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Mayumi Nakamura, 2014, “Legal Reform, Law Firms, and Lawyer
Stratification in Japan,” Asian Journal of Law and Society,
1 (1), pp.99-123.
Legal Reform, Law Firms, and Lawyer Stratification in
Japan/
The Effects of Gender and School Prestige on the
Stratification of Japanese Lawyers: Their Impacts on
Initial Firm Sizes
Mayumi Nakamura*
* Mayumi Nakamura is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Department of Economics, University of
Toyama, Toyama-shi, Japan. She has published articles on work and life balance and occupational
attainment of professional men and women, determinants of decreasing birth rate and marriage rate
, and gendered status attainment paths in Japan. She is currently editing a book on work and life balance and occupational attainments of Japanese lawyers.
Direct correspondence to Mayumi Nakamura, Department of Economics, University of Toyama, 3190
Gofuku, Toyama-shi, Toyama-ken 930-8555, JAPAN. Email address is: [email protected]. I
would like to thank Iwao Sato, the participants of Bengoshi Seido Kenkyukai, and anonymous referees
and editors for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank Japan
Federation of Bar Associations for kindly allowing us to analyze theirKeizai Kiban Chosa data.
1
Abstract
In many countries, the size of a law firm is closely related to the specialisations and incomes of the lawyers it employs, and can be considered an index for disparities among lawyers. Gender and school prestige may affect the size of the first firm that lawyers join. Moreover, since the lawyer population has quadrupled over the last twenty years in Japan, mainly due to judicial reform, I hypothesise that this population increase has changed how gender and school prestige affect the size of the first firm law school graduates decide to join. To test this, I conducted a secondary statistical analysis on the effect ofgender and school prestige on the size of the first firm that lawyers joined, using survey data collected by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations in 2010. Findings suggest that there were no significant differences in the size of women’s and men’s first employer, but that school prestige was significant. Moreover, the importance of school prestige has increased over the years.
Keywords: woman, gender, lawyer, work and life balance,
stratification, education
I. Introduction
Does gender and school prestige contribute to the
stratification of Japanese lawyers? If so, do changes in
the institutional environment, such as the vast increase in
the lawyer population and changes brought about by judicial
reform, contribute to weakening such stratification,
2
providing more equal opportunities for various groups?
Using census data1 collected by the Japanese Bar
Association in 2010, in this paper I conduct a secondary
analysis, examining the effect of lawyers’ gender and
school prestige on the size of the first law firms they
decide to join,.
II. Background
In this section, I will provide an overview of basic
information and theories of gender and school
stratification. First, I will present a basic picture of
the career of Japanese lawyers, judicial reform, and
changes brought about by this reform. Second, I will
discuss the theories and previous findings on gender
stratification both in Japan and overseas. Third, I will
discuss the theories as well as the published literature on
school stratification in general and among lawyers.
Finally, I will discuss why I focus primarily on firm size
(especially the size of the first employing firm) as an
index of lawyer stratification.
A. The Japanese Legal Profession and Education, Judicial Reform, and Changes
1 Sase (2011), p. 6-15.
3
to both
The Japanese legal profession and legal education have
changed dramatically due to judicial reform introduced in
the 1990s and 2000s. This section begins with an overview
of the typical career path of Japanese lawyers, followed by
a brief overview of the judiciary reforms that changed
legal education and the bar examination. This section
concludes with a discussion of the changes in the
profession that were caused by these reforms.
1. Careers of Japanese Lawyers
Legal professionals in Japan belong to one of the following
three categories: lawyers, judges, or prosecutors. There is
a single entrance examination, the National Legal
Examination (NLE), for all three professions. Those who
wish to become legal professionals must pass the NLE and
participate in a training program at the Legal Training and
Research Institute (LTRI), operated by the Supreme Court
(Figure 2). Upon graduation, graduates may choose to
become judges, prosecutors, or lawyers; the majority of
LTRI graduates become lawyers (Figure 1).2 Before judicial
2 Chan (2013), p. 322. Until recently, almost no one failed the
graduation examination at the LTRI; the number of entrants to the
legal profession was determined by the number of people who passed the
NLE.
4
reforms, the number of people who passed the NLE was
extremely low. From 1974 to 1990, the passing rate of the
second stage of the examination was approximately 2% or
lower.3 As a result, the lawyer to population ratio in
Japan was very small. In 1990, for instance, the lawyer to
population ratio was 1:7099 in Japan, 1:339 in the U.S.,
1:811 in the UK, and 1:2362 in France.4 Given the
difficulty of the NLE and the paucity of attorneys, in
Japan the legal profession has garnered considerable
respect.
In addition to the overall paucity of lawyers, this
resulted in the uneven geographical distribution of
attorneys. They have traditionally clustered in big cities,
especially in Tokyo, creating a shortage of attorneys in
other areas. Of all attorneys, in 2001 47% practiced in
Tokyo and 14% practiced in Osaka.5 Of all the areas under
the jurisdiction of the district and domestic courts, in
2001 seventy-one had one or fewer lawyers.6 Lawyers
3 Ministry of Justice (2012). Those who studied for two years at a
university and obtained 32 credits were exempt from the first stage of
the examination. 4 Japan Federation of Bar Associations (2012), p. 81. In 2012, the
lawyer to population ratio was: 1:3471 in Japan, 1:257 in the U.S.,
1:417 in the UK, and 1:1051 in France. 5 Japan Federation of Bar Associations, supra note 4, p. 114.6 Ministry of Justice, supra note 3.
5
traveling from those cities, as well as other law-related
professionals – such as tax accountants, patent attorneys,
judicial scribers, and administrative scribers – partially
made up for the scarcity of lawyers in these peripheral
areas.7
All Japanese lawyers have or belong to a single office,
and they are classified into the following five categories:
(1) employed lawyers, (2) office sharers, (3) solo
practitioners, (4) solo principals with employed lawyers,
and (5) partners.8 Lawyers in the second to the fifth
categories are called “employer lawyers”. The typical
career path for Japanese lawyers is the following: pass the
NLE and finish training at the LTRI, join a pre-existing
law firm as an employee lawyer and receive on-the-job
training, and eventually become an employer lawyer, either
through promotion to partner status within the same firm or
by founding (or cofounding) a new, independent office.9
“Partners” are a “new invention”, 10 introduced as the
size of international law firms have expanded rapidly after
2000, and the opportunity to work as associates and
7 Rokumoto (1995), p. 164.8 Ibid., p. 167.9 Ii (2011), p. 227.10 Rokumoto, supra note 7, p. 164.
6
partners for these firms has expanded.11 In 2000,
Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu, as a result of e merger of two
firms, became the first international law firm to have more
than one hundred lawyers.12 Because of recent increases in
M & A and large-scale finance cases – as well as the
specialisation and internationalisation of the field of
business law – in the last ten years, large-scale
international law firms have expanded.13 As of 2012, eight
law firms with more than one hundred lawyers were operating
in Japan. With 465 lawyers, Nishimura Asahi is the largest
of these firms, and all except one are located in the Tokyo
area.14 Fourteen firms have more than fifty lawyers, and 8%
of all Japanese lawyers work at these firms.15 The
percentage of lawyers who work at large firms (more than
fifty lawyers) has increased from 4% in 2003 to 8% in
2013.16 The percentage of lawyers who belong to mid to
large firms (eleven or more lawyers) has increased from 13%
to 22%.17
Over the course of their careers, the majority of lawyers
11 Yoshioka (2011), p. 59.12 Ibid., p. 59.13 Ibid., P. 59.14 Japan Federation of Bar Associations, supra note 4, p. 12215 Ibid.16 Ibid.; Japan Federation of Bar Associations (2008), p. 108.17 Ibid.
7
work at a small number of firms (experience 0.7 transfer on
average)18; they are most likely to work at one firm (no
transfer) as an employed lawyer and another as an employer
lawyer (including partner).19 Because most lawyers work at
one firm as an employed lawyer, and because on-the-job
18 Ii (2011), supra note 9, p. 227.19 Ishida (Forthcoming), According the survey conducted in 2008, among
“employed lawyers” who work in an office with one employer lawyer
(master), those who worked at one firm (thus, no transfer) are 70.2%
(male) and 83.0% (female), two firms 23.4% (male) and 11.3% (female),
and three firms 6.4% (male) and 5.7%(female). Among the employed
lawyers who work in an office with more than two (employer) lawyers,
those who worked at one firm were 84.3% (male) and 68.5% (female), two
firms 10.1% (male) and 21.2% (female), and three firms 4.5% (male) and
7.6% (female). Among employed attorneys, those who worked at one firm
were 84.3% (male) and 68.5% (female), two firms 10.1% (male) and
21.2%, and three firms 4.5% and 7.6%. Although female attorneys are
more likely to transfer as employee attorney, those who stay with one
firm as an employee attorney are still the majority. With respect to
employer lawyers, among those who are currently in solo practice,
16.3% of men and 4.3% of women worked at only one firm, 63.8% of men
and 61.0% of women worked at two firms, and 16.7% of men and 24.1% of
women worked at three firms. Of the employer lawyers with more than
two (principal) lawyers in the same firm, 20.3% of men and 20.9% or
women worked at one firm, 46.4% of men and 53.1% of women worked at
two firms, and 22.7% of men and 18.4% of women worked at three firms.
Although female lawyers are more likely than their male counterparts
to work at more than one firm as employee lawyer, those who work at
only one firm as an employee lawyer remain the majority. Thus, the
majority of lawyers work at only one firm as an employed lawyer and
8
training is conducted while they work as an employed
lawyer, the type of firms that lawyers join is crucial for
their training. The transition from employee to employer
status occurs around the age of forty; of employee lawyers,
54.5% of men and 61.4% of women are in their 30s, and only
12.9% of men and 13.0% of women are in their 40s.20 Lawyers
are likely to transition from a larger firm (a firm with
more than two lawyers) to a smaller office (often solo
practice).21 Moreover, the size of a firm is closely
one firm as an employer lawyer.20 Ibid.21 Ibid. Among male employed lawyers, 20.9% belong to a solo practice
(with one “master” and one employed lawyer), 40.4% belong to firms
with fewer than five lawyers, 16.4% belong to firms with fewer than
ten lawyers, 14.2% belong to firms with fewer than 50 lawyers, and 8%
belong to firms with more than fifty lawyers. Among the male employer
lawyers, 55.3% are in solo practice, 24.6% belong to a firm with fewer
than five lawyers, 12.7% belong to firms with fewer than ten lawyers,
5.4% belong to firms with fewer than fifty lawyers, and 1.3% belong to
firms with more than 50 lawyers. Among female employed lawyers, 12.5%
are in solo practice (with one “master” and one employed lawyer),
33.7% belong to firms with fewer than five lawyers, 21.9% belong to
firms with fewer than ten lawyers, 19.0% belong to firms with fewer
than fifty lawyers, and 12.8% belong to firms with more than fifty
lawyers. Among female employer lawyers, 40.3% are in solo practice,
33.6% belong to firms with fewer than five lawyers, 16.8% belong to
firms with fewer than ten lawyers, 6.7% belong to firms with fewer
than fifty lawyers, and 2.6% belong to firms with more than fifty
lawyers.
9
related to the firm’s specialisation. For instance, those
in solo practice, or small firms, tend to specialise in
family law, while those in very large firms tend to
specialize in international transactions.22
2. Judiciary Reforms and their Effects
The judicial reforms in Japan consisted of the following
two key elements: increasing the NEL pass rate and changing
22 Nakamura (2009), p. 45. Among those who list “family” as their area
of expertise, 40.3% are in solo practice, 35.8% belong to a firm with
fewer than five lawyers, 17.3% belong to a firm with five to nine
lawyers, 6.1% belong to a firm with ten to forty-nine lawyers, and
only 0.5% belong to a firm with more than fifty lawyers. Among those
who list “family” as their area of expertise, 40.3% are in solo
practice, 35.8% belong to a firm with fewer than five lawyers, 17.3%
belong to a firm with five to nine lawyers, 6.1% belong to a firm with
ten to forty-nine lawyers, and only 0.5% belong to a firm with more
than fifty lawyers. The following areas are common at solo offices:
succession (44.0% are in solo practice), traffic accidents (40.9%),
environmental pollution (45.3%), real estate (41.4%), taxes (42.1%),
criminal cases (40.6%), and adult guardianship (41.3%). On the other
hand, relatively larger firms are more likely to deal with areas
concerning corporate clients. The most conspicuous example is
international business transactions. Among those who specialise in
international business transactions, only 9.7% work in solo practice,
11.7% in a firm with fewer than five lawyers, 12.3% in firms with five
to nine lawyers, 24.0% in firms with ten to forty-nine lawyers, and
42.2% in firms with more than fifty lawyers. Although less common,
economic, company, intellectual property, and tax law are generally
the specialties of attorneys working for large firms.
