long-term development plan.
The FFYDP assigned the responsibilities for slum clearance and provision of
serviced sites to the government-owned company the National Housing
Corporation (NHC) and to the Lands Division of the then-Ministry of Lands,
Settlement and Water Development (MLSWD). Under the FFYDP the
implementation of the slum clearance and provision of serviced sites was to rely
on funding from the central government. FFYDP was, however, highly
dependent on foreign funding (about 80 per cent of the total project funding)
and when for political reasons donors withdrew funding from the government
of Tanzania in 1965, this adversely affected government commitment to the
sites and services program. For example, despite the central government's
financial commitment to the NHC, the corporation obtained only about 25 per
cent of the expected funds (Stren, 1975b: 280). Thus, the NHC could not meet
the objectives of the slum clearance and squatter resettlement program.
Despite the failure of the sites and services and squatter resettlement schemes
during the FFYDP 1964-69, the schemes were further included in the Second
Five Year Development Plan (SFYDP) 1969-74. It was in this plan that, for the
first time in the government planning process, the sites and services and
squatter upgrading schemes were treated as distinct policy objectives requiring a
separate policy document. The preparation of separate policy documents for
some plan objectives was an innovation of the British Economic
Commissioners who were invited by President Nyerere in 1968 to assist the
government in preparing a framework for implementing its First Five Year
Development Plan (Tordoff, 1967; Pratt, 1976). To that effect in 1969, the
newly created Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development - MLHUD
(from a merger of the MLSWD and the Ministry of Local Government and
Housing - MoLGH), prepared a paper titled "The Limited Resettlement of
Squatters and Interim Rehabilitation of Squatter Areas". The paper elaborated
the objectives, implementation program and financial requirements, as well as
the expected outcomes, of the sites and services and squatter upgrading
program. The paper was adopted for implementation. The government
203
committed a total of Tshs 32.1 million to the program. The funding was to
cover the provision of serviced residential and industrial plots in ten towns. Dar
es Salaam, the country's primate city and capital, was to have 25,000 serviced
plots by 1974, with a production of 5,000 plots per annum (Temba, 1983: 102).
A pilot project was initiated in Kijitonyama subdivision, in Dar es Salaam. The
Kijitonyama pilot project failed because the NHC, which was responsible for
the implementation, could only service 425 plots. When the pilot project was
suspended in 1973, only 795 foundations and 60 core houses in the Kijitonyama
pilot project had been provided (Stren, 1975a: Halfani, 1987). In the
government's view, the main cause for the failure of the Kijitonyama pilot
project was lack of funding. It was in this context that the government appealed
to the World Bank for funding of a nationwide sites and services and squatter
upgrading project.
The Making of the National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading
Project: NSSP 1, 1970-1977
In 1970, President Kaunda of Zambia visited Tanzania. The Tanzanian
President Nyerere learnt from Kaunda that Zambia was in the final stages of
preparing a World Bank-funded sites and services and squatter upgrading
program. The visit coincided with the World Bank economic mission to
Tanzania and President Nyerere appealed to it for funding for a sites and
services and squatter upgrading program. The mission was receptive to this
request because sites and services and squatter upgrading were then being
promoted as part of the World Bank urban housing policies for developing
countries (Mgullu, 1978; Halfani, 1987). The government was advised to
prepare a formal proposal for submission to the World Bank. The President
directed the permanent secretary of the MLHUD to prepare a policy proposal
for cabinet consideration, approval and submission to the World Bank.
The President further directed the MLHUD to send an official to Zambia for
project design familiarisation. As will be shown in the following sections, very
little of the Zambian experience was used by the Tanzanian official in the
planning and implementation of the NSSP 1. This is because although the two
countries adopted broadly similar approaches, there were marked differences
between the countries in their processes and institutional frameworks for project
planning and implementation. For instance, in Zambia the formulation and
implementation of the sites and services scheme involved local authorities and
204
not central government authorities as was the case in Tanzania. Such contextual
differences explains the variation in the project contents between the two
countries.
Tanzania's project plan preparation coincided with the World Bank's
International Development Association (IDA) and the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) 1oint study: 'Urbanisation and Regional
Development Trends in Tanzania'. The IDA-UNDP study team confirmed the
urgent need for funding of Tanzania's urban housing policies and recommended
that donor funding should be sought for Tanzania's urban housing schemes. The
team's confirmation and recommendations concerning the validity of the
program and the necessity for external funding added weight to the Tanzanian
government's proposal to the World Bank for financial assistance.
Following the President's directive, the Permanent Secretary in the MLHUD
appointed the Commissioner for Housing to organise the formulation of the
NSSP. In turn he allocated the task to the Assistant Director for Housing. What
was very clear from the interviews conducted for this thesis was that the
functional structure of the Ministry, which divided tasks by specialisation,
inhibited any effort at team work and tended to personalise tasks. This explains
why the Assistant Director for Housing who specialised in housing personalised
the whole exercise of preparing the policy proposal. This was demonstrated by
the fact that contrary to the official procedure for ministerial policy preparation
which required consultations within and between government ministries as well
as other government agencies, the NSSP 1 policy proposal was prepared by one
official, the Assistant Director for Housing. While the official made use of staff
of the housing directorate and other ministries to gather necessary information,
there were no consultations with them in the writing up of the policy proposal.
From the interviews it was learnt that a number of factors led to the
centralisation of the formulation of the policy proposal. Firstly, the urgency of
the matter did not leave time for the ministry to follow the established
consultative procedure identified in the formally prescribed sequence of
project/policy formulation in Tanzania (see Table 8.1). Secondly, the MLHUD
feared opposition from other ministries and government agencies responsible
for housing, on both the MLHUD's perception of the problem and its proposed
solutions. At the time when the NSSP was being formulated, the MLHUD was
still struggling to establish itself as the appropriate sectoral ministry for housing
205
activities in Tanzania. The NSSP 1 formulation started two years after the
MLHUD was created from a merger of the Ministry of Lands, Settlement and
Water (MLSWD) and that of Local Government and Housing (MoLGH).
Following the merger, housing activities were concentrated in the MLHUD.
Other ministries and government agencies, such as the Ministry of Works
(Mo W), had demonstrated resistance to the perceived take-over of functions by
the MLHUD. For example, the MoW challenged the expansion of the NHC, a
MLHUD-owned corporation, into activities such as housing construction and
consultancy services which were still being carried by the MoW-owned
companies, the Mwananchi Engineering Company (MECCO) and the National
Engineering Design Company (NEDCO). The Mo W challenge was in part a
desire to retain the functions and get a share of the central government housing
budget.
Moreover, the MLHUD had noted that the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the
clearing house for all foreign funded projects, had expressed the intention of
taking full responsibility for the management of the proposed donor-funded
NSSP 1. The MoF used the IDA requirement that the Ministry of Finance of a
loan-receiving country should sign the financial agreement with the IDA for
purposes of accountability and control as a ~ustification for its claim to
ownership of the project. An added MLHUD fear was the Ministry of Planning
(MoP) which had claimed that NSSP 1 had to go through the national planning
process in order to obtain funding from the government. This would have
required the project proposal to follow the formally established sequence for
policy/project formulation which the MLHUD was trying to avoid. These
concerns were not only attempts at domain protection but also a reflection of
policy making in a situation of acute resource scarcity (Stren, 1982). As noted
in the previous section, at the time NSSP 1 was being formulated the
government was facing severe financial constraints due to the withdrawal of
funding by major bilateral donors. In official circles it was thought that any
ministry's financial position would be greatly relieved if it were to secure
foreign-funded projects. Thus, throughout the 1970s there were struggles within
and between ministries for leading foreign-funded projects and so gaining
control over the financial resources which were involved.
206
Table 8.1: Formally Prescribed Sequence for Policy Formulation in
Tanzania
Process
1. Initiating unit in the ministry gathers information nationwide on the issue
2. Responsible unit of the project initiating ministry submits project proposal to the ministry's Principal Secretary
3. Principal Secretary submits proposal to the Minister
4. Discussions within the ministry on the project proposals
5. Initiating ministry circulates information and intentions to other ministries and government agencies
6. Preparation of final draft in ministry
7. Project proposal submitted as ministry cabinet paper to cabinet secretary
8. Cabinet secretary circulates to responsible cabinet committee members
9. Cabinet decision referred to the Central Committee and the National Executive Committee of the ruling party
Consultation
Ministries, parastatals, private sector, local authorities, other units within the ministry
Not required
Not required
Minister, principal secretary and all departmental heads in the ministry
Not required
Not required
Not required
Not required
Not required
Approval
Not required
Proposal approval and recommendations by Principal Secretary
Not required
Proposal approval and recommendations by the Minister
Approval and recommendations by the Ministry of Planning and the Treasury
Not required
Not required
Not required
Not required
Source: Nyumayo, S. C., 1991, 'Financing of Regional Plans in Tanzania: An Overview', in
Halla, F., and Treuner, P. Mechanisms ofi Vertical and Horizontal Financial Balance
ifor the Promotion ofiDecentralised Development with Special Reference to Tanzania.
Proceedings ofa Seminar, Dar es Salaam: Ardhi Institute, 23-27 September, p.48.
207
In September 1972, the proposal for NSSP 1 was submitted to the cabinet by
the MLHUD. At that time, the policy advisory role of the cabinet was divided
between two committees: the Economic Committee of the Cabinet (ECC) and
the Scholarship Committee of the Cabinet (SCC). The Economic Committee,
chaired by the President, included all ministers directly responsible for
economic development together with the Ministers for Regional
Administration, Labour and Development, and Central Establishment (Tordoff,
1967: 81).
There was little debate in the ECC on the project proposal because it was
already part of the SFYDP. Also, the World Bank was anxious to meet its
lending targets for Tanzania and to get the project moving. Thus, the World
Bank exerted pressure on ECC members to treat the matter as urgent and
approve the proposal. The enthusiastic support shown by the chairman of ECC
(who was also the country's President) negated any attempts to reject the
proposal.
According to the formally prescribed procedures for policy-making in Tanzania
the formulation of NSSP 1 should have followed the path set out in Table 8.1. ·
In practice, however, it was not the case. With the exception of discussion in the
ECC the project proposal did not go through the established policy-making
procedure. Neither the parliament nor the ruling party decision-making
institutions had an opportunity to consider the proposal. It should be noted that
in this thesis with reference to the NSSP the terms project and policy are used
interchangeably because in the absence of a national urban housing policy as
was the case in Tanzania between 1961 and 1982 the NSSP 1 became a de facto
policy. Thus, the official distinction between policy and major project was
blurred. Also it should be noted that the planning of a project of major
consequence such as NSSP 1 ideally should have followed the same path as that
of other national policies described in Table 8.1.
While the cabinet did not oppose the proposal it recommended changes. Firstly,
it rejected the MLHUD proposal for nationwide coverage. Instead, the ECC
preferred a pilot project approach covering the urban centres of three regions.
Secondly, it reduced the proposed building plot size to a quarter of an acre from
the proposed half acre. The project proposals were passed as Cabinet papers No
81/72 on National Urban Housing Policy and No 106/72 on Squatter
Improvement Scheme. Although these were called 'Cabinet papers', they
208
remained the exclusive knowledge of the ECC. As a matter of cabinet
procedure, other cabinet members not in the ECC should have been informed of
the decisions by the secretariat of the ECC. However, this did not happen. The
Cabinet Secretary forwarded to the MLHUD through the Ministry of Finance an
action abstract from the minutes of the meeting together with an extract from
the relevant paragraph of the cabinet paper. Moreover, cabinet procedure
required all cabinet decisions to be recorded in the cabinet registry. This was
intended to facilitate information dissemination to concerned ministries and
agencies, as well as the cabinet secretariat's follow-up of policy implementation.
Contrary to the standard cabinet procedures the two policies were not recorded
in the cabinet registry.
Following that cabinet decision, in October 1972 the government officially
approached the World Bank for financial assistance. A two-man delegation
from Washington visited Dar es Salaam in November to assist officials in the
MLHUD to prepare a more detailed plan. After that, two officials from the
MLHUD went to Washington for further clarification and negotiations on the
technical specifications for standards of roads and social infrastructure. In the
World Bank's view, the Tanzanian government's proposed standards for roads
and social infrastructure contradicted the intention of producing low-cost
serviced sites. The World Bank wanted the MLHUD to lower the specifications
for roads and social infrastructure in the specified sites to make them affordable
to the low income groups.
Moreover, the World Bank demanded a statement identifying intended
beneficiaries. Since NSSP 1 was for low income groups, the World Bank
insisted that the proposed NSSP 1 in Tanzania should cater exclusively to low
income groups. Interviews for this thesis revealed that, since the ministry's main
goal was to obtain funding from the World Bank, it was prepared to go along
with the World Bank's recommendations regarding beneficiary identification
without due regard to the implications.
Following MLHUD and World Bank exchange visits, a more detailed project
plan was produced in mid-1973. Although some officials saw the plan as being
substantially different from the MLHUD-cabinet approved plan (Halfani, 1987),
evidence gathered from the NSSP 1 files at the MLHUD suggests that the
differences were mainly of details. There was no change in the approach to the
housing problems of the urban poor of Tanzania.
209
Table 8.2: Distribution of Funding Responsibilities Between the
Government of Tanzania and the IDA for the NSSP 1
Project Activity
I. Sites and Services
Responsible Funding Institution
(a) Site clearance IDA
(b).Site servicing: surveying, physical and community infrastructure IDA
(c) Compensation to previous site occupants Government of Tanzania
(d) Wages and salaries of project staff Government of Tanzania
(e) Equipment - vehicles, and technical facilities IDA
(0 Stationery and non-technical equipment - type-writers, writing pads Government of Tanzania
2. Squatter Upgrading
(a) Surveying
(b) Service provision
(c) Compensation to those affected by the project activities
(d) House construction and improvement finance
(e) Wages and salaries of project staff
(0 Stationery and non-technical equipment - typewriters
(g) Equipment - vehicles and technical facilities
IDA
IDA
Government of Tanzania
IDA
Government of Tanzania
Government of Tanzania
IDA
Source: Tanzania, 1974, 'Development Credit Agreement (Sites and Services Project) between United
Republic of Tanzania and International Development Association', unpublished material, Dar es
Salaam: MLHUD.
210
What the World Bank did was to elaborate, omit or add debut according to the
Bank's lending policy. However, the elaborations, omissions and additions were
based on the policy proposal submitted by the Tanzanian government and did
not substantially alter that proposal.
In August 1973, a four-man World Bank team arrived from Washington to
appraise the project and determine its technical, financial, social and
administrative feasibility. The appraisal team scaled down the project costs by
omitting some of the proposed project activities including the Tabata West area
in Dar es Salaam, which would have consisted of 6,400 new minimally serviced
plots, and the improvement of public transportation facilities and services
operating along Morogoro Road in Dar es Salaam.
The project was estimated to cost about Tshs. 103.2 million of which 58.7 per
cent was to be financed by the World Bank through an IDA credit of US$ 17
million. The remaining 41.3 per cent was to be financed by the Tanzanian
government through its normal budgetary process. Table 8.2 shows the
distribution of funding responsibilities between the government of Tanzania and
the IDA (Mgullu, 1978: 97). The IDA funding comprised two interrelated
agreements: Development Credit Agreements (for sites servicing and squatter
upgrading) and Project Agreements (for loans to persons awarded plots).
It is evident that the formulation of the NSSP 1 passed through four stages,
namely: (1) MLHUD position paper (2) Tanzania's government policy paper (3)
World Bank-Tanzania government policy paper (4) World Bank Appraisal
Team policy paper. From the four stages four versions of the NSSP 1 were
generated. The four versions are presented in Table 8.3. which indicates the
variations in the perception of the urban housing problems by the four
institutions involved.
211
Tahlc ~.J: lJlllCrlllg l'crspccllvcs 01 lllC r'-1::,::-,1• l
First Version Second Version Third Version Fourtl, Version
MLHUD Cabinet Policy World Bank-MLHUD World-Bank position paper Papers improvement on Appraisal Team to Cabinet Cabinet Papers policy paper
Aim To providelow To provide low To provide low cost To provide low cost serviced cost serviced serviced plots to low cost plots to low plots plots income groups income groups
Regional A policy to A pilot project to A pilot project for A pilot project or Coverage cover 8 major cover select selected areas of selected areas of
urban centres areas of selected particular urban in the country particular urban urban centres for centres for
centres replication throughout replication the country throughout the
country
Level of High High Moderate Low Service to be Provided (ie unit costs per
lot)
Size of Plots
Target Beneficiaries
Level of Details of Implementation Plan
First Version
MLI-IUD position paper to Cabinet
Half of an acre Not stated
Not Detailed
'l'ahle 8.3: Differing Perspectives of the NSSP l (Continued)
Second Version
Cabinet Policy Papers
Quarter of an acre Not stated
Not Detailed
11,ird Version
World Bank-MLHUD improvement on Cabinet Papers
Quarter of an acre
Low income groups
Not Detailed
Four/11 Version
World-Bank Appraisal Team policy paper
Quarter of an acre
Low income groups
Detailed on identification of implementing agencies but not on implementation details
Table 8.3: Differing Perspectives of the NSSP 1 (Continued)
First Version Second Version Third Version Fa11rth Versinn
MLHUD Cabinet Policy W orlrl nank- World Bank position paper Papers MLI-IUD Appraisal Team to Cabinet improvement on policy paper
Cabinet Papers
Numherof Production of Same no of i>roduction of 8,006 Production of 8,000 targeted "J ,000 serviced project outputs surveyed plots and surveyed plots and serviced plots plots per year as in the first 6,370 serviced plots 6,370 serviced plots and number of in 8 major version except in four sites in Dar in four sites in Dar targete~ towns and that all were ta es Salaam; es Salaam squatter areas provision of he produced in improvement of improvement of for upgrading infrastructure only 3 major infrastructure in infrastructure
to all squatter towns squatter areas of in squatter areas of areas in the Manzese, Dar es Manzese, Dar es country Salaam; raising Salaam; raising
standards of 5,000 standards of plots to the 5,000 plots; standards of provide shared surveyed plots; community provide shared facilities in 5 areas community facilities areas of Dar es in 5 areas of Dar es Salaam; Salaam;
First Version
MLHUD position paper to Cabinet
Table 8.3: Differing Perspectives of the NSSP I (Continued)
Second Version
Cabinet Policy Papers
Third Version
World BankMLHUD improvement on Cabinet Papers
production of 10,000 new plots in 2 other major towns; perform feasibility study for extension of sites and services squatter upgrading in other up country towns
Fourt1z Version
World Bank Appraisal Team policy paper
production of 10,000 new plots in 2 other major towns; perform feasibility study for extension of sites and services and squatter upgrading in other up country towns
Source: Compiled from the various First NSSP files, 1972, at the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, Dar cs Salaam.
a. The eight major towns were those which were categorised as growth-pole centres in the Second Five Year Development Plan (SFYDP)
At this stage it is important to provide the characteristics of the policy which
was finally adopted for implementation, that is, the fourth version in Table 8.3.
In this thesis, policy characteristics include the nature of the policy's impact on
society and the relationships among those involved in its formulation and
implementation (Anderson, 1984: 113). Understanding the characteristics of a
particular policy is important because it enables not only the prediction of the
conflicts likely to be generated but also the responses of various stakeholders
and the strategy employed by them to manage the conflicts but also the
implementability or non-implementability of the policy (Lowi, 1966; Heclo,
1972; Ripley and Franklin, 1980; May, 1986; Thomas and Grindle, 1990: 1163:
Sabbatier, 1991; Wayne, 1995: 132).
In this thesis, the term stakeholders is used to refer to those persons or
institutions affected by the outcome, - negatively or positively, or those who can
affect the outcome of a proposed intervention (World Bank, 1995: 125). Based
on their characteristics public policies have been classified in terms of being
distributive, redistributive, regulatory and constituent (Lowi, 1972). Distributive
policies mainly deal with distribution of new resources; redistributive policies
involve changing the distribution of existing resources; regulatory policies deal
with the regulation and control of activities; and constituent policies are
concerned with the setting-up or reorganisation of institutions.
Using Lowi's (1966: 27; 1972) classification, the sites and services policy had
distributive, regulatory and constituent aspects. As a distributive policy, NSSP 1
was to distribute new resources or benefits in terms of serviced building plots,
land ownership deeds, housing improvement loans, and community services to
low income groups. It also provided funding to the NSSP 1 project division, the
Cowi Consult Engineers, MECCO and other local companies involved in the
project. The regulative aspects of the project are reflected in its imposition of
land rents and service charges on project beneficiaries, and to the local
administrative units (regional and local councils) which were to take over the
maintenance of services after completion of the project. The creation of the
NSSP 1 section to deal with matters such as surveying and land allocation,
which until then were the exclusive activities of other units in the MLHUD,
represented the constituent aspect of the NSSP 1 project.
The distributive, regulative and constituent elements of the NSSP 1 project
were likely to generate different kinds of conflicts among stakeholders. The
216
land rents and service charges were not going to be easily accepted by the
beneficiaries who previously did not have to pay any charges. Similarly, other
central government and local government agencies and units of the MLHUD
specialising in activities similar to those of the NSSP 1 section could not easily
accept participation in the implementation under the NSSP 1 supervision for
fear of losing control of their domains. This is because the major structure of
government institutions in Tanzania was of a mechanistic functional
bureaucratic form. A mechanistic functional bureaucratic structure divides tasks
by speciality, with separate units created to deal with each one. Integration is
achieved by vertical reporting relationships to a central, apex coordinating unit,
whose administrators guide the organisation using standard operating
procedures (Brinkerhoff, 1991: 106). This type of organisational structure
limited communication across and hence cooperation with other institutions
participating in the implementation of the project. A case in point was the
negative attitude towards the NSSP 1 from the town planning division of the
MLHUD which had activities which were similar in nature to those of the
NSSP 1. Thus, to the urban planning division, the NSSP 1 was a threat to its
domain.
Project Implementation Plan
The MLHUD submitted a policy implementation plan to the newly created
Presidential Implementation Committee (PIC) in September 1972 at the same
time as the policy proposal was submitted to the cabinet. The implementation
plan advocated the creation of a new section in the MLHUD as the appropriate
vehicle for the implementation of the project. The proposed section constituted
a fourth level in the MLHUD's hierarchy of authority (See Figure 8.1). Unlike
other sections of the MLHUD, the plan proposed that the NSSP section should
be headed by a Project Manager whose position was equivalent to a director in
the MLHUD's organisation hierarchy. The plan identified other institutions
which would be involved in implementing specific policy objectives but
awarded the principal implementing and coordinating agency roles to the
MLHUD. However, there were no specifications on the implementation plan on
relationship between the NSSP 1 section and other institutions outside and
within the MLHUD. Neither did the plan include the powers and limits of the
MLHUD in its coordinating role. Interviews with officials at the Central
Establishment suggested that the absence of such details in the implementation
plan prepared by the MLHUD proposal was not unusual in Tanzania at that
217
time, because details of implementation were not considered important by
government departments and the state in general. The general perception among
government officials at that time was that implementation would occur
automatically once the policy was formulated (Said, 1983: 44).
The MLHUD implementation plan proposal was never discussed at any of the
PIC's meetings. Respondents mainly attributed this to the newness of the PIC, to
the poor attendance record of members at meetings, and the fact that the PIC's
decisions were not taken seriously because they were often overruled by the
President. In addition, the PICs secretariat, the Management Services Section of
the Central Establishment, did not have the capacity in human and physical
resources to provide the PIC with adequate secretariat services. The
Management Services Section had never attracted sufficient resources for its
operations since it was established in 1970 as a merger of the Organisation and
Development Section of the MoF and the Staff Inspection Unit of the Central
Establishment.
Moreover, the decision to award the Central Establishment with more powers to
coordinate the human resources management function in the public service
through elevation of its status to that of a Ministry of Labour and Development
(MLD) in 1972 increased the workload of the Management Services Section.
This came at a time when the government was experiencing budget deficits and
thus could not provide adequate funding to the MLD.
The lack of details in the MLHUD implementation plan was noted by World
Bank visiting officials. To ensure that implementation was in line with their
requirements, the World Bank appointed a three-man team comprising two
expatriates then working in the MLHUD and the Tanzanian official responsible
for NSSP 1 to prepare a detailed implementation plan. The team prepared the
implementation plan in relation to (a) the administrative system (b) the methods
of financial recovery, and (c) the appropriate form of technical assistance to the
beneficiaries. Nowhere in the plan did the team question the inconsistencies
between various aspects of the project. For example, the team did not question
the implementability of the housing construction and improvement loans given
the low level of income of the targeted beneficiaries. Similarly they failed to
consider all aspects of the cost recovery component of the project. There was, in
short, insufficient anticipation of the possibilities of project failure
218
Also of significance was that the World Bank-IDA loan agreements had
specifications indicating the institutions to be involved and the levels and nature
of their involvement. Interviews with officials at MLHUD confirmed that the
ID A's guidelines for selection of participating institutions were modified by the
Tanzanian government with IDA's approval to fit with the government's interest
of ensuring that institutions likely to block the implementation of the policy did
not participate in the implementation process. Table 8.4 presents a summary of
IDA institutional role specifications and its modification through role
assignment by the government of Tanzania.
In examining Table 8.4 it is clear that while the World Bank-IDA specifications
identified participating institutions they did not provide directions on which
institutions should take part in the implementation of which aspects of the
project, and how the implementation should proceed. Such decisions were left
for the Tanzanian government to determine. Hence, the Tanzanian government
had the leading role in providing details of institutional involvement. Such
details were determined less by recourse to technical rationality than to the
prevailing intra-governmental political processes.
According to the implementation plan worked out by the World Bank and
MLHUD a total of about 15 institutions were to be involved in the
implementation of the various elements of the NSSP 1. Table 8.5 presents a
summary of the responsibilities allocated to various institutions which were to
be involved in the implementation of NSSP 1. As shown in Table 8.5 the
involvement of all these institutions in the implementation of NSSP 1 generated
a complex pattern of interactions and the need for coordination and control,
factors which were neglected in the implementation plan.
219
>le 8.4: Dividing the Tasks for NSSP 1: The International Development
Association's (IDA) Specification and the Tanzanian Government
Interpretation
IDA Specifications
IDA extends credit to receiving country through an pointed implementing agency
Credit receiving country through institutions ,ponsible for administration of building codes regulates the law to allow smooth implementation of the iSP
The government of Tanzania employs consultants to ;ist in preparing detailed engineering plans and also pervising the construction of the basic infrastructure d community facilities
Government monitors and supervises its principal ,plementing agency on matters pertaining preparation of accounts and submission upon request progress reports to the IDA
The government of Tanzania to fill vacancies in sites d services section not later than June 1975
The government ensures that its principal :plementing agency operates a separate project account
The government of Tanzania on request provides the >A with updated information on financial and economic nditions of the country
The government of Tanzania through its taxation licies ensures tax exemption for the IDA loan
Interpretation through Institutional Role Assignment by the Tanzanian Government
1. The Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD) appointed as principal implementing agency
2. Did not assign the role to any institution. However, the role should have been assigned to the Regional Development Directorate which was the institution responsible. As such the role remained ambiguous.
3. The NSSP 1 staffing role assigned to the NSSP 1 section in the MLHUD
4. The role was not assigned to any institution because no institution had such a role in Tanzania at that time.
5. The role of filling vacancies in sites and services section assigned to NSSP 1 section in theMLHUD
6. The role assigned to the NSSP 1 section in th MLHUD
7. The government of Tanzania did not assig1 to any institution the role of providing updated information on financial and economic conditions of the country to the IDA. The IDA, however, did receive such information either from the Treasury or the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (MoPEA)
8. The role of ensuring and providing tax exemption for the IDA loan was assigned to the Central Bank of Tanzania
rce: Compiled from the IDA Credit Agreement and various NSSP l files in the MLHUD.
220
Table 8.5: Responsibility Matrix for NSSP 1
Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban
Development
roject Planning : roject Financing Jhysical Planning ,ite Selection .ayouts :adastral Surveys :ngineering Designs 1frastructure Constr. · upervision Constr. 'lot Allocations (Res) 'aluations :ompensation (Houses) ·ouse Registration reparation of Titles
: elocation Assistance ·ommunity Organization .'esign of Com. Facilities :onstruction of Com. Fae. -upervision (Com. Fae.) '.aintenance (lnfrast.) reparation and Main.(CF)
· esign Power Supply onstr. Power Supply
)per. (Maintenance) 'ouse Improvement Loans ~ost Recovery Service :harge
2:.~ ~:§ ""t U>,~
2e (/) a..
. 0
0 0 0 0
0 0
.
.
.
. . . 0 0
0
"" j II> Cl ~8 ...... c ,u·-2: 8: -u·-
c2: o1~ !3~
0
0 .
0
Key • Primary Direct Responsibility 0 Secondary Responsibility
c ro oiQ l:l: C .!: ro ro -u '1)
-e := f/)
1%1& :::)
0
0
Other _oca Para stat, Ministries AciTin Org.
~ c C C ~ st c ro
l:l: .!!'.! Cl ::::, "' c·o C ll>'C: "' "" ·;;; ro i: ro C ,uµ
~ 0
~ -e::::, ::::, cu
u :::)8 0 ~~ UJ ::r:
0 0 . 0
0 0
0
0 0 . 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 . . .
. . 0
1 Others
... .., 8 C
ro u .., ~ :; ..,
"' C C
8 8
0 .
0
.
0 0
Source: Mghweno J., 1980, 'Management of Squatter Area Upgrading Programme', Brief on the Tanzanian Case, Workshop on the Management of Squatter Area Upgrade Programme, Birmingham, 21-26 September.
221
Project Implementation Process
At the start the NSSP project was handled by a section in the Housing Division
of the MLHUD headed by an expatriate project manager on secondment from
the World Bank. As shown in Figure 8.1, the formal bureaucratic lines of
communications for the project were long and delayed decisions pertaining to
the operations of the project. As a result, the expatriate project manager
preferred to use informal lines of communication to speed up the decision
making process. He set up a system of weekly briefings involving himself, the
ministry's Principal Secretary, the Director for Housing and World Bank
representatives in the country. At the operating level, the project started with 10
staff who were transferred into the NSSP section from various divisions of the
MLHUD.
When the expatriate manager's term expired in 1976 the project's status was
elevated to that of a division which constituted the second level in the
MLHUD's hierarchy. Unlike other divisions, NSSP 1 had sections which
replicated the functions of major divisions of the MLHUD (see Figure 8.2). One
former NSSP 1 project manager described the NSSP 1 division as a "mini
ministry". In explaining the situation, officials from the Central Establishment
argued that the elevation of the NSSP 1 status was necessary to remove the
delays in decision making of the project section resulting from a long chain of
command in the ministry's bureaucracy. The elevation of the project's status to
a division in 1976 was accompanied by an increase in the number of staff from
ten to twenty-five.
To meet IDA requirements, the NSSP 1 division had its own accounting and
financial procedures, a separate procedure for resource acquisition and a
reporting system different from that of the MLHUD. Therefore, the NSSP 1
opened a separate account and the project manager was its accounting officer. It
was ascertained from interviews that the MLHUD's Principal Secretary, the
ministry's accounting officer, did not have control of the project's account, but
did have control over that portion of project funding which was supplied by the
government of Tanzania.
222
··-·----· ---·-
PrinciJ)al
-·------- Secretary
Internal Planning Unit '----- Auditor
Urban Director
Development I Department
Cornrnissioner
Finance & Office Services Unit
Urban Planning Housing National Housing& PAS
Development Building I Division Division Research Unit __ c__ I I Director
Director Director
I I Finance Accounts Office Services Section Section Section
Technical Building Econ. Human
I I Section Sect Recruitment
Planning Manpower Land Development Services Surveys and
Master Plans Drawing Department Srevices
Section Office Division Division Mapping
Section Director
Director Division Director
I I I I
l Manpower Personnal
Planning & Ardhi Institute Administration Surveys Map Production Recruitment
Sites and Housing Section
Section Section Section
Services Finances
Section Services Section
r I I I I Land Economic Customary
Sect Legal Section Land Registrar
Land Tribu Rent Tribunal
National Registrar of
Housing Buildings
Corporation Source: World Bank, 1977, 'Tanzania: The Second National Sites and Services Project Rerort No. I518a-TA',
Washington DC: World Bank. Urban Protects Derartment. Annex 5 Figure :I.
N N +:so-
Urban Planinng Division Director
Master Plans Section
~---i-----
Principal Secretary
Sites and Services
>- Internal Auditor Division Director
I Engineering Planning Finance Survey and Office Services
Section Section Section Mapping Sect. Section
Planning Unit Director
Finance & Office Urban Services Unit
Development PAS Department
I I I I I
Office Housing Developnment National Housing & Finance Accounts
Services Division Building Research Unit Section Section
Section Director Director
\ I I I
Building Human Technical
Economics Recrutment Manpower Department Land Development Surveys and Mapping Section
Section Section Division Services Division Division Director Director Oirector
I I I Housing National Housing Registrar of
Finances Corporation Buildings Manpower Planning I A,a,; 1osnw, Personnel
Map Production Services Section & Recruitment Administration Surveys Section Section Section
Section
I I I
Land Economics Legal Section Land Registrar
Customary Land Rent Tribunal Drawing Office Planning Sect Tribunal
Section Services Section
• I I Source. World Bank 1977, Tanzania. The Natrona! Sites and Services Proiect Report no. 1518a-TA, Washington DC World Bank, Urban Projects Department Annex 5 Figure 4.
The NSSP 1 division did not follow the normal personnel management
procedures of the MLHUD. It had its own personnel procedures which allowed
it to apply directly to the Central Establishment for its personnel requirements.
As such, the NSSP 1 division's personnel requirement were not integrated into
the MLHUD plan. With regard to the division's reporting system, the project
manager had to provide two types of reports to three different offices. First, he
had to provide financial and physical performance reports to the World Bank.
The physical performance report would include information concerning the
number of plots allocated, the number of loans approved and the number of
roads, schools and dispensaries constructed. Provision of financial and physical
performance reports to the World-Bank was a mandatory prerequisite for the
release of IDA funds.
Furthermore, the physical performance reports from the NSSP 1 division were
to be presented to President Nyerere as well as to the minister of the MLHUD.
On some occasions the President, and later on Prime Minister Sokoine,
occasionally ordered progress reports from the NSSP 1 division. In the wake of
increasingly uncontrolled and inadequately serviced squatter settlements, both
the President and the Prime Minister regarded the NSSP 1 as an important
project representing the government's commitment to overcoming the housing
problems of the poor in urban Tanzania. Finally, the project manager was
required as part of ministerial procedure to provide the minister with
information on the overall implementation progress.
The actual implementation of NSSP 1 involved and relied on a multiplicity of
institutions of various kinds within and outside the MLHUD: national and local,
public and private. For example, the processing of plots, as well as their
approval and allocation, required participation of the · MLHUD's land
development division whose commissioner had the ultimate authority for
issuing tittle deeds. This also applied to the NSSP 1 survey activities, whose
commencement depended on the readiness of the layout designs from the
Division of Urban Planning which was the custodian of master plans. The
NSSP 1 divisions' dependence on other institutions within and outside the
MLHUD for its activities limited its autonomy.
With reference to physical infrastructure such as primary schools, markets,
electricity, water and dispensaries, the actual provision rested with sectoral
ministries. For example, the Ministry of Water, Energy and Natural Resources
225
(MoWENR) through its publicly owned company the National Urban Water
Authority (NUW A) was to provide water in project areas. Such arrangements,
whereby a project is in the hands of a multiplicity of institutions, give rise to a
complex pattern of interactions which require good coordination. This was,
however, not taken into account in the planning of the implementation of the
NSSP 1 project.
The implementation of NSSP 1 started in 1974 with an announcement in the
government gazette for persons from low income groups to apply for loans and
building plots in designated areas. The applicants were required to collect
application forms from the NSSP 1 manager in the MLHUD for plots in Dar es
Salaam and from the NSSP 1 delegate in the Regional Lands Office (ie
MLHUD representative at the regional level) for those outside Dar es Salaam.
Similarly, applicants for housing construction and improvement loans were
required to collect application forms from the NSSP 1 officials at the Tanzania
Housing Bank (THB) for Dar es Salaam. Those in the regions were to collect
forms from the bank's branch offices. The housing construction and
improvement loan forms were then referred to headquarters in Dar es Salaam
for processing and approval.
