MEMORANDUM - NFPA

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection

FROM: Elena Carroll, Sr. Committee Administrator

DATE: February 22, 2021

SUBJECT: NFPA 502 First Draft Technical Committee FINAL Ballot Results (A2022)

According to the final ballot results, all ballot items received the necessary affirmative votes to pass ballot.

31 Members Eligible to Vote 1 Members Not Returned (Bergner)

The attached report shows the number of affirmative, negative, and abstaining votes as well as the explanation of the vote for each revision.

To pass ballot, each revision requires: (1) a simple majority of those eligible to vote and (2) an affirmative vote of 2/3 of ballots returned. See Sections 3.3.4.3.(c) and 4.3.10.1 of the Regulations Governing the Development of NFPA Standards.

1

First Revision No. 63-NFPA 502-2021 [ Detail ]

[Move G.2.4.1 to G.1.1]

G.1.1 Hydrogen Behavior Compared to OtherFuelsPropertiesofAlternativeFuels.

Table G.1.1provides information on hydrogen properties relative to otherofalternative fuels and gasoline.

Table G.1.1 Comparative Properties of Hydrogen FuelsProperties ofAlternative Fuels

Properties Units HydrogenaMethaneaPropaneaMethanolaEthanolaGasoline

Chemicalformula

H2 CH4 C3H8 CH3OH C2H5OHCxHy (x= 4 − 12

Molecularweightc,d

2.02 16.04 44.1 32.04 46.07100 to105

Density(NTP)c,e,f kg/m3 0.0838 0.668 1.87 791 789 751

lb/ft3 0.00523 0.0417 0.116 49.4 49.3 46.9

Viscosity(NTP)c,d,e

g/cm-sec

8.81 ×10-5

1.10 ×10-4

8.012 ×10-5

9.18 ×10-3 0.0119

0.0037 t0.0044

lb/ft-sec

5.92 ×10-6

7.41 ×10-6

5.384 ×10-6

6.17 ×10-4

7.99 ×10-4

2.486 ×10-4 to2.957 ×10-4

Normalboilingpointc,d

°C −253 −162 −42.1 64.5 78.5 27 to 22

°F −423 −259 −43.8 148 173.3 80 to 43

Vaporspecificgravity(NTP)c,e,g

air =1

0.0696 0.555 1.55 N/A N/A 3.66

Flashpointd,g °C <−253 −188 −104 11 13 −43

National Fire Protection Association Report https://submittals.nfpa.org/TerraViewWeb/ContentFetcher?commentPar...

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Properties Units HydrogenaMethaneaPropaneaMethanolaEthanolaGasoline

°F <−423 −306 −155 52 55 −45

Flammabilityrange inaird,f,g

vol% 4.0 to 75.05.0 to15.0

2.1 to10.1

6.7 to36.0

4.3 to19

1.4 to 7.

Autoignitiontemperaturein aird,g

°C 585 540 490 385 423230 to480

°F 1085 1003 914 723 793450 to900

N/A: Not applicable.

aProperties of the pure substance.

bProperties of a range of commercial grades.

cSource: NIST Chemistry WebBook, http://webbook.nist.gov/chemistry/.

dSource: Alternatives to Traditional Transportation Fuels: An Overview, DOE/EIA-0585/U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy,Washington, DC, June 1994.

eNTP: Normal temperature and pressure [measured at 20°C (68°F) and 1atmosphere].

fSource: Perry's Chemical Engineers' Handbook, 7th Editionedition, McGraw-Hill,1997.

gSource: Hydrogen Fuel Cell Engines and Related Technologies, Module 1:Hydrogen Properties, U.S.US Department of Energy, 2001.

Submitter Information Verification

Committee:

Submittal Date: Mon Jan 11 09:17:37 EST 2021

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Table G.2.4.1 title and section is updated to improve the accuracy of the datasummarized and enhance the value of the standard.

ResponseMessage:

FR-63-NFPA 502-2021

Public Input No. 28-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. G.2.4.1]

Ballot Results

This item has passed ballot

31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned


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26 Affirmative All

3 Affirmative with Comments

0 Negative with Comments

1 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold

Fitzpatrick, Michael F.

Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry

Kroboth, III, Joseph

Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi

Affirmative with Comment

Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas


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-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

improvement of document

Abstention

Sparrow, Paul W.

outside of my area of expertise


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First Revision No. 59-NFPA 502-2020 [ Chapter 2 ]

Chapter 2 Referenced Publications

2.1 General.

The documents or portions thereof listed in this chapter are referenced within this standardand shall be considered part of the requirements of this document.


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2.2 NFPA Publications.

National Fire Protection Association, 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471.

NFPA 1, Fire Code, 2018 edition.

NFPA 3, Standard for Commissioning of Fire Protection and Life Safety Systems, 2018 2021edition.

NFPA 4, Standard for Integrated Fire Protection and Life Safety System Testing, 2018 2021edition.

NFPA 10, Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers, 2018 2022 edition.

NFPA 11, Standard for Low-, Medium-, and High-Expansion Foam, 2016 2021 edition.

NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 2019 2022 edition.

NFPA 14, Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems, 2019 edition.

NFPA 15, Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection, 2017 2022 edition.

NFPA 16, Standard for the Installation of Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water SpraySystems, 2019 edition.

NFPA 18, Standard on Wetting Agents, 2017 2021 edition.

NFPA 18A, Standard on Water Additives for Fire Control and Vapor Mitigation, 2017 2022edition.

NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection, 2019 2022edition.

NFPA 22, Standard for Water Tanks for Private Fire Protection, 2018 edition.

NFPA 24, Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances,2019 2022 edition.

NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based FireProtection Systems, 2020 2023 edition.

NFPA 70®, National Electrical Code®, 2020 edition.

NFPA 72®, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 2019 2022 edition.

NFPA 80, Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives, 2019 2022 edition.

NFPA 92, Standard for Smoke Control Systems, 2018 2021 edition.

NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code®, 2018 2021 edition.

NFPA 110, Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems, 2019 2022 edition.

NFPA 111, Standard on Stored Electrical Energy Emergency and Standby Power Systems,2019 2022 edition.

NFPA 241, Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations,2018 2022 edition.

NFPA 262, Standard Method of Test for Flame Travel and Smoke of Wires and Cables for Usein Air-Handling Spaces, 2019 edition.

NFPA 750, Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems, 2019 2022 edition.

NFPA 820, Standard for Fire Protection in Wastewater Treatment and Collection Facilities,2020 edition.

NFPA 1561, Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System and CommandSafety, 2014 edition.

NFPA 1670, Standard on Operations and Training for Technical Search and Rescue Incidents,2017 edition.

NFPA 1963, Standard for Fire Hose Connections, 2019 edition.


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2.3 Other Publications.

2.3.1 ASTM Publications.

ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, P.O. Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA19428-2959.

ASTM E84, Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials,2018a 2020 .

ASTM E119, Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials,2018a 2019 .

ASTM E136, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials Assessing Combustibility ofMaterials Using in a Vertical Tube Furnace at 750°C, 2016a 2019a .

ASTM E2652, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in Assessing Combustibility ofMaterials Using a Tube Furnace with a Cone-shaped Airflow Stabilizer, at 750°C, 2016 2018 .

2.3.2 BSI Publications.

BSI British Standards, 12110 Sunset Hills Road, Suite 200, Reston, VA 20190-5902.

BS 476-4, Fire tests on building materials and structures, Non-combustibility test formaterials , 1970, corrigendum, 2014 .

2.3.3 CSA Publications.

Canadian Standards Association, 178 Rexdale Boulevard, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M9W1R3.

CSA C22.2 No. 0.3, Test Methods for Electrical Wires and Cables, 2009, reaffirmed 2014.

2.3.4 Efectis Publications.

Efectis Nederland, Brandpuntlaan Zuid 16, 2665 NZ, Bleiswijk, The Netherlands,www.efectis.com.

2008-Efectis-R0695, “Fire Testing Procedure for Concrete Tunnel Linings,” 2008.

2.3.4 FHWA Publications.

Federal Highway Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, DC 20590.

Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), 2012.

2.3.5 IEEE Publications.

IEEE, Three Park Avenue, 17th Floor, New York, NY 10016-5997.

FT4/ IEEE 1202, Standard for Flame-Propagation Testing of Wire and Cable, 2006.

2.3.6 ISO Publications.

International Organization for Standardization, Central Secretariat, BIBC II, 8, Chemin deBlandonnet, CP 401, 1214 Vernier, Geneva, Switzerland.

ISO 1182, Reaction to fire tests for products — Non-combustibility test, 2010 2020 .

2.3.7 Military Specifications.

Department of Defense Single Stock Point, Document Automation and Production Service,Building 4/D, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094.

MIL-DTL-24643C, Detail Specification: Cables, Electric, Low Smoke Halogen-Free, forShipboard Use, Revision C.

2.3.8 OSHA Publications.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington,DC 20210.

Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1910.146, “Permit-Required Confined Spaces.”


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2.3.9 UL Publications.

Underwriters Laboratories Inc., 333 Pfingsten Road, Northbrook, IL 60062-2096.

UL 723, Test for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials , 2018.

ANSI/ UL 1685, Vertical-Tray Fire-Propagation and Smoke-Release Test for Electrical andOptical-Fiber Cables, 2015.

UL 1724, Outline of Investigation for Fire Tests for Electrical Circuit Protective Systems, 2006.

ANSI/ UL 2196, Standard for Fire Test for Circuit Integrity of Fire-Resistive Power,Instrumentation, Control, and Data Cables, 2017.

2.3.10 Other Publications.

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th edition, Merriam-Webster, Inc., Springfield, MA,2003.

EN 13501-1, Fire classification of construction products and building elements — Part 1:Classification using data from reaction to fire tests, 2007 + A1:2010.

IEC 61508, Standard for Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programable ElectronicSafety-Related Systems , 2010.

2.4 References for Extracts in Mandatory Sections.

NFPA 3, Recommended Practice for Commissioning of Fire Protection and Life SafetySystems, 2018 edition.

NFPA 10, Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers, 2018 edition.

NFPA 70®, National Electrical Code®, 2020 edition.

NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code®, 2018 edition.

NFPA 402, Guide for Aircraft Rescue and Fire-Fighting Operations, 2019 edition.

NFPA 472, Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons ofMass Destruction Incidents, 2018 edition.

NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, 2017 edition.

NFPA 1142, Standard on Water Supplies for Suburban and Rural Fire Fighting, 2017 edition.

NFPA 1901, Standard for Automotive Fire Apparatus, 2016 edition.

NFPA 5000®, Building Construction and Safety Code®, 2018 edition.

Supplemental Information

File Name Description Approved

502-2020_Chapter_2_Updates.docx For Staff Use.


Committee: ROA-AAA

Submittal Date: Wed Nov 25 10:49:09 EST 2020

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Reference Updates as per latest editions and additional publications added tothe standard.

Response Message: FR-59-NFPA 502-2020

Public Input No. 18-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. 2.3.6]


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Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

26 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.


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Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Maevski, Igor Y.

Suggest adding ASHRAE Standard 217 "Non-Emergency Ventilation in Enclosed Road, Rail andMass Transit Facilities".

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Update.

Negative with Comment

Rakovec, Tomas

I agree with all changes, except this: "2.3.4 Efectis publications" should be only updated, notremoved. This was also agreed during the committee meeting and is also visible in the document"502-2020_Chapter_2_Updates.docx" attached to this First Revision FR-59. In other words, it seemslike an error in Terra which can be easily corrected.


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First Revision No. 58-NFPA 502-2020 [ Section No. 3.3.44 ]

3.3.44 Noncombustible Material.

See Section 4.8 A material that, in the form in which it is used and under the conditionsanticipated, will not ignite, burn, support combustion, or release flammable vapors, whensubjected to fire or heat .

A.3.3.44 Noncombustible Material.

Standards other than ASTM E136, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in aVertical Tube Furnace at 750°C , exist that are used to assess noncombustibility ofmaterials. They include: ASTM E2652, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials ina Vertical Tube Furnace at 750°C with a Cone-Shaped Airflow Stabilizer ; ISO 1182,Reaction to fire tests for products — Non-combustibility test ; and BS 476-4, Fire tests onbuilding materials and structures, Non-combustibility test for materials .


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Definition should not be a reference to the main body of the standard thereforedefinition of noncombustible material was added.

Annex language deleted as the information is redundant and the same informationis required under section 4.8.

ResponseMessage:

FR-58-NFPA 502-2020


Public Input No. 13-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. A.3.3.44]

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

25 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned


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Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sparrow, Paul W.

as per committee remarks

Sprakel, Dirk K.

clarification.



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Alston, Jarrod

The proposed definition results in a lack of consistency between other NFPA documents includingNFPA 101, NFPA 5000, and NFPA 130.


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3.3.56 RWS (Rijkswaterstaat) Time-Temperature Curve.

The fire test and time-temperature curve described in the report, Efectis-R0695, 2008.


Committee: ROA-AAA

Submittal Date: Tue Nov 10 09:15:50 EST 2020

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Placing only RWS definition in section 3 misleads the user to consider it as amandatory time temperature curve to follow. There are other time temperature curvesthat can be utilized therefore the specific RWS time temperature curve definition isremoved.

ResponseMessage:

FR-5-NFPA 502-2020


Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

23 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Debs, Alexandre


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Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Important clarification to correct misuse of RWS curve.


Barry, Ian E.

