Perceiving Intergroup Conflict: From Game Models to Mental Templates

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Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

DOI: 10.1177/0146167206291947 2006; 32; 1674 Pers Soc Psychol Bull

Nir Halevy, Lilach Sagiv, Sonia Roccas and Gary Bornstein Perceiving Intergroup Conflict: From Game Models to Mental Templates

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Perceiving Intergroup Conflict:From Game Models to Mental Templates

Nir HalevyLilach SagivHebrew University of Jerusalem

Sonia RoccasOpen University

Gary BornsteinHebrew University of Jerusalem

THINKING ABOUT GROUP INTERDEPENDENCE

Research on interdependent decision making hastraditionally focused on the choices individuals andgroups make within a given payoff structure. Researchersusually create a well-defined situation of social interde-pendence in the laboratory and study how individualsand groups act in this setting (e.g., Bornstein, 2003;Insko et al., 2001; Kelley et al., 2003; Kelley & Thibaut,1978; Schopler et al., 2001; Wit & Kerr, 2002). There is,however, ample evidence that suggests that in real-life set-tings people not only choose different courses of action

This article puts forward a parsimonious framework for studyingsubjective perceptions of real-life intergroup conflicts. Four studieswere conducted to explore how individuals perceive the strategicproperties of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Studies 1 and 2found theory-driven associations between people’s subjective per-ception of the conflict’s structure as a Chicken, Assurance, orPrisoner’s Dilemma game and their ingroup/outgroup percep-tions, national identification, religiosity, political partisanship,voting behavior, and right-wing authoritarianism. Studies 3 and4 manipulated the saliency of the needs for cognitive closure andsecurity, respectively, demonstrating that these needs affect people’sendorsement of the game models as descriptions of the conflict.

within a given situation but also have different ways ofconstruing or interpreting the situation (De Dreu &Carnevale, 2003; A. P. Fiske, 1992; Kelley, 1997; Kelley &Thibaut, 1978; Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000; Van

Keywords: intergroup conflict; mixed-motive games; mental repre-sentation

16

Vugt, Meertens, & Van Lange, 1995; Weber, Kopelman, &Messick, 2004). Thus, unlike interdependent decision

Authors’ Note: This research was supported by grants from the IsraelFoundation Trustees (027/05), the Gilo Center for Citizenship,Democracy and Civic Education, and the Davis Institute for the Studyof International Relations to Nir Halevy; a grant from the RecanatiFund of the School of Business Administration at the HebrewUniversity to Lilach Sagiv; and a grant from the Israel ScienceFoundation (535/05) to Gary Bornstein. We wish to thank the editorand two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. We alsowish to thank Shahar Halevy for her assistance in data collection.Please address correspondence to The Hebrew University of Jerusalem,Department of Psychology, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem, Israel, 91905;e-mail: [email protected].

PSPB, Vol. 32 No. 12, December 2006 1674-1689

That subjective perceptions play a pivotal role inintergroup relations has been established repeatedly(Sherif, 1966; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif,1961; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). However, little hasbeen done to study how individuals perceive the pat-tern of outcome interdependence in intergroup con-flicts. This article demonstrates that people holddifferent perceptions of the same real-life intergroupconflict, namely, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; thatthese perceptions are adequately captured by a limitednumber of prototypic mixed-motive games; and thatpeople’s perception of the underlying strategic proper-ties of the conflict in terms of a particular game are pre-dictably associated with other conflict-related beliefs,attitudes, and (reported) behaviors.

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making in laboratory settings, in which the nature of thesituation is assumed to be common knowledge, in realitythe same objective1 situation can evoke different subjec-tive interpretations.

PERCEIVING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIANCONFLICT AS A MIXED-MOTIVE GAME

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a violent, ongoingintergroup conflict that combines ethnic, national,political, and religious elements. This conflict consti-tutes the major cleavage dimension in Israeli politicsand distinguishes the political left and right in Israel(Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Shamir & Shamir, 2000).

Although this conflict is at times highly destructive, wemaintain that it is best modeled as a mixed-motive game.The literature on experimental games distinguishes fullycooperative games, in which the players’ interests com-pletely coincide, from strictly competitive games, inwhich the players’ interests are utterly opposed. Situatedin between these two extremes are mixed-motive games,in which the players’ preferences are neither identicalnor completely contradictory.

Fully cooperative games are clearly (and, needless tosay, regrettably) not relevant for describing the Israeli-Palestinian game. Strictly competitive games are also of

limited relevance. Although individuals sometimes per-ceive intergroup conflicts to be strictly competitive (asresearch on fixed-pie perceptions shows; e.g., De Dreu& Carnevale, 2003), “in everyday life the protagonists’interests are seldom strictly opposed” (Colman, 1999,p. 54). Even in a full-scale war, the most extreme mani-festation of intergroup conflict, there is always a commoninterest, “even if only in the avoidance of mutual disaster”(Schelling, 1980, p. 83; see also Luce & Raiffa, 1957).Indeed, agreeing with Colman (1999) that “strictlycompetitive games certainly occur in everyday life, butmixed-motive games are undoubtedly more common”(p. 54), most researchers have employed the latter cat-egory of games to model intergroup conflicts (Axelrod,1984; Plous, 1985, 1987; Powell, 1989; Roy, 1994).

The current investigation thus focuses on three pro-totypic mixed-motive games, namely, the Chicken,Assurance, and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games, whichwe believe adequately capture both the reality and layperceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Table 1presents the structure of these three games.

The games in Table 1 are 2 × 2 games where eachplayer has to choose whether to cooperate (C) or todefect (D). The three games are similar in the sense thatmutual cooperation (CC) yields better outcomes forboth sides than mutual competition (DD), but when oneside competes while the other side cooperates, the out-come for the unilateral competitor is higher than thatfor the unilateral cooperator. The three games are dif-ferent in that the outcome resulting from mutual coop-eration is highest in Assurance and lower in PD andChicken, whereas the outcome resulting from mutualcompetition is lowest in Chicken and higher in PD andAssurance games.

We now describe in more detail the strategic proper-ties of each of these games in turn. The game of Chickenmodels conflicts that involve mutual threat (e.g., militaryconfrontations or disputes between management andworkers), where the failure of either group to yield leadsto the DD outcome (e.g., war or strike), which is disas-trous to both sides. The fundamental strategic considera-tions in the Chicken game can be described as follows. Ifone group fears that the other group will compete(choose D), its best response is to cooperate or yield(choose C). However, if a group assumes that the othergroup will choose not to compete (i.e., chicken out), itsbest response is to compete. These two asymmetric out-comes (DC and CD) are equilibrium points, meaningthat no side has an incentive to deviate from either ofthem unilaterally. Thus, the group that convincingly com-mits itself to the competitive strategy (D) is bound to win,provided that the other group is rational. Of course, ifboth groups compete in an attempt to win the game, bothare exposed to the risk of getting the mutually disastrous

Halevy et al. / PERCEIVING INTERGROUP CONFLICT 1675

TABLE 1: The Chicken, Assurance, and Prisoner’s Dilemma Games

Chicken

Player II

C D

Player I C 3,3 2,4D 4,2 1,1

Assurance

Player II

C D

Player I C 4,4 1,3D 3,1 2,2

Prisoner’s Dilemma

Player II

C D

Player I C 3,3 1,4D 4,1 2,2

NOTE: Entries in the table represent payoffs on an order scale, withhigher figures denoting more desirable outcomes. In each cell, theleft figure represents the payoff to the row player and the right figurerepresents the payoff to the column player.