The project manager communicated directly with officials of the participating
institutions on matters related to the project. It is evident from the project files
that most memos or letters from the NSSP 1 project manager to the
participating institutions did not follow the participating institutions' formal
communication channels. For example, on all occasions the project manager
communicated directly with the Tanzania National Electric Company
(T ANES CO) without passing through its parent ministry. In addition, all
correspondence emanating from NSSP 1 had the project manager's signature
rather than the principal secretary or minister as the official procedure required
at the MLHUD. The NSSP 1 manager's decision to ignore the established
bureaucratic communication system was mainly intended to avoid delays
associated with decision making in the Tanzanian government bureaucracy.
The NSSP 1 division used the leaders of the ruling party to communicate its
intentions to the communities involved. In areas earmarked for sites and
services initiatives, meetings were held between the NSSP 1 project team, the
ruling party and locally based government functionaries, the consulting and
contracting engineers and the communities involved. In all areas the meetings
226
were presided over by the Ward Chairperson of the ruling party. All meetings
were accompanied by party sloganeering songs such as TANU Yajenga Nchi (ie
TANU builds the Nation). The meetings were organised for the project manager
to convey government intentions to the residents. The residents were told that
the government was going to implement a project which required their removal
from the government land but from which they would benefit. They were
promised full monetary compensation and a building plot in surveyed areas
elsewhere or on the same land depending on government's plans. It was made
very clear in the meetings that allocation of these plots was based on meeting
conditions laid down by government and not a product of community
consultation.
The affected communities were further informed that the NSSP 1 division
would determine the criteria for compensation and amount to be paid to each
household. The responsibility of preparing a registry of all residents and their
properties, which included dwellings and crops, was assigned to 'ten cell'
leaders (ie leaders of the lowest level in the hierarchy of the political
administrative system of Tanzania until 1992) of each project area. The ten cell
leaders were also the ruling party's functionaries in the areas. Although there
was no elaboration in the NSSP 1 community briefing minutes on what the
project meant and what were its implications, there was no immediate feeling of
discontent among the communities. This was because at that time people
respected and had sympathy with both the government and the ruling party.
Thus, any mention of government or ruling party activities was sufficient
~ustification for public acceptance. Moreover, there was awareness amongst
residents that the land they occupied belonged to the government.
A similar information dissemination approach was used in squatter upgrading
areas. However, the message in squatter areas was different. The residents were
informed of the government intention to improve their living conditions by
providing sewage, drainage and access roads. They were also informed of the
government intention to provide them with security of tenure through issuance
of title deeds to the plots they occupied. They were further told of the need for
demolition of some houses to provide space for the services. Families in the
affected communities were promised monetary compensation and a surveyed
and serviced building plot.
227
With respect to the actual provision of physical infrastructure (excavation for
water supply, pipe laying and standpipes, shaping and compacting of roads, and
gravelling of roads) the NSSP 1 division's main task was to call tenders and
make contracts, appoint engineers, and on request provide participating
institutions permits for the acquisition of resources such as foreign currency and
cement whose availability was controlled by the government. To avoid the
delays associated with decision making in this government bureaucracy the
NSSP 1 project adopted its own tendering procedures and processes. The
central government tendering procedure required that all tenders be considered
by the central tender board of the Ministry of Finance. The NSSP 1 tendering
procedure allowed the Project Manager to accept a tender from any institution
that satisfied the conditions set by the NSSP 1. This explains why despite the
fact that officially the project tender was announced in the government owned
newspaper (Daily News), the actual tender allocation did not follow the usual
government tendering procedure. In this instance, the expatriate project
manager offered the contract to Messrs Cowi Consult a foreign company he had
worked with in another project. Cowi Consult decided to subcontract various
elements of the contract to different companies. For example, Unico a local,
privately owned, company was contracted by Cowi Consult to install water
pipes and standpipes in the Mikocheni area of Dar es Salaam. Similarly
MECCO, another local government-owned, company, was subcontracted to
install water pipes in Sinza, Dar es Salaam.
A hierarchical supervisory relationship linked the major contractor,
subcontractor and NSSP 1 division. The MLHUD was responsible for
monitoring Cowi Consult projects while Cowi Consult was responsible for the
subcontractors (Unico and MECCO). Cowi Consult was the consulting engineer
for the design and supervision of construction of physical infrastructure for
NSSP 1 projects in all the three regions. The company was also responsible for
handing over completed work to the regional and district authorities. The
subcontractors were responsible for the construction of the physical
infrastructure .
The NSSP 1 was financially responsible for the services provided. However,
neither the IDA specifications nor the project implementation plan specified the
mode of payment to the consulting engineer and the subcontractors by the
NSSP 1. On a number of occasions the MLHUD made payments to
subcontractors without prior consultations with the consulting engineer. In some
228
cases, payments were made to the ministry responsible for the provision of the
services without the knowledge of the consulting engineer or the subcontractor.
This sometimes resulted in double payments. The NSSP 1 files show that as late
as 1991, the MLHUD was still trying to recover from other sectoral ministries
funds which were incorrectly paid to them by the NSSP 1 directorate. It was
clear from the interviews that the problems of double payments were a result of
the project manager's inability to supervise and follow up activities of other
participating institutions. This was again the outcome of work overload in the
position of the project manager resulting from enormous responsibilities
imposed on it.
That the responsibilities granted to the NSSP 1 project manager were enormous
is demonstrated by the fact that apart from monitoring the activities of the
consulting engineers and subcontractors, he was also compelled by the
circumstances of the time to act as a guarantor for them. This was especially the
case with respect to the companies' access to construction equipments and
materials. For example, due to a cement shortage at that time, one needed a
permit from the government to obtain cement from the country's only cement
manufacturing company. With respect to the NSSP 1, obtaining such permits
was the project manager's responsibility. Similarly, permits were required by the
Central Bank for import licences. For example, to secure an import licence for
obtaining a six ton grader from outside the country, Unico needed to acquire a
certification note from the MLHUD for submission to the Central Bank. The
files show that the project manager preferred to carry out these tasks himself.
One former project manager explained his lack of delegation in terms of the
possibilities that such powers could be abused for personal gain. Furthermore,
since he was personally accountable for the project he believed that he had to
have full knowledge of every activity.
It is evident from the description above that Cowi Consult's decision to
subcontract to Unico and MECCO, together with the centralisation of all
decision-making powers in the position of the NSSP 1 project manager,
expanded the NSSP 1 project manager's supervisory role or span of control.
Such wide span of control turned out to be beyond the NSSP 1 project
manager's personal capabilities. This resulted in inadequate supervision of the
contractors and subcontractors. The case of Cowi Consults awarding Handing
Over Certificates (HOCs) without due regard to procedures is illustrative. The
procedure required Cowi Consult to issue HOCs to regional and district
229
authorities after the construction activity was completed and only where it was
satisfied with the subcontractors work. Also, the procedure required the handing
over meetings to be attended by Cowi Consult, the subcontractor, the sectoral
ministry responsible for provision of the service, the officials from the NSSP 1
division, and officials from the local or central government authorities
responsible for the maintenance of the completed work. Project files reveal that
lack of adequate supervision and monitoring from the NSSP 1 project manager
enabled Cowi Consult to issue HOCs before the construction activity was
completed. Moreover, lack of supervision enabled Cowi Consult to ignore
procedure and issue HOCs even when the required institutions were absent.
Quite often HOCs were issued despite the absence of regional or local
government authorities.
Project Outcomes
Policy outcomes refer to the substantive effects of policies on conditions they
were designed to correct (Dror, 1968: 4). With reference to the NSSP 1
therefore, project outcomes entail the extent to which the housing conditions -
availability of housing and services, and reduction in overcrowding - of the
urban poor in Tanzania changed following the implementation of the NSSP 1.
Although the project has been described as a success by the World Bank, the
MLHUD's officials and the government of Tanzania (Mghweno, 1979;
Mghweno and Kulaba, 1981; World Bank, 1977: 1518a: i-5), evidence gathered
from the project files as well as previous studies focusing on project outcomes
and the author's visits to squatter areas of Dar es Salaam show that the project
failed to make a significant impact on improving the housing conditions of the
urban low income groups.
The success record outlined by the World Bank, MLHUD's officials and the
government of Tanzania can be attributed to the evaluation approach adopted by
the two institutions. It is evident that the World Bank and the government of
Tanzania adopted an evaluation approach which focussed on project outputs
rather than the impacts or outcomes. Project outputs include the quantitative
objectives of the project (Anderson, 1984: 136). The quantitative data resulting
from this type of evaluation maybe useful in providing feedback for future
project implementation, monitoring and evaluation, but it does lack an essential
component of a project's objectives. This is the changing needs and goals of the
intended beneficiaries (Salmen, 1987: 6). The output-focussed evaluation as
230
was adopted by the World Bank and the Tanzanian government, although it
~ustified their decision to continue the project into its second phase (ie NSSP 2),
was inadequate because it concealed the fact that the project had serious flaws I
in its design and hence was incapable of achieving the intended outputs as well
as addressing housing problems of the intended beneficiaries. This section
provides an account of the NSSP 1 outputs. Furthermore, the section looks at
the extent to which the project impacted on the beneficiaries. The project
outputs presented in this section are those directly related to the project
objectives.
At the time of NSSP 1 project completion in 1982, a total of 4,106 houses had
been constructed, and 1,212 were still under construction. Even if the 1,212
houses under construction were included in the output figure, only a total of
5,318 houses-constituting 50.2 per cent of the estimated 10,600 houses-had
been built (see Table 8.6). Of even greater significance to the appropriateness of
the NSSP 1 project in alleviating housing problems of the urban low income
group, is the fact that more than 70 per cent of both the completed units and
those under construction had a value above Tshs 100,000, with some reaching
as high as Tshs 500,000 in 1982 prices. It is evident that the value of these
houses was beyond the economic reach of the targeted population which
comprised persons whose earnings were estimated to range from Tshs 301 to
Tshs 750 per month in 1974 prices (Stren, 1985b: 82; Halfani, 1987: 114;
Matern, 1992: 20). This is a clear indication that the high and middle income
groups rather than the intended group (low income) benefited from the project's
activities. The lower income group simply could not afford to build the houses
required under the NSSP 1 project (Halfani, 1987: 99; Kulaba, 1985b: 40). Such
outcomes question the appropriateness of the NSSP 1 project in addressing the
housing problems of the urban low income groups.
231
Table 8.6: NSSP 1 Performance as at 1982
Target Actual Actual as % of Target
1. Residential Units Serviced Newly-serviced sites: 10,600 8,517 80
2. New Residential Units Constructed 10,600 4,106 39
3. Community Facilities
Education Centres 11 9 82
Health Centres and Dispensaries 8 7 88
Markets 11 9 82
Total 30 25 83
4. House Loans
Small Construction 4,400 1,313 30
Improvement 2,640 1,500 57
Total 7,080 2,813 (Average) 40
Source: Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, MLHUD, 1983 'NSSP 1
Evaluation Report' unpublished material, Dar es Salaam: MLHUD
Similar observations can be made regarding the access of intended beneficiaries
(low income groups) to the housing construction and improvement loans. By
1983, the Tanzania Housing Bank (THB) had committed only 55 per cent of its
allocated funds at an average of 230 loans per annum. The THB could not
commit more funds due to the fact that most of the applicants did not meet the
bank's loan requirements. For example, out of 6,138 plot allottees who applied
for housing financial credits to the THB, only 34 per cent qualified. Of the 34
per cent who qualified, the majority were in the medium and high income
category (Halfani, 1987: 100; Tanzania-THB, 1983). A further breakdown of
these figures, shown in Table 8.7, depicts this situation.
232
Table 8.7: Dar es Salaam-NSSP 1 Project: Types of Loan Commitments to
Project Beneficiaries (September 1979)
Loan Category
10-25000
35-60000
60-80000
10-35000.
35-60000
60-80000
Sinza, Kijitonyama and Mikocheni (Sites and Services
Qualifying Income (Tshs/month)
480-750
751-1500
1501 and Above
Number of Recipients
393
348
70
Manzese (Squatter Upgrading)
480-750
751-1500
1501 and Above
345
48
6
Percentage of Total
48.5
42.9
8.6
86.5
12.0
1.5
Source: Tanzania, Tanzania Housing Bank, 1983, 'Report and Statement of NSSP 1 Progress',
unpublished material, Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban
Development
The qualification for obtaining THB loans included provision of a title deed as a
proof of ownership of land, regular wage employment in the lower levels of
industry and government service, and steady income (Temba, 1983: 96: Matern,
1992: 21). This was a serious project design flaw. As shown in Chapter Six,
very few of the urban low income group could meet such qualifications. The
inability of low income groups to access the housing construction loans resulted
in them either selling their allocated land to middle and high income groups or
leaving it undeveloped (Nnkya, 1980; Mosha, 1988: 154). At the time of project
completion in 1982, of the 8,500 total sites and services plots surveyed,
serviced and allocated, only 54 per cent were fully developed (Kironde, 1989).
Of the 54 per cent plots, 60 to 70 per cent belonged to middle and high income
groups who were not the original owners of the plots (Nnkya, 1980). About 43
per cent of the plots were partially developed while only 3 per cent were fully
developed. In Dar es Salaam's Kijitonyama and Sinza sites and services areas,
15 years after the introduction of the program only 60 per cent of the plots were
developed (Materu, 1992; Mosha, 1995).
233
Furthermore, at the time of project completion in 1982, the number of serviced
plots and community services provided were fewer than estimated. Table 8.6
shows that by 1982, only 8,517 (ie 80 per cent) plots were surveyed and only 25
of an estimated 30 community facilities were provided. Similarly, the project
did not perform well in cost recovery. The NSSP 1 was to recover 70 per cent of
costs through collection of land rents and service charges and the amounts
received would enable the MLHUD to extend its activities such as surveying
and servicing of plots to other parts of the country. Taking Dar es Salaam as an
example, in most projects areas only 40-41 per cent of recipients paid land rents
and service charges (see Table 8.8). Inability to collect revenue from project
beneficiaries led to failure to recover costs, thus restricting government efforts
to replicate the project in other urban centres.
Table 8.8: Dar es Salaam NSSP 1: Percentage of Beneficiaries who
Paid Land Rent and Service Charges
Settlement Area
Manzese
Mikocheni
Kijitonyama
Sinza
Percentage of People Paying Land Rent and Service Charges
40
41
41
56
Source: Kulaba, S., 1985b, 'Urban Growth and the Management of Urban Reform in Tanzania',
unpublished paper, Dar es Salaam: Ardhi Institute, p.91.
The poor performance of NSSP 1 is further explained by its inability to control
expenditure. By 1982, the actual project costs were higher than the forecast
costs of Tshs 103.2 million, thus forcing a reduction in the project activities
such as training and monitoring and evaluation. Despite the reduction in project
activities, unit costs for servicing new plots remained higher than projected. For
example, sites servicing costs rose by 15 per cent from an estimated Tshs 3,020
to Tshs 3,480 per year. Table 8.9 compares unit costs at appraisal and at the end
of the project. This situation can be explained in terms of inflation and the lack
234
of proper management of funds particularly the double payments made to
consulting engineers and subcontractors. In 1974, when the project
implementation started, the inflation rate was 11.1 per cent, but by 1982 the
annual inflation rate had risen to 32.6 per cent (The Central Bank of Tanzania,
1990).
One area in which the project was claimed to have had overwhelming success
was in upgrading squatter areas. This success is based on the fact that at the
time of project completion the number of residential units had increased and the
costs of servicing such areas was lower than projected. By 1982, NSSP 1 had
provided services to 14,634 residential units in squatter areas. This was 66 per
cent above the target project figure of providing services to 8,800 residential
units. With regard to costs, the actual unit costs in upgrading were lower than
the estimated unit cost of Tshs 1,500 (see Table 8.9). However, even though the
World Bank, the MLHUD and the Tanzanian government were calling the
upgrading component of NSSP 1 a success, there are some questions as to the
long-term outcomes of the upgrading approach.
Table 8.9: NSSP 1 Project: A Comparison of Unit Costs of Service
Construction (Tshs)
Project Component
Sites and Services(Servicing costs)
Upgrading (Servicing costs)
Target
3,020
1,810
1972 1982
Actual Costs
3,480
1,500
Source: Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, MLHUD, 1983 'NSSP I
Evaluation Report' unpublished material, Dar es Salaam: MLHUD
For example, the upgrading component of NSSP 1 was considered a success on
the basis the number of houses and hence population at the completion of the
project. There is no doubt that project benefits such as the availability of
electricity and water attracted more people to the squatter areas, thus resulting
in densification - the process of increase in the number of people per square
metre (Kulaba, 1985b). For example, in squatter areas of Manzese in
235
Dar es Salaam, housing units had increased from an estimated 7,600 in 1974 to
12,225 in 1982. Similarly, the population grew from 80,000 resident in 1974 to
170,000 residents in 1982 (Masembejo, 1980; Nnkya, 1980; Halfani, 1987;
Mosha, 1988; 1995). However, by 1983, it was clear that the densification
occurring in the upgraded areas was far beyond that which could be adequately
supported by the levels of servicing introduced through upgrading. As a
consequence the upgraded areas were returned to the previous state of urban
blight exemplified by unhygienic conditions and overcrowding which
necessitated upgrading in the first place. Unhygienic conditions of squatter
areas of Kinondoni-Moscow, Manzese and Kinondoni-Hananasif were found to
be the main causes of cholera and other epidemic diseases in 1983 and 1995
(Ntukula, 1984; Lugalla, 1996).
The other negative consequence of the upgrading component of NSSP 1 was
that of relatively poorer families being displaced by relatively richer families.
The introduction of service charges and land rents in upgraded squatter areas
resulted in higher rents forcing relatively poorer families out. For instance, in
upgraded areas of both Manzese in Dar es Salaam and Kihesa in Iringa the rent
of a single room rose from between Tshs 50 and Tshs 100 in 1974 to between
Tshs 600 and Tshs 800 by 1990. This amount excludes water and electricity
bills which were calculated according to the amount consumed. These rents
were far beyond the estimated Tshs 599 per month which was the average
earning of a low income earner employed in the informal sector. The rents were
also higher than the minimum wage earner (ie Tshs 1,660 per month) obtained
in the formal sector (Lugalla, 1990: 280: Matern, 1992).
Introduction of services such as water and sewerage system in upgraded squatter
areas attracted middle and high income groups into the upgraded areas, opening
up a thriving land market. Lucrative monetary gains from the land market
forced relatively poorer families to sell their land to interested parties and to
move to other squatter settlements (Masembejo, 1980; Nnkya, 1980; Mosha,
1988; 1995; Segal, 1988). The presence of houses whose value was estimated to
be above Tshs 80,000 (the NSSP 1 estimated value of a house of a low income
earner) in 1983 prices was a clear indication of land exchanges between
upgrading beneficiaries and middle and high income groups (Halfani, 1987;
Matern, 1992).
236
Another area in which the project is seen to have performed well is in the
provision of physical infrastructure such as roads and stand-pipes. According to
the World Bank, the NSSP 1 achieved its objective of providing basic
infrastructure to the designated areas. However, despite the success recorded by
World Bank and the MLHUD, the quality of the physical infrastructure
provided left much to be desired. For example, gullies and potholes were the
most noticeable features of the roads in the project areas. Poor drainage
exemplified by flooding roads during rainy seasons in Sinza and Mikocheni
areas is yet another indicator of poor quality of drainage systems introduced by
NSSP 1 (Halfani, 1987: 98: Materu, 1992: Mosha, 1995).
Conclusion
This chapter has noted that sites and services schemes and squatter upgrading
projects as alternative approaches to housing the urban poor appeared for the
first time in the agenda of the Tanzanian government in the First Five Year
Development Plan (FFYDP). Despite the influence the World Bank had on
introducing the idea to the political leadership in Tanzania, the government
through its political and administrative processes influenced the content (and
thence ultimately the outcomes) of the sites and services and squatter upgrading
schemes adopted.
The chapter has revealed that the NSSP 1 failed to generate the intended
outcomes of solving housing problems of the urban poor of Tanzania. Neither
did the NSSP 1 achieve the targeted outputs. From the discussion of the
formulation and implementation of the NSSP 1 it was clear that NSSP 1 failure
to address housing problems of the low income groups of urban Tanzania was a
result of the flaws in its design. Various elements of the NSSP 1 such as the
construction and housing loans improvement and introduction of land rents and
service charges to the squatter residents were unaffordable to the low income
groups of urban Tanzania. Similarly, squatter upgrading not only resulted in
densification but also in rent increases and consequent eviction of poor tenants.
The chapter has argued that the major implementation problems (lack of
institutional capacity, bureaucratic obstinacy and inexperience, poor access of
beneficiaries to various components of the projects, and general flaws in the
project design) were a result of lack of consultation between the state agency
responsible for formulation of the NSSP 1 (ie the Housing Directorate of the
237
MLHUD) and other stakeholders. The political and administrative framework in
which the sites and services and squatter upgrading was carried out did not
provide any incentive for consultation and cooperation between the various
stakeholders (including government institutions involved in urban housing), the
intended beneficiaries, and others negatively or positively affected by the
intended program. Even where attempts were made to consult other
administrative and political institutions of the state, the manner in which the
consultation was carried out indicates that this consultation was nothing but an
attempt by the political leadership to legitimate their actions.
Finally, the NSSP 1 implementation plan was conceived after the project
contents and objectives had been formulated, and was carried by a state agency
separate from that which formulated them. This suggests that processes -
formulation and implementation - were perceived to be separate and sequential
needing the attention of different decision-making institutions.
238
Chapter Nine
The National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project (NSSP) Phases 2 and 3
This chapter provides detailed description of the formulation and
implementation of phases 2 and 3 of the National Sites and Services and
Squatter Upgrading Project in Tanzania. It commences with a focus on the
processes and institutions that were involved in the formulation and
implementation of NSSP 2 and 3, and proceeds with a description of their
outcomes in terms of the problems they were set to address.
Phase 2 of the National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project
(NSSP 2) 1977-1982
Policy Formulation
The NSSP 2 was prepared by the NSSP 1 division and the World Bank
evaluation team and ironically did not go through the formally prescribed policy
planning procedures described in Table 8.1. It was perceived by both the World
Bank and the Tanzanian government that since NSSP 2 was a continuation of
NSSP 1, subjecting its formulation to the national planning process would entail
repeating a decision which had already been made and the project would be
held up by bureaucratic procedures. In by-passing the formally prescribed policy
planning procedures the World Bank evaluation team and the NSSP 1 division
managed to shorten the policy proposal formulation time to six months.
However as with NSSP 1, the decision not to let the formulation of NSSP 2 go
through the formally prescribed policy planning procedures, obstructed
consultation between the NSSP 2 division and the various institutions that were
to be involved in the project implementation.
The NSSP 2 project was to commence in 1977 and end in 1982. The estimated
costs for NSSP 2 was Tshs 243 million of which 60 per cent was to be financed
239
locally by the government of Tanzania in its normal budgetary process. The
remaining 40 per cent was to be financed by the World Bank through an IDA
credit facility. Table 9.1 provides a summary of the distribution of financial
responsibilities between the World Bank-IDA, and the Tanzanian government
and its various institutions.
The government of Tanzania was to rely on its normal budgetary allocations to
meet its financial commitment to NSSP 2, whereas the THB (a government
owned statutory body) relied on funds from the Workers and Farmers
Development Fund (WFHDP). The WFHDP was established in 1974 to provide
a pool of financial resources that could be drawn on by low income workers and
by people living in rural areas for the construction and improvement of their
housing. The source of the fund was a levy of 2 per cent on the wage bill of
every employer of ten or more persons in the country. The money was collected
by the Revenue Offices and given to the THB as an implementing agency
(Temba, 1983: 123-5).
Project Objectives
The NSSP 2 objectives were: to provide secure tenure and basic urban
infrastructure including water supply, drainage, footpaths, roads and street
lights to about 16,000 houses in existing squatter neighbourhoods in six
political administrative regions including Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Tabora,
Morogoro and Iringa (see Figure 9.1 on project towns); to prepare about 19,000
surveyed plots in planned residential areas to be allocated to low-income
families who would be displaced in the process of squatter upgrading; provision
of community facilities including primary schools, health centres and markets
for each of the neighbourhoods to be upgraded; to provide financial assistance
to the Tanzania Housing Bank (THB) for continuation and improvement of the
lending programme established under the NSSP 1 for building materials for
self-help housing improvements in upgraded areas, construction of new housing
on surveyed plots, and construction of worksheds for small-scale industries
programs; to provide financial assistance for the development and improvement
of existing small-scale industries, selected small enterprises, cooperatives and
artisans with a view to creating employment in the squatter areas of Tabora and
Tanga; and to provide monetary compensation as well as building plots for
those people whose houses were to be demolished in the process of providing
urban infrastructure and community facilities.
240
In NSSP 2, emphasis was placed on reducing costs per beneficiary so that
project benefits could be extended to a larger number of low-income
households in more towns. To achieve this, a number of strategies were adopted
including the provision of surveyed rather than serviced plots, and the lowering
of standards of community services such as education and health. For example,
whereas in NSSP 1 emphasis was on building health centres such as
dispensaries, in NSSP 2 the focus was on introducing specialised health care
such as Maternity Child Health (MCH) to the existing health centres. To reduce
the costs of constructing new buildings for MCH, this specialised care was to be
administered through the existing health structures. The same lower cost
approach was adopted for schools, with emphasis on providing a one-stream
school (seven years), with six classrooms, a small administration block and a
toilet block as against NSSP 1 which emphasised the provision of primary
schools as complete community education centres, with six classrooms,
teachers' offices, kitchen, dining hall, craft workshops and dispensaries.
With reference to house construction and improvement loans, changes were
made to streamline the THB's administrative and lending procedures. To reduce
bureaucratic barriers to lending, the THB was to open offices in project areas
for the distribution of loan application forms. Furthermore, valuation fees for
project applicants were reduced. To make loans accessible, the THB was to
relax its lending procedures which required beneficiaries to provide a title deed
and proof of security of employment. Instead, the THB adopted procedures
which required among others, deposit of letters of intent from the MLHUD
indicating that the preparation of a long-term right of occupancy title had been
initiated as well as the signatures of district and ruling party officials as security.
To ease acquisition of building materials, on-site depots for cement selling were
opened in project areas to provide low-income groups easy access.
The NSSP 2 stressed the sustainability of the project through strengthening the
institutional and financial capacity of government. This involved the provision
of financial assistance for training of required personnel as well as for physical
resources, and improving coordination between government agencies. To this
effect the World Bank and the NSSP 2 Division prepared an implementation
plan that would address the implementation deficiencies of NSSP 1. Details of
this are in the following sections.
241
!Ure 9.1: Tanzania, Second national Site sand Services Project, The Project Towns
Lake Victoria
..,.. -- . -- . \
..... i
I
J
.¼ SUMBAWANGA
'-'
++++++ EXISTING RAILWAY ·-.
l..J.J,.J.U. RAILWAY UNDER CONSTRUCTION
HIGHWAYS
NATIONAL BOUNDARY
• PROJECT TOWNS
KM 0 100 200
·,. , . .... '·,,L
Lak;'·..._ ·, ·, .
-·-·"·"· ....... ,· ____ ., .. Lake Malawi
t' ...... __, --· .,,,.,..
Source: Tanzania, Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (tvILHUD), 1980, Surveys and Mapping Div is ion, Dar es Salaam
242
Project Implementation Plan
Paradoxically, despite documenting NSSP l as a success both the World Bank
and the Tanzanian government acknowledged deficiencies in its social impacts
financial management and cost recovery arrangements (World Bank, 1977:
1518a-TA: i-5). These problems were perceived as implementational. To this
effect the World Bank and NSSP 2 Division developed an implementation plan
that would address the deficiencies of NSSP 1.
According to the World Bank and the government of Tanzania, the major
implementation problems from NSSP 1 that needed addressing in NSSP 2 were
the un-implementability of the housing construction and improvement loans
given the low level of income of targeted project beneficiaries; poor
coordination of the NSSP 1 activities; lack of cooperation from other
participating institutions; project benefits filtering to unintended beneficiaries
(high and medium income groups); cumbersome bureaucratic procedures both
in the MLHUD and the THB; shortage of local administrative and technical
manpower; and severe budgetary constraints (World Bank, 1977: 1518a).
As a consequence a number of new implementation strategies were adopted for
NSSP 2. They included changing the conditions for acceptance of low income
families into the project. For example, the minimum level of income for project
beneficiaries to was raised from Tshs 750 to Tshs 1,000 per month. A minimum
income level of Tshs 1,000 was considered as necessary to enable the project
beneficiary repay the loan and meet the building standards expected by NSSP 2
division. Moreover, the definition of housing for the poor was broadened to
include measures to address poverty and unemployment through the creation of
employment opportunities. To accomplish this, small-scale industries were to
be introduced in to the project areas. To spread benefits geographically, the
project coverage was extended to include four more up-country towns; Tanga,
Morogoro, Tabora and Iringa. It meant that the towns now covered by the
project comprised 70 per cent of the national urban population and 84 per cent
of the squatter housing (World Bank, 1977: 1518a).
243
Table 9.1: The Division of J<'inancial Responsibilities in the NSSP 2 Between the IDA
and the Government ofTanzania
Estimated National % THB- % IDA % Cost Government of Total Parastatal of Total of Total
Cost Cost Cost
Compensation 723 723 100
Infrastructure 7,617 2,284 30 5,331 70
Community Facilities 1,125 338 30 787 70
Technical Assistance and Consultancy 1,593 160 10 1,433 90
Vehicles and equipment 414 41 10 373 90
t0 +:al.II
Table 9.1: The Division of Financial Responsibilities in the NSSP 2 Between the IDA
and the Government ofTanzania (Continued)
Estimated National % THB- % IDA % Cost Government of Total Parastatal of Total of Total
Cost Cost Cost Housing Improvement and Construction Loans 12,311 11,236 91 1,075 9
Small Scale Industry Development (SIDO) 1,445 145 IO 1,300 90
Contingencies 4,054 1,003 25 1,350 33 1,701 42
TOTAL 29,280 4,694 16 12,586 43 12,000 41
Source: World Bank, 1977, Tanzania: The Second National Sites and Services Project Report No. /5/8a-TA, Wahington DC: World Bank, Urhan Project
Development, p.16
Further changes were made to the ex1stmg project implementation
arrangements. Although the NSSP 2 division of the MLHUD continued with its
primary role of project planning, implementation and coordination, the division
was restructured to strengthen its project management and community
development capabilities. The project manager's span of control was reduced
and NSSP 2 section heads were given functional autonomy. Direct
communication channels were opened between sections of the NSSP 2 division
and other participating institutions within and outside the MLHUD. The Survey
Section of NSSP 2 division was transferred to the Survey and Mapping division
of the MLHUD. Furthermore, the NSSP 2 division decentralised its activities to
the regional and district land officers by appointing regional or district NSSP 2
staff who were directly accountable to the project manager at the headquarters
in Dar es Salaam.
Attempts were made to clarify the roles of the different participating institutions
(see Table 9.2 for the planned responsibility matrix for NSSP 2). In the revised
institutional arrangements, a more formal approach to local project management
was proposed. The local project management team was to comprise water, land,
health, education and social welfare officials from the regional or district and
urban authorities, site officers, project coordinators and Regional Development
Director (RDDs) in the regional administration. The local functional officials
were to work under the direction of project coordinators designated by the
RDD. The project coordinator could be the District Development Officer or the
District Planning Officer or a member of the MLHUD staff at the local level.
Regardless of their professional background, they were to report directly to the
RDDs and the NSSP 2 division in Dar es Salaam.
The project coordinators were responsible for planning local project
implementation with assistance from the NSSP division in Dar es Salaam;
coordinating the activities of the various local officials involved in the project;
and monitoring progress and submitting periodic reports to their RDD's and
NSSP 2 division in Dar es Salaam. The functional units at the regional, district
and council levels were responsible for the implementation of the physical and
community facilities as well as the servicing and provision of surveyed sites.
The newly created urban authorities were to assume responsibility for the
maintenance of the public and community facilities provided by the project (see
Figure 9.2 for a summarised version of the role relationships of different
participating institutions).
246
I Land
Officer
ROD Project Manager
NSSP 1
\ __
I Water Officer
Project Coordinator
Site Officer
I Health Officer
I Social
Welfare Officer
Source: Drawn by the Authoron the basis o~ information obtained from the World Bank.
1977, 'Tanzania: The National Sites and Services Project No. 1518a-TA', Washington DC, World Bank, Urban Projects Department, Annex 5 page 5.
The project coordinator's role was part-time since he/she was expected to be a
full-time employee of the District Administration (ie District Commission)
which was the appointing authority. Since the project coordinator's presence at
the project site was temporary, a permanent position of site officer was created
to maintain administrative continuity in the project. The site officer could be
appointed by the Regional Development Directors or District Development
Directors. Apart from maintaining continuity of administration at the project
site, the site officer was also to act as a link between the administration and the
local political leadership. Another element introduced to improve the
institutional arrangements for implementation of NSSP 2 was the use of
community political organisations such as the ward construction and transport
committees as official links between the project and the community.
To improve the relationship between the project and the communities, a
position of community development officer was created. The community
development officers were responsible for the non-physical aspects of the
project, including project publicity, registration of squatter houses and
preparation of titles, on-site assistance to residents in project areas, and the
formation of housing cooperatives. This was essential to counteract the public
hostility emanating from NSSP 1. Although at the beginning of the
implementation of NSSP 1 communities in the project areas were receptive to
the project, their attitudes changed as they began to understand more about the
project and its implications. This was particularly the case in the squatter
upgrading areas of Manzese where the communities agreed to take part in the
project by allowing their sites to be surveyed, but became hostile when they
were asked to pay registration fees, land rents and service charges. Similarly,
hostility emerged in sites and service areas where NSSP 1 failed to provide the
affected communities the promised compensation in the form of finance and
surveyed and serviced building plots. The hostility was manifested in
communities refusing to vacate the site areas. In some instances, the
communities retaliated by illegally selling the land to high and medium income
groups.
To implement its employment creation program, the NSSP 2 appointed a
statutory body, the Small Industries Development Organisation (SIDO), as the
implementing agency. Through a World Bank and Tanzanian government
financed hire-purchase facility, SIDO was to offer equipment, construction and
248
working capital loans to qualified low-income persons to enable them to
establish small-scale industries which would generate income and employment.
One problem which was overlooked in the implementation plan for NSSP 2
was that of cost recovery. In the sites and services and squatter upgrading
housing approaches, cost recovery from service charges and land rents was
fundamental for the extension of project benefits to other urban centres. Despite
the acknowledged importance of cost recovery, the NSSP 2 did not clarify the
formula and the institutional framework for its implementation. For example,
there was no clarification about which institutions would be responsible for
collection of the land rents and service charges. Information gathered from the
MLHUD indicates that residents' hostility towards service charges and land
rents in the squatter upgrading areas of Manzese prompted the ruling party and
government to intervene informally and stop implementation of the cost
recovery element of the NSSP 1.
One other problem which was overlooked in the implementation strategy for the
NSSP 2 was a lack of clarity in the financial relationship between the NSSP 2
division and other participating institutions. However, correspondence between
the NSSP 2 project manager and the implementing agencies in the regions,
districts and urban authorities during implementation suggests that
implementing agencies at the local level were expected to finance the activities
from their respective budgets and not from the NSSP 2 directorate at the
headquarters in Dar es Salaam. This lack of clarity on financial responsibility
was also reflected at the headquarters level. For example, the implementation
strategy did not specify how the NSSP 2 division would receive services from
other divisions within the MLHUD. This lack of clarity was used by other
divisions of the MLHUD to demand a share of the NSSP 2 budget. For
example, in 1980 the Survey and Mapping division demanded that the NSSP 2
directorate should finance the printing of the maps which had been requested by
the project. The NSSP 2 manager rejected the demand on the grounds that the
project did not have funds.
