FINANCIAL AUTONOMY AS PSYCHOLOGICAL NEED FORFUNCTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NIGERIAN JUDICIARY

by

OKECHUKWU DOMINIC, NWANKWO (M.Sc, LL.B, BL, PNM),

DIVISION OF GENERAL STUDIES, ANAMBRA STATE UNIVERSITY, IGBARIAM CAMPUS, P.M.B. 6059, AWKA, ANAMBRA STATE,NIGERIA. Phone:08030809950, 08120207053: E-mail: nwankwodo@gmail.com;

nwankwodo@yahoo.com

ABSTRACTThis is an analytical exposé of the psychological need that exists in the Nigerian Judiciary.

This is as regards how the absence of financial autonomy has become a challenge to the Nigerian

judicial functioning. Psychological need is a deficiency state that energizes or triggers goal-directed

behaviour to satisfy/fill the deficiency. The discourse identifies two perspectives of Judiciary financial

autonomy as (i) Socio-political institutional financial autonomy, and (2) Psycho-personal financial

autonomy. Consequently, the rationale for the Judiciary financial autonomy is justified from the

following perceptions as highlighted below. It protects the Judiciary power and integrity. It

maintains the Judiciary independence. Again, it checks instrumental nepotism, and it also ensures

security of Judiciary tenure. Moreover, the financial autonomy of the Judiciary will help to improve

the judicial officers’ remunerations and working conditions. In the same vein, there will also be

improved retirements and pension benefits for them (The Judiciary officers). Furthermore, such

financial autonomy of the Judiciary will contribute tremendously toward enhancing institutional

fairness and equity. Other benefits include minimizing corruption and parochial interest, protection

of democracy, reduction of judicial delay and barriers to decisions enforcement. It is thus

recommended that the Judiciary should be given a very strong and comfortable financial-base and

autonomy. This should be made a constitutional provision.

INTRODUCTIONBackground Of The Study: Psychological need is a

deficiency state that energizes or triggers goal-directed

behaviour to satisfy/fill the deficiency. Unfulfilled need

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induces uncomfortable and tensive actions cum responses that

make an individual to find solutions on how to reduce/satisfy

the need. The stronger the need, the more zealous an

individual becomes in finding solutions to the deficiency

state. Basically, a satisfied need rarely leads to a motivated

action (McShane, and Von Glinow, 2003).

An organized and institutional system (entity) can also

experience need. The government is an instance of an organized

and institutional system (entity). Any of the organs (the

Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary) can as well

experience their respective functional-related need. The

Judiciary is the organ under consideration in this discourse.

It is the cardinal objective of the Judiciary to administer

equity, justice, fairness, responsibility, etc. These are

noble elements of civilization and socio-human development

attributes. The judicial system that is deficient and

incompetent in discharging these socio-human development

elements has created need factor in the society. Such judicial

system inhibits sustainable development (Unanka, 2009).

Financial autonomy of the Judiciary is of pivotal

significant in the effective and efficacious functioning of

the Judiciary. Consequently, its absence in the Nigerian

governmental framework has created a psychological need state

that affects the performance of, and general responsibilities

of the Judiciary to the Nigerian socio-human development

ambition/goals. These development motivations include the

various attributes of sustainable development as politics,

governance, public service, ecology/environment, security,

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international relations, social diversity/development (Onu,

2009), peace, psychological qualities (healthy life-style,

habits, etc), disease and poverty eradications, as well as

other contemporary challenges to Nigeria. Basically, only a

strong financial autonomy of the Judiciary in Nigerian can

assist in the judicial responsibility of enhancing and

protecting sustainable socio-human advancement.

PURPOSE/OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The purpose/objectives of the research are the aims which

are intended to achieve with the discourse. They are the goals

targeted in the research. And these purpose/objectives are

highlighted below:

1. It is the purpose of this discourse to do an adequate

psychological exposé of the roles impressive and comprehensive

financial autonomy play in the functioning of the Nigeria

Judiciary.

2. The discourse helps to articulate the fact that financial

autonomy of the Nigerian Judiciary would enhance its

(Judiciary) performance effectiveness.

3. It is an aim of the paper to bring into focus the absolute

reality that Judiciary financial autonomy is very inevitable

for the growth and development of the Nigerian Judiciary.

