No Discretion Required? Caseworker Autonomy and the Rules of Welfare Reform

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No Discretion Required? Caseworker Autonomy and the

Rules of Welfare Reform*

Tiffany Taylor, Kent State University

Previous research suggest that welfare caseworkers break rules either for their own

gain or to help clients. In the last decade, the rules regarding Temporary Assistance to

Needy Families participation have become stricter and more prescriptive for clients

although caseworkers still use discretion. Using observations and interviews in a case

study of a welfare-to-work office in rural North Carolina (USA), I find caseworkers used

discretion in ways that benefited the county Department of Social Services; yet, they

gave accounts of sticking to the rules. Building on literature on welfare provider discre-

tion, I broaden my focus to examine welfare workers within the broader context of

worker autonomy. I draw on classic studies of worker autonomy, and I argue placing

studies of welfare worker discretion within a broader body of literature on autonomy

will allow scholars to better understand contemporary issues of worker autonomy across

sectors.

Introduction

It has been nearly 2 decades since the passage of 1996 Personal Responsi-

bility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). This reform over-

hauled cash assistance programs in the United States, abolishing Aid to

Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and creating Temporary Assistance

to Needy Families (TANF). The transition from AFDC to TANF was substan-

tial with major policy changes including federal time limits on assistance, work

activity requirements, and limits to assistance if a client became pregnant while

receiving cash assistance (known as “family caps”). Under TANF, caseworkers

require clients to adhere to these new requirements and sanctions have become

a primary tool to gain compliance. But, sanctions are not just tools used by

caseworkers. The devolution of welfare administration from federal to state to

county governments required local governments to report program outcomes to

state and federal governments to obtain block grants to fund their welfare-

to-work programs (Fording, Schram, and Soss 2006; Fording, Soss, and Schram

2007). State and federal governments threaten sanctions (loss of economic

resources) if counties and states do not meet new requirements. In short, TANF

policies encourage the use of punitive policies as means to increase account-

ability of both clients and local governments (Handler and Hasenfeld 2007).

Sociological Inquiry, Vol. xx, No. x, 2014, 1–23

© 2014 Alpha Kappa Delta: The International Sociology Honor Society

DOI: 10.1111/soin.12038

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How have caseworkers responded to these changes? With each new

reform, caseworkers are faced with new rules and may struggle to keep up with

current policy. Further, caseworkers find themselves in a tough situation

because of their contradictory job duties of helping and policing clients. In this

study, I examine how caseworkers use discretion in the current U.S. welfare

system? Do caseworkers use discretion to help clients or to police them? In this

study, I build on existing literature concerning whether or not caseworkers use

discretion by turning my focus to examine their accounts of the rules and using

discretion. While the literature on welfare worker discretion is important, I

broaden my lens using classic sociological theories of bureaucracy and worker

autonomy to place this study within the sociological tradition of organizational

case studies of labor process. Additionally, while much of the United States is

rural, less research examines worker discretion and autonomy in rural areas.

This study attempts to lessen this gap in the literature through my case study

of a rural county in North Carolina. This county has deindustrialized and is left

with high unemployment and poverty. In this context, welfare-to-work program

service providers are incredibly constrained in helping clients move from wel-

fare to work. Given these conditions, I find caseworkers give accounts about

the rules and discretions that often contradict what they actually do. I argue fur-

ther that given caseworkers’ deskilled status, their contradictory accounts reflect

the caseworkers’ efforts to feel like good, autonomous workers in a highly con-

strained and unrewarding job.

Literature Review

In his classic work on bureaucracy, Merton (1957) describes the ideal

formal organization and following Weber (1981) the key components of

bureaucracy. The division of labor is differentiated to be specialized. Author-

ity is hierarchical and passed down through the organization largely in the

form of procedures. If not followed, these procedures are enforced with

some form of sanction. Merton states “the generality of the rules requires

the constant use of categorization, whereby individual problems and cases

are classified on the basis of designated criteria and are treated accordingly”

(emphasis in original, 1957:196). Further, Merton reminds us that in bureau-

cracies, individuals are separated from the instruments of production and

workers do not fully control their labor. This is not welcomed by workers,

and therefore, for a bureaucracy to be successful, discipline is key. Worker

behavior needs to be routine and predicable. Merton argues further that “the

efficacy of social structure depends ultimately upon group participants with

appropriate attitude and sentiments” (1957:198–99). In other words, workers

need to internalize certain beliefs such as deference, beliefs in the effective-

ness of the rules and the organization.

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Workers also need to be monitored to make sure they are following the

rules. In bureaucracies, workers are usually monitored by standardized mea-

sures that are easily quantified. This often results in workers playing a “num-

bers game” to keep management at bay (Blau 1963). This, in turn, can create

more “bureaucratic personalities” and creates a paradoxical situation for worker

autonomy. Monitoring of the rules and regulations through standardized quanti-

tative measures often leaves workers some room to exercise discretion (Blau

1963; Brodkin 1997, 2006; Fording, Schram, and Soss 2006; Fording, Soss,

and Schram 2007; Hays 2003; Lipsky 1980; Ridzi 2004, 2009). Sometimes,

the worker may use this window of discretion to exercise some level of author-

ity or autonomy, becoming, in Merton’s words, the bureaucratic personality

(Merton 1957).

More than 3 decades ago, Lipsky (1980) illustrated how street-level

bureaucrats implemented social policy. He argued that the public service work-

ers faced considerable conflict in their jobs and often worked in heavily rule-

bound workplaces. Despite the conflict and the constraints, these workers were

able to exercise discretion and authority to implement policies. As Lipsky

(1980) argues, workers attempt to maximize their autonomy working in jobs

that require them to negotiate contradictory job demands of helping people,

while simultaneously being agents of social control. Subsequent research has

examined the contexts in which street-level bureaucratic discretion is used

(Scott 1997 examines individual, organization, or client attributes), how indi-

viduals’ feelings of justice affect discretion (Kelly 1994), devolution and dis-

cretion (Fording, Schram, and Soss 2006; Fording, Soss, and Schram 2007),

and how discretion is used in unjust ways, including task-specific discretion of

case closure (Monnat 2010; Monnat and Bunyan 2008; Schram et al. 2009).

Shortly after the 1996 US welfare reforms that created TANF, Sharon

Hays (2003) focused her attention on 2 county social service agencies and

found caseworkers would often bend rules in ways they felt would benefit the

client (see also Lurie 2006). Caseworkers resisted changes to welfare policy in

the United States in many ways. This finding contrasted prior research, such as

Blau’s (1963) work in which he found street-level bureaucrats bend rules in

ways to meet productivity requirements, regardless of the outcome for clients.