The RWS Time/Temperature Curve has been accepted as an industry standard throughout the world.It has been developed using sound scientific data with the intention of testing the performance ofpassive protection materials under elevated temperatures not witnessed in building or petrochemicalfires. Data from numerous tunnel fires over many years have shown that the temperaturedevelopment defined by the RWS curve is realistic. Whilst acknowledging that many otherTime/Temperature curves have been developed over many years, removing the RWS curve from thestandard may increase the risk of materials being installed that will not perform at the temperaturesexperienced in tunnel fires. Materials successfully tested to the RWS curve will perform even if thereis no intervention from mechanical systems such as deluge, water mist or other fire suppressionsystems.

Both, Cornelis Kees

The committee statement is not correct. It suggests that all definitions imply mandatory requirements,which is not the case. Although there are other temperature time curves, it is a fact that the RWS firecurve is widely used across the globe, and the de-facto standard used across the globe. Theproposed way forward is to keep the definition 3.3.56, but to add some of the text proposed in thepublic input 41, such as: Alternative recognised time-temperature curves are mentioned in A.7.3.2(c).

Dalton, John A.

The RWS Fire test standard is a de-facto fire test around the world. It provides a rigorous baseline forall products looking to be used in this sector. I do not believe that the practice of fire-engineering is ata sufficiently advanced or well understood state that we can afford to “discard” the most widely used


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fire-test standard for the passive fire protection of tunnels. While I am sure that there are manyinstances of outstanding multi-disciplinary engineering that can be pointed to as evidence of thebenefits of performance based design, or that would permit the use of a less severe fire test, there arealso many projects where the lack of a specific mandatory requirement leads to a cafeteria approach,where a fire test that is best suited to the needs of an interested party will be selected. In too manyinstances that driver for the selection of other fire test standards is cost. It is not in the best interestsof the NFPA 502 standard to permit a free-lancing approach in the selection of a fire-test standard.Respectfully submitted, John

Rakovec, Tomas

Since this RWS curve is mentioned several times in the main body, it should remain in the definitions.Moreover, the Committee Statement is not completely true, because having a definition of a curvedoes not automatically mean that the curve is mandatory to follow. Other curves are shown inFIGURE A.7.3.2(c) and as mentioned in 7.3.2, also other recognized curves may be used.

Sparrow, Paul W.

The RWS Time/Temperature Curve is accepted as an industry standard throughout the world. Datafrom numerous tunnel fires over many years have shown that the temperature development asillustrated by the RWS curve is realistic. Presently there is already scope within the current NFPA 502document for AHJ's to accept other Time/Temperature curves (in A.7.3.2) Furthermore removing theRWS curve from the standard may increase the risk of materials being installed that will not perform atthe temperatures experienced in tunnel fires. NFPA 502 is used as the point of reference forstandards throughout the world and unlike the USA the majority of countries still do not incorporateFFFS systems.


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First Revision No. 6-NFPA 502-2020 [ New Section after 3.3.62 ]

3.3.56 Safety Integrity Level (SIL).

Discrete level (one out of a possible four) for specifying the safety integrity requirements ofthe safety functions to be allocated to the E/E/PE safety related systems, where safetyintegrity level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity and safety integrity level 1 has thelowest.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Definition of SIL is added as it is now used in the document, in the SCADAsystem requirements in Chapter 7.

ResponseMessage:

FR-6-NFPA 502-2020

Public Input No. 2-NFPA 502-2020 [New Section after 3.3.62]

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.


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Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kashef, Ahmed

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sparrow, Paul W.

SIL is now widely used and warrants being recognised in future 502 documents

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Necessary clarification.


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4.3.1*

Regardless of the length of the facility, at a minimum, the following factors shall be consideredas part of a holistic multidisciplinary engineering analysis of the fire protection and life safetyrequirements for the facilities covered by this standard:

(1) New facility or alteration of a facility

(2) Transportation modes using the facility

(3) Anticipated traffic mix and volume

(4) Restricted vehicle access and egress

(5) Fire emergencies ranging from minor incidents to major catastrophes

(6) Potential fire emergencies including but not limited to the following:

(a) At one or more locations inside or on the facility

(b) In close proximity to the facility

(c) At facilities a long distance from emergency response facilities

(7) Exposure of emergency systems and structures to elevated temperatures

(8) Traffic congestion and control requirements during emergencies

(9) Fire protection features, including but not limited to the following:

(a) Fire alarm and detection systems

(b) Standpipe systems

(c) Water-based fire-fighting systems

(d) Ventilation systems

(e) Emergency communications systems

(f) Protection of structural elements

(10) Facility components, including emergency systems

(11) Evacuation and rescue requirements

(12) Emergency response time

(13) Emergency vehicle access points

(14) Emergency communications to appropriate agencies

(15) Facility location such as urban or rural (risk level and response capacity)

(16) Physical dimensions, number of traffic lanes, and roadway geometry

(17) Natural factors, including prevailing wind and pressure conditions

(18) Anticipated cargo

(19) Impact to buildings or landmarks near the facility

(20) Impacts to facility from external conditions and/or incidents

(21) Traffic operating mode (unidirectional, bidirectional, switchable, or reversible)

(22) Maintainability


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Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The ability to maintain a life safety feature is an important part of engineering analysistherefore added as one of the factors to be considered. The maintainability factor isvalid for all fire life safety features of a building and is not limited to fire protectionsystems.

ResponseMessage:

FR-7-NFPA 502-2020


Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

25 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur


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21

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sparrow, Paul W.

agree with committee statement

Sprakel, Dirk K.

adaption to recent development in society.


Alston, Jarrod

The inclusion of maintainability is inconsistent with the remainder of the section. The list ofengineering analysis considerations establish the risks associated with the facility. Maintainability isspecific to systems and is a factor in their selection.


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First Revision No. 60-NFPA 502-2020 [ Section No. 4.8 ]

4.8* Noncombustible Material.

A material that complies with any one of the following shall be considered a noncombustiblematerial:

(1) The material is reported as passing ASTM E136, Standard Test Method for Behavior ofMaterials in Assessing Combustibility of Materials Using a Vertical Tube Furnace at750°C.

(2) The material is reported as complying with the pass/fail criteria of ASTM E136 whentested in accordance with the test method and procedure in ASTM E2652, Standard TestMethod for Behavior of Materials in Assessing Combustibility of Materials Using a TubeFurnace with a Cone-shaped Airflow Stabilizer, at 750°C.

(3)

* The material, in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, willnot ignite, burn, support combustion, or release flammable vapors, when subjected tofire or heat.

A.4.8.1

Examples of such materials include steel, concrete, masonry, and glass.

* The material is reported as complying with the pass/fail criteria of EN 13501-1, Fireclassification of construction products and building elements — Part 1: Classificationusing data from reaction to fire tests , in relation to ISO 1182, Reaction to fire tests forproducts — Non-combustibility test, and BS 476-4, Fire tests on building materials andstructures, Non-combustibility test for materials . .

A.4.8(3)

Note that the pass/fail criteria for noncombustible materials based on ISO 1182 in EN13501-1 are different than those in ASTM E136 so that materials have been knownto meet the criteria contained in EN 13501-1 but fail the criteria contained in ASTME136.


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A.4.8

The provisions of Section 4.8 do not require inherently noncombustible materials to betested in order to be classified as noncombustible materials. Examples of such materialsinclude steel, concrete, masonry, and glass.

ASTM E136 and ASTM E2652, which are referenced in Section 4.8 , are not the onlystandards used for assessing the combustibility of materials. ISO 1182 (most recentlyupdated in 2020) and BS 476-4 are also used for the purpose of assessing whether amaterial is combustible. BS 476-4 contains acceptance criteria, but it is not in common useand has not been updated recently. ISO 1182 and ASTM E2652 use the same testequipment, but neither standard contains acceptance criteria. The European Union schemefor classification of materials based on reaction-to-fire tests (EN 13501-1) uses ISO 1182for determining whether a material is noncombustible and includes its own acceptancecriteria. ASTM E136 allows the use of the ASTM E2652 test apparatus but requires thesame set of acceptance criteria irrespective of the test apparatus used.



NFPA_502_Section_4.8.docx For Staff Use.


Committee: ROA-AAA

Submittal Date: Wed Dec 02 13:25:58 EST 2020

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Item (1) has been relocated in the definition of "noncombustible" as this is theappropriate location. New test method added to allow an alternative.

The annex is expanded to provide further guidance on noncombustibility tests. OldA.4.8(1) is added to 4.8 as section 4.8(1) is deleted from the standard.

ResponseMessage:

FR-60-NFPA 502-2020

Public Input No. 17-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. 4.8]

Public Input No. 15-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. A.4.8]

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

24 Affirmative All



0 Abstention


23 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

24

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Barry, Ian E.

In the current standard there is no A.8.4(2) should FR-60 be changed from A.8.4(3) to A.8.4(2)?

Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sparrow, Paul W.

agree with committee statement

Sprakel, Dirk K.

clarification


24 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

25


Alston, Jarrod

As noted in comment on FR-58, the proposed changes to the definition results in a lack ofconsistency between other NFPA documents including NFPA 101, NFPA 5000, and NFPA 130.


25 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

26


7.2* Application.

For the purpose of this standard, factors described in 4.3.1 shall dictate fire protection and fire-life safety requirements. The minimum fire protection and fire-life safety requirements, basedon tunnel length, are categorized as follows:

(1) Category X — Where tunnel length is less than 90 m (300 ft), an engineering analysisshall be performed in accordance with 4.3.1, an evaluation of the protection of structuralelements shall be conducted in accordance with Section 7.3, and traffic control systemsshall be installed in accordance with the requirements of Section 7.6.

(2) Category A — Where tunnel length is 90 m (300 ft) or greater, an engineering analysisshall be performed in accordance with 4.3.1, an evaluation of the protection of structuralelements shall be conducted in accordance with Section 7.3, and a standpipe system andtraffic control systems shall be installed in accordance with the requirements ofChapter 10 and Section 7.6.

Category B — Where tunnel length equals or exceeds 240 m (800 ft) and where themaximum distance from any point within the tunnel to a point of safety exceeds 120 m(400 ft), all provisions of this standard shall apply unless noted otherwise in thisdocument.

(3) Category C B — Where the tunnel length equals or exceeds 300 240 m (1000 800 ft), allprovisions of this standard shall apply unless noted otherwise in this document.

(4) Category D C — Where the tunnel length equals or exceeds 1000 m (3280 ft), allprovisions of this standard shall apply.

7.2.1*

Where a roadway or portion of a roadway is not fully enclosed on both sides, is not fullyenclosed on top, or any combination thereof, the decision by the authority having jurisdiction(AHJ) to consider the roadway as a road tunnel shall be made after an engineering analysis isperformed in accordance with 4.3.1.



502-2020_7.2_Tunnel_Categories.docx For Staff Use.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The tunnel length of category B and C has a difference of only 60 meters and the onlydifference in requirement is a conditional mandatory requirement for fixed fire fightingsystems. Category C is removed and conditional mandatory requirement for fixed firefighting systems is included in Category B tunnels for simplicity.

ResponseMessage:

FR-42-NFPA 502-2020


26 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

27

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

26 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


27 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

28


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Simplifying revision.


Maevski, Igor Y.

There is no substantiation for 800 ft. The number shall be changed to 1,000 ft which is consistentwith the maximum spacing between exits in accordance with 7.16.6.2


28 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

29


7.4.1

Tunnels described in categories B, and C, and D shall have at least two independent meansof identifying and locating a fire.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Tunnel category C has been merged with B as the two categories have a minordifference. Section 7.4.2 is updated as per the changes made in 7.2.

ResponseMessage:

FR-62-NFPA 502-2020

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.


29 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

30

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Simplifying revision.


30 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

31


7.4.2

Tunnels described in categories B, and C, and D without 24-hour supervision shall have anautomatic fire detection system in accordance with 7.4.6.


Committee: ROA-AAA

Submittal Date: Mon Nov 16 11:02:32 EST 2020

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Added 24-hour supervision to remove the contradiction with 7.4.3.


ResponseMessage:

FR-24-NFPA 502-2020

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.


31 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

32

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

clarification.


32 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

33


7.4.5

Ancillary spaces within tunnels defined in categories B and , C, and D (such as pump stationsand utility rooms) and other areas shall be supervised by automatic fire alarm systems inaccordance with 7.4.6.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:


ResponseMessage:

FR-43-NFPA 502-2020

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.


33 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

34

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Simplification.


34 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

35

First Revision No. 26-NFPA 502-2020 [ Section No. 7.4.6.2 ]

7.4.6.2*

Where a fire detection system is installed in accordance with the requirements of 7.4.6.1,signals for the purpose of automatically indicating the direction of evacuation and relocation ofoccupants shall not be required.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

Committee Statement: Editorial change to remove "the purpose of" as it is redundant text.


Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.


35 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

36

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

language.


36 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

37


7.4.6.7

Automatic fire detection systems shall be able to provide detection in the early stages of adeveloping fire within the tunnel under anticipated detect a tunnel fire incident of 5 MW or lesswithin 90 seconds or better in a testing environment of 3 m/sec (590 fpm) air velocity.

A.7.4.6.7

Automatic fire detection systems should be able to detect a tunnel fire incident of 5 MW orless within 90 seconds or better in a testing environment of 3 m/sec (590 fpm) air velocity.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Annex section is moved to the mandatory section in order to provide aquantitative requirement that can be enforced.

ResponseMessage:

FR-61-NFPA 502-2020

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

26 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan


37 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

38

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Improvement.


Alston, Jarrod

The values for heat release rate and time are arbitrary in nature and have not been provided withsubstantiation. The performance achieved with the proffered criteria is not evident.