249
t-0 Vi 0
. ·-· ··- ---------· --·- .- ····-
CENTRAL ADMINISTRA TIDN LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
ARORI SITES .. I CERVICES
i/Ji1tillif/lit/liffJi/J11J .... ... ~ .:t ~ c:- .so .... ? -. ~ ~ ~ ,I -~o. ~ ~ c- C" r:: o • ';J, -~ t: 4., '- "- '- • <i O ;;, ' b ~ ~ ~ ~C:fi ;,.::t:_~Us<>;;<o'TI f~ ... f.:..~ ~!! ~ ~, oc:- ~ ~o .:..~ ti!!~c-... ~!' f
ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS ~.,! 0~/i.~ .ff/'t'~•~~s{/ 0{~/j'~/ J
0
~l / ,~ ~$ ~/ &~;~/~{/:i)·/,/ ARDHI: SITES AND SERVICES
Prcp.ar.ation ol title lorm lor upgr.ading .arc.as 0 • Prcp1r•1ion ol m•n•gomcnl handbook 0 0 0 • 0 Prcp.ar.ation ol community development guidelines & m.atcri.als • Pl u111ing lor & conduct ol orianuJion scmin.ar 0 0 0 • 0 RcvirN ol type pl.ans lor dcmonstr.ation houses 0 • Prcp.ar.ation ol periodic progress reports • • 0 Conduct ol 1m•II , .... ,ch studies -LOCAL ADMINISTRA TIDN Design.at ion o I Proicct Coordin.ators • Appointment ol Site Ollicc11 • 0 Prr•u•ation ol Joe.al imnlcmcnt.ation schedule • () () 0 n 0 n () 0
UPGRADING COMPONENT Publicity in commuhitics 0 • 0 Rcoatr.a)lon ol squ.attcr houses 0 • 0
Prcp.ar.ation o I tit let 0 0 • 0 • 0
Compcns•110n ol displ•ccd household• 0 0 • 0
Rcloation •ui,uncc lo displ•ccd hou1Cholds • • 0
M.an.agcmcnt ol sicc olliccs • 0 0 0
Construction ol dcmonstr.ation houses • 0 0
S•I• ol dcmonstr•lion hou1C1 • 0 Tcchnial u1i11•ncc (1rti .. n1J • • 0 Form.ation ol cooper.ativcs 0 -
SURVEYED PLOT COMPONENT Site selection • 0 • B•tc mop •nd llyoul prcp1r•lion • 0 0
Pl•nnin~ rc•i~ Survey • • • Alloc•loon, • • Title prcp.ar.ation 0 Construction ol dcmonstr.ation houses •
COMMUNITY FACILITIES Opcr•tion ol 1choob • Opcr•lion ol MCH', • OpcrHion ol morkcll • Budacurv pl.annina lor recurrent uoenscs • • 0 0 0
MAINTENANCE M.aintcn.anc• ol ro.ads .and dr.ains • E.Jtperimcnt.al community m.aintcn.ancc progr.am 0 • • •
e Prim•ry direct rc1pon1ibili1y
O S.cond•ry rc1pon1ibilily or responsibility lor lnpull Source: World Bank, 1977, Tanzania: 'fhe Sec01id Natiomil Sites ,\nd Services Project Report No. l518a-TA', Wasliinglon DC:
World Bank, Urban Projects Deparl!1icnl, Annex 5 Figure 11
Project Outcomes
Table 9.3 shows that the project achieved extraordinarily good outputs in terms
of sites newly serviced and houses serviced in upgraded areas.
Table 9.3: Second National Sites and Services Project (NSSP 2):
Implementation of Physical Program
Residential Units Serviced
(a) Newly Serviced Sites
(b) Houses in Upgraded Areas
(c) Surveyed Plots
Community Facilities
(a) Education centres
(b) Health centres
(c) Markets
Small Construction and Improvement Loans (No of Recipients)
Estimate
1,518
15,811
18,985
12
6
6
3,250
Actual
3,728
23,017
6,460
2,324
Actual as% of Estimate
246
146
34
72
Source: Majani, B. B. K., 1991, Financing of Urban Plans in Tanzania: A Case Study of the
Third Sites and Services Project', in F. Halla and P. Treuner, Mechanisms of Vertical
and Horizontal Financial Balance for the Promotion of Decentralised Development
with Special Reference to Tanzania, Proceedings of a Seminar, Dar es Salaam: Ardhi
Institute, 23-27 September, p.39.
The achievements however, did not meet the objective of serving the low
income group. This is because about 60 and 70 per cent of the serviced plots
went to higher income groups (Mosha, 1988: 154; Materu, 1986: 129, 1992:
19). This was inevitable given the fact that in almost all project areas the criteria
preferred by the urban authorities who allocated plots gave priority to people
251
who would comply with the building codes. It was only people with stable and
above medium income who could meet the criteria. This was in sharp contrast
to the NSSP 2 project's proposed allocation procedure of giving maximum
priority not only to low income applicants (ie those with monthly incomes
below Tshs 1,000) but also those with a higher dependency ratio.
The increase in the number of houses from the estimated 15,811 to 23,017 in
upgraded areas appears to be a notable success. This was, however, not entirely
the case because the increase resulted in densification thus putting strain on the
upgraded services. In the proposed NSSP 2 squatter upgrading plan, it was
estimated that the project would benefit more than 315,000 low income resident
in the 15,811 houses (ie each house containing 5 rooms with an average
occupancy rate of 4 persons per room). Over the span of the project, 1977 to
1982, the squatter population in the upgraded areas under NSSP 2 had increased
to about 476,700. This was an increase of over 51 per cent in the estimated
beneficiaries (MLHUD, 1980-1987; Mosha, 1995: 350).
There was also a demonstrated lack of concern by both the NSSP 2 division and
the MLHUD for inclusion of sites and services and squatter upgrading policies
into the national, sectoral and local government plans as long-term strategies for
housing the urban poor of Tanzania. The project files reveal that the inclusion
of sites and services and squatter upgrading schemes into the national plan was
down-played by the MLHUD which wanted a continued use of the project
structure. The MLHUD was of the view that once the sites and services and
squatter upgrading concepts were incorporated into the national plan, their
funding would be severely affected and would be relegated to the cash-starved
status operations of other routine governmental programs.
Although there are no figures available, NSSP 2 project files suggest that the
house construction and improvement loans provided by THB were also not
accessible to a great majority of persons in the low income groups. Several
related reasons contributed to this failure, including the THB 's financial
problems and rigid lending procedures. The THB failed to raise the required
amount of money to finance the program. As a government-owned bank THB
lending and deposit interest rates were controlled by the government. The
government's decision to freeze THB lending rates at below the inflation rate
hindered the bank in attracting depositors. Throughout the 1970s when the
project started THB interests on deposits were under the inflation rate. In the
252
early 1980s, the THB could only offer 5 per cent to depositors against an
inflation rate of 36 per cent (Mosi, 1981; Alder, 1992: 10). Since deposits were
the THB's main source of finance, the low deposit interest rates adversely
affected its performance in providing loans to low income families. With
reference to THB lending procedures, despite efforts to relax some of the
conditions, the remaining ones continued to discriminate against low income
groups. The requirements for a down payment of up to 5 per cent of the total
housing costs and the provision of adequate and acceptable security for loans,
and several fees (such as valuation and revenue stamp duty), made the THB
loan unaffordable to the vast majority of potential borrowers whose incomes
were hardly enough to meet the daily necessities of life (as previously discussed
in Chapter Six).
The revised NSSP 2 implementation plan did not solve the problems that it was
intended to address. Lack of cooperation between the NSSP 2 di vision and
other participating institutions was ubiquitous throughout the project life.
Although this lack of cooperation had its origin in NSSP 1, the reorganisations
in central and local government that were being introduced at the
commencement of the NSSP 2 compounded the problems. With reference to
local administration, in 1978 there was a transfer of functions from the regional
development directorates to the reintroduced urban councils. The urban councils
were responsible for managing social services such as housing, education, and
health. Unlike the regional and district development directorates, urban councils
had powers to raise revenue. Since NSSP 2 activities were similar to those
provided by the urban councils the central government thought it proper for the
councils to assume direct responsibility for NSSP 2 activities. Urban councils
took over implementation and maintenance of NSSP 2 activities in their
localities. However, the take-over was not supported by funding from the
central government. Rather, urban councils were expected to finance NSSP 2
activities from their own funds. Due to their newness, urban councils did not
have the capacity to raise adequate revenue to finance NSSP 2 activities in their
jurisdictions. For example, the Morogoro town council which was charged with
the implementation of the project had one assistant land surveyor, two
supporting staff, a secretary and a messenger to cater for the whole council and
not just the NSSP 2 activities (Materu, 1986: 126). In 1979, the Morogoro town
council had a population of 179,000 people (Tanzania Bureau of Statistics,
1978).
253
The involvement of the newly created urban councils in the implementation of
the NSSP 2 created an additional implementation problem particularly in land
delivery. Although the law gave urban councils rights over the administration of
housing codes and regulations, it was not clear on matters of land allocation.
This created a system whereby both central and local government institutions
got involved in land allocation. Five institutions, namely the MLHUD, the
regional land office, the district land office, the urban council and the ruling
party officers in their respective areas, were all allocating land in urban areas.
The confusion created a situation of individual plots potentially being allocated
to five different people by the five different institutions acting autonomously.
The urban councils went further and used the opportunity to allocate reserved
plots from sites and services areas. The reserved areas in sites and services were
for community services such as playgrounds. Table 9.4 indicates the in-filling
of reserved plots in sites and services by the Dar es Salaam City Council
(DCC).
Cost recovery was an element of the NSSP 2 project which urban councils were
reluctant to implement as agents of the central government. Even though the
NSSP 2 implementation plan did not specify the institutions responsible for the
cost recovery aspect of the project (ie collecting land rents and service charges
from project beneficiaries), in 1980 the Ministry of Finance (MoF) ordered
project beneficiaries to start paying land rents and service charges to the
revenue offices throughout the country. This did not happen in most places
because the communities were not aware of the locations of revenue offices in
their areas and did not know about the payments.
Most of the revenue offices were located far from the project areas. For
example, in Dar es Salaam revenue offices were located in the city centre 20
kilometres from the upgraded squatter areas of Manzese. In 1981, a meeting
was convened in Dar es Salaam under the chairmanship of the MoF to
deliberate on strategies for implementation of cost recovery. The meeting was
attended by the MLHUD with the DCC representing other urban councils. The
MoF expressed its interest in using urban councils as agents for the collection of
land rents and service charges in project areas.
The DCC representative was of the view that since urban councils were already
administering Urban House Tax their involvement in cost recovery would mean
the council collecting two related taxes from the same community. He felt that
254
this would create the impression that the DCC was engaging in double taxation
of the communities. This would create hostile feelings among communities
towards councils. The urban councils believed that participation in
implementing cost recovery would have been possible if one of the taxes were
abolished.
Table 9.4: In-fillings in Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Areas
in Dar es Salaam
Plots allocated under the NSSP 2
ln-filli11gs by DCC 011 plots reserved for community service
i11NSSP2
Total number of plots
Sin:,a
(i) Block A
(ii) Block B
(iii) Block C
(iv) Block D
(v) Block E
Kijitonyama
(i) Block 43
(ii) Block 46
(iii) Block 47
1'vfikoche11i
(i) Block B
(ii) Block C
870
780
959
780
869
718
649
779
500
470
130
71
109
102
11
180
40
19
319
Source: Compiled by the author from various aerial maps for NSSP 2 at MLHUD, Dar es
Salaam.
Concerns were also expressed by urban councils on the future of the MoF in
implementing the cost recovery aspect of the project. Urban councils felt that, in
the event of the abolition of the Urban House Tax, they should assume the
implementation of cost recovery in project areas. In the urban councils' view,
255
1000
790
1030
889
1032
729
839
819
519
789
their familiarity and close proximity to the people gave them advantage over
other institutions in implementing cost recovery. Moreover, the urban councils
felt that if they were to be involved in collecting land rents and service charges,
they should retain some proceeds to enable them to maintain the services for
which they were responsible. Collecting and keeping cost recovery money
would be a useful way to accomplish this.
With reference to the NSSP 2 division operations, despite the official
institutional implementation framework the division chose to conduct its
activities through an informal framework. For example, the NSSP 2 division
continued to use and rely on the engineer at the MoW for approval of technical
matters in the project areas of Dar es Salaam, rather than the DCC engineer as
the implementation plan required. Interviews revealed that the NSSP 2 division
chose to by-pass the DCC engineer because he had on several occasions
expressed his dissatisfaction with the subcontractors' (Unico and MECCO)
work. The NSSP 2 behaviour resulted in the DCC's refusal to accept Handing
Over Certificates (HOCs) of the completed work from Cowi Consult. In the
DCC's view, they did not want to accept responsibility for activities in which
they did not have a say. For example, the DCC refused to accept the HOC for
Sinza Road in Dar es Salaam because of poor workmanship on the culverts.
Another major central government reorganisation that affected the
implementation of NSSP 2 was that of the transfer of the Housing Division
from the MLHUD to the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). The transfer was
deemed necessary for the coordination of housing activities throughout the
country as the PMO was the ministry overseeing regional and urban councils
which were responsible for housing. However, the transfer of housing activities
did not include the NSSP 2 division because the project manager had convinced
the government that NSSP 2 encompassed activities which were more diverse
than housing. By remaining under the MLHUD, the NSSP had the advantage of
easy access to services such as urban planning, land surveying and land
development, which were important for its operations. However, since the
NSSP 2 received budget allocations for its activities through the Housing
Division which was now under the Prime Minister's Office it could not receive
any funding under the MLHUD. This was because under the budget system of
Tanzania, budget allocation was made on the basis of items indicated by each
Ministry. Thus, the NSSP 2, which was classified by the central government as
a housing activity could not henceforth receive funding under the MLHUD. In
256
1981, housing responsibility in central government was further transferred to
the newly created Ministry of Cooperatives and Local Government. This
transfer further divorced housing from its related functions of land surveying,
land mapping and land servicing. On the part of the NSSP 2, the transfer further
de-linked it from other housing activities now located in the Ministry of
Cooperatives and Local Government.
The implementation of the NSSP 2 was also affected by problems in the
organisation structure and processes within the MLHUD. In 1979, concerns
were being raised about the existing organisation structure and processes within
the MLHUD. The Principal Secretary requested the Central Establishment to
suggest ways in which the ministry could improve its information and
communication management. He believed that the communication system in the
MLHUD was inadequate because there were delays in responding to urgent
matters. For example, all received correspondence was required to pass to all 18
divisional and sectional heads. The Central Establishment suggested a system
which would require correspondence to go through only one divisional head or
his/her deputy. The Central Establishment further noted that the absence of a
mechanism for the recording of file movements created unnecessary costs in
terms of the number of registry clerks and also created loopholes for corruption
among the MLHUD employees. Since the NSSP 2 was dependent on the
MLHUD's registry for receiving and sending its correspondence the above
problems adversely affected its functioning. With regard to the absence of a
mechanism for recording file movement, interviewees confirmed that is
weakness was used by some unscrupulous employees to demand payments from
land applicants so that their files could be traced. This, among other things,
contributed to the NSSP 2 project failure to allocate land on time to project
beneficiaries.
There were also implementation problems resulting from the NSSP 2 use of the
ruling party organisations as the project's major links to the communities. While
community organisations like the ward construction and transport committees
were expected to hold meetings for land allocation, throughout the project life
in all project areas in the country no such meetings were held.
The implementation of all other aspects of the NSSP 2 was affected by
inadequate funding from both the World Bank and the government of Tanzania.
As part of the loan agreement, the IDA's release of funds for the NSSP 2 was
257
conditional on the Tanzanian government meeting its financial obligations. The
failure of the Tanzanian government to release its committed funds to the NSSP
2 compelled the IDA to release only 40 per cent of its committed funds. This
forced the NSSP 2 division to cut the planned project technical assistance.
There are no available data on the actual amount of money committed b,y the
Tanzanian government to the NSSP 2. However, it was a time of declining
economic growth, from an annual average of 5.7 per cent between 1965 and
1970 to 1.8 per cent between 1976 and 1980. The enormous cost of the
Tanzania-Uganda war of 1978 further compounded the government's financial
problems.
One other factor which affected government commitment to the NSSP 2 was a
shift in government priorities towards productive activities which were ~udged
as essential for reviving the country's ailing economy. This was manifested in
the adoption of the National Economic Survival Program (NESP) in 1980. This
put government spending into areas which were directly related to economic
growth. Since housing was not one of these areas, it did not receive special
consideration. This was demonstrated by a decline in government spending on
housing as compared to other areas. Table 9.5 shows that the proportion of
government expenditures devoted to housing between 1967 and 1975 was
negligible. As Table 9.5 shows there are no available data from 1976 to 1986.
However, information available for the period between 1986 and 1987 show
that housing including the NSSP 2 received only 0.082 per cent of the total
government budget. The amount was negligible given the housing crisis
experienced by population in the towns and cities of Tanzania.
258
Table 9.5: Government Expenditure on Housing 1965-1988 (Tsh million)3
1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87
Recurrent and Development Expenditure
17.7 16.8 21.1 21.7 13.8 3.0 9.8 17.8
48.30
a See Appendix A for currency exchange rates
Total Government % of Total Government Expenditure Expenditure (Recurrent and Development
1,409.1 0.012 1,646.5 0.010 2,137.2 0.009 2,460.6 0.008 2,665.0 0.005 3,182.2 0.001 4,473.2 0.002 5,722.8 0.003
0.082
Source: Compiled by the author from, Tanzania National Economic Survey, vanous issues
1965-1987, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer; and Tanzania Economic Trends: A
Quarterly Review of the Economy, 1991, Vol. 3 No 4, Dar es Salaam: Government
Printer.
Phase 3 of the National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project
(NSSP 3) 1985-1990
Policy Formulation
Efforts by the MLHUD to extend NSSP 2 to a third phase started in 1982. The
efforts were initiated by the project manager who took over the management of
259
the NSSP directorate in 1980. This was a year after the actual implementation
of NSSP 2 had begun. While working as a senior town planner in the MLHUD
in 1979 the project manager learnt from the World Bank office in Tanzania of
the possibility of IDA extending its credit for a NSSP 3 on condition that the
government reformed and strengthened the housing delivery system. The World
Bank offer coincided with the government intentions of 'mainstreaming' NSSP
2 activities into the MLHUD's regular activities. The central government's
intention was not well received by the NSSP division which preferred to
continue as a project. Indeed, the NSSP division used the World Bank promise
for funding of a third phase as a ~ustification for its continued existence.
In attempting to demonstrate its commitment to reforming and strengthening the
housing delivery system to the World Bank, the NSSP 2 project management
prepared a position paper for submission to the World Bank. In addition, the
project manager on his own initiative created a task force comprising
institutions which he identified as key players in the housing delivery system.
The position paper was to be presented to the task force for discussion and
approval.
In the project manager's view, the task force for NSSP 3 was to have
representation from the MoF, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs
(MPEA), all divisions of the MLHUD, the Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC),
the PMO and the THB. An invitation was sent to all the above institutions but
there was no specification as to whether the invitations were for individuals or
their institutions. The first task force meeting was held on 19 January 1982,
with attendance from all invited institutions except the DCC, MoF, and the
Housing and Urban Planning Divisions of the MLHUD. Invitees who did not
attend were either on leave or on official trips. The meeting was chaired by the
NSSP 2 project manager.
The meeting started with the chairman providing background information on
the problems of the previous NSSP phases. First, the two phases encountered
problems because they were formulated in response to the availability of funds
from the World Bank without due regard to the settlements affected and the
level of service required. Second, the project designs in the two phases were
inflexible and inaccurate and hence did not match prevailing circumstances and
proved to be unduly expensive. In the project manager's view a realistic solution
260
to the problem of squatter growth needed to address the problem of
densification resulting from squatter upgrading.
The NSSP 3 task force was not presented with the proposed project's objectives.
· However, the project manager presented the task force with a proposed
structure for the implementation of the NSSP 3. According to the project
manager, this suggested structure for NSSP 3 included the formation of a
national housing coordinating mechanism in the form of an ad hoc committee
responsible for overseeing the housing production system in its totality;
ensuring participation and cooperation of institutions responsible for shelter
delivery; providing a framework for conflict resolution and consensus building
in housing delivery; and ensuring the free flow of information to allow all
participants equal access to data necessary for the decision making process. It
was proposed that the national housing committee be comprised of high level
officials from positions equivalent to principal secretary from ministries and
institutions engaged in housing production.
It was further proposed that the housing delivery function and responsibility be
transferred to the Ministry for Local Government as the institution responsible
for managing development at the local level. The NSSP project manager
believed that local governments rather than the MLHUD were better able to
assess problems and opportunities regarding the shelter delivery system, and to
evaluate available local resources, because they were closer to the people than
the MLHUD. Finally, the paper proposed reorganisation of the Housing
Division of the MLHUD. This involved transferring the policy implementation
role from the housing division to the regional, district and urban authorities.
The Housing Division at the MLHUD was to retain its policy formulation and
supervision role. To link this role to successful implementation of housing
policies it was further proposed that the housing division should provide (i)
management of a housing data system and research coordination, (ii)
coordination and delivery of technical assistance, (iii) coordination of field
training, and (iv) management for the Housing Development Fund (HDF). The
proposed HDF was to pool all housing funds from the government and other
sources for lending to local authorities to develop infrastructure such as water
pipes and roads in residential areas. The task force endorsed the proposal and a
core group chaired by the secretary to the task force, was appointed to prepare a
detailed project proposal for submission to the World Bank.
261
The core group made up of MLHUD officials prepared the project proposal and,
in 1983 submitted it to the World Bank. The document endorsed the sites and
services and squatter upgrading concepts as the appropriate approaches for
addressing housing problems of the poor in urban Tanzania. The major
emphasis in NSSP 3 would be to provide building plots to all income categories
(low, medium, and high) in two urban centres: Dar es Salaam and Arusha.
According to the proposed plan, the two urban centres were selected because
they constituted more than 40 per cent of the total urban population, had more
than 50 per cent of houses within unplanned squatter areas, and also had more
than 50 per cent of the total applications for industrial sites in the country.
Contrary to the data in the proposed plan, at the time of NSSP 3 formulation
Arusha's proportion of Tanzania's total urban population (ie 3.6) was low
compared to other towns (such as Dodoma, Mbeya, Mwanza and Tanga) not
included in the NSSP 3 plan (See Table 6.2 for details).
Furthermore, unlike in the previous NSSP phases, residential areas were to be
structured into high, medium and low density areas on the basis of income. Low
income groups were to be allocated small plots of 12.24 square metres in the
high density areas, while medium and high income groups were to be allocated
36.12 and 48.20 square metre plots in medium and low density areas
respectively. Each residential area was to be provided with different levels of
services depending on its would-be residents' income levels. In NSSP 3 the
intention was to create a system of service charges in which medium and high
income groups subsidised low income groups. Three different classes of people
were identified as ultimate beneficiaries of NSSP 3: the government and the
ruling party functionaries, the entrepreneurs, and the common people.
The project proposal was for commencement in 1985 and completion in 1990.
The estimated total project cost was Tshs 271 million (in 1983 prices). To make
the project affordable by very low income households the costs for both
infrastructural improvements and surveying were to be lowered to Tshs 160,000
and Tshs 250,000 per acre respectively. It was expected that a total of 5,000
low, medium and high density plots would be surveyed in Dar es Salaam, with
51,000 people benefiting from squatter upgrading in seven squatter areas of Dar
es Salaam and Arusha. Moreover, 631 residents were to be compensated for
losses deriving from various demolition and site acquisition activities.
262
In Dar es Salaam two areas, Tegeta and Tabata, were selected for new sites and
services, while the squatter areas of Mwananyamala Kisiwani, Kinondoni
Shamba and Hanna Nassif were selected as candidates for upgrading. A total of
3,000 plots to be divided into six residential blocks were to be surveyed and
serviced in Tegeta. Two of the residential blocks of Tegeta (Blocks E and G)
and Tabata were specifically selected as high density areas for the overspill
population from the upgrading areas as well as from site acquisition. The
proposed size of plots in high density areas was small (ie 12 square metres) to
provide more housing units for low income groups (Materu, 1992). The
remaining blocks in Tegeta (Blocks B, C, D and F) were earmarked for top
government and ruling party officials, including those in the parastatal sectors.
The proposed plot size in low density areas was three times bigger than that of a
higher density area. See Table 9.6 for the number of plots allocated to each
block.
Table 9.6: A Summary of the Performance of the Sites and Services Section
(SS) in Surveying and Allocating Plots
Area Density Forecast: Actual No of No of Plots Classification Plots to be Surveyed Plots Allocated to
Surveyed population affected by SSs activities
Tegeta
(i) Block B Low 289 289 Not indicated
(ii) Block C Low 364 364 Not indicated
(iii) Block D Low 276 276 Not indicated
(iv) Block E High 1517 1416 Not indicated
(v) Block F Low 877 877 Not indicated
(vi) Block G High 1472 1400 473
Tabata
(i) Block S High 1544 1500 1500
Source: Tanzania, Ministry o~ Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD), 1993, 'Sites
and Services Section Annual Report for 1993 ', unpublished material, Dar es Salaam.
263
The same institutional arrangements for the implementation of the NSSP 2 were
recommended for adoption in phase 3. The project proposal was submitted to
the World Bank. The World Bank required the government to provide 49 per
cent of the estimated costs to enable the project to qualify for IDA credit. The
government failed to guarantee the required amount and hence NSSP 3 could
not get funds from the IDA. Neither did NSSP 3 receive funding from the
government. The government was still insisting that the MLHUD mainstream
the NSSP activities into its regular activities. In 1986, the NSSP division was
abolished and a new section called Sites and Services (SS) in the Urban
Planning Division of the MLHUD was created to take over the activities of the
NSSP division. Although the government used its long-time intention to
mainstream NSSP 2 activities into the MLHUD as a ~ustification, it was learnt
from the interviews that the decision was also influenced by the powerful
interests within the MLHUD who perceived the NSSP project manager as
'uncontrollable'. The interviews confirmed that through control of plot
allocation and project funds the NSSP 2 project manager became very powerful,
overruling decisions of those above him. On several occasions the project
manager whose division was endowed with several vehicles had refused the
request of the MLHUD's Principal Secretary to use the vehicles.
The SS section adopted as its major activity the provision of surveyed building
sites in the areas which were earmarked for the NSSP 3. The provision of basic
services such as electricity and water was left to the sectoral ministries and
parastatal organisations concerned. The provision of community facilities such
as sewerage and drainage systems, schools, health centres and markets was left
to the project beneficiaries themselves. Attempts were made by the SS section
to proceed with upgrading of squatter settlements earmarked for attention in the
NSSP 3. However, the actual squatter upgrading did not take place due to lack
of funding from the government and the whole exercise of squatter upgrading
begun under NSSP 1 was suspended in 1987.
Project Outcomes
The NSSP 3 recorded poor performance in acquiring already occupied land for
the purposes of allocating it to people displaced from upgrading activities. This
was particularly the case in areas where the majority of land occupants were not
compensated (see Table 9.7 for a summarised version of planned and actual
264
compensation activities of the SS). As was planned under the NSSP 3, the SS
was to compensate communities which were going to be affected by the project
activities. Since the earmarked areas for sites and services were occupied by
squatters, compensation was a necessary condition for land acquisition and
subsequent re-allocation. Failure to compensate the affected communities
resulted in a situation where surveyed plots could not be allocated because the
original (illegal) occupants still resided on them. A good example was in Blocks
E, and G of Tegeta areas which were planned to be high density settlements.
Although the SS managed to survey a total of 3,866 plots, it could allocate only
473 (36 per cent) of the plot to the displaced persons. These were people whose
houses had been demolished in the process of upgrading areas of Kinondoni
Shamba, Mbagala and Tegeta (see Table 9.6). Failure to compensate the illegal
occupants prompted them to remain in the surveyed areas. This denied the
government revenues which it could have obtained if the surveyed plots had
been allocated.
Consequently, an informal land market developed wherein original occupants
awaiting compensation sold the plots on which they resided to new owners
(who may or may not have been aware of the situation). This is confirmed by
the presence of a substantial number (about 50 per cent of all houses) of one
storey buildings in areas of blocks G and E which are officially classified as
vacant surveyed land in SS aerial maps for Tegeta.
Although the government made it clear that there were limited resources for
basic infrastructure, what was made available was directed to the low density
areas of Tegeta (NSSP 3, 1993). These are areas reserved for senior government
and ruling party officials.
In the period between 1986-92, the SS managed to provide water to all low
density blocks and to one high density block in Tegeta. The blocks are B, C, D,
F and G respectively. A total of Tshs 17.2 million was paid to NUW A for water
installation. Similarly efforts were made to provide roads for low density areas
of Tegeta. A total of Tshs 35.8 million was allocated and spent for Tegeta
benefiting medium and high income families.
265
Table 9.7: The NSSP 3 Planned and Actual Compensation Plan 1986-1992
(in 1983 Prices)
Area
Tegeta and Tabata
Hanna Nassif
Kinondoni Shamba
M wananyamala Kisiwani
No of people to be compensated
576
186
139
306
Value (Tshs, Million)
Not known
35,931,000
17,842,063
63,584,960
No of people compensated
52
Not known
Not known
Not known
Amount paid (In Tshs Million)
48,047,877
Not known
10,000,000
Not known
Source: Compiled by the author from various SS files in MLHUD, Dar es Salaam, 1993-1994.
Conclusion
NSSP 2, initiated as a successor to NSSP 1, was mainly concerned with
providing surveyed rather than serviced sites to families displaced from the
upgraded settlements. Like the NSSP 1, the NSSP 2 formulation did not go
through the formally prescribed planning procedures neither did it involve the
ECC. The decision not to subject NSSP 2 to the formally prescribed policy
planning framework was meant to avoid bureaucratic procedures. However,
such a decision obstructed the consultation between the various stakeholders
which was necessary if the project was to address housing problems of the low
income groups of Tanzania.
Despite attempts by the NSSP 2 to adopt implementation strategies different
from those used by NSSP 1, the project experienced severe implementational
266
problems including lack of clarity on the financial relationship between NSSP 2
di vision and other participating institutions; lack of institutional capacity; and
poor access of beneficiaries to various components of the project. The contents
of NSSP 2 like those of the NSSP 1 were incongruent with the objective
conditions of the intended beneficiaries, the urban poor of Tanzania.
Consequently, the NSSP 2 like its predecessor failed to generate the intended
benefits of solving housing problems of the urban poor.
With regard to NSSP 3, the chapter has revealed that despite attempts made by
the NSSP division to consult other administrative and political institutions of
the state in formulating the project, the manner in which this was carried out
indicates that the exercise had been intended to legitimise the actions or
intentions of the project manager rather than facilitating participation of various
stakeholders in the decision making process. With regards to the NSSP 3
outcomes, rather than providing serviced sites to people of all income categories
with special attention paid to the urban poor, the project benefits concentrated
on settlements meant for medium and high income families. The NSSP 3
project's contents like those of the NSSP 1 and NSSP 2 were incongruent with
the objective conditions of the intended beneficiaries (ie the urban poor of
Tanzania).
267
Chapter Ten
The National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project (NSSP) in Tanzania: Analysis of Findings
1 the discussion of the formulation and implementation of the three phases of the
:ational Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project in Chapters Eight and
:ine, the poor performance of this policy was seen as a result of serious flaws in its
esign. Specifically, it did not address the housing problems of the urban poor of
'anzania described in Chapter Six. This chapter analyses the data presented in the
s1rlier chapters to identify the factors that accounted for the poor performance of the
:SSP. The first section examines the performance of the NSSP in relation to the
1eoretical perspectives presented in Chapter Four. The second section of the chapter
xamines a specific dimension of the state-centred explanations, namely the political
nd administrative systems of the state, and demonstrates how they contributed to the
)rmulation of an NSSP policy with serious flaws in the design.
NSSP Performance and the Theoretical Perspectives
:1 Chapter Four, various theoretical perspectives were reviewed in an attempt to
xplain the poor performance of urban housing policies of developing countries .
. 'hese theories included the class bias nature of the state, rent-seeking behaviours of
10th state and non-state actors, incrementalist behaviour of state officials, bureaucratic
·olitics, bureaucratic processes and institutional incapacity. This section analyses the
·xtent to which these perspectives assist in understanding the poor performance of the
'-fSSP.
,lass bias explanations and the NSSP
::xplanations based on the class bias nature of the state associate the poor performance
if urban housing policies in developing countries with the actions of state officials
vhich are geared towards protecting or promoting the interests of privileged classes.
fhere is no evidence from available information (presented in Chapters Eight and
268
"fine) that the NSSP 1, 2 and 3 were formulated as responses to pressure from the
lominant classes in Tanzania. Neither does that data suggest that the NSSP 1, 2 and 3
vere explicitly formulated to protect the interests of the well-to-do in Tanzania.
"ievertheless, it is true that, as argued by the advocates of the class bias explanations
he beneficiaries of the NSSP 1, 2 and 3 in Tanzania included the middle and high
ncome groups. This outcome was not a conscious act of bias towards these groups.
)n the contrary the information presented in Chapters Eight and Nine clearly shows
hat the favourable outcomes for privileged classes from the three phases of the NSSP
.vas a result of the re-interpretation of the project objectives by the various state
.tgencies during the implementation stage. This re-interpretation of project objectives
)Y the implementing agencies was an outcome of inadequate organisational
.trrangements and work methods in the state in Tanzania.
The state in Tanzania was characterised by centralisation of authority, duplication of
functions, lack of consultation, acute resource shortages, a politicised and bloated
Jublic service, lack of an established bureaucratic code of conduct, unclear lines of
.tuthority, lack of accountability and control mechanisms, lack of co-operation, and
:onstant conflicts over domain control between and also within various institutions of
:he state (see Chapter Five). These characteristics adversely affected the performance
)f the NSSP. What was evident from the data was the fact that lack of consultation
)etween part of the department which prepared the NSSP policy proposal and the
fifteen other implementing agencies during the project formulation stage resulted in
·hese institutions being allocated functions which could not fit with their
xganisational procedures and processes. As a consequence, re-interpretation was seen
.ts necessary by these implementing agencies if they were to continue with the
implementation of the project. The Tanzania Housing Bank (THB) loans which
benefited middle and high income groups rather than the target low income families
.tre illustrative. The NSSP di vision allocated the implementation of housing
:onstruction and improvement loans to the THB. However, THB lending procedures
.md conditions such as those which required loan applicants to provide a certificate of
occupancy or a letter from an employer, a tax certificate or bank statement, resulted in
the THB lending only to the middle and high income families who alone could meet
the THB conditions. These conditions could not be met by low income groups who
:·elied on insecure and meagre incomes from the informal sector (Chapter Six). The
Jecision by the state to review THB lending procedures and conditions with a view to
~nabling low income groups to gain access to its loans derived from the institutional
!'ealisation that the outcome of THB loans for the NSSP was benefiting groups other
than those originally targeted. There was no conscious policy designed to favour these
269
:roups, but a lack of consultation and an institutional preference for operating
ccording to set bureaucratic procedures had this biased effect.
)ther organisational attributes of the Tanzanian state such as excessive centralisation
lf authority and lack of accountability and control mechanisms also contributed to
'l"SSP benefits passing to middle and high income groups rather than to the intended
)eneficiaries. As discussed in Chapter Eight, centralisation of NSSP coordination and
;ontrol in the project manager overloaded that position rendering him incapable of
Jerforming his supervisory functions adequately. The lack of accountability and
..:ontrol was used by the government officials involved in the project to disrupt the
Jroject management and distribute project benefits to middle and high income groups.
For instance, by accepting bribes, office messengers and typists at the MLHUD were
~asily able to rearrange the application order in the summary sheet submitted to an
allocation committee. Quite often the rearranged order gave priority to those who had
bribed the officials involved. Similarly, lack of accountability and control mechanisms
~nabled government officials involved in the project to distribute project benefits to
..:a-ethnics. Clearly, this centralisation of power in the project manager was done in
good faith to facilitate the operations of the project and was not intended to benefit the
well-to-do families.
The discussion in Chapters Eight and Nine also lends no support to the class bias
assertion that the state in Tanzania formulated and implemented the NSSP to further
the interests of foreign capital. There were two foreign institutions involved with the
NSSP 1 and 2: the World Bank and Cowi Consult Engineers. The data in Chapter
Eight indicated that the World Bank (anxious to meet its lending targets for Tanzania)
did exert pressure on the Tanzanian Economic Committee of the Cabinet (ECC) to
adopt the policy proposal. Nevertheless, it is difficult to describe the position of the
World Bank in the project as promoting the project to further the interests of foreign
capital. Cowi Consult Engineers as a foreign company did represent international
capital in the project. The decision by the Tanzanian government to ignore the
formally prescribed tendering procedures and offer the consultancy to foreign
companies such_ as Cowi Consult Engineers is cited by Mgullu ( 1978) as a
demonstration of state action to promote the interests of foreign capital. Although it is
true that the process of awarding Cowi Consult the consulting ~ob did not follow the
formally prescribed tendering procedures (Chapter Eight), the decision was made to
avoid delays in decision making resulting from the bureaucratic tendering system of
the Tanzanian government. There were other factors which influenced the Tanzanian
government to award the consulting ~ob to Cowi Consult Engineers. The first NSSP l
270
oject manager awarded the contract to Cowi because he had worked with the
mpany on a project similar to NSSP 1 in another developing country and because
e company had a certificate of best performance from the World Bank. Moreover, in
174 when project implementation started there were no indigenous firms which had
e capacity to provide consulting services similar to those of Cowi Consult
ngineers.
he idea of the state being a harmonious group of institutions acting in unison to
:·eserve and even extend identified class interests as advocated by class bias
cplanations does not hold true for the NSSP in Tanzania. The data in Chapters Eight
1d Nine revealed that tensions and conflicts over domain control between and within
Jrious state agencies were characteristics of all the three phases of the NSSP. The
~nsions and conflicts were a clear indication of lack of unity of purpose amongst state
fficials. The case of the Dar es Salaam City Council engineer disagreeing with the
;ssP-Cowi Consult engineer's road designs for the Sinza and Kijitonyama sites and
~rvices areas is illustrative. Understanding that conflict or rivalry between and within
:ate agencies is one of major features of the state in Tanzania is important because, as
:as demonstrated in Chapters Eight and Nine these conflicts and tensions contributed
) the NSSP's poor performance. For example, conflicts over control of the housing
-1nction between the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD)
nd other state agencies in 1972, among other things, resulted in the MLHUD's
\ssistant Director for Housing centralising the formulation of the NSSP 1 policy
1roposal. By doing so the Assistant Director for Housing alienated all the important
takeholders in the policy formulation. This resulted in formulation of an NSSP policy
vith serious flaws in its design.