Hays and Blau suggest that caseworkers use discretion either for their own gain

or to help clients.

Watkins-Hayes (2009) builds on this literature and also focuses on the

consequences of the conflicting roles of welfare caseworkers. In her case study

of 2 county welfare-to-work programs in Massachusetts, she finds tensions

between caseworkers’ roles as counseling clients and enforcing rules. Case-

workers’ develop contrasting identities toward their work, becoming either

“social workers” or “efficiency engineers” (see also Taylor and Seale 2013).

NO DISCRETION REQUIRED? 13

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Caseworkers with a social work identity are more expansive in how they

attempt to address self-sufficiency and the areas in which they should intervene.

Those with a social work orientation seek to get to the roots of the problems

their clients are facing and use discretion in ways to help clients. In contrast,

efficient engineers emphasize specific reform demands such as eligibility

determination, rule enforcement, and referrals, and they argue meeting these

benchmarks will help their clients reach self-sufficiency. They focus on time

limits, sanctioning and work-related activity participation rate goals, and more

often use discretion to benefit the county bureaucracy. These managers are ex-

emplars of Merton’s (1957) concepts of rule-mindedness and the bureaucratic

personality.

While we know that caseworkers use discretion, the literature suggests that

caseworkers may use discretion in ways to meet bureaucratic goals (Blau

1963), or they may use discretion in ways that benefit clients (Hays 2003).

Consistent with other research on street-level bureaucrats, within the same orga-

nization, some workers might use discretion to benefit the clients, while others

use it in ways to help the organization (Lens 2012; Maynard-Moody and

Musheno 2003; Watkins-Hayes 2009). However, less research has examined

caseworkers’ talk about rules and discretion more broadly. I build on this exist-

ing literature by examining how caseworkers understand and discuss following

rules. I conduct my study in a county in rural North Carolina and describe this

location and context, and the methods used in this study, in the following

sections.

Location

The location chosen, Smithgrove County,1 was selected for theoretical rea-

sons. The county is rural, has deindustrialized, and has high rates of unemploy-

ment and poverty. The county also has a high number of program clients

reaching state time limits (24 months in North Carolina). In other words, this

county faces a number of serious challenges to being successful in helping cli-

ents move from welfare to work. Faced with these enormous challenges, I

wanted to see how caseworkers in this county implemented welfare policy.

Smithgrove County is in eastern North Carolina, where the economy has

centered on cotton agriculture and textile manufacturing in the second half of

the twentieth century. Several small cities grew from mill towns that textile

manufacturers constructed when they sought cheap labor that was socially and

geographically isolated (Wood 1986). Wealthy southerners essentially invited

these firms to exploit the desperately poor white farmers as mill laborers, while

using already exploited African American tenant and sharecropping farmers to

harvest their supply of cotton (Tomaskovic-Devey and Roscigno 1996, 1997).

This historical economic development set into motion decades of worker

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exploitation and poverty (Anderson, Schulman, and Wood 2000; Wood 1986).

Smithgrove County’s racial makeup was attractive to companies at the time,

and still today, the African American population in Smithgrove County is lar-

ger than the non-Hispanic white population (53% and 43% respectively, with 4

percent of the population comprising other racial categories according to 2000

Census data).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics2 reports that in 2007, when the data were

being collected, Smithgrove County was among 200 US counties with the

highest poverty and unemployment rate. More than a quarter of Smithgrove

County’s population was living in poverty (more than double the North Caro-

lina average) and more than 9 percent were unemployed (which is much higher

than the NC rate of 5.5%). These figures simply illustrate Smithgrove County

residents face tough conditions that show little promise of improving. Work

opportunities are not plentiful and most jobs that are currently filled offer very

low wages. Smithgrove County and the eastern part of the state never diversi-

fied their industrial base. This lack of industrial diversity proved disastrous for

the economy by 2000. When the textile and apparel industries moved further

south (first to the US Deep South and then to Central America) for cheaper

labor, many people in this region were left without jobs (Anderson, Schulman,

and Wood 2000). In 2007, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported retail as the

largest industry in the county and the jobs in this sector paid <$20,000 a year.

In North Carolina3, TANF funding is used to support the “Work First”

program discussed in this study. Like many states, North Carolina instituted

time-limited assistance, only offering assistance for 24 consecutive months and

recognizing the federal 60-month lifetime limit. Family caps were also insti-

tuted and forbid additional assistance if a program client becomes pregnant

while receiving cash assistance. Finally, North Carolina instituted work require-

ments for cash assistance. Caseworkers use sanctions to enforce rules under

TANF, and Work First and sanction policies vary greatly by state. In North

Carolina, sanctions result in case of closure and the loss of cash assistance for

the entire family for 30 days. Once the sanction period ends, then families can

reapply for assistance. Compared to other states “toughness,” Soss et al. (2001) 3

find North Carolina to have adopted weak parent only sanctions (although they

switched to stricter full-family sanctions in 2005), strict work requirements, a

time limit shorter than the federal limit, and a family cap. Overall, North Caro-

lina policies are in the top-third of states in terms of “toughness.”

Methods

There is a long tradition of case studies of organizations in sociology

(Blau 1963). Case studies are appropriate when studying organizations and the

workers within the organization (Stake 1995; Yin 1994) 4. As mentioned, the


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location for this case study was selected for its uniqueness or “particularity”

(Stake 1995; Yin 1994). Instead of examining the typical welfare-to-work

office, the focus of this research was to explore how workers work to feel

effective in a highly constrained workplace. Therefore, using the case study

method is appropriate because of both the particularity and the need to place

the case within a historical, social, political, and economic context of the work-

ers in this organization attempting to implement this policy. Data collection for

this case study occurred from June 2006 until June 2007. While case studies

vary in the methods employed, several methods were used in this project given

the numerous benefits to use multiple methods in research. For instance, by

interviewing, researchers can learn what caseworkers’ say they do and how

they feel. By observing, researchers see what caseworkers actually do. The var-

ious methods, then, serve as a check and balance, improving the reliability and

validity of the data and findings (Hammersley and Atkinson 1985; Marshall

and Rossman 1998; Stake 1995; Yin 1994). The first step in the research was

to conduct a thorough review of the policies and procedures relevant to the area

of study, including welfare history and policy documents in the United States,

North Carolina, and Smithgrove County. These include training manuals from

the job readiness class, performance reviews, program policy manuals, and a

variety of paperwork used by caseworkers and clients on a daily basis. This

allowed me to develop an understanding of the historical, social, political, and

economic development of Smithgrove County, as well as county, state, and

federal welfare policy.