38 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

39

First Revision No. 27-NFPA 502-2020 [ New Section after 7.4.7.1 ]

7.4.7.2*

For facilities that utilize a nonlisted supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systemto monitor and control facility subsystems that are a part of an integrated emergencyresponse system, the FACP shall be allowed to interface with the SCADA system for thepurpose of reporting alarm signals from the automatic fire detection system directly to theSCADA system.

A.7.4.7.2

Ventilation, fire protection, traffic control, emergency communications systems, are someexamples of integrated emergency response systems. The number of data points exportedfrom the FACP to the SCADA system should be sufficient to provide notifications, alarms,and status conditions from the automatic fire detection system to the SCADA system toinitiate the appropriate subsystem(s) by the SCADA system.

7.4.7.3*

For facilities that utilize a nonlisted SCADA system to monitor and control facilitysubsystems that are a part of an integrated emergency response system described in7.4.7.2 , the components of the SCADA system including and between the programmablelogic control platform and the field level input/output modules shall attain a minimum safetyintegrity level (SIL) of SIL-2 in accordance with IEC 61508, Standard for Functional Safetyof Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems .

A.7.4.7.3

Road tunnels often rely on a timely and integrated fire emergency response that requires acoordinated deployment of various fire emergency related subsystems that also includevarious traffic control systems to alert motorists and stop traffic from entering. Typically, theapplication design for the actuation and control of these fire emergency subsystems thatare specific to road tunnels is through a programmable SCADA system platform. This isdue to the complexity of the various sequences of operation that need to occur between allthe tunnel subsystems for a given incident at a specific location within the tunnel. Thisprogrammed control complexity, which is unique to road tunnels, is beyond the capability oftypical fire alarm control panels. Nonlisted SCADA systems and components that meet thesafety reliability standards established in this standard should be considered equal orsuperior to a fire alarm control panel for this function as allowed under the equivalencyprovisions of NFPA 72 .

7.4.7.4

For facilities that do not utilize a nonlisted SCADA system to monitor and control facilitysubsystems, the activation of subsystems in response to a fire emergency shall be directlyinitiated from the FACP.


Committee: ROA-AAA



39 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

40

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Monitoring and control of the multiple operating systems typically required within a roadtunnel facility requires a complex programmable system operating platform capable ofprocessing numerous data points and translating these data points into pre-programmedintegrated system response notifications and/or activations. In supervised road tunnelfacilities, a programmable logic control-based SCADA system is typically used to processthe data points and perform the monitoring and control functions of each operatingsystems including those systems required to be operated in an integrated responsemanner to fire emergency. In road tunnel facilities that have a SCADA system and anautomatic fire detection system, the required fire alarm control panel function should belimited to only sending alarm notifications to the SCADA and not initiating functionalcontrol or operation of the fire emergency systems.

The committee has adopted the IEC Standard as an alternative and an equivalentprescription of requirements to those in NFPA 72 as the IEC standard requirements areeven more stringent.

ResponseMessage:

FR-27-NFPA 502-2020

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold



40 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

41

Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

updating to good pratice.


41 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

42


7.10.1

Fixed water-based fire-fighting firefighting systems shall be conditionally mandatory incategory C B and category C D tunnels.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:


ResponseMessage:

FR-44-NFPA 502-2020

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.


42 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

43

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

sinmplification.


43 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

44


9.4.4.2

For protection of structural elements, the applicable provisions of Section 7.3 shall applyunless evidence of the performance of the required structural fire protection by a fixed water-based fire-fighting firefighting system is provided demonstrated and approved by the AHJ.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The term “Evidence” is not determinative and does not provide criteria where asdemonstrated shows a point reached.

ResponseMessage:

FR-8-NFPA 502-2020

Public Input No. 50-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. 9.4.4.2]

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

24 Affirmative All



1 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.


44 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

45

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Barry, Ian E.

Consideration should be given to the provision of well documented maintenance regimes in order toevidence that a system will continue to operate in the same way as the newly installed system. Poorlymaintained mechanical/electrically operated firefighting systems may not perform as intended.

Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

clarification


Sparrow, Paul W.

Cannot see how this can be DEMONSTRATED as (unlike Passive Protection Systems)there iscurrently no prescribed test standard for FFFS. Tests are mostly performed to answer specificresearch questions

Abstention

Maevski, Igor Y.

I disagree that The term “Evidence” is not determinative and does not provide criteria where asdemonstrated shows a point reached.


45 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

46


9.4.5 Layout Parameters.

To achieve the design objectives in accordance with 9.2.1, discharge device coverage,spacing, positioning, spray characteristics, working pressure, and flow rates shall bedetermined by use of applicable codes, or standards, or accepted practices, or wherenecessary, by an engineering analysis considering relevant available data resulting from full-scale tunnel fixed water-based fire-fighting firefighting tests of the type of fixed water-basedfire-fighting firefighting system being used.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The term “accepted practices” is removed as it is not an enforceable requirement."where necessary" is removed as it is redundant. Inserting the last sentence related tothe AHJ at the end of the section is redundant.

ResponseMessage:

FR-9-NFPA 502-2020


Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

26 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan


46 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

47

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Necessary correction.


Sparrow, Paul W.

there is currently no prescribed test standard for FFFS.


47 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

48


9.7.1*

When an FFFS is included in the design of a road tunnel, the impact of this system on othermeasures that are part of the overall safety concept shall be evaluated. At a minimum, thisevaluation shall address the following:

(1) Impact on drainage requirements

(2) Impact on tenability, including the following:

(a) Increase in humidity

(b) Reduction (if any) in stratification and visibility

(3) Integration with other tunnel systems, including the following:

(a) Fire detection and alarm system

(b) Tunnel ventilation system

(c) Traffic control and monitoring systems

(d) Visible emergency alarm notification

(e) Protection of structural elements

(4) Incident command structure and procedures, including the following:

(a) Procedures for tunnel operators

(b) Procedures for first responders

(c) Tactical fire-fighting firefighting procedures

Protection and reliability of the FFFS, including the following:

Impact events

Seismic events

Redundancy requirements

(5) Ongoing system maintenance, periodic testing, and service requirements


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Paragraph is removed as there are no requirements in place for FFFS intunnels.




48 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

49

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William


49 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

50

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Correction.


50 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

51


12.1.2

Emergency circuits installed in a road tunnel and ancillary areas shall remain functional for aperiod of not less than 1 hour for the anticipated fire condition by one of the following methods:

(1)

(2)

(3) They shall remain functional by the routing of the cable system external to the roadway.

(4) They shall remain functional by using diversity in system routing as approved, such asseparate redundant or multiple circuits separated by a 2-hour fire barrier, so that a singlefire or emergency event will not lead to a failure of the system.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The standards are ANSI approved and not developed by ANSI. ANSI is removedto avoid confusion on the actual name of the standard.

ResponseMessage:

FR-10-NFPA 502-2020


Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

* Fire-resistive cables shall be approved or listed for no less than 2 hours when tested tothe time-temperature curve of ASTM E119, Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests ofBuilding Construction and Materials, in accordance with ANSI/ UL 2196, Standard for FireTest for Circuit Integrity of Fire-Resistive Power, Instrumentation, Control, and DataCables, or other approved, recognized standards, as follows:

(a) Fire-resistive cables shall be tested as a complete system, in both vertical andhorizontal orientations, on conductors, cables, and raceways as applicable.

(b) Fire-resistive cables intended for installation in a raceway shall be tested in the typeof raceway in which they are intended to be installed.

(c) Each fire-resistive cable system shall have installation instructions that describe thetested assembly with only the components included in the tested assemblyacceptable for installations.

* Circuits shall be protected by a 2-hour fire barrier system in accordance with UL 1724,Outline of Investigation for Fire Tests for Electrical Circuit Protective Systems. The cablesor conductors shall maintain functionality at the operating temperature within the firebarrier system.


51 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

52

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed


52 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

53

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Clarification.


53 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

54


12.2.1.3

All cables and conductors used in road tunnels shall be resistant to the spread of fire and shallhave reduced smoke emissions by one of the following methods:

(1) Wires and cables listed as having fire-resistant and low smoke-producing characteristics,by having a cable char height of not greater than 1.5 m (4.9 ft) when measured from thelower edge of the burner face, a total smoke release over the 20-minute test period no

greater than 150 m2, and a peak smoke release rate of no greater than 0.40 m2/sec,when tested in accordance with either the IEEE 1202, Standard for Flame-PropagationTesting of Wire and Cable , method described in ANSI/ UL 1685, Vertical-Tray Fire-Propagation and Smoke-Release Test for Electrical and Optical-Fiber Cables, or the CSAFT4, Vertical Flame Test, per CSA C22.2 No. 0.3, Test Methods for Electrical Wires andCables.

(2) Wires and cables listed as having fire-resistant and low smoke-producing characteristics,by having a flame travel distance that does not exceed 1.5 m (4.9 ft), generating amaximum peak optical density of smoke of 0.5 and a maximum average optical density ofsmoke of 0.15 when tested in accordance with the methods described in NFPA 262 or inCSA FT6, Horizontal Flame and Smoke Test, per CSA C22.2 No. 0.3.

(3) Wires and cables tested to equivalent internationally recognized standards approved bythe authority having jurisdiction (AHJ).


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:


ResponseMessage:

FR-11-NFPA 502-2020

Public Input No. 58-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. 12.2.1.3]

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

26 Affirmative All



0 Abstention


54 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

55

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sparrow, Paul W.

as per committee statement

Sprakel, Dirk K.


55 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

56

clraification.


56 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

57


12.3.2

Raceways, equipment, and supports installed in a road tunnel and ancillary areas shall complywith the following:

(1) Exposed raceways, equipment, and supports with combustible outer coverings orcoatings shall emit less than 2 percent acid gas when tested in accordance with MIL-DTL-24643C, Detail Specification: Cables, Electric, Low Smoke Halogen-Free, forShipboard Use, or with an approved, equivalent, internationally recognized standard.

(2) Nonmetallic conduits shall be permitted when covered with a minimum of 100 mm (4 in.)concrete when approved. All conduit ends inside of pull boxes and junction boxes shall befirestopped.

(3) Nonmetallic raceways used in road tunnels shall meet a flame spread index notexceeding 25 and a smoke developed index not exceeding 50 when tested in accordancewith ASTM E84, Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of BuildingMaterials, or UL 723, Test for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials , orshall be noncombustible per Section 4.8.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

UL 723 is an equivalent standard to ASTM E 84 therefore added as analternative test method.



Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

26 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.


57 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

58

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sparrow, Paul W.


Sprakel, Dirk K.

alternative method added.


58 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

59

First Revision No. 45-NFPA 502-2020 [ Section No. 12.4 [Excluding any Sub-

Sections] ]

Road tunnels complying with Category B–D B and C in Section 7.2 shall be provided withemergency power in accordance with Article 700 of NFPA 70. (For emergency and standbypower systems other than separate service, see NFPA 110.)


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Tunnel category C has been merged with B as the two categories have a minordifference. Section 12.4 is updated as per the changes made in 7.2.

ResponseMessage:

FR-45-NFPA 502-2020

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.


59 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

60

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

simplification.


60 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

61



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62

13.2* Emergency Incidents.

The following typical incidents shall be considered during the development of facilityemergency response plans:

(1) Fire or a smoke condition in one or more vehicles or in the facility

(2) Fire or a smoke condition adjoining or adjacent to the facility

(3) Collision involving one or more vehicles

(4) Loss of electric power that results in loss of illumination, ventilation, or other life safetysystems

(5) Rescue and evacuation of motorists under adverse conditions

(6) Disabled vehicles

(7) Flooding of a travel way or an evacuation route

(8) Seepage and spillage of flammable, toxic, or irritating vapors and gases

(9) Multiple casualty incidents

(10) Damage to structures from impact and heat exposure

(11) Serious vandalism or other criminal acts, such as bomb threats and terrorism

(12) First aid or medical attention for motorists

(13) Extreme weather conditions, such as heavy snow, rain, high winds, high heat, lowtemperatures, or sleet and ice, that cause disruption of operation

(14) Earthquake

(15) Hazardous materials accidentally or intentionally being released into the tunnel

(16)* Fires exceeding design basis

A.13.2(16)

Tunnel fires could occur that reach higher peak heat release rates (HRR) or growfaster than an existing tunnel’s fire life safety systems were designed to manage.

Such fire conditions could exceed the ability for an existing tunnel ventilation systemto prevent back layering or spread of smoke. These conditions might then exposetunnel occupants to increased heat and toxicity, and reduced visibility from smokeand fire that impair their ability to self-rescue.

The resulting situation could also exceed the conditions that an existing facility’soperators and emergency responders would have expected for the facility designcriteria when constructed.

Examples of where the design basis might be exceeded include many existingtunnels with ventilation systems designed for a peak fire HRR of 20 MW to 100 MW,based on the understanding of vehicle fire potential at the time they were designed.

Larger fires involving ordinary commodities have occurred or been demonstrated intesting, including 1999 Mont Blanc estimated at 190 MW and Runehamar full-scaletests of 200 MW.

Where hazardous materials are involved in tunnel fires, [see 13.2(15) ] even largerfires have occurred with flammable liquids, including 1982 Caldecott estimated at400 MW and 2015 Skatestraum estimated at 440 MW.

Tunnel operators and responders might need to consider planning for the possibilityof fires exceeding the existing facility’s design fire life safety basis.


62 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

63


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Tunnel designers, operators and responders need to be made aware that larger, fasterfires than expected may occur due to variety of reasons including but not limited todesigns that occur before modern understanding of a fire size and speed of a particularhazard, Failure or delayed operation of a fire protection system; prohibited cargo, etc. Toimprove safety, operators and responders should be able to modify procedures andprocesses.