4. The paper also has it as its purpose to depict the

challenges characteristics confronting the operation and

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performance efficacy of the Nigerian Judiciary due to its

financial dependency.

5. It is a goal of the discourse to expose the double

standard, constitutional mistake, and the inconclusive

position of the consolidated Revenue Fund, and its associated

derivative provisions, as not implying the total financial

autonomy to the Nigerian Judiciary.

6. The rationale for this paper is to bring into cognition and

possibly put into implementation the corresponding

recommendations, on the fact that there is the need to attain

a noble judicature in Nigeria, as would be facilitated through

the Judiciary financial autonomy.

7. Finally, through the discourse, it is to be made clear that

the effective protection of the civil society, substantially,

depends on the sound financial independence of the Judiciary

(which is part of the comprehensive targets of the doctrine of

the separation of powers).

SCOPE OF THE STUDYThe need for the financial autonomy of the Nigerian

Judiciary envisioned a total and comprehensive independence of

the Judiciary. It also connotes a very high and impressive

socio-economic comfort of, and for service of the judicial

members. There are two perspectives (scope) of the Judiciary

financial autonomy espoused in the research. They are (a)

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Socio-Political Institutional Financial Autonomy, and (b)

Psycho-Personal Financial Autonomy.

(A). Socio-Political Institutional Financial Autonomy Of The

Judiciary: This perspective of financial autonomy of the

Judiciary is a constitutionally established component of the

government of the society. As an institution, this perspective

considers Judiciary as indispensable societal system for the

interpretation of norms, rules, regulations/laws, etc of

socio-human conducts, as well as administration of justice. It

is this perspective that makes the Judiciary a heritage of

socio-human development. A financial dependency status is

therefore very likely to subject the Judiciary to an abuse, as

well as treat the Judiciary with disdain. There is the need to

forestall such financial enslavement of the Nigerian

Judiciary. This idea is well envisaged by the provision of

Sections 84 (7), 81 (3), and 162 (9) of 1999 Nigerian Constitution as regards

recurrent expenditure, Consolidated Revenue Fund, and payment

of the standing credit to the National Judicial Council for

disbursement to the Courts respectively.

(B). Psycho-Personal Financial Autonomy Of The Judiciary: This

perspective relates to the Judiciary on individual basis as

judicial officers or members. By implication, it connotes the

fact that judicial officers or members should be well

remunerated both during their active service and during

retirement. This is a major way of maintaining the nobility

and distinguished status of the Judiciary. Doing this would

boost the socio-economic standard or status of the judicial

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officers, so that they would not be unnecessary influenced,

manipulated, or enticed by wealth and power.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PREMISE ON JUDICIARY FINANCIAL AUTONOMY

The psychology of making the Judiciary an independent arm

of the Government is to give and protect the effective

performance and autonomy respectively for the Judiciary. The

necessity of this performance autonomy is undoubtedly emphatic

for the corresponding administration and protection of

justice. As the Judiciary decides disputes by determining the

degree of behaviours that are permissible, required, or

forbidden in interpersonal relation (Abonyi, 2006), it (the

Judiciary) therefore requires an unconditional institutional

autonomy. This would enhance the institutional efficacy,

efficiency, and effectiveness in the functioning of the

Judiciary.

The perspective of Judiciary autonomy (independent)

envisioned should be comprehensive. And this encompasses

financial autonomy for the Judiciary. Basically, the Judiciary

members are engaged in working-life. They therefore need

remunerations as the rewards for their services cum

employment. The emergence of money as a unit of payment has

made it a generic medium of remuneration for most workers, of

which the Judiciary members are no exceptions. Consequently,

for a successful and sustainable development of Nigeria

Judiciary to be actualized, there is the need to embrace

uncompromisingly the development of effective and efficient

economic reforms for the Nigerian Judiciary (Ebe, 2009).

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Possibly there could be the fear that a compressive

independence of the Judiciary would empower it to exercise

determinism role on the functionality of the other

governmental organs. Thus, by limiting the financial autonomy

of the Judiciary, a check is strategically designed to contain

the Judicature zealotry. Since human beings have the natural

inclination to dominate (Falode, 2009), it could have been

perceived that reinforcing this domineering tendency in the

Judiciary with financial cum economic autonomy would lead to

Judicature absolutism. This is an illogical perceived anxiety.