DD outcome (i.e., a head-on collision; e.g., Rapoport &Chammah, 1966; Schelling, 1980).

The strategic considerations in the Assurance gameare virtually reversed. If one group fears that the othergroup might compete (choose D), its best response isalso to compete. Competition is the safest (i.e., max-imin) strategy, which protects the group from the possi-bility of losing the competition and guarantees a rewardgreater than that resulting from unilateral cooperation.Yet, if a group expects the outgroup to behave coopera-tively (choose C), its best response is also to cooperate.The mutually cooperative (CC) outcome yields the high-est payoff in this game for both sides—higher than thepayoff for unilateral defection (e.g., Jervis, 1978; Skyrms,2004). Both the mutually competitive (DD) and themutually cooperative (CC) outcomes are equilibriumpoints, and no group can benefit from unilaterally devi-ating from them. The game of Assurance thus models arelatively benign conflict where the temptation of eachside to compete for defensive reasons is balanced by thestrong preference of both sides for mutual cooperation.

In the PD game, the optimal strategy for each groupis to compete (choose D), regardless of whether theother group is expected to cooperate or compete. Thus,unlike the Assurance game, where the groups’ incentiveto compete is clearly defensive (a rational group shouldcompete only if it expects the outgroup to compete aswell), or the Chicken game, where the groups’ incentiveto compete is clearly offensive (a rational group shouldcompete only if it expects the outgroup not to com-pete), competition in the PD game can be motivated byeither defensive or offensive reasons. The DD outcomeresulting from mutual competition is the only equilib-rium of the (one-shot) PD game. However, it is collec-tively deficient; if both groups compete, each receives apayoff that is smaller than the payoff obtained if bothgroups cooperate. Consequently, both groups prefermutual cooperation to mutual defection (e.g., Colman,1999; Poundstone, 1992; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965).

GROUP INTERDEPENDENCE ANDINTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS

Intergroup Perceptions in Experimental Settings

Experiments by Bornstein (1992; Bornstein, Mingelrin,& Rutte, 1996) demonstrated that the structural proper-ties of these three games have profound effects onpeople’s beliefs about ingroup and outgroup membersas well as on their expectations about the outcomes ofthe competition. These experiments involved competi-tion between two groups and showed that when groupmembers were allowed a short period of discussion to

select a joint group strategy, most groups in the Chicken,Assurance, and PD games chose to compete against theoutgroup. However, the rationale for choosing the com-petitive strategy (as coded from group discussions) andthe beliefs of individual group members following dis-cussion (as reflected in the postdecision questionnaire)differed systematically as a function of game type.2

The choice of the competitive strategy in theAssurance game was based on distrust or fear of theopponent. Ingroup members expected the outgroup tocompete and decided to protect themselves against los-ing the game by making the same choice. This “playingit safe” scenario was evident in the group discussions,which included risk-avoidance arguments (e.g., “If wecompete we are assured of at least a tie”) and symmet-ric expectations for the ingroup and the outgroup(e.g., “They must be thinking exactly the same way”). Italso was clear in the postdecision questionnaire, wherethe participants predicted that ingroup and outgroupmembers would be about equally likely to contribute,and consequently expected the game to be tied.

In contrast, the decision to compete in the Chickengame was clearly motivated by greed. Group discussionscontained risk-taking arguments (e.g., “If we compete,it’s either all or nothing”) and asymmetric ingroup/outgroup expectations. Specifically, participants expectedthe outgroup to be less likely to compete (or morelikely to chicken out) and consequently assessed theingroup’s chances of winning as much higher than theoutgroup’s. In the PD game (Bornstein, 1992), the deci-sion to compete was motivated by both defensive andoffensive reasons. Group members assumed that theingroup was somewhat more likely to compete than theoutgroup and estimated their own group’s chances ofwinning the game as slightly higher.

Experiments that allowed nonbinding communica-tion (cheap talk) between the competing groups as wellfurther establish the importance of the games’ payoffstructure in determining intergroup beliefs and behav-iors. Bornstein and Gilula (2003) found that between-group communication invariably led to the mutuallycooperative outcome in the Assurance game while hav-ing absolutely no effect on cooperation in the Chickengame (again, as compared with the no-communicationcondition, Bornstein et al., 1996).

These differential effects are again attributed to thestructural differences between the two games. In theAssurance game, where the only rational reason to com-pete is fear of an irrational or competitive opponent (orfear of the opponent’s fear, and so on), communicationwas effectively used to reassure each group of the othergroup’s rationality (its intention to maximize absolute,rather then relative, payoffs), verify a common under-standing of the game’s payoff structure, and enhance

1676 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN



trust through an explicit agreement of mutual coopera-tion (Majeski & Fricks, 1995). In the Chicken game,communication was utterly useless. Although promisesto play cooperatively often were exchanged, none werekept, and the game was played as competitively, and asinefficiently, as in the no-communication experiment(Bornstein et al., 1996). Furthermore, between-groupcommunication did little to change the biased ingroup/outgroup perceptions; group members still saw them-selves as more determined than their rivals and were stillconfident about their chances to win the game.

Another experiment that studied the effect of between-group communication in the PD game (Bornstein,1992) found it to be less effective in bringing about apeaceful resolution than in the Assurance game yetmore effective in doing so than in the Chicken game.Moreover, between-group communication in the PDgame, while significantly reducing the bias in ingroup/outgroup perceptions, did not eliminate it altogether.Thus, both the theoretical analysis of the games’ struc-ture and the experimental results suggest that inter-group cooperation is more feasible in the Assuranceand PD games than in the Chicken game.

Intergroup Perceptions in Real-Life Contexts

As argued above, perceptions of the strategic proper-ties of real-life conflicts are subjective. Some people canperceive a given conflict as a game of Chicken, where win-ning is what matters most; others as a game of Assurance,where the crucial thing is not losing; and yet others as aPD game, where both winning and not losing are impor-tant (e.g., Plous, 1985, 1987). We assume that the samerelations between game structure and intergroup percep-tions observed in the laboratory would apply outsidethe laboratory as well. Accordingly, we hypothesize thatthe particular way in which individuals perceive or framethe structure of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be asso-ciated with their beliefs about the ingroup, the outgroup,and the expected outcomes of the intergroup conflict.

In addition, people have a strong need for cognitiveconsistency (Abelson et al., 1968; Festinger, 1957),which serves as a mental “glue” that binds together dif-ferent beliefs and attitudes into complex social andpolitical syndromes (e.g., ethnocentrism, LeVine &Campbell, 1972; political conservatism, Jost, Glaser,Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). We therefore expectpeople’s perception of the conflict to be associated withother conflict-related variables.

Specific hypotheses. Our first hypothesis is that perceiv-ing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a game of Chickencorrelates positively with perceptions of ingroup superi-ority (i.e., high ingroup bias, S. T. Fiske, 2002; Hewstone,Rubin, & Willis, 2002), whereas perceiving it to be a

game of Assurance correlates negatively with percep-tions of ingroup superiority. We expect people who per-ceive the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a PD game toreport ingroup/outgroup perceptions located inbetween the two extremes reported by endorsers of theChicken game and of the Assurance game.