10
legal education. There were two waves of reforms: 1) the
reforms in the 1990s and 2) the justice system reform
movement (late 1990s to 2001) and its implementation (post
2001).23 In the first wave of reforms, the number of people
who passed the NLE gradually increased from 499 in 1990 to
994 in 2000.24 In the second wave of reforms, the number of
people who passed increased to 2133 in 2010.25 Thus, during
the course of these two waves of reform, the number of
people who passed quadrupled. There reforms occurred
because of various factors, including changes in the role
that law plays in Japanese society, the political
environment, and its economic development toward
globalisation.26
In the course of the second wave of reforms, in 2004 the
law school system was introduced, and in 2006 the new NLE
was introduced (Figure 2). Sixty-eight law schools were
established in 2004, followed by six more.27 Before the
second round of judicial reforms, in Japan law education
was mostly carried out at the undergraduate level. In the
23 Chan, supra note 2, p. 322. For a detailed discussion of factors
involved in the judicial reforms in Japan, please see Chan 2013. 24 Japan Federation of Bar Associations, supra note4, p. 119.25 Ibid.26 Chan, supra note 2, p. 332.27 Ibid., p. 329.
11
old system, people did not need a university or law degree,
although the majority of lawyers did have a university
degree, leaving only 1.6% of lawyers without a university
degree in 1980.28 However, under the new law school system,
two to three years of graduate level education were
required to qualify to apply for the new NLE (Figure 2).29
Due to the introduction of the new system and an increase
in the number of lawyers, competition among lawyers
increased. The average income dropped from 17,010,000 yen
in 2000 to 14,710,000 yen in 2010.30 Since lawyers no
longer enjoy privileged status and have difficulties
finding jobs, the number of applicants to law schools
dropped from 72,800 in 2004 to 13,924 in 2013.31 Law
schools are currently having difficulties attracting
sufficient numbers of students, and eight law schools have
ceased to – or plan to cease to – accept applications.32
28 Rokumoto, supra note 7, p. 16529 The preliminary examination, which started in 2011, functions as a
detour path to avoid the cost of attending a law school. If a person
passes the examination, he or she is allowed to take the new NLE
without attending law school (Nakanishi 2008, p.1). However, the pass
rate for the preliminary examination is quite low (1.78% in 2011,
2.40% in 2012), leaving attendance at law school the best option for
becoming a legal professional (Ministry of Justice 2013).30 Japan Federation of Bar Associations, supra note 4, p. 93.31 Saitou (2013).32 Ibid.
12
On the other hand, the scarcity of lawyers in peripheral
areas has improved.33 In 2000, seventy-one
district/domestic court areas had one or fewer lawyers.34
In 2011, however, this figure dropped to two.35 To assess
the judicial reforms, it is important to examine how they
affected stratification (increasing or decreasing
disparities) among lawyers and law schools. Thus, this
paper focuses on not only the effects of gender and
education on the size of a lawyer’s first firm but also how
the effects of gender and education on firm sizes change
over environmental changes such as increase in lawyer
population caused by judicial reforms
B. Gender Stratification
In this section, I will briefly discuss a) theories on
gender stratification, b) gender stratification in Japan,
and c) gender stratification among lawyers.
1. Theories on Gender Stratification
Theories regarding the sources of gender inequality in
wages and status can be divided between those that focus on
33 Ministry of Justice, supra note 3. 34 Ibid.35 Ibid.
13
supply and those that focus on demand. Human capital theory
represents the supply approach. Becker attributes gender
inequality to how much one invests in education and work
experience.36 Women tend to invest more time and resources
into their homes and less into paid employment, which leads
to differences in wages and work status. On the other hand,
the demand-side approach (gender stratification theory)
views “constraints and inefficiency in work structures and
employers” as the primary reasons for gender inequality.
Women who are committed to their careers are “penalised”
because employers improperly evaluate their work.37 Women
may also be willing to give up promotions, or are forced to
do so, in order to have flexible work hours.38
2. Gender Stratification in Japan
Japan is known as one of the most gender-stratified
countries in the advanced world. According to the Global
Gender Gap Report, Japan ranked 105th, due in part to its
poor representation of women among professionals.39 For
instance, only a small percentage of female employees
advance to administrative positions. Of companies with more
36 Becker (1985), p. s33.37 Kay and Hagan (1998), p. 729.38 Ibid.39 World Economic Forum (2013).
14
than 100 employees, in 2013 only 8.1% of section chiefs and
15.3% of the subsection chiefs were women.40
Gender stratification in Japan can be explained by both
supply theory (human capital theory) and demand theory
(gender stratification theory).41 Under Japanese style
business management practices (e.g., life time employment),
it becomes “rational” for employers to employ more men and
invest in more training for men than women. Employers
expect less long-term returns on their investment in the
case of women, since, on average, Japanese women work only
intermittently, due to responsibilities involving
childcare. Since educational decisions are made early in
life in Japan, parents play a large role in their
children’s educational decisions. Being familiar with
gender discrimination in the labor market, parents
rationally invest more heavily in their sons’ than their
daughters’ education, which causes women to be less
prepared for the labor market than men.
Thus, for higher education, women are more likely to
attend junior colleges than men as well as major in
humanities subjects.42
40 Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (2013)41 Brinton (1993), p. 3.42 Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
(2013).
15
Known for its lifetime employment system, seniority wage
system, and long working hours, “Japanese style business
management” structures the labour market and work place.
Due to statistical discrimination that results, this places
Japanese working women at a disadvantage.43 Companies that
plan to hire invest heavily in their employees and expect
to receive a long-term return on their investment. Thus, if
women are expected to have an intermittent working life due
to responsibilities associated with child rearing,
companies are less likely to hire women. Since Japanese
men work long hours, most of the housework is left to their
wives, which makes it difficult for Japanese women to
engage in full-time careers.
Working women worldwide bear a double burden at both work
and home. However, this situation seems to be even more
difficult with Japanese working women. Comparing time
allocation for various activities among ten advanced
countries shows that, for dual career couples with a child
under six, working wives spend more time on household work
and childcare than working husbands in all ten countries.
