Conflict as a Learning Process

States Conflict Versus State and Non-State Actor Conflict

Rahel Suissa

School of Political Science

University of Haifa

Mount Carmel, Haifa

Israel

Phone: 972- (4) 8112448

Fax: 972- (4) 8257785

Paper Prepared for the Presentation at the ISAC/ISSS Conference

“Global Security Challenges: When New and Old Issues Intersect”

McGill University, Montreal, Quebec

October 18-20, 2007

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to propose a model of an enduring rivalry as a

learning process within a comparative psychological-cognitive theory between

states, and state and non-state actor conflicts and draw conclusions about the

perception of the adversary and the behavior of the sides.

The theoretical arguments which the paper raises are based on the assumption

that, on the one hand, at the basis of every organization, whether it is political or

non-political, is the structural and functional need for learning, while on the other

hand, various organizations learn differently at a given point in time and similarly

at another point in time.

The hypotheses presented for the first time in this paper propose an theoretical

argument for the connection between learning-perception of the adversary-

behavior of the sides. Accordingly, the ability of one side to predict the behavior

of the other is measured by his actual behavior Predicting adversarial behavior

which corresponds with his actual behavior constitutes learning from success

while the lack of correspondence between predicting the behavior of the

adversary and actual adversarial behavior constitutes learning from failure.

These learning patterns affect the opponent's perception and the behavior of both

sides. The comparison between the different conflicts reveals other learning

patterns as well as conceptual, methodological, and practical value.

How do adversaries involved in a prolonged conflict learn about each other, and

how does this learning affect their behavior in terms of escalation or non-escalation of

the conflict? What is the difference between learning from enmity between states and

enmity between a state and a non-state actor, and how is it possible to compare

learning of different non-state actors?

As this paper integrates psychological-cognitive and behavioral components, it

assumes that there is a need for dialectical learning which will involve both learning

from failure and learning from success, in which not only does each side learn, but

also its learning depends on what the adversary has learned. It also assumes that the

most reliable way to identify learning patterns is to survey the sequential decisions of

the sides, from which conclusions may be drawn regarding perception of the

adversary and patterns of behavior.

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There is a tendency to claim that decision makers often ignore perception of an

adversary who is not viewed as a strategic threat or considered as inferior in abilities.

This could be partially true in a conflict between states, but it is not exact in relation

to a conflict between a state and a non-state organization. In fact, when it seems to be

possible to determine the power of the state organization in contrast to the terrorist or

guerilla organization, the perception of the adversary is structural in the conduct of

the conflict and it is strongly embedded as an integral part of the salient military tactic

of psychological warfare. It does not depend on the “good will or the positive

rationale of the sides.”

As the conflict between states is the pattern which is “popular and better known”

both historically and academically, it is convenient for us to use it in order to

understand the difference imposed by a low intensity/terror and guerilla conflict.

Methodologically, it is problematic to understand the unknown using insights about

what is known, but we must allow this on a limited basis until the unknown begins to

take shape independently. Then, comprehension may be improved upon and made

more accurate as the optimal research goal is that the less well known, in this case a

conflict between a state and a non-state organization, will contribute new insights into

the better known conflict between states.

Learning, learning through failure and learning through success

The question of learning in international relations and its incorporation into models

of foreign policy decision making (Tetlock 1991, Levy 1994, Reiter 1994 et al.)

belongs to the multi-disciplinary realm of social psychology and cognitive theory,

organizational as well as applied game theory (Chan,1984, Ordeshook 1989).