Intergroup conflict enhances ethnocentrism (Brewer,1999; LeVine & Campbell, 1972), which manifests itselfin different ways in various intergroup settings. In a warbetween nations, ethnocentrism can be found in certaintypes of national identification (e.g., Kosterman &Feshbach, 1989; Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001;Schatz & Staub, 1997). In rivalry between religiousgroups, ethnocentrism is reflected in the tendency ofingroup members to treat outgroup members with hos-tility and aggression (e.g., Allport, 1954; Beit-Hallahmi &Argyle, 1997; Fox, 2004; Struch & Schwartz, 1989; White& Langer, 1999). In political disputes, ethnocentrismmay lead to strict adherence to political partisanship andideology and rejection of alternative worldviews (e.g.,Chambers, Baron, & Inman, 2006; Cohen, 2003; Jost,Glaser, et al., 2003).

We therefore hypothesize that perceiving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a game of Chicken, in which theonly stable solution is the asymmetric outcome whereone group dominates the other, will correlate positivelywith national identification, religiosity, and right-wingpolitical partisanship (including both political orienta-tion and actual voting behavior). Complementarily, wehypothesize that perceiving the conflict as a game ofAssurance, in which both stable solutions involve equaloutcomes for the ingroup and the outgroup, will corre-late negatively with these ethnocentric attitudes. Finally,as with intergroup perceptions, we expect the associa-tions between these variables and the endorsement ofthe PD game to be located somewhere in between.

STUDY 1

Study 1 was designed to explore the basic models ofoutcome interdependence that individuals use to rep-resent the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in their mindsand the relations between these subjective perceptionsof the conflict and other conflict-related constructs.Finding meaningful and consistent associations betweenthe two would indicate that prototypical mixed-motivegames indeed capture common subjective perceptionsof the conflict and that these subjective perceptions canbe used to predict important social and political phe-nomena. Specifically, Study 1 examined associationsbetween the endorsement of a particular game modeland (a) perceptions of conflict of interests between theIsraelis and the Palestinians, (b) evaluative ingroup bias,




(c) national identification, (d) religiosity, (e) politicalpartisanship, and (f) voting behavior.

Method

Sample. Five hundred and six individuals, includingboth students and nonstudents (age range from 18 to64, M age = 27 years, 45% women), responded to thissurvey. All the respondents were Israeli citizens belong-ing to the Jewish majority group. Respondents wererecruited through snowball sampling that started simul-taneously at the campuses of eight institutions forhigher education in Israel (six universities, one teachers’seminar, and one yeshiva—school for higher Jewishstudies). A research assistant approached potentialrespondents on their way into a university library or apublic library, asking them to respond to a survey con-cerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Participation wascompletely voluntary and respondents were not rewardedor compensated in any way.

MEASURES

Endorsement of games. We constructed three differentwritten descriptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict tofit the defining strategic properties of the Chicken,Assurance, and PD games, as described above. Thismethod is consistent with the view (a) that perceptionsof intergroup conflict are mentally represented as “sto-ries,” (b) that there can be more than one such story,and (c) that these multiple stories can be hierarchicallyorganized in individuals’ minds (Sternberg, 2003).Three expert judges (scholars who regularly use mixed-motive games in their own lines of research) were askedto read each of the scenarios and identify the game asso-ciated with each description. All three judges correctlyidentified the games behind the written descriptions.

Respondents read three paragraph-long descriptions,each depicting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a differ-ent mixed-motive game (see the appendix). The orderin which the three descriptions were presented was coun-terbalanced. Participants first read all the descriptionssuccessively. Then they were instructed to read eachdescription again (on a separate sheet) and respond toseveral questions. This method was used to ensure thatparticipants read through all the alternative descriptionsbefore responding. Participants were subsequently askedto rate on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (verymuch) the extent to which they thought each descriptionaccurately reflected the nature of the Israeli-Palestinianconflict. Specifically, they were asked to rate the extent towhich they perceived each description to fit (a) thenature of the conflict, (b) Israelis’ view of the conflict,and (c) Palestinians’ view of the conflict. Cronbach’salphas for these three items exceeded .75 for all three

descriptions. The responses were then averaged to com-pute a single endorsement index for each game descrip-tion. In addition to the rating measure, participants wereasked to order the scenarios from the one with whichthey agreed the most to the one with which they agreedthe least. The rationale behind the employment of twomeasures of game endorsement was the reasoning thatindividuals might differ in the extent to which they usemixed-motive games to represent real-life intergroupconflicts in their mind. Hence, including both a ratingmeasure and a ranking measure to assess endorsementof games allowed us to assess the extent to which indi-viduals possessed a consistent, consolidated perceptionof this conflict in terms of a particular game.3

Perceived conflict of interests. To validate our scenarios, weassessed individuals’ perceptions of the level of conflict ofinterests between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Weexpected that individuals who see the conflict as a gameof Chicken would perceive the interests of the two sides ashighly conflicting and irreconcilable and that individualswho perceive the conflict as a game of Assurance wouldsee the interests of the two sides as least conflicting.Perceived conflict of interests was assessed using five pairsof items, each measuring the subjective belief that each ofthe competing sides would achieve its goals. The firststatement in each pair referred to the expected successof the Israelis and the second referred to that ofthe Palestinians (e.g., “The chances that the Israelis/Palestinians will achieve most of their goals in the conflictare . . . ”). The respondents’ task was to estimate eachside’s probability of success (between 0% to 100%). Foreach individual, we averaged the five probability estimatesfor the Israelis and the five for the Palestinians to createmean expected success scores for the Israelis and thePalestinians, respectively. A negative correlation betweenthese two scores reflects the perception that one group’ssuccess in achieving its goals must be at the expense ofthe other group and thus indicates a perception of con-flicting interests. A positive correlation between these twoexpectation scores indicates a perception of commonalityof interests, reflecting a belief that profits for one groupmay involve gains for the other group too.

Evaluative ingroup bias. Participants rated bothIsraelis (ingroup members) and Palestinians (outgroupmembers) on three traits (morality, trustworthiness,and violence) on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to7 (very much). We computed a difference score for eachparticipant by subtracting the rating of the Palestiniansfrom that of the Israelis (after reverse-coding the vio-lence item) and averaged the three difference scores tocreate a single ingroup bias index for each participant.Higher scores on this index indicate greater evaluativeingroup bias. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was .82.




Ethnocentrism. We used a 16-item scale to measurenational identification. This scale had been validatedin previous research (e.g., Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, inpress). Participants indicated their agreement or dis-agreement with each statement (e.g., “Being Israeli isan important part of my identity”; “It is important to meto contribute to my country”) on a scale ranging from1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). Cronbach’salpha for this scale was .92.

We used a single item validated in pretests to mea-sure self-reported religiosity. Respondents indicatedtheir religiosity on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to7 (very much). Political partisanship was measured ontwo scales ranging from 1 (not at all similar) to 6 (verysimilar). Participants were asked to indicate the extentto which their political attitudes normally resembledthose of the hawkish, right-wing side of the politicalmap and those of the dovish, left-wing side of the polit-ical spectrum. We computed a single index of right-wing political orientation by subtracting the responseon the left-wing item from the response on the right-wing item. Higher scores on this index indicate a morehawkish political orientation. Finally, respondents indi-cated which political party they had voted for in thepreceding general elections, which took place about 6months prior to the administration of the survey.