Additionally, in all ten countries, working wives work
shorter hours than their working husbands.44
43 Satou (2012), p. 133. 44 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2006).
International comparison of the time allocation of working husbands
16
In Japan, the difference between the genders is more
pronounced. Japanese men work the longest hours and spend
the least time on housework and childcare among husbands
from those ten countries, leaving most of the
responsibilities for housework and childcare to their
wives.45 Japanese working husbands spend the longest hours
at work and commuting to and from work and the least time
on housework and childcare.46 Thus, to avoid the double
burden at home and at work, a considerable number of
Japanese women leave the labour force at childbirth. At
childbearing age, participation of Japanese women in the
labour force declines (from 77.6% at age 25-29 to 67.7% at
35-39).47 In 2011, 63.7% of Japanese women left their jobs
after marriage and the birth of a first child,,48 resulting
in the “dent” in the “M shaped curve” of the female labour
force participation rate across age groups for Japan.
and working wives with a child(ren) under six
45 Ibid.46 Ibid.47 Cabinet Office (2013).48 Ibid.
17
3. Gender Stratification in the Legal Profession
The legal profession in other countries is stratified by
gender. Women are underrepresented among lawyers in almost
all countries.49 There are gender differences in terms of
specialisation. Female lawyers tend to be less specialised
than men and tend to specialise in areas dominated by
women, such as family law, and work with individual clients
from the lower to middle classes in a solo practice or in a
small firm.50 The difference in pay between male and
female lawyer ranges from 10 to 25 %.51 In England and
Canada, male lawyers are more successful in obtaining
training at the place of their choice, because men have
greater support in social networks and share cultural
assets (cultural capital) with male partners at the firm,
which can be advantageous in the application process.52 The
long working hours that law firms require (1,800 to 2,000
billable hours on average in Canada) makes it difficult for
female lawyers to raise a family.53
Since the pre-war period, in Japan the legal profession
49 Schulz (2003), p. xxxvi. For instance, in the U.S., 27% of the
lawyers were female in 2000.50 Mather (2003), p. 36.51 Shultz, supra note 49, p. xliv.52 Ibid., p. xli.53 Kay and Hagan, supra note 37, p. 730.
18
has also been stratified by gender. The old lawyer act
introduced in 1893 only allowed men to be lawyers – until
it was reformed in 1933 – and universities did not accept
female students until 1913.54 Limited access to higher
education prevented women from obtaining a legal education.
In 1940, the first three women were admitted to the bar.55
The Japanese constitution was developed in 1947, and the
Fundamental Law of Education and the School Education Law
were introduced. Consequently, obstacles were lifted for
Japanese women, who were then allowed to attend a
university law department. The NLE was introduced in 1949,
which opened the door for women to become not only lawyers
but also judges and prosecutors.56
However, the percentage of female lawyers remains low
(Figure 1), and female lawyers have a lower average income
than their male counterparts. The percentage of lawyers who
were female was 0.1% in 1950, 0.7% in 1960, 2.1% in 1970,
3.7% in 1980, 5.6% in 1990, 8.9% in 2000, 16.2% in 2010,
and 17.4% in 2012.57 The percentage of female attorneys is
growing steadily, especially since the reforms in the 1990s
54 Tsunoda (2007), p. 17.55 Ibid., p. 19.56 Ibid.57 Japan Federation of Bar Associations, supra note 4, p. 113.
19
and 2000s.58 In 2010, the average income for male lawyers
was 11,320,000 yen, and the average income for female
lawyers was 8,390,000 yen.59
Specialisations are different along gender lines.60 Except
for international business transactions and intellectual
property, women are more likely to specialise in areas in
58 Ibid. 59 Ishida (2011), p. 27.60 Nakamura, supra note 22, p. 42. Women are more likely to specialise
in the following: family (45.8% of male lawyers and 62.6% of female
lawyers state that they specialise in this field), intellectual
property (5.0% of male lawyers and 9.7% of female lawyers state that
they specialise in this field), international transactions (6.5% of
male lawyers and 12.7% of female lawyers state that they specialise in
this field), juvenile delinquency (12.9% of male lawyers and 19.9% of
female lawyers state that they specialise in this field) and adult
guardianship (10.6% of male lawyers and 20.1% of female lawyers state
that they specialise in this field). Male attorneys are more likely
to specialise in the following areas: traffic accidents (38.9% of male
lawyers and 25.0% of female lawyers state that they specialise in this
field), public administration (11.4% of male lawyers and 4.0% of
female lawyers state that they specialise in this field), company law
(36.5% of male lawyers and 30.0% of female lawyers state that they
specialise in this field), bankruptcy law (3.1% of male lawyers and
21.4% of female lawyers state that they specialise in this field),
real estate law (44.8% of male lawyers and 22.9% of female lawyers
state that they specialise in this field), tax law (3.5% of male
lawyers and 1.8% of female lawyers state that they specialise in this
field), and criminal law (30.0% and 20.4%). Respondents are allowed to
declare more than one area of specialisation.
20
which they will address individual clients, while men are
more likely to specialise in areas that involve continuous
work with company clients, which is more profitable.61
Moreover, the specialisation of Japanese female lawyers
also differs by age.62 For instance, older female lawyers
are overrepresented in fields such as family law, while
younger women are overrepresented in international business
transactions, intellectual property, and company law.63
The size of law firms and the types of practice in which
they engage are related to gender stratification. Older
female lawyers in Japan tend to practice family law,64
which is more likely to take place in solo practices or
small law firms, which entails relatively low income.65 On
61 Ishida, supra note 59, p. 28.62 Nakamura, supra note 22, p. 43. For instance, older female lawyers
are overrepresented in fields such as family law (44.6% of women in
their 20s, and 80.7% of women in their 50s), while younger women are
overrepresented in international business transactions (18.5 of women
in their 20s, 5.3 of women in their 50s), intellectual property (12.0%
of women in their 20’s, 6.1% of women in their 50s) and company law
(34.8% of women in their 20s, 25.4% of women in their 50s). 63 Ibid.64 Ibid.65 Nakamura, supra note 4. Among female lawyers, the percentage of those
who specialize in family law by age are: 44.6% in their 20s, 54.5% in
their 30s, 64.1% in their 40s, 80.7% in their 50s, and 84.2% in their
60s. (The respondents were allowed to specify multiple areas of
specialization) (p. 43). As shown in another section, family law is
21
the other hand, the field of intellectual property contains
a relatively high proportion of female lawyers in Japan.66
Additionally, young female Japanese lawyers appear in
relatively high proportions in extremely large firms.67
Thus, there seem to be two contrasting tendencies for
more likely to be practiced in small firms (among those who specialize
in family law, 40.3% belong to a solo practice and 35.8% belong to
firms with fewer than five lawyers) (p. 45). Those who specialize in
family law tend to have a lower income, where 15.8% earn less than
5000000 yen, 40.4% earn 5010000 to 9990000 yen, 22.2% earn 10000000 to
15000000 yen, 11.2% earn 15000000 to 19990000 yen, and 10.4% earn more
than 20000000 yen. Those who specialize in family law have the highest
percentage of lawyers in the lowest earning category (15.8% in the
less than 5000000 yen category), followed by those who specialize in
criminal law and juvenile delinquency (19.9% and 17.8%). In contrast,
among those who specialize in economic law, 6.3% earn less than
5,000,000 yen, 26.8 earn 5,010,000 to 9,990,000 yen, 19.6% earn
10,000,000 to 14,990,000 yen, 13.4% earn 15,000,000 to 19,990,000 yen,
and 33.9% earn more than 20,000,000 yen. 66 Among all female lawyers, 9.7% specialize in intellectual property,
while among all male lawyers, 5.0% specialize in that field (Nakamura,
p. 42).67 Nakamura, supra note 4. For instance, in the study conducted in 2008,
among women in their 20s, 22.9% worked for firms with 11 to forty
lawyers and 19.8% worked for firms with more than fifty lawyers (p.