Tetlock (1991), Levy (1994) and Jarosz (1991) deal with the definition of the

concept of learning both in content and in its attributes from the area of organization

theory and of social psychology. Levy (1994) discusses various theoretical aspects of

experience and proposes one central definition by which learning is a change in

beliefs, or the development of new beliefs. He does not require a change in behavior

as a result of a change in beliefs. Jarosz (1991) emphasizes that only if there is a

change in behavior can learning be assumed. Hall (1974) defines learning as a change

in policy. In their book, Tetlock and Breslaur (1991) make an attempt to categorize

various definitions of learning regarding the relevant theoretical approach of each,

while in the empiric background, the prolonged conflict between the United States

and the Soviet Union is analyzed. This attempt prevents a reduction of the concept of

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learning both from theoretical and from empiric standpoints. Even if there is a

connection between a definition and a relevant theoretical approach, it is not

impossible to bridge between different definitions, as the characteristics of the

instance discussed in this paper require an element of synergy in any definition of

learning which is employed. In addition, a long-term conflict cannot be narrowed

down to only one definition of learning, whether from the standpoint of an extended

length of time or from the dynamic of events and individuals involved.

To observe the relationship between the systems of belief and the behavior

between adversaries involved in a prolonged conflict, the formal definition which has

been accepted is learning as change in the image of the adversary; that is to say, a

perceptual change in the system of beliefs. However, if we ignore the demands of

methodological division of variables, it can certainly be maintained that, in a

prolonged conflict, learning takes place as changes in beliefs, in behavior, and in

policy, due to the extent of time and the variety of events included in this type of

conflict. But it should not be concluded that the length of the conflict may affect the

definitions of learning. What is meant is that the quality of learning changes, and that

learning in a prolonged conflict should not be limited to a change of one single aspect.

Organizational learning theory discusses learning from failure and sees it as a

catalyst for organizational change and for adaptation to changes in the environment

(Sitkin, 1995; Choen and Sproul, 1996; et al.). On the other hand, success in previous

behavior resulting from policies implemented is perceived as reinforcing patterns of

behavior which have led to this success. This idea has also been expressed in

theoretical learning in international relations. (Etheredge, 1985; Tetloch, 1991; Reiter,

1994).

The understanding of learning from failure which is discussed in the literature and

which comes closest to the subject of this paper appears in the research of Maoz and

Mor (1994). Maoz and Mor emphasize learning which connects the predicted results

of preferences and decisions which are attributed to the adversary and the actual

results. Conditions are set in which learning is possible. According to Maoz and Mor,

learning is possible only if the actual results are different from the predicted results; in

other words, only when there has been a failure of prediction. Although

correspondence between predicted and actual results are not yet proof that the actor or

decision maker has correctly understood the preferences of the adversary, the first

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case can be seen as a failure of prediction. Failure of prediction may influence

(although not solely) the preferences which each side attributes to the other.

Regarding learning as it is discussed here, it can be said that failure of prediction

of actual results causes learning, i.e. a change in behavior, belief system, and others. It

should be emphasized that unexpected results may be either negative or positive, but

have not been predicted. Either of the two results are an outcome discrepancy on the

part of decision makers and thus, they are a failure which may encourage learning in

accordance with the process of attribution. This process is an attempt by decision

makers to clarify what happened to cause behavioral results of the adversary which

they did not expect (Maoz, 1990).

The concept of failure is, for the first time, discussed differently in this paper, as is

learning from success, a discussion of which will follow. We do not mean to define

these according to the results of policy. We refer to failure or success as the ability to

predict the adversary, whether in policies which end in success or those which end in

failure. In other words, the question is whether the decision maker has succeeded in

predicting the behavior of the adversary or has failed. The fact of determination

enables learning in a change of the system of beliefs of the side which has succeeded

or failed in predicting the behavior of the adversary.

In any case, reference to learning from failure in the organizational learning

literature and in international relations sees failure as a cause of change in learning,

while success has a more reinforcing effect. The argument in this paper is different.

Success, and especially repeated success, has the ability to encourage learning, that is,

change, and sometimes, even to encourage far-reaching change. Thus, it may be

derived that, when there is success in forecasting the behavior of the adversary, there

will be a change in the belief system and behavior of the side which has successfully

predicted its adversary's behavior. Beyond what has been said about failure and

success as motivations for learning, it should be remembered that failure may also

reinforce patterns of thinking and behavior because of the fear of abandoning known

patterns for an unknown change at a moment of crisis connected to the atmosphere of

failure. In addition, a situation is possible in which the failing side does not change its

behavior or perceptions, i.e. does not learn, because the failing side attributes the

failure to the other side.