Results and Discussion

Endorsement of games. Two measures (rating and rank-ing) were used to assess the extent to which each indi-vidual perceived the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as agame of Chicken, a game of Assurance, and a PD game.For each respondent, we compared the responses onthe two measures. Respondents were classified as con-sistent if they rated a particular game highest on the rat-ing scales and ranked the same game as the most fittingdescription of the conflict on the ranking measure.Respondents were classified as inconsistent if they ratedone game as most fitting but ranked a different game asthe best description.

Of 506 respondents, 335 (66%) were classified as con-sistent (hereafter labeled the CONS group) because theyprovided consistent responses to the rating and rankingmeasures. In this group, 67% of the participants per-ceived the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a game ofAssurance, 19% as a game of Chicken, and 14% as a PDgame. The other 171 participants (hereafter labeledthe NCONS group) were inconsistent in their responses,favoring one game in the rating scale and another inthe ranking measure.4 We tested our hypotheses sepa-rately for each of these two groups.

Results for the consistent majority. A MANOVA revealedthat the order in which the different game descriptions

were presented to respondents did not significantlyaffect game endorsement (p > .10 for all three games).Table 2 presents the means and standard deviationsof the research variables separately for the CONS andNCONS groups. As expected, within the CONS group,the relation between the interests of the Israelis andthose of the Palestinians was seen as negative by respon-dents who endorsed the game of Chicken (r = –.55,p < .001) and as positive by respondents who endorsedthe game of Assurance (r = .46, p < .001). Also in accordwith our expectations, respondents who endorsed thePD game perceived the conflict of interests between theIsraelis and Palestinians to be in between these twoextremes (r = .03, ns). These three correlations differedsignificantly from each other (Fischer’s Z ranged from2.78 to 7.77, all ps < .005).

Table 3 presents the correlations between theresearch variables for these two groups. In accordancewith our hypotheses, evaluative ingroup bias, nationalidentification, religiosity, and political hawkishness allcorrelated positively with endorsement of the Chickengame and negatively with endorsement of the Assurancegame. The associations with endorsement of the PDgame were consistently between these two extremes.Finally, as hypothesized, endorsement of a particulargame to describe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also wasassociated with the self-reported vote in the last generalelections. Specifically, those who endorsed the Chickengame as a description of the conflict voted primarily for


TABLE 2: Means and Standard Deviations of the Research Variablesas a Function of Game Endorsement (upper and lowerlines in each row are for the CONS and NCONS groups,respectively).

Conflict Perceived as a Game of

Chicken PD Assurance

Identification with 5.41 (.91) 4.99 (.90) 4.56 (1.11)one’s nation

5.18 (.93) 4.99 (1.03) 4.53 (.91)Evaluative ingroup bias 4.02 (1.41) 2.73 (1.67) 2.01 (1.57)

3.41 (1.28) 2.66 (1.81) 1.75 (1.27)Religiosity 3.94 (2.35) 2.53 (2.10) 1.54 (1.90)

2.96 (2.44) 2.28 (2.13) 1.69 (1.76)Right-wing (hawkish) 2.47 (2.42) .73 (2.98) –1.61 (2.79)Political orientation 1.81 (2.40) .53 (2.92) –1.29 (2.76)Voting for right-wing 75% 50% 18%Political partiesa 79% 39% 20%Voting for left-wing 4% 25% 58%Political partiesa 5% 29% 64%

NOTE: The differences between means for Chicken and Assuranceare significant (all ps < .001). The differences between Chicken andPrisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and between Assurance and PD are signifi-cant (all ps < .05).a. Indicates a valid percentage. Individuals who did not vote in thepreceding elections are omitted (valid ns = 274 and 123 for the con-sistent [CONS] and inconsistent [NCONS] groups, respectively).




nationalist right-wing political parties, whereas thosewho endorsed the Assurance game voted primarily forleft-wing parties. Endorsing the PD game was associatedwith voting for more moderate parties located near thecenter of the political spectrum.

We subsequently carried out a more fine-grainedanalysis of our ranking data to further test our hypothe-ses. We expected to find a different pattern of responsesfor respondents who rank-ordered the games differently.Specifically, for all four variables—identification withone’s nation, evaluative ingroup bias, religiosity, andright-wing political orientation—we expected to findthe following order of means, from lowest to highest:(1) Assurance-PD-Chicken, (2) Assurance-Chicken-PD,(3) PD-Assurance-Chicken, (4) PD-Chicken-Assurance,(5) Chicken-Assurance-PD, (6) Chicken-PD-Assurance.To test this hypothesis, we computed four Spearman cor-relation coefficients between the expected and theobserved order of means for each of the four variables.Consistent with our hypothesis, the Spearman correla-tion coefficients were .94 (p = .005) for identificationwith the nation and 1.00 (indicating a perfect match) forevaluative ingroup bias, religiosity, and a right-wing polit-ical orientation.

Age correlated negatively (although very weakly)with endorsement of the Chicken and PD games(r = –.10, p = .057; r = –.11, p = .049, respectively)and insignificantly with endorsement of the Assurancegame (p > .50). Level of education did not significantlyaffect the endorsement of either the Chicken game(p > .30) or the Assurance game (p > .70). The meanendorsement of the PD game was higher for respon-dents with 12 or fewer years of formal education andlower for respondents with university degrees (4.17 vs.3.49, respectively), t(271) = –2.74, p = .007. Finally, menendorsed the Chicken game more strongly than didwomen (Ms = 3.71 vs. 3.30, respectively), t(332) = 2.37,p = .019, whereas women endorsed the Assurance gamemore strongly than did men (Ms = 5.30 vs. 4.72, respec-tively), t(332) = –3.69, p = .000. There were no gender

effects for endorsement of the PD game (Ms = 3.69 formen and 3.50 for women, p = .361).

Results for the inconsistent minority. A MANOVA revealedthat the order in which the different game descriptionswere presented to respondents did not significantlyaffect game endorsement in this group either (ps > .15for all three games). As can be seen in Tables 2 and 3, thepattern of means and associations between the researchvariables in the NCONS group was generally the same asin the CONS group. Nevertheless, as expected, the cor-relations between the endorsement of a particular game(using the rating measure) and other constructs wereconsiderably weaker in the NCONS group.

Study 1 demonstrated that the Chicken, Assurance,and PD games capture the basic ways in which individ-uals think about a real-life intergroup conflict. It alsofound that individuals use different games to representthe same real-life intergroup conflict and that theserepresentations are significantly associated with conflict-related beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. This suggeststhat the systematic relations between the nature ofgroup interdependence and intergroup perceptionspreviously found in laboratory experiments (Bornstein,1992; Bornstein et al., 1996; Bornstein & Gilula, 2003)also can be extended to real-life intergroup conflicts.

STUDY 2

Study 2 focused on the association between theendorsement of a particular game and the belief thatcertain relations ought to exist between the ingroupand the outgroup. Specifically, Study 2 examined theassociations between endorsement of the Chicken andAssurance games as valid descriptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and right-wing authoritarianism.