Zent-seeking explanations and the NSSP
~ent-seeking explanations of the poor performance of urban housing policies in
.leveloping countries perceive public policies as by-products of mutual exchange
)etween state officials and organised interests in the civil society. Central to the rent
-;eeking explanations is the existence of powerful organised interests in society which
:an exert pressure on the state to act in their favour. Since the achievement of state
)fficials' interests relies on the support of the organised interests of the civil society,
he state will act in favour of the latter. The data presented in Chapters Eight and Nine
.lo not support the views advanced by the rent-seeking explanations that the NSSP
was formulated and implemented to favour certain groups in society in exchange for
political support. This is because, when the NSSP was considered for the first time in
271
>70, the political leadership in Tanzania had almost completed its political power
,nsolidation process which had begun immediately after independence. At this stage
:1te officials did not need to rely on the support of organised groups in society to
,rmulate and implement government policies.
urthermore, at that time there were no powerful organised interest groups in the civil
)ciety that could have exerted pressure on the state to act in their favour. This is
~cause the process of centralisation of political authority begun in l 96 l culminated
1 the control of civil society institutions by the state. The one-party political system
Jopted to achieve centralisation of political authority was accompanied by the
jolition and reorganisation of civil society institutions. Economically and politically
rganised interest groups such as the trade union movement, the cooperative union
1ovement, the Tanzania parents association and professional bodies which previously
.rticulated the interests of their members were abolished and/or integrated into the
tate system. Those which were integrated into the state system found that their
ctivities and leadership were controlled and determined by the government (Baregu,
987; Nyang'oro, l 989). Thus, there were no powerful organised interests in
~anzanian civil society that could exert pressure on the state, nor did the state rely on
uch groups to formulate and implement its policies. While it is true that informal
1ractices accounted for NSSP benefits passing over to functionaries of the ruling party
,nd to co-ethnics, there is no evidence to suggest that such benefits were exchanged
'or political support.
'ncrementalism and the NSSP
..\s discussed in Chapter Four, incrementalism explanations of the poor performance
.Jf urban housing policies in developing countries associate this with the continuation
.Jf urban housing policies started by colonial rulers. As was noted in Chapter Three,
.::onceptually the NSSP represented a radical departure from the standard approaches
to the urban housing problems of the cities and towns of developing countries. This
was particularly the case for the squatter upgrading policy which recognised squatter
)ettlements as important forms of urban housing and advocated their improvement, in
contrast to the colonial urban housing policies which promoted the abolition of these
)ettlements. However, despite its radical nature the NSSP in Tanzania did exhibit
)Orne elements of incrementalism, elements which in many instances contributed to
the filtering of project benefits up to middle and high income families. This was
particularly the case with the continued use of building standards which were based on
urban laws inherited from the colonial government. In all three phases of the NSSP,
272
plot owners were required to comply with strict building regulations. As was
demonstrated in Chapters Eight and Nine, to comply with such building regulations
one needed to have a stable income and to earn more than the low income families of
Tanzania.
Bureaucratic politics and the NSSP
Bureaucratic politics explanations associate the poor performance of urban housing
policy with conflicts over domain control and disagreements over the policies and the
means to achieve them, between and within various institutions of the state. The
disagreements encountered in the policy-making arena also recur among agencies at
the implementation stage. In the description of the formulation and implementation of
the NSSP in Chapters Eight and Nine, bureaucratic politics and consequent lack of
cooperation between the various state institutions and also within these institutions
contributed to the project's poor performance. It was indicated in Chapter Eight that
disagreements over the urban housing problems and their solution between MLHUD
official responsible for formulation of the NSSP policy and the various ministries and
government agencies responsible for housing in Tanzania was one of the reasons
which hindered consultation and led to the centralisation of the formulation of the
policy proposal. Although this centralisation did avoid the bureaucratic competition
associated with the formulation stage of the NSSP, these disagreements recurred
during the implementation stage, which, as discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine,
relied on the cooperation of fifteen other institutions. This cooperation was hindered
by differences of opinion with regard to the policy objectives and the means of
implementation among the participating agencies. One element of the NSSP whose
implementation was adversely affected by bureaucratic politics was that of the
allocation of building plots to project applicants. Lack of cooperation between the
NSSP 1 division and the Land Development Services division of the MLHUD
(responsible for land registration and issuance of title deeds), prevented the NSSP 1
division from providing title deeds to the squatter residents on time. While it is true
that shortage of resources was one of the major factors accounting for the Land
Development Services division not issuing title deeds on time, interviews confirmed
that even if the MLHUD division had adequate resources it would have been unlikely
to cooperate with the NSSP division which they perceived as interfering in their
domains.
The implementation of cost recovery under NSSP was another victim of bureaucratic
politics. Differences of opinion with regard to NSSP objectives between and within
273
mplementing agencies resulted in the cost recovery element not being implemented.
;~his meant that land rents and service charges could not be collected. Since the
evenue collected from the NSSP was essential for extension of sites and services and
,quatter upgrading activities into other areas of urban Tanzania, un-implementability
if the cost recovery element greatly hindered such prospects. The case of plots
ntended for low income groups being allocated to unintended middle and high
ncome beneficiaries was also a result of bureaucratic politics. In phase 3, the NSSP
livision required building plots to be allocated to low income groups preferably
-·amilies with high dependency ratios. These conditions were interpreted as
nappropriate by the urban authorities. From their experience, people from low income
;roups were unable to comply with the urban building regulations. As a consequence,
_1rban authorities ignored the NSSP division's criterion and allocated plots to those
Nho could comply with their building regulations. Evidently the middle and high
ncome groups were most able to comply with the building codes .
..\nother dimension of bureaucratic politics which affected the performance of the
\/SSP was that of lack of cooperation between the agencies involved in the
mplementation of the NSSP, resulting in each institution working on its own without
Jue regard or concern about the activities of the others. The divergent and variable
nformation provided by the various institutions at the time of evaluation is illustrative
)f such practices. This was the case during the evaluation of the shelter construction
~lement of the NSSP 1. For instance, figures compiled by the Dar es Salaam City
~ouncil for March 1983 showed that 32.5 per cent of allocated plots were not
Jeveloped; 34.5 per cent of the allocated plots had some development and 33.0 per
..:ent had houses which were occupied by the owners. On the other hand, the NSSP
Jivision of the MLHUD report offered figures which were remarkably different from
:hose of the Dar es Salaam City Council. The NSSP division's report of February 1983
,how that only 13 per cent of the allocated plots were not developed; 25 per cent of
he allocated plots had some development; and 62 per cent of the allocated plots had
:1ouses occupied by the owners (MLHUD, 1983). It was evident from the interviews
Jmt the discrepancies in the reports of the two agencies were mainly caused by lack of
..:ooperation in the gathering and sharing of information .
..\ccording to advocates of bureaucratic politics, state officials build coalitions,
1argain, compromise, co-opt, guard information and devise strategies to protect their
Jomains without due regard to public interest. Chapter Eight showed how the NSSP 2
Jroject manager co-opted engineers from the Ministly of Works (MoW) to isolate the
Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC) engineers because they were opposed to Cowi
274
~onsult Engineer's proposed road designs. The DCC engineers opposed the proposed
oad design because they felt that the culverts were poorly designed, did not fit with
he established urban drainage requirements, and were going to impose huge
naintenance costs on the DCC which was to take over the management of the roads.
\f otwithstanding this opposition, the NSSP 2 project manager with the support of the
VloW engineers went ahead and implemented Cowi Consult's road designs. It was
Jear that the NSSP 2 division was less concerned with the DCC engineer's worries
)Ver the inappropriateness of the designs than with its domain protection. That the
Jesigns were indeed poor was demonstrated later by constant blockage of the drains of
he roads in the project areas.
:=:ram the discussion above it is evident that the functional bureaucratic form which
was the dominant structure of the NSSP was the major source of bureaucratic politics.
The structural arrangements promoted a mode of organisational thinking which
::laimed specific areas of activity as exclusive organisational domains not to be
:ntered by other government agencies or divisions of the same agency. As was
jemonstrated in Chapters Eight and Nine, the various agencies involved in the NSSP
focussed on delineating domains and defending them against invaders. These agencies
were less concerned with the results of their activities on project implementation. The
DCC's unwillingness to collect land rents and service charges is illustrative. The DCC
:·ejected the Ministry of Finance's proposal of using it to collect land rents and service
::harges because it felt that since it was already administering the Urban House Tax,
: ts involvement in cost recovery would create the impression that is was engaged in
jouble taxation of the communities. By doing so the DCC ignored the fact that cost
:·ecovery was an essential element for continuation of provision of similar services to
other squatter areas of Dar es Salaam.
Bureaucratic processes and the NSSP
Poor performance of urban housing policies of developing countries is sometimes
associated with the structuring and mode of operation of the state. The state in
developing countries is perceived to be bureaucratic, characterised by multi-layered
structures which are linked into a single chain of command (ie centralism). Such a
-;tate relies on cumbersome procedures, rules and regulations for its operations. These
characteristics are inflexible and inappropriate to deal rapidly and effectively with the
housing needs of the urban low income groups of developing countries. The data
presented in Chapters Eight and Nine demonstrated how the various elements of the
bureaucratic structure of the NSSP division, MLHUD and THB all prevented the
275
:rban poor from accessing the project benefits. The processes and procedures which
1ere meant to give an individual applicant access to THB loans in th_e NSSP 1, 2 and
· were complex and cumbersome facilitating corruption which could only be afforded
iy people from middle and high income families. For example, to fulfil the loan
onditions NSSP project beneficiaries needed the inputs of not less than seven other
;overnment agencies including the Land Development and Services division and the
\JSSP division of the MLHUD, the Revenue Office of the Ministry of Finance, the
ocal office of the ruling party, and the Regional Commissioner's office (for NSSP 1)
)r the Dar es Salaam City Council (for NSSP 2 and 3). At least fourteen procedures
iad to be fulfilled to acquire a THB loan. Inefficiencies created by the above
rnreaucratic procedures facilitated corruption whereby payment of money to
ndividual NSSP officials became the norm for securing results in the form of blocks
)f land, THB loans and building permits.
Similar complex and cumbersome procedures confronted individual applicants
ntending to build houses under NSSP 1, 2 and 3. In total an individual had to go
hrough 21 administrative procedures in the process of building one house; there was a
,ingle procedure in plot application, two procedures in the process of plot allocation,
md seventeen procedures in land registration. It became clear from interviews that the
Jathologies associated with the above cumbersome and complex procedures and
Jrocesses for obtaining THB loans, NSSP plots, building permits and title deeds were
-1sed by officials of the two institutions to distribute project benefits to their co
:thnics, ruling party officials and friends.
lnstitutional incapacity and the NSSP
Institutional incapacity explanations associate poor performance of urban housing
policies in developing countries with organisational attributes of the states of these
:ountries. Specifically, poor performance is associated with shortages of qualified
technical staff, inadequate incentives to the few qualified staff, inadequate funds and
technical equipment, and poor organisational design. In 1974 when the
implementation of the first phase of NSSP 1 started, the state in Tanzania was
aperiencing acute resource shortages following withdrawal of funding by major
bilateral donors. These shortages adversely affected the implementation of the three
phases of the NSSP. The NSSP 1 and 2 were jointly financed by the World Bank and
the Tanzanian government but there are no figures available to indicate how much
was actually received. However, available figures for the NSSP 2 and 3 indicate that
inadequate funding was one of the major causes contributing to their poor
276
erformance. For instance, in the NSSP 2 the technical assistance (ie training)
>mponent had to be cut by 60 per cent because of the World Bank's dissatisfaction
1ith the project management.
hortages of staff and technical equipment were also elements of institutional
:1capacity that contributed to poor performance of the three phases of the NSSP in
·anzania. In 1974 when NSSP was being implemented for the first time, there were
,nly five land survey officers in the MLHUD catering for the whole country.
\!though all five were attached to the NSSP, they also had to perform routine land
urvey activities for the MLHUD in Dar es Salaam and for the four other
.dministrative regions, an enormous task for which they were inadequate. This
hortage of technical personnel resulted in delays in surveying land for the NSSP and
irban land uses. Staff shortages were prevalent in other divisions of the MLHUD and
hese shortages adversely affected the performance of the NSSP which relied on
lCtivities of other units of the MLHUD. It should be noted that in situations where
.ctivities involved in land development are sequenced (as was the case in Tanzania),
lelays in land surveying meant that other subsequent activities such as land
.pplication, processing of applications and allocation of land had to be halted. Such
nstitutional weaknesses provided the opportunity for the urban residents to build
1ouses in unsurveyed areas and without due regard to government plans. While such
;rass-roots actions eased the housing needs of the urban poor, unguided development
:haracteristic of towns and cities of Tanzania hindered government efforts in
lllocating land for planned developments including those of housing for low income
:roups. This was particularly the case for NSSP 3 where efforts to survey land and
lllocate it to low income groups displaced from upgraded squatter settlements were
1bstructed because the land was already occupied by other members of the land
;tarved urban poor.
--\nother aspect of institutional incapacity which adversely affected the performance of
he NSSP was the poor design of the project management which resulted in the
:reation of a bureaucracy within a bureaucracy. As was discussed in Chapter Eight, to
mplement the NSSP a section and later a division was created within a Ministry-the
VILHUD (Figure 8.1). The structural thinking and organisation design principles
.vhich characterised the ministry concerned were replicated in the division. Moreover,
he NSSP was structured in such a way that its activities became sequentially
nterdependent with those of other units of the MLHUD. Sequential interdependence
,n this study is used to refer to a situation where one organisational unit must act
1efore the next can (Thompson, 1967: 54-60). This meant the NSSP division which
was intended to be an autonomous structure found itself experiencing similar
277
·uctural problems as those of the other units of the MLHUD. The NSSP division's
option of, and dependence on, MLHUD processes and procedures for land
,plication is illustrative. For example, the processing as well as approval and
location of plots under NSSP required participation of the MLHUD's Urban
~velopment Department whose head (the Commissioner) had the ultimate authority
· issuing title deeds. Such participation was hindered by lack of staff and other
sources in the Urban Development Department. Even if the resources had been
:ailable the head of the Urban Development Department was under no obligation to
;t on the directive of the NSSP project manager who was his peer (Figure 8.2). Also
.e MLHUD's communication system which was utilised for the NSSP operations,
1ch as receiving application forms, complaints or other correspondence, was too long
1d slowed down NSSP decision-making processes. Evidently, the NSSP division's
~pendence on the services of the MLHUD for its performance defeated the whole
urpose of creating it as an autonomous structure since the institutional incapacity
'<perienced by other units of the MLHUD were transferred to the NSSP division and
.so affected project performance.
>ther institutional incapacity problems were related to poor leadership in the project
rnnagement. In this study, leadership is used to refer to the abilities and skills in
irecting and influencing the task-related activities of group members (Yukl, 1981:
0; Bass, 1981: 7; Drucker, 1985). As discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine, the
owers vested in the project manager exceeded his leadership abilities. The project
rnnager for NSSP 1 apart from supervising his 25 staff was also responsible for
oordination and supervision of more than fifteen public and private institutions
wolved in the project (see Table 8.5). The project manager also had authority over
:1e project's personnel management, finances and resource acquisition. Although these
1owers were aimed at facilitating the management of the project it was evident (see
lata in Chapters Eight and Nine) that the project manager, especially the second and
hird persons in the position, could not handle effectively the actual operating
.tructures and processes of the division. This resulted in inadequate supervision of the
1roject activities and consequent poor performance. The practice of NSSP allocating
he same plot more than two times to either the same person or different persons is
llustrative. For instance in 1983, in the Dar es Salaam sites and services component,
~ 15 plots were allocated twice, and 17 plots were allocated three times. This was an
1bvious case of poor record-keeping resulting from inadequate supervision and
iccountability (NSSP 1, 1983). That poor record-keeping rather than corruption was
he cause of multiple and triple allocations is demonstrated by the fact that records of
141 NSSP plots were found in two or more files. Other outcomes of the NSSP such as
278
ismanagement of project funds and issuance of Handing Over Certificates for
complete and poorly constructed physical infrastructure were also indicative of
adequate supervision. With regard to mismanagement of project funds it was noted
. Chapter Eight that frequently payments were made to the construction company
Jnico) without cross-checking with the consulting engineers (Cowi Consult). There
ere also incidences of companies receiving payments twice or three times for a
ngle activity. Until 1991, the sites and services unit of the MLHUD was trying to
·cover funds which were irregularly paid to Unico in the 1970s and 1980s.
he problems of institutional incapacity which contributed to the poor performance of
1e NSSP in Tanzania were partly caused by political decisions of the time. The
)rmulation and implementation of the various phases of the NSSP occurred in
criods when major political changes were being made. These changes were rapid and
ot well planned consequently causing confusion and ambiguities in the workings of
1e state. For instance, the formulation of the NSSP 1 started in 1969 at the same time
-; urban authorities were being abolished. Prior to their abolition urban authorities
·ere responsible for various functions including urban planning, provision and
iaintenance of social services such as schools, housing, health, roads, drainage
ystems, street lights and water taps in urban areas. While functions like urban
lanning were placed under central government ministries the situation of other
unctions such as the provision and maintenance of urban roads, street lights, water
upply and garbage collection remained unclear. This adversely affected the
erformance of the NSSP. For example, in the NSSP 1 a number of responsibilities
uch as maintenance of the physical infrastructure of the project (roads, water kiosks
tc) were not allocated to any institution because the NSSP division had no idea about
vhich institutions were going to take over those functions from the urban authorities.
;uch ambiguity adversely affected the servicing and maintenance of physical
nfrastructure in the project areas. Consequently, many roads remained in poor
,hysical condition with numerous potholes and gullies cutting across them while their
1pen drains were blocked with uncollected refuse and garbage. Many public water
josks (ie stand-pipes) were out of use (Kulaba, 1985b; Halfani, 1987).
:'he reintroduction of urban authorities in 1978 compounded the problems of
nstitutional incapacity as they were allocated functions which were also being
1erformed by central government agencies. For instance, urban authorities were given
he responsibility of coordinating land-use development in their respective urban
·entres. These functions were also being performed by the NSSP division, the Land
)evelopment division and the Mapping and Survey division of the MLHUD, the Land
279
1ffice of the Regional Administration, and the Land Office of the District
.dministration. The duplication of functions between these institutions created
,mfusion in the project management and hence contributed to poor project
erformance. The case of individual plots under NSSP project being allocated to five
ifferent people by the five institutions acting autonomously is illustrative.
\nother consequence of the changes in the organisation structure and work methods
.f the state in Tanzania that compounded the problems of institutional incapacity for
1e NSSP was that of lack of clear lines of authority between the various agencies of
:1e state; for example, between the NSSP division, the reintroduced urban authorities,
nd the other state agencies involved in the implementation of the NSSP. Lack of
lear lines of authority in project management structures resulted in institutional
ivalries and disagreements leading to implementation difficulties and un-met
chedules. Chapters Eight and Nine are full of evidence of institutional rivalries
,etween the NSSP division, the Ministry of Finance and the urban authorities, and of
he manner in which these hindered the implementation of cost recovery. Lack of clear
ines of authority was exacerbated by the absence of a uniform definition of urban
treas (see Chapter Six). Variation over the definition of urban areas resulted in other
:overnment agencies refusing to provide services to the NSSP on the grounds that the
Jroject areas did not fit into their definitions of urban areas. This was the case for the
fanzania National Electricity Company (TANESCO) and the National Urban Water
-\uthority (NUW A), which refused to provide services in some NSSP project areas
1ecause the areas were classified by these as rural (MLHUD, 1983).
fhis section has demonstrated how problems of conflict over domain control,
.:umbersome bureaucratic procedures, rules and regulations, and institutional
incapacity adversely affected the performance of the three phases of NSSP. The
,;ection has revealed that their outcomes were not consciously designed to favour well
:o-do families but rather stemmed from an attempt made by the various implementing
jgencies to re-interpret the project objectives to suit their standard procedures and
.::onditions. The re-interpretation of NSSP objectives by these agencies was a clear
manifestation of lack of consultation between and within implementing agencies
Juring the formulation of the NSSP policy proposal. The next section focuses on the
factors which inhibited consultation between the various stakeholders and the manner
in which this contributed to the formulation of an NSSP policy with serious flaws in
the design.
280
The Political and Administrative Framework of Tanzania and the NSSP
fhe three phases of the NSSP were formulated and implemented at a time when the
~ountry was dominated by centralisation of political authority in its political and
.tdministrative system. The argument presented in Chapter Five was that this
..:entralisation ostensibly undertaken to facilitate the drive for rapid national
Jevelopment produced disappointing results, with a host of inefficiencies plaguing the
politico-administrative system and providing a context in which poor policy
performance was both typical and inevitable. This section discusses how centralisation
Jf power in the political and administrative system of Tanzania adversely affected the
performance of the three phases of the NSSP. However, political and administrative
..:entralisation must be viewed in conjunction with several other factors such as poor
performance of the economy, budget deficit resulting from withdrawal of foreign
fonding, rapid urbanisation and threats of national disintegration.
Centralisation of political authority and policy coordination
Coordination refers to the integration of the functions of separate sub-units of a
,;ystem to achieve desired goals (Mintzberg, 1979). Two types of coordination are
;::ommonly distinguished in government: administrative coordination and policy
..:oordination (Self, 1977; Painter, 1981; Boston, 1992). Administrative coordination
concerns the problem of getting everyone to pull in the same direction given
~tgreement on what direction to go (Painter, 1981: 274). A range of devices can be
used to achieve administrative coordination including clear lines of communication
within and between governmental agencies; clear operating procedures and conflict
resolution mechanisms; hierarchical authority, power and coercion; and bargaining,
persuasion and partisan mutual adjustment (Boston, 1988). Policy coordination, by
contrast, is concerned with the development of a clear, consistent and agreed set of
policies, the determination of priorities, and the formulation of strategies for putting
these policies into practice. According to Boston (1992: 90) good policy coordination
in government relies on the satisfactory functioning of at least three kinds of
relationship: the horizontal relationship between ministers; the vertical relationship
between ministers and their most senior advisers (ie the principal secretaries in the
case of Tanzania); and the horizontal relationship between senior officials in different
departments.
As noted in Chapter Five, in Tanzania concern for policy coordination culminated in a
change to the constitution in 1977, among others things to define and clarify the roles
281
f the various institutions of the state in the policy process. Following that change, the
1ree policy processes of formulation, implementation and evaluation were separated
nd sequenced. The state party was assigned the policy-making, supervision and
valuation roles while the bureaucracy (ie the cabinet) was given the implementation
ole (Mwaikusa, 1995: 154). There was also further division of the policy making
·unction within the party. The National Executive Committee (NEC) was responsible
or setting the broad objectives of the party, while the parliament - which was also one
if the committees of the ruling party - was responsible for deciding on matters of
10w, when and in what order of priority the agreed policies should be put into effect
Nyerere, 1975). The separation and sequencing of the policy processes was replicated
n the cabinet, where the role of policy making was assigned to the political officials
ie ministers and others invited to cabinet committee meetings by the President) while
he role of deciding on implementation was assigned to the technicians (ie principal
,ecretaries ).
:n Tanzania policy coordination was to be achieved through the use of hierarchical
.1uthority whereby all policy institutions in the country were linked into a single chain
)f command. The leadership of the two institutions responsible for coordinating the
.1dministrative and political aspects of the policy process was merged. Thus, the
?resident became the leader of the two institutions: the cabinet, and the National
::xecutive Committee (NEC) of the only political party then allowed in the country,
:he Revolutionary Party (CCM). To this effect, the President was the chairman of the
:abinet and the NEC ( except in 1984-87 when leadership of the two was separated) .
..\t the cabinet level, policy coordination was facilitated through a cabinet committee
,ystem. Rules and procedures were established to handle cabinet business particularly
:he flow and vetting of ministerial papers. In 1972, when the NSSP was formulated
for the first time, there were two cabinet committees, the Scholarship Committee
i_SCC) and the Economic Committee (ECC) of the cabinet. The ECC was chaired by
the President and was the most important and influential of the two cabinet
committees (Tordoff, 1967: 81; Bienen, 1970; Pratt, 1972). By 1995, the number of
cabinet committees had increased to four. In addition, three inter-ministerial
committees were created in 1983 to facilitate further policy coordination at the
national level. These were the Presidential Implementation Committee (PIC), the
[nter-Ministerial Technical Committee (IMTC), and the Cabinet Implementation
Committee (CBK). The CBK was aimed at promoting horizontal communication
between ministers. On the other hand, the PIC was intended to facilitate horizontal
communication between principal secretaries in different coordinating ministries,
282
, le the IMTC was to facilitate horizontal communication between principal
;-etaries in different ministries.
discussed in Chapter Five, the importance and operation of these formally
_tblished mechanisms for policy coordination were undermined by the centralisation
political authority in the President. This centralisation of authority made the
~sident rather than the cabinet decision-making system the major source of policy
;Jroval. Ministers and senior civil servants came to rely on the President for policy
proval. The President's approval was not only important in getting the ministers and
·ii servants' policies adopted but also for obtaining the support of other ministers .
. mentioned in Chapter Eight, the NSSP 1 was an initiative of President Nyerere and
such it had his full support from the outset. Guaranteed support from the President
couraged the MLHUD official responsible for preparing the proposal to ignore the
nsultative process which was necessary for obtaining support and approval of the
1licy proposal. This, among other things, explains why there was no horizontal
mmunication between the ministry responsible for the formulation of the NSSP
1licy proposal (MLHUD) and other ministries whose activities were essential for the
)erations of the NSSP during the formulation of NSSP. The President's support also
1dermined any criticisms of the policy proposal during the discussion of the policy in
e Economic Committee of the Cabinet (ECC).
he pressure from the President for urgent approval and adoption of the policy
:·oposal undermined policy coordination at the cabinet level. It was evident from
Herviews that pressure from the President for urgent adoption of the NSSP created
1e opportunity for cabinet procedures and rules to be ignored. As a matter of official
abinet procedure, other cabinet members not in the ECC should have been informed
1f the decisions by the secretariat of the cabinet. Moreover, the procedure required
hat the policy decisions be recorded in the cabinet policy registry for both information
:issemination to concerned ministries and other government agencies and for follow-
1p of policy implementation by the cabinet secretariat. However, these procedures
vere not followed. The Cabinet Secretariat ignored the procedures and forwarded the
nformation to the MLHUD only. Neither were the NSSP 1 policy decisions recorded
n the cabinet policy registry. By ignoring such rules and procedures, the cabinet
,ecretariat obstructed policy coordination.
Poor coordination during the formulation of the NSSP project eliminated any
prospects of achieving unity of purpose amongst the government agencies involved in
its implementation. Unity of purpose concerns getting everyone in an organisation to
283
·.ill in the same direction (Self, 1977; Boston, 1992: 89). The data in Chapters Eight
1d Nine demonstrated that unity of purpose (ie all relevant institutions working
)Operatively to address the housing problems of the urban poor) amongst the fifteen
1stitutions involved in the implementation of the NSSP required fundamental change
1 the procedures and working arrangements of some of these institutions. For
1stance, the lending conditions and working procedures of the THB needed to be
~viewed if low income groups were to benefit. Similarly, the definitions of 'urban'
sed by public utility companies such as the Tanzania Electric Supply Company
T ANESCO) and the National Urban Water Authorities (NUWA) had to be reviewed
) incorporate the NSSP project areas. Review of working procedures and conditions
f these other institutions required negotiation, bargaining and compromises between
':1e NSSP and the institutions. Evidently good coordination at the formulation stage
vould have facilitated the negotiations and bargaining of the parties involved.
---.:entralisation of authority and its impact on consultation within the state
n the political and administrative system of Tanzania consultation between state
'.gencies was to be carried through the established sequence of policy formulation
1resented in Table 8.1. The consultation process involved a number of procedures and
nstitutions of the cabinet and the ruling party. Consultation between the various state
,gencies was necessary for NSSP 1 given the characteristics of the policy itself. As
11entioned in Chapter Eight, the NSSP 1 policy had distributive, regulative and
:onstituent elements which were likely to generate conflicts among those persons
md/or institutions affected by its activities. For example, the regulatory aspect of
\JSSP 1 imposed responsibilities and financial obligations on local administrative
.mits which were to take over maintenance of the services provided after completion
Jf the project.
8espite its importance, consultation between the various state agencies was difficult
'.O achieve because of centralisation of political authority in the presidency. This
enabled Presidents Nyerere and Mwinyi to ignore the established sequence of policy
formulation and adopt policy making strategies which pitted state agencies against
each other. This created conflicts amongst the state agencies consequently
c1ndermining any possibility of consultation between them (Miti and Mutahaba, 1988;
Hartmann, 1988). Lack of consultation characterised the formulation processes of all
three phases of the project. The discussion of the formulation of the NSSP 1 in
Chapter Eight has showed how centralisation of power in the presidency undermined
consultation between various state agencies. As the initiator of the NSSP 1 President
284
lerere chose to ignore the established policy consultation framework and instead
--!d the ECC for consultation as well as approval. Neither the parliament nor the
ling party decision-making institutions had the opportunity to consider the proposal.
.; was indicated in Chapter Eight, the urgency of the matter and fear of opposition
)rn the NEC made President Nyerere rely on the cabinet rather than the NEC for
lth consultation and ratification of the NSSP 1.
:veral features of the NSSP such as the inability of the THB to provide loans to low
.come families and the project's failure to recover costs were a result of lack of
msultation between and within various state agencies as well as between the state
1d the targeted beneficiaries. For instance, it was only when the implementation of
1e project had begun that the NSSP division realised that the lending procedures and
Jnditions of the THB needed to be reviewed to reflect the socio-economic conditions
f the project beneficiaries. It was also at the implementation stage when the NSSP
ivision became aware that the project proposal did not clarify the roles of the
linistry of Finance, and the Regional and District Administrations in implementing
1e cost recovery component of the project.
\lthough attempts were made by the NSSP division to consult other stakeholders
uring the formulation of the NSSP 3, such attempts were hampered by the form of
onsultation adopted by the NSSP division. Influenced by the MLHUD's functional,
nechanistic and bureaucratic structure, the NSSP division, perceiving the project as
ts exclusive domain, prepared the policy proposal without involving other
nstitutions. As discussed in Chapter Nine, the NSSP 3 was initiated by the project
nanager and presented to a task force for consideration. The task force was to have
·epresentation from almost all institutions that took part in the implementation of the
\ISSP 1 and 2. The task force meeting had poor attendance. It was mainly attended by
:he NSSP 2 division's staff and other officials of the MLHUD. Furthermore, rather
.han seeking views from other participants the meeting was mainly a briefing session
in which the project manager informed members of the task force of the NSSP
Jivision's intentions to extend the project to phase 3. This act was a mere public
relations approach that sought to make the NSSP 2 division look good in the eyes of
'.he World Bank by providing some semblance of consultation.
Centralisation of authority and policy consultation between the state and the public
With regard to consultation between the NSSP and the intended beneficiaries, Chapter
Five described how under the centralised political and administrative system in
285
ranzania consultation between the state and the public was to be achieved through the
nstitutional framework of the ruling party (Figure 5.2). The ruling party, whose
eadership was merged with that of the government, was to provide two-way
~ommunication between the state and the public. This consultation was seen as
:1ecessary for effective planning and securing the participation of the people in
;overnment activities (Nyerere, 1972). According to the formally prescribed sequence
)f policy making, consultation between the state and the public in policy formulation
•Nas to be organised by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party. Having
,·eceived the NSSP l policy proposal from the cabinet, NEC through its established
:_Jrocedures and framework was expected to refer the policy proposal to the public (ie
intended beneficiaries) for consideration and approval. However, this consultation
between the NEC and the urban poor (ie project beneficiaries) did not take place
because the formulation of the NSSP l disregarded the established sequence of policy
making. Paradoxically, the urban poor did not take part in formulating the NSSP l
which was aimed at solving their problems.
[t should be noted that, even if the established sequence of policy making had been
followed during the formulation of NSSP 1, 2 and 3, the party (ie NEC) like many
other institutions of the state in Tanzania had serious capacity problems (Bienen,
1970; Msekwa, 1977; Mwansasu, 1979; Miti and Mutahaba, 1988). The party had
neither the qualified staff nor adequate funds to perform its functions. The
institutional incapacity problems of the party adversely affected its role in facilitating
consultation between the government and the public.
The creation of elected bodies in 1974 to facilitate the people's participation in
decision-making as well as consultation between the government and the public did
little to improve consultation between the state and the public. This is because rather
than broadening the membership of the elected bodies, these bodies (the Regional
Development Councils, the District Development Councils, the Ward Development
Committees in urban areas and the Village Development Committees in rural areas)
were dominated by functionaries of the ruling party and hence limited the opportunity
for participation of ordinary citizens. Moreover, the elected bodies made decisions
without consulting the people they represented. The re-introduction of urban councils
in 1978 with elected assemblies did not improve the people's participation in decision
making. The urban councils like all other elected bodies in Tanzania did not provide
the opportunity and mechanisms for participation of the urban poor in the decision
making (Max, 1991; Ngware and Haule, 1993; The Express, 16 January 1994).
286
s demonstrated in Chapters Eight and Nine, the NSSP division took upon itself the
sponsibility of communicating government intentions to the proposed beneficiaries.
he NSSP division in all three phases chose to use the local leaders of the then ruling
Jrty (ie ten cell leaders) to facilitate the debriefing meetings. These meetings were
-;sentially top-down information giving sessions rather than participatory occasions
e allowing involvement of the urban poor in decision making). Rather than
1cilitating consultation between the state and the public, such meetings legitimised
1e actions of the government.
·he issue of lack of involvement of the intended beneficiaries in the formulation of
1e NSSP needs to be taken seriously because of its implication for the performance of
1e project. First, it contributed to the formulation of a policy with serious flaws in the
esign. Secondly, it denied the NSSP division access to the resources of the urban
oor, such as their labour, finances or opinion, which could have improved the
erformance of the project. The importance of the contribution of intended
eneficiaries in improving the performance of the project is underscored by the
xperience of other developing countries. The costs of implementing some aspects of
ites and services and squatter upgrading schemes in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1972 and San
:alvador, El Salvador, in 1975, decreased substantially because of the use of the
.tbour and monetary contributions of the intended beneficiaries (Pasteur, 1979: 145;
,aquian, 1983: 116; van der Linden, 1986). This was made possible through
nvolvement of the intended beneficiaries in the policy formulation and
mplementation stages. In both Lusaka and San Salvador, community involvement
,;as achieved through the use of democratic processes of consultation and
1articipation conducted through community based institutions.
;equencing and institutional separation of the policy process
fhe idea of sequencing the policy processes: formulation, implementation and
:valuation traces its origin to the views of stagists who perceived the policy process as
~onstituting a series of steps or sequences (Simon, 1959; Jones, 1970; Anderson,
1975; Hagwood and Gunn, 1984). The stagists' perceptions of the policy process have
1een generically classified as a top-down approach or linear model (Pressman and
Nildavsky, 1973; Majone and Wildavsky, 1978: 106; Grindle and Thomas, 1989:
~ 15; Thomas and Grindle, 1990; 1165). According to these models the policy process
1egins with agenda-setting and concludes with policy evaluation and termination.
'J nder the linear or top-down approach, policy is made by the policy-maker while
287
nplementation 1s considered a technical matter involving another group,
Jministrators or managers in the state bureaucracy (Grindle, 1991 ).