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Therefore, in a discussion of prolonged conflict and interaction between adversaries

over time, the effects of failure and success should be examined symmetrically from

the standpoint of the potential of each of them. Both may motivate or hinder learning.

In summary, the stages of a prolonged conflict discussed in this paper, the image

of the adversary and the behavior of the sides are all connected to learning as a central

motivation. The question is asked, "Do political leaders learn from historical

experience and do the lessons affect the decisions and preferences in their foreign

policy? It would seem, theoretically, that that decision makers would always be

searching for ways to avoid the failures of the past.

The answer to this question must take into account the unique characteristics of the

learning which is being discussed. Although we may advance our understanding of

world politics by combining historical learning with models of foreign policy decision

making, we must first refer to a number of important conceptual and methodological

problems. It is one thing to maintain that historical learning often takes place, and

another to describe when certain actors learn lessons from a certain type of events,

and under what conditions this leads to a change in policy. The concept of learning is

difficult to define, to isolate, to measure and to empirically apply and researchers only

recently have begun to investigate these questions methodically and intensively.

As mentioned, learning, as it is discussed in this paper, is part of the category of

learning from historical experience, but it has specific qualities:

First, learning, here, is not normative, in the sense that it does not judge

decision makers ethically on the question of whether they have learned or not learned

from the failures of the past. The basis of learning indicates that we are dealing with

procedural learning; in other words, a procedure which generally is used in decision

making between adversaries. Thus, decision makers discuss their options parallel to

the options of the opposing side, i.e. the adversary. The behavior of the adversary,

whether corresponding or not corresponding to the predictions which are ascribed to

it, becomes cognitive and factual information which is considered when making the

next decision of the side which has either succeeded or failed in its predictions. This is

a process with implications for the subjective aspect of decision making, but it takes

place in the factual rather than the normative forum.

Second, this learning is not historical in the sense of learning from the perspective

of the far past, but rather, immediate and continuous learning, referring to the bond

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between learning and continuous decisions, relatively close in time and referring to

the same actors.

Another unique aspect of this learning is that it can be ascribed to sides or

adversaries of different cultures, religions and environments. Adversaries of different

cultures have a universal quality when, at certain states of the conflict they consider

how the other side will act towards them. This is what makes the conflict ego-

relevant.

.When learning from historical experience in its wide and normative sense, it is

impossible to claim that different political leaders learn in the same way, but in the

learning process which is discussed here, this claim can be made. Different political

leaders, and especially when considering political leaders who have been in conflict

over time, operate according to certain predictions, and make decisions which are

linked to the adversary, and simultaneously, to the way in which they perceive him

and his expected behavior. A gap or the absence of a gap between their predictions

and reality accumulates as cognitive information which sustains the image of the

adversary on each side and which determines his behavior (negative or positive).

Learning Between State Actors and a State and a Non-State Actor Conflict - A

Learning Paradigm Put to the Test

A list of all existing definitions of learning may testify to a normative-bias

component such as a definition by which only a change in values and/or a change in

behavior may testify that learning had taken place. Even if the theory generally seems

to leave the type of change in behavior open, the concept of learning is presented as a

linear cognitive process resulting in a change of behavior. Indeed, the concept of

adaptation and/or of non-learning, discussed in the theory of learning moderates this

deviation, but this paper posits that additional patterns of learning may be considered,

in general, and patterns of learning from failure and from success in particular. Thus,

the process of learning in a conflict between a state actor and a non-state actor will

reveal additional situations of learning such as:

- Learning which is not accompanied by change either in the belief system of

the sides or in their behavior.

- Learning as a situation of adaptation which is not accompanied by a change in

the system of beliefs but which is accompanied by a change in behavior

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- Learning as an addition of cognitive input which is not accompanied by any

change but which strengthens and justifies a system of existing beliefs and

behaviors.