I also observed, as a participant and non-participant observer in a number

of settings. These observations included shadowing caseworkers as if I were

training, sitting in on interviews with welfare clients, and sitting in the cubicle

area, observing phone and face-to-face interaction between caseworkers and

welfare clients. I also went on home visits to clients’ homes and attended the

job readiness class, as well as the regional economic development summit and

the quarterly regional workforce and economic development meetings. Addi-

tionally, I attended “success staffing” meetings in which DSS workers and their

community partners (nonprofit and other government agencies who provide ser-

vices) met with welfare clients who were in danger of hitting time limits.

Finally, I often observed and had informal conversations with caseworkers and

managers in the large open cubicle office.

I conducted interviews with welfare service providers including casework-

ers, line supervisors, and the program manager. Caseworkers’ actions are the

main focus in this study. Caseworkers are responsible for the intake of clients,

determining eligibility for programs, and maintaining clients’ paperwork. I

interviewed all thirteen caseworkers working in the Work First program in the

county. Of these caseworkers, all were women, 5 were white and 8 were

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African American. I estimate that 6 were in their thirties, while the remaining

caseworkers were older, their ages ranged from forties up to a few supervisors

who were in their sixties. Three of the caseworkers had received cash assis-

tance through the DSS before becoming caseworkers. An additional caseworker

had once received county-coordinated outplacement assistance when the

local textile mill closed. In addition to the caseworkers, I interviewed 2

employees responsible for interacting primarily with organizations in the com-

munity and secondarily with clients. One of these employees was an African

American woman in her thirties who was employed full time with the Depart-

ment of Social Services. A second liaison was a white woman, also in her

thirties who worked out of the county’s Chamber of Commerce, but half of her

time and salary was dedicated to DSS. In addition to spending more than a day

each week meeting clients at the Employment Security Commission, these

community liaisons were responsible for promoting the “Work Experience”

program.

I also formally interviewed 3 line supervisors as a group and had frequent

informal follow-up discussions with them individually. Of these supervisors, 2

were white and one was African American. Finally, I interviewed the supervi-

sor who oversees the Work First program in the county. This supervisor was a

white woman who has been with the DSS for more than 20 years. She is one

of the few workers in this division holding a 4-year degree. All of the supervi-

sors worked with DSS prior to the implementation of 1996 welfare reform

policies. All interviews with individuals (in total 19 DSS employees) were

semi-structured using techniques meant to elicit rich stories (Weiss 1994). Inter-

views lasted between 30 minutes to over 2 hours, averaging just over an hour.

I recorded all interviews, which were transcribed immediately.

The data were analyzed using a grounded theory approach (Glaser and

Strauss 1967 5; 6; 7; Charmaz 2001 5; 6; 7, Charmaz 2006) 5; 6; 7. As I conducted interviews, I

began open (or line-by-line) coding data to uncover the emergent patterns con-

cerning discretion that were present within and across interviews. Consistent

with Lofland and Lofland (1995) 8, after initially open-coding the data, I used

analytic memos to explore themes that emerged in the interview data and the

observation data. I then used focused-coding and subsequent analytic memos to

analyze themes further in both the interview and relevant observation data, not-

ing contrasts and contradictions between the interview data and the observation

data. Consistent with axial coding, I begin to note sub-categories in the data

(for instance, the different accounts workers made about using discretion) and

then theoretical coding to connect the emerging patterns to a broader theoretical

framework of worker discretion and autonomy (Charmaz 2006) 9. I report these

themes in the following sections, linking the findings to relevant literature to

better contextualize the findings.


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The Context of Constraints: Rules and Intensity of Monitoring

Supervisors in Smithgrove County discussed being frustrated with rules

imposed on them by the state. In an interview with 3 line supervisors, one

supervisor said:

But it is frustrating. Sometimes it feels like it—especially with participation rate—and you do

all you can. It’s almost like they set you up to fail. They have unrealistic numbers you have

to meet. It is all a numbers game. And we need to get away from numbers. And we need to

realize these are people and individuals. . . it is all numbers and what makes the state look

good.

Many Work First supervisors in Smithgrove County described “the State”

as having a “numbers game,” and said that the state does not acknowledge all

the good things they do to help clients, such as education programs, substance

abuse treatment, and domestic violence counseling. These feelings are exacer-

bated, as the quote above suggests, by recent reauthorizations of TANF requir-

ing that 50 percent of clients in North Carolina be engaged in work and

work-related activities (this was referred to in the above quote as “participation

rates” and is a result of the US Deficit Reduction Act of 2005).4

In Smithgrove County, this requirement has resulted in their altering the

labor process, making caseworkers specialize in the type of client they serve.

Specifically, some caseworkers now have only employment cases, which are

cases in which the parent is or should be seeking work. These cases are consid-

ered by far the most labor intensive and involve caseworkers checking on

employment activities of the clients and even making house visits. Caseworkers

said that the more “senior” caseworkers had these cases; however, a supervisor

told me the decision was based on who was best at getting the clients out to

work and getting their paperwork completed on time (see Taylor 2013 for an

examination of paperwork). Other caseworkers work only with the clients roll-

ing onto disability and child-only cases,5 both of which are considered “low

maintenance” cases, as these require only updating paperwork. Supervisors

argue that this specialization in caseload will make the county more efficient

and effective in hitting the new work-related activity requirements.

Despite this effort and reorganization, supervisors indicate that the new

work-related activity requirement is impossible to reach and will result in the

county being sanctioned by the state government. While they briefly expressed

their frustration over this situation, they remained hopeful that their new labor

process might help them achieve this seemingly impossible goal. Interestingly,

however, when clients assert that a rule or goal is impossible, the caseworkers

and supervisors respond with sanctions and justifications such as “the

real world has rules” which I heard often during my time in the field. This

requirement has also led to a number of instances in which caseworkers use

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discretion, but in ways more similar to Blau’s findings than Hays’s. They use

discretion to make their numbers, with little regard to the consequences for

clients.