·he stagists' perception of the policy process was absorbed by the political leadership
f Tanzania in 1977. During this time the Constitution was amended not only to
cquence the policy process but also to assign the various roles of the policy process
) different institutions of the state. The sequencing and institutional separation of the
olicy processes as outlined under the linear or top-down approach was evident for the
1SSP 1 in Tanzania. The task of formulating the policy objectives was assigned to the
olicy makers in the Economic Committee of the Cabinet (ECC), while that of
'.eciding on policy implementation was assigned to bureaucrats (technicians)
cpresented by the Presidential Implementation Committee (PIC).
the general weakness of the top-down approach or linear model is the discreteness of
he stages. By treating the various aspects of the policy as discrete stages rather than as
. single process, the linear model has resulted in policies made without due attention
o potential implementation problems (Dror, 1971: 108; Hyden, 1973: 93-113; Saasa,
. 985). These difficulties were only appreciated at the implementation stage by those
vho were running the various activities. In appreciating the difficulties, policy
mplementors have frequently changed policies to make them implementable
Grindle, 1980). Quite often, the changes have been influenced by the implementors'
)pinion rather than by demand from the environment (Grindle, 1980: 53-4; Saasa,
'. 985: 311 ). As was the case for the NSSP, the impossibility of implementing the
)riginal guidelines prompted implementors to change the policy during the
mplementation stage. Cases of the THB and the urban authorities targeting families
-vith medium and high income instead of low incomes as was required in the policy
suideline is illustrative. Evidently the changes made by the THB and urban authorities
Jt the implementation stage resulted in the NSSP benefiting unintended groups (ie
·niddle and high income groups) and hence in its poor performance. This situation
emphasises the fact that implementation cannot be considered simply a technical
matter with officials following clear, feasible instructions supplied by policy makers.
\nother weakness of the linear model adopted by the state in Tanzania is its tendency
:o describe policy implementation as a technical matter requiring rational
-::onsideration. Implementation is frequently a highly political process involving
bargaining, coalition building, negotiation, compromise and conflict between the
parties involved (Grindle, 1980: 15). This is particularly the case in developing
-:ountries, where weak interest aggregating structures often entail resolution of conflict
288
the implementation stage. Appreciating the political nature of the implementation
ucess helps policy makers to direct attention to the decisions that are likely to
· nerate conflicts during the implementation stage. The discussion of the
1plementation processes of all the three phases of the NSSP in Chapters Eight and
ine illustrated the political nature of the implementation process. State officials
volved in the implementation of the NSSP were constantly engaged in actions (ie
~gotiation, coalition building and conflict) which are defined as political by authors
·1 organisation theory (Mechanic, 1962; Cyert and March, 1963: 114; Selznick, 1966;
mith, 1982: 3-7; Elmore, 1979). For example, in order_ to implement the cost
:covery element of the NSSP officials in the Ministry of Finance had to negotiate
ith the urban authorities on the possibility of the latter acting as the former's agent.
he findings also demonstrated how the NSSP 2 project manager embarked on
Jalition building to by-pass his critics and get the project implementation going. It
·as evident from the research findings that some negative consequences of the three
hases of the NSSP resulted from coalition building and conflicts during the project
nplementation stage.
lleffective feedback mechanisms
'he problem of policy changes or goal displacement occurring at implementation
cage is a reflection of the ineffective feedback mechanisms inherent under the linear
node! or top-down approach (Sabbatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; 1-4). Feedback as
.sed in this thesis refers to flow of information to facilitate control (Deutsch, 1963).
) nder the linear model or top-down approach, feedback occurs at the end of the
1olicy process, and is one-way or unidirectional. Such feedback creates a gap between
he time the information is received and decisional response (Lindblom and
,Voodhouse, 1993 ). Thus it does not permit the opportunity for policy makers to learn,
md to anticipate the consequences of their policies, neither does it permit policy
mplementors the opportunity to air their views regarding policy. In situations where
:he state's objectives are not well-defined and uncertainty and confusion over means of
Jbtaining the objectives are the norm, as is the case in Tanzania, the absence of an
~ffective feedback system provides an opportunity for implementors to redefine the
Jolicy guidelines they receive. These negative outcomes would have been minimised
. f the feedback mechanism in Tanzania allowed two-way communication. Unlike a
Jne-way feedback, a two-way feedback perceives the policy process as a complexly
inter-active process without beginning or end, allowing policy makers as well as
implementors to learn about the policy and its possible consequences.
289
was indicated in Chapter Five that feedback on political decisions in the Tanzanian
1odel of the policy process was one way. Ideally, the party (CCM) which was also the
ccision-maker was to get feedback on government activities by conducting
valuation of the associated policies. The evaluation was to be carried out after the
•Jmpletion of implementation. With regard to NSSP 1, feedback on its impact was to
e received at the completion of the project in 1977. As was indicated in Chapters
-:ight and Nine the formulation of the NSSP did not follow the prescribed sequence of
olicy making that would have involved the formal political evaluation processes.
'his explains why the party did not perform an evaluation of the NSSP. Even if the
arty had carried out an evaluation, the information would have been of little help to
1e NSSP 1 performance precisely because the evaluation would have been done after
1e completion of the project.
ndeed any attempt by the party to evaluate the NSSP would have proven futile given
ts institutional incapacity problems. As was shown in Chapter Five, the party (CCM)
id not have the capacity to perform its functions. Fragmentation of communication
hannels in the political and administrative system of Tanzania compounded the
1arty's problems of facilitating feedback between policy makers and implementors.
)espite the official requirement that the party was the only communication channel
or transmitting government policies to implementing agencies and receiving progress
eport from them, several others (ie President's Office, Cabinet Secretariat) existed.
rhis allowed implementors to ignore the official communication channel thus
1indering policy coordination. As demonstrated in Chapter Eight, the NSSP 1 project
nanager had no obligation to supply progress report to the party. However, he was
1bliged to provide periodic reports to the President, the Prime Minister's Office and
he World Bank. These progress reports were concerned with getting the NSSP going
·egardless of whether or not it was addressing the housing problems of the low
ncome groups.
it should be noted that various other mechanisms and structures were available for
eedback in the political and administrative system in Tanzania. However, their
~ffectiveness was undermined by the one-way top-down feedback inherent in the
fanzanian model of the policy process. The top-down relationship between the policy
nakers in the cabinet and the Presidential Implementation Committee (PIC) is
llustrative. The role of the PIC in the Tanzanian model of the policy process was to
iecide on the means for and implementability of policies proceeding from the cabinet
)Olicy-makers' decisions. However, while information was flowing from the cabinet
..:ommittees to the PIC, there was no provision for information exchange between the
290
and the cabinet policy makers. This top-down relationship was apparent for NSSP
i1en after the NSSP 1 policy had been adopted the PIC was asked by the cabinet
ctariat to plan the implementation of NSSP 1. This was an anomaly because there
c several aspects of the NSSP 1 policy that could not be implemented and perhaps
1e PIC had been consulted prior to the adoption of the policy such problems might
e been detected. The introduction of the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee
:TC) in 1984 to consider implementability of cabinet decisions before the
nmencement of implementation was a positive direction towards effective feedback
the Tanzanian policy process. However, as was shown in Chapter Five, the
xtiveness of the IMTC was undermined by the centralisation of power in the
sidency and the consequent tendency of policy actors to rely on the president rather
n the cabinet decision making system for approval and support of a policy
)posal.
inclusion
:is chapter has discussed the extent to which factors such as incrementalist actions
state actors, bureaucratic centralism, bureaucratic politics and institutional
:apacity contributed to NSSP benefits being captured by middle and high income
.Jups. The chapter has further demonstrated that the problems of bureaucratic
ilitics and institutional incapacity were compounded by the organisation structure
:d work methods of the state in Tanzania. The second part of the chapter
:monstrated how the characteristics of the political and administrative system of the
.mzanian state contributed to the formulation of an NSSP policy with serious flaws
. the design. Specifically, it demonstrated how the centralisation of authority in the
resident hindered policy coordination in the cabinet decision-making system. The
irnpter further exhibited how the centralisation of political authority in the presidency
indered consultation between and also within the various policy institutions. Such
cntral control over the policy process created problems of conflict and competition
etween the various institutions of the state. The chapter also showed how the nature
,f state in Tanzania hindered consultation between the state and low income groups in
1olicy formulation. It was demonstrated that the enormous powers vested in the
,residency in Tanzania allowed presidential incumbents to by-pass the formal policy
naking framework which, among other things, would have allowed consultation
1etween the state and the public to occur. By not consulting the urban poor the state
~nded in formulating an NSSP project with serious flaws in its design.
291
Chapter Eleven
Summary and Concluding Remarks
Vhile there is no one explanatory factor which can be held solely responsible for the
oor performance of urban housing policies in developing countries, this thesis has
emonstrated the causal importance of organisational factors. The major contribution
f the thesis has been to elucidate and analyse a range of organisational factors which,
:1 large part, account for unwise policies, poor planning and unsatisfactory
:nplementation. The structures and processes of the state's political, administrative
nd business agencies, as well as relations between them, can lead to inefficiency,
1equity and disappointing outcomes in urban housing policy formulation, planning
nd implementation. As the thesis also shows, these factors do not operate in a
acuum but are set in a particular historical, social, economic and political
nvironment, typically characterised by uncertainty. This combination of
rganisational factors and environmental uncertainty adversely affected the process
.nd outcomes of the NSSP in Tanzania.
J the light of the foregoing, it will be worthwhile at this point to provide a summary
,f the major arguments of the study. At the start, the thesis argued that the urban
tousing crisis of developing countries owes its origin to rapid urbanisation. The
apidity of the urbanisation process of these countries is manifested by high urban
1opulation growth rates, and increase in and growth of urban centres and especially
he fast growth of their primate cities. Such rapid urbanisation has been the result of
rntural increase, rural-urban migration, and reclassification of boundaries. With
,pecial reference to Tanzania the thesis has shown that the country has the highest
·ates of population growth of all sub-Saharan African countries. Of greater
,ignificance concerning Tanzania's urbanisation is the fact that its rate of urban
1opulation growth is higher than the country's capacity to produce food and other
.ervices. Despite official measures to divert growth from the primate city of Dar es
-;alaam, the city has continued to grow faster and at a higher rate than all other
:entres. The study has revealed that although natural increase of population and urban
,prawl have contributed to the significant growth of the urban population of Tanzania,
292
1ral-urban migration has been the major factor. Decline in agricultural output and
:gnificant falls in rural income have been the major factors pushing rural dwellers
Ito urban areas. In Tanzania, rural migrants are mainly young and relatively well
ducated. Those arrival in the cities has made a major contribution to the country's
:rban housing crisis.
Zegarding the character of the urbanisation of developing countries, the thesis found
hat the process is not accompanied with the kind of industrialisation which could lead
o concomitant social and economic prosperity as was the case in the developed
ountries. On the contrary, developing countries' urbanisation is often paralleled with
ncreasing poverty, unemployment, poor housing conditions and inadequate basic
:menities. The majority of the urban population of many developing countries is
iving at or below subsistence level. With respect to unemployment, the thesis
1uestions the explanations which equate developing countries' unemployment rates
vith those of developed countries. It is argued in this thesis that unemployment in
leveloping countries is higher than that of developed countries, but that it is less
·isible because it is disguised by the presence of informal sector activities. The most
listurbing character of the informal sector of developing countries is the insecure and
neagre incomes that it provides to its workers. The insecure and low incomes are
Jften inadequate for shelter, education and health needs. The case of Tanzania
lemonstrated the problematic nature of the character of the informal sector of
leveloping countries. It was evident that the monthly income of less than Tshs 599
:arned by the majority of residents in the squatter areas of Dar es Salaam in 1971 and
'. 976 was too low to cover the cost of living of an average family of five people. A
nonthly income of more than Tshs 1,000 was required to enable a family of five to
neet its basic needs in 1976.
-\gainst the background of poverty and unemployment, the urban poor have resorted
o squatter housing as it is the housing option they can afford. The discussion on the
:10using problems of the urban poor of developing countries has revealed that these
;,roblems have reached crisis proportions. An estimated 60 per cent of the urban
;,opulation of developing countries resides in squatter settlements. The levels of
,ervice provision, household density and physical quality of the settlements for the
najority of the squatter residents fall short of satisfying the conditions necessary for
:;uaranteeing adequate human development. The household density obtaining in the
,quatter settlements of developing countries has produced the most overcrowded
:onditions in the world. In the majority of these settlements basic facilities such as
toilets, bathrooms, kitchens, water supply, drainage and sewerage are not available.
293
hen they are available the pressure on them in terms of numbers of users leaves
uch to be desired. Inadequate or lack of basic facilities in overcrowded urban
1using in developing countries has generated severe health problems in the squatter
ttlements of these countries. The spread of diseases such as tuberculosis, influenza
1d meningitis is related to such conditions.
he urban housing crisis in Tanzania was found to exhibit characteristics similar to
.ose of other developing countries. In Tanzania at least 60 to 80 per cent of the total
·ban population lived in squatter settlements in the period between 1980 and 1990.
he levels of household density, service provision, and physical quality of the squatter
~ttlements in Tanzania were well below those officially aspired to for a healthy and
1fe living environment. Squatter settlements in major towns of Tanzania have been
1d still are densely populated with 160 persons per acre in 1978. This high
opulation density constitutes a problem because settlements are comprised of many
ngle storey housing units, which are densely populated, inadequately serviced and
ith little space between them. The study found that in common with other
~veloping countries poverty, unemployment, and the insecure and meagre incomes of
1e informal sector were the major factors contributing to the housing problems of the
)W income earners of urban Tanzania.
"his thesis argues that the phenomenon of rapid urbanisation and its consequences (ie
nemployment, poverty and housing crisis), although a result of externally generated
_1ctors such as colonialism and dependence on foreign capital, is accelerated by the
ctions or domestic policies of the state in developing countries. The thesis has shown
ow the tendency toward centralisation of political authority in the 1960s and 1980s in
.lmost all. developing countries led to a loss of autonomy for local government
nstitutions and people's organisations. In Tanzania the trend towards centralisation of
iolitical authority led at first to the abolition of the institution of local government,
vhile on its reintroduction it was characteristically unstable. The Tanzanian case also
,howed how institutional incapacity problems rendered the reintroduced urban
1uthorities inappropriate to deal with the rapidity of the urbanisation process of this
~ountry. The study has demonstrated how the loss of autonomy of urban management
-tructures in developing countries resulted in neglect of the maintenance and provision
1f basic infrastructure such as water and sewerage. Indeed, the Tanzanian case
lemonstrated that neglect of urban services and the consequent decay of urban areas
.vas the major reason for the state to re-introduce semi-autonomous urban authorities
n 1978.
294
'he thesis further reveals that a lack of capacity to impose compliance with central
uthority created opportunities for urban dwellers to ignore central state rules. This
ompounded the problems of unguided development in cities and towns of developing
ountries. Very little of the cities of developing countries are a result of planned
levelopment.
:he thesis also argues that urban development policies (and particularly the promotion
if growth-poles) rather than curtailing the rapidity and negative consequences of the
,rbanisation process compounded the situation. The growth and deteriorating social
:nd economic conditions of some of the lesser cities of rapidly urbanising developing
~ountries resulted from the growth-pole strategies. The case of Tanzania exhibited
10w towns such as Dodoma and Arusha which were beneficiaries of the state policy
lf decentralisation of urban population and industrial development emerged as rapidly
.1rbanising towns with the same dreadful housing conditions as the primate city of Dar
~s Salaam. It is nevertheless the case that the promotion of new cities and towns has
lone little to reduce the growth of primate cities in developing countries.
r anzania provides a clear case of local policies rather than exogenous factors
LCcelerating the rapidity of the urbanisation process. The country's urbanisation
Jrocess although set in motion by colonial economic measures, was accelerated by
Jost- independence government policies. The emergence and increase in numbers of
owns with large populations was speeded up by the creation of 25 regional
1dministrative centres, the elevation of the administrative status of some centres, the
irban and industrial development decentralisation programs of I 964 and I 969, the
Jecentralisation of government in I 972, and the transfer of government headquarters
o Dodoma in I 976.
The thesis argues that various policies and strategies were experimented with by the
,tates of developing countries to address their urban housing crises. The policy
:xperiments included the public housing and slum clearance policies of the 1950s and
l 960s, and the sites and services, and squatter upgrading policies of the 1970s and
l 980s. The public housing policies have included direct construction of houses by
;tate agencies; legislative actions compelling employers to provide housing for
~mployees; and intervention in the supply of the means of housing such as land,
:redit, housing prices and building materials. The public housing policies were guided
,y a philosophy which perceived the state as the prime mover of development in
Jeveloping countries. The thesis has shown that despite good intentions the above
:)Olicy experiments did not achieve the objective of providing housing and improving
295
ousing conditions for low income families. Public housing programs produced only a
11ail proportion of housing compared to the annual growth in needs. Rental public
ousing could only be afforded by the middle and high income groups. The only way
1at low income groups could afford rental public housing was by sub-letting. Where
uh-letting occurred, it resulted in overcrowding thus exacerbating social problems.
'ublic housing was usually located on the urban fringes far from the family and work
,pportunities of the intended beneficiaries. Both the structure and size of the public
.ousing were unsuitable for the needs of the urban poor.. Compounding the problems
,f public housing was the absence of social facilities such as schools, health centres,
narkets and transport. Employer-based housing benefited only a small proportion of
he urban population. Similarly, subsidised housing credit reached especially those
·amilies from the middle and high income category. The same classes tended to be
hose which reaped the greatest benefits from urban land reforms.
[hrough an historical approach the thesis examined the various urban housing
trategies employed by the state in Tanzania. It was established that these housing
)Olicies failed to generate the intended outcomes because they were inappropriately
.lesigned. The Rental public housing, rent controls, government sponsored housing
:redit, nationalisation of land and rental properties, introduction of socialist town
)lans as well as state intervention in production and distribution of building materials
Jid not alleviate the housing problems of the urban poor. The benefits of all these
mategies were captured by the middle and high income families. This was a clear
nanifestation of flaws in the designs of the policies. The thesis has further
Jemonstrated that in the cause of addressing the flaws in the designs of the policies,
.mplementors ignored the intended beneficiaries and distributed benefits to
~mintended groups.
The thesis argues that the public housing policy experiments of developing countries,
including Tanzania, performed poorly because they were inappropriately designed.
They ignored the objective conditions of the urban poor of these countries. The
procedures and conditions set for accessing the benefits of the various public housing
policies (such as housing credit, rental housing, employer-based housing, and building
land) required someone to have secure employment, legally owned property, as well
JS a certain level of education to understand the working of the state. These
requirements ignored the fact that the majority of urban dwellers were unemployed,
had insecure and meagre incomes and did not understand the complexity of the
bureaucracy. The action of state in ignoring the objective reality of their urban poor
was paradoxical because the public housing policies of industrialised countries, from
296
hich developing countries drew inspiration, were gauged on the social and economic
:ality of the urban dwellers of those countries.
·he thesis findings are in contrast to those exciting theoretical perspectives which
iew the inappropriate design of the urban housing policies of developing countries as
~suiting from conscious action by the state to favour and protect well-to-do families.
'his view is not supported by the thesis which instead views the inappropriate designs
,,; a result of the operational procedures and organisational arrangements of the
ountry's political and administrative system. In particular, the state in Tanzania
xcluded the participation of the urban poor in the design of these policies.
~he thesis argued that the introduction of sites and services (S&S) and squatter
1pgrading (SU) approaches to the urban housing problem in the 1970s signified a
najor step forward as compared to earlier approaches. This was because unlike the
:arlier approaches which were inspired by the experience of industrialised countries,
he S&S and SU approaches were influenced by experiences in the cities and towns of
[eveloping countries. Unlike the slum clearance programs of the 1960s, the S&S and
)U approaches acknowledged the role of squatter settlements in housing urban low
ncome families. The S&S and SU schemes reduced the role of government in
1ousing to that of providing already serviced building plots and other necessary
nfrastructure. The actual building of a dwelling was left to the people themselves.
Ideally, the S&S and SU approaches were to offer a family a plot of land, gradual
,ervicing, access to credit, and advice on construction and materials to be used, all at a
xice within the family income. The recognition of squatter settlements brought
sovernment control to these residential areas. Owners of land and buildings in
Jpgraded areas were now to pay land rents and service charges to the government. The
S&S and SU approaches were taken up by numerous developing countries, often at
the prompting of the World Bank and other international development agencies.
Despite the radical departure from the earlier public housing policies, the performance
of the sites and services and squatter upgrading schemes of the 1970s and 1980s has
not been satisfactory. Like the public housing policies of the 1960s and 1970s, the
actual beneficiaries of the S&S and SU schemes have tended to come
disproportionately from middle and high income groups. The thesis has shown that
squatter upgrading has resulted in illegal subdivision and consequent higher
population density which has strained the available resources. Moreover, land rents
and service charges imposed on squatter settlements have pushed house rents higher
thus forcing the poorest tenants out of their rented accommodation. With regard to
already serviced sites allocated to the low income groups, emphasis on high building
297
andard as well as lucrative monetary gains from the land market has forced the
,Jorest families who have acquired building plots to sell their plots to middle and
igh income groups.
·he thesis argues that the causes of the poor performance of urban housing policies in
eveloping countries could be explained through a systematic analysis of the
,rganisational structures and work methods of the state in developing countries. This
rgument was influenced by the lack of systematic analysis of the organisational
tructures and work methods of the state in the urban housing policy literature. This
acuum in the available literature was worth investigating particularly because of the
•ivotal role played by the state in developing countries in controlling externally
!erived resources. It is argued that a systematic analysis of the influence of the
,rganisational structures and work methods of the state on the performance of a policy
·ould be achieved through reconstruction and examination of the particular policy
)rocess. It is against this background that the study reconstructed the formulation and
mplementation of the various phases of the national sites and services and squatter
,pgrading projects to examine the extent to which their performance was influenced
1y the organisational structures and work methods of the state.
~he analysis of the National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project
NSSP) in Tanzania has indicated that the flaws in the designs of its three phases were
he direct result of the organisational structures and working arrangements of the state
n Tanzania. The state in Tanzania is seen as characterised by centralisation of
tuthority, duplication of functions, lack of consultation, acute resource shortages,
mclear lines of authority, a bloated and politicised public service, lack of
1ccountability and control mechanisms, lack of cooperation between state agencies
ind conflicts over domain control between and within various institutions of the state.
The discussion of the NSSP has shown how centralisation of authority in the political
ind administrative system of Tanzania resulted in the formulation of an urban housing
Jolicy whose objectives, although intended to assist low income groups actually gave
greater benefits to middle and high income groups. This centralisation of political
.mthority hindered consultation between the state and the urban poor for whom the
Jolicy was intended. Since centralisation of political authority was evident in many
ieveloping countries until the end of 1980s, it is suggested that the explanation may
)e extended to other similarly centralised developing countries.
The argument here is not to suggest that centralisation is inappropriate in all
~ituations, but that centralisation of political authority in Tanzania undermined the
298
mportance of the established policy-making sequence which was to facilitate
·onsultation between the state and the intended beneficiaries. This lack of consultation
iad adverse effects on both the state and the urban poor. On the part of the state, lack
>f consultation with the urban poor denied its agencies and officials the opportunity to
mderstand the underlying causes of the their housing problems. This lack of
1ppreciation resulted in the formulation of uninformed policies. The lack of
;onsultation also denied the state access to the resources and talents available in the
;ommunities. These resources would have assisted the resource-poor state of Tanzania
n carrying out the NSSP. One of the elements necessary to the success of sites and
;ervices and squatter upgrading approaches to the urban housing problems of
leveloping countries is community self-help which involves the use of resources (ie
abour, finance, talents) available in the community to reduce the costs of providing
;ommunal goods.
:.fowever, one wonders how would these resources be obtained without consulting the
,ffected communities. The decision not to consult the affected communities was a
1egation of the major principle of sites and services and squatter upgrading. It resulted
n the Tanzanian government committing scarce resources into areas and activities
.vhich would have seen superior outcomes if appropriate consultation with the
:ommunities had been undertaken. In addition to increased effectiveness, there would
iave been efficiency gains shown in reduced project costs. That appropriate
;onsultation with the community would have facilitated commitment of their
·esources is not an overstatement because evidence from other developing countries
ias shown that despite being poor the low income families of these countries will
nvest their limited resources in activities that they perceive to be of benefit to them.
mproved housing is one these benefits.
fhe thesis has shown that lack of consultation during the formulation of NSSP denied
he urban poor the opportunity to participate in making the decisions which directly
1ffect their lives. Available literature on urban housing policies of developing
;ountries has shown that successful sites and services and squatter upgrading schemes
iave involved the communities affected in their planning and implementation. What
natters is not only that consultation takes place but the nature and the manner of that
·onsultation. It is imperative to note that the successful sites and services and squatter
1pgrading schemes have used community-based organisations to facilitate the
;onsultative process. The decision on what mechanisms and forms of participation
-hould be used needs to take into account the social and political factors in squatter
299
~ttlements of developing countries paying particular attention to the specific
onditions of individual countries, cities and squatter settlements.
\.lthough the state in Tanzania from the mid- l 980s officially incorporated
onsultation with the intended beneficiaries as part of its post-Arusha development
trategy, the mechanisms adopted for consultation left much to be desired. These
nechanisms included the use of community-based organisations, non-governmental
,rganisations and the (re-introduced) semi-autonomous urban authorities. In the event,
t was the elite which dominated the non-governmental organisations and community
•ased organisations appointed to facilitate consultation. This tendency was, however,
.ot a result of conscious action by the state but rather a result of bureaucratic
1rocesses which favoured the educated and skilled urban dwellers. As a consequence,
he expressed needs of the majority of the urban poor have continued to be excluded
'rom the various post- Arusha urban development programs.
~he thesis established that centralisation of authority undermined consultation
•etween and within state agencies and demonstrated that centralisation of political
uthority in Tanzania resulted in the presidency ignoring the established policy
naking sequence. Since consultation between and within the state agencies was to be
chieved through the established policy-making sequence, by ignoring it the
•residency in Tanzania hindered the consultative process. It was clear from the
iiscussion of the NSSP in Tanzania that this lack of consultation frustrated any effo11s
o formulate an urban housing policy that would adequately address the housing
1roblems of the urban poor. Prevailing conditions in the bureaucracy, and lack of
:1ter-agency coordination and communication meant that implementation inefficiency
vas inevitable from the outset.
r'he thesis has shown that the organisation structure and operational procedures of the
tate in Tanzania are the major obstacles to formulating and implementing urban
1ousing policies which address the housing problems of the urban poor of Tanzania.
::ormulation and implementation of policies which reflect the reality of the urban poor
if Tanzania require policy makers to take people's needs into account and to consider
he impact of policies and programs on them. This will only be feasible if the various
takeholders including the poor themselves are involved .
.Vhatever mechanisms and forms of consultation and/or participation are adopted to
acilitate the involvement of various stakeholders in the formulation and
300
,nplementation of urban housing policies, it is the contention of this thesis that in
·anzania an appropriate urban housing policy design needs to consider the following:
The three interrelated factors of unemployment, poverty, and insecure and meagre
wages of the informal sector are the major factors constraining the urban poor
from improving their housing conditions. Urban poverty continues to be a leading
issue in contemporary Tanzania where the government, under pressure to
implement austerity measures and service its foreign debt, has not only reduced
subsidies in basic welfare services such as education and health but has also
withdrawn from urban low-income housing schemes.
Squatter upgrading tends to favour landlords rather than renters who constitute the
majority in these settlements. Given that the majority of residents in squatter
settlements of Tanzania are renters, improvement programs which frequently raise
rents tend to favour the landlords and middle and high income tenants and not the
low income groups. However, this is not to suggest that the situation for squatter
upgrading in Tanzania is hopeless. Indeed, as the thesis has demonstrated, in some
squatter settlements of developing countries with similar circumstances as those of
Tanzania, upgrading has involved measures to protect tenants from the threat of
rental increases and potential loss of homes.
In some cases the urban poor are no-income earners. The discussion of socio
economic conditions of the urban poor in Tanzania indicated that a large
proportion of the economically active urban population of Tanzania is hired on
either a temporary or casual basis. Such irregularity of employment is a clear
indication that there is a proportion of the urban population of Tanzania which
does not earn income at all.
• Land already occupied on the urban fringes of cities and towns of Tanzania offers
no solution for the rapidly growing urban population. The sites and services and
squatter upgrading schemes in Tanzania have relied on the acquisition of land
from the urban fringes. In all three phases of the NSSP in Tanzania land was
acquired on the urban fringes. Despite government policy making the acquisition
of such land easy, in reality government failure to compensate the occupants of the
land on time has made the land unavailable for sites and services and squatter
upgrading schemes. With increasing demand on government resources it is
inconceivable that in the near future the Tanzanian government will be able to
compensate land owners on time. It appears that the government in Tanzania must
301
think about other means of obtaining already occupied land for development
purposes.
Giving cheap land to urban residents with insecure and meagre income in a
situation of increasing land shortages and a thriving land market does not solve
their housing problems. The lucrative monetary gains from the land market has
and will continue to force relatively poorer families to sell their land to interested
parties and establish themselves in other squatter settlements. In other developing
countries such tendencies have been curbed by making the land in question only
valuable to the original owner and not to the second and third owners.
Learning needs to be considered as a vital element of the policy process as lack of
learning on the part of policy makers resulted in the formulation of policies with
serious flaws in their designs. This learning process needs to start with
mobilisation of the various stakeholders and working with them to identify their
needs and problems and tentative solutions. Participatory learning, though not a
panacea for all urban housing problems of developing countries, has enabled the
state to learn and develop more efficient and effective service delivery methods for
intended beneficiaries. However, participatory learning requires improvement in
the forms and patterns of communication between the state and the public and also
between and within state agencies. Elite-based, non-governmental organisations
do not necessarily provide the best alternative communication channel between
the state and the public. Moreover, the linear model of policy process which de
links policy formulation from implementation inhibits learning and hence needs to
be replaced by an iterative one which emphasises the links between formulation
and implementation.
Bureaucratic processes and procedures need to be re-thought. Those obtaining in
Tanzania are ineffective in delivering services such as land to urban low income
groups. Moreover, such procedures and processes have been one of the major
causes of corruption in the Tanzanian civil service. This suggests a need to rethink
the usefulness of such processes and procedures. Elsewhere in developing
countries reform of these processes and procedures have involved reducing the
number of officials that an individual applicant of a public service needs to contact
for a single application. Other measures have involved merging fragmented
functions to relieve the public from the backward-forward tracking created by
fragmentation of the land delivery mechanism. There is also a need to consider
problems of bureaucratic duplication and rivalries between the various state
302
institutions involved in delivery of housing related services for the urban low
income families processes need to be streamline to eliminate overlapping, shifting,
and sometimes conflicting rules and requirements for housing related services.
The existence of a corrupt and highly de-motivated civil service needs to be taken
seriously because of its negative effect on the quality of service provided to the
public. Various ways need to be considered to reorient the values and attitudes of
civil servants in Tanzania. In other developing countries the introduction of a code
of ethics has resulted in a new public sector value system whose major concern is
the public it serves. Other developing countries have introduced systems to
enforce their code of ethics by introducing written commitments by all
government agencies pertaining to the delivery of outputs or services to their
customers. The written commitments are assurance by agencies that their outputs
or services will comply with declared quality standards that are in conformance
with the expectations and requirements of customers.
• Despite structural constraints to effective formulation and implementation of
policies, there is room for manoeuvre in developing countries. Both public and
private actors do have some autonomy in decision-making which means getting
more policies right is possible. The influence of both private and public actors can
be made to produce policies and outcomes which are more equitable and effective
and which make more efficient use of scarce resources. In some developing
countries such potentials have been tapped through the formation of coalitions of
interested actors around jointly identified problems.
303
APPENDIX A
Tanzania Exchange Rate to US Dollar 1960 to 1994
1960 7.142860 1961 7.142860 1962 7.142860 1963 7.142860 1964 7.142860 1965 7.142860 1966 7.142860 1967 7.142860 1968 7.142860 1969 7.142860 1970 7.142860 1971 7.142860 1972 7.142900 1973 7.020380 1974 7.134980 1975 7.366790 1976 8.376770 1977 8.289210 1978 7.712050 1979 8.216620 1980 8.196590 1981 8.283510 1982 9.282590 1983 11.142800 1984 15.292200 1985 17.472300 1986 32.698000 1987 64.260300 1988 99.292100 1989 143.377000 1990 195.056000 1991 219.157000 1992 297.708000 1993 405.274000 1994 509.63IO00
Source: DX Data Base, Econ -------
304
References
Books and Articles
Abrahams, K., 1982, 'The "Waserauta" Phenomenon: Additional Notes on the
Namibian Elite', Namibian Review, 25: 21-31.
Abrams, C., 1964, Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanising World,
Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Abu-Lughod, J. and Hay, R., eds, 1977, Third World Urbanisation, Chicago:
Maaroufa Press.
Adamolekun, L., 1983, Public Administration: A Nigerian and Comparative
Perspective, London: Longman.
Adedeji, A., ed., 1980, Indigenisation of African Economies, London:
Hutchinson.
Alavi, H., 1972, 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and
Bangladesh', New Left Review, 74.
Aldrich, B.C., 1985, 'Habitat Defence in Southeast Asian Cities', Southeast
Asian Journal of Social Science, 13: 1-14.
Aldrich, B.C. and Sandhu, R.S., 1995, 'The Global Context of Housing
Poverty', in B.C. Aldrich and R.S. Sandhu, eds, Housing the Urban
Poor: Policy and Practice in Developing Countries, London: Zed
Books, pp.17-33.
Aldrich, H., 1979, Organisations and Environments, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Amani, H.K.R., 1992, 'Agricultural Market Reforms in Tanzania: Evolution,
Performance and Future Policy Issues', in M.S.D. Bagachwa, A.V.Y.
Mbelle and B. Van Arkadie, eds, Market Reforms and Parastatal
Restructuring in Tanzania, University of Dar es Salaam: Economics
Departments and Economic Research Bureau, pp.116-132.
305
Amis, P., 1990, 'Introductions: Key Themes in Contemporary African
Urbanisation', in P. Amis and P. Lloyd, eds, Housing Africa's Urban
Poor, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp.1-31.
Amis, P. and Lloyd, P., eds, 1990, Housing Africa's Urban Poor, Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Amos, J., 1993, 'Planning and Managing Urban Services', in N. Devas and
C. Rakodi, eds, Managing Fast Growing Cities: New Approaches to
Urban Planning and Management in the Developing World, New York:
Longman and John Wiley, pp.132-152.
Anderson, J.E., 1975, Public Policy-Making. New York: Praeger.
Anderson, J.E., 1984,, Public Policy-Making, 3rd ed., Sydney: CBS College.
Angel, S., 1983, 'Upgrading Slum Infrastructure, Divergent Objectives in
Search of Consensus', Third World Planning Review, 5(5): 5-21.
Appleby, P. H., 1949, Policy and Administration, Alabama: University of
Alabama Press.
Armstrong, A., 1987, 'Urban Planning in Developing Countries: An Assessment
of Master Plans for Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', Singapore Journal of
Tropical Geography, 7(1): 12-27.
Ashworth, H., 1957, Housing in Great Britain, London: Thomas Skinner.
Astuto, P.L. and Leal, R.A., 1964, Latin American Problems, New York: St.
John's University Press.
Atman, R., 1975, 'Kampong Improvements in Indonesia', Ekistics, 40(238):
216-20.
Ayeni, B., 1981, 'Lagos', in M. Pacione, ed., Problems and Planning in Third
World Cities, Surry Hills: Croom Helm, pp.127-156.
Azis, J.J, 1989, 'Key Issues in Indonesian Regional Development', in H. Hill,
ed., Unity and Diversity: Regional Economic Development in Indonesia
Since 1970, Singapore: Oxford University Press.
Babu, A.M., 1990, 'The Limits of Populist Nationalism: The Case of Tanzania',
in H. Campbell and H. Stein, eds, The IMF and Tanzania: The
Dynamics of Liberalisation, Harare: SAPES Trust, pp.115-125.
Bagachwa, M.S.D., 1992, 'Background, Evolution, Essence and Prospects of
Current Economic Reforms in Tanzania', in M.S.D. Bagachwa, A.V.Y.
Mbelle and B. Van Arkadie, eds, Market Reforms and Parastatal
306
Restructuring in Tanzania, University of Dar es Salaam: Economics
Department and Economic Research Bureau, pp.19-43.
Bagchi, A.K., 1993, Rent-Seeking: The New Political Economy and the
Negation of Politics, Calcutta: Centre for Studies in Social Sciences.
Baguma, R., 1992, 'Towards Realisation of an Optimal Size of the Government:
A Review of Government Functions and Structures', unpublished report,
Dar es Salaam: Civil Service Reform Programme.