- Learning from success and learning from failure with no change in the system

of beliefs and/or in the behavior of the sides.

The Development and Reduction of a Prolonged Conflict Between States as Shift

from Learning from Failure to Learning from Success.

The accepted division of a prolonged conflict includes three main stages: the

development stage, the intermediate stage and the reduction stage. A description of

the links between the stages of a prolonged conflict and patterns of learning are shown

in the following model:

I. The earliest part of the conflict: failure (gap between predictions and

behavior)� rise in violence

II. The intermediate stage, during which the gap between predictions and

behavior is reduced as a result of experiential interaction.

III. The reduction stage: success (correspondence between predictions and

behavior)� reduction in violence

This paper does not examine the second stage of the model but rather focuses on

the first and third stages. One reason for centering on the edges of the development of

a prolonged conflict and less on the intermediate stage is connected to the importance

of understanding the two phases which have clear contradictions between them from

the standpoint of the atmosphere of the conflict and of the behavior of the sides. There

are clear differences in these aspects at the beginning of a conflict between

adversaries and at its conclusion. It is possible that understanding the stage of the

beginning of a conflict may aid in shortening the way to the intermediate stage, and to

bringing the conflict to its reduction stage in a relatively short time.

An additional reason for not focusing on the intermediate stage is the dynamic

character of this stage during which there is a disorder of various tendencies in the

behavior of the sides in their beliefs and perceptions of the conflict.

The final reason for focusing on the edges is connected to the proposed hypothesis

for the comparison which this paper aims to make between a conflict between states

and a conflict between a state and a non-state actor. The asymmetry which constitutes

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a dominant component in identifying the various actors includes a learning rationale

on which it is methodologically difficult to automatically apply analogies from

knowledge which has been accumulated about learning in a conflict between states.

First, the framework of learning and the categorical limitations of this type of conflict

must be determined before delving into the intermediate situations and afterwards, to

permit a more particular and “differentiated” diagnosis. Although this paper will try to

follow the development of learning in this type of conflict sequentially, the

understanding which will be proposed is limited to a new learning framework,

challenging existing comprehension of learning patterns which we have known up to

now and requiring additional research.

The model describes two stages in the prolonged conflict using the dynamic of

learning. The developmental stage is linked to learning from failure while the

reduction stage is linked to learning from success.

In the developmental stage, a system of interactive recognition between the sides

has not been created. The adversaries are foreign to the conflict arena, and have

almost no channels of direct and explicit communication. At times, these are two

sides with significantly different cultures, which may cause difficulties at least on the

level of perceptual framework of the images they hold of each other.

In this state, the perception of the adversary may entail a variety of perceptual

distortions. The adversaries tend to surprise each other more and more, as the

predictions of behavior which they attribute to one another do not fit actual behavior.

On a procedural level of the process of decision making, learning from failure usually

occurs, when the emphasis in failure is the lack of correspondence between

predicting the behavior of the adversary and actual adversarial behavior. The

side which fails to predict the behavior of the adversary is surprised, which affects

perception on two levels:

A. A rise in the severity of situational variables (Level of stress, Level of

ambiguity, and degree of threat. (Maoz, 1990, pp. 468-476).

A description of this rise as it is expressed by Maoz (ibid.) will be limited to the

emphases which are brought out in ideas discussed in this paper, and their essence is

as follows:

• There are ramifications of the correspondence or lack of

correspondence of decision makers' predictions regarding the

adversary and his/her actual behavior. Correspondence constitutes

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success in predicting and non-correspondence is failure to predict. It

does not matter whether the result is good or bad. In other words,

whether the result of the actual behavior of the adversary is good or

bad in the opinion of the decision maker, the determinant for our

purposes is whether he has failed or succeeded in predicting actual

behavior.

• The situational variables, as described, will not be ranged according to

their previous classification, and the change will be due to the gap

between predication and result (as Maoz maintains) (ibid.). This paper

deals with the development of conflict between two sides which have

not accumulated established interactive experience about each other,

and the attitude towards failure and success in the prediction of

decision makers does not depend on the type of result (good or bad).