The fact remains that the Judiciary does not need interference

in its performance. Limiting the financial autonomy of the

Judiciary presents a potentially potent source of

interference.

The idea of the financial autonomy of the Nigeria

Judiciary is very eclectic. It involves all the facets of

financial and economics requirements that influence work

performance. Both personal and institutional financial

requirements of the Judiciary should not be subjected to any

other political determination, particularly with reference to

the Executive and Legislature. The Judiciary members should

be impressively remunerated in salaries, allowances,

retirement benefits, etc. These would help tremendously in

improving the economic quality-of-life of the Judiciary

members, so as not to subvert justice influenced by monetary

inducements. This is bearing in mind that seven out of every

ten Nigerians are poor (Obademi, 2008). And poverty breeds

corruption. This must not be allowed to exist in the Nigerian

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Judiciary. The institutional financial requirement of the

Judiciary is targeted towards ensuring that the operations of

the Ministry of Justice ennobled. This embraces effective

payment of workers salaries, and sustainable modernization of

the working conditions and infrastructure.

In independence of the Judiciary is one of the major

hallmarks of a civilized society. Asserting the independence

of the Judiciary, and at the same time subjecting the same

Judiciary to financial dependency are paradoxical. The on-

going reviewing of the Nigeria Constitution should be an ample

opportunity to earmark the percentage of the nation’s budget

that is for the Judiciary. This is a major way of putting into

effect the maxim “Judicial Independence”. The maxim connotes

the responsibilities entrusted on the Judiciary to contribute

towards sustainable development values by dispensing equity,

justice, fairness, etc (Unanka, 2009). And it is only when

the Nigerian Judiciary is comprehensively financial autonomous

that it cannot be induced by economic motivation to distort

the administration of justice.

SOCIO-HUMAN IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL AUTONOMY FOR THENIGERIAN JUDICIARY

(1) Protection Of The Judiciary Power And Integrity: The

Judiciary has the sovereign authority to decide controversies

as to rights, life, liberty, property, etc. This authority is

vested in the court. The Judiciary constitutes the ultimate

interpreter of the constitution, and the amour of the rule of

law (Abonyi, 2006). It has the power to check the excesses of

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its own activities, that of the Executives and the

Legislature. It also uses judicial review as its most potent

weapon to maintain the rule of law. Having been entrusted with

this high magnitude of responsibilities there is also the need

for the financial resources necessary for dispensing these

onerous tasks not to be regulated by another body, except the

Judiciary itself. The decisions of the Judiciary can affect

for better or worse the Executives or the Legislature. Hence,

allowing the Executive to allocate and the Legislature to

approve the financial resources of the Judiciary may be

counter productive. They (the Executive and Legislature) can

use their powers to economically sanction the Judiciary. This

will invariably affect the socio-economic wellbeing of the

Judiciary as an institution and as individuals. Therefore,

maintaining financial autonomy of the Judiciary will check the

Judiciary from being puppets to any societal or governmental

institution, body or agency.

(2) Maintenance Of The Judiciary Independence: The

independence of the Judiciary is more than absence of

interference from other organs of the government or societal

agencies. The Judiciary is not independent when its financial

resources are still subjected to external determination. The

financial autonomy of the Judiciary, both from the socio-

institutional and psycho-personal perspectives will enhance

comprehensive independence of the Judiciary. The sustainable

financial autonomy of the Judiciary has been well elucidated

by Aguda (1992) that the: “deciding officers shall be independent in the full

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sense, from external direction by any political and administrative superiors in the

dispensation of individual cases and inwardly free from the influence of personal

gains and partisans or popular bias; that is to say decisions shall be reasoned,

rationally justified of general principles and the demands of the particular situation”

(pp.35-36). By implications, some of the extra judicial

influences that money has on the judicial

functioning/performance could be inhibited by the financial

autonomy of the Judiciary. This will strengthen the Judiciary

independence.

(3) A Check On Instrumental Nepotism: The Judiciary serves

instrumental purpose when it is used for any other aim that is

not objectively incidental to the administration of justice.

