3

Learning from Conflict

Fabrizio Butera, C�eline Darnonand Gabriel Mugny

Do only rebels induce dissent in groups? In the present chapter, we contend

that dissent with others’ points of view should not be the prerogative of

some particularly committed individuals, but rather a customary and

promoted activity whenever learning is concerned. Indeed, dissent occur-

ring during group or peer learning favours cognitive development and

knowledge acquisition. We present a theory of socio-cognitive conflict,

which argues that dissent with one or several partners over a task in which

learning is concerned may stimulate task-related cognitive activity and

result in progress. Should, therefore, socio-cognitive conflict be prescribed

in educational settings? We address these questions by drawing on research

pointing out that socio-cognitive conflict is beneficial for learning to the

extent that conflict is regulated in an epistemic manner; that is, by focusing

on the task or on the knowledge at hand. On the contrary, socio-cognitive

conflict can result in detrimental effects whenever conflict is regulated in a

relational manner, that is, by focusing on status and on interpersonal

dominance.

This distinction is of importance with respect to the question of the

usability of socio-cognitive conflict, as recent research has shown that the

two forms of conflict regulation are predicted by different achievement

goals. Epistemic regulation is predicted bymastery goals (the will to acquire

knowledge and develop competences), and relational regulation is pre-

dicted by performance goals (thewill to demonstrate competence relative to

others). We argue that, although mastery goals are inherent to education,

educational organisations also promote performance goals through eval-

uation and selection. In this respect they create the conditions for conflicts

Rebels in Groups: Dissent, Deviance, Difference and Defiance Jolanda Jetten and Matthew J. Hornsey

� 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

to be regulated in a relationalmanner, which is detrimental for learning.We

conclude the chapter by reflecting upon the goals promoted by educational

organisations thatmay favour or hinder the constructive effects for learning

of socio-cognitive conflict.

Socio-Cognitive Conflict

In the introduction to this book (see Chapter 1), it is argued that social

psychology, by giving a prominent place to the study of such phenomena

as obedience and conformity, conveys the notion that these behaviours are

the default within groups and that dissent rarely occurs. Indeed, social

psychology has repeatedly shown that confronting a point of view that

differs from one’s own is not comfortable. People usually prefer: infor-

mation that confirm their own views (Festinger, 1957; Freedman &

Sears, 1965; Frey, 1986); being confronted by familiar arguments (Begg,

Anas & Farinacci, 1992; Zajonc, 1968); and being surrounded by similar

others (Brehm, 1992; Byrne, 1971; Newcomb, 1961) rather than facing

difference. Dissent is often described as a disturbing behaviour. And indeed,

research on group processes has shown that dissent is seen as a threat for

group locomotion and, as a consequence, leads to rejection (Festinger, 1950;

Schachter, 1951). This is why dissent is so often avoided in social

interactions.

Unfortunately, learning settings – be they the classroom, the university

system, or other forms of training – are no exception, and one must admit

that conformity and obedience are indeed the norm. The vast majority

of educational organisations rely upon a classic unilateral teaching struc-

ture, in which the learner is asked to assimilate a number of pieces of

knowledge that are presented as true by the teacher. Little time and space are

left to questioning and arguing, with the notable exception of a small

minority of alternative pedagogical systems. Indeed, in most educational

organisations, students encounter relatively few opportunities to endorse a

counter-normative point of view. They are socialised in a way that favours

conformity to their teachers’ view (Dambrun et al., 2009; Guimond &

Palmer, 1990), and they are rarely encouraged to endorse dissenting points

of views. If they do, they take the risk of being sanctioned (e.g., to receive a

low grade).

We have referred to this state of affairs as unfortunate because research in

social psychology clearly points out that dissent is a particularly powerful

37Learning from Conflict

tool to promote learning (Buchs et al., 2004; Doise &Mugny, 1984; Johnson

& Johnson, 1993). A great deal of studies have demonstrated that – although

unpleasant – unfamiliar arguments (Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2001),

diverging evidence (Kruglanski, 1980), opposing views (Nemeth, 1986),

disconfirmatory information (Toma & Butera, 2009) and counterintuitive

findings (Berlyne, 1960; Piaget, 1985) can generate deeper information

processing andmore elaborate knowledge than being confronted to familiar

arguments or confirmatory evidence. Thus, should dissent be promoted in

environments that are designed to help people construct and develop

knowledge?