Bakari, A.H., 1988, 'Traditional Social Security as Practices in Contemporary
Tanzania's Urban Centres', in F. von Benda-Beckmann, ed., Between
Kinship and the State and Law in Developing Countries, Dordrecht:
Paris Publications.
Balchin, P.N., 1981, Housing Policy and Housing Needs, London: Macmillan.
Ball, G., 1991, 'Rent Control: Aid or Impediment', in World Bank, 1991,
Infrastructure Notes: Transportation, Water and Urban Development,
Washington DC: World Bank.
Banyikwa, W.F., 1985, 'Salient Characteristics of Urbanisation in Tanzania',
Journal of the Geographical Association of Tanzania, 16: 38-66.
Barnes, S. T., 1982, 'Public and Private Housing in Urban West Africa: The
Social Implications', in M.K.C. Morrison, and P.C.W. Gutkind, eds,
Housing the Urban Poor in Africa, New York: Syracuse University,
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, No. 37.
Barnum, H.N. and Sabot, R.H, 1976, Migration, Education and Urban Surplus
Labour: The Case Study of Tanzania, Paris: OECD.
Baross, P., 1983, 'The Articulation of Land Supply for Popular Settlements in
Third World Cities', in S. Angel, R. Archer, S. Tanphiphat and E.
Wegelin, eds, Land ifor Housing the Poor, Singapore: Select Books,
pp.108-210.
Baross, P., 1987, 'Land Supply for Low-Income Housing: Issues and
Approaches', Regional Development Dialogue, 8(4): 29-49.
Baross, P., 1990, 'Sequencing Land Development: The Price Implications of
Legal and Illegal Settlement Growth', in P. Baross and J. van der
Linden, eds, The Transformation of Land Supply Systems in Third
World Cities, Aldershot: Avebury, pp.57-82.
307
Baross, P. and van der Linden, J., eds, 1990, The Transformation of Land
Supply Systems in Third World Cities, Avebury: Aldershot.
Bass, B.M., 1981, (revised edition) Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: A
Survey of Theory and Research, New York: Free Press
Basu, R., 1992, Public Administration: Concepts and Theories, New Delhi:
Sterling.
Bates, R., 198_1, Markets and States in Tropical Africa, Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Bates, M.L., 1962, 'Tanganyika', in G.M. Carter, ed., African One-Party States,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp.395-459.
Batley, R., 1978, 'Technocracy and Exclusion', International Journal of Urban
and Regional Research, 2(1): 75.
Batley, R., 1982, 'The Politics of Administrative Allocation', in R. Forest,
J. Henderson and P. Williams, eds, Urban Political Economy and
Social Theory, Aldershot: Gower, pp.78-111.
Baynham, S., 1990, 'Tanzania 1990: Economic and Political Developments',
Africa Insight, 20(4): 255-262.
Berg-Schlosser, D. and Siegler, R., 1990, Political Stability and Development:
A Comparative Analysis of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, Boulder:
Lynne Rienner.
Berry, B.J.L., 1973, The Human Consequences of Urbanisation, New York: St.
Martin's Press.
Berry, B.J.L., 1981, Comparative Urbanisation, New York: St. Martin's Press.
Berry, L., 1971, Tanzania in Maps, London: University of London Press.
Berry, L., 1990, 'Tanzania: Physical and Social Geography', in Africa South of
the Sahara, 20th edn, London: Europa Publications, p.1009.
Berry, R.A. and Sabot, R.H., 1978, 'Labour Market Performance in Developing
Countries', World Development, 6: 1199-1242.
Bhooshan, B.S. and Misra, R.P., 1980, Habitat Asia: Issues and Responses, Vol
1, New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company.
Bienen, H., 1970, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic
Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
308
Bienen, H., 1972., 'National Security in Tanganyika after the Mutiny,' in L.
Cliffe and J.S. Saul, eds, Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. 1: Politics,
Nairobi: East African Publishing House, pp.216-225.
Biermann, W., 1988, 'Tanzanian Politics under IMF Pressure', in M. Hodd, ed.,
Tanzania After Nyerere, London: Pinter, pp.175-183.
Biermann, W., 1990, 'Industrialisation and Post Colonial Reconstruction', m
N. O'Neil and K. Mustafa, eds, Capitalism, Socialism and the
Development Crisis in Tanzania, Aldershot: Avebury, pp.255-274.
Biesanz, M.H., Biesanz, R. and de Biesanz, K.Z., 1979, The Costa Ricans, San
Jose, Costa Rica: Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia.
Blau, P. M. and Schoenherr, R. A., 1971, The Structure of Organisations, New
York: Basic Books.
Boesen, J., 1979, 'Tanzania: From Ujamaa to Villagization' in B.U.
Mwansansu and C. Pratt, eds, Towards Socialism in Tanzania, Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, pp.125-44.
Bollen, K.A. and Appold, S.J., 1993, 'National Industrial Structure and the
Global System', American Sociological Review, 58: 283-301.
Bomani, M.D., 1965, 'Tanzania: Towards a One-Party State', Civilisations, 15:
493-501.
Boston, J., 1988., 'Advising the Prime Minister in New Zealand: The Origins,
Functions and Evolution of the Prime Minister's Advisory Group',
Politics, 23: 8-20.
Boston, J., 1992, 'The Problems of Policy Coordination: The New Zealand
Experience', Governance, 5(1): 88-103.
Brayant, C., 1969, Health and Developing World, New York: Cornell
University Press.
Brookfield, H., 1975, Interdependent Development, London: Methuen.
Bryant, J.J., 1993, 'Development Below? Aspects of Urban Poverty in the
Pacific', Development Bulletin, 27: 16-19.
Breese, G., ed., 1969, The City in Newly Developing Countries: Readings on
Urbanism and Urbanisation, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Breese, G., 1978, Urbanisation in Newly Developing Countries, New Delhi:
Prentice-Hall of India.
309
Breton, A., 1974, The Economic Theory of Representative Government,
Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
Brinkerhoff, D.W., 1991, Improving Development Program Performance:
Guidelines for Managers, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.
Brock, W. and Magee, S. M., 1984, 'The Invisible Foot and the Waste of
Nations', in D. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, pp.177-185.
Bromley, R., 1978, 'Introduction - The Urban Informal Sector: Why is it Worth
Discussing?', World Development, 6: 1033-9.
Bromley, R. and Gerry. C., eds, 1979, Casual Work and Poverty in the Third
World Cities, Chichester: John Wiley.
Bruce, J., 1989, 'Homes Divided', World Development, 17(7): 979-91.
Brutkus, E., 1975, 'Centralised vs Decentralised Pattern of Urbanisation in
Developing Countries: An Attempt to Elucidate a Guideline Principle',
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 23: 633-652.
Buchanan, J.M., Tollison R.D. and Tullock, G, 1980, eds, Toward a Theory of
Rent Seeking Society: Texas A and M University Press.
Burgess, R., 1977, 'Self Help Housing: A New Imperialist Strategy? A Critique
of the Turner School', Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography, 9(2):
50-59.
Burgess, R., 1978, 'Petty Commodity Housing or Dweller Control? A Critique
of John Turner's View on Housing Policy', World Development,
6(9/10): 1105-1133.
Burgess, R., 1982, 'Self-help Housing Advocacy: A Curious Form of
Radicalism: A Critique of the Work of John F. C. Turner', in P. Ward,
ed., Self-help Housing: A Critique, London: Mansell.
Burgess, R., 1982, 'The Limits of State Self-Help Housing Programmes',
Development and Change, 16(2):271-312.
Burnett, J., 1978, A Social History of Housing 1815-1970, London: Methuen.
Burns, T. and Stalker, G.M., 1961, The Management of Innovation, London:
Tavistock.
Cadman, D. and Payne, G., eds, 1990, The Living City: Towards A Sustainable
Future, London: Routledge.
310
Caiden, N. and Wildavsky, A., 1974, Planning and Budgeting in Poor
Countries, New York: John Wiley.
Cairncross, S., 1990, 'Water Supply and the Urban Poor', in J.E. Hardoy, S.
Cairncross and D. Satterthwaite, eds, The Poor Die Young: Housing
and Health in Third World Cities, London: Earthscan Publications,
pp. I 09-126.
Callaghy, T. M., 1984, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative
Perspective, New York: Columbia University Press.
Cammack, P., Pool, D. and Tordoff, W., 1993, 2nd edn, Third World Politics: A
Comparative Introduction, London: Macmillan Press Limited.
Campbell, J., 1990a, 'The State, Urban Development and Housing', in N. O'Neil
and K. Mustafa, eds, Capitalism, Socialism and the Development Crisis
in Tanzania, Aldershot: Gower, pp.152-175.
Campbell, J., 1990b, 'World Bank Urban Shelter Projects in East Africa:
Matching Needs with Appropriate Responses?', in L. Amis and P.
Lloyd, eds, Housing Africa's Urban Poor, Manchester: Manchester
University Press, pp.205-226.
Cardoso, H., 1973, Associated Dependent-Development: Theoretical and
Practical Implications, in A. Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins,
Policies and Future, New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
pp.142-178.
Casanova, R., Hai, S.T., Leong, K.C. and Soepangkat, S.H., 1979, 'Land
Policies and Practices', in S.H.K. Yeh and A.A. Laquian, eds, Housing
Asia's Millions: Problems, Policies and Prospects for Low-Cost
Housing in Southeast Asia, Ottawa: International Development
Research Centre, pp.101-114.
Castells, M., 1977, The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach, London: Edward
Arnold.
Castells, M., 1982, 'Squatters and Politics in Latin America: A Comparative
Analysis of Urban Social Movements in Chile, Peru and Mexico', in
H.I. Safa, ed., Towards a Political Economy of Urbanisation in Third
World Countries, Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Castells, M., Goh, L. and Kwok, W., 1990, The Shek Kip Mei Syndrome:
Economic Development and Public Housing in Hong Kong and
Singapore, London: Pion.
311
Cell, C.P., 1980, 'The Urban-Rural Contradiction in the Maoist Era: The Pattern
of Deurbanisation in China', Comparative Urban Research, 7: 48-62.
Chachage, S.S., 1990, 'The Socio-Economic Crisis: Ask a Different Question',
in N. O'Neil and K. Mustafa, eds, Capitalism, Socialism and the
Development Crisis in Tanzania, Aldershot: Avebury, pp.255-274.
Chandra, R., 1992, Industrialisation and Development in the Third World,
London: Routledge.
Chazan, N., Mortimer, R., Ravenhill. R. and Rothchild, D., 1988, Politics and
Society in Contemporary Africa, London: Macmillan.
Chen, Xiangming and Parish, W.L., 1996, 'Urbanisation in China: Reassessing
an Evolving Model' in J. Gugler, ed., The Urban Transformation of the
Developing World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.61-92.
Chenery, H., Ahluwalia, M., Bell, C.L.G., Duloy, J.H. and Jolly, R., 1974,
Redistribution with Growth, New York: Oxford University Press.
Child, J.J. and Mansfield, R., 1972, 'Technology, Size and Organisation
Structure', Sociology, 6: 369-393.
Childe, V.G., 1951, 'The Urban Revolution', Town Planning Review, 21(1):3-
17.
Chirot, D., 1977, Social Change in the Twentieth Century, New York: Harcourt.
Choguill, C.L., 1990, 'Controlled Third World Decentralisation: A Tale of Two
Countries', in D. Cadman and G. Payne, eds, The Living City: Towards
a Sustainable Future, London: Routledge, pp.212-220.
Clapham, C., 1982, 'Clientalism and the State', in C. Clapham, ed., Private
Patronage and Public Power, London: Frances Pinter.
Clark, E., 1978, Socialist Development and Public Investment in Tanzania,
1964-1973, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Clarke, C.G., 1974, 'Urbanisation in the Caribbean', Geography, 59: 223-32.
Cleaves, P., 1974, Bureaucratic Politics and Administration in Chile, Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Cliffe, L., 1967, ed., One Party Democracy: The 1965 Tanzania General
Elections, Nairobi: East African Publishing House.
312
Cliffe, L., 1972, 'Socialist Transformation and Party Development', in L. Cliffe
and J.S. Saul, eds, Socialism in Tanzania I: Politics, Nairobi: East
African Publishing House, pp.266-276.
Coehorn, P., 1983, 'State Land Allocation and Class Formation in Nigeria',
Journal of Modern African Studies, 21(3): 461-481.
Colander, D.C., 1984, 'Introduction', in D.C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical
Political Economy, Cambridge: Ballinger, pp.1-13.
Collier, D., 1979, 'Overview of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model', in
D. Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Collier, P., Radwan, S. M. and Wangwe, S. M., 1986, Labour and Poverty in
Rural Tanzania: Ujamaa and Rural Development in the United
Republic of Tanzania, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Collier, P. and Sabot, R.H., 1982, 'Measuring the Difference Between Rural
and Urban Incomes', in P. Collier and R.H. Sabot, eds, Migration and
Labour Market in Developing Countries, Boulder: Westview Press.
Connel, J., Dasgupta, B., Laishley, R. and Lipton, M., 1976, Migration from
Rural Areas: The Evidence from Village Studies, Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
Cornelius, W. A., 1975, Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City,
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Correa, C., 1990, The New Landscape: Urbanisation in the Third World,
London: Concept Media.
Couch, C., 1990, Urban Renewal: Theory and Practice, London: Macmillan.
Coulson, A., 1982, Tanzania: A Political Economy, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Courtney, J.M., 1978, 'Intervention Through Urban Land Use Regulations', in
H.B. Dunkerley, ed., Urban Land Policy: Issues and Opportunities,
Washington DC: World Bank, Staff Working Paper 283, Vol 2: 127-149.
Cyert, R. and March, J., 1963., A Behavioural Theory of the Firm, Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
Datta, K.A., 1955, Tanganyika: A Government in a Plural Society, Leiden:
Leiden Rijksuniversiteit.
313
Davidson, B., 1987, African Nationalism and the Problems of Nation Building,
Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
Davila, J.D., 1987, 'Guinea Bissau's Socialism: the Politics of Shelter in a Small
Economy', Third World Planning Review, 9(3): 255-73.
Davila, J.D., 1990, 'Guinea Bissau', in D. Mathey, ed., Housing Policies in the
Socialist Third World, London: Mansell, pp.13-18.
Dawyer, DJ., .1975, People and Housing in Third World Cities: Perspectives on
the Problem of Spontaneous Settlements, New York and London:
Longman.
de Oliveira, 0. and Roberts, B., 1996, 'Urban Development and Social
Inequality in Latin America', in J. Gugler, ed., The Urban
Transformation of the Developing World, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp.253-314.
Deshpande, C.D. and Arunachalam, B., 1981, 'Bombay' in M. Pacione, ed.,
Problems and Planning in Third World Cities, London: Croom Helm,
pp.187-217.
Despande, V.W. and Masebu, H., 1986, 'Land for Housing Tanzania's Urban
Poor', in K.P. Bhattacharya, ed., Human Settlements in Developing
Countries: Appropriate Approaches and Alternatives, Calcutta: Habitat
Centre, pp.77-87.
Deutsch, K.W., 1963., The Nerves of Government: Models of Political
Communication and Control, New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
Devas, N.,1983, 'Financing Urban Land Development for Low Income
Housing: An analysis with particular reference to Jakarta, Indonesia',
Third World Planning Review, 5(3): 209-225.
Devas, N. and Rakodi, C., 1993, eds, Managing Fast Growing Cities: New
Approaches to Urban Planning and Management in the Developing
World, New York: Longman and John Wiley.
Dewar, D. and Watson, V., 1981, Unemployment and the 'Informal Sector':
Some Proposals, Cape Town: University of Cape Town, Urban
Problems Research Unit.
Diacon, D., 1991, 'Innovative and Successful Solutions to Global Housing
Problems', Ekis tics, 58 (346), 4-17.
314
Doriye, J., 1992, 'Public Office and Private Gain: an Interpretation of the
Tanzanian Experience', in M. Wuyts, M. Mackintosh and T. Hewitt, eds,
Development Policy and Public Action, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp.91-116.
Doxiadis, C.A., 1976, 'How Can We Learn About Man and His Settlements?',
in A. Rapoport, ed., The Mutual Interaction of People and Their Built
Environment: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, The Hague: Mouton,
pp.77-117.
Drakakis-Smith, D.W., 1976, 'Urban Renewal in an Asian Context', Urban
Studies, 13(3):295-306.
Drakakis-Smith, D.W., 1979, 'Low Cost Housing Provision in the Third World:
Some Theoretical and Practical Alternatives', in H.S. Murrison and J.P.
Lea, eds, Housing in Third World Countries: Perspectives on Policy and
Practice, London: Macmillan, pp.22-30.
Drakakis-Smith, D.W., 1981, Urbanisation, Housing and the Development
Process, London: Croom Helm.
Drakakis-Smith, D.W and Kivel!, P.T., 1990, 'Food Production Retailing and
Consumption Patterns in Harare', in R. Paddison, A. Findlay and
J. Dawson, eds, Urban Retailing in the Third World, London:
Routledge, pp.100-120.
Dror, Y., 1968, Public Policy Making Re-examined., San Francisco: Chandler.
Dror, Y., 1971, Public Policy Re-examined., Bedfordshire: Leonard Hill Books.
Drucker, P.F., 1985, Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practice and Principles,
London: Heinemann.
Dryden, S., 1968, Local Administration in Tanzania, Nairobi: East African
Publishing House.
Dunkerley, H.B., ed., 1978, Urban Land Policy: Issues and Opportunities,
Washington DC: World Bank, Staff Working Paper 283, Vol. 2: 85-126.
Dwyer, DJ., 1974, The City in the Third World, London: Macmillan.
Dwyer, DJ., 1975, People and Housing in Third World Cities: Perspectives on
the Problem of Spontaneous Settlements, New York and London:
Longman.
315
Ekpenyong, S., 1985, 'Development and Operation of the Urban Informal
Sector in Port Harcourt Calibar', Comparative Urban Research, 10 (2):
21-31.
El Sammani, M.O., El Hadi Abu Sin, M., Talha, M., El Hassan, B.M. and
Haywood, I., 1989, 'Management Problems of Greater Khartoum' in R.
Stren and R. White, eds, African Cities in Crisis: Managing Rapid
Urban Growth, Boulder: Westview Press, pp.247-275.
El-Shakhs, S. and Obudho, R., 1974, Urbanisation, National Development and
Regional Planning in Africa, New York: Praeger.
Elmore, R., 1979., 'Backward-Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy
Decisions', Political Science Quarterly, 94:601-616.
Engels, F., 1969, 'The Housing Question', in K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected
Works, Vol. 2, Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp.295-375.
Epstein, A.L., 1969, 'Urbanisation and Social Change in Africa' in G. Breese,
ed., The City in Newly Developing Countries: Readings on Urbanism
and Urbanisation, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, pp.246-287.
Ergas, Z., 1980, 'Why Did Ujamaa Villages Policy Fail? - Towards a Global
Analysis', Journal of Modern African Studies, 18(3): 387-410.
Esman, M.J., 1996, Management Dimensions of Development: Perspectives and
Strategies, West Hartford: Kumarian Press.
Esman, M.J. and Bruhns, F.C., 1966, 'Institution Building in National
Development: An Approach to Induced Social Change in Transitional
Societies', in P.W. Hollis, ed., Comparative Theories of Social Change,
Ann Arbor: Foundation for Research in Human Behaviour.
Evers, H.D., 1977, 'Urban Expansion and Land Ownership in Underdeveloped
Societies', in J. Walton and L.H. Masotti, eds, The City in Comparative
Perspective, London: Halsted Press, pp.67-79.
Field, A.J., ed., 1970, City and Country in the Third World: Issues in the
Modernisation of Latin America, Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing
Co., pp.229-284.
Findley, S.E., 1993, 'Third World City: Development Policy and Issues', in J.
Kasarda and A.M. Parnell, eds, Third World Cities: Problems, Policies,
and Prospects, Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, pp.1-31.
316
Firman, T., 1992, 'The Spatial Pattern of Urban Population Growth in Java,
1980-1990', Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 28(2): 95-109.
Fitzgibbon, R. and Fernandez, J., 1981, Latin America: Political Culture and
Development, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Fox, R., 1975, Urban Population Growth Trends in Latin America, Inter
American Development Bank.
Frank, A.G., 1969, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New
York: Monthly Review Press.
Fransman, M., 1982, Industry and Accumulation in Africa, London:
Heinemann.
Friedland, W.H., 1967, 'Co-operation, Conflict and Conscription: TANU - TFL
Relations, 1955-1964', in J. Butler and A.A. Castagno, eds, Boston
University Papers on Africa: Transition in African Politics, New York:
Praeger, pp.67-103.
Friedman, J. and Douglas, M., 1976, Agropolitan Development: Towards a New
Strategy for Regional Development in Asia, United Nations Centre for
Regional Planning, London: Arnold.
Fryer, D.W., 1953, 'The Million City in Southeast Asia', Geographical Review,
43: 474-494.
Fuerst, J.S., 1974, Public Housing in Europe and America, London: Croom
Helm.
Gabrielsen, T., 1981, Uncontrolled Urban Development: Squatter Settlements
in Tanzania, Oslo: Norges Tekniske.
Ghai, Y.P. and McAuslan, J.P.W.B., 1965, 'Constitutional Proposals for a One
Party State in Tanzania', East African Law Journal, 1: 124-47.
Ghai, Y.P. and McAuslan, J.P.W.B., 1970, Public Law and Political Change in
Kenya, Nairobi: Oxford University Press.
Gide, C. and Rist, C., 1967, History of Economic Doctrines, London: Harrap.
Gifford, P. and Roger, L.W., eds, The Transfer of Power in Africa:
Decolonisation 1940-1960, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Gilbert, A., 1981, 'Bogota', in M. Pacione, ed., Problems and Planning in the
Third World Cities, London: Croom Helm, pp.65-93.
317
Gilbert, A., 1984, 'Planning, Invasions and Land Speculation: The Role of the
State in Venezuela', Third World Planning Review, 6(3): 225-238.
Gilbert, A., 1994, The Third World City, London: Latin American Bureau.
Gilbert, A. and Gugler, J., 1982, Cities, Poverty and Development:
Urbanisation in the Third World, London: Oxford University Press.
Gilbert, A. and Ward, P.M., 1985, Housing, the State and the Poor: Policy and
Practice in the Three Latin American Cities, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Ginsburg, N.S., 1955, 'The Great City in Southeast Asia', American Journal of
Sociology, 60: 455-462.
Ginsburg, N., Koppel, B. and McGee, T.G., 1991, eds, The Extended
Metropolis Settlement Transition in Asia, Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press.
Goldstein, S., 1993, 'The hnpact of Temporary Migration on Urban Places:
Thailand and China a Case Studies', in J.D. Kasarda and AM. Parnell,
eds, Third World Cities: Problems, Policies and Prospect, California:
Sage, pp.199-219.
Green, R., 1979, 'Tanzania's Political Economy: Goals, Strategies and Results',
in B. Mwansasu and C. Pratt, eds, Towards Socialism in Tanzania, Dar
es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, pp.19-45.
Green, R.H., 1982, 'Industrialisation in Tanzania', in M. Fransman, ed., Industry
and Accumulation in Africa, London: Heinemann.
Grindle, M., 1991, 'The New Political Economy: Positive Economics and
Negative Politics' in G. Meier, ed., Politics and Policy Making in
Developing Countries: Perspectives on the New Political Economy, San
Francisco: International Centre for Economic Growth (ICS) Press,
pp.41-68.
Grindle, M. and Thomas, J.W., 1989, 'Policy Makers, Policy Choices, and
Policy Outcomes: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing
Countries', Policy Sciences, 22: 213-248.
Grindle, M.S., ed., 1980, Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third
World, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Grindley, M. and Merrill, R., 1972, Sites and Services: The Experience and
Potential, Washington DC: World Bank.
318
Grohs, G., 1972, 'Slum Clearance in Dar es Salaam' in J. Hutton, ed., The
Urban Challenge in East Africa, Nairobi: East African Publishing
House, pp.157-175.
Gugler, J., 1982, 'Overurbanisation Reconsidered', Economic Development and
Cultural Change, 31 (1): 173-189.
Gugler, J., 1996, ed., The Urbanisation of the Developing World, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Gugler, J. and Flanagan. W.G., 1978, Urbanisation and Social Change in West
Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gutkind, P.C., 1969, 'African Urbanism, Mobility and the Social Network', in
G. Breese, ed., The City in Newly Developing Countries: Readings on
Urbanism and Urbanisation, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, pp.389-
400.
Hance, A.W., 1970, Population, Migration and Urbanisation in Africa, New
York: Columbia University Press.
Hansen, K.T., 1982, 'Lusaka's Squatters: Past and Present', African Studies
Review, 25(2-3): 117-136.
Hardoy, J.E. and Satterthwaite, D., 1981, Shelter: Need and Response: Housing,
Land and Settlement Policies in Seventeen Third World Nations,
Chichester: John Wiley.
Hardoy, J.E., and Satterthwaite, D., 1990, 'Urban Change in the Third World:
Are Recent Trends a Useful Pointer to the Urban Future?', in D. Cadman
and G. Payne, eds, The Living City: Towards A Sustainable Future,
London: Routledge, pp.75-110.
Hardoy, J.E., Cairncross, S. and Satterthwaite, D., 1990, eds, The Poor Die
Young: Housing and Health in Third World Cities, London: Earthscan
Publications.
Harris, N., 1992, Cities in the 1990's: The Challengefor Developing Countries,
London: University College.
Harris, J.R. and Sabot, R.H., 1982, 'Urban Unemployment in LDC's: Towards A
More General Search Model', in R.H. Sabot, ed., Migration and the
Labour Market in Developing Countries, Boulder: Westview Press,
pp.65-89.
319
Hart, K., 1973, 'Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in
Ghana', Journal ofi Modern African Studies, 11: 61-89.
Hartman, J., 1988, 'President Nyerere and the State', in M. Hodd, ed., Tanzania
After Nyerere, London: Pinter, pp.165-174.
Harvey, D., 1973, Social Justice and the City, London: Arnold.
Hatch, J., 1971, Tanzania: A Profile, London: Pall Mall Press.
Hay, R.J., 1977, 'Patterns of Urbanisation and Socio-Economic Development in
the Third World: An overview', in J. Abu-Lughod and R. Hay Jr, eds,
Third World Urbanisation, Chicago: Maaroufa Press, pp.76-90.
Hayuma, A.M., 1979, 'A Review and Assessment of the Contribution of
International and Bilateral Aid to Urban Development Policies in
Tanzania', Ekistics 46(279): 349-360.
Hayuma, A.M., 1983, 'The Growth of Population and Employment in Dar es
Salaam City Region in Tanzania, City Region, Tanzania', Ekistics,
50(30): 255-259.
Haywood, I., 1986, "Popular Settlements in Sub-Saharan Africa: Their
Emerging Role', Third World Planning Review, 8(4): 315-333.
Heclo, H., 1972, 'Review Article: Policy Analysis', British Journal ofi Political
Science, 2: 83-108.
Helleiner, G.K., 1989, 'Stabilisation, Adjustment, and the Poor', in R.M. Bird
and S. Horton, eds, Government Policy and the Poor in Developing
Countries, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp.23-48.
Hermassi, E., 1980, The Third World Reassessed., Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Heussler, R., 1971, British Tanganyika: An Essay and Documents on District
Administration, Durham: Duke University Press.
Hogwood, B.W. and Gunn, L.A., 1984, Policy Analysis ifor the Real World,
London: Oxford University Press.
Hollnsteiner, M.R., 1977, 'The Case of the "People Versus Mr. Urbano Planner
v Administrator", in J. Abu-Lughod and J. Hay Jr, eds, Third World
Urbanisation, Chicago: Maaroufa Press, pp.307-20.
Hopkins, R.F., 1971, Political Roles in a New State: Tanzania's First Decade,
New Haven: Yale University Press.
320
Horowitz, D.L., 1989, 'Cause and Consequences in Public Policy Theory:
Ethnic Policy and System Transformation in Malaysia', Policy Sciences,
22: 249-287.
Horowitz, LL., 1977, 'Coming of Age of Urban Research in Latin America',
Review Essay, American Journal of Sociology, 83: 761-65.
Hugo, G., 1993, 'Urbanisasi: Indonesia in Transition', Development Bulletin, 27:
46-49.
Hugo, G., 1996, 'Urbanisation in Indonesia: City and Countryside Linked', in
J. Gugler, ed., The Urbanisation of the Developing World, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp.133-183.
Hulme, D. and Turner, M. M., 1990, Sociology and Development: Theories,
Policies and Practices, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Huntington, S., 1968, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven,
Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Hyden, G., 1973, 'Administration and Public Policy', in J.J. Barkan and J.
Okumu, eds, Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania, New
York: Praeger, pp.93-113.
Hyden, G., 1975, Public Policy-Making and Public Enterprises in Tanzania, The
African Review, A Journal of African Politics, Development and
International Affairs, 5(2): 20-35.
Hyden, G., 1979, 'Policy Making in Tanzania: We Must Run While Others
Walk', in J.D. Barkan and J.J. Okumu, eds, Politics and Public Policy in
Kenya and Tanzania, London: Praeger.
Hyden, G., 1980, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an
Uncaptured Peasantry, London: Heinemann.
Hyden, G., 1983, No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development in
Perspective, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Hyden, G., 1995, 'Public Administration in Developing Countries: Kenya and
Tanzania in Comparative Perspective', in C. Pierre, ed., Bureaucracy in
the Modern State: An Introduction to Comparative Public
Administration, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp.161-184.
Hyden, G. and Rweyemamu, A.H., 1974, 'A Decade of Public Administration',
Africa. Management and Administration Series, No. 5, Nairobi: East
African Literature Bureau.
321
Iliffe, J., 1979, A Modern History of Tanganyika, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
James, M., 1989, 'Welfare, Coercion and Reciprocity', in M. James, ed., The
Welfare State: Foundations and Alternatives, Sydney: Centre for
Independent Studies, pp.1-24.
Jesse, P.H., ed., 1971, The Cell System of the Tanganyika African National
Union, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House.
Jones, C.O., 1970, An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy, Belmont,
California: Wardsworth.
Jones, G.W., 1988, 'Urbanisation Trends in Southeast Asia: Some Issues for
Policy', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 19(1): 137-54.
Jones, G.W., 1993, 'Urbanisation in Developing Countries', Development
Bulletin, 27: 3-5.
Juma, C. and Clark, N., 1995, 'Policy Research in Sub-Saharan Africa: An
Explanation', Public Administration and Development, 15: 121-137.
Kahama, G.C., 1986, The Challenge for Tanzania's Economy, Dar es Salaam:
Tanzania Publishing House.
Kaitilla, S., 1987, 'The Land Delivery Mechanism in Tanzania: The
Implications for a Socialist State', Habitat International, 11(3): 53-59.
Kaitilla, S., 1990, 'The Struggle for Housing Provision in Tanzania: A Case of
Confusing Policies, Housing Studies, 5(1): 59-67.
Kalabamu, F.T., 1985, 'A Review of Tanzania's New Housing Policy', Habitat
International, 9(2): 85-95.
Kasarda, J.D. and Crenshaw, E.M., 1991, 'Third World Urbanisation:
Dimensions, Theories, and Determinants', Annual Review of Sociology,
467-501.
Kasarda, J.D. and Parnell, A.M., eds, 1993, Third World Cities: Problems,
Policies and Prospects, California: Sage.
Kayila, J.O., 1986, 'Improving Urban Settlements for the Poor: Case Studies of
Dandora and Chaani Projects in Kenya', in S.G. Cheema, ed., Reaching
the Urban Poor: Project Implementation in Developing Countries,
Boulder: Westview Press, pp.145-162.
322
Kidiro, J.C.O., 1991, 'Administration Responsibility in Developing Countries:
The Case of Tanzania', in UONG071, Journal of Management
Development, 3(3): 243-266.
Kiggundu, M.N., 1989, Managing Organizations in Developing Countries,
West Hartford: Kumarian Press.
Kikenya, J.D., 1975, 'NHC: Progress in Housing the Masses', Tanzania Notes
and Records, 76: 185-90.
Kilembe, J.C., 1989, Serikali za Mitaa Tanzania: Historia Fupi: 1884-1972,
Dar es Salaam: Educational Publishers and Distributors.
Kimambo, I., 1991, Penetration and Protests in Tanzania. The Impact of the
World Economy on the Pare, 1860-1960, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania
Publishing House.
Kimambo, I.N. and Temu, A.J., 1969, eds, A History of Tanzania, Nairobi: East
African Publishing House.
King, A., 1974, 'The Language of Colonial Urbanisation', Sociology, 8(1): 81-
110.
Kingsley, D. and Golden, H.H., 1954, 'Urbanisation and the Development of
Pre-industrial Areas', Economic Development and Cultural Change, 3:
6-26.
Kiondo, A.Z., 1990, 'The Nature of Economic Reforms in Tanzania', in
H. Campbell and H. Stein, eds, The IMF and Tanzania: The Dynamics
of Liberalisation, Harare: SAPES Trust, pp.23-47.
Kirkby, R.J.R., 1985, Urbanisation in China, New York: Columbia University
Press.
Kironde, J.M.L, 1990, 'Received Concepts and Theories in African
Urbanisation and Management Strategies: The Struggle Continues',
Urban Studies, 29(8): 1277-1292.
Kiros, F.G., ed., 1985, Challenging Rural Poverty, Trenton: Africa World
Press.
Krasner, S., 1988, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global
Liberalism, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kulaba, S.M., 1983, 'An Integrated Development Approach to Housing
Cooperatives in Tanzania', Ekistics, 50.
323
Kulaba, S.M., 1989, 'Local Government and the Management of Urban Services
in Tanzania', in R. Stren and R.R. White, eds, African Cities in Crisis:
Managing Rapid Urban Growth, Boulder: Westview Press.
Lai, 0., 1995, 'The Logic of Urban Development and Slum Settlements: The
People's Republic of China', in B.C. Aldrich. and R.S. Sandhu, eds,
Housing the Urban Poor: Policy and Practice in Developing Countries,
London: Zed Books, pp.277-292.
Lander, L. and Funes, J.C., 1975, 'Urbanisation and Development', in J.E.
Hardoy, ed., Urbanisation in Latin America: Approaches and Issues,
Garden City: Anchor Doubleday, pp.287-337.
Lane, J.E., 1986, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, California: Sage.
Laquian, A.A., 1971, Rural-Urban Migrants and Metropolitan Development,
Toronto: lntermet.
Laquian, A.A., 1983, Basic Housing: Policies for Urban Sites, Services, and
Shelter in Developing Countries, Ottawa: International Development
Research Centre (IDRC) ..
Laquian, J.P., 1969, Slums arefor People, Manila: D.M. Press.
Larry, B.H., ed., 1992, The State of Public Bureaucracy, London: M.E. Sharpe.
Lawrence, P.R. and Lorsch, J.W., 1967, Organisations and Environment:
Managing Differentiation and Integration, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press.
Leeds, A., 1969, 'The Significant Variables Determining the Character of
Squatter Settlements', America Latina, 12: 44-86.
Leeds, A., 1973, 'Locality Power in Relation to Supralocal Power Institutions',
in A. Southall, ed., Urban Anthropology: Cross-Cultural Studies of
Urbanisation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.15-41.
Leeds, A. and Leeds. E., 1970, 'Brazil and the Myth of Urban Rurality: Urban
Experience, Work and Values in the Squatments of Rio de Janeiro and
Lima', in A.J. Field, ed., City and Country in the Third World: Issues in
the Modernisation of Latin America, Cambridge: Schenkman
Publishing, pp.229-284.
Legum, C., 1988, 'The Nyerere Years: A Preliminary Balance Sheet', in
M. Hodd, ed., Tanzania After Nyerere, London: Pinter, pp.3-11.
324
Leornard, D.K., 1984, 'Class Formation and Agricultural Development', in
J.D. Barkan, ed., Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania,
Revised Edition, New York: Praeger.
Leslie, J.A.K., 1963, A Survey of Dar es Salaam, London: Oxford University
Press.
Lewellen, T.C., 1995, Dependency and Development: An Introduction to the
Third World, London: Bergin and Garvey.
Leys, C., 1972, 'Tanganyika: the Realities of Independence', in L. Cliffe and J.S.
Saul, eds, Socialism in Tanzania I: Politics, Nairobi: East African
Publishing House, pp.187-195.
Lichfield, N. and Darin-Drabkin, H., 1980, Land Policy in Urban Planning,
London: Allen and Unwin.
Liddle, W., 1992, 'The Politics of Development Policy', World Development,
20(6): 793-807.
Light, I., 1983, Cities in World Perspective, New York: Macmillan.