Right-wing authoritarianism entails a perceptionof constant social threat from either inside or outsidethe group. According to Altemeyer (1998), right-wingauthoritarians hold the view of “the world as a dangerous

TABLE 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients Among Research Variables for the CONS (n = 335, above the diagonal) and NCONS (n = 171,below the diagonal) Groups

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1. Conflict perceived as a Chicken game .23** –.37** .37** .45** .47** .34**2. Conflict perceived as a PD game .17* –.10 .20* .12* .18* .023. Conflict perceived as an Assurance game .00 .51** –.23** –.36** –.49** –.42**4. Identification with one’s nation .08 .01 –.14 .65** .56** .44**5. Evaluative ingroup bias .21* –.08 –.24* .63** .65** .49**6. Right-wing political orientation .18* –.08 –.27* .47** .57** .58**7. Religiosity –.02 –.04 –.22* .42** .37** .56**

NOTE: PD = Prisoner’s Dilemma; CONS = consistent group; NCONS = inconsistent group.*p < .05. **p < .001.



place on the brink of self-destruction from evil and vio-lence” (p. 52). Indeed, research shows that the percep-tion of social threat, as opposed to personal threat, isstrongly associated with authoritarianism (Duckitt,Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; Feldman & Stenner,1997). Because outgroups are often considered a poten-tial source of threat, right-wing authoritarianism, asa sociopolitical worldview, often is associated with eth-nocentrism, prejudice, discrimination, and intolerance(Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950;Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1998; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003;Eckhardt, 1991; Feldman, 2003; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).

Seeing the outgroup as a threatening enemy ratherthan a potential collaborator predisposes individualswith a high score on right-wing authoritarianism toendorse the Chicken game as a description of intergroupconflicts in general and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict inparticular. Consistent with the worldview of right-wingauthoritarianism, the Chicken game portrays intergroupconflict as a dangerous game, where winning is crucialand mutual disaster is a real possibility. Also consistentwith their perception of the conflict as a Chicken gameis the tendency of right-wing authoritarians to favora forceful reaction to outgroup threat and to believe inthe superiority of the ingroup over the outgroup. Wethus hypothesize that right-wing authoritarianism corre-lates positively with endorsement of the Chicken gameand negatively with endorsement of the Assurance gameto describe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Method

One hundred and ninety-four students (M age = 24,SD = 2, 57% women) responded to this survey. Studentswere approached in class by a research assistant andwere offered the chance to participate in a lotteryin which two prizes of 100NIS each (approximately US$20) would be given out.

Respondents completed a 10-item version of the right-wing authoritarianism scale (McFarland, 2005). Pretestresults (N = 90) showed that this short measure of right-wing authoritarianism correlates strongly (.87, p < .001)with Altemeyer’s 30-item scale. Respondents subsequentlycompleted the measure of game endorsement used inStudy 1. Based on the findings of Study 1, which showedthat the Chicken and Assurance games are situated at thetwo extreme poles of intergroup perception, Study 2 usedonly these two games, omitting the PD game.


In accord with our hypothesis, right-wing authoritari-anism correlated positively with endorsement of theChicken game (r = .44, p < .001) and negatively withendorsement of the Assurance game (r = –.39, p < .001)

as accounts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Theseresults extend those of Study 1 by showing that endorse-ment of these game models is associated not only withviews of the ingroup and the outgroup but also with asocial-political worldview that addresses the relations thatought to exist between the ingroup and the outgroup.Right-wing authoritarianism, in particular, has importantimplications for intergroup relations and might there-fore affect the prospects of conflict resolution.

Studies 1 and 2 used surveys to investigate how indi-viduals utilize abstract game models to describe theirsubjective views of a real-life intergroup conflict.Studies 3 and 4 employed experimental designs tostudy the role of individual needs in motivatingpeople’s perception of intergroup conflict. Consistentwith the motivated social cognition approach (e.g., Jost,Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003; Jost, Glaser, et al.,2003; Kruglanski, 1996), we maintain that individuals’endorsement of a simple game to describe a complexintergroup conflict might be aimed, at least in part, atsatisfying certain individual needs (see also Bar-Tal,Kruglanski, & Klar, 1989).

STUDY 3

Schematic perceptions of a real-life intergroup con-flict are first and foremost information structures,which follow the same epistemic processes as all otherbeliefs (Bar-Tal et al., 1989, p. 237). Study 3 investigatesthe extent to which such perceptions are indeed sensi-tive to an experimental manipulation known to affectepistemic processes. Specifically, Study 3 focuses on theeffect of an experimentally induced need for cognitiveclosure on endorsement of game models to describethe Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Certain informational states are considered reward-ing (e.g., absolute confidence in one’s knowledge, sim-plified cognitive structures; Van Hiel, Pandelaere, &Duriez, 2004). Trying to attain these desired states oftenaffects the nature of the epistemic processes that indi-viduals employ, as well as the results of these processes.Specifically, epistemic needs affect the duration of thequest for knowledge and the mental flexibility exercisedin this quest (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster,1996). According to Lay Epistemic Theory (Kruglanski,1989), individuals dislike uncertainty and ambiguity.This tendency often leads people to adopt firm beliefsand prefer simple information structures.

Study 3 was designed to examine whether temporar-ily increasing people’s need for cognitive closure affectstheir endorsement of the various game models asdescriptions of an intergroup conflict. Research sug-gests that “individuals high in need for cognitive




closure may tend to construe conflicts in a one-sided,black-and-white fashion. This suggests that a high needfor cognitive closure should be associated with a moreaggressive approach toward intergroup conflict” (Golec& Federico, 2004, p. 750). Thus, one plausible hypoth-esis is that temporarily raising people’s need for closurewill lead to greater endorsement of the Chicken gameand lower endorsement of the Assurance game todescribe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Golec andFederico (2004) further suggest that a strong need forcognitive closure might “produce increased reliance onsalient beliefs about how the conflict should be dealtwith” (p. 570). Thus, a second plausible hypothesis isthat temporarily raising people’s need for cognitive clo-sure may lead to increased endorsement of the Chickenor of the Assurance game, depending on the percep-tion one held to begin with.

We maintain, however, that although the Chickenand Assurance games have different strategic proper-ties, the two games are similar in the sense that bothenable individuals to replace a complex real-life situa-tion of interdependence with a simplified abstractstructure in their mind. The Chicken and Assuranceare both 2 × 2 mixed-motive games and are thus equallysimple (or complex). We therefore assume that the twogames are equally suited for satisfying the epistemicneed for a simplified mental representation of theintergroup conflict. Consequently, we tested thehypothesis that increasing people’s need for cognitiveclosure would lead them to indiscriminately endorseeither game as an account of the Israeli-Palestinian con-flict. Of importance, Study 3 was designed to allow fal-sification of all three competing hypotheses (i.e.,increased aggressiveness, increased reliance on preex-isting beliefs, and undiscriminating endorsement ofboth games).

To manipulate the saliency of epistemic needs, wevaried the level of cognitive load (CL). Previousresearch has shown that increasing CL renders infor-mation processing more effortful and costly so thatindividuals are quicker to form judgments and showgreater preference for well-structured information(e.g., Bar-Tal et al., 1989; Landau et al., 2004). Thus, wepredict that participants in the high CL condition willendorse the Chicken and Assurance games indiscrimi-nately, regardless of whether they are right-wing or left-wing supporters, whereas participants in the low CLcondition (the control group) would perceive the con-flict as either a game of Chicken or as a game ofAssurance, depending on their political worldview.That is, consistent with the findings of Study 1, whenCL is low, right-wing supporters should prefer theChicken game over the Assurance game, whereas left-wing supporters should show the reverse pattern.