This was not always the case. Constraints have increased over time, and

caseworkers have come to resist these changes less and less. In a discussion

with supervisors about caseworkers’ daily interactions with clients, supervisors

talked about how difficult face-to-face interactions can be for caseworkers, par-

ticularly given the sanction-heavy nature of the current programs. When case-

workers want a client to do something, typically, they send the client a letter to

notify the client that they must do some action before a certain date or they

will be sanctioned. Talking about the letter, one supervisor said:

And [caseworkers] have gotten better with that– as far as – they are getting to the mindset

now where they don’t have a choice. [The letter] is [the client’s] second chance. [Clients] call

then and [say] ‘this happened’ and ‘my child was sick.’ Well, I am sorry. Either you do what

you have to do, what you were supposed to by that time or – we don’t have room for leeway

anymore. Kim, Line Supervisor

This quote from Kim illustrates changes in caseworkers’ perceptions of

sanctioning. First, caseworkers must have once been more resistant, but they

have now accepted this new “mindset” in which they must embrace sanction-

ing. Further, the letter is seen as a second chance, a warning. It is now the cli-

ent’s responsibility, even their job, to comply with the rules. The caseworkers

can no longer accept the excuses, as the caseworkers, according to the supervi-

sor, do not “have room for leeway anymore.”

Caseworkers’ Accounts of Avoiding Discretion and Autonomy

Many caseworkers insisted that they did not break the rules or at least that

they did not have the leeway to bend rules anymore. There is some fear of the

repercussions for not following the rules; however, this only scratches the sur-

face. But, why do caseworkers say they do not bend the rules? In interviews,

when we discussed, what rules meant to the caseworkers and how they used

the rules, they gave accounts that sticking to the rules is better for them and

better for the clients.

In some ways, it is not surprising that the caseworkers claimed to follow

the rules. As Kanter (1977) illustrated decades ago, “rules-mindedness” is a

source of power and affirmation for workers with little opportunity for advance-

ment. The caseworkers in Smithgrove County in this sense are “stuck” in their

jobs as there are very few supervisor positions and the current supervisors have

no plans of retiring in the near future. As Kanter notes, following the rules also

provides workers with legitimate authority, as the supervisors will always

back them up when they invoke the rules. That said, expectations about rule


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following might be conflicting. On the one hand, following the rules means

you are a good worker. On the other hand, following the rules could mean you

surrender your autonomy.

According to caseworkers, they follow the rules for 4 major reasons: effec-

tiveness, efficiency, avoiding mistakes, and being fair. Overall, the caseworkers

argue that going by the book and having a book to go by are better for them

as they are not burdened by negative consequences of their decision making.

Another way to look at this is that, caseworkers use the rules as they need to;

if anyone questions their actions, they fall back on the rules as justification for

their actions. One caseworker stated she tells clients, “. . . if you don’t do what

is required of you to do, this is what is happened. This is our job and we have

to enforce this.” Another caseworker said:

I used to like not sanction people, because I would listen to them, them telling this story and

I would say okay, okay. [The supervisors] start getting on me because she said ‘you are too

nice you need not do that, if they don’t do this you need to go ahead’ [. . .]. But I have a job

to do and you’re responsible for your part. I’m responsible for my part, so if you don’t do

your part then I’m gonna have to do my part and that’s just that. But I was being a little too

nice and you need to go head on and do what you need to do. Get these people, either they

going to do what they need to do or you just going to terminate services. Now, I listen, I

explain to them that I have a job to do, I do what I suppose to do and you supposed to be

doing this and they don’t do it, then that’s it. Judy, Caseworker

This caseworker outlines a process through which she learned that not

using discretion to benefit the client was a good thing. Her account (discussed

more below) stressed that it was good for her, the county, and in her quote,

she argues it is a lesson for the client. The caseworker was being “too nice.” In

the following sections, I discuss the caseworkers’ accounts that following rules

(and avoiding discretion) is more efficient and helps them avoid making mis-

takes that could have bad consequences for the clients. In this sense, a lack of

discretion is better for the clients. Additionally, they argue avoiding discretion

insures that all clients are treated the same. Caseworkers believe treating the

clients the same is equal to treating them fairly.

More Effective

Caseworkers said they did not bend the rules as they are more effective in

helping clients. According to the caseworkers, when using the rules, you

always tell clients all the things you are supposed to tell them. Without the

manual, it would be very difficult for caseworkers to keep track of the complex

requirements of welfare reform post-TANF. In fact, the manual fills 3 to 4

huge binders. For this reason, caseworkers often just access it online. Several

caseworkers showed me the manual to illustrate the incredible amount of infor-

mation they were required to know.

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There are a great number of things clients must be told. As part of the

“mutual responsibility agreement” (MRA) ideology that places more responsi-

bility on the clients, caseworkers must tell the clients their responsibilities.

They have to tell the clients, and remind them, about all the rules, which usu-

ally involve reminding clients of work-related responsibilities and keeping

paperwork updated. As Julie, a caseworker said, “what the MRA is saying is

that this client is going to do these things, not that they are doing it right now,

but you have to make sure it’s done fair, by review.” Caseworkers rotate

responsibilities each day of the week such that: some days are dedicated to

paperwork, some are dedicated to client home visits, and some to client intake.

Due to this rotation, clients may be seen by other caseworkers and not the

caseworker assigned to their case (caseworkers become standardized in this

rationalized labor process). Therefore, following the rules in terms of telling the

clients what to do and documenting it in the computer system may allow any

caseworker to interact with any client, no matter who is assigned that client.

For instance, one caseworker noted it was important to follow rules regarding

documentation, echoing the quote above, “we have everything straight. . .

because we all the time have to be seeing each other’s clients.” Caseworkers,

then, give accounts that the rules are effective for both the caseworkers and the

clients.

More Efficient

Secondly, it is more efficient to follow the rules. Instead of trying to

decide what to do, the rules will always instruct the caseworkers on what to

do. The following quote captures the importance of efficiency and why case-

workers follow the rules:

Well, anything that we need to know, we can pull that manual up and most of the time it’s

there. And so we don’t have to wonder about ‘should I do it this way or should I do it that

way?’ And that’s why I, where I think the book comes in real good. Ann, Caseworker

As Ann indicates in the quote above, “we don’t have to wonder about

should I do it this way or should I do it that way.” In other words, waffling

back and forth wondering whether you should do this or that wastes time. Time

is certainly not a resource caseworkers have to waste. The demands of the job

include face-to-face meetings and phone calls with clients, and caseworkers

may have little control over how much time these take. Additionally, casework-

ers have an overwhelming amount of daily, weekly, and monthly paperwork

(all of the caseworkers complained about the difficulties getting this work com-

pleted on time). Further, caseworkers must enter the time they spend on each

task into a computer system, much like an hourly billing system, which takes

additional time. In other words, caseworkers do not want to waste any time


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wondering about what to do next. Following the rules saves time they would

use making decisions about how to proceed.