41). On the other hand, among women in their 50s, 46.7% belonged to a
solo practice, 32.5% were in firms with two to four lawyers, 11.7%
were in firms with five to nine lawyers, 7.5% were in firms with
eleven to forty-nine lawyers, and 1.7% were in firms with more than
fifty lawyers.
22
female Japanese lawyers. In addition, Kaminaga suggest that
there used to be open discrimination at the time of hiring,
including “low initial salaries, discouragement by
interviewers, or priority being given to male candidates”,
and “one third of the recruiting firms had advertised posts
as for ‘men only’”, although such practice was prohibited
in the Equal Opportunity Act in 1999.68
Thus, it is important to investigate the effects of
gender on lawyer stratification. This hypothesis was made
because of gender discrimination; female lawyers in older
generations faced more gender discrimination at the time of
hiring than younger women, and were unable to work for
larger law firms in their first jobs, while female lawyers
in the younger generation are free from such
discrimination. Thus, by examining the size of the first
firms at which lawyers work, this paper investigates
whether there were and still are signs of gender
discrimination at the time of hiring, and whether such a
gender gap has changed (improved) over the years.
C. School Stratification
1. Theories on School Stratification and School Stratification in Japan
68 Kaminaga (2003), p. 473.
23
In addition to gender, school stratification is another
possible source of stratification among Japanese lawyers.
The sociology of education has long paid attention to
stratification across schools and elucidated the possible
effects this stratification on the future of students. For
instance, “tracking” is a concept within the sociology of
education. Tracking means that the “school a student
attends” can determine the range of possible future career
paths.69 Graduates from high schools of the highest
educational calibre are, for example, more likely to enrol
in prestigious universities than graduates from high
schools of a lower educational calibre. The rank (or track)
of a school affects the educational and career aspirations,
personalities, and determines the future opportunities of
those students.70 Moreover, according to signalling
theory,71 attendance at prestigious schools can function as
an index for those who have higher abilities, and those who
graduate from such institutions have advantages in the job
search. In addition, the alumni network of one’s alma mater
can function as a type of social capital, useful in the job
search. In the search for jobs of new college graduates in
Japan throughout the 1980s, the network of OGs and OBs
69 Fujita (1980), p. 118.70 Ishido (1985), p. 121-5.71 Fukuda (2012).
24
functioned as a “node” between job applicants and
companies, and provided opportunities for preliminary semi-
informal job interviews for job applicants.72 Thus, the
type of institution one attends can affect (and thus limit)
possible job entry paths.
2. School Stratification in the Legal Profession
A similar tendency is evident among U.S. lawyers. In their
analysis of Chicago lawyers, Heinz et al.73 show that
stratification is determined among lawyers by the prestige
of the law schools they attended, with those who graduated
from prestigious law schools tending to work for larger law
firms. In the U.S., the American Law School Review
publicized the ranking system as early as 1902.74 Starting
in 1990, the U.S. News and World Report ranked law
schools.75 Large law firms make hiring decisions based on
these rankings, which specifically help those from elite
law schools.76 Moreover, the types of law schools students
attend and the size of law firms lawyers join are related
72 Kariya et al. (1993), p. 97.73 Heinz, supra note 2, p. 57.74 Jewel (2008), p. 1181.75 Ibid.76 Ibid.
25
to class.77 Those who enter elite law schools are more
likely to be from privileged backgrounds, while those who
attend low-tier law schools are more likely to be from
disadvantaged backgrounds.78
In Japan, rankings among universities (at the
undergraduate level) are also public; hensachi is a detailed
index indicating academic competitiveness of the entrance
examination for the individual departments of each
university. Because law schools are mostly affiliated with
universities (at the undergraduate level) and share their
undergraduate law faculties, the hensachi of the undergraduate
level also reflects the academic competitiveness of
affiliated law schools. Moreover, the rankings of each law
school – in terms of the percentage of people passing the
NLE – are available publicly.79 As indices that evidence
stratification among universities and law schools are made
available, it is possible to observe similar stratification
among Japanese lawyers as well, based on school prestige.
This article attempts to illustrate such stratification
among Japanese lawyers based on school prestige.
Moreover, if stratification exists among lawyers, it can
be affected by institutional changes, especially changes in
77 Ibid., p. 1173.78 Ibid.79 Shikakuseek (2013).
26
the supply and demand for the lawyers. In their analysis of
Chicago lawyers, Heinz et al.80 show that the percentage of
lawyers from local schools in large law firms increased
over a twenty-year period (1975 to 1995), attributing this
rise to increases in the size of law firms during that
period and the increased demand for lawyers. Thus, with
regard to the Japanese system, vast changes in the supply
and demand for lawyers caused by institutional changes
(especially judicial reforms) can be identified as causes
for stratification among lawyers.
D. Why Do We Care About the Size of Law Firms?
As discussed in previous sections, the size of law firms is
closely related to lawyers’ specialisations and income, and
is, therefore, an important factor in the stratification of
lawyers. According to a study on Chicago lawyers, for
instance, Heinz et al. contend that “the distinction
between lawyers who represented large organisations and
those who represented individuals or the small businesses
owned by individuals” were like “two hemispheres.”81 Law
firm size is strongly related to lawyers’ income and the
types of practices in which they engage. Lawyers in large
80 Heinz, supra note 2, p. 58.81 Ibid., p. 6-7.
27
law firms tend to engage in fields related to business law,
which entail higher income, while lawyers who are solo
practitioners tend to engage in fields dealing with
personal clients that entail lower income.82
A similar tendency has been observed among Japanese
lawyers. As discussed in previous sections, the average
income differs based on specialisation, and specialisation
is related to the size of the firm. In Japan, the average
income for lawyers differs based on specialisation as well.
Those fields that represent personal clients (such as
family law) tend to have a lower average income, while
those fields that represent enterprises tend to have higher
average income. Extremely large law firms with more than
fifty lawyers are particularly likely to deal with
international law.83 Thus, law firm size is closely related
to the types of practice in which lawyers engage, the
levels of income they earn, such that law firm size can be
considered a significant factor in lawyer stratification in
Japan.