The Judiciary acts with nepotism when its conducts are

prejudicial and biased in order to favour selfish groups’

interests. Occasionally, financial inducements are used to

influence the appointment of judicial officers. This was the

major feature of the then (Nigerian) Judicial Service

Commission (Ogbu, 2000). It is still doubtful whether the

present (Nigerian) National Judicial Council has overcome the

shortfall. Consequently, using financial motivation to

influence the integrity of the Judiciary can be checked, if

the Judiciary is made financially autonomous. Again, judicial

officers that give economically induced-judgments may be

discouraged when they are officially well remunerated.

(4) Ensuring Security of Tenure: The financial autonomy of the

Judiciary will enhance the security of the tenure of the

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office of the judicial officers. Corrupt judicial officers are

often removed from office before their tenure expires.

Essentially, they should be well provided for economically so

as to maintain their personality firmness in the temple of

justice. Comfortable financial autonomy of the Judiciary will

safeguard the Judiciary officers from corruption, arbitrary

removal, as well as ensure that they enjoy security of their

working life (International Commission Of Jurists, 1959).

Similarly, financial autonomy of the Judiciary will inhibit

the Judiciary from being manipulated by foreign powers. Often,

the Judiciary has to decide on cases that involve alien

interests. This can be effectively carried out if the

Judiciary is financially autonomous so as not to succumb to

foreign financial assistance. A miserable financial disparity

in earnings between Nigerian judicial officers and their

foreign counterparts can be very discouraging. And this can

predispose the Nigerian judicial officers to be influenced by

foreign powers as regards protecting the interests of the

aliens. Financial autonomy of the Nigerian Judiciary is

therefore a veritable mechanism of ensuring Judiciary/judicial

security in Nigeria (Ijalaye, 1991).

(5) Improved Remuneration And Working Conditions: Expectedly,

Judges and other judicial officers sittings at the Bench are

not expected to engage in business ventures, hold directorship

of companies, or even engage in legal practices on retirement

(S. 292/2 of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution). Again, their social lives

are cloistered and restricted to very discrete associations.

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There is therefore the need for a very comfortable financial

autonomy at the psycho-personal perspective, as compensation

for secluded conditions of services and other social

privations. Improved financial autonomy of the Judiciary will

also strengthen the professional and judicial ethics,

principal, code of conduct, performance standard, quality of

service and control, respect, integrity and trust on the

Judiciary. These and many more are the hallmark of sovereign

and independent Judiciary (Karibi-Whyte, 1987), which Nigeria

should aspire to develop through the Judiciary financial

autonomy.

(6) Retirements And Pension Benefits Improvements: Financial

autonomy of the Judiciary will contribute significantly

towards improving the retirement benefits, and pension rights

of members of the Bench, and other judicial officers cum

staff. This is a way of ensuring their social insurance

against needs/wants and poverty while out of office. The

retirements’ benefits and pension rights are expressed as a

percentage of the personal emoluments. As a result, it is only

when the personal emoluments are impressive that the

retirement benefits and pension rights of members of the

Judiciary can be very impressive and comforting. This is one

of the objectives enshrined in making the financial resources

of the Judiciary autonomous.

(7) Institutional Fairness And Equity: The Executive and the

Legislature institutional organs/arms of the Government are

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financially autonomous and self-accounting. It is therefore

very logical that the whole tripartite arms/organs should be

financially autonomous and self-accounting. By this, the

Judiciary as one of the tripartite arms/organs should be

financially autonomous and self-accounting as regards fairness

and equity. This was one of the logical implications of

separation of powers first envisaged in the 1979 Constitution

of Nigeria. It was envisaged in the 1979 Constitution that the

Judiciary should project its constitutional fund which should

not be subjected to any politics or any superior political

consideration or any tripartite approach. In other words, the

Judiciary should make constitutional projection and budgeting

of its fund, which should not be subjected to any other

political pedestal appraisal.