Avoiding Mistakes and Being Fair

In the previous quote from Ann, caseworkers worry about making mis-

takes and especially making mistakes that harm clients in some way. With only

1 or 2 exceptions, all of the caseworkers and supervisors placed a great deal of

emphasis on doing a good job and doing it “right.” Caseworkers did not want

to make mistakes in general, and they certainly did not want to make a mistake

that might harm a client. To this end, caseworkers felt following the rules

helped them tell the clients everything they needed to know. Obviously, the

underlying assumption is that telling them everything means you are telling

them the right thing.

In this sense, the workers argue the rules mean doing something “cor-

rectly” or “the right way” in an uncertain world where what is “right” may not

be so clear cut and might not be in the manual. Making a mistake might indi-

cate a “wrong” action, and avoiding mistakes means a right action. However,

following the rules is not necessarily the most moral or even effective action.

To do what is morally “right” might require caseworkers to break the rules,

and this is something that many of the caseworkers seem to be aware of on

some level, especially when it comes to issuing sanctions. Judy, a caseworker

who had once received welfare cash assistance, described how difficult it had

been to sanction clients, but quickly talked about the necessity of it.

I used to not like to sanction people because I would listen to them, them telling this story

and that. And I would say okay, okay and [my supervisor] start getting on me because she

said, you are too nice. You need not do that. If they don’t do this you need to go ahead-

and- and- then I was finding myself getting behind. Judy, Caseworker

Judy’s emotions are difficult to convey through the quote except for the

broken sentences and pauses. Judy was attempting to make sense of the moral-

ity of her sanctioning clients, and she eventually found at least some satisfac-

tion in that she had to stop being so nice to avoid her supervisor “getting on”

her and so she could keep up with her workload.

Another example of the moral dilemmas of this work is telling. One case-

worker described her frustration with clients walking off jobs:

[. . .] you get drained when you do so much. Like the girl we got the job and she didn’t even

work 3 hours before she walked out, you know. [. . .]You know, we invested so much time

and energy and effort and then when she walked out I was like ‘okay you quit a job without

good cause, you’re going into sanction.’ And then she’s sick and she has to quit school. Well

you quit school, now we got to put you in the world. You’re just drained and you’re like

‘whatever.’ But then you’re– I walked to her house Wednesday and I saw her laying on the

couch with those tubes coming out of her and I said ‘what’s that’ and she said ‘I told you I

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been sick. I’ve had eight surgeries in two weeks. That’s why they’re draining the fluid from

me.’ And then you see the almost yellow fluid coming out of her into the– you know, kinda

pumping it out of her. Then you kinda got slapped in the face. Then you think ‘oh man’ and

then your whole attitude has to change because then you have to realize that she really is sick

and you have to exempt her from employment services. Stephanie, Caseworker

Stephanie began the story by telling how she was frustrated that the client

walked off the job. However, then, she turned to how she had misjudged the

client’s situation. She had thought the client was being irresponsible, when in

fact the client had been sick. In a later conversation, Stephanie told me she had

the ability to size people up when they came into the agency. She could tell

whether a client was going “to do” or whether they were “not going to do.”

But, Stephanie had misjudged this client. This made her question her ability to

“size up” clients. In other words, Stephanie’s comment of thinking “oh man”

reflects a few things: the situation of having sanctioned a client that was legiti-

mately sick, but also her concern about her competence in “sizing up” clients.

She ends noting she has to exempt the client from employment services. This

client will “count against” her numbers.

Finally, having the rules helps caseworkers feel that they treat all clients

the same. The caseworkers argue that treating them the same is the same as

treating them fairly. In this sense, caseworkers argue standardization means

fairness and a lack of discrimination. Historically, there has been some concern

over caseworkers using discretion to illegally discriminate against clients (for

detailed historical analyses see Gordon 1990; as well as recent work by Goo-

den 1998; Hagen and Owens-Manley 2002; Gooden and Douglas 2006; Mon-

nat and Bunyan 2008; Schram et al. 2009; Monnat 2010). The caseworkers

seem aware of this criticism and suggest they must consistently document their

actions on forms and in the computer databases.

Contradictions about Discretion

When I first entered the field, I was told again and again that “this is not a

one size fits all program.” I heard this from the program manager down to each

caseworker. When caseworkers spoke with me, one another, and with clients,

they consistently discussed using “strategies” to fit the needs of clients. After

all, as caseworkers told me, clients’ situations are all different and require dif-

ferent strategies. I was also told the county has a “success staffing” meeting

where clients, DSS personnel, and leaders of local nonprofits get together and

develop strategies to help clients approaching time limits reach “their goal of

self-sufficiency.”

When I attended one of these meetings, I realized the “strategy” was a

laundry list of referrals. The community nonprofit and government agency lead-

ers and DSS personnel would read through the list to see to where the client


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had or had not been referred. If the client had not been referred to a service or

organization on the list, the “success staffing” workers would suggest the client

give that service a try. The client’s program was, therefore, composed of a

standardized strategy, but discussed as if it were an individualized strategy. In

hindsight, a standardized process was not surprising, but the DSS employees’

discussions of using individualized strategies were convincing to me when I

entered the field. This seeming contradiction between what caseworkers

claimed to do and what they actually did was puzzling.

Additionally, when clients complained about the rules that are imposed on

them, many caseworkers and supervisors said that they were just following the

rules imposed on them and that everyone does exactly the same thing when

interacting with a client. This contradicted the rhetoric of developing individual-

ized strategies. If each caseworker was developing individual strategies for cli-

ents, we might expect that different caseworkers would come up with different

strategies. At the very least, they might use discretion in different ways when

interacting with the rules and clients. In the following quote, however, Carol, a

supervisor, suggests that everyone will follow the rules in the same way:

Sometimes you really have to tell and get them away from thinking this is a personal thing.