Therefore, it is logical that, at the beginning of the rivalry in a

prolonged conflict, failure to predict behavior will lead to a rise in the

severity of the situational variables, i.e. a rise in the level of stress

between the sides, a rise in the level of ambiguity and in the extent of

threat. As time goes by, the sides know each other better and

accumulate prior experience in dealing with the rise in the severity of

the situational variables. Therefore, there will be a lesser tendency to

fail in predicting the behavior of the adversary and there will be a

moderation in the severity of situational variables.

In light of these emphases, the achievements of Maoz (ibid.) will be analyzed with

appropriate relevancy:

Failure to predict the behavior of the adversary leads to a rise in the perception of

the severity of stress, ambiguity and threat. Failure harms the level of confidence with

which the decision maker is willing to evaluate the intentions and preferences of his

adversary. The rise in stress also results from the perception of threat from an

unexpected and cognitively uncontrolled adversary whose moves are hard to predict.

B. A rise in hostility as a result of threat perception. The rise in threat perception

is affected, to a great extent, also by the rise in the level of stress and

ambiguity (Maoz, ibid.). Threat perception is a central concept in

understanding the rise of hostility and unrest and the absence of mutual trust

leading the sides to violent behavior (Fisher, 1990; pp. 159-160). It appears

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that the rise in hostility can be seen as emotional control for regulation of the

distortion of cognitive perception. In other words, the lack of correspondence

between the prediction of decision makers and the actual results, apart from

increasing the severity of the perception of situational variables, tends to

create a kind of spillover in the form of an increase in hostility towards the

object of perceptual distortion, as well. The increase in hostility is discussed

here in terms of a negative image of the adversary, as this is the psychological

mechanism which undergoes change, and learning occurs as a result of the

non-correspondence between the prediction of decision makers and the actual

results of adversarial behavior.

The change in the image of the adversary constitutes a mediating variable between

failure/success in predication and the behavioral changes of the sides. An increase in

the negative image of the adversary constitutes a rise in hostility which leads to a rise

in violence between the sides. A decrease in the negative image constitutes a

moderation and a reduction in hostility which allows for a fall in violence between the

sides. These links cay be described in the following diagram1:

From Failure Rise in negative image Rise in level of violence

Learning

From Success Rise in positive image Fall in level of violence

In summary, regarding the change in situational variables, it is not important

whether the result has been good or bad. In the process of rational attribution2, there

will be a change in the perception of situational variables as both a good result and a

bad result are perceived as a surprise constituting a negative feedback to the

understanding of decision makers and to their acts. In both cases, they will try to

clarify what occurred.

1 The study does not examine the change in tendencies of situational variables. The link between

failure/success and the situational variables has already been discussed in detail in Maoz's book (ibid.).

This study makes use of aspects which were examined there as a basis for additional support for our

assumptions.

2 In my opinion, there is no contradiction in attributing hostility or psychological-emotional aspects to

a rational decision maker in whom the process of rational attribution is carried out. Rationality in

decision making is primarily an instrumental cognitive approach, a kind of method for perceiving

reality and solving problems, and it does not necessarily invalidate emotions of the decision maker.

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As the definition of "good" or "bad" entails subjective interpretation of the sides in

a prolonged conflict, for the purposes of this article, we may be satisfied with the

following description:

- A "good" result is the range of circumstances derived from the behavior of the

adversary whose political significance moves on a continuum from

maintaining the status quo to opening opportunities for political gain.

- A "bad" result is the range of circumstances derived from the behavior of the

adversary whose political significance moves on a continuum from violating

the status quo to a threat to political values.

As this paper does not discuss the results of behavior, but focuses on the prediction of

adversarial behavior, on the success of the prediction or its failure, there is no wide

discussion of the political results of adversarial behavior.