Very unfortunately, the financial autonomy as was

demanded by the Judiciary in the 1979 Constitution was

misconstrued. It was misunderstood to resemble a creation of

republic within a republic (Ogbu, 2000). Ironically, this

argument and misconception were not extended to the Executive

and the Legislature. Nevertheless, it was the controversy

stirred by the demand for a total financial autonomy of the

Judiciary in the 1979 Constitution that gave rise to the

Judiciary’s very limited funding package (Consolidated Revenue

Fund) of the 1999 Constitution. Even with the above funding

provision, the Judiciary still needs a total financial

autonomy, in order to maintain its firmness, objectivity, and

impartiality in dispensing justice. When financially

autonomous to control its fund and personnel, the Judiciary

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will no longer be bullied as it happened in the case of Kalu

Anya Vs AG Borno Suit No FCA/K/141/82, where the Executive and the

Legislature confronted the Judiciary for deciding a case

against them.

8. To Minimize Corruption In The Judiciary: In absolute

language, the Judiciary should be above suspicion. The

Judiciary should avoid and detest corruption. And this is one

of the major goals that are pursued in the quest for the

Judiciary financial autonomy. The aim is to use this mechanism

to improve the socio-economic status of the Judiciary members

to a very high standard. Doing this will enhance the

personality quality of the Judiciary members to shun

unethical practices, avoid extrajudicial gratification and

overcome the weakness of being lured to subvert justice by

receiving economic and material rewards or gifts. Poor

socio-economic condition predisposes an individual to

corruption. And corruption is very endemic in Nigeria due to

the poor socio-economic experience prevalent in population

(Ndaba, 2008). Members of the Judiciary are parts of the

Nigerian population. They are not immune or shielded from the

impacts of poor socio-economy and its corruption derivatives.

It is not surprising that General Ibrahim Babangida as a

military leader of Nigeria gave Mercedez Benz cars as gifts to

the Justices of the Supreme Court, for them to favour him in

his efforts to perpetuate himself as Nigeria’s Head of State

(Weekend Concord, 1993). Again, many Judges are now engaging

in multi-million naira economic and business ventures. Just

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like some Justices of the Supreme Court now engage in

construction deals at Abuja or unscrupulous oil deals (Tell,

1994).

Ancillary to the above is that even members of the

election petition tribunals engage in improprieties. By this,

many of them are bribed to give biased, prejudiced, doctored

and controversial ruling (Human Right Defender, 2000).

Correspondingly, Elias, and Jegede, (1993) noted succinctly

the observation of Oputa, JSC as regards the very negative

correlates of corruption and justice (the Judiciary) as:

“Money, they say, is the root of all evils. The Bench is definitely not a place to make

money. A corrupt Judge is thus the greatest vermin, the greatest cause ever to afflict

any national…. It is far better to have an intellectually average but honest Judge

than a legal genus who is a rogue. Nothing is as hateful as venal justice that is

auctioned, justice that goes to the highest bidder” (p.231). It is therefore

anticipated that a well improved financial autonomy of the

Judiciary will be of immense significance in minimizing

corrupt practices in the Judiciary. It will also aid

tremendously in the performance quality of the members of the

Judiciary. Again, the poor socio-economic condition of the

Judiciary members will be enormously augmented and be made

prestigious. The judiciary, at least to a large extent will

no longer be enticed by bribes, gifts and unscrupulous

economic deals.

9. To Minimize Parochial Interest In The Judiciary: Parochial

interests make a caricature of the Judiciary. The Judiciary

engages in parochial interest when its decisions are

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inconsistent, biased and partial in order to protect or favour

some other extra-judicial interests cum groups. The interests

or groups may have ethnic or political considerations. It may

have the attributes of friendship or religious motives. Or it

(parochial interest) may be explained from gratitude for past

favours as well as receipt of, or expectation of

gratification. By implication, members of the Judiciary who

are economically unsecured can easily be influenced by

parochial interests that have economic benefits. This has been

well elucidated by Professor B.O. Nwabueze that parochial

interests were the major reasons why the Supreme Court gave

two different conflicting judgments in two cases whose facts

are similar (Nwabueze, 1985), as regards Nwobodo vs Onoh (1985) 10

SC 42, and Omoboriowo vs Ajasin (1985) 10 SC 178. Hence, comfortable

financial autonomy of the Judiciary will contribute immensely

in minimizing financial parochial interest that mar judicial

integrity and functioning.