Method

One hundred and eighteen students (M age = 24,SD = 3, 42% women) participated. Participants wererecruited through ads on campus offering a monetaryreward (approximately US$3) for participation.Participants were randomly assigned to the low CL orhigh CL condition. We used a standard paradigm of adigit-span memory task to manipulate cognitive load.Participants in the low cognitive load condition had tomemorize (and later recall) a three-digit number duringinformation processing (i.e., while responding to thesame measure of game endorsement used in Study 2),whereas participants in the high cognitive load conditionwere given a 10-digit number to memorize and recall.

We assessed the endorsement of game models andpolitical partisanship (right-wing/left-wing) using thesame methods employed in Studies 1 and 2. We com-puted a difference score for each individual by sub-tracting the response on the left-wing scale from thaton the right-wing scale. Participants were classified asright-wing supporters if their difference score was posi-tive and as left-wing supporters if it was negative.


In accord with our hypothesis, participants in thelow CL condition differed significantly in the endorse-ment of the two game models as a function of theirworldview (political partisanship), namely, left-wingsupporters were more likely than right-wing supportersto endorse the Assurance game, whereas right-wingsupporters were more likely than left-wing supportersto endorse the Chicken game. The participants in thehigh CL condition were equally likely to endorse eithergame regardless of their worldview. These results aredepicted in Figure 1.

Specifically, when cognitive load was low, the meanendorsement score for the Assurance game as adescription of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was 5.00for left-wing and 3.69 for right-wing supporters, t(49) =3.19, p < .005. The mean endorsement of the Chickengame in this condition was 3.40 for left-wing and 4.73right-wing supporters, t(49) = –3.12, p < .005. Whencognitive load was high, the mean endorsement of theAssurance game was 5.00 and 4.55 for left-wing andright-wing supporters, respectively, t(52) = 1.21, p > .20,whereas the mean endorsement of the Chicken gamewas 4.10 and 4.61 for left-wing and right-wing support-ers, respectively, t(53) = –1.02, p > .30.

The results of Study 3 indicate that a strong need forcognitive closure leads to undiscriminating endorse-ment of both game models as plausible accounts of theconflict. The study did not find support for the notionthat the need for cognitive closure increases support




for a competitive, black-and-white (“us or them”) viewof the conflict or that it increases reliance on preexist-ing schematic perceptions of the conflict.

STUDY 4

Study 4 was designed to examine the effect of securityneeds on endorsement of the Chicken and Assurancegames as plausible accounts of the Israeli-Palestinianconflict. In contrast to epistemic needs, rendering secu-rity needs salient should facilitate a differential endorse-ment of the games, leading individuals to choose onegame over the other as the more accurate account ofthis conflict.

Fear and greed are the two prime motivators forcompeting in intergroup conflict (e.g., Insko et al.,1993; Insko & Schopler, 1987; Insko, Schopler, Hoyle,Dardis, & Graetz, 1990). Analyses of social motivesin experimental settings (e.g., Bornstein et al., 1996;Bornstein & Gilula, 2003; Kelley et al., 2003) suggestthat the game of Assurance makes fear and the need forsecurity more salient than the game of Chicken, wheregreed is the prime motivator. In addition, the game ofAssurance provides a benign, reassuring, stable solutionto the conflict situation, which the threatening game ofChicken does not. Study 4 thus tested the hypothesisthat rendering security needs salient would increasesupport for the fear-associated Assurance game butwould not affect endorsement of the greed-associatedChicken game.

Method

One hundred and thirty-two students participated(M age = 24, SD = 3, 61% women). Participants wererecruited through ads on campus offering a monetaryreward (approximately U.S.$4) for participation. Wemanipulated the saliency of security needs using a mor-tality salience manipulation derived from research in the Terror Management paradigm (e.g., Cozzolino,Staples, Meyers, & Samboceti, 2004; Greenberg,Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). Participants were ran-domly assigned to the mortality salience (MS) conditionor a control condition. Participants in the MS conditionread a scenario depicting death by fire in an apartmentbuilding and were asked to imagine themselves in thissituation. Participants in the control condition read a scenario depicting a harmless visit to a similar apart-ment building and were asked to imagine themselves inthat situation (Cozzolino et al., 2004). Then, partici-pants in both conditions responded to an open-endedquestion asking them to describe their thoughts andemotions in detail. Following the experimental manip-ulation, individuals received the same measures ofgame endorsement and political partisanship used inStudies 1 through 3.


Manipulation check. Each phrase in the responses tothe open-ended question was coded as indicating nega-tive, positive, or neutral emotions, reflections, and phys-ical reactions. Examples of negative responses werefear, frustration, stress, anxiety, helplessness, and stat-ing a “difficulty in breathing.” Examples of positiveresponses were calm, happy, satisfied, relaxed, fun, andpleasant. Examples of neutral responses were curious,indifferent, strange, and describing the story as “unre-alistic.” For each participant, we computed a differencescore by subtracting the number of positive responsesfrom the number of negative responses. Higher scoreson this measure indicate a more negative reaction.Participants in the MS condition reported significantlymore negative reactions than did participants in thecontrol condition (M = 1.96, SD = 1.93; M = –1.58, SD =1.55, respectively), t(130) = 11.58, p = .000.

In accord with our hypothesis, the mean endorse-ment of the Assurance game as an accurate account ofthe Israeli-Palestinian conflict was significantly higherin the MS condition than in the control condition(M endorsement = 5.12 vs. 4.51, respectively), t(130) =2.23, p < .05. As expected, the MS manipulation did notsignificantly affect the endorsement of the greed-associated Chicken game (M endorsement = 3.69 vs.3.86, in the MS and control conditions, respectively),p > .50. The results are presented in Figure 2.


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Right Wing Left Wing Right Wing Left Wing

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Figure 1 Endorsement of game models by political partisanshipunder conditions of low and high cognitive load.

NOTE: CL = cognitive load.



Analyzing the results separately for right-wing andleft-wing supporters indicates that although bothgroups were more likely to endorse the Assurance gamein the MS condition than in the control condition, theeffect was statistically significant only for right-wing sup-porters. The mean endorsement scores for the right-wing participants were 4.67 and 3.62 in the MS andcontrol conditions, respectively, t(54) = 2.34, p < .05.For left-wing supporters, these scores were 5.70 and5.24, respectively, t(58) = 1.58, p < .15. The smallereffect size among left-wing supporters probably reflectsa ceiling effect because these participants tended toendorse the Assurance game more strongly to beginwith. Still, Study 4 lends further support to the view thatpeople’s perceptions of intergroup conflict are moti-vated, at least in part, by the saliency of individualneeds. Of importance, Study 4 used a manipulation ofincidental (rather than integral) threat caused by anexogenous source and not by the stimulus under judg-ment (i.e., we did not use outgroup threat or threatcaused by the intergroup conflict itself as our manipu-lation). Identifying the outgroup as the source of threatmight plausibly lead to a different pattern of results(see Study 2 for a discussion of the associations betweenperceived outgroup threat and game endorsement).