In this section, we focus on socio-cognitive conflict theory, developed

within the field of developmental social psychology (Doise &Mugny, 1984;

Doise & Palmonari, 1984; Mugny, Perret-Clermont & Doise, 1981). The

theory states that social interaction represents the very context for progress

and learning, precisely because the diversity in training, knowledge and

points of view across group or dyad members has the potential to create

dissent and discussion. Dissent occurring during social interaction has been

termed ‘socio-cognitive conflict’, because it is both social (it entails

disagreement between twoormore persons) and cognitive (as disagreement

leads each individual to doubt her/his own answer).

Socio-cognitive conflict can promote learning, understanding and cog-

nitive development for several reasons. Facing dissent may lead to the

realisation that a different point of view than one’s own is possible, and

therefore produces uncertainty (Butera, Mugny & Tomei, 2000; Darnon

et al., 2007; Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Indeed, if more than one answer is

possible, one can come to question the validity of one’s own answer,

resulting in a sort of ‘cognitive conflict’ (see Berlyne, 1960; Limon, 2001;

Piaget, 1985). Questioning the validity of one’s own answer may then lead

one to ‘decentre’ from one’s point of view and take seriously into account

the other’s position (cf. Butera & Buchs, 2005). To account for the existence

of different points of view, one must process and understand the elements

that might explain that another person holds another position, which can

result in an increase in knowledge. In sum, socio-cognitive conflict prompts

individuals to reconsider their own point of view and to integrate the

others’.

This theory has received abundant empirical support, showing the benefit

of socio-cognitive conflict on learning and on the quality of reasoning. For

instance, in an early study, children were confronted with a conservation-

of-equal-length task (Doise, Mugny & Perret-Clermont, 1976). In this task,

38 Fabrizio Butera, C�eline Darnon and Gabriel Mugny

two pieces of railway tracks equal in length were presented to each child.

When the two pieces are aligned so that they start and finish at the same

point, any child is capable of recognising that they are equal. Non-

conserving children, however, consider that they are unequal when the

experimenter pushes one of the pieces so that the two are no longer aligned,

since perceptually one sticks out and seems to outmeasure the other. The

experiment was conducted with non-conserving children only. The exper-

imenter reacted to the non-conserving answer given by the child (‘this piece

is longer because it sticks out here’) in two different ways, according to the

experimental condition. In the ‘same-level-conflict’ condition, the exper-

imenter used the same argument as the child (‘this piece is longer because

it sticks out here’), but pointing to the other piece of track. Thus, the

experimenter disagreed with the child, but also gave a wrong answer based

on the same non-conserving reasoning. In the ‘higher-level-conflict’ con-

dition, the experimenter used a compensatory conservation argument

and gave the right answer (‘the two pieces are equal in length, as this one

sticks out here, but the other one sticks out there’). In the control condition,

the experimenter did not contradict the child. Results showed progress on

a delayed post-test for the two conflict conditions, as compared to the

control condition. In other words, the ‘same-level-conflict’ condition also

induced a higher degree of progress than the control condition, although –

unlike the ‘higher-level-conflict’ condition – the answer proposed was just

as wrong as the child’s. This shows the crucial role of conflict in promoting

learning.

In the same vein, Ames and Murray (1982) found significant progress

when dyads of non-conserving children were composed by pairing two

children who had previously given different, incorrect, answers. It is then

not necessary that one of the children knows the correct answer to observe

progress; it is sufficient that they are in conflict. In sum, research has shown

in the past 30 years that socio-cognitive conflict can be beneficial for

learning and cognitive development (cf. Darnon, Butera & Mugny, 2008;

Doise, Mugny & P�erez, 1998; Perret-Clermont &Nicolet, 2001; Quiamzade

et al., 2006).

Two Forms of Conflict Regulations

The above conclusion may have conveyed the idea that socio-cognitive

conflict is an all-purpose remedy to foster learning and cognitive

39Learning from Conflict

development. In this respect, it could be viewed as a solution to the

aforementioned pervasiveness of pedagogicalmethods based on conformity

and obedience. After all, this research has been available for a long time, as

has cooperative learning research and practice, which also places an

emphasis on the beneficial effects of conflict (named controversy in this

research tradition; see Johnson & Johnson, 1985, 1993; Johnson, Johnson &

Tjosvold, 2000). However, research also shows that conflict may result

in detrimental effects for learning (e.g., Buchs et al., 2010; Butera &

Mugny, 2001; Darnon, Buchs & Butera, 2002; Quiamzade, Tomei &

Butera, 2000). Thus, research has focused on the conditions under which

socio-cognitive conflict can be beneficial or detrimental for learning.