(10) Encourage To Protect Democracy: Economic interest and

financial gratifications among other parochial interests were

the major reasons why Nigerian Courts ridiculed themselves as

it concerns the June 1993 elections in Nigeria. High Courts

between the Northern and Southern Nigeria were commercialized

as interested parties (politicians) mesmerized the Judges with

financial packages, inducements, gratifications, gifts and

promises. The Courts were then challenging and confronting one

another as they give competing and conflicting judgments or

injunctions and counter judgments or injunctions arbitrarily

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(Satellite Newspaper, 1993). It was not surprising therefore

that some Nigerian multi-billionaires who were siphoning the

national treasury during the then incumbent military ruler

(Ibrahim Babangida) wanted him to stay on in power. They

consequently formed a non-registered group known as the

Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) with which they overdosed

the Court with money. Again, the Association for Better

Nigeria had been earlier declared illegal by a Lagos High

Court because of its clandestine and dubious motives or

objectives (Ogbu, 2000).

Having been intoxicated by the enormous monetary

inducement forced on them, the Abuja High Court granted an

injunction sought by the Association for Better Nigeria (ABN)

to halt the 1993 democratic process (Ogbu, 2000). A well

improved financial autonomy of the Judiciary will go a long

way in giving firmness and confidence in judicial officers to

shun money-minded politicians. Some members of the Judiciary

supported the then Interim National Government, which the

Ibrahim Babaginda’s military regime handed power over to, even

when there was no law backing it. They also went ahead to

support and worked for self-succession of General Sani Abacha

as Nigerian ruler. They (the Judiciary) do all these because

of the financial benefits the rulers showered on them/the

Judiciary (Ogbu, 2000). There is the need to fortify the

financial position of the Judiciary through a well fortified

and comfortable financial autonomy. This will help the

Judiciary perform its responsibilities of dispensing justice

without respecting money from politicians. The executives and

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the legislators come and go. They are transient and

transitional. However, the Judiciary is permanent. The

Judiciary should therefore be provided with a well fortified

financial autonomy that will encourage it to wield the sword

of justice that is the language of the Judiciary in war as in

peace. And by implication, this applies in protecting

democracy in Nigeria.

11. Minimizing Delay In The Judicial Process: The judicial

process in Nigeria is very slow. This has lead to loss of

faith in it as a dispute settlement mechanism, since justice

delayed is justice denied. The financial resources at the

disposal of the Judiciary are still being voted for by the

politicians, who occasionally use this opportunity to gain

political advantage. As a result of this, the maintenance of

the Judiciary is often ignored if it is not in the

politicians’ political priorities. Consequently, the Judiciary

is ill-equipped to carry out its duties effectively within a

reasonable time. The population of the judicial officers is

small vis-à-vis the magnitude of cases to be adjudicated on.

Again, the judicial proceedings are still hand-written. Poor

financial resources have retarded, if not inhibited, the

modernization of the Nigerian Judiciary. This has been well

noted by Agua (1998) observed that the Nigeria’s present

system of judicial administration is a bankrupt system, and it

is very sad indeed that no government from independence in

1960 to this moment has ever made any conscious effort to re-

organize or modernize this bankrupt system.

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The above assertion or observation by Agua (1998) is a

typical experience of a Judiciary system that is not

financially autonomous. To enhance modernization and justice

delivery system in Nigeria, the Judiciary needs to be

financially autonomous. This will help the Judiciary become

well equipped, be informative, manage or access knowledge

effectively. Financial autonomy of the Judiciary will also

promote cross-breeding of ideas, trainings, organizational and

management capacity of the Judiciary. Similarly, impressive

financial autonomy of the Judiciary will attract more members

of society into the legal professions. This will in turn lead

to the employment of more legal professionals into the Bench,

a strategy that will facilitate quicker determination of

cases. In the same vein, a comfortable financial autonomy of

the Judiciary will discourage members of the Bench from

turning into “judicial politicians”, because this thwarts the

Judiciary from dispensing justice.