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Surveys administered to both students and nonstu-dents in Israel were used to examine the extent to whichsubjective views of the strategic properties of the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be captured by three pro-totypic mixed-motive games and whether these views areassociated with other conflict-related psychological con-structs. Studies 1 and 2 found that perceiving the conflictin terms of a particular game was predictably associatedwith beliefs and attitudes regarding the ingroup and theoutgroup as well as with more general belief-systems,worldviews, and behaviors that affect the relationsbetween the conflicting groups. Studies 3 and 4 providedinitial support for the notion that perceiving the conflictas a simple mixed-motive game is motivationally func-tional. Specifically, Study 3 showed that rendering epis-temic needs salient facilitates the endorsement of eitherthe Chicken or the Assurance game. These two games,being similar in simplicity, seem to be equally suitable forsatisfying people’s need to replace a complex real-lifeconflict with a simple mental structure. Study 4 showedthat increasing the saliency of security needs increasespeople’s tendency to endorse the Assurance game as anaccurate account of the conflict.

The current research builds on Realistic ConflictTheory (Campbell, 1972; Coser, 1956; Sherif, 1966), inpresupposing that the (real or perceived) interdepen-dence between the groups is crucial and that differentpatterns of interdependence lead to different cogni-tions and behaviors. However, although realistic con-flict theory (as well as research on conflict schemas,e.g., Bar-Tal et al., 1989; Golec & Federico, 2004) makesonly a crude distinction between competitive and coop-erative intergroup relations, we employed a more fine-grained distinction between different games, eachcontaining a qualitatively different mixture of competi-tive and cooperative elements.

The finding that people use different games todescribe the same real-life conflict also is consistentwith the Social Identity approach (e.g., Tajfel & Turner,1979, 1986; for reviews, see Brown, 2000; Turner, 1999),which emphasizes the role of subjective views in shap-ing intergroup relations. We agree with the SocialIdentity approach that intergroup conflict is, to somedegree, in the eyes of the beholder. Moreover, consis-tent with the assertions of the Social Identity approach,the present study demonstrates that subjective percep-tions of a real-life conflict are meaningfully associatedwith group identification.

The results of this research also are consistent withinterdependence theory as applied to interpersonal,mainly dyadic, relations. Kelley and Thibaut (1978),and more recently Kelley et al. (2003), theorized thatindividuals may mentally transform the structure of agiven payoff matrix and act on the new effective matrixwhen making their decisions. Kiyonari et al. (2000)argued that individuals often transform the Prisoner’sDilemma game into an Assurance game and behave


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Control Mortality Salience

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Figure 2 Endorsement of game models under conditions of mortal-ity salience and control.



accordingly. We add to these findings by showing thatindividuals subjectively transform the structure of areal-life intergroup conflict in a manner consistent withtheir preexisting beliefs and worldviews.

Our findings also relate to the literature on socialvalue orientations. This literature shows that people’sperceptions and behavior in both laboratory and real-life social situations is meaningfully associated with thevalue they attach to their own outcomes as comparedwith the outcomes of others with whom they are inter-dependent (Joireman, Van Lange, Kuhlman, Van Vugt,& Shelley, 1997; Liebrand, Wilke, Vogel, & Wolters,1986; Van Lange, 1999, 2004; Van Vugt et al., 1995). Thefindings of the current research indicate that people dif-fer in their perceptions of the pattern of outcome inter-dependence. Future research could examine whethersocial value orientations affect these perceptions. Thus,future research on social value orientations could focusnot only on the way people perceive interdependencesituations in laboratory settings (provided to partici-pants in the form of payoff matrices) but also investigateindividuals’ perceptions of the structural properties ofreal-life social interactions (e.g., Joireman et al., 1997).

Research on the “Might versus Morality” effect is par-ticularly relevant in this respect. Liebrand, Jansen,Rijken, and Suhre (1986) found that whereas individu-als with prosocial motives interpreted interdependencedecision making in terms of morality, individuals withproself motives interpreted the same task in terms ofpower relations. Van Lange and Kuhlman (1994)manipulated the perceived honesty and perceived intel-ligence of partners, showing that social value orienta-tions moderate the effects of this information onparticipants’ expectations regarding partners’ coopera-tion as well their own cooperation. Finally, De Dreu andBoles (1998) showed that social motives are associatedwith negotiators’ information processing in that proso-cial individuals choose and recall more cooperativethan competitive heuristics when preparing for negoti-ation, whereas competitors display the reverse pattern.Based on these studies, it is plausible to assume thatsocial value orientations would be related to individualdifferences in the endorsement of game models todescribe real-life intergroup conflicts as well.

Methodological Issues and Research Limitations

In the current research, we measured perceptions ofoutcomes interdependence (i.e., endorsement of games)using verbal descriptions of games. This approachunavoidably involves making choices about the phrasingor framing of strategies and outcomes. These framingeffects can potentially change the way the situation is per-ceived (e.g., Allison, Beggan, & Midgley, 1996; De Dreu

& McCusker, 1997; Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004;Weber et al., 2004).

An alternative method would be using 2 × 2 matricesto describe the games (see, e.g., Joireman et al., 1997;Kelley, 1979, pp. 85-91). Such a method providesabstract, context-free descriptions of the games and isthus less contaminated by a specific social context.However, such a method might be less natural for par-ticipants as a means for reporting their perceptions andpreferences. Lay cognition about social situations isprobably not organized as outcome matrices (Joiremanet al., 1997, p. 443) but rather has story-like qualities(Sternberg, 2003). Future research could compare thetwo approaches.

For the sake of simplicity, two important issues havebeen largely ignored in the article. First, the descriptionsof the conflict that were provided to participants por-trayed a game that is played once, in which decisions aremade simultaneously with no communication betweenthe players. In real life intergroup conflicts, the game istypically an ongoing one, moves are rarely simultaneous,formal and informal communication is regularlyexchanged between the sides, and each side constantlyobserves the other in an attempt to assess its intentionsand capabilities. Intergroup conflicts in general, and theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, are complexdynamic games rather than simple matrix games.Nevertheless, we theorize (as does the theory of interde-pendence, e.g., Kelley et al., 2003) that the static proper-ties of games can provide valuable insights into people’sbehavior and cognition in dynamic games as well.

Second, groups, certainly nations, are not unitaryplayers. To execute a collective group strategy, thegroup has to induce its individual members to con-tribute the necessary effort (of time, money, and will-ingness to risk injury and death). Moving from groupdecision to group action is not trivial. This is so becauseindividual contribution, while being potentially verycostly, can hardly affect the outcome of a large-scaleconflict, and the payoffs associated with the outcome ofthe conflict are often available to all group membersregardless of whether they contributed (these payoffs,in other words, are public goods, Bornstein, 2003;Rapoport & Bornstein, 1987).

Relevance for Other Types of Intergroup Conflict

What is key to our research is the assumption that alimited number of abstract interdependence patternscan capture both the objective social reality of inter-group conflicts and the subjective mental representationof this reality (e.g., Anderson, 1991; A. P. Fiske, 1992;Kelley, 1997). Kelley (1997) suggested that the ability tothink about social interdependence in an abstract way




is what enables individuals to develop cognitive, emo-tional, and behavioral strategies to cope with variousinterdependence situations “that are diverse in theirdetails but similar in their essential features” (p. 152).The Chicken, Assurance, and PD games may have fig-ural prominence in the stimulus field, which accordingto Kelley (1997), gives them prototypic (or “deep struc-ture”; Chomsky, 1980) status in people’s minds.