ResponseMessage:

FR-13-NFPA 502-2020

Public Input No. 35-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. 13.2]

Public Input No. 36-NFPA 502-2020 [New Section after A.13.2]

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

22 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold

Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur


63 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

64

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Alston, Jarrod

The concept introduced within FR-13 implies a concept that is similar to the characterization of firesas "design", "high challenge", or "extreme" as promulgated by such standards as AS 4825. Note, theproposed language for A.13.2(16) would benefit from edits at the comment phase.


Regarding A.13.2(16) Any confirmed vehicle fire is considered an emergency incident, regardless ofheat generated.

Maevski, Igor Y.

I agree that Tunnel designers, operators and responders need to be made aware that larger, fasterfires than expected may occur; however they may need to be aware that smaller fires, with slow firegrowth rates, than indicated in standard happen more often, than large design fires specified

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sparrow, Paul W.


Sprakel, Dirk K.

important warning.


Connell, William G.

It is unrealistic to assume that the ultimate fire size of a specific incident could be known and thencompared to the "design" fire size during an an actual incident. Therefore, considering this possibilityfor purposes of response planning is not practical nor necessary.

Kashef, Ahmed

The added item 16 "Fires exceeding design basis" is vague in terms of how big the fire that should beconsidered.


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65

First Revision No. 46-NFPA 502-2020 [ Section No. A.7.2 ]


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66

A.7.2


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67

The categorizing of road tunnels is also influenced by their level of traffic congestion asevidenced by the tunnel’s peak hourly traffic count, as shown in Figure A.7.2. These minimumrequirements, which are fully described within this standard, are summarized in Table A.7.2,as a reference guide to assist in the search for requirements listed elsewhere in this standard.

Figure A.7.2 Urban and Rural Tunnel Categories.

Table A.7.2 Minimum Road Tunnel Fire Protection Reference Guide

Road Tunnel Categories

Fire ProtectionSystems

NFPA 502Sections

X

[See7.2(1).]

A

[See7.2(2).]

B

[See7.2(3).]

C

[See7.2(4).]

D C

[See7.2(5 4 ).]

Engineering Analysis

Engineering analysis 4.3.1 MR MR MR MR MR

Fire Protection of

Structural Elementsa

Fire protection ofstructural elements 7.3 MR MR MR MR MR

Fire Detection


67 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

68



NFPA 502Sections

X

[See7.2(1).]

A

[See7.2(2).]

B

[See7.2(3).]

C

[See7.2(4).]

D C

[See7.2(5 4 ).]

Detection,identification, andlocation of fire in tunnel 7.4 — — MR MR MR

CCTV systemsb 7.4.3 — — CMR CMR CMR

Automatic fire

detection systemsb 7.4.6.7 — — CMR CMR CMR

Fire alarm controlpanel 7.4.7 — — MR MR MR

Emergency Communications

Systemsc

Emergencycommunicationssystems 4.5/7.5 CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR

Traffic Control

Stop trafficapproaching tunnelportal 7.6.1 MR MR MR MR MR

Stop traffic fromentering tunnel’s directapproaches 7.6.2 — — MR MR MR

Fire Protection

Fire apparatusd 7.7 — — — — —

Fire standpipe 7.8/10.1 — MR MR MR MR

Water supply 7.8/10.2 — MR MR MR MR

Fire departmentconnections 10.3 — MR MR MR MR

Hose connections 10.4 — MR MR MR MR

Fire pumpse 10.5 — CMR CMR CMR CMR

Portable fireextinguishers 7.9 — — MR MR MR

Fixed water-based fire-

fighting systemsf7.10/9.0 Chapter

9 — — — CMR CMR CMR

Emergency ventilation

systemg7.11/11.0 Chapter

11 — — CMR CMR MR

Tunnel drainage

systemh 7.12 — CMR MR MR MR

Hydrocarbon

detectionh 7.12.7 — CMR MR MR MR

Flammable andcombustibleenvironmental

hazardsi 7.15 — — CMR CMR CMR

Means of Egress

Emergency egress 7.16.1.1 — — MR MR MR


68 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

69



NFPA 502Sections

X

[See7.2(1).]

A

[See7.2(2).]

B

[See7.2(3).]

C

[See7.2(4).]

D C

[See7.2(5 4 ).]

Exit identification 7.16.1.2 — — MR MR MR

Tenable environment 7.16.2 — — MR MR MR

Walking surface 7.16.4 — — MR MR MR

Emergency exit doors 7.16.5 — — MR MR MR

Emergency exits(includes cross-

passageways)j 7.16.6 — — MR MR MR

Electrical Systemsk

General 12.1 — CMR MR MR MR

Emergency power 12.4 — CMR MR MR MR

Emergency lighting 12.6 — CMR MR MR MR

Exit signs 12.6.8 — CMR MR MR MR

Security plan 12.7 — CMR MR MR MR

Emergency Response Plan

Emergency responseplan 13.3 MR MR MR MR MR

MR: Mandatory requirement (3.3.42). CMR: Conditionally mandatory requirement (3.3.42.1).

Note: The purpose of Table A.7.2 is to provide guidance in locating minimum road tunnel fireprotection requirements contained within this standard. If there is any conflict between therequirements defined in the standard text and this table, the standard text must always govern.

aDetermination of requirements in accordance with Section 7.3.

bDetermination of requirements in accordance with Section 7.4.

cDetermination of requirements in accordance with Sections 4.5 and 7.5.

dNot mandatory to be at tunnel; however, they must be near to minimize response time.

eIf required, must follow Section 10.5.

fIf installed, must follow Section 7.10 and Chapter 9.

gSection 11.1 allows engineering analysis to determine requirements.

hIf required, must follow Section 7.12.

iDetermination of requirements in accordance with 7.16.2.

jEmergency exit spacing must be supported by an egress analysis in accordance with 7.16.6.

kIf required, must follow Chapter 12.



502-2020_A.7.2_Tunnel_Categories.docx For Staff Use.



69 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

70

Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The tunnel length of category B and C has a difference of only 60 meters and the onlydifference in requirement is a conditional mandatory requirement for fixed fire fightingsystems. Category C is removed and conditional mandatory requirement for fixed firefighting systems is included in Category B tunnels for simplicity.

ResponseMessage:

FR-46-NFPA 502-2020

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

26 Affirmative All



1 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry



70 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

71

Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

simplification.

Abstention

Maevski, Igor Y.

See my disposition on FR-42. The curves shall be changed to reflect 1,000 ft long instead of 800 ftshown


71 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

72

First Revision No. 14-NFPA 502-2020 [ Section No. A.7.3.2 ]


72 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

73

A.7.3.2


73 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

74

Any passive fire protection material should satisfy the following performance criteria:

(1) Be resistant to freezing and thawing and follow STUVA Guidelines; BS EN 12467, Fibre-cement flat sheets. Product specification and test methods; or ASTM C666, Standard TestMethod for Resistance of Concrete to Rapid Freezing and Thawing

(2) Withstand dynamic suction and pressure loads; 3 kPa (12 in. w.g.) to 5 kPa (20 in. w.g.)depending on traffic type, cross section, and speed limits; amount of cycles to bedetermined based on traffic volume

(3) Withstand both hot and cold thermal shock from fire exposure and hose streams

(4) Meet all applicable health and safety standards

(5) Not itself become a hazard during a fire

(6) Be resistant to water ingress; follow BS EN 492, Fibre-cement slates and fittings. Productspecification and test methods

The time-temperature development for the RWS curve is shown in Table A.7.3.2(a) and inFigure A.7.3.2(a). Other internationally recognized standardized time-temperature curves areshown in Figure A.7.3.2(c).

Table A.7.3.2(a) Furnace Temperatures

Time

(min)

Temperature

ºC ºF

0 20 68

3 890 1634

5 1140 2084

10 1200 2192

30 1300 2372

60 1350 2462

90 1300 2372

120 1200 2192

An engineering analysis for the purposes of determining the appropriate time-temperaturecurve should consider the following:

(1) Tunnel geometry

(2) Types of vehicles anticipated

(3) Types of cargoes

(4) Expected traffic conditions

(5) Fire mitigation measure(s)

(6) Reliability and availability of fire mitigation measure(s)

Figure A.7.3.2(a) RWS Time-Temperature Curve.


74 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

75

The RWS fire curve represents one of the standardized time-temperature curves, which wasinitially developed during extensive testing conducted by the Dutch Ministry of Transport(Rijkswaterstaat, RWS) in cooperation with the Netherlands Organization for Applied ScientificResearch (TNO) in the late 1970s, and later proven in full-scale fire tests in the Runehamartunnel tests in Norway in September 2003, conducted as part of the European Union (EU)–funded research project, Cost-Effective Sustainable and Innovative Upgrading Methods forFire Safety in Existing Tunnels (UPTUN), in association with SP Technical Research Instituteof Sweden and the Norwegian Fire Research Laboratory (SINTEF/NBL).

As shown in Table A.7.3.2(b), four tests were carried out on fire loads of nonhazardousmaterials using timber or plastic, furniture, mattresses, and cardboard cartons containingplastic cups in a tunnel protected with fire insulation board .

Table A.7.3.2(b) Fire Test Data

Test

Timefrom

Ignitionto

PeakHRR

(min)

Linear Fire Growth Rate (MW/min) (R-LinearRegression Coefficient)

PeakHRR

(MW)

Estimated HRRfrom

LaboratoryTests

(No Target /

InclusiveTarget)

(MW)

1 18.5 20.1 (0.996) 201.9 186/217

2 14.3 26.3 (0.992) 156.6 167/195

3 10.4 16.4 (0.998) 118.6 —

4 7.4 16.9* (0.996) 66.4 79/95

* 5-66.4 MW

All tests produced time-temperature developments in line with the RWS curve as shown inFigure A.7.3.2(b).

Figure A.7.3.2(b) Test Fire Curves.


75 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

76

All fires produced heat release rates of between 70 MW for cardboard cartons containingplastic cups and 203 MW for timber/plastic pallets.

Figure A.7.3.2(c) depicts the T1 fire test time-temperature development in comparison tovarious standardized time-temperature curves.

Figure A.7.3.2(c) Various Standardized Time-Temperature Curves and Fire Test Time-Temperature Development.

The RWS requirements are adopted internationally.

The level of fire resistance of structures and the emergency time/temperature certification ofequipment should be proven by testing or reference to previous testing.

Fire test reports are based on the following requirements:

(1) Concrete slabs used for the application of passive fire protection materials for fire testingpurposes have dimensions of at least 1400 mm × 1400 mm (55 in. × 55 in.) and a nominalthickness of 150 mm (6 in.).

(2) The exposed surface is approximately 1200 mm × 1200 mm (47 in. × 47 in.).

(3) The passive fire protection material is fixed to the concrete slab using the same fixationmaterial (anchors, wire mesh, etc.) as will be used during the actual installation in thetunnel.

(4) In the case of board protection, a minimum of one joint in between two panels should becreated, to judge if any thermal leaks would occur in a real fire in the tunnel.

(5) In the case of spray materials, the number of applications (number of layers) should beregistered when preparing the test specimen. This number of layers should be consideredwhen the spray material is applied in a real tunnel.

(6) Temperatures are recorded by K-type thermocouples in the following locations:


76 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

77

(a) At the interface between the concrete and the passive fire protection material

(b) At the bottom of the reinforcement

(c) On the nonexposed face of the concrete slab

For an example test procedure to assess the spalling and the thermal protection of aconcrete structure, see Efectis-R0695, “Fire Testing Procedure for Concrete TunnelLinings and Other Tunnel Components .”

The installation of passive fire protection materials should be done with anchors having thefollowing properties:

(1) The diameter should be limited to a maximum of 6 mm (1⁄4 in.) to reduce the heat sinkeffect through the steel anchor into the concrete. Larger diameter anchors can create aspalling effect on the concrete.

(2) The use of high-grade stainless steel anchors is recommended.

(3) If necessary, a washer should be used to avoid a pull-through effect when the system isexposed to dynamic loads.

(4) The anchors should be suitable for use in the tension zone of concrete (crackedconcrete).

(5) The anchors should be suitable for use under dynamic loads.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The first change proposed by the proponent adds factual material to the annex.Structural componenets are to be tested to prescribed conditions. Inclusion of the testwould potentially lead to confusion in application of the structural requirements.

ResponseMessage:

FR-14-NFPA 502-2020


Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

25 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.


77 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

78

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

clarificaction.


Barry, Ian E.

The writer disagrees with the statement made in Public Input No.3. Different concrete mix designs willabsorb heat at different rates. Therefore a general statement is incorrect In addition, the rapidtemperature development experienced in tunnel fires can result in damage to concrete (possiblyirreparable) before the concrete has had the opportunity to absorb any heat from a fire


78 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

79

Sparrow, Paul W.

Data from numerous tunnel fires over many years have shown that the temperature development asillustrated by the RWS curve is realistic.


79 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

80


A.7.4.7

For facilities that utilize a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system tomonitor and control facility sub-systems as part of an integrated emergency responsesystem (i.e., ventilation, fire protection, traffic control, emergency communications systems,etc.), the fire alarm control panel (FACP) should interface with the SCADA system for thepurpose of reporting alarm signals from the automatic fire detection system directly to theSCADA system. The number of data points exported from the FACP to the SCADA systemshould be sufficient to provide notifications, alarms, and status conditions to the SCADAsystem necessary to allow the initiation of an appropriate sub-system response by theSCADA system to the alarms and conditions received from the automatic fire detectionsystem.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The text has been split into two and enhanced in sections A.7.4.7.2 and A.7.4.7.3therefore no longer needed in A.7.4.7.