Considering a rise in the negative image: a situation in which the result of actual

behavior of the adversary is good, is not enough to induce confidence regarding

supervision and control over the adversary. In the developing stage of a conflict a

good result can arouse suspicion and lack of trust in adversaries who have not yet

established a system of interactive recognition. At this stage, success in predicting the

behavior of an adversary is quite rare.

As time passes, the gap between prediction and foreseen behavior is narrowed as a

result of experience and the sides are introduced to the other's "rules of the game"

(Ben-Dor, 1987, pp. 10-11, in Brecher). This is expressed in an accumulation of

information which enables more accuracy in perceiving the adversary and greater

success in predicting his behavior.

When there are repeated successes, there will be a decrease in the negative image

of the adversary, as the ability and confidence in predicting behavior moderate the

perception of the adversary as dangerous and threatening to the other side. In addition,

there will be a decrease in the severity of situational variables; due to the fact that,

over time, decision makers have had experience in situations of high stress, ambiguity

and threat and have also received feedback in the behavioral results of the adversary

over time, who has supplied them with information about him and their perceptions of

him (Maoz, 1990, ibid.)

However, this does not mean that a realistic opinion of the adversary (i.e.

unsurprising) as having goals which are a threat to the state will reduce the negative

image and the perception of threat. It is important to remember that success in

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predicting the behavior of the adversary may have a good or a bad result. We will

assume that only in the case of three repeated successes3 whose results are good, there

will be a change in the image of the adversary. In the case of success or successes

which have bad results, it can be assumed that the side which predicted the behavior

of his adversary has prepared for the result which was predicted and therefore, in the

next step which will be taken as a reaction, there will be constancy of both the level of

situational variables as they were perceived previously and also in the image of the

adversary; even if his behavior led to a bad result, it was predicted and it was possible

to take the necessary precautions.

The Development of a Prolonged Conflict Between a State and a Non-state

Actor- Multidimensional Learning Model

I. The earliest part of the conflict:

STATE ACTOR- Learning from failure (gap between predictions and behavior)

(change in image and behavior) � rise in violence

NON-STATE ACTOR – non-learning (correspondence between predictions and

behavior without change in image or behavior)

II. The intermediate stage

PHASE A

STATE ACTOR - During this phase, the gap between predictions and behavior is

reduced as a result of experiential interaction from learning from failure to

adaptation (no change in image in image. change in behavior) → rise in violence

NON-STATE ACTOR – from non-learning to adaptation → rise in violence

PHASE B

Competing learning – Which side will first undermine the other's learning from

success? (psychological warfare)

III. The reduction stage: Back to the state conflict model of learning with an

advantage to the state in learning from success (correspondence between

predictions and behavior)� reduction in violence

3 The logic which supports three successes is as follows: One success can be perceived as coincidental

or as luck, and does not as yet arouse confidence in the perception of the adversary; two successes are

not coincidental but still border on fear and doubt; three successes reflect more confidence and bring

the adversary closer in a perceptual sense. In no form of assessment is there a model which can tell us a

priori that we must predict a certain number of successes, and therefore, the threshold which has been

set represents a preliminary assumption the accuracy of which will become clear during the data

analysis.

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The onset of terrorist insurgency, whether moderate or extremely violent, reveals that

the learning pattern of the state in this stage of conflict is similar to the pattern in the

state level conflict – which is learning from failure:

Learning from failure – Rise in negative image → rise in level of violence

This paper posits that the rise in the state’s negative image of the terrorist/guerilla

organization is even stronger because of the psychological effect of the asymmetry

that exists between it, as a powerful and dominant side, and the inferior side which

has dared to surprise the state negatively.

Regarding the non-state actor: it would appear that he learns from success and

improves in foreseeing the behavior of the adversarial state. He knows that the state

will react strongly against him and pursue him, and this is correct. The non-state

organization’s expectations are in keeping with the behavior of the state which is

fighting against him. However, as there is no change either in the image of the

adversary or in his behavior, there is no learning. The non state actor has been

emotionally charged with hostility