Some will say, ‘Well, I don’t want her as a worker anymore,’ and you say, ‘Well, ma’am, I

am sorry, but they are all the same.’ You kind of have to explain it, that no matter who they

get they should all be telling them– they have to do the same thing anyway. Carol, Line

Supervisor

Here, Carol speaks of this standardization as a good thing, and a tool that

caseworkers can use to reinforce their justifications for sanctioning clients. As

the prior section illustrated, caseworkers argue that standardization and going

by the rules means they are being fair. However, moments earlier in the inter-

view Carol argued that “welfare has never been a one size fits all and it

shouldn’t be” and that programs need to be individualized so that they can bet-

ter serve clients. In this instance, Carol is referring to the programs that they

can offer people. She wants caseworkers to have extensive time one-on-one

with clients as everyone’s situation is different. She does not want the state to

have such a “numbers game.” Carol and other county Work First employees

resent monitoring from the state and federal governments.

This gap between what caseworkers say they do and what they actually do

may in part reflects the conflicting ideologies of welfare reform. On the one

hand, welfare reform relies on the ideology of devolution. This involves the

notion that local county governments can best meet the needs of local popula-

tions as they understand the local environment. However, counties are still

accountable to the state and federal government. To insure this accountability,

the state and federal governments monitor the counties, requiring them to report

the number of families on the rolls and the percentage of clients involved in

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work-related activities. In this sense, monitoring is evaluation based on county

reports of standardized, quantitative measures. Indeed, monitoring from afar

necessitates a level of standardization on the “shop floor” to increase the effi-

ciency of managing workers (Blau 1963; Clawson 1980). While workers and

supervisors embrace the notion that they use strategies and therefore retain

some autonomy and discretionary power, they also argue that standardization

as necessary and fair.

How Caseworkers Bend the Rules

Despite caseworkers’ insistent claims that they always go by the book,

there are many instances in which caseworkers do bend the rules. In fact, bend-

ing these rules is often encouraged by county supervisors. County supervisors

and caseworkers have brainstorming sessions concerning ways to bend the

rules. This work is not considered rule breaking, but instead is considered good

strategy to “make the numbers.” One supervisor alluded to this, saying:

It is just hard when you are trying to think of ways to make things count for you and you

are dealing with a population that is largely under-educated. . . you know what I am saying—

it’s not—it is just hard to do. Carol, Supervisor

After Carol described the difficulties above, she went on to talk about how

certain activities, such as “job search,” could count for the county for only

6 weeks. If someone takes longer than 6 weeks to search for a job, they no

longer count toward the county’s goal. However, as the state and federal gov-

ernments monitor the counties from afar through statistical measures, the case-

workers are allotted some autonomy to use discretion.

Despite the caseworkers’ and supervisors’ views that many of these statis-

tical measures are ineffective or unattainable, the caseworkers elect to use dis-

cretion in ways that help them meet the numbers. Similar to the workers in

Blau’s (1963) classic study of a state employment agency, the expectations and

demands of the state also outweigh those of the clients. Caseworkers are

accountable to people in power—their bosses—not their subordinate clients.

Specifically, to meet the numbers, caseworkers regularly bend the rules or use

discretion in 3 key ways: they determine when to close a case by what they

need to meet their numbers, they require more hours of job search than the

rules actually call for, and they place all new clients in a job readiness class

whether they need the class or not.

When to Close Cases

A key change in welfare since 1996 has been the pressure on counties to

reduce the number of cases on their caseload rolls. Counties are required on a

regular basis to report the number of cases on their rolls and to update the state


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and federal government on their efforts to reduce this number. Further, just as

each county has goals to get half of its total caseload involved in work-related

activities, caseworkers also strive to reach this goal individually. Each case-

worker has a list of their cases that details the number of months the client has

been receiving benefits and whether or not the client is involved in a work-

related activity. One day, I was shadowing a caseworker, and she described the

report to me. 10She noted which cases were doing what they “should be doing”

and which ones, in her words, “ain’t doing nothin’ for me.” By this she means

that the client is not involved in work-related activities and therefore is not

helping the caseworker reach her goal to have half of her caseload involved in

work-related activities. When I asked further about these cases, she noted some

were cases in which the clients were applying for disability and some were

cases the caseworker was considering closing. I later found that caseworkers

commonly use discretion to determine when to close a case. While not all case-

workers pointed this out, most caseworkers initiated informal conversations

with me about worrying about “their numbers” and frustration with clients hurt-

ing their numbers.

How does this work and what factors influence caseworkers’ decisions to

close a case? Caseworkers can often decide to close a case during the current

month or wait until the next month. The decision is largely based on what the

caseworker needs to make her statistical performance measures, not what clients

need to survive. If the current month’s goals are already met, a caseworker

might delay closing a case until the next month. If the caseworker needed the

case to improve the current work-related activity numbers, she would immedi-

ately close the case. The window of time is narrow, but this pocket of autonomy

is possible due to the paperwork and computer entry lag that is commonplace.

In this way, deciding to delay closing a case is like banking or holding a

kitty (a performance number maker) for the next month. This language of

“banking” or “keeping a kitty” was used by both Donald Roy (1952) and later

Burawoy (1979) 11in their classic ethnographic studies of manufacturing workers

controlling their work output. Burawoy describes this output control and work-

ers playing the game of “making out.” In this game, workers would overpro-

duce to make wage bonuses. However, to avoid being a rate buster, workers

would never overproduce too much. In the unfortunate event that a machine

broke down or you could not overproduce, the workers benefited from having

a kitty—a completed product that they could count in their rate of production

when they needed it. In this sense, the caseworkers engage in a process similar

to rate control tactics (e.g., a “kitty”) as Burawoy (1979) describes. While an

act of discretion in one sense (deciding exactly when to close cases), it is also

an act of consent (the case gets closed eventually, which ultimately serves a

management goal).

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Job Search/Work-Related Activity Requirements

Caseworkers also exercise discretion by requiring more hours of job search

or work-related activity than the rules specify. By the rules, the number of

hours a client must commit to doing job search-related tasks or being involved

in any combination of work-related activities is determined by how long the

client has been receiving benefits. The calculation means that the longer a cli-

ent has been receiving benefits, the more hours they need to log. This is com-

puted by dividing the total money received to date by the legal minimum wage

rate. The outcome is the number of hours a client must be involved in work-

related activities, essentially to “pay back” their cash assistance payments. This

paying back can be carried out through job search, attending the job readiness

class, or participating in a “work experience” program in which the client

works for an employer in the community for no wage.