ResponseMessage:

FR-29-NFPA 502-2020

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees


80 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

81

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

clarification.


81 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

82


A.12.1.5

Guidance for seismic protection can be found in the following documents:

(1) AISC 325, LRFD Manual of Steel Construction

(2) ASTM E580, Standard Practice for Installation of Ceiling Suspension Systems forAcoustical Tile and Lay-in Panels in Areas Subject to Earthquake Ground Motions

(3) IEEE 693-2005, Recommended Practices for Seismic Design of Substations

(4) USACE TI 809, Seismic Design for Buildings

(5) ANSI/ UL 1598, Luminaires

(6) ASCE/SEI 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures

(7) EN 61508-1, Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:


ResponseMessage:

FR-15-NFPA 502-2020


Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

26 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.


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Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sparrow, Paul W.


Sprakel, Dirk K.

clarification


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First Revision No. 17-NFPA 502-2020 [ Section No. E.2 ]

E.2 Fixed Water-Based Systems.

Equipment permanently attached to a road tunnel that, when operated, has the intended effectof reducing the heat release and fire growth rates, is able to spread an extinguishing agent inall or part of the tunnel using a network of pipes and nozzles.

Fixed water-based fire-fighting firefighting systems should be used as a component of anintegrated fire engineering approach to fire protection to reduce the rate of fire growth and theultimate heat release rate.

Fixed water-based firefighting systems have been installed to protect the structure andincrease the availability of the tunnel. This supports re-opening of the tunnel after a large fireincident.

Examples of fixed water-based fire-fighting firefighting systems include deluge systems, mistsystems, and foam systems.


Committee: ROA-AAA

Submittal Date: Sun Nov 15 20:07:00 EST 2020

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The text is enhanced as fixed fire fighting systems in tunnels protecting thestructure provides benefits on facility availability.

ResponseMessage:

FR-17-NFPA 502-2020

Public Input No. 55-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. E.2]

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

26 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Barry, Ian E.


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85

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kashef, Ahmed

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

adaption to recent developments in society.


Alston, Jarrod

The proposed wording suggest that fixed water-based systems have been installed with the specificintent of structural protection. It is more likely that the reduction in damage to the structure is abeneficial by-product of the installation.

Sparrow, Paul W.

there is no evidence currently available that can demonstrate that FFFS provides adequateprotection to the structure under ALL conditions and the assumption is being made that the FFFSsystem will always work on demand.


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First Revision No. 36-NFPA 502-2020 [ Section No. G.1 ]

G.1 General.

Most vehicles currently used in the United States are powered by either spark-ignited engines(gasoline, ethanol ) or compression-ignited engines (diesel). Vehicles that use alternative fuelssuch as compressed natural gas (CNG), compressed gas hydrogen (cGH 2 ), liquefiedpetroleum gas (LP-Gas), and liquefied natural gas (LNG) are entering the vehicle population,but the percentage of such vehicles is still not large enough to significantly influence thedesign of road tunnel ventilation with regard to vehicle emissions. With the introduction of fuelcell electric vehicles (FCEVs), compressed gas hydrogen (cGH 2 ) has entered the market asa source of power for fuel cells. However, it is possible that growing concerns regarding thesafety of some alternative-fuel vehicles that operate within road tunnels will affect the fire-related life safety design aspects of highway tunnels. See Chapter 11 for requirements for roadtunnel ventilation during fire emergencies.

There are a number of standard requirements for these types of systems, and therequirements derive from existing requirements for storage and transport of CNG tanks.

The creation of accepted consensus-based standards for hydrogen tanks is an ongoingprocess. However, there are current international draft standards available, which providesome insight to what will be required outside the U.S. in the near future.

In the U.S., the primary standards used are FMVSS 304, Compressed Natural Gas FuelContainer Integrity , and ANSI NGV2, American National Standard for Natural Gas VehicleContainers . Both of these standards were developed for the approval of compressednatural gas. It is currently being investigated whether FMVSS 304 can be used for hydrogenfuel tanks. In addition, an ANSI HGV standard is under development, which will mirror theNGV standard, but incorporate specific tests for hydrogen gas vehicle containers andsystem components.

The tests in both of these standards include full-scale fire tests of the containers and theirpressure relief devices (PRDs), as well as component reliability testing, such as pressurecycling, impact resistance, drop tests, and hydrostatic burst testing. In addition to therequired tests, a quality-control system is required to be administered by an independentthird party to ensure that the fuel system components are manufactured in the same manneras when they were approved through testing. Further, the fuel system would be listed andlabeled, such that it would be easily recognizable to an authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) ashaving met these requirements.

In the long run, it It should be feasible for regulators to only allow vehicles that carry anapproved listing and label to travel through a road tunnel. In the short term, this is unrealistic,since the standards process is under development and there is some level of controversy asto the minimum acceptable design parameters. As a result, in the short term, the decision willbe in the hands of the AHJ as to the mitigation measures for dealing with alternative fuels inroad tunnels.

Section G.2 provides some highlighted information about selected alternative fuels,Section G.3 provides some additional information about possible mitigation measures, andSection G.4 provides a brief discussion of applicable codes and standards, as well as recentresearch into the hazards of alternative fuels.

Detail FR-63


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G.1.1 Hydrogen Behavior Compared to Other FuelsProperties of Alternative Fuels.

Table G.1.1 provides information on hydrogen properties relative to otherof alternative fuelsand gasoline.

Table G.1.1 Comparative Properties of Hydrogen FuelsProperties of Alternative Fuels

Properties Units Hydrogena Methanea Propanea Methanola Ethanola Gasolineb

Chemicalformula

H2 CH4 C3H8 CH3OH C2H5OHCxHy (x = 4− 12)

Molecular

weightc,d 2.02 16.04 44.1 32.04 46.07 100 to 105


lb/ft3 0.00523 0.0417 0.116 49.4 49.3 46.9

Viscosity

(NTP)c,d,eg/cm-sec 8.81 × 10-5

1.10 ×

10-48.012 ×

10-5 9.18 × 10-3 0.01190.0037 to0.0044

lb/ft-sec 5.92 × 10-6

7.41 ×

10-65.384 ×

10-6 6.17 × 10-47.99 ×

10-4

2.486 × 10-4

to 2.957 ×

10-4

Normal boiling

pointc,d °C −253 −162 −42.1 64.5 78.5 27 to 225

°F −423 −259 −43.8 148 173.3 80 to 437

Vapor specificgravity

(NTP)c,e,gair = 1 0.0696 0.555 1.55 N/A N/A 3.66

Flash pointd,g °C <−253 −188 −104 11 13 −43

°F <−423 −306 −155 52 55 −45

Flammabilityrange in

aird,f,gvol% 4.0 to 75.0 5.0 to 15.0 2.1 to 10.1 6.7 to 36.0 4.3 to 19 1.4 to 7.6

Autoignitiontemperature in

aird,g

°C 585 540 490 385 423 230 to 480

°F 1085 1003 914 723 793 450 to 900


aProperties of the pure substance.

bProperties of a range of commercial grades.

cSource: NIST Chemistry WebBook, http://webbook.nist.gov/chemistry/.

dSource: Alternatives to Traditional Transportation Fuels: An Overview, DOE/EIA-0585/U.S.Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC, June 1994.

eNTP: Normal temperature and pressure [measured at 20°C (68°F) and 1 atmosphere].

fSource: Perry's Chemical Engineers' Handbook, 7th Editionedition, McGraw-Hill, 1997.

gSource: Hydrogen Fuel Cell Engines and Related Technologies, Module 1: HydrogenProperties, U.S.US Department of Energy, 2001.



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502-2020_Annex_G.1.docx For Staff Use.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Annex section is updated to reflect latest information on alternative fuel vehicles.Updates include references on new alternative fuel vehicles, entering the market,additional risks associated with alternative fuel vehicles and references requirementsthat need to be followed to mitigate hazards and alternative vehicle fires.

ResponseMessage:

FR-36-NFPA 502-2020

Public Input No. 22-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. G.1]




Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.


88 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

89

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Updating.


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G.2 Alternative Fuels.

It is evident that the use of vehicles powered by alternative fuels (i.e., fuels other than gasolineor diesel) will continue to increase. Of the potential alternative fuels, ethanol, compressednatural gas (CNG) , LP-Gas, electric, and hybrid electric currently are the most widely used.LNG and cGH 2 are entering the market. Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the CleanAir Act Amendment of 1990, the following are considered potential alternative fuels:

(1) Methanol

(2) Hydrogen

(3) Ethanol

(4) Coal-derived liquids

(5) Propane

(6) Biological materials

(7) Natural gas

(8) Reformulated gasoline

(9) Electricity (stored energy batteries)

(10) Clean diesel

The alternative fuels that are considered most viable in the near future are CNG, LP-Gas,LNG, methanol, hydrogen, and electric hybrid.


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G.2.1 Compressed Natural Gas. (CNG).

CNG has some excellent physical and chemical properties that make it a safer automotive fuelthan gasoline or LP-Gas, provided well-designed carrier systems and operational proceduresare followed. Although CNG has a relatively high flammability limit, its flammability range isrelatively narrow compared to the ranges for other fuels.

In air at ambient conditions, a CNG volume of at least 5 percent is necessary to supportcontinuous flame propagation, compared to approximately 2 percent for LP-Gas and 1 percentfor gasoline vapor. Therefore, considerable fuel leakage is necessary in order to render themixture combustible. Furthermore, fires involving combustible mixtures of CNG are relativelyeasy to contain and extinguish.

There are a number of standard requirements for these types of systems, and therequirements derive from existing requirements for storage and transport of CNG tanks. In theU.S., the primary standards used are FMVSS 304, Compressed Natural Gas Fuel ContainerIntegrity , and ANSI NGV2, American National Standard for Natural Gas Vehicle Containers .Both of these standards were developed for the approval of compressed natural gascontainers.

The tests in both of these standards include full-scale fire tests of the containers and theirpressure relief devices (PRDs), as well as component reliability testing, such as pressurecycling, impact resistance, drop tests, and hydrostatic burst testing. In addition to the requiredtests, a quality-control system is required to be administered by an independent third party toensure that the fuel system components are manufactured in the same manner as when theywere approved through testing.

Furthermore, fires involving combustible mixtures of CNG are relatively easy to contain andextinguish.Since natural gas is lighter than air, it normally dissipates harmlessly into theatmosphere instead of pooling when a leak occurs. However, in a tunnel environment, suchdissipation can lead to pockets of gas that collect in the overhead structure. In addition, sincenatural gas can ignite only in the range of 5 percent to 15 percent volume of natural gas in air,leaks are not likely to ignite due to insufficient oxygen.

Another advantage of CNG is that its fueling system is one of the safest in existence. Therigorous storage requirements and greater strength of CNG cylinders compared to those ofgasoline contribute to the superior safety record of CNG automobiles.

An incident with a CNG-propelled bus in the Netherlands [Fire in a CNG bus (Brand in eenaardgasbus, 2012)] highlighted the issue and associated risk of possible jet fires as aconsequence of the pressure release valve operation.

G.2.2 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LP-Gas).

There is a growing awareness of the economic advantages of using LP-Gas as a vehicularfuel. These advantages include longer engine life, increased travel time between oil and oilfilter changes, longer and better performance from spark plugs, nonpolluting exhaustemissions, and, in most cases, mileage that is comparable to that of gasoline. LP-Gas isnormally delivered as a liquid and can be stored at 38°C (100.4°F) on vehicles under a designpressure of 1624 kPa to 2154 kPa (250 psi to 312.5 psi). LP-Gas is a natural gas andpetroleum derivative. One disadvantage is that it is costly to store because a pressure vesselis needed. Also, where LP-Gas is engulfed in a fire, a rapid increase in pressure can occur,even if the outside temperature is not excessive relative to the gas–vapor pressurecharacteristics. Rapid pressure increase can be mitigated by venting the excessive buildupthrough relief valves. In Australia a significant proportion of the vehicle fleet uses LPG-powered LP-Gas-powered vehicles. Alternative-powered vehicles are marked by coloredlabels on their registration plates. No restrictions on use of such vehicles exist in Australia. InAustralia, the only impact on managing these vehicles is by alternative procedures for incidentresponse by emergency services.


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G.2.3 Methanol.

Currently, methanol is used primarily as a chemical feedstock for the production of chemicalintermediates and solvents. Under EPA restrictions, it is being used as a substitute for lead-based octane enhancers in the form of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE) and as a viablemethod for vehicle emission control. MTBE is not available as a fuel substitute but is used as agasoline additive.

The hazards of methanol production, distribution, and use are comparable to those ofgasoline. Unlike gasoline, however, methanol vapors in a fuel tank are explosive at normalambient temperature. Saturated vapors that are located above nondiluted methanol in anenclosed tank are explosive at 10°C to 43°C (50°F to 109.4°F). A methanol flame is invisible,so a colorant or gasoline needs to be added to enable detection.

G.2.4 Hydrogen.