The effects of socio-cognitive conflict on learning largely depend on the

way the conflict is regulated by the partners (Mugny, De Paolis &

Carugati, 1984). Indeed, socio-cognitive conflict during an interaction with

a partner has two distinct facets. On the one hand, the existence of an

alternative point of view casts doubt on the validity of one’s own answer. On

the other hand, this implies that the other person might be right and, as a

consequence, she/he might be more competent than oneself. The result is

that socio-cognitive conflict can yield two distinct consequences. It can

make individuals doubt the validity of their own knowledge, which can

represent an interesting potential for engagement in the task, epistemic

curiosity and cognitive reconstruction (Berlyne, 1960; Ohlsson, 1996;

Piaget, 1985). However, conflict can also threaten self-competence (Butera

& Mugny, 2001; Pool, Wood & Leck, 1998; Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001).

Thus, socio-cognitive conflict can be regulated in two distinct ways. If the

focus is on the doubt raised about the validity or accuracy of different

answers, individuals can try to work through the problem again and

examine the validity of each proposition. Previous research has termed

this form of regulation ‘epistemic conflict regulation’, as it is centred on the

correctness or validity of knowledge (cf. Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001). If,

however, the focus is on the possibility of being less competent than the

partner – especially in tasks in which competence is highly valued (Mugny

et al., 2003) – lower competence can affect a person’s perception of self-

worth (Covington, 1984, 1992; Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988), and lead the

individual to defend his/her own competence, for example by demonstrat-

ing that he/she is right and that the partner is wrong. Previous research has

termed this formof regulation ‘relational conflict regulation’, as it is centred

on the relative status of the partners (Darnon et al., 2002; Mugny

et al., 1984).

40 Fabrizio Butera, C�eline Darnon and Gabriel Mugny

Over the years, research on socio-cognitive conflict has accumulated

converging evidence that epistemic and relational conflict regulations are

related to different perceptions of the task and the other person (Mugny

et al., 1984, 2003; Butera & Mugny, 2001; Quiamzade, 2007; Quiamzade &

Mugny, 2001). For instance, it has been shown that epistemic regulation is

favoured when individuals believe in the complementarity of their points of

views (Butera et al., 1998; Butera et al., 2000; Butera & Mugny, 2001;

Johnson, Johnson& Smith, 2000;Quiamzade,Mugny&Darnon, 2009). On

the contrary, socio-cognitive conflict is regulated in a relational way when

the other person has the potential to be a competitor (e.g., Butera &

Mugny, 1995; Butera et al., 1998, 2000; Darnon et al., 2002; Johnson &

Johnson, 1985; Quiamzade & Mugny, in press) or is susceptible to upstage

one’s competence (Butera et al., 2000; Quiamzade, Tomei & Butera, 2000;

Tjosvold, Johnson & Fabrey, 1980).

A recent experiment illustrates these dynamics (Darnon, Doll &

Butera, 2007). University students participated in a fictitious computer-

mediated interaction about a text with a bogus partner who introduced

through her/his rhetoric either an epistemic conflict (a conflict that referred

to the content of the text), or a relational conflict (a conflict that questioned

participants’ competence). Results indicated that compared to the episte-

mic conflict, the relational conflict enhanced threat and reduced the

perceived contribution of the partner. Moreover, after a relational conflict,

participants were more assertive in their answers, justified them to a

lower extent, and expressed less doubt than after an epistemic conflict.

Results also indicated that the intensity of disagreement predicted different

modes of regulation depending on the conflict type. When the conflict was

epistemic, the stronger the perceived conflict, the more participants said

they worked through the problem to understand it better and tried to

integrate the two points of views, that is, themore they regulated the conflict

in an epistemic way. On the contrary, after a relational conflict, the stronger

the perceived conflict, the more participants said they tried to assert they

were right and the other person was wrong, that is, the more they engaged

in a relational regulation of the conflict. Finally, epistemic conflict

elicited better learning than relational conflict. Thus, the above line of

research specifies that socio-cognitive conflict is beneficial for learning

to the extent that conflict is regulated in an epistemic manner, but it can

result in detrimental effects whenever conflict is regulated in a relational

manner.