Caseworkers and supervisors in Smithgrove County were worried about

meeting participation rates. The program manager told me that the supervisors

had a “brainstorming session” and decided they would require every new client

who is physically able to participate in any of these work-related activities to

participate for 35 hours a week. While not a formal policy, they instructed

caseworkers to make this a part of every new client’s MRA. The supervisors

and caseworkers all argue that if they did not require clients go “above and

beyond,” then the clients would not do it. However, if clients fail to achieve

and report this higher rate requirement, they will be sanctioned. Even if clients

reach the number of hours of work-related activity actually required by the

state and county policy, the caseworkers and supervisors enforce the higher

35-hour requirement. They achieve this by telling the clients they need to meet

the higher requirement, and then having the client sign a form that they agree

to do it. At no time, do the caseworkers tell the clients they are asking them to

do more than the rules actually require. Requiring new clients to overproduce

their work-related activity hours works the same way as strategically timing

when to close a case. Increasing new clients’ work-related activity hours and

using discretion about when to close a case helps both the caseworkers and the

county reach their goals for work-related activity. In short, workers “control

their output” similar to the manufacturing workers in Roy and Buraway’s

studies.

Job Readiness Classes

Finally, while the job readiness class was once reserved for people who

really needed to gain skills in resume writing, filling out applications, and cer-

tain “soft skill” development, now the class is mandatory for everyone applying

for Work First benefits. In fact, clients are expected to begin attending the class


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while they are waiting for their applications to be approved. Given the number

of diversion techniques used under TANF, applicants could easily fear that the

failure to attend the class could result in the application not being approved. If

the person is currently a client and receiving benefits, not attending the class

results in a sanction.

This mandatory class requirement serves 2 purposes for the county. First,

anyone who would prefer just to go get a job instead of being forced to sit in a

class for 30 hours a week will be discouraged from seeking assistance. As she

had a stable history of employment, she decided she would rather not seek bene-

fits than be required to attend a class that would not be helpful to her. The poten-

tial client had children, and the cons of arranging childcare and losing earnings to

go to the class were outweighed by the short-term benefits of getting whatever

minimum wage job she could quickly obtain. However, there are potential long-

term consequences. If the woman had been given more time to look for a job, she

might actually be able to find a better job. Making her rush to find a job likely

means she will take the first job that comes along. Judy, the caseworker conduct-

ing the interview with the potential client, suggested to the client that she did not

think the class would be very beneficial to someone with her skill set, but that it

was now required of everyone. When Judy and I left the interview, I inquired as

to how commonly people decided not to finish applying for Work First as they

made the class mandatory. She replied that it happened all the time, at least sev-

eral times a week (and she is one of thirteen caseworkers).

Making the job readiness class mandatory serves a second function for the

county. While the first function helped the county keep people from ever going

on the rolls, this second function helps the county reach its work-related activ-

ity goals. The job readiness class is now one of the few “educational” activities

that count as a work activity. Making all new clients take the class means that

everyone coming onto the welfare rolls is involved in a work-related activity,

thereby helping the county improve its numbers for this newer requirement.

Again, not everyone coming onto the rolls needs this class. Further, time spent

in the class is time that could be spent looking for a job. So while the client is

involved in a work-related activity, it is possible that the client might actually

prolong his or her job search by being in the class. In that sense, this act of

discretion helps the county achieve one end (work-related activity require-

ments), while potentially delaying another (clients getting jobs).

Discussion and Conclusions

Some of the most interesting questions facing scholars of work concern

worker autonomy and their power to exercise discretion. Implicit in this question

is the assumption that workers want autonomy and discretion. Marxists have long

believed that it was human nature to want complete power over one’s labor. As a

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“conscious species being,” humans want to both conceptualize and execute the

labor process. However, Marx (1932) also believed capitalism would corrupt our

human nature, making us content with our exploitation. Since Marx, researchers

have described management processes of routinization of the labor process (Blau-

ner 1964), deskilling of workers (Braverman 1974), and credentialing to control

and differentiate workers (Collins 1979). In this study, I was interested in this

classic question of worker discretion, but also how workers understood discre-

tion. In examining this, I have drawn on both classic and contemporary research

in the literatures on bureaucracy, discretion, and worker autonomy.

Any study of workers and the labor process must be contextualized. The

structural constraints imposed by the federal, state, and county social services

incorporate a number of processes to control caseworkers. Faced with these con-

ditions and uncertainties, how do caseworkers understand their discretion and

autonomy? While some research (Hays 2003; Watkins-Hayes 2009; Maynard-

Moody and Musheno 2009; and Lens 2012 12; 1312; 13) finds variation in how street-level

bureaucrats use discretion, all the caseworkers in my setting used discretion in

ways that helped the county, not clients. A number of things could explain how

they chose to use discretion. First, Smithgrove County was a chosen as the case

study site for uniqueness. The county is a rural, deindustrialized county with

very high unemployment and poverty rates. There are few employment options,

and therefore, it is difficult for caseworkers to assist clients in moving from

welfare to work. In short, caseworkers face substantial challenges to their ability

to help clients and therefore focus more attention on policing clients.

Beyond the county context, there are organizational and caseworker-level

factors that might explain why caseworkers readily use discretion to help the

county. In Smithgrove County, caseworkers came from poor and working-class

backgrounds. Three of the 14 caseworkers once received welfare benefits them-

selves. In this county, caseworkers are not professionally trained social work-

ers. Most caseworkers have only a high school diploma or perhaps an associate

degree from the local community college. In fact, in many ways, caseworkers

are not so different than the clients coming through the doors. The clients, then,

serve as a constant reminder of the conditions the caseworkers themselves

might face if they were to enter the job market again. Therefore, structural con-

straints and deskilling of caseworkers result in a routinized labor process in

which caseworkers with few skills and coming from poor and working-class

backgrounds, lacking professional credentials, are in little position to demand

autonomy and discretionary power to help clients. Faced with this status and

this constraining environment, caseworkers use discretion to make their

numbers and to benefit the county. Caseworkers in this sense have consented

to management control, but in a way that helps them feel helpful (to their

supervisors), effective, and autonomous.


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While this is a study of welfare service provision, this is also a story about

worker autonomy and contemporary labor processes. The social services sector

is one of many service sectors, an area of the economy that is expanding (Tay-

lor 2010). To understand work in this sector, the rich literature on caseworker

discretion is obviously important, but it is also important to see this sector as a

part of a larger picture and greater trends. In Smithgrove County, caseworkers

face more challenges and more constraints in helping clients as the unemploy-

ment and poverty rates are higher than the state or national averages. Case-

workers face enormous challenges moving clients from welfare to work,

making it nearly impossible to be successful in helping clients. However, case-

workers can be effective at enforcing the rules. They can also be good at bend-

ing rules in ways their supervisors would approve (e.g., helping achieve county

work-related activity goals). These actions help caseworkers keep their jobs.