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Hydrogen is one of the most attractive alternative fuels due to its ability to power fuel cells invehicles, the abundant availability, and the potential higher efficiency in vehicles. Hydrogencan be used to power vehicles in the form of fuel cells or as replacement fuel in internalcombustion engines. 2.2 lb (1 kg) of hydrogen gas has about the same energy as1 gallon (3.8 L) of gasoline. The first commercially Commercially deployed hydrogen-powered vehicles employ fuel cells to convert hydrogen into electricity to power an electricmotor. For a driving range of 300 miles (450 km) or more, a light-duty fuel cell vehicle mustcarry approximately 11 lb(5 kg) of hydrogen. Commercially available storage technologiestypically include high-pressure tanks for compressed hydrogen gas up to 70 MPa (10,000 psi;700 bar )Fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) have evolved from a demonstration to commercialtechnology. Several OEMs automotive companies now sell or lease fuel cell electric vehicles( FCEVs) , and networks of hydrogen fueling stations have been constructed on both UScoasts with plans to provide fueling service to the entire country.

Medium and heavy-duty gaseous hydrogen vehicles are in their demonstration phase.

Currently, FCEV vehicles use tanks to store cGH 2 . Currently, the on-board storage of liquidhydrogen (LH 2 ) is not used in any vehicles. The on-board hydrogen system usually containsa single or several cGH 2 storage tank(s), a refueling receptacle, and hydrogen fuel lines.Each tank is equipped with its own thermally activated pressure relief device (TPRD). In caseof fire, TPRDs will release hydrogen either individually or they can be routed to a single ventlocation. The direction of hydrogen release from TPRD is vertically downwards or at a slightangle, when a car is in normal position, with four wheels on the ground. The hydrogen fuellines contain hydrogen at much lower pressures (from ambient to about 0.7 MPa) than in thetanks. The lines are made of stainless steel compatible with hydrogen. The entire fuel systemis sealed, and no relevant amount of hydrogen is released during operation or parking.

In addition, FCEVs contain high-voltage electricity, similar to electric and hybrid-electricvehicles, and therefore comply with FMVSS305.

In comparison with gasoline, hydrogen has a much wider flammability range (4 percent to75 percent by volume) and explosive limit. The minimum ignition energy of hydrogen in air isabout an order of magnitude (by a factor of 10) less than that of gasoline vapor. A staticelectric spark such as by the human body or from a vehicle tailpipe is sufficient to ignitehydrogen. As the density is only about 7 percent of air, hydrogen release in atmosphereusually results in rapid dispersion and mixing to a nonhazardous concentration. However,accumulation of hydrogen in stagnant space that cannot be ventilated is a fire and explosionhazard. A minimum separation distance from the ceiling or explosion proofing should beconsidered for such electrical equipment (classified electrical systems). Proper ventilation isimportant to dilute released, unburned H 2 below critical values .

Emergency response to an incident involving hydrogen fuel leak or fire requires necessarytraining, such as recognizing the hydrogen tank, high-voltage battery, or capacitor pack thatmight be present on the incident vehicle. The NFPA website shown below in G.2.4(2)provides specific emergency response information on commercially available FCEVs. The H2Tools website shown below in G.2.4(1) provides training materials for emergency respondersthat can be used to prepare for incidents involving FCEVs. See the following sites forinformation on emergency response and emergency response training for FCEVs:

(1) H2 2 Tools: https://h2tools.org/content/training-materials

(2) NFPA: http://www.nfpa.org/training-and-events/by-topic/alternative-fuel-vehicle-safety-training

(3) Hydrogen Fuel Cell Electric Tunnel Safety Study, C. LaFleur et al., Sandia NationalLaboratories SAND2017-11157, October, 2017

(4) Alternative Fuel Vehicles in Tunnels , C. LaFleur et al., Sandia National Laboratories,SAND2020-5466, May 2020

Detail FR-63


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G.2.4.1 Properties of Alternative Fuels.

Table G.1.1 provides information on properties of alternative fuels and gasoline.

Table G.2.4.1 Properties of Alternative Fuels

Properties Units Hydrogena Methanea Propanea Methanola Ethanola Gasolineb

Chemicalformula

H2 CH4 C3 H8 CH3 OH C2 H5 OHCx Hy (x =4 − 12)

Molecular

weightc,d 2.02 16.04 44.1 32.04 46.07 100 to 105


lb/ft3 0.00523 0.0417 0.116 49.4 49.3 46.9

Viscosity

(NTP)c,d,eg/cm-sec 8.81 × 10-5

1.10 ×

10-48.012 ×

10-5 9.18 × 10-3 0.01190.0037 to0.0044

lb/ft-sec 5.92 × 10-6

7.41 ×

10-65.384 ×

10-6 6.17 × 10-47.99 ×

10-4

2.486 ×

10-4 to2.957 ×

10-4

Normalboiling

pointc,d°C −253 −162 −42.1 64.5 78.5 27 to 225

°F −423 −259 −43.8 148 173.3 80 to 437

Vaporspecificgravity

(NTP)c,e,g

air = 1 0.0696 0.555 1.55 N/A N/A 3.66

Flash

pointd,g °C <−253 −188 −104 11 13 −43

°F <−423 −306 −155 52 55 −45

Flammabilityrange in

aird,f,gvol% 4.0 to 75.0 5.0 to 15.0 2.1 to 10.1 6.7 to 36.0 4.3 to 19 1.4 to 7.6

Autoignitiontemperature

in aird,g

°C 585 540 490 385 423 230 to 480

°F 1085 1003 914 723 793 450 to 900


a Properties of the pure substance.

b Properties of a range of commercial grades.

c Source: NIST Chemistry WebBook, http://webbook.nist.gov/chemistry/.

d Source: Alternatives to Traditional Transportation Fuels: An Overview , DOE/EIA-0585/U.S.Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC, June 1994.

e NTP: Normal temperature and pressure [measured at 20°C (68°F) and 1 atmosphere].

f Source: Perry's Chemical Engineers' Handbook , 7th edition, McGraw-Hill, 1997.

g Source: Hydrogen Fuel Cell Engines and Related Technologies , Module 1: HydrogenProperties, US Department of Energy, 2001.


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G.2.5 Electric and Electric Hybrid Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) .


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Executive Order 13423 signed in 2007 directed federal agencies to use plug-in hybrid electricvehicles (PHEVs) when their cost becomes comparable to non-PHEVs. PHEVs combine thebenefits of pure electric and hybrid electric vehicles, which allows on-board energy storagedevices be charged either by plugging into the electric grid or through an auxiliary power unit(APU), using replenishable fuels including certain types of alternative fuels such as CNG orhydrogen. Hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) offer better fuel economy and lower emission thanvehicles using fossil fuels, while electricity produces zero tailpipe emission. Efficiency inenergy storage, transmission, and conversion is critical regardless of electric vehicle types.Both battery EVs and gasoline- electric type hybrid electric vehicles ( HEVs) have beencommercially available for a number of years. Their volumes are expected to grow rapidly inthe next years. Due to the introduction of electric drive, energy storage, and conversionsystems in the powertrain , one of the safety considerations consideration is associatedwith involves the high-voltage system (e.g., 600 400 VDC) used for the powertrain, such aselectric shock and short-circuit; . the The other is the heat generated during battery chargingand discharging, which also tends to give off can generate toxic fumes. and hydrogen gas;another safety consideration is accidental spill of battery electrolyte.

The main EV and HEV Li-ion battery pack failure mode involving EV and HEV Li-ion batterypacks involves is thermal runaway events where the batteries self-heat and fail energetically .Thermal runaway runaways in batteries are typically the result of electrical failure, mechanicaldamage, or excessive exposure to heat. These events results in venting of flammable gasesand could result in subsequent fires. Venting of these gases can occur before actually goinginto thermal runaway but can be difficult to observe visually. If vented gases are accumulatedin a confined or semiconfined space, there is the potential to reach lethal concentrations or forcombustion/explosion in the presence of an ignition source. Typical cell vent gases consist ofa mixture of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, hydrogen, methane, hydrogen fluoride, and anumber of heavier hydrocarbons including but not limited to ethane, ethylene, and propylene.Recent testing has confirmed that the exact composition of vent gases depends on the batterystate-of-charge and battery chemistry [1].

Typical cell vent gases consist of a mixture of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, hydrogen,methane, hydrogen fluoride, and a number of heavier hydrocarbons. , including but not limitedto ethane, ethylene, and propylene. Recent testing Testing has confirmed that the exactcomposition of vent gases depends on the battery state-of-charge and battery chemistry [1].

Smoke originating from a lithium-ion battery fire is a severe potential health risk due tocontamination with heavy metals and hazardous gases [2]. Smoke generated by battery firescan severely damage concrete or steel structures due to the smoke’s corrosive properties.Related health risks to first responders should be considered in the design of enclosedfacilities for EV such as tunnels and parking garages. Further, the potential presence of high-voltage areas is a risk to tunnel occupants and rescue services. One concern for firstresponders is also the hydrogen fluoride can enter the body through the skin, which increasesthe requirements and properties of the protective clothing and equipment used by firstresponders. NFPA provides information on most commercially available EVs detailing specificareas of risk [3] in a database on its public home page. NFPA also provides dedicated onlinetraining courses [4]. Contaminated water treatment should also be considered during design.

Note also that a number of materials used in the battery, such as lithium, could burn at veryhigh temperature if ignited. These issues have long been recognized and addressed inrelevant SAE documents, for example, SAE J2344, Guidelines for Electric Vehicle Safety ,and UL standards, including battery thermal management and monitoring, proper electricalinsulation and structural isolation of the battery compartment, and automatic disconnect forthe energy storage system. Similarly, these have also been recognized for maintenance,training, and emergency response. Testing of full-scale mock-up vehicles equipped with EVand HEV battery packs confirmed water Water to be is an effective suppression agent forthese types of EV fires. However, the results confirmed that the amount of water required forsuppression in performance tests was much higher than for standard IC vehicle fires and ashigh as 2600 gallons (9850 L) [5 2 ]. Testing showed that the most effective way to attack EVand HEV fires is to concentrate the water flow onto the battery pack in order to reduce thetemperature of the cells, and avoid avoiding thermal runaway progression and fire re-ignition.When using water to extinguish/suppress an EV battery fire, a large volume of water shouldbe used.


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The risk of thermal runaway during charging and discharging of EV batteries is higher thanduring periods of inactivity such as normal parking [6]. Therefore, enclosed spaces intendedfor EV charging should be equipped with a fire detection, ventilation, and fixed firefightingsystems depending on the overall safety concept. Battery packs of EVs are typically locatedunderneath the vehicle or below the trunk area and therefore difficult to be reached by water-based fixed firefighting systems. Hence, the main purpose of fixed firefighting systems in thiscase is to cool the environment near the burning EV and to reduce the smoke’s hazardouscontent. This action will limit fire spread and provide better access for fire brigades. Again, thetreatment of run-off water should be considered.

EVs whose batteries have been mechanically damaged, exposed to mechanical impact, orinvolved in a fire have a risk for re-activation, even after seemingly stable conditions, andshould be separated from other combustible material by at least 50 ft (15 m) [7]. In someEuropean countries such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, fire brigades submerge EVcars in water to prevent re-ignition during transport and disassembly. Submersion for largerEVs such as busses and trucks is not typically practical due to size limitations.

It should be noted that research on EV fires so far has been very limited. Most fire tests havebeen performed using a limited number of battery cells, single battery packs, or single EV.There is limited information on larger battery installations. Furthermore, no methodicalresearch is currently available for large size battery packs such as those used in busses ortrucks or those transported in trucks. Neither have fire tests been carried out to examine firescenarios involving multiple EVs or combinations of EVs and vehicles powered by other fuelsources such as diesel, petrol, gas, or hydrogen.

The following documents are referenced in this section:

[1] Colella et., Electric Vehicle Fires , International Symposium on Tunnel Safety andSecurity, 2016.

[2] Fire Protection Research Foundation Report: Best Practices for Emergency Responseto Incidents Involving Electric Vehicles Battery Hazards: A Report on Full-Scale TestingResults .

G.2.6 Hybrid (HEV/PHEV).

In contrast to battery electric vehicles, HEV and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV)combine a conventional internal combustion engine (ICE) system with an electric propulsionsystem.

The battery systems used in hybrid vehicles are typically smaller in both size and energycapacity than full electric vehicles.

PHEVs offer the possibility to recharge the battery by connecting it to an external electricpower source. HEVs are recharged by regenerative breaking. Therefore, HEVs do not implyadditional risks. Whereas PHEVs, being charged during parking, should be assessed in a waysimilar to fully electric vehicles since the battery system is active.

In terms of energy release, PHEVs are not considered to be more dangerous than ICEvehicles as the vehicles themselves generate the major fire load. Nevertheless, research isnot available that is focused on the burning characteristics of combined conventional andelectric propulsion systems. Research conducted has revealed that risks and hazards ofHEVs and PHEVs fires do not differ significantly from fires with EVs. Since the batteries ofHEVs and PHEVs are substantially smaller than those of EVs, the amount of toxic fumes frombattery fires is considerably less.

The following documents are referenced in this section:

[1] Colella et., Electric Vehicle Fires, International Symposium on Tunnel Safety and Security,2016.

[2] Fire Protection Research Foundation Report: Best Practices for Emergency Response toIncidents Involving Electric Vehicles Battery Hazards: A Report on Full-Scale Testing Results.



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Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Annex section is updated to reflect latest information on alternative fuel vehicles.Updates include references on new alternative fuel vehicles, entering the market,additional risks associated with alternative fuel vehicles and references requirementsthat need to be followed to mitigate hazards and alternative vehicle fires.

ResponseMessage:

FR-37-NFPA 502-2020

Public Input No. 25-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. G.2.4 [Excluding any Sub-Sections]]

Public Input No. 21-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. G.2.1]

Public Input No. 24-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. G.2 [Excluding any Sub-Sections]]

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.


98 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

99

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Updating.