41Learning from Conflict

Two Goals Predicting Conflict Regulations

The above research provides a caveat for the use of socio-cognitive conflict

in educational organisations. Practitioners should be aware that the con-

struction of teaching methods that rely upon interpersonal interaction,

cooperation and confrontation of viewpoints is to be implemented in an

environment that focuses pupils, students or trainees on the development of

knowledge and not on a competitive social comparison of competences.

This caveat might seem trivial, but a longstanding area of research has

shown that several goals may be at work when learning. Indeed, achieve-

ment situations such as those in which the individual must carry out a

school-related or academic task, are situations in which competence is at

stake (Nicholls, 1984; P�erez & Mugny 1996). However, how do people

establish their own competence? Making progress and improving one’s

mastery of the task is one way. Trying to appear superior to others is

another. In the eyes of researchers on achievement goals, the choice between

these options depends on the extent to which different types of goals are

endorsed in a specific task. It seems that two main types of goals exist:

mastery goals and performance goals (see for reviews Dweck, 1986; Pintrich

& Schunk, 2002). Mastery goals – also called learning goals (Dweck, 1986,

1992) or task-involvement goals (Nicholls, 1984) – correspond to the desire

to learn, to understand the problem, to acquire new knowledge or to

increase task-mastery. Competence, in this context, is therefore defined in

terms of personal progress. Performance goals, on the other hand – also

called ego-involvement goals (Nicholls, 1984) or relative competence goals

(Butler, 1992; Urdan, 1997) – correspond to the desire to promote one’s

capacities and competences, to engender a positive evaluation or to succeed

and be better than others. In this case competence evaluation is a question of

competitive social comparison.1

With such a characterisation of achievement goals, it appears that there

might be a parallel betweenmastery goals and epistemic conflict regulation,

on the one hand, and between performance goals and relational conflict

regulation on the other hand. This hypothesis has been tested by

Darnon et al. (2006). In a first study, French introductory psychology

students – for whom mastery and performance self-set goals had been

recorded – were asked to imagine a discussion with another person who

disagreed with them about an experiment they had studied in class during

42 Fabrizio Butera, C�eline Darnon and Gabriel Mugny

the previous semester. They were then asked to report to what extent during

this ‘debate’ they would try to regulate the conflict in an epistemic way or a

relational way. Items related to epistemic regulation asked students to

what extent when disagreements occurred they would try: (a) to think

about the text again in order to understand better; (b) to examine the

conditions under which each point of view could help themunderstand; and

(c) to think of a solution that could integrate both points of view. Items

related to relational regulation asked students to what extent when disagree-

ments occurred they would try: (a) to show they were right; (b) to resist by

maintaining their initial position; and (c) to show their partner was wrong.

Results indicated that mastery goals positively predicted the reported

amount of epistemic conflict regulation whereas performance goals posi-

tively predicted the reported amount of relational conflict regulation.

Although results of this study showed that endorsed goals do predict

different modes of conflict regulation assessed using self-reported inten-

tions, one could argue that conflict regulation is a less conscious process and

that these measures of conflict regulation are perhaps too sensitive to social

desirability effects. Moreover, participants were just led to imagine they

interactedwith another personwhodisagreed. It is possible to think that this

situation, since it implies a fictitious interaction, does not reflect howpeople

reactwhen they have to face a real conflict. To examine these issues in amore

realistic context, participants were placed in a real, standardised conflict

situation to provide evidence of the link between achievement goals and

conflict regulation strategies using a more subtle measure of conflict

regulation; that is, the competence attributed to oneself and to the person

who disagreed. The study was conducted with 10th grade French students.

In a first stage, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire assessing

achievement goals. One week later, they were invited to participate in a

‘computer-mediated cooperative learning study’, a task inducing a conflict

with a bogus partner. When this task was over, participants were asked to

report their perceived self-competence as well as the ‘partner’s’ competence.

Two weeks later, participants had the opportunity to ask for some infor-

mation about the experiment: a more detailed version of the text studied

during this experiment, the grade they obtained on a test about it, or both.

Results indicated that mastery goals positively predicted reports of the

other’s competence, whereas performance goals positively predicted re-

ported self-competence. In addition, results also indicated that mastery

goals significantly predicted the request for the text whereas performance

goals predicted the request for the grade.