Lindblom, C.E. and Woodhouse, E.J., 3rd edn, 1993, The Policy-Making
Process, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
Lipton, M., 1977, Why Poor People Stay Poor: A Study of Urban Bias in World
Development, London: Temple Smith.
Lipumba, H.H.I., Msambichaka, L.A. and Wangwe, S., 1984, Economic
Stabilisation Policies in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es
Salaam: Economic Research Bureau and Economics Department.
Listowel, J., 1965, The Making of Tanganyika, London: Chatto and Windus.
Lonsdale, J., 1990, 'Tanzania: Recent History', in Africa South of the Sahara,
20th edn, London: Europa Publications, pp.1010-1014.
Lowi, T .J ., 1966, 'Distribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of
Government', in R. Ripley, Public Policies and Their Politics: An
Introduction to the Techniques of Government Control, New York:
Norton.
Lowi, T.J., 1972, 'Four Systems of Policy Politics and Choice', Public
Administration Review, 32: 298-310.
Lugalla, J.L., 1995, Crisis, Urbanisation and Urban Poverty in Tanzania: A
Study of Urban Poverty and Survival Politics, Maryland: University
Press of America.
325
Mabogunje, A.L., 1968, Urbanisation in Nigeria, London: University of
London Press.
Mabogunje, A.L., 1980, The Development Process: A Spatial Perspective,
London: Hutchinson.
Mabogunje, A.L., Hardoy, J.E. and Misra. R.P., 1978, Shelter Provision in
Developing Countries, Chichester: John Wiley.
MacPherson, S. and Midgley. J., eds, 1987, Comparative Social Policy and the
Third World: Studies in International Social Policy and Welfare, New
York: St. Martin's Press.
Maghimbi, S., 'Co-operatives in Agricultural Development', in N. O'Neill and
K. Mustafa, eds, Capitalism, Socialism and Development Crisis in
Tanzania, Aldershot: Gower: pp.81-100.
Majone, G. and Wildavsky, A., 1978, 'Implementation as Evolution', in
E.H. Freeman, ed., Policy Studies Review Annual 2, Beverly Hills: Sage.
Malyamkono, T.L. and Bagachwa, M.S.D., 1990, The Second Economy in
Tanzania, London: James Currey and Ohio University Press.
Mangat, J., 1969, A History of the Asians in East Africa, Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Mangin, W., 1967, 'Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a
Solution', Latin American Research Review, 2: 65-98.
Mansfield, R., 1973, 'Bureaucracy and Centralisation: An Examination of
Organisation Structure', Administrative Science Quarterly, 18: 477-488.
Marcussen, L., 1990, Third World Housing in Social and Spatial Development:
The Case of Djakarta, Aldershot: Avebury.
Martin, R., 1974, Personal Freedom and the Law in Tanzania, Nairobi: Oxford
University Press.
Martin, R.J., 1983, 'Upgrading', in R.J. Skinner and M.J. Rodell, eds, People,
Poverty and Shelter: Problems of Self-Help Housing in the Third World,
London: Methuen.
Matern, J., 1986, 'Sites and Services Projects in Tanzania. Third World
Development Problems', in A Regional Development Dialogue, 8(2):
121-38.
Mattingly, M., 1993, 'Urban Management Intervention in Land Markets', in
N. Devas and C. Rakodi, eds, Managing Fast Growing Cities: New
326
Approaches to Urban Planning and Management in the Developing
World, New York: Longman and Wiley, pp.102-131.
Max, O.A., 1991, The Development of Local Government in Tanzania, Dar es
Salaam: Educational Publishers and Distributors.
May, P., 1986, 'Politics and Policy Analysis', Political Science Quarterly,
101(1): 109-25.
Mazumdar, D_., 1976, 'The Urban Informal Sector', World Development, 4:655-
679.
Mbelle, A., 1992, 'Restructuring the Public Textile Industry in Tanzania: Nature
and Prospects', in M.S.D. Bagachwa, A.V.Y. Mbelle and B. van
Arkadie, eds, Market Reforms and Parastatal Restructuring in
Tanzania, University of Dar es Salaam, Economics Department and
Economic Research Bureau, pp.185-204.
Mbuyi, K., 1989, 'Kinshasa: Problems of Land Management, Infrastructure and
Food Supply', in RE. Stren and R. White, eds, African Cities in Crisis:
Managing Rapid Urban Growth, Colorado: Westview Press, pp.149-
176.
McAuslan, P., 1985, Urban Land and Shelter for the Poor, London: Earthscan.
McAuslan, J.P.W.B. and Ghai, Y.P., 1972, 'Constitutional Innovation and
Political Stability in Tanzania', in L. Cliffe and L. Saul, eds, Socialism in
Tanzania, Vol. 1: Politics, pp.196-215.
McAuslan, P. and Ghai, Y.P., 1966, 'Constitutional Innovation and Political
Stability in Tanzania: A Preliminary Assessment', Journal of Modern
African Studies, 4: 479-515.
McCoy, A.W., ed., 1994, An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the
Philippines, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila.
McDougall, G., 1982, 'Theory and Practice: A Critique of the Political
Economy Approach of Planning', in P. Healey, G. McDougall and M.J.
Thomas, eds, Planning Theory and Prospects for the 1980s, Oxford:
Pergamon.
McGee, T.G., 1971, The Urbanisation Process in the Third World: Exploration
in Search of a Theory, London: Bell.
McGee, T.G., 1991, 'The Emergence of the Desa Kota Regions in Asia:
Expanding an Hypothesis', in N. Ginsburg, B. Koppel and T.G. McGee,
327
eds, The Extended Metropolis Settlement Transition in Asia, Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, pp.3-26.
Mchauru, F.J., 1974, 'The Changing Role of the African Administrator: The
Tanzanian Model', in G. Hyden and A.H. Rweyemamu, eds, A Decade
of Public Administration in Africa, Nairobi: East African Literature
Bureau, Management and Administration Series, No. 5, pp.75-88.
Mechanic, D., 1962., 'Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex
Organisations', Administrative Science Quarterly, 7:349-364.
Mehta, S.K., 1969, 'Some Demographic and Economic Correlates of Primate
Cities: A Case of Revaluation', in G. Breese, ed., The City in Newly
Developing Countries: Readings on Urbanism and Urbanisation,
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, pp.295-321.
Mendiola, E.C., 1983, 'Urban Land Reform in the Philippines', in S. Angel,
R.W. Archer, S. Tanphiphat and E.A. Wegelin, eds, Land for Housing
the Poor, Singapore: Selecte Books.
Meyer, J. and Scott, W.R., 1992, Organisational Environments: Ritual and
Rationality, Berkeley: Sage.
Mghweno, J.M., 1984, 'Tanzania's Surveyed Plots Programme', in G.K. Payne,
ed., Low-income Housing in the Developing World: The Role of Sites
and Services and Settlements Upgrading, Chichester: John Wiley and
Sons, pp.109-124.
Mghweno, J.M., 1979, 'Tanzania's Surveyed Plots Programme in Low Income
Housing', in G.K. Payne, ed., Developing Third World Cities: The Role
of Sites and Services and Settlement Upgrading, London: Methuen,
pp.21-52.
Michaelson, K.L., 1979, 'Power, Patrons, and Political Economy: Bombay', in
M.B. Leans and F. Rothstein, eds, New Directions in Political
Economy: An Approach from Anthropology, Contributions m
Economics and Economic History 22, Greenwood Press, pp.235-248.
Migdal, J.S., 1981, 'Strong Societies, Weak States: Power and
Accommodation', in E. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic
State, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp.391-434.
Migdal, J.S., 1988, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations
and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
328
Miliband, R., 1969, The State in Capitalist Society, London: Quartet Books.
Mill, J.S., 1970, Principles ofiPolitical Economy, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Mintzberg, H., 1979, The Structuring of Organisations. Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall.
Misra, B., 1979, Capitalism, Socialism and Planning, New Delhi: Oxford and
I.B.H. Publishing Co.
Misra, H.N., -1990, 'Housing and Health in Three Squatter Settlements in
Allahabad, India', in J.E. Hardoy, S. Cairncross and D. Satterthwaite,
eds, The Poor Die Young: Housing and Health in Third World Cities,
London: Earthscan Publications, pp.89-108.
Mkama, J., 1970, 'Urban Development Policies and Planning Experience in
Tanzania', in M. Safier, ed., Urban and Regional Planningifor National
Development, Kampala: Obote Foundation, pp.196-208.
Mohan, R., 1996, 'Urbanisation in India: Patterns and Emerging Policy Issues,
in J. Gugler, ed., The Urban Transformation of the Developing World,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.93-132.
Montgomery, J.D., 1988, Bureaucrats and People: Grassroots Participation in
Third World Development, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University
Press.
Mooney, J.D., 1931, The Principles ofi Organisation, New York: Harper and
Row.
Mosha, A.C., 1988, 'Slum and Squatter Settlements in Mainland Tanzania', in
C.C. Mhlanga and R.A. Obudho, eds, Slum and Squatter Settlements in
Sub-Saharan Africa: Toward a Planning Strategy, New York: Praeger,
pp.145-158.
Mosha, A.C., 1995, 'Squatter and Slum Settlements in Tanzania, in B.C.
Aldrich and R.S. Sandhu, eds, Housing the Urban Poor: Policy and
Practice in Developing Countries, London: Zed Books, pp.339-357.
Msekwa, P., 1977, Towards Party Supremacy, Arusha: Eastern Africa
Publications.
Mtatifikolo, F.P., 1992, 'The Social Context of Reforms: Poverty and Poverty
Alleviation in Tanzania', in M.S.D. Bagachwa, A.V.Y. Mbelle and B.
van Arkadie, eds, Market Reforms and Parastatal Restructuring in
329
Tanzania, University of Dar es Salaam, Economics Department and
Economic Research Bureau, pp.57-73.
Mukandala, R.S., 1992, 'To be or not to be: The Paradoxes of African
Bureaucracies in the 1990s', International Review of Administrative
Sciences, 58: 555-576.
Mulokozi, B., Shellukindo, W.H. and Baguma, R., 1989, 'The Adaptation of
Government to Economic Change: A Case of Tanzania', in M.J.
Balogun and G. Mutahaba, eds, Economic Restructuring and African
Public Administration: Issues, Actions and Future Choices, West
Hartford: Kumariam Press, pp.187-202.
Murie, A., Niner, P. and Watson, C., 1976, Housing Policy and the Housing
System, London: George Allen and Unwin.
Murphy, D., 1990, A Decent Place to Live - Urban Poor in Asia, Bangkok:
Asian Coalition for Housing Rights.
Murrison, H.S. and Leah, J.L.P., eds, 1979, Housing in Third World Countries:
Perspectives on Policy and Practice, London: Macmillan.
Mushi, S.S., 1980, 'Tanzania', in A. Adedeji, ed., Indigenisation of African
Economies, London: Hutchison, pp.204-237.
Mutahaba, G.R., 1985, 'Organisation for Development: Tanzania's Search for
Appropriate Local Level Organisational Forms', in F.G. Kiros, ed.,
Challenging Rural Poverty, Trenton: Africa World Press, pp.127-45.
Mutahaba, G., 1989., Reforming Public Administration for Development:
Experiences from Eastern Africa, West Hartford: Kumarian Press.
Mwakyembe, H.G., 1990, 'Mbozi: The End of a Honeymoon', in H. Othman,
1.K. Bavu and M. Okema, eds, Tanzania: Democracy in Transition, Dar
es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, pp.135-49.
Mwansasu, B.U., 1979, 'The Changing Role of the Tanganyika African National
Union', in B.U. Mwansasu and C. Pratt, eds, Towards Socialism in
Tanzania, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp.169-92.
Mwansansu, B.U. and Pratt, C., eds, 1979, Towards Socialism in Tanzania,
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Myrdal, G., 1968, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations,
London: Penguin.
330
Nagpaul, H., 1988, 'India's Giant Cities', in M. Dogan and J. Kasarda, eds,
A World of Giant Cities, Newbury Park: Sage, pp.252-90.
NEDA (National Economic and Development Authority), 1974, 'Housing in the
Philippines', Journal ajiDevelopment, 1 and 2: 2-4.
Ngom, T., 1989, 'Appropriate Standards for Infrastructure in Dakar', in R.E.
Stren and W. Rodney, eds, African Cities in Crisis: Managing Rapid
Urban Growth, Boulder: Westview, pp.177-202.
Nindi, B.C., 1990, 'Compulsion in the Implementation of Ujamaa', in N. O'Neill
and K. Mustafa, eds, Capitalism, Socialism and Development Crisis in
Tanzania, Aldershot: Gower, pp.57-68.
Nuru, K., 1990, 'Tanzania', in K. Mathey, ed., Housing Policies in the Socialist
Third World, London: Mansel, pp.181-196.
Nwaka, G.I, 1979, 'The Nigerian Land Use Decree: Antecedents and Prospects',
Third World Planning Review, 1(2): 193-204.
Nyango'ro, J.E., 1989, 'The State of Politics in Africa: The Corporatist Factor',
Studies in Comparative International Development, 24 (1): 1-19.
O'Connor, A.M., 1983, The African City, New York: African Publishing
Company.
O'Connor, A.M., 1991, Poverty in Africa: A Geographical Approach, London:
Belhaven Press.
O'Donnel, G., 1979, 'Tensions in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State and the
Question of Democracy', in D. Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in
Latin America, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Okema, M., 1990, 'Some Salient Changes in the Tanzania Parliamentary
System', in H. Othman, 1.K. Bavu and M. Okema, eds, Tanzania:
Democracy in Transition, Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University
Press, pp.37-57.
Okpala, I., 1979, 'The Land Use Decree of 1978: If The Past Should Be
Prologue', Journal of Administration Overseas, 18(1): 15-21.
Okpala, I., 1984, 'Urban Planning and the Control of Urban Physical Growth in
Nigeria', in Habitat International, 8(2): 73-94.
Okumu, J.J., 1979, 'Party and Party State Relations', in D. Barkan and J.J.
Okumu, eds, Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania, New
York: Praeger.
331
O'Neil, N., 1990, 'Politics and Development Strategies in Tanzania', in N.
O'Neil and K. Mustafa, eds, Capitalism, Socialism and the
Development Crisis in Tanzania, Aldershot: Gower, pp.1-22.
Onibokun, A.G., 1989, 'Urban Growth and Urban Management in Nigeria', in
R.E. Stren and R.R. White, eds, African Cities in Crisis: Managing
Rapid Urban Growth, Boulder: Westview Press, pp.69-112.
Onimode, B., 1988, A Political Economy of the African Crisis, London: Zed
Books:
Ozo, A.O., 1986, 'Public Housing Policies and the Urban Poor in the Third
World: A Case Study From Nigeria', Third World Planning Review,
8(1): 51-67.
Pacione, M., ed., 1981, Problems and Planning in Third World Cities, London:
Croom Helm.
Paddison, R., Findlay, A. and Dawson, J., eds, 1990, Urban Retailing in the
Third World, London: Routledge.
Padmini, R., 1993, 'Children and Urbanisation: Problems and Prospects',
Development Bulletin, 27: 7-10.
Painter, M., 1981, 'Central Agencies and Coordination Principles', Australian
Journal of Public Administration, 40: 265-280.
Palchin, P.N., 1985, Housing Policy: An Introduction, London: Croom Helm.
Palen, J., 1975, The Urban World, New York: McGraw Hill.
Palumbo, D.J., 1987, ed., The Politics of Program Evaluation, Newbury Park:
Sage.
Parmar, V.A., 1991, 'Urbanisation m Third World Countries' m Social
Change, 21: 10-21.
Parnwell, M., 1993, Population Movements in the Third World, London:
Routledge.
Pasteur, D., 1979, The Management of Squatter Upgrading: A Case Study of
Organization, Procedures and Participation, Farnborough: Saxon
House.
Payne, G.K., 1977, Urban Housing in the Third World, London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
332
Payne, G., 1989, Informal Housing and Land Subdivision in Third World
Cities: A Review of the Literature, Oxford: Oxford Polytechnic, Centre
for Development and Environmental Planning.
Perlman, J., 1976, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio
de Janeiro, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Pierre, J., ed., 1995, Bureaucracy in the Modern State: An Introduction to
Comparative Public Administration, Brookefield: Gower.
Portes, A., 1979, 'Housing Policy, Urban Poverty and the State: The Favelas of
Rio de Janeiro, 1972-7', Latin American Research Review, 14: 3-24.
Portes, A., 1985, 'The Informal Sector and the World Economy: Notes on the
Structure of Subsidised Labour', in M. Timberlake, ed., Urbanisation in
the World-Economy, Tokyo: Academic Press, pp.53-62.
Portes, A., 1976, 'The Economy and Ecology of Urban Poverty', in A. Portes
and J. Walton, eds, Urban Latin America: The Political Condition from
Above and Below, Austin and London: University of Texas Press.
Potter, R.B., 1985, Urbanisation and Planning in the Third World: Spatial
Perceptions and Public Participation, Sydney: Croom Helm, pp.247-
275.
Powell, J.D., 1970, 'Peasant Society and Clientalist Polities', American Political
Science Review, 64: 411-425.
Pratt, C., 1971, 'The Cabinet and Presidential Leadership in Tanzania: 1960-
1966', in M.F. Lofchie, ed., The State of the Nations: Constraints on
Development in Independent Africa, Berkeley: University of California
Press, pp.93-118.
Pratt, C., 1972, 'The Cabinet and Presidential Leadership in Tanzania in 1960-
66', in L. Cliffe and L. Saul, eds, Socialism in Tanzania: An
Interdisciplinary Reader, Vol 1, Politics, pp.226-240.
Pratt, C., 1976, The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968: Niyerere and the
Emergence of a Socialist Strategy, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Pratt, C., 1982, 'Colonial Governments and the Transfer of Power in East
Africa', in P. Gifford and L.W. Roger, eds, The Transfer of Power in
Africa: Decolonisation 1940-1960, New Haven: Yale University Press,
pp.249-81.
333
Pressman, J. and Wildavsky, A., 1973, Implementation, Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Prothero, M.R., 1964, 'Continuity and Change in African Population Mobility',
in R.W. Steel and M.R. Prothero, eds, Geographers and the Tropics:
Liverpool Essays, London: Longmans.
Pugh, C., 1980, Housing in Capitalist Societies, Farnborough: Gower.
Pugh, C., 1990, Housing and Urbanisation: A Study of India, New Delhi: Sage.
Pugh, C., 1995, 'The Role of the World Bank in Housing', in B.C. Aldrich and
R.S. Sandhu, eds, Housing the Urban Poor: Policy and Practice in
Developing Countries, London: Zed Books, pp.34-92.
Rakodi, C., 1986, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia
and its Legacy', Third World Planning Review, 8(3): 193-217.
Rakodi, C., 1990a, 'Self-Help Housing: The Debate and Example', Habitat
International, 13(4): 5-18.
Rakodi, C., 1990b, 'Can Third World Cities be Managed?', in D. Cadman and
G. Payne, eds, The Living City: Towards a Sustainable Future, London:
Routledge, pp.111-124.
Ramachandarn, P., 1974, Pavement Dwellers in Bombay City, Bombay: Tata
Institute of Social Sciences.
Reed., R.R., 1974, Colonial Manila: The Context of Hispanic Urbanism and the
Process of Morphogenesis, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Reitsman, H.A. and Kleinpenning, J.M., 1989, The Third World in Perspective,
Assen: Van Gorcum.
Renaud, B., 1981, National Urbanisation Policy in Developing Countries: A
World Bank Research Publication, New York: Oxford University Press.
Richardson, H.W., 1993, 'Efficiency and Welfare in LDC Mega-Cities', in
J.D. Kasarda and A.M. Parnell, eds, Third World Cities: Problems,
Policies and Prospects, Newbury Park: Sage.
Riggs, F., 1973, Prismatic Society Revisited, Morristown, New Jersey: General
Learning Press.
Ripley, R. and Franklin, G., 1980, Congress, the Bureaucracy and Public
Policy, Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey.
334
Rivkin, M.D., 1978, 'Some Perspectives on Land Use Regulations and Control',
in H.B. Dunkerley, ed., Urban Land Policy: Issues and Opportunities,
Washington DC: World Bank, Staff Working Paper 283, Vol 2: 85-126.
Robbins, S. P. and Barnwell, N., 1994, Organisation Theory in Australia,
Sydney: Prentice Hall.
Roberts, B.R., 1978, Cities of Peasants: The Political Economy of Urbanisation
in the Third World, London: Arnold.
Rockman, B.A., 1992, 'Bureaucracy, Power, Policy and the State', in B.H. Larry,
ed., The State of Public Bureaucracy, London: M.E. Sharpe Inc.,
pp.148-165.
Rodell, M., 1983, 'Sites and Services and Low Income Housing', in R.J. Skinner
and M.J. Rodell, eds, People, Poverty and Shelter: Problems of Self
Help Housing in the Third World, London: Methuen, pp.24-25.
Rodney, W., 1972, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Dar es Salaam:
Tanzania Publishing House.
Rondinelli, D., 1985, Applied Methods of Regional Analysis: The Spatial
Dimension of Development Policy, Boulder: Westview Press Inc.
Rondinelli, D.A., 1992, 'UNDP Assistance for Urban Development: An
Assessment of Institution-Building Efforts in Developing Countries',
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 58(4): 519-538.
Rosser, K.C., 1971, 'Housing for the Lowest Income Groups: The Calcutta
Experience', Ekistics, 31: 126-131.
Rothenberg, I.F., 1980, 'Administrative Decentralisation and the
Implementation of Housing Policy in Colombia', in M. Grindle, ed.,
Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, pp.145-169.
Rudolph, P., 1970, Financing Local Government in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam:
East African Publishing House.
Rweyemamu, AH.A., 1973, Underdevelopment and Industrialisation in
Tanzania, London: Oxford University Press.
Rweyemamu, AH.A., 1974, 'Delegation to Public Enterprises: Introduction', in
AH.A. Rweyemamu and G. Hyden, eds, A Decade of Public
Administration in Africa, Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau,
pp.233-236.
335
Saasa, 0., 1985, 'Public Policy-Making in Developing Countries: The Utility of
Contemporary Decision-making Models', Public Administration and
Development, 5(4):309-321.
Sabatier, P.A., 1991, 'Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process', in Political
Science and Politics, 24: 147-56.
Sabatier, P.A. and Jenkins-Smith, H.C., eds, 1993, Policy Change and
Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach, Boulder: Westview Press.
Sabot, R.H., 1979, Economic Development and Urban Migration: Tanzania
1900-1971, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sabot, R.H., ed., 1982, Migration and Labour Market in Developing Countries,
Boulder: Westview.
Safier, M., ed., 1970, Urban and Regional Planningfor National Development,
Kampala: Obote Foundation.
Saini, B., 1978, 'Site Development and Sanitary Services', in H.S. Murrison
and J.L.P. Leah, eds, Housing in Third World Countries: Perspectives
on Policy and Practice, London: Macmillan, pp.88-99.
Salas, R., 1985, Reflections on Population, New York: United Nations Fund for
Population Activities.
Salau, A.T., 1991, 'Urbanisation, Housing and Social Services in Nigeria: The
Challenge of Meeting Basic Needs', in R.B. Potter and A.T. Salau, eds,
Cities and Development in the Third World, New York: Mansell, pp.51-
69.
Salmen, L.F., 1987, Listen to the People: Participant Observer Evaluation of
Development Projects, New York: Oxford University Press.
Sarnoff, J., 1974, Tanzania: Local Politics and the Structure of Power,
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Sarnoff, J., 1977, 'Crises and Socialism in Tanzania', Journal of Modern African
Studies, 19(2): 179-306.
Sandbrook, R., 1982, The Politics of Basic Needs: Urban Aspects of Assaulting
Poverty in Africa, Toronto: University of Toronto.
Sandbrook, R., 1985, The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Santos, M., 1979, The Shared Space: The T.wo Circuits of the Urban Economy
in Underdeveloped Countries, London: Methuen.
336
Sarin, M., 1983, 'The Rich, the Poor and the Land Question', in S. Angel, R.
Archer, S. Tanphiphat and E. Wegelin, eds, Land For Housing the
Poor, Singapore: Select Books, pp.237-53.
Saul, J., 1971, 'Nationalism, Socialism and Tanzanian History', in L. Cliffe and
L. Saul, eds, Socialism in Tanzania, An Interdisciplinary Reader, Vnl 1
Politics, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, pp.65-75.
Saul, J.S., 1979, The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa: Essays, London:
Heinemann.
Schmetzer, H., 1982, 'Housing in Dar es Salaam', Habitat International, 6 (4).
Seers, D., 1981, 'Development Options: The Strengths and Weaknesses of
Dependency Theory in Explaining a Government's Room to
Manoeuvre', in D. Seers, ed., Dependency Theory: A Critical
Reassessment, London: Francis Pinter.
Segal, E.S., 1988, 'Spontaneous and Planned Housing in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania', in C.C. Mhlanga and R.A. Obudho, eds, Slum and Squatter
Settlements in Sub-Saharan Africa: Toward a Planning Strategy, New
York: Praeger, pp.158-174.
Self, P., 1972, Administrative Theories and Politics: An Inquiry into the
Structure and Processes of Modern Government, London: George Allen
and Unwin.
Self, P., 1977, Administrative Theories and Politics, London: George Allen and
Unwin.
Selznick, P., 1966, ~VA and the Grass Roots, New York: Harper and Row.
Seth, M.L., 1969, Theory and Practice of Planning, Delhi: S. Chand & Co.
Shaw, T.M., 1982, 'Beyond Neo-colonialism: Varieties of Corporatism in
Africa', Journal of Modern African Studies, 20(2): 239-261.
Sheriff, F., 1985, 'Housing Policies and Strategies in Tanzania: Socialist
Housing?', Trialog, 6: 8-14.
Shivji, LG., 1973, 'Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle', in L Cliffe and J. Saul,
eds, Socialism in Tanzania, Nairobi: East African Publishing House,
pp.304-330.
Shivji, LG., 1976, Class Struggles in Tanzania, London: Heinemann.
Shubert, C., 1993, 'Urbanisation in Asia: Current Trends, Future Prospects and
Policy Implications', Development Bulletin, 27: 25-30.
337
Sibbing, G., 1984, 'Migration, Employment and Development: On the Role of
Small Towns in the State of Minas Gerais (Brazil)', in H.D. Kammeier
and P.J. Swan, eds, Equity and Growth? Planning Perspectives for
Small Towns in Developing Countries, Bangkok: AIT Press, pp.78-88.
Sicat, G.M., 1979, 'Housing Finance', in S.H.K. Yeh and A.A. Laquian, eds,
Housing Asia's Millions: Problems, Policies and Prospects for Low
Cost Housing in Southeast Asia, International Development Research
Centre: Ottawa, pp.81-100.
Sidaway, J.D., 1990, 'Post-Fordism, Post-Modernity and the Third World',
Area, 22(3): 301-3.
Simon, H., 1959, 'Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioural
Science', American Economic Review, 49(3): 245-83.
Simon, D., 1984, 'Urban Poverty, Informal Sector Activity and Inter-sectoral
Linkages: Evidence from Windhoek, Namibia', Development and
Change, 15(4): 551-576.
Simon, D., 1992, Cities, Capital and Development: African Cities in the World
Economy, London: Belhaven Press.
Sinnatambay, G., 1990, 'Low Cost Sanitation', in J.E. Hardoy, S. Cairncross and
D. Satterthwaite, eds, The Poor Die Young: Housing and Health in
Third World Cities, London: Earthscan Publications, pp.109-126.
Skinner, R.J. and Rodell, M.J., eds, 1983, People, Poverty and Shelter:
Problems of Self-Help Housing in the Third World, London: Methuen.
Smith, B.C., 1996, Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political
Change and Development, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Smith, D.A., 1995, 'Overurbanisation Reconceptualised: A Political Economy
of the World-System Approach', Urban Affairs Quarterly, 23: 270-294.
Smith, S.J. and Mallinson, S., 1996, 'The Problem with Social Housing
Discretion, Accountability and the Welfare Ideal', Policy and Politics,
24(4):339-358.
Smith, T.Y., 1964, 'Why the Cities? Observation on Urbanisation in Latin
America', in P.L. Astuto and R.A. Leal, eds, Latin American Problems,
New York: St. John's University Press.
338
Snyder, D. and Kick, E.L., 1979, 'Structural Position in the World System and
Economic Growth, 1955-1970: A Multiple-Network Analysis of Trans
National Interactions', American Journal of Sociology, 84: 1096-1125.
Southall, A., 1973, Urban Anthropology: Cross-cultural Studies of
Urbanisation, New York: Oxford University Press.
Souza, P.R and Tokman, V., 1976, 'The Informal Urban Sector in Latin
America', International Labour Review, 114: 355-65.
Sperber, K.W., 1970, Public Administration in Tanzania, Munchen: Weltforum
Verlag.
Sridharan, N., 1995, 'Indian Slum: Problems, Policies and Issues, in B.C.
Aldrich and RS. Sandhu, eds, Housing the Urban Poor: Policy and
Practice in Developing Countries, London: Zed Books, pp.385-417.
Srinivasan, T.N., 1985, 'Neoclassical Political Economy, the State and
Economic Development', Asian Development Review, 3(2): 38-58.
Stallings, B., 1972, 'Economic Dependency in Africa and Latin America', in
Comparative Politics Series, No 1-31, Vol. 3.
Stein, H., 1985, 'Theories of the State in Tanzania: A Critical Assessment',
Journal of Modern African Studies, 23(1): 105-123.
Stephens, H.W., 1968, The Political Transformation of Tanganyika: 1920-67,
New York: Frederick A Praeger.
Stoner, J.A.F., Yetton, P.W., Craig, J.F. and Johnston, K.D., 2nd edn, 1994,
Management, Sydney: Prentice Hall.
Streeton, P., 1974, Aid to Africa: A Policy Outline for the 1970s, New York:
Praeger.
Stren, RE., 1975a, Urban Inequality and Housing Policy in Tanzania: The
Problem of Squatting, Berkeley: University of California.
Stren, RE., 1975b, 'Urban Policy and Performance in Kenya and Tanzania,
Journal of Modern African Studies, 13(2): 267-94.
Stren, RE., 1979, 'Urban Policy', in J. Barkan and J.J. Okumu, eds, Politics
and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania, New York: Praeger, pp.179-
208.
Stren, RE., 1981, 'Ujamaa Vijijini and Bureaucracy in Tanzania', Canadian
Journal of African Studies, 15(3):591-592.
339
Stren, R.E., 1982, 'Underdevelopment, Urban Squatting, and the State
Bureaucracy: A Case Study of Tanzania', Canadian Journal of African
Studies, 16(1): 67-91.
Stren, R.E., 1985, 'State Housing Policies and Class Relations in Kenya and
Tanzania', Comparative Urban Research 10(2): 59-76.
Stren, R.E., 1990, 'Urban housing in Africa: the Changing Role of Government
Policy', in P. Amis and P. Lloyd, eds, Housing Africa's Urban Poor,
Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp.35-53.
Stren, R.E., 1996, 'Africa; Introduction', in P.L. McCamey, ed., The Changing
Nature of Local Government in Developing Countries, Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Stren, R.E. and White, R.R., eds, 1989, African Cities in Crisis: Managing
Rapid Urban Growth, Boulder: Westview Press.
Sutton, J., 1979, 'Dar es Salaam: A Sketch of a Hundred Years', in J. Sutton,
ed., Dar es Salaam: City, Port and Region, Tanzania Notes and
Records, 71: 1-20.
Swan, P.J., Wegelin, E.A. and Panchee, K., 1983, Management of Sites and
Services Housing Schemes: The Asian Experience, Chichester: John
Wiley.
Syagga, P.M. and Kiamba, J.M., 1991,'Urbanization and Housing Problems in
Africa', in C.K. Omari and L.P. Shaidi, eds, Social Problems in Eastern
Africa, Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, pp.120-136.
Taylor, J.L. and Williams, D.G., 1982, Urban Planning Practice in Developing
Countries, Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Taylor, L., 1983, Structuralist Macroeconomics: Applicable Models of the
Third World, New York: Basic Books.
Temple, F. and Temple, N., 1980, 'The Politics Of Public Housing in Nairobi',
in M.S. Grindle, ed., Politics and Policy Implementation in The Third
World, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 224-49.
Tesfaghiorghi, H., 1993, 'Overview of African Urbanisation', Development
Bulletin, 27: 7-10.
Thomas, J.J., 1992, Informal Economic Activity, New York: Harvester
Wheatsheaf.
340
Thomas, J.W. and Grindle, M., 1990, 'After the Decision: Implementing Policy
Reforms in Developing Countries', World Development, 18(8): 1163-
1181.
Thompston, J.D., 1967, Organisations in Action, New York: McGraw Hill.
Timberlake, M., 1985, 'The World System Perspective and Urbanisation', in
M. Timberlake, ed., Urbanisation in the World-Economy, Tokyo:
Academic Press, pp.3-24.
Todaro, M.P., 1976, Internal Migration in Developing Countries: A Review of
Theory, Evidence, Methodology, and Research Priorities, Geneva:
International Labour Organization.
Tooker, P.D., 1977, 'Sub-National Politics and the Advent of Dual Rule in
Tanzania, 1961-1965', Quarterly Journal of Administration, 9(1 and 2):
43-65.
Tordoff, W., 1967, Government and Politics in Tanzania, Nairobi: East African
Publishing House.
Turner, F.J. C., 1967, 'Barriers and Channels for Housing Development in
Modernising Countries', Journal of the American Institute of Planners,
33: 167-181.
Turner, F.J.C., 1968, 'Housing Priorities, Settlement Patterns and Urban
Development in Modernising Countries', Journal of the American
Institute of Planners, 34: 354-363.
Turner, F.J.C., 1969, 'Uncontrolled Urban Settlements: Problems and Policies,
in G. Breese, ed., The City in Newly Developing Countries, Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, pp.507-34.
Turner, F.J.C., 1972, 'Housing As A Verb', in J.F.C. Turner and R. Fichter, eds,
Freedom to Build, London: Collier-Macmillan, pp.148-75.
Turner, F.J.C., 1976a, Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in Building
Environments, New York: Pantheon Books.
Turner, F.J.C., 1976b, 'Approaches to Government Sponsored Housing',
Ekistics, 41: 4-7.
Turner, F.J.C., 1978, 'Housing in Three Dimensions: Terms of Reference for the
Housing Question Redefined', World Development, 6.
341
Turner, F.J.C., 1990, 'Barriers, Channels and Community Control', in D.
Cadman and G. Payne, eds, The Living City: Towards a Sustainable
Future, London: Routledge, pp.181-191.
Turner, M. and Hulme, D., 1997, Governance, Administration and
Development: Making the State Work, London: Macmillan.
Valladares, L-P., 1978, 'Working the System: Squatter Response to
Resettlement in Rio de Janeiro', International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research, 2: 12-25.
van der Linden, J., 1986, The Sites and Services Approach Renewed: Solution
or Stopgap to the Third World Housing Shortage, Westmead: Gower.
van Donge, J.K. and Liviga, A.J., 1985, 'The 1982 Elections for Membership of
the National Executive Committee of Chama cha Mapinduzi: A Case
Study of Political Recruitment in Tanzania', Journal of Commonwealth
and Comparative Politics, 23: 43-66.
van Donge, J.K., 1992, 'Agricultural Decline in Tanzania: The Case of Uluguru
Mountains', Journal of African Affairs, 91(362):73-94.
van Donge, J.K. and Liviga, A.J., 1986, 'Tanzanian Political Culture and the
Cabinet', Journal of Modern African Studies, 24 (4): 619-639.
van Huyck, AP., 1971, 'Planning for Sites and Services Programs', Ideas and
Methods Exchange, 68.
van Velzen, H.U.E., Thoden and Sterkenburg, J.J., 1972, 'The Party
Supremacy', in L. Cliffe and J.S. Saul, eds, Socialism in Tanzanian, Vol.
I, Politics, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, pp.257-64.
van Vliet, W., 1987, 'Housing in the Third World', Environment and Behaviour
19: 267-85.
Vecchio, R., Hearn, G. and Sothey, G., 1988, Organisational Behaviour: Life at
Work in Australia, Sydney: Harcourt Brace.
von Freyhold, M., 1976, 'The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version'
Review of Africa Political Economy, 5(1): 75-89.
Wakely, P.I., Schmetzer, H. and Mumtaz, B., 1976, Urban Housing Strategies:
Education and Realisation, London: Pitman.
Wallestein, I., 1974, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the
Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century,
London: Academic Press.
342
Walton, D.S., 1984, 'The role of International Consultants', in G.K. Payne, ed.,
Low Income Housing in the Developing World, Chichester: John Wiley.