E. Why Do We Focus On The Size Of A Lawyer's First Law Firm?
In this paper, the focus will be on the size of lawyers'
82 Ibid., p. 100-5.83 Nakamura, supra note 22, p. 45.
28
first law firms. In the normal job trajectory for Japanese
lawyers, after passing the bar, they take legal training at
LTRI and then join a law firm as an employed lawyer, to
engage in on-the-job training. As discussed in previous
sections, the majority of employed lawyers work for only
one firm as an employed lawyer. Thus, the size of a
lawyer’s first firm determines the type of OJT training he
or she receives, which additionally determines the types of
practices and range of work available to that lawyer in the
future. Thus, the size of a lawyer’s first firm determines
his or her future career opportunities and becomes,
therefore, an important indicator of lawyer stratification.
III. Hypothesis
How do gender and education affect stratification among
lawyers, and how does their effect change over time? Shavit
and Blossfeld84 claim that gender disparities tend to
decrease over time, whereas disparities across class are
harder to change. In Japan, a strong correlation exists
between the prestige of the universities students attend
and their socioeconomic backgrounds. A disproportionate
number of students at Japan’s most competitive academic
84 Shavit and Blossfeld (1996), p. 233.
29
institutions, such as the University of Tokyo, come from
families with the highest average incomes.85 Thus, school
prestige is strongly correlated with social class. Most
likely, such a correlation between school prestige and
social class also applies in the case of the education of
Japanese lawyers, with the prestige of one’s school
reflecting the social class of one’s family.
Thus, it is predicted that structural changes (e.g., the
vast increase in the lawyer population due to judicial
reforms, and intensified competition among lawyers) lead to
a decrease in gender disparity, while they either have no
effect on or lead to an increase in socio-economic
disparity by educational background. Thus, the following
hypotheses are tested using data regarding Japanese
lawyers.
Hypotheses regarding gender:
Hypothesis 1-a: The size of the lawyer’s first firm is
related to a lawyer’s gender. Female lawyers tend to
85 Kariya (2001), p. 136. Kariya shows that students from families of
the highest socioeconomic strata are overrepresented among students at
the most competitive academic institutions, such as the University of
Tokyo. The families of students at the University of Tokyo, for
instance, have very high average annual incomes (more than 10,000,000
yen).
30
start with smaller firms than male lawyers.
Hypothesis 1-b: The effect of gender has decreased over
time.
Hypothesis 1-c: The effect of gender has decreased since
the introduction of the judicial reforms.
Hypotheses regarding school prestige:
Hypothesis 2-a：The size of a lawyer’s first firm is
related to the prestige of a lawyer's school. Lawyers
from prestigious institutions are more likely to join
large firms than lawyers from less prestigious
institutions.
Hypothesis 2-b: The effect of school prestige has
increased over time.
Hypothesis 2-c: The effect of school prestige has increased
since the introduction of the judicial reforms.
IV. Data and Variables
The data used in this analysis comes from a survey titled
“Bengoshi gyomu no keizaiteki kiban ni kansuru jittai chosa hokokusho (Keizai
Kiban Chosa),” which was conducted in 2010 by the Japanese
Federation of Bar Associations.86 This survey, which is
86 For more detailed information on the data, refer to Japan Federation
of Bar Associations (2011).
31
conducted every ten years, is the most inclusive and most
authoritative survey concerning Japanese lawyers. The data
is based on a stratified random sampling of lawyers listed
as full members. (Those listed as semi-members as well as
those who registered after 2009 were excluded from the
analysis). A questionnaire was sent to one thousand lawyers
(two thousand women and eight thousand men, with women
being oversampled). The return rate was 15.7%. Although the
return rate seems low, the rate is actually above average
for mail surveys of lawyers in Japan.
The dependent variable for analysis is the size of
lawyers' first firms. Independent variables include the
gender and educational institutions of respondents. I
examine whether gender and school prestige affect the size
of lawyers’ first firms, and whether such disparities
change (or do not change) over time, especially after the
introduction of the judicial reforms.
V. Educational Institutions Included in the Analysis
For the institutional category, the seven individual
universities (and affiliated law schools) that had a
considerable number of graduates (more than fifty) in the
data are included in the analysis. Among those seven
32
universities, two universities (A and B) are former
imperial universities, one university (C) is a pre-war
public university (kanritsu daigaku), and four universities
are private (D, E, F, and G). Other universities are
categorised for inclusion in the analysis according to the
following characteristics: 1) other former imperial
universities (besides Universities A and B), 2) other
national universities (besides Universities A, B, and C),
3) municipal universities (founded by local governments),
4) private universities (besides Universities D, E, F and
G), and 5) foreign universities. Moreover, because most
large law firms are located in Tokyo, universities were
also categorised in terms of location: whether they are in
the Kanto (Tokyo metropolitan) area.
To present the “tracks” for the seven individual
universities included in this analysis, descriptions of the
schools from the law school guidebook, as well as the
percentage of their graduates who pass the bar, are shown
in Table 1.87
Table 1 shows that the descriptions for universities A,
D, and F emphasise cutting-edge subjects. Cutting-edge
subjects are mostly in the area of corporate law, and
87 For the analysis of school “tracks,” I followed the method used by
Nakanishi (1993) p. 135-137 for classifying “school tracks and
charters” using information from guidebooks for Japanese high schools.
33
therefore, these schools better prepare their students to
find jobs in large-scale international law firms. Thus, it
is expected that graduates from these schools are more
likely to work for large firms.
VI. Analysis
A. The Effect of Gender on First Firm Size
Table 2 shows the result of the OLS analysis of gender on
first firm size. In Models 1 to 4, none of the coefficients
for the main effect of gender were significant. Thus,
hypothesis 1-a (“Gender affects first firm size”) was not
supported. Gender was not a significant factor in
determining first firm size at the outset.
B. The Effect of Gender on First Firm Size over Time
Next, is there a “change over time in the effect” of gender
on first firm size? The results in table 2 suggest that
neither of the interaction effects in Models 3 and 4 were
significant. This outcome suggests that changes over time,
including the introduction of the reformed system, did not
affect (i.e., did not improve or worsen) the equality or
34
inequality between genders, as far as first firm size is
concerned.
Thus, at least as far as first firm size is concerned, no
significant gender disparity was found, nor were
significant changes found over time, including possible
changes caused by the introduction of the reformed system.
None of the gender-related hypotheses (1-a, 1-b, 1-c) were
supported.