43Learning from Conflict

Taken together, the results of these two studies indicated thatmastery and

performance goals predicted differentmodes of conflict regulation. The first

illustrated these links on a self-reported measure of conflict regulation,

whereas the second study showed similar results on a different and more

subtle measure of conflict regulation and in a real conflict situation. It also

indicated that in an interpersonal situation, as it was the case in individual

situations (e.g., Butler, 1992), mastery goals favoured interest in ‘instructive

information’ (the text), whereas performance goals favour the search for

‘normative evaluative information’ (the grade).

Similar dynamics have been observed with manipulated goals. In one

study (Darnon & Butera, 2007) participants interacted by discussing

conflictual issues in a context enhancing either performance goals, mastery

goals or no goals. Participants each received one text (one received Version

A and the other receivedVersionB), which contained four parts discussing a

different psychological topic. For example, the first part of the texts was

about coaction effects: Version A presented the social facilitation effect and

Version B the social inhibition effect. Another part was about social

judgement with Version A describing the assimilation effect and Version

B the contrast effect. Thus, the experimental effects presented in the two

texts seemed contradictory, although they were not incompatible. These

texts were designed to enhance the opportunities of disagreement during

the social interaction. Results indicated that the amount of disagreement

during the interaction predicted epistemic conflict regulation in themastery

goals condition, but not in the two other conditions. Moreover, disagree-

ment predicted relational conflict regulation in the performance goals

condition, but not in the other two.

Importantly, achievement goals also interact with socio-cognitive

conflict to predict actual learning. In a recent study (Darnon, Butera

& Harackiewicz, 2007), participants were led to think they interacted with

a partner via a computer sharing opinions about a text that they were

studying. Mastery and performance goals were manipulated. During the

‘interaction’, they received either disagreeing or agreeing answers from

this bogus partner. Results showed that the condition in which mastery

goals were induced led to better learning than the performance goal

condition only when the partner disagreed. No differences between goal

conditions were observed when the partner agreed. In other words, when

conflict is elicited during interaction, mastery goals have the potential to

make conflict constructive, and lead to better learning than performance

goals.

44 Fabrizio Butera, C�eline Darnon and Gabriel Mugny

The good news is that teachers can influence achievement goals by

shaping classroom climate. Indeed, students are more likely to develop

mastery goals when they are explained the intrinsic value of a task, when the

teacher does not engage in controlling behaviour, when there is recognition

of effort, and when a reward structure based on personal progress is used

(Ames, 1992; Ames & Ames, 1984; see Meece, Anderman & Anderman,

2006, for a review on the impact of classroom structure on student

motivation and achievement). The knowledge generated by research on

classroom climate provides teachers with the necessary information to set

up an educational environment that fosters mastery goals, and therefore

provides the ideal ground for socio-cognitive conflict to be regulated in an

epistemic way that is conducive to improved learning. However, this

research has also identified factors that enhance performance goals. Indeed,

performance goals will be favoured in contexts characterised by extrinsic

reward structures, controlling teacher behaviour or normative standards for

assessment. The bad news is that these factors are commonplace in the

majority of educational organisations. This means that, although most

teachers would agree that education is about inducing mastery goals in

students, educational organisations are structured in such a way as to

promote performance goals as well, thereby confronting students with an

ambivalent normative environment.

Two Functions of Educational Organisations

Numerous positive outcomes are thus associated with mastery goals,

including a positive regulation of the conflict, whereas performance goals

seem to representmostly negative outcomes. Teachers should then promote

mastery goals and discourage performance goals in classrooms, especially

when they want to encourage exchanges between students and positive

reaction to divergence. In the achievement goals literature, this is indeed

what researchers recommend (e.g., Ames, 1992; Brophy, 2005). However,

we have also pointed out that institutional goal promotionmight notmatch

these recommendations. Indeed, if educational organisations were solely

concerned with learning, there is no doubt that mastery goals should be

promoted, but not performance goals.

Another analysis leads to different predictions. Some sociologists have

pointed out that inWestern countries educational institutions have takenup

the structuring role of assigning pupils and students to ‘the place where they

45Learning from Conflict

belong’ in society by selecting them in such a way as to reproduce the social

inequalities typical of liberal societies (see Bourdieu, Passeron&Nice, 1990).

According to some economic analysis (see Arrow, 1973), universities serve as

a ‘filter’ designed to determine the place one may occupy in the workplace.