99 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

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100 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

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G.3 Additional Considerations.


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As the use of alternative fuels in road vehicles increases, each operating agency or AHJ mustdeal with the issue of whether to permit such vehicles to pass through the tunnel or lower levelof a dual-level bridge for which it is responsible. Each alternative fuel type must be consideredon its own merit.

It should be noted that Annex G mostly focuses on light duty vehicles, such as passengervehicles. However alternative fuels are also being used to power medium and heavy-dutyvehicles, such as buses, trucks, and industrial vehicles (e.g., refuse trucks). In these cases,special consideration is needed for the increased quantity of alternative fuel used and the factthat some of the storage tanks are mounted on the roof of vehicles.

Identification of the alternative fuel type used within a vehicle is the first and most critical animportant issue to address because it can inform responders on the most appropriatefirefighting and emergency intervention strategies . This is a difficult prospect for manyagencies. It is not enough to realize that a fire incident involves an alternative fuel vehicle; thefuel must also be identified. Currently there are no national requirements within the UnitedStates US for a standard placard system identifying the type of fuel. Typically emergencyresponders undergo specialist training on how to identify specific alternative fuel vehicles andthe most appropriate strategies to deal with them in an emergency. As a consequence, if aparticular fuel is prevented by regulation from entering a tunnel facility, vehicle identification isimportant for the enforcement of the facility’s rules and procedures. Most emergencyresponse guides for alternative vehicles offer methods on how to identify alternative fuel type.Specifically, SAE J2990 and SAE J2990/1 offer guidance on how to identify and respond toEV and hydrogen powered vehicles.

Identification of alternative-fuel vehicles is critical, as the correct emergency response stronglydepends upon knowing the hazard posed by a fire incident. Specific emergency responseprocedures, precautions, and training requirements for each type of alternative-fuel must alsobe prepared and included as part of the facility emergency response plan.

These should also be coordinated with the local fire department response plan. Examples ofalternative fuel vehicle response plans are accessible at http://www.nfpa.org/training-and-events/by-topic/alternative-fuel-vehicle-safety-training listed in Annex O . The hazardspresented by various alternative fuel fires differ and are fuel dependent. For instance,hydrogen and methanol flames are not easily discernable with the naked eye. High voltagepotential in electric vehicles should be recognized. Therefore, emergency response personnelshould be provided with training specific to each alternative-fuel vehicle. In addition, the firstresponder should consider specialty response equipment such as, but not limited to, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), high-voltage gloves, static dissipative equipment, andinfrared cameras to visualize a vehicle fire.

Due to the gaseous nature of most alternative fuels, the first responder might be directed tonot extinguish the fire, but instead to manage the fire incident. If there is a delayed ignitionafter gas release, released gases could move away from the vehicle incident. In extremecases, there might be the formation of flammable gas clouds that could ignite away from thevehicle and, in rare instances, this could lead to a flash fire or more significant overpressureevent. and the common use of overpressure devices, there is a risk of having a continuousgas flow without a direct ignition, creating a gas cloud that potentially could later be ignited.The priority of emergency responders should be extinguishing the fire, cooling the fuelcontainment vessels, and not extinguishing any jet if present. The focus of the emergencyresponse should be to do so in a safe and efficient way.

It is recognized that many alternative fuel vehicles have a concealed pressure release devicethat could be compromised if water froze it open or closed.

Typically, the pressure release valves are protected against exposure to water during normaloperations and thereby create an opportunity for appropriate emergency intervention byemergency responders trained in responding to vehicles involved in incidents that usepressure relief valves.

The facility must also review the potential of accumulation of a gaseous fuel. This could be ata low point as in the case of dense gas clouds (e.g., propane, LNG, or CNG ) or at a highpoint as in the case of CNG or hydrogen. If alternative fuel vehicles are using the tunnel,these areas should be identified and monitored to prevent unaware personnel from entering


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an environment with a latent hazard. Tunnel ventilation provides the tunnel facility with onemeans of mitigation. Tunnel ventilation can provide sufficient air to dilute the escaped fuel toconcentrations below the lower flammability limit (LFL). It is necessary to establish a minimumlevel of ventilation to provide such dilution under all circumstances.





Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Inclusion of further text explores important tension between the importance offirefighting and the risks of applied water compromising the functional performance ofpressure release valves of many alternative fuel vehicles.

ResponseMessage:

FR-38-NFPA 502-2020


Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.


103 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

104

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Updating on recent findings.


104 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

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First Revision No. 21-NFPA 502-2020 [ Chapter N ]

Annex N Autonomous Vehicles

This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included forinformational purposes only.

N.1 General Background on Autonomous Vehicles.

Autonomous and semiautonomous vehicles are a reality on road networks worldwide. Anassociated technology also in the process of being introduced is that of connectedvehicles, — that is, vehicles capable of wirelessly communicating data with other similarvehicles (vehicle-to-vehicle, abbreviated as V2V) and/or suitable enabled infrastructure.(vehicle-to-infrastructure, abbreviated as V2I). The commonly used terminology for thesewireless communications includes vehicle to vehicle (V2V), vehicle to network (V2N), vehicleto infrastructure (V2I), and vehicle to everything (V2X), which is a generic term encompassingV2V, V2N, and V2I.

An autonomous vehicle (AV) is defined as a vehicle that is capable of sensing its environmentand navigating without human input. Presently, no fully AV has been introduced to the publicroad network networks . All vehicles AVs currently on the road networks are semiautonomousand require the presence of a human driver who is able to take control of the vehicle in theevent that the vehicle is unable to respond correctly to an environmental input.

AVs use a range of techniques to detect the environment around them, including radar,LIDAR, GPS, odometry, and computer vision. Control systems interpret the sensory input toidentify appropriate navigation paths, obstacles, and relevant signage. Pre-programmed Preprogrammed control logic determines the vehicle’s response to the sensoryinputs.

The AV technology is advancing at a rapid pace. Impacts Several countries and local, state,and federal agencies within the US have authorized designated trial testing grounds todemonstrate and further develop AV technology for automobiles, buses, and heavy goodsvehicles. The development of this technology has significant backing from the automobilemanufacturers, freight industry, and transportation network companies. The rapiddevelopment of this technology and the potential impacts to the fire prevention and fireprotection of NFPA 502 facilities need to be monitored with the changingtechnologies considered by agencies and facility designers .

N.2 SAE Classifications.


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The automotive standards body, SAE International, published a classification system for levelsof autonomous control in 2014 (revised in 2016 and 2018), in SAE J3016, Taxonomy andDefinitions for Terms Related to On-Road Motor Vehicle Automated Driving Systems. Thestandard defines six levels based on the level of driver intervention and awareness required. Ithas been adopted by the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),replacing an earlier system that NHTSA used until 2016. The six levels are listed in Table N.2.

Table N.2 SAE Summary Levels of Driving Automation per J3016-2018

SAELevel SAE Name Description Automation Features

0 Noautomation

Full-time performance byhuman driver of all aspects ofdynamic driving task

Automation system includes featuresproviding warnings and momentaryassistance. Examples includeemergency braking, blind spotwarning, and lane departure warning.

1 Driverassistance

Automation system controlseither steering or speed whilehuman driver performs allremaining aspects of dynamicdriving task

Automation system includes featuresproviding steering orbrake/acceleration support to thedriver. Example features include lanecentering or adaptive cruise control.

2 Partialautomation

Automation system(s) controlboth steering and speed whilehuman driver performs allremaining aspects of dynamicdriving task

Automation system includes featuresproviding steering andbrake/acceleration support to thedriver. Example features include lanecentering and simultaneous adaptivecruise control.

3 Conditionalautomation

Automation system performsall aspects of dynamic drivingtask with the expectation thathuman driver will respond to arequest to intervene

Automation system drives vehicleunder the following limited conditions:traffic jams.

4 Highautomation

Automation system performsall aspects of dynamic drivingtask, even if a human driverdoes not respond to a requestto intervene

Automation system drives vehicle.Example applications includedriverless taxi or vehicles in which thepedals and steering wheel might notbe installed.

5 Fullautomation

Automation system performsall aspects of dynamic drivingtask under all roadway andenvironmental conditions thatcan be managed by a humandriver

Automation system drives vehicle asper level 4, but vehicle can driveeverywhere in all conditions.

Table N.2 SAE AV Classifications Per J3016-2018

AutonomousLevel

Description

0 Automated system has no vehicle control but can issue warnings.

1

Driver must be ready to take control at any time. Automated system caninclude features such as adaptive cruise control (ACC), parking assistancewith automated steering, and lane keeping assistance (LKA) Type II in anycombination.

2

The driver is obliged to detect objects and events and respond if theautomated system fails to respond properly. The automated systemexecutes accelerating, braking, and steering. The automated system candeactivate immediately upon takeover by the driver.


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AutonomousLevel

Description

3Within known, limited environments, such as freeways, the driver can safelyturn their attention away from driving tasks but must still be prepared to takecontrol when needed.

4The automated system can control the vehicle in all but a few environmentssuch as severe weather. The driver must enable the automated system onlywhen it is safe to do so. When enabled, the driver’s attention is not required.

5Other than setting the destination and starting the system, no humanintervention is required. The automatic system can drive to any locationwhere it is legal to drive and make its own decisions.

N.2.1 Current Status of Implementation.

Level 1 and 2 AVs are currently in use on roads in the US and other countries. Level 3 and 4AVs are currently being tested on roads in the US and other countries. Level 5 AVs currentlyare not in use on roads in the US and other countries.

N.3 Fire-Safety Issues Related to Usage Within NFPA 502 Facilities.

NFPA 502 facilities are recognized as one of the more significant challenges for safe operationof AVs. Among the potential fire-safety issues envisioned with the use of AVs in facilitiesaddressed by this standard are the following:

(1) V2V communication functionality under the range of conditions anticipated

(2) V2I V2X communications with facility systems infrastructure such as lane control signals,variable message signs, public address (PA) systems, fixed water-based fire-fighting firefighting systems (FFFS), and fire alarm systems

(3) Special lane/shoulder striping and temporary construction work zones

(4) Special wall finishes/quality of lighting

(5) Ability of vehicle sensors to function reliably within the facility

(6) GPS positioning capability in facility environment

(7) Agency decision-making in emergency scenarios and emergency response plans

(8) Potential for an AV to be an active participant in a fire emergency with the ability tocontribute dynamically to the overall facility safety systems’ operational performance

(9) Potential need to interrogate vehicles about their fitness to enter a facility such as healthof onboard intelligence, nature quantity and health of stored energy, and details of thecarrier load.

(10) Vulnerability of facility communications and infrastructure (V2X) to cyberattacks

N.4 Emergency Response Considerations.

Agencies that allow AV operations should consider specific challenges raised by theirpresence in the event of a fire emergency occurring in the facility, and should includemeasures in emergency response planning.


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N.4.1 Recognition of Fire Emergency by AVs.

Predominant among these considerations is whether the vehicles have the capability torecognize the occurrence of the fire emergency. Factors that should be considered include thefollowing:

(1) Does the AV have the ability to identify stopped vehicles (including those suddenlystopped due to accidents and/or loss of V2V communications) in facilities covered by thisstandard? This should be a fundamental ability of any licensed AV. The AV should cometo a safe stop if it identifies stopped vehicles.

(2) Does the AV have the ability to recognize the presence of smoke and/or heat? Visualsensors might respond to loss of visibility by losing visual cues such as walls, vehicles,lights, and so forth, necessary for autonomous operation. In such cases, the AV wouldrequest the driver to take over (all levels below SAE 5). Detection of heat is a separateissue. In principle, this could be implemented; however it is not believed that current AVspossess this capability.

(3) Does the AV have the ability to recognize signals from systems designed to notifymotorists of danger, such as human intervention, traffic control gates, vehicle messagingsigns (VMS), lane control signals (LCS), flashing beacons, public address (PA) systems,and FFFS? Based on current technology, the AV would likely recognize a closed gate andstop the vehicle, and it would possibly treat an activated FFFS similarly to a severerainstorm and thus would request the driver to take control. It is not believed that currentAVs would identify VMS, LCS, beacons, or PA systems without implementation of V2Icapabilities.

(4) Does the AV have the ability to communicate to the occupants the nature of the fireemergency and the correct occupant response? Current AV technology is not likely toinclude this capability. However, development of V2I and V2V technologies might in thefuture provide the capability to advise the AV of the nature of the emergency and for theAV to communicate that information to the occupants.

N.4.2 Ability of Agency to Communicate Directly with the AV.

The presence of a V2I system could allow for direct communications between the agency andthe AV. This would allow the agency to issue instructions to AVs, such as slow down, stop,keep to curb lane, proceed to exit, and so on. AV heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) with a fire intheir load could be prioritized to exit the facility and be prevented from entering the facility ifthey are approaching it. AV HGVs with regulated cargo, or over-height vehicles could bediverted to eliminate the possibility of them using a regulated facility.

Currently, communications with AVs would be limited to the existing systems in place forcommunicating with the vehicle occupants, such as VMS, LCS, PA systems, beacons,regulatory signs, radio rebroadcasts, and so forth. The agency should consider whether usingsuch systems to issue instructions for occupants to take control of the AV is desirable.

N.5 Platooning.