12. Reduce Barriers To The Enforcement Of Judicial Decisions:

Often the judicial decisions are not enforced as the Judiciary

lacks the financial machinery or institution with which to

enforce its decisions. Basically, the Nigerian Judiciary still

depends heavily on the Executive and the Legislature for

fund/finance and personnel to enforce its decisions. Again,

the Judiciary has no independent machinery for the enforcement

of its judgments. The Police and to some extent the Sheriffs

are the agencies through which the Court can enforce its

judgments. It is virtually unimaginable to serve Court

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process on the State Commissioner of Police, let alone the

Inspector General of Police. By extension, it is almost

impossible to arrest or compel them to answer to the Court,

unless the Executive (the President) has interest in the case

(Nwabueze, 1985). All the instruments or machinery necessary

to compel compliance to the society’s value system is within

the administration and instruction of the Executive. Even the

Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff depend on the Police to enforce the

Court’s order. Since compelling compliance, obedience and

coercion are within the whims and caprices of the Executive,

the Judiciary is therefore of the mercy, and good relation of

the Executive in order to enforce judicial decisions.

Alexander Hamilton seemed to comprehend wholistically the

precarious position of the Nigerian Judiciary when he stated

that: “The Judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of

power…. It has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of

the strength or the wealth of the society, can take no active resolution whatever. It

may truly be said to have neither force, nor will, but merely judgment” (Nwabueze,

1977: p.225).

Even the Attorney-Generals who are among the

practitioners of Judiciary disobey judicial decision just

because of the financial benefits they are to secure from the

Executive. Being financially dependent on other governmental

bodies for financial resources subjects the Judiciary to a

morbid position. This is as it concerns the performance of

its duties, such as the enforcement of its decisions. In the

light of these judicial challenges there is an absolute need

for an absolute financial autonomy of the Judiciary. This will

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help the Judiciary pay for the enforcement of its decisions.

The financial autonomy of the Judiciary will also enable it to

lobby for the change of oppressive legislatures that are

barriers to the functioning of the Judiciary. For instance, a

large scale based financial autonomy of the Judiciary will

enable it permeate its way into the government when it comes

to the enforcement of the Judiciary decisions. The Judiciary

can do this by using its secured financial wealth to

pressurize for constitutional changes that will make the

Police (Inspector-General of Police, Commissioners of Police,

Polices bosses, and all Police personnel) apparatus answerable

to the Judiciary, when it comes to the enforcement of the

judicial decisions. Alternatively, the Judiciary can use its

financial wealth to lobby to be provided with its own parallel

coercive agency that must be constitutionally obeyed,

respected and revered by the Executive, Legislature,

government and all the institutions of the society. This is

similar to the Court Marshal’s idea of the military (Nwokedi,

1992). Of course, such a coercive outfit must be well funded.

This is why a very solid financial autonomy of the Judiciary

is very indispensable when it comes to the enforcement of the

judicial judgments.

RECOMMENDATIONS

From the ideas espoused in this discourse, the following

recommendations as reflected below are therefore proffered.

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(1). The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has

to be amended to eliminate the impact/significance of the

Executive and the Legislature in the financial remunerations

of the Judiciary. Without mixing words, this must entail

absolute and full financial autonomy of the Judiciary.

(2). The Judiciary should have its own constitutionally

provided coercive force (Police, etc) for enforcing its

judgments cum decisions. This coercive force shall not be

subordinate to the Executive nor The Legislature organ.

(3). It is also recommended that the Nigerian Judiciary

officers should be appointed and approved by the National

Judicial Commission. This is against the present

constitutional provisions that the Executive and the

Legislature appoints and approves respectively any of such

appointments.

(4). The National Judicial Commission should take budgetary

proposal from all levels of the Judiciary in the Nigeria. It

should as well make and approve comprehensive appraisal cum

compilation of the budgetary proposals. The final budgetary

proposal shall be sent to the Executive for the financial

disbursement. This means that the Judiciary financial

requirements must be determined by the Judiciary itself very

independently. This should be made a constitutional provision

so that the Executive and the Legislature do not politicize on

that.

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(5). There is need to use the on-going Nigerian constitutional

review to provide a comprehensive financial autonomy for the

Nigeria Judiciary. This can be done by reserving a substantial

percentage of the national budget for the Judiciary. This

percentage has to be determined by the National Judicial

Commission, bearing in the numerous financial challenges

facing the Nigerian Judiciary. This percentage has to be

incremental irrespective of the socioeconomic development of

the nation.

REFERENCES

Abonyi, N.N. (2006). New perspectives in the practice of

separation of power. Nigerian Journal Of Development, Vol.

II, No.1, March, p.39, Department of Psychology, Enugu

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