Indeed,many students enrol every year at university, but these large numbers

will be heavily reduced before they reach the bachelor’s or master’s degree

graduation level (OECD, 2006). Thus, it appears that the role of university is

not only to educate people, but also to ‘detect’ who – among the millions of

students who enrol every year – are the ‘best’ students, those who most

‘deserve’ a degree (Dornbusch, Glasgow & Lin, 1996). This means that if

students are aware of this system, they might infer that in order to succeed

they not only have to learn and improve their skills (i.e., mastery goals), but

also have tomake it through the ‘filter’ – that is, to perform better than their

fellow students (i.e., performance goals).

Because of this very functioning, a profound ambivalence is embedded in

achievement goal promotion in universities (Darnon et al., 2009). Mastery

goals promotion is recommended by most researchers. Thus, the student

who strongly endorses mastery goals fulfils the teachers’ motivations and

aims and is consequently perceived as someone who is appreciated by

teachers. This is not the case for performance goals, which are not valued by

teachers in their discourse.However, the selection processes throughwhich the

students have to go through in their university career implicitly indicate that, in

order to succeed, they not only have to improve knowledge but also get better

grades than other students. Thus, not only mastery goals but also performance

goals are seen by students as effective tools to succeed at university (Darnon

et al., 2009;Dompnier et al., 2008). In sum, it appears that students are aware of

the two functionsofuniversity, namely education (apparent in teachers’ official

discourse) and selection (hidden in the university structure). This means that

performance goals may interfere with mastery goals in shaping the students’

social interactions and academic achievement.

Conclusions

Is socio-cognitive conflict a viable mechanism to implement in educational

organisations characterised by the promotion of ambivalent norms? We

have opened this chapter by presenting the theory of socio-cognitive

conflict, as well as relevant research showing that dissent in learning settings

may enhance the development of knowledge. However, we have also shown

46 Fabrizio Butera, C�eline Darnon and Gabriel Mugny

that socio-cognitive conflict is beneficial for learning only when conflict is

regulated in an epistemic manner, since when it is regulated in a relational

manner socio-cognitive conflict appears to result in detrimental effects. The

question of the usability of socio-cognitive conflict is therefore linked to the

means that educators have at their disposal to induce epistemic, and not

relational, regulation. Research on achievement goals has pointed out that

educators may have a grip on conflict regulation through the induction of

achievement goals. Epistemic regulation is predicted by mastery goals, and

relational regulation by performance goals. However, we have also shown

that, notwithstanding the educators’ intention, education takes place in

organisations that are concerned with formation and selection. Since

students seem to be aware of this double function of educational organisa-

tions, at least as far as university is concerned, teachers’ attempts to promote

mastery goals are doomed to be counteracted by the reality of selection

devices, from normative grades to year-failing, from streaming to honour

roll. Thus, while the mastery goals promoted by teachers may favour the

constructive effects for learning of socio-cognitive conflict, the performance

goals associated to the selection practices may represent a hindrance.

A few years ago, some of us ended an article by noting that ‘it is important

that teachers using conflict avoid performance issues (e.g., normative

comparisons) and enhance epistemic issues (e.g., the construction of

knowledge; Maehr & Midgley, 1991), in order to allow their students to

benefit from this confrontation’ (Darnon et al., 2007). In fact, there is not

much more that teachers can do in their relationship with students. With

some variations, teachers are already well committed to the promotion of

mastery goals in their everyday practice. However, they can do more with

respect to their acceptance and endorsement of the general structure with

which educational organisations function. They can, indeed, put into

question such structural devices as streaming, ranking or year-repetition,

which will prompt performance goals whatever the teacher’s ideology and

teaching method. In such a context only, dissent will not be perceived as a

threat but as a help, and thus promote learning, knowledge construction

and development of new ideas.

Notes

1. Recent research suggests that each of these two types of goals can be further

divided into approach and avoidance goals (Elliot &Harackiewicz, 1996; Elliot &

47Learning from Conflict

McGregor, 2001). In this chapter, however, we will focus on the approach form

of performance and mastery goals, the two goals which have been the most

examined in the literature and, paradoxically, the two goals whose effects are still

the objects of much debate (cf. Darnon, Butera & Harackiewicz, 2008).

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation and a

Young Investigator project of the French Agence Nationale pour la Re-

cherche (ANR-08-JCJC-0065-01).

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