Platooning of AVs, especially trucks, introduces new hazards for facilities, agencies, andAHJs. Platooning refers to the synchronized movement of multiple AVs with minimalseparation distances, such that the vehicles have much smaller separation distances than isusual with driver-operated vehicles. The implementation of platooning has significant backingfrom the trucking and freight industry due to the fuel savings benefits; however, There thereare several fire-life safety issues related to the future use of platooning that should beconsidered for new and existing facilities addressed by NFPA 502. The multidisciplinaryengineering analysis required with Section 4.3 , Fire Protection and Fire-Life Safety Factors,should closely consider . These include the impact of platooning on fire-life safety suchas including potential impacts to the range of fire emergencies, design fire size, emergencyresponse time, and fire protection features. Particular emphasis should be given to the type offacility, as platooning could have significant impacts previously not considered for bridges andlimited access highways.


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N.5.1 Mitigation Measures.

Agencies, designers, and AHJs should be aware of the current AV technologies andplatooning, current regulations and legislation, and issues related to their use, including thepotential impact of their use to the facilities.

As truck platooning develops towards receiving regulatory approval, agencies and AHJsshould consider establishing policies to address truck platooning. Agencies and AHJs couldconsider mitigation measures similar to those used for regulated cargo, which could includeprohibition or other regulations such as time-of-day restrictions, to mitigate the concernsspecific to the facility.

N.6 Informational References.

Ensuring American Leadership in Automated Vehicle Technologies: Automated Vehicles 4.0 ,US DOT, January 2020.

Preparing for the Future of Transportation: Automated Vehicles 3.0, U. S. DOT, October 2018.



_3a_NFPA_502_Annex_N_Edits.docx For Staff Use.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The annex section has been updated to reflect the latest developments in thearea of autonomous vehicles in the following:

N.1- (first & second paragraph) The proposed edits are required so the sectionreflects the current industry terminology.

N.1- (fourth paragraph) The proposed edits are required so the section reflects thecurrent industry status.

Table N.2- The proposed edits are required so the table reflects the currentinformation as described per SAE J3016-2018

N.2.1- The proposed edits are required so the Annex identifies the current level ofAV implementation.

N.3- The proposed edits are required so the section reflects the current industryterminology and fire safety issues.

N.4.1- The proposed revisions are editorial and required to clarify the factors to beconsidered.

N.5- The proposed revisions are editorial and required clarify issues related toplatooning.

N.6- The proposed edits are required so the section includes an additional currentreference publication.


109 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

110

ResponseMessage:

FR-21-NFPA 502-2020

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

26 Affirmative All



1 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.


110 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

111

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Updating.

Abstention

Connell, William G.

Not familiar enough with the material to either support or reject FR


111 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

112

First Revision No. 41-NFPA 502-2020 [ Section No. O.1.2.3 ]

O.1.2.3 ASCE Publications.

American Society of Civil Engineers, 1801 Alexander Bell Drive, Reston, VA 20191-4400.

ASCE/SEI 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, 2010 2016 .


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

Committee Statement: Reference Update.


Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre


112 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

113

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Updating.


113 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

114


O.1.2.5 ASTM Publications.

ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, P.O. Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA19428-2959.

ASTM C666/C666M, Standard Test Method for Resistance of Concrete to Rapid Freezing andThawing, 2015.

ASTM E136, Standard Test Method for Behavior Assessing the Combustibility of Materialsin Using a Vertical Tube Furnace at 750°C, 2016a 2019a .

ASTM E580/E580M, Standard Practice for Installation of Ceiling Suspension Systems forAcoustical Tile and Lay-in Panels in Areas Subject to Earthquake Ground Motions, 2017.

ASTM E2652, Standard Test Method for Behavior Assessing the Combustibility of Materialsin Using a Tube Furnace with a Cone-shaped Airflow Stabilizer, at 750°C, 2016 2018 .


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The reference title updates were adopted. The reference to ASTM E3134 is notaccepted as it was not referenced in the document with the resolution of PI-8. ASTME3134 and the Efectis-2008 report are not equivalent and proof is missing as to why thereplacement of RWS time temperature curve with ASTME E3134 time temperaturecurve is necessary as well as how to interpret ASTM E3134 in the context of NFPA 502.

ResponseMessage:

FR-2-NFPA 502-2020

Public Input No. 10-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. O.1.2.5]

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

26 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.


114 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

115

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sparrow, Paul W.


Sprakel, Dirk K.

Update.


115 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

116


O.1.2.6 BSI Publications.

BSI British Standards, 12110 Sunset Hills Road, Suite 200, Reston, VA 20190-5902.

BS 476-4, Non-Combustibility, Part 4: Fire tests on building materials and structures, Non-combustibility test for materials, 1970, corrigendum, 2014.

BS EN 492, Fibre-cement slates and fittings. Product specification and test methods, 2012.

BS EN 12467, Fibre-cement flat sheets. Product specification and test methods, 2012.

BS EN 13501-1, Fire classification of construction products and building elements — Part 1:Classification using data , 2019 .


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

Committee Statement: Added new informational reference as it's now in section A.4.8(3) document.


Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco


116 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

117

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Updating.


117 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

118


O.1.2.9 Efectis Publications.

Efectis Nederland, Brandpuntlaan Zuid 16, 2665 NZ, Bleiswijk, The Netherlands,www.efectis.com.

2008 Efectis-R0695, “Fire Testing Procedure for Concrete Tunnel Linings and Other TunnelComponents ,” 2008 2020 .


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

A new version of the test procedure was issued in September 2020. Therefore,the date and name is updated.

ResponseMessage:

FR-23-NFPA 502-2020

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.


118 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

119

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

updating.


119 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

120


O.1.2.13 ISO Publications.

International Organization for Standardization, Central Secretariat, BIBC II, 8, Chemin deBlandonnet, CP 401, 1214 Vernier, Geneva, Switzerland.

ISO 1182, Reaction to fire tests for products — Non-combustibility test, 2010 2020 .


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

Committee Statement: Updated the reference document.



Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

26 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.


120 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

121

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sparrow, Paul W.


Sprakel, Dirk K.

clarification.


121 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

122


O.1.2.18 UL Publications.

Underwriters Laboratories Inc., 333 Pfingsten Road, Northbrook, IL 60062-2096.

ANSI/ UL 1598, Luminaires, 2012 2018 .


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

Committee Statement: Standards are actually UL standards and are not developed by ANSI.

Update of existing references.



Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

26 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.


122 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

123

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sparrow, Paul W.


Sprakel, Dirk K.

clarification.


123 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

124

First Revision No. 20-NFPA 502-2020 [ Section No. O.2.1 ]

O.2.1 Alternative Fuels Codes and Standards.

NFPA 2 , Hydrogen Technologies Code , 2020 edition.

NFPA 1975, Standard on Emergency Services Work Apparel, 2019 edition.

More information is at www.Fuelcellstandards.com.

CSA America Inc.’s NGV2, Basic Requirements for Compressed Natural Gas Vehicle(NGV) Fuel Containers .

ISO 11439, Gas Cylinders — High Pressure Cylinders for the On-Board Storage of NaturalGas as a Fuel for Automotive Vehicles .

FMVSS 304, Compressed natural gas fuel container integrity .

NCHRP Synthesis 415: Design Fires in Road Tunnels, National Cooperative HighwayResearch Program, 2011.

SAE J2579, Technical Information Report for Fuel Systems in Fuel Cell and OtherHydrogen Vehicles , January 2008 .

SAE J2990, Hybrid and EV First and Second Responder Recommended Practice .

List of codes and standards that apply to CNG vehicles:

http://nexgenfueling.com/t_codes.html

ASTM F1506 , Standard Performance Specification for Flame Resistant Textile Materialsfor Wearing Apparel for Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric Arc andRelated Thermal Hazards, 2008.

In 2008, the United National Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) revised “AnAgreement Concerning the Establishing of Global Technical Regulations for WheeledVehicles, Equipment and Parts Which Can be Fitted and/or be Used on Wheeled Vehicles.”The document lists several national regulations and industry standards that apply tohydrogen, CNG, and hybrid-electric vehicles:

www.unece.org/trans/doc/2008/wp29grsp/SGS-4-01r1e.pdf

O.2.1.1 Codes and Standards that Apply to GH2 Vehicles.

NFPA 2, Hydrogen Technologies Code, 2020 edition.

SAE J2579, Technical Information Report for Fuel Systems in Fuel Cell and Other HydrogenVehicles, January 2008.

SAE J2990/1, Gaseous Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Vehicle First and Second ResponderRecommended Practice .

United Nations Global technical regulation No. 13, Global technical regulation on hydrogenand fuel cell vehicles .


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O.2.1.2 Codes and Standards that Apply to CNG Vehicles.

http://nexgenfueling.com/t_codes.html.

ASTM F1506, Standard Performance Specification for Flame Resistant Textile Materials forWearing Apparel for Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric Arc andRelated Thermal Hazards, 2008.

CSA America Inc.’s NGV2, Basic Requirements for Compressed Natural Gas Vehicle (NGV)Fuel Containers.

FMVSS 304, Compressed natural gas fuel container integrity.

ISO 11439, Gas Cylinders — High Pressure Cylinders for the On-Board Storage of NaturalGas as a Fuel for Automotive Vehicles.

In 2008, the United National Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) revised “AnAgreement Concerning the Establishing of Global Technical Regulations for WheeledVehicles, Equipment and Parts Which Can be Fitted and/or be Used on Wheeled Vehicles.”The document lists several national regulations and industry standards that apply to hydrogen,CNG, and hybrid-electric vehicles:

www.unece.org/trans/doc/2008/wp29grsp/SGS-4-01r1e.pdf


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Addition of new reference material and logical rearrangement of existing materialis an appropriate amendment.

ResponseMessage:

FR-20-NFPA 502-2020

Public Input No. 26-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. O.2.1]

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.


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126

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Update.


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First Revision No. 39-NFPA 502-2020 [ New Section after O.2.2 ]

O.2.2 Alternative Fuels Emergency Responder Information.

H2 Tools: https://h2tools.org/content/training-materials.

NFPA: http://www.nfpa.org/training-and-events/bytopic/alternative-fuel-vehicle-safety-training.

SAE J2990, Hybrid and EV First and Second Responder Recommended Practice .

SAE J2990/1, Gaseous Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Vehicle First and Second ResponderRecommended Practice .


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Alternative fuels emergency responder training information moved from G.2.4(PI-25) to a new O.2.2 section.

ResponseMessage:

FR-39-NFPA 502-2020

Public Input No. 27-NFPA 502-2020 [New Section after O.2.2]

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned

26 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco


127 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

128

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Alston, Jarrod

Providing reference to materials is appropriate. However, reference to website URL's may be subjectto reference errors and broken links. Reference to specific titles, articles, etc. would be moreappropriate.

Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Adding recent information.


128 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

129

First Revision No. 40-NFPA 502-2020 [ Section No. O.2.2 ]

O.2.3 Alternative Fuels Research References.

Houf, B., “Releases from Hydrogen Fuel-Cell Vehicles in Tunnels,” International Journal ofHydrogen Energy, 37, pp. 715–719, 2012.

LaFleur, "Alternative Fuel Vehicles in Tunnels," Sandia National Laboratories,SAND2020-5466, May 2020.

LaFleur, C. et al., “Hydrogen Fuel Cell Electric Tunnel Safety Study,” Sandia NationalLaboratories, SAND2017-11157, October 2017.

Lam, C., et al., “Full-Scale Fire Testing of Electric and Internal Combustion Engine Vehicles,”Proceedings of 4th International Conference on Fires in Vehicles — FIVE 2016, Baltimore,MD, 2016.

Stephenson, R., Fire Investigation for Hybrid and Hydrogen-Fueled Vehicles, InternationalSymposium on Fire Investigation Science and Technology, June 2006.

Weyandt, N., Southwest Research Institute Final Report: Analysis of Induced CatastrophicFailure of a 5000 psig Type IV Hydrogen Cylinder, February 2005.

Weyandt, N., Southwest Research Institute Final Report: Ignited Hydrogen Releases from aSimulated Automotive Fuel Line Leak , December 2006.

Weyandt, N., Southwest Research Institute Final Report: Vehicle Bonfire to InduceCatastrophic Failure of a 5000 psig Hydrogen Cylinder Installed on a Typical SUV, December2006.

Weyandt, N., Southwest Research Institute Final Report: Ignited Hydrogen Releases from aSimulated Automotive Fuel Line Leak , December 2006.

Zalosh, R., CNG and Hydrogen Vehicle Fuel Tank Failure Incidents, Testing, and PreventiveMeasures, January 2008, www.mvfri.org.

Zalosh, R., “Hydrogen Vehicle Post-Crash Fire Research Recommendations,” February 2003,www.mvfri.org.


Committee: ROA-AAA


Committee Statement

Committee Statement: New study related to hydrogen releases in tunnels added.


Public Input No. 29-NFPA 502-2020 [Section No. O.2.2]

Ballot Results


31 Eligible Voters

1 Not Returned


129 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

130

27 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Not Returned

Bergner, David L.

Affirmative All

Alston, Jarrod

Barry, Ian E.

Both, Cornelis Kees

Brinson, Alan

Colella, Francesco

Connell, William G.

Conrad, James S.

Cordell, Robert M.

Dalton, John A.

Debs, Alexandre

Dix, Arnold


Harvey, Norris

Huczek, Jason P.

Ingason, Haukur

Kogan, Dimitry


Lake, James D.

Lakkonen, Max

Maevski, Igor Y.

Pilette, Maurice M.

Plotkin, David M.

Ruiz, Ana

Sparrow, Paul W.

Sturm, Peter J.

Ventura, William

Wijaya, Hadi


Kashef, Ahmed

Agreed


130 of 131 2/22/2021, 12:16 PM

131

Rakovec, Tomas

-

Sprakel, Dirk K.

Adding recent information.


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132

Documents

MEMORANDUM - NFPA