The fact that the effect of gender was not significant
suggests that the gender gap does not occur at the time of
joining the first firm but sometime before or after that
period. The percentage of lawyers who are female remains
low (Figure 1). This means that the gender gap occurs prior
to taking the NLE. Japanese women are more likely to attend
junior colleges than men (89% of junior college students
are women), and Japanese women traditionally select majors
in humanities over the social sciences or natural sciences;
among university students, in 2013 66% of humanities
students, 34% of social sciences students, and 12% of
Engineering students were women.88 Thus, Japanese women are
less likely to major in law (in Japan law belongs to the
social sciences). The gender gap also occurs after the
first job. Women are more likely than men to leave firms,
88 Ministry of Education, Science and Culture 2013.
35
citing “family (marriage, childbirth, childcare, and
elderly care)” as the main reason.89 Female lawyers work
fewer hours than male lawyers (males work an average of
2684.6 hours per year and females work an average of 2371.1
hours per year).90 Moreover, the specialisations of lawyers
differ by gender, as shown in a previous section (Section
B-3). Thus, constraints and inefficiencies most likely
present themselves “after” joining the first law firm.91
C. The Effect of Education on First Firm Size
In this section, the effects of education on the size of
lawyers’ first firms are examined. In Tables 2 and 3, seven
individual universities (Universities A to G) and four
categories are contrasted with the base category (“other
private universities”), in terms of their effect on first
firm size.
Models 1 to 4 suggest that the effects of “University A,”
89 Asaoka (2009), p. 31. For those under thirty nine, among males who
leave firms, only 1.5% cite “family” as the main reason, and among
females who leave firms, 12.6% cite “family” as the reason; for those
over forty, among males who leave firms, 0% cite “family” as the
reason, and among females who leave firms, 12.5% cite family as the
reason).90 Ishida supra note 59, p. 28.91 More discussion of this point will follow in the discussion section.
36
“University D,” and “foreign universities” on first firm
size differ significantly from the base category. In Model
1, “University F” is also significantly different from the
base category. Thus, compared to the base category “other
private universities,” those lawyers who graduated from
Universities A, D, and F, and foreign universities tend to
join law firms of significantly different sizes. For
instance, in Model 1, those who graduated from University A
tended to join larger law firms than those who graduated
from “other private universities,” with a difference of
approximately forty-six lawyers. Those who graduated from
Universities D and F tended to join larger law firms than
those who graduated from universities in the base category
(with a difference of approximately twenty-five and twelve
lawyers, respectively). Universities A, D, and F are
located in Kanto (the Tokyo metropolitan area) and
emphasised their strengths in cutting-edge subjects (sentan
kamoku) in their school descriptions from the law school
guidebook. These factors may have contributed to their
graduates finding jobs at large-scale international law
firms. Those who graduated from foreign universities (or
foreign law schools) also tended to work for large firms.92
Large-scale law firms are international, and it is 92 Lawyers who attended foreign universities (law schools) tended to do
so after graduating from Japanese universities.
37
understandable that those who had studied law in foreign
countries would be overrepresented in law firms of this
type. In fact, as Rokumoto notes, most international firms
send their young associates to study abroad in Western
countries as well as to obtain a legal education and
training”.93 Thus, it is understandable that those who
graduate from foreign universities are overrepresented in
the population of people working for large-scale,
international law firms.
D. The Effect of Education on First Firm Size over Time
Has the effect of a lawyer’s alma mater on the size of his
or her first firm changed over time? Models 5 and 6 of
Table 3 show the results of the analysis addressing this
question. Model 5 examines long-term changes in the effect
of one’s alma mater across different cohorts of legal
apprenticeship. Model 6 examines changes over time
surrounding the introduction of the law school system
associated with the legal reforms.
In Model 5, which examines long-term effects, the
interaction effects for University A, University D, and
foreign universities are significantly different from the
93 Rokumoto, supra note 7, p. 168.
38
base category (“other private universities”) in terms of
the size of the first firms, and the coefficients are
positive. Thus, for every younger cohort (using ten-year
cohort groups), the average size of the first firm for
University A graduates becomes larger by twenty-six people
than that of graduates from the base category (“other
private universities”) every year. For University D
graduates, the average size of the first firm becomes
larger by eighteen people, and for foreign university
graduates, fifty-six people. Thus, the gap between most
elite schools and “other” schools widens every year.
In Model 6, which examines changes surrounding the
introduction of law schools and the bar exam system, the
interaction effects for Universities A and F are
significantly different from the base category (“other
private universities”), and the coefficients are positive.
After the introduction of the reformed system, graduates of
Universities A and F joined firms that are significantly
larger (156 lawyers and fifty-six lawyers on average,
respectively) than the base category (“other private
universities”).
Thus, the disparity in first firm size between graduates
from elite schools and those from other schools has widened
over time, in the long term and since the introduction of
39
the reformed system.
VII．Discussion
The effect of gender did not significantly affect first
firm sizes, while the effects of one’s school were
significant. Thus, gender does not initially stratify
Japanese lawyers, at least at the time of entry into an
attorney’s first firm. Entry into one’s first firm is
decided more by merit than gender. This is in agreement
with the finding that, among Harvard law school graduates,
women were more successful at obtaining a job in large
elite firms than men, although more than one half of men
became partners within ten years, while only one quarter of
women did so.94 During the old NLE era, Japanese lawyers
belonged to an extremely elite occupation; from 1974 to
1990, approximately 2% or fewer of applicants passed the
NLE.95 The extreme selectivity of that process may have
spared women from encountering discrimination at the time
of their entry into the job market, which is similar to the
data reported on women from Harvard. Moreover, the fact
that law firms do not follow “typical” Japanese style
employment practices (e.g., lifetime employment) and the
94 Kay and Hagan, supra note 37, p. 729.95 Ministry of Justice (2010).
40
majority of employed lawyers leave their firms to become
independent, facilitates law firms in hiring women as
lawyers.
Thus, with regard to the two approaches that purport to
explain gender stratification, supply theory (human
capital) and demand theory (gender stratification theory),
the former has more explanatory power, at least in terms of
the size of first firms. Female lawyers have excellent
human capital, are chosen on merit, and do not seem to face
outright discrimination at the time of entry into their
first firms.
This does not mean, however, that gender stratification
among Japanese lawyers does not exist. Differences exist in
average incomes and specialisations, as was shown in
previous sections. These findings suggest that gender
differences occur “before” and “after” entry into one’s
first firm. As discussed in previous sections, the
percentage of women who major in social sciences is lower
than men. In 2012, among those who applied for the NLE,
only 24.3% were women, and among those who passed the NLE,
only 25.9% were women.96 Thus, women are less likely to
attend a four-year university than men, are less likely to
study law than men, and are less likely to take the NLE
96 Eru Paaku Sendai (2012).
41
than men. Therefore, gender stratification occurs “prior
to” entry into one’s first firm.