This process is unlikely to be unique among welfare service providers. Future

research should further examine how structural constraints and other contextual

factors are related to worker autonomy.

Future research on social services would benefit greatly from further

exploring the effects of routinization, deskilling, and credentialing on the labor

process. A number of rich sociological studies of other service sectors (Leidner

1993) have uncovered important dynamics of worker autonomy and corporate

control. These studies may uncover social processes that parallel those in the

social services, especially given trends to devolve and privatize more and more

social services. My own research hints at the importance of routinization, desk-

illing, and credentialing processes. In Smithgrove County, eligibility workers

now do the work once carried out by professional social workers, but without

the professional credentials and the power that comes with those credentials.

County DSS offices have streamlined their labor process, routinizing, standard-

izing, and specializing every task they can.

Finally, this research is not without limitations. My study was in a rural

area of the United States and was selected as rural areas are more neglected in

research and as the county experienced considerable economic depression.

While the county is theoretically interesting for those reasons, generalizations

cannot be made to other contexts. Also, as my interest indiscretion emerged

inductively during coding and unfortunately, my data did not allow me to

examine the ways race (of workers and of clients) affects how workers view

their autonomy. There is literature (Monnat 2010; Monnat and Bunyan 2008;

Schram et al. 2009) connecting race to the use of sanctions, which suggests

this is an important avenue of future research. Despite the limitations, I have

argued there are important implications for sociological theory and our under-

standing of worker autonomy more broadly, as well as specifically about how

welfare service providers view their autonomy. We might hypothesize that as

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economies worsen, caseworkers will be less willing to use discretion in ways

that help clients. This could be very consequential for poor families who rely

on cash assistance to survive.

Additionally, the findings have implication for policy. Researchers have

longed questioned the intentions and goals of contemporary welfare policy

makers. While this is still a topic of debate, one thing is clear from my study.

Workers in this county first and foremost focus on making their numbers. This

has negative consequences for clients. The important policy implication here is

the resilience of standardized measures of effectiveness even when a great deal

of evidence shows they can be harmful to the people who are supposed to be

helped by social service workers. This final point is both a question of policy

making, but it also continues to be a question for sociologists. The question of

worker autonomy and social control is as relevant today as it was for Marx.

ENDNOTES

*Please direct correspondence to Tiffany Taylor, Department of Sociology, Kent State Uni-

versity, P.O. Box 5190, Kent, OH 44242-0001, USA; e-mail: [email protected]. 21All names are pseudonyms to protect the identity of the county and workers. All quotes,

when possible, are taken verbatim. I do not alter the respondents’ grammar or vocabulary to pre-

serve their words.2All poverty, unemployment, and wage data come from public reports available at http://

www.bls.gov/ 14and http://www.stats.indiana.edu/uspr/a/us_profile_frame.html. Statistics are approxi-

mated to help protect the identity of the county.3Details on NC policies can be found at: http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd/databook.cfm4S.1932 is the law passed by the Senate and signed by the President. It re-authorized welfare

reform for another 5 years. For more info: http://www.cbpp.org/2-9-07tanf.htm.5In child-only cases, a guardian (not the biological parent) gets cash assistance for raising a

child. For instance, a grandmother might raise their child’s child and receive cash help with related

expenses. The guardian is not required to consistently report information like employment clients.

Instead, the guardians only give school and doctor’s records annually.

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Tiffany

Sticky Note

Deleting second website since it is unnecessary. The first is correct.

Tiffany

Cross-Out

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Author Query Form

Journal: SOINArticle: 12038

Dear Author,

During the copy-editing of your paper, the following queries arose. Please

respond to these by marking up your proofs with the necessary changes/addi-

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address and provide telephone number

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3 AUTHOR: Soss, Schram, Vartanian, and

O’Brien (2001) has been changed to Soss

et al. (2001) so that this citation matches

the Reference List. Please confirm that

this is correct.

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Yin 1994 so that this citation matches the

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correct.

5 AUTHOR: Glaser and Strauss 1967 has

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please supply full publication details.

Tiffany

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Sorry. This works for me though!

Tiffany

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Phone number added. Address correct.

Tiffany

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Correct. Thank you.

Tiffany

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Correct. Thank you.

Tiffany

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Glaser, Barney, and Anselm Strauss. "The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research." (1967). Sorry! I checked these and seemed to have missed many. My apologies!

6 AUTHOR: Charmaz 2001 has not been

included in the Reference List, please

supply full publication details.




8 AUTHOR: Lofland and Lofland (1995)

has not been included in the Reference

List, please supply full publication

details.




10 AUTHOR: Please check the phrase “ain’t

doing nothin’ for me” in the sentence

“She noted. . .”ain’t doing nothin’ for

me”“.

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12 AUTHOR: Watkins-Hayes 2003 has been

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Charmaz, Kathy. 2006. Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis. Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage.

Tiffany

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Charmaz, Kathy. 2006. Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis. Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage.

Tiffany

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I am not sure what I am checking. The grammar is not academic, but this was the correct language in the quote.

Tiffany

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Charmaz, Kathy. 2001. “Grounded Theory.” Pp. 335-352 in Contemporary Field Research: Perspective and Formulations, ed by Robert Emerson. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.

Tiffany

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Lofland, John and Lyn H. Lofland. 1995. Analyzing Social Setting: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis. Belmont, Ca: Wadsworth.

Tiffany

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Burawoy, Michael. 1979. Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Tiffany

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This is correct. Thank you.

Tiffany

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Maynard-Moody, Steven, and Michael Musheno. 2003. Cops, Teachers, Counselors: Stories from the Front Lines of Public Service. Ann Arbor MI: The University of Michigan Press.

Tiffany

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see text. Deleted second website since it was not needed.

15 AUTHOR: Please provide Accessed date,

month and year for reference Fording et

al. (2006).

16 AUTHOR: Please provide the publisher

location for reference Taylor (2010).

Tiffany

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I actually cited this wrong. It is an annual volume, not a book. It should be: Taylor, Tiffany. "Supply, demand, and organizational processes: changes in women's share of management in United States workplaces, 1966–2000." Advances in Gender Research 14 (2010): 167-188.

Tiffany

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2/7/2012

Documents

No Discretion Required? Caseworker Autonomy and the Rules of Welfare Reform