Wang, L.H. and Tan, T.H., 1981, 'Singapore', in M. Pacione, ed., Problems and
Planning in Third World Cities, London: Croon Helm, pp.218-249.
Wangwe, S., 1992, 'Nature and Extent of Parastatal Restructuring: Case of
Industrial Parastatals in Tanzania', in M.S.D. Bagachwa, A.V.Y. Mbele
and B. van Arkadie, eds, Market Reforms and Parastatal Restructuring
in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam, Economic
Department and Economic Research Bureau, pp.167-184.
Wayne, P., 1995, Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of
Policy Analysis, Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
Wee, A., 1972, 'Some Social Implications of Rehousing Programmes in
Singapore', in DJ. Dwyer, ed., The City as a Centre of Change in Asia,
Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
Wegelin, E.A., 1977, Urban-Low Income Housing and Development: A Case
Study in Peninsular Malaysia, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.
Weisner, T.S., 1976, 'Kariobangi: The Case History of a Squatter Resettlement
Scheme in Kenya', in W. Arens, ed., A Century of Change in East and
Central Africa, The Hague: Mouton, pp.77-97.
Wheatley, P., 1971, The Pivot of the Four Quarters, Chicago: Chicago
University Press.
White, 1985, 'The Impact of Policy Conflict on the Implementation of a
Government-Assisted Housing Project in Senegal', Canadian Journal of
African Studies, 19(3): 505-528.
Wirsing, R.G., 1973, 'Association "Micro-Arena" in Indian Urban Polities',
Asian Survey, 13: 408-420.
Wynn, M., ed., 1984, Housing in Europe, London: Croom Helm.
Yaeger, R., 2nd edn, 1989, Tanzania: An African E:cperiment, Boulder:
Westview Press.
Yap, K., 1990, 'Capital Interests and Housing Policy in Baldia Township in
Karachi', in B.C. Aldrich and R. Sandhu, eds, Housing in Asia, Jaipur:
Rawat Publications, pp.191-201.
Yukl, G.A., 1981, Leadership in Organisations, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall.
343
Zetter, R., 1984, 'Land Issues in Low Income Housing', in G.K. Payne, ed., Low
Income Housing in the Developing World, Chichester: John Wiley.
Zlotnik, H., 1993, 'Women as Migrants and Workers in Developing Countries',
International Journal of Contemporary Sociology, 30(1): 39-62.
Monographs, Bulletins and Reports
Alder, G.J., 1992, 'Economic, Financial, and Institutional Aspects of Shelter
Delivery', unpublished report prepared for the UNCHS (HABITAT) and
the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, Dar es Salaam.
Aradeon, D., 1978, 'Regional Assessment of Human Settlements Policies in
Nigeria', paper presented at the Symposium on National Human
Settlements Policies and Theory held at the University of Sussex,
February.
Aucoin, P. and Bakvis H., 1988, 'The Centralisation - Decentralisation
Conundrum: Organisation and Management m the Canadian
Government', Halifax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy.
Baregu, M.L., 1987, 'Ideology and Political Stability in Tanzania', paper
presented at the AAPS East African Regional Workshop on
Constitutionalism and Political Stability in East African Region,
Nairobi, Kenya, 5-7 January.
Barkat, H.M., 1994, 'Retrenchment and Redeployment in Tanzania: Civil
Service Problems and Prospects', unpublished M.A Thesis, The Hague
Institute of Social Studies.
Bathily, A. and White, R., 1978, 'Evaluation Bureau of the Dakar Sites and
Services Project: Interim Report', Dakar: Evaluation Bureau of Dakar
Sites and Services Project.
Benjamin, S., 1971a, 'Squatter Settlements in Tanzania', unpublished material
for the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development in
Tanzania.
Benjamin, S., 1971 b, 'Housing Cooperatives in Tanzania', unpublished material
for the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development in
Tanzania.
344
Bienefeld, M., 1970, 'A Long Term Housing Policy for Tanzania', Dar es
Salaam, University of Dar es Salaam, Economic Research Bureau, Paper
No. 70.9.
Bienefeld, M. and Binhammer, B., 1969, 'Tanzania Housing Finance and
Housing Policy', Dar es Salaam, University of Dar es Salaam, Economic
Research Bureau, Paper No. 68.16.
Binhammer, H.H., 1969, 'Financing Housing m Tanzania', Dar es Salaam,
University of Dar es Salaam, Economic Research Bureau, Paper No.
69.5.
Bossert, A., 1987, 'Traditional and Modern Forms of Social Security in
Tanzania; An Examination of the Conditions of their Development',
Augsburg.
Brain, A., 1979, 'The Political Economy of Urbanisation m Tanzania',
unpublished PhD Thesis, University of British Columbia.
Burgess, D., 1970, 'A Study of the Construction Industry m Tanzania',
unpublished paper, Dar es Salaam.
Campbell, J. and Pons, V., 1987, 'Urbanisation, Urban Planning and Urban Life
in Tanzania: An Annotated Bibliography', Occasional Paper, University
of Hull, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology.
Chachage, S.S., 1980, 'Housing Problem and the Policy of Socialism: A Case of
the Housing Problem in Dar es Salaam', Dar es Salaam: University of
Dar es Salaam.
Chachage, S.S., 1983, 'The Development of Urban Capitalism in Tanzania',
unpublished MA Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam.
Choguill, C.L., 1985, 'Third World Shelter Policy: Solutions and Problems for
Housing the Poor', Sheffield University, Department of Town and
Regional Planning, TRP55.
Claeson, C. and Egero, B., 1971, 'Movement to Towns in Tanzania: Tables and
Comments', BRALUP Research Notes No. 11(1), Dar es Salaam:
BRALUP.
Cohen, M.A., 1980, 'The Senegal Sites and Services Project: A Case Study of ' Project Experience', a paper prepared for use in the EDI-HABIT AT
Course, Abidjan, June-July.
345
Comoro, C.J.B., 1984, 'Two Shanty-Towns in Dar es Salaam: A Study of
Housing Process', unpublished MA Thesis, Carleton University.
Comoro, C.J.B., 1990, 'Urbanisation in Tanzania: The Dynamics of Market',
unpublished PhD Thesis, Carleton University.
Doherty, J., 1975, 'Ideology and Town Planning in Tanzania', University of Dar
es Salaam, mimeo.
Egero, B. and Henin, R., eds, 'The Population of Tanzania: An Analysis of the
1967 Population Census', Dar es Salaam: BRALUP and Bureau of
Statistics.
Ellis, F., 1981, 'Agricultural Pricing Policy in Tanzania 1970-79: Implication
for Agricultural Output, Rural Incomes, and Crop Marketing Costs',
University of Dar es Salaam: Economic Research Bureau.
Fong, P.K.W., 1980, 'Housing Problems and Public Housing Program in Hong
Kong: A Case Study of the Housing Provision in a Densely Populated
Metropolitan Area', unpublished PhD thesis, New York University.
Gambishi, B.N.J., 1983, 'Industrialisation and Urban Development in Tanzania
1969-1981: The Case of Arusha and Morogoro Towns', unpublished
MA Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam.
Gibbon, P., 1980, 'Background Report on Development in Dodoma Capital
District and Design for the Future Research', University of Dar es
Salaam: Department of Sociology.
Gilbert, R., 1991, 'Technical and Operational Report', in the Planning
Commission and the Ministry of Labour and Youth Development,
Tanzania, Report of the National Informal Sector Survey Mainland
Tanzania, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, pp.31-58.
Grimes, O.F., 1974, 'Urban Land and Public Policy: Social Appropriation of
Betterment', Washington DC: World Bank, SWP 179, May.
Grimes, O.F., 1976, 'Housing for Low-Income Urban Families', Washington
DC: World Bank.
Halfani, M.S., 1987, 'Urban Management and the Implementation of Externally
Financed Projects in Dar es Salaam', unpublished PhD Thesis,
University of Toronto.
Hamad, S.S., 1983, 'Economy and Efficiency in Parastatal Sector', The Hamad
Report for United Republic of Tanzania.
346
Hanak, E.E., 1981, 'The Tanzanian Balance of Payments Crisis: Causes,
Consequences and Lessons for Survival Strategy', University of Dar es
Salaam, Economic Research Bureau.
Harris, J.R., 1984, 'Tanzania's Performance m Meeting Basic Needs: The
International Context', African Studies Centres Working Papers, 82.
Hartmann, J., 1984, 'The Arusha Declaration and the Tripartite System of Policy
Making in Tanzania', University of Dar es Salaam, Department of
Sociology, mimeo.
Hartmann, J., 1991, ed., 'Re-Thinking the Arusha Declaration', Copenhagen:
Centre for Development Research.
Hauser, P.M., 1957, 'Urbanisation in Asia and the Far East', Calcutta:
UNESCO.
Hayuma, A.M., 1987, 'Urban and Rural Planning in Tanzania', seminar paper
presented to a Conference on Living in the Cities, Goethe Institute, Dar
es Salaam, 13-18 July.
Hinderink, J. and Sterkenburg, J., 1975, 'Anatomy of an African Town', Utrecht
State University.
Honesto, C., 1996, 'Low Cost Program is Anti-Poor and Pro-Rich', Philippine
Daily Inquirer, 13 September.
Hosaka, M., 1988, 'Case Studies on Metropolitan Fringe Development with
Focus on Informal Land Subdivision', summary of
INSCAPE Regional Workshop on Metropolitan
Development, June, Bangkok: INSCAPE.
proceedings of
Fringe Land
HUDA (Housing and Urban Development Associates), 1990, 'Housing Needs
Assessment Study', Final Report, Accra: Ministry of Local Government,
Government of Ghana.
Hurley, D., 1990, 'Income Generation Schemes for the Urban Poor',
Development Guidelines, No. 4, Oxford: Oxfam.
International Labour Organisation (ILO), 1982, 'Basic Needs in Danger: A
Basic Needs Oriented Development Strategy for Tanzania, Jobs and
Skills Programme for Action', Addis Ababa: ILO.
Jambiya, G.L.K., 1987, 'Industrial Location in Tanzania: A Study of the Spatial
Dimension and Decision Making', unpublished MA Thesis, University
of Dar es Salaam.
347
Jumbe, Z.N., 1984, 'The Improved Policy Making Structure in the Tanzanian
Cabinet', mimeo, Dar es Salaam.
Kean, S.A., 1994, 'The Institutional Politics of Agricultural Research in
Zambia: A Model of Contingent Innovation', unpublished PhD thesis,
School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia.
Keare, D. and Parris, S., 1982, 'Evaluation of Shelter Programs for the Urban
Poor: Principal Findings', Washington DC: World Bank, Staff Working
Paper No. 547.
King, K., 1984, 'The End of Education for Self Reliance in Tanzania',
University of Edinburgh, Centre for African Studies, Occasional Paper
1.
Kiondo, A.Z., 1990a, 'The Politics of Economic Reforms in Tanzania',
unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Toronto.
Kironde, J.M., 1989, 'The Under Utilisation of Allocated Land in Developing
Neighbourhoods in Tanzania, with Examples from Dar es Salaam',
unpublished paper, Dar es Salaam: Ardhi Institute, Centre for Housing
Studies.
Kironde, J.M.L., 1992, 'Urban Land', in report prepared for the UNCHS
(HABITAT) and the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban
Development, MLHUD, Dar es Salaam, pp.1-19.
Kisumo, P.A., 1983, 'Economy and Efficiency in Government', unpublished
report for the United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam: Civil
Service Commission.
Kivugo, J.J., 1987, 'Control of Local Government Finance in Tanzania', in
'Financing of Local Government in East and Southern African
Countries', Ministry of Local Government and Marketing and FESF,
seminar report, proceedings of an International Symposium on Local
Government Finance held at the Arusha International Conference
Centre, Arusha, 17-21 August.
Kleruu, W., 1965, 'Why and Wherefore of the TANU Cell System', The
Nationalists, 20 September.
Krausse, G.H., 1977, 'Problems and Prospects of Low-Income Settlements in
Southeast Asian Cities', Paper Presented at the Third World Conference
on Low Income Housing, University of Nebraska at Omaha.
348
Kulaba, S.M., 1981, 'Housing, Socialism and National Development in
Tanzania, A Policy Framework', Occasional Paper, Dar es Salaam:
Ardhi Institute, Centre for Housing Studies.
Kulaba, S.M., 1985a, 'Managing Urban Growth through Sites and Services and
Squatter Upgrading in Tanzania, Lessons and Experiences', in P.
Crooke, ed., Management of Sites and Services in Squatter Upgrading
Housing Areas, Occasional Paper, Dar es Salaam: Centre for Urban
Studies.
Kulaba, S.M., 1985b, 'Urban Growth and the Management of Urban Reform in
Tanzania', unpublished Occasional Paper, Dar es Salaam: Ardhi
Institute.
Kulaba, S.M., 1990, 'Thematic Evaluation of UNDP Urban Projects in
Tanzania', New York: UNDP.
Kyessi, A.G., 1990, 'Urbanisation of Fringe Villages and Growth of Squatters:
The Case of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', unpublished MSc. Thesis, ITC,
Rotterdam.
Lewis, M.A. and Miller, T.R., 1986, 'Public-Private Partnership in African
Urban Development', mimeo, Nairobi: USAID.
Li, M. and Hu, X., eds, 1991, 'The Impact of Floating Population on the
Development of Large Cities and Their Policy Responses', Beijing:
Economic Daily Press.
Loxley, J., 1970, 'The Domestic Finance of Development Projects in Tanzania',
in M.A. Bienefeld, ed., A Long Term Housing Policy for Tanzania, Dar
es Salaam, University College, Economic Research Bureau Paper, 70.9.
Lugalla, J.L., 1990, 'Socialist Construction and the Urbanisation Process in
Tanzania: An Analysis of Urban Poverty and Polities', unpublished PhD
Thesis: University of Bremen.
Lugalla, J.L., 1996, 'The Social Context of Management of Environmental
Pollution in Dar es Salaam City in Tanzania', a research report
submitted to the International Development Research Council (IDRC).
Madihi, M.C.D., 1991, 'Total Employment in the Informal Sector', in Planning
Commission and Ministry of Labour and Youth Development, Tanzania,
Report of the National Informal Sector Survey in Tanzania, Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer, pp.1-5-12.
349
Magembe, E.J. and Gashumba, H.C., 1982, 'Promotion of Housing
Cooperatives in Tanzania: Observations and Recommendations', paper
presented to a seminar on the Promotion of Housing Cooperatives in
Tanzania, Moravian Youth Centre, Mbeya, 22-29 August.
Majani, B.B., 1991, 'Financing of Urban Plans in Tanzania: A Case Study of the
Third Sites and Services Project', in F. Halla and P. Treuner, eds,
Mechanisms of Vertical and Horizontal Financial Balance for the
Promotion of Decentralised Development with Special Reference to
Tanzania, proceedings of a seminar, Dar es Salaam: Ardhi Institute, 23 -
27 September.
Malpezzi, D.J., Tipple, A.G. and Willis, K.G., 1990, Costs and Benefits of Rent
Control: A Case study in Kumasi Ghana, Washington DC: World Bank
Discussion Paper No. 74.
Malpezzi, S., 1990, 'Malaysia: Getting Housing Incentives Right', in
Infrastructure Notes: Transportation, Water and Urban Development
Department, Washington DC: World Bank.
Martin, R., 1980, 'Standards: Can They be Made Relevant?', paper presented to
a conference on Towards a National Housing Policy, Arusha
International Conference Centre, 3-8 March.
Mascarenhas, A.C., 1966, 'Urban Development in Dar es Salaam', unpublished
MA Thesis, University of California.
Mascarenhas, A.C., 1973, 'Urban Housing m Tanzania', in B. Egero and
R. Henin, eds, The Population of Tanzania: An Analysis of the 1967
Population Census, Dar es Salaam: Bureau of Resource Assessment and
Land Use Planning, and Bureau of Statistics, pp.98-118.
Mascarenhas, A.C. and Mascarenhas, 0., 1976, 'Man and Shelter: An Overview
and Documentation on Housing in Tanzania', Dar es Salaam: Bureau of
Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, and Bureau of Statistics,
Research Paper 45.
Masembejo, L.M., 1980, 'Impacts of Squatter Improvement: Case Study
Manzese, Dar es Salaam', unpublished Diploma Thesis, Ardhi Institute:
Dar es Salaam.
Matern, J., 1992, 'The Shelter Delivery System in Tanzania', unpublished report
prepared for UN CHS HABITAT and the Ministry of Lands, Housing
and Urban Development, Dar es Salaam.
350
Mayaya, R.M., 1978, 'Public Policy Implementation in Tanzania: The Case of
the Village Managers Policy', unpublished MA Thesis, University of
Dar es Salaam.
Mbago, M.C. Y., 1975, 'Statistical Analysis of Differences in Infant Mortality
Estimates by District', unpublished MA Thesis, University of Dar es
Salaam.
Mbah, F.U., 1979, 'Prostitution in Tanzania: A Case Study of Dar es Salaam
City', unpublished BA Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam.
Mbilinyi, M., 1981, 'Twenty Years of Tanzania's Independence', Africa Now,
December.
McGee, 1977, 'Conservation and Dissolution in the Third World City',
mimeograph, Burg Wartenstein Symposium, No. 73, Shanty-towns in
Developing Nations, New York: Wenner-Gren Foundation.
McGurn, W., 1997, 'Urbanisation: City Limits', Far Eastern Economic Review,
6 February, 1997: 34-38.
McKinsey and Company Inc., 1974, 'Achieving the Objectives of the Arusha
Declaration', United Republic of Tanzania, McKinsey Report, February,
Dar es Salaam, Government Printer.
Mesaki, S., 1982, 'The Conception and Building of the New Capital City in
Dodoma Tanzania', University of Dar es Salaam, mimeo.
Mghweno, J. and Kulaba, S., 1981, 'Tanzania Experience on Implementing Low
Income Housing Programme: A Case Study on Sites and Services and
Squatter Upgrading Projects', paper prepared for the Seventh Conference
on Housing in Africa, 30 March - 3 April, Mauritius.
Mgullu, F., 1978, 'A Study of Tanzania's National Sites and Services Schemes',
unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam.
Mihyo, P.B., 1986, 'Parliamentary Control and Time Accountability of Public
Enterprise in Tanzania', unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Dar es
Salaam.
Misigaro, A., 1994, 'Critically Rethinking the Community Based Squatter
Upgrading Pilot Project in Hanna Nassif - Dar es Salaam City: Towards
a More Viable and Replicable Community Based Squatter Upgrading
Approach for Tanzania', project report presented to the 64th
International Centre for Housing, Planning and Building Workshop on
351
Urban Management and Planning at the Institute for Housing and Urban
Development Studies, Rotterdam.
Misra, B., 1986, 'Urban Development Policies in India: Focus on Land
Management', in H. Nagamine, ed., Urban Development Policies and
Programmes: Focus on Land Management, Nagoya: UN Centre for
Regional Development.
Miti, K., 1982, 'Crisis After Crisis: Tanzania Post Independence Economic
Development', a paper presented to a seminar, University of Dar es
Salaam, Economic Research Bureau.
Miti, K. and Mutahaba, G., 1988, 'Public Policy Making and Implementation in
Tanzania by Edward Moringe Sokoine', unpublished work, University of
Dar es Salaam; Department of Political Science and Public
Administration.
Mitullah, W.V., 1985, 'A World Bank Housing Upgrading Project in Kenya
Town: Winners and Losers', paper presented at the South/South African,
Latin American and Caribbean Connection, Montreal, 15-17 May.
Mmari, D.M.S., 1987, 'Organisation of the Government: Salaries and Other
Terms and Conditions of Service for the Public Service', United
Republic of Tanzania, unpublished report of the Inter-ministerial Task
Force on the 1987 Salaries Review Commission Report, December, Dar
es Salaam: Central Establishment.
Mohamed, T., 1980, 'Policy Formulation and Institution Building for Public
Housing in Peninsular Malaysia', unpublished PhD Thesis, University of
Wisconsin-Madison.
Moses, B., 1986, 'Policy Implementation in Tanzania: The Case of Transfer of
Government Capital to Dodoma', unpublished MA thesis, The Hague,
Institute of Social Studies.
Mosha, A.C., 1990, 'Urbanisation and the Environment', Occasional Paper No.
12, Dar es Salaam: Ardhi Institute.
Moshi, H.P.B., 1990, 'Tanzania's Parastatal Enterprises and the Economic
Recovery Programme', paper presented to the 6th Economic Policy
Workshop, Dar es Salaam, 2-4 January.
Mosi, M.E.W., 1981, 'The Role of the Tanzania Housing Bank in Housing
Development in Tanzania', mimeo, Bowcentrum International and the
Centre for Housing Studies, No. 871.
352
Mulokozi, E., 1978, 'Report on Discipline in the Civil Service in Dar es
Salaam', Civil Service Department, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer.
Munishi, G., 1982, 'Development Administration in Tanzania: Public Service
Planning and Utilization', unpublished PhD Thesis, University of
Wisconsin.
Mwaikusa, J.T., 1995, 'Towards Responsible Democratic Government:
Executive Powers and Constitutional Practice in Tanzania 1962-1992',
unpublished PhD Thesis, University of London.
Mwakasendo, B.A., 1980, 'Urban Housing: Case Study of Mbeya Urban
Centre', unpublished Advanced Diploma Dissertation, Dar es Salaam,
Centre for Housing Studies.
Mwita, D.M., 1978, 'Urban Landlordism and the Acquisition of Buildings Act',
unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam.
Ndatulu, T.S. and Makileo, H.B., 1989, 'Housing Cooperatives in Tanzania',
Building Research Unit Working Report, unpublished material, Dar es
Salaam: Ardhi Institute.
Ndjovu, C., 1980, 'The Housing Market in Dar es Salaam: A Survey of the Post
Independence Period', unpublished Advanced Diploma Dissertation, Dar
es Salaam: Ardhi Institute.
Ngowi, D., 1990, 'Reforming the Parastatal Sector in Tanzania: Options for
Economic Recovery Programme II', paper presented to the 6th
Economic Policy Workshop, Dar es Salaam, 2-4 January.
Ngware, S. and Haule, M., 1993, 'Empowerment of People and Democratisation
of Local Government Under Multi-Party System in Tanzania',
unpublished Report submitted to Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Dar es
Salaam.
Nnkya, T.J.W., 1980, 'Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading', unpublished
Diploma Dissertation, Dar es Salaam: Ardhi Institute.
Nsekela, A.J., 1987, 'Report of the Salaries Commission: Summary of
Recommendations of Volumes One to Four', unpublished report, Dar es
Salaam: Central Establishment.
Ntukula, M., 1984, 'Social Problems of Squatters: A case study of Kinondoni
Moscow-Dar es Salaam', unpublished BA Dissertation, University of
Dar es Salaam.
353
Nyerere, J.K.N., 1972, 'Decentralisation', Dar es Salaam: Government Printer.
Nyumayo, S.C., 1991, 'Financing of Regional Plans in Tanzania: An Overview',
in F. Halla and P. Treuner, eds, Mechanisms of Vertical and Horizontal
Financial Balance for the Promotion of Decentralised Development with
Special Reference to Tanzania, proceedings of a seminar, Dar es
Salaam, Ardhi Institute, 23-27 September.
OHE (Office of Health Economics), 1972, Medical Care in Developing
Countries, New York: Office of Health Economics.
PADCO-World Bank, 1981, 'The Bertaud Model', World Bank Technical Paper
No. 2.
Rasmussen, J., 1990, 'Understanding Industrial Development in Africa',
Copenhagen, Centre for Development Research, Project Paper 90 (6).
Reforma, M.A., 1977, 'An Evaluation of the Tondo Dagat-Dagtan Development
Project: A Research Design', Manila: Philippines, National Housing
Authority.
Said, S.G., 1983, 'Factors Affecting Workers Performance in Public Service:
The Case of Operational Personnel in the Ministries of Lands and
Manpower Development', unpublished MA thesis, University of Dar es
Salaam.
Sandberg, 0., 1974, 'Attitudes Towards Squatting: A Review', Research Report,
University of Dar es Salaam: Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land
Use Planning.
Sandbrook, R and Stren, R.E., 1983, 'Notes Towards the Political Economy of
Third World Urban Policy', Department of Political Science, University
of Toronto, Working Paper B(2).
Sanyal, B., Valverde, N. and Bamberger, M., 1981, 'Evaluation of the First
Lusaka Upgrading and Sites and Services Project', Washington DC:
World Bank, final draft mimeo.
Schmetzer, H., 1980, 'Housing in Dar es Salaam: A Case Study', unpublished
Conference Paper, Centre for Housing Studies, Dar es Salaam: Ardhi
Institute.
Sembajwe, LS., 1983, 'Mortality Levels', in United Republic of Tanzania,
Bureau of Statistics, Population Census, Vol. VIII: 281-324.
354
Sembajwe, LS., 1985, 'Mortality Levels, Differentials and Trends in Tanzania
and the Their Implications for Policy Making and Socio-Economic
Development Planning', paper presented to a workshop on Population
Studies, Arusha.
Sen, M.K., 1973, 'The Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Squatters: The K.L.
Experience', Kuala Lumpur, mimeo.
Shidlo, G., 1994, 'Housing Regulatory Reform in Mexico', in Infrastructure
Notes,.Transportation, Water and Urban Development Department, New
York: The World Bank.
Smit-Hoek, M.C., 1990, 'The Urban Housing Sector in Tanzania: Analysis of
the 1990 Urban Housing Survey', World Bank Report.
Smith, B., 1982, 'Contemporary Approaches to Inter Governmental Relations in
Industrial Societies', unpublished Paper at Conference on the Importance
of Inter Governmental Relations for the Understanding of Power
Distribution in Industrial Societies, Milan.
Smith, D.R., 1974, 'Independence for Tanganyika: An Analysis of the Political
Developments which led to the Emancipation of the Trust Territory
1946-1961', unpublished PhD Thesis, St. Johns University.
Sogga, G., 1979, 'The Developmental Consequences of the Arusha Declaration
on the Tanzanian Economy', unpublished PhD Thesis, University of
Pittsburgh.
Stretton, A., 1979, 'Urban Housing Policy in Papua New Guinea', Boroko:
Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, Monograph 8.
Sunny, G., 1986, 'Policies and Strategies for Economic Recovery: Some Pre
requisites for Better Economic Performance in Tanzania in the Eighties',
unpublished paper presented to Economic Policy Workshop, Dar es
Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam.
Tabibzadeh, I., Rossi-Espagnet, A. and Maxwell, R., 1989, 'Spotlight on the
Cities: Improving Urban Health in Developing Countries', Geneva:
World Health Organisation.
Tadesse, A., 1980, 'Post-Colonial Economic Development of the United
Republic of Tanzania', unpublished MA Thesis, Denton: North Texas
University.
355
Temba, A.N., 1983, 'Urban Housing in Tanzania: An Evaluation of Problem,
Policy and Strategy', unpublished material for the Ministry of Planning
and Economic Affairs, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer.
Turnham, D., 1970, 'The Employment Problem in Less Developed Countries: A
Review of Evidence', OECD Development Centre.
Uisso, M., 1991, 'Privatisation in Developing Countries: The Case of Tanzania',
MBA Dissertation, Maastricht Institute for Management.
UNCHS (United Nations Commission on Human Settlements), 1992, A New
Agenda for Human Settlements, Nairobi, Kenya: UNCHS.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 1988, Cities, People and
Poverty: Urban Development Co-operation for the 1990s, Strategy
paper, New York: UN.
UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa), 1989, Patterns,
Causes and Consequences of Urbanisation in Africa, Addis Ababa.
UNECLA (United Nations Economic Council for Latin America), 1971, income
Distribution in Latin America, New York: UN.
UNFPA (United Nations Fund for Population Activities), 1980, Report, New
York: UN.
United Nations, 1968, Methods for Establishing Targets and Standards for
Housing and Environmental Development, New York: UN.
United Nations, 1985, Estimates and Projections of Urban, Rural and City
Populations 1950-2025: The 1982 Assessment, New York: Department
of International Economic and Social Affairs.
United Nations, 1989, Population Studies: Prospects of World Urbanisation
1988, No. 112, New York: Department of International Economic and
Social Affairs.
United Nations, 1991, World Urbanisation Prospects 1990, New York: United
Nations.
United Nations, 1992, World Urbanisation Prospects, New York: United
Nations Population Division, United Nations.
United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 1987, Global Report on Human
Settlements, New York: United Nations.
356
United Nations Development Programme, 1991a, Cities, People and Poverty:
Urban Development Co-operation for the 1990s, New York: United
Nations.
United Nations Development Programme, 1991b, Human Development Report
1991, New York: United Nations Development Programme.
United Nations Development Programme, 1994, Human Development Report
1994, New York: Oxford University Press.
UNSEC (United Nations Social and Economic), 1957, Report on the World
Social Situation - Including Studies of Urbanisation in Underdeveloped
Areas, New York: United Nations.
Vatikiotis, M., 1988, 'Worrying About Idle Minds', Far Eastern Economic
Review, 39.
Vendiola, L., 1996, 'A Message to President Fidel V. Ramos From Sama-Sama,
the Largest Organisation of the Urban Poor People, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, 24 September.
Wells, J., 1972, 'The Construction Industry in East Africa', in University
College Economic Research Paper 72.1, Dar es Salaam: BRALUP and
the Department of Economics.
WHO (World Health Organisation), 1988, Urbanisation and its Implications
for Child Health Potential for Action, Geneva: WHO.
WHO (World Health Organisation), 1989, Urbanisation and its Implications
for Child Health: Potential for Action, Geneva: WHO.
Wigglesworth, M., 1982, 'Planning Legislation: a Necessary Charade', in
Planning Legislation, report of proceedings of a seminar in Cyprus,
London: Commonwealth Association of Planners.
Wong, L.S.K., 1969, 'A Geographical Study of Squatter Areas in the Victoria
Kowloon Urban Areas', unpublished MA thesis, University of Hong
Kong, Department of Geography and Geology.
World Bank, 1977, Tanzania: The Second National Sites and Services Project,
Report No. 1518a-TA, Washington DC: World Bank, Urban Projects
Department.
World Bank, 1980, World Development Report 1980, Washington DC: World
Bank.
357
World Bank, 1983, Learning by Doing: World Bank Lending for Urban
Development, 1972-1982, Washington DC: World Bank.
World Bank, 1984, Completion Report: Tanzania First National Sites and
Services Project, Report No. 4941, World Bank, Eastern Africa
Regional Office.
World Bank, 1985a, World Development Report 1985, New York: Oxford
University Press.
World Bank, 1985b, Focus on Poverty: A Report by the Task Force of the
World Bank, Washington DC: World Bank.
World Bank, 1988a, World Development Report 1988, New York: Oxford
University Press.
World Bank, 1988b, Parastatals in Tanzania: Towards a Reform Program,
Washington DC: World Bank.
World Bank, 1990, World Development Report 1990, Poverty, New York:
Oxford University Press.
World Bank, 1991a, Urban Policy and Economic Development: An Agenda for
the 1990s, Washington DC: World Bank.
World Bank, 1991 b, Tanzania Economic Report Towards Sustainable
Development in the 1990s, New York: Oxford University Press.
World Bank, 1992a, Development and the Environment: World Development
Indicators, New York: Oxford University Press.
World Bank, 1992b, The Housing Indicators Program, Washington DC: World
Bank.
World Bank, 1994, World Development Report 1994, Washington DC: World
Bank.
World Bank, 1996a, World Development Report 1996, Washington DC: World
Bank.
World Bank, 1996b, The World Bank Participation Source Book,
Washington DC: World Bank.
Yeh, S.H.K. and Laquian, A.A., eds, Housing Asia's Millions: Problems,
Policies and Prospects for Low Cost Housing in Southeast Asia,
Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.
358
Yusoff, H., 1993, 'A Culturally Appropriate and Economically Sustainable
Housing Delivery System for Urban Low-Income Households m
Malaysia', unpublished PhD Thesis, Texas A&M University.
Official Documents: Government of Tanzania
Departmental Committee of Inquiry into Allotments (DCIA), 1969, 'Report',
London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, 1984,
A Manual of the Budget Process in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam:
Government Printer.
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD), Tanzania,
1980-1987, NSSP files (various), Dar es Salaam: Ardhi Institute.
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD), Tanzania,
1983, 'NSSP 1 Evaluation Report', unpublished material, Dar es
Salaam: Ardhi Institute.
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD), Tanzania,
1992, 'Report on Housing Situation in Tanzania', Dar es Salaam:
Government Printer.
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD), Tanzania,
1993a, 'National Strategy for Sustainable Human Development',
unpublished Ardhi document, Dar es Salaam: Ardhi Institute.
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD), Tanzania,
1993b, 'National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project
Phase 3 (NSSP 3), Annual Report', unpublished material, Dar es
Salaam: Ardhi Institute.
Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Tanzania, 1989, Housing Report,
Dar es Salaam: Government Printer.
Project Planning Associates Limited (PPAL), 1968, 'National Capital Master
Plan', Dar es Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanganyika, First Three Year Development Plan (FTYDP), 1961-1964, 1961,
Dar es Salaam: Government Printer.
359
Tanzania, 1966, The Rent Restriction Act 1966, Dar es Salaam: Government
Printer.
Tanzania, 1969, First Five-Year Development Plan (FFYDP), Dar es Salaam:
Government Printer.
Tanzania, 1969, Second Five Year Development Plan (SFYDP) 1969-74, Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanzania, 197_4, Staff List, Central Establishment, Dar es Salaam: Government
Printer.
Tanzania, 1977, The National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading
Project, Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanzania, 1982, Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act 1982, Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanzania, 1982a, Local Government Act 1982, Dar es Salaam: Government
Printer.
Tanzania, 1982b, The New National Housing Development Policy for Tanzania
(NNHP), Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanzania, 1982c, 'Proposals for the Third National Sites and Services Project',
Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development,
mimeo.
Tanzania, 1987, The National Urban Development Policy (NUDP), Ministry of
Lands, Housing and Urban Development, Dar es Salaam: Government
Printer.
Tanzania, Bureau of Statistics, National Economic Survey, 1965 to 1977, Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanzania, Bureau of Statistics, 1981, Survey of Employment and Earnings
1977-78, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanzania, Bureau of Statistics, 1978, National Population Census, Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanzania, Bureau of Statistics, 1988, National Population Census, Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanzania, Bureau of Statistics, 1991-92, Household Budget Survey, Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer.
360
Tanzania, The Central Bank of Tanzania, 1990, Economic and Operations
Report, Vol. 3, No. 4.
Tanzania, The Central Bank of Tanzania, 1993, Economic Trends, Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanzania, Central Statistical Bureau, 1967, National Population Census, Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanzania, Central Statistical Bureau, 1968, Population by Residential Areas
and Densities in 1967, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanzania, Central Statistical Bureau, 1969, Household Budget Survey, Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanzania, Central Statistical Bureau, 1977, Household Budget Survey, Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanzania, Civil Service Commission (CSC), 1991, Civil Service Census Report
1991, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer.
Tanzania, Economic Recovery Programme II (ERP II) 1990, Dar es Salaam:
Government Printer.
Tanzania Housing Bank (THB), 1973, Annual Report, unpublished material,
Dar es Salaam.
Tanzania Housing Bank (THB), 1978, Annual Report, unpublished material,
Dar es Salaam.
Tanzania Housing Bank (THB), 1993, Annual Report, unpublished material,
Dar es Salaam.
Tanzania, National Housing Corporation, 1991, 'Corporate Plan 1991-92 -
1995-96', unpublished material, Dar es Salaam: National Housing
Corporation.
Tanzania, Planning Commission and the Ministry of Labour and Manpower
Development, The National Informal Sector Survey, Dar es Salaam:
Government Printer.
361
Newspapers
Africa Now (United Kingdom, quarterly magazine, London)
Beijing: Economic Daily Press (China, daily paper, Beijing)
Business Times (Tanzania, weekly paper, Dar es Salaam)
Daily News (Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, daily newspaper)
Family Mirror (Tanzania, weekly paper, Dar es Salaam)
Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong, weekly Magazine, Hong Kong)
Heko (Tanzania, weekly newspaper, Dar es Salaam)
Mwananchi (Tanzania, biweekly newspaper, Dar es Salaam)
Philippine Daily Inquirer(The Philippines, daily newspaper, Manila)
Sunday News (Tanzania, weekly paper, Dar es Salaam)
Tanganyika Standard Newspaper (Tanzania, daily paper, Dar es Salaam)
The Express (Tanzania, weekly paper, Dar es Salaam)
The Nationalists (Tanzania, biweekly paper, Dar es Salaam)
Uhuru newspaper (Tanzania, daily paper, Dar es Salaam)
362