We suggest the concept of conflict templates to dis-tinguish between the recurring fundamental patternsor structural regularities used by people to representintergroup conflicts in their mind and the very samegames used by scholars to model the reality of such con-flicts or to reproduce it in the laboratory. Clearly, asshown by the present study, people may use differentmental templates to grasp the same real conflict, andwe assume that different conflicts may be perceivedusing the same template.

Thus, although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (simi-lar to any other real-life conflict) has many unique fea-tures, the knowledge provided by the current researchmay perhaps be used for understanding other inter-group conflicts as well. Preliminary research has alreadyshown that people differentially endorse the Chickenand Assurance games to describe religious and organi-zational conflicts. For example, Halevy, Bornstein,Sagiv, and Roccas (2004) showed that in the conflictbetween different religious factions within Judaism(orthodox vs. reformed Jews in Israel), social distance(e.g., Struch & Schwartz, 1989) correlated positivelywith endorsement of the Chicken game and negativelywith the endorsement of the Assurance game.

Moreover, as shown by another study, people caneffectively use these games not only to describe person-ally relevant conflicts but also to reflect on conflicts thatdo not involve their own group. Halevy, Bornstein,Sagiv, and Roccas (2005) investigated how peopleattribute different conflict templates to differentleaders. International relations students read verbaldescriptions of an abstract (context-free) intergroupconflict, portrayed once as a game of Chicken and asecond time as a game of Assurance. Participants weretold that these were in fact paragraphs taken fromspeeches by political leaders delivered during a time ofconflict. The participants’ task was to identify the leadermost likely to have given each speech from a list of 1220th-century leaders. The leader judged as most likelyto have given the Chicken speech was WinstonChurchill, who led Britain in fighting an uncompro-mising battle during World War II (with Martin LutherKing Jr., Gandhi, and Mandela judged as the leastlikely). The leader judged most likely to have given theAssurance speech was Jimmy Carter, who won theNobel Peace Prize in 2002 for his endeavors to find

peaceful solutions to international conflicts (withMussolini, Hitler, and Stalin judged as least likely).

Implications for Conflict Managementand Conflict Resolution

This research shows that perceiving a conflict interms of a particular game model is associated withsocial and political worldviews. Individuals’ need forcognitive consistency makes it difficult to change onecomponent (e.g., perceptions of ingroup superiority)without affecting the others (e.g., perceptions of inter-dependence). Although this state of affairs seeminglyconstitutes an obstacle for improving intergroup rela-tions, it also holds a promise: If one can change the sub-jective perception of the conflict’s structure, perhapschanges in other components (e.g., ingroup/outgroupperceptions) might follow. Similarly, if one changesingroup/outgroup perceptions, one also might changethe subjective interpretation of the conflict’s structure.As our research shows, such perceptions are malleableto some extent: Both cognitive (Study 3) and motiva-tional (Study 4) experimental manipulations can, atleast temporarily, affect perceptions of group interde-pendence. Specifically, leading individuals to renouncethe Chicken conflict template in favor of the Assuranceconflict template might increase their propensity topursue peace.

APPENDIXThe Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Described in Terms ofChicken, Assurance, and Prisoner’s Dilemma Games

CHICKEN

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, if the Israelis don’t maketerritorial concessions and the Palestinians don’t end their vio-lent struggle, both sides to the conflict could end up in a head-on collision that would inflict great damage on both. Such arisk of a disastrous outcome can be prevented only if one of thesides admits defeat and allows the other side complete victory.If one side is perceived as more determined and committed towin at all costs, it can win the conflict by causing the other sideto surrender, provided that it is rational. The Israeli-Palestinianconflict thus has three possible outcomes: complete victory forthe Israelis, complete victory for the Palestinians, and a head-on collision that will end in disastrous outcomes for both.

Assurance

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both sides would bebetter off if the Israelis make territorial concessions and thePalestinians end their violent struggle. The benefits for eachside separately and for both of them together, in this case,would be as great as possible. Once such a cooperative state is





reached, it is likely to be sustained by both sides because com-petition would be self-defeating. However, fear that the otherside will act irrationally prevents the Israelis and thePalestinians from reaching such a mutually beneficial state.Specifically, the Israelis fear that the Palestinians might irra-tionally choose to continue the violent struggle. Likewise, thePalestinians fear that the Israelis would irrationally choosenot to make territorial concessions.

PRISONER’S DILEMMA

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, if the Palestinians endthe violent struggle, then there is no reason for the Israelis tomake territorial concessions, and if the Palestinians continuethe violent struggle, then there is even less reason for theIsraelis to reward them with territorial concessions. From thePalestinians’ point of view, if the Israelis continue to holdonto the territories, they should continue their violent strug-gle, and if the Israelis make territorial concessions because ofthe violent struggle, then there is even more reason for thePalestinians to continue the violent struggle. Thus, regardlessof what the Palestinians do, the Israelis should not make ter-ritorial concessions, and regardless of what the Israelis do, thePalestinians should continue their violent struggle. In thisconflict, however, if the Israelis don’t make territorial conces-sions and the Palestinians don’t end the violent struggle, bothwill lose a great deal. Contrarily, if the Israelis make territorialconcessions and the Palestinians end the violent struggle,both stand to profit a great deal.

NOTES

1. We acknowledge that different individuals experience theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict (similar to any other real-life conflict) dif-ferently. Differential exposure to media, informational gaps, eachperson’s unique background in terms of military service, exposure toterrorist attacks, and many other factors clearly make a difference.Accordingly, throughout the article, when we write “the same situa-tion” all we mean to say is that this research consistently refers to dif-ferent views of the one intractable conflict commonly referred to as“the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.”

2. It should be stressed that intergroup competitions in theseexperiments were not operationalized as two-person games but ratheras team games where each group member decides privately whetherto contribute to the collective group effort. Team games, unlike two-person games, allow for conflicts of interests within the groups as well(Bornstein, 2003). However, if one ignores these internal conflicts,team games are reduced to two-person games.

3. We do not contend that all individuals use game models simi-larly in perceiving structural relations between groups. Rather, indi-viduals may differ in their tendency to utilize structures of outcomeinterdependence to describe real-life intergroup conflicts or even intheir tendency to perceive real-life intergroup conflicts in such terms.Accordingly, we expect to find meaningful and consistent associationsbetween the endorsement of games and other conflict-related con-structs only for those individuals who show a consistent, consolidatedperception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of a particularmixed-motive game.

4. The fact that about one third of the respondents providedinconsistent responses to the two measures of game endorsementmight reflect individual differences in the tendency to use gamemodels to describe real-life intergroup conflicts, a desire of somerespondents to balance their responses not to appear too competitive


or too cooperative, or lack of fully consolidated attitudes and per-ceptions regarding the strategic nature of this conflict. We tried tominimize misunderstanding of the instructions by having one of theauthors present throughout the data collection, training researchassistants properly, running pretests and various versions of the ques-tionnaire, and so on. However, some inconsistent responses mightreflect limitations of our survey. As Table 3 shows, the interrelationsbetween research variables other than game endorsement neverthe-less formed the expected pattern in both the consistent (CONS) andthe inconsistent (NCONS) groups. This provides some reassurancethat the inconsistent endorsements of the games, as well as theweaker associations of game endorsement with these variables in theNCONS group, were not caused by lack of attention or carelessnessin responding because these also would have affected the interrela-tions between other variables.

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Perceiving Intergroup Conflict: From Game Models to Mental Templates