Moreover, gender stratification also occurs “after” the
time of entry into one’s first firm. As was shown in the
previous section, women are more likely than men to leave
their firms, citing “family” reasons. In addition, in
response to the question “Have you ever thought about
quitting your job?” 43.2% of women answered yes, while only
27.2% of men answered in the affirmative.97 Thus, after
women embark on their first job, they seem to encounter
severe enough difficulties that they consider leaving their
jobs significantly more than men. Women who stated that
“demonstrating one’s abilities” is a reason for becoming a
lawyer, and those who stated that they experienced “gender
discrimination in terms of the job content and distribution
of work,” were more likely to have thought about leaving
their jobs (odds ratios of 1.401 and 1.813, respectively,
which are both significant at 5%).98 Thus, the "constraints
and inefficiency in work structures and employers”, as
described by gender stratification theory, do play a role
in generating gender stratification in Japan, “after” entry
into one’s first firm.
Future research is required to investigate what occurs 97 Matsuda (2009), p. 86.98 Ibid., p. 92.
42
“prior to” and “after” entry into one’s first firm, which
causes the gender gap among lawyers.
On the other hand, school prestige did affect the size of
one’s first firm, and this effect is increasing, but in an
unexpected way. The differences were expected to occur
across different school types according to prestige and
history (e.g., that former imperial universities would do
better than the reference category). However, the
difference did not occur in terms of school types, and only
occurred between a limited number of elite individual
institutions (e.g. Universities A, D, and F) versus the
rest. University A was the most striking example, where its
graduates are overrepresented as new entrants to very large
institutions, and this trend has increased. There were even
differences between elite former imperial universities A
and B. Although school prestige appears to be important,
other factors are also involved. A curriculum emphasising
cutting edge subjects is one such factor affecting the
success of a graduate to secure a position at a large elite
firm. Thus, human capital seems to play a role in being
hired by large firms.
However, there is also evidence that a signalling effect
is at work. A partner from one of Japan’s big four law
firms said, “Due to the introduction of the new bar exam
43
system, the role of alma mater has increased. Before the
judicial reform, a very limited number of people passed the
bar. The fact that someone passed the bar could provide
assurance of her/his ability. However, as the number of
lawyers increases rapidly, passing the bar in itself can no
longer ensure the ability of the person. Thus, school
prestige became more important at the time of hiring as an
index for ability.” This suggests that one’s school can be
used as a marker of innate abilities. Further investigation
is required to explain the factors involved in this
phenomenon.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper examined the effects of gender and alma mater on
the size of Japanese lawyers' first firms and changes in
such effects over time. The results of the analysis showed
that gender has no significant effect on the size of one’s
first firm. Thus, none of the hypotheses regarding gender
were supported.
However, it is too early to determine that gender does
not matter in the career tracks of Japanese lawyers.
Although no significant gender differences were found in
terms of one’s first firm size, there is a significant
44
gender disparity in terms of current overall
specialisations and incomes for Japanese lawyers, as was
discussed in previous sections.
The findings of this paper suggest that gender disparity
does not arise mainly at the beginning of one’s career
(affecting first firm size) but during stages in the middle
of one’s career, during child-rearing years. A considerable
percentage of female Japanese lawyers list “family-related
reasons” as an explanation for job changes, while few male
lawyers do so.99 Thus, although young female lawyers in
Japan do not start out their careers differently than their
male counterparts, their careers change as they approach
child-rearing years.
According to Japanese lawyers I interviewed, female
lawyers commonly change their specialisations and work
settings to make their careers more compatible with family
life. One female lawyer said she began to specialise in
high-interest issues (cresara mondai)100 because this field
does not require continuous education in new knowledge and
skills, thus allowing her to spend more time caring for her
99 Asaoka, supra note 89, p.31.100 A high interest issue refers to an issue related to and caused by
credit card companies and consumer loan companies, such as multiple
debts, severe collection, illegally high interest rates, illegal
firms, and reimbursement of overpayment.
45
family. Another female lawyer who formerly worked for a
large-scale international law firm was loaned out to a
public institution after she gave birth to her first child.
Moreover, female lawyers who work for large international
law firms tend to specialise in “research jobs,” which
allow for a more flexible work schedule. Yet, specialising
in such research jobs deprives female lawyers of
opportunities in dealing with clients directly and in
developing the connections and skills required to obtain
new clients, experiences that are necessary if they wish to
remain in a firm and become partners. Thus, the findings in
this paper point to the importance of focusing on mid-
career stages to elucidate the mechanisms of gender
disparity among Japanese lawyers.
Regarding the effects of one’s alma mater, disparities
were found between a limited number of elite schools and
the base category in terms of first firm size, and this
disparity is increasing over time, both in the long term
and since the introduction of the reformed system.
Regarding disparity across schools, I expected that a
disparity would be widely observable across different
categories of establishments (e.g., former imperial
universities, other national universities, municipal
universities, and private universities) and across schools
46
with different levels of academic calibre. Yet, the
disparity was only observed between a limited number of
individual elite schools and the rest of the schools,
rather than across categories. For instance, Universities D
and E are often considered to have the same overall
academic calibre and are often compared. Yet, regarding
first law firm size, graduates from University D worked for
larger firms significantly more than graduates from
universities in the base category, while graduates from
University E did not. At those universities, the emphasis
on cutting-edge subjects may have helped their graduates to
secure positions at large-scale international firms. The
most striking finding concerned University A. Its graduates
seem to secure the most jobs at the largest firms by far.
This tendency is increasing over time, as well as since the
introduction of the reformed system.
The introduction of the reformed system appears to be an
equalising process. It has increased the number of law
schools throughout Japan and opened the door to a wider
range of people with a wider range of backgrounds. However,
under this seeming process of equalisation, hidden
inequalities and disparities among lawyers may be on the
rise.
47
48
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Notice: To avoid identification of universities included in
54
these analyses, I changed the name of the publisher of
the law school guidebook.
55
Table 1: Descriptions of seven individual universities101
101 N publisher (2012); Ministry of Justice (2011). Translation is mine.
56
Table 2: Results of the analysis (Models 1 to 4)
** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<0.5; †p<.10
57
Table 3: Results of the analysis (Models 5 to 6)
*** p<.001; **
p<.01; * p<0.5; †p<.10
Note: The interaction effect for foreign universities with
the reformed system was excluded from the analysis due to
58
the lack of cases in that category after the introduction
of the new system.
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
Judges ProsecutorsAttorneys OtherJudges (%female) Prosecutors (%female)Attorneys (%female)
Figure 1: The number of people who became judges, prosecutors, and attorneys, and the percentage of attorneyswho are females after the completion of training at the LTRI.
Source: Japan Federation of Bar Association (2012) Bengoshi Hakusho p.80
59
Figure 2: Education and Training in the Old and New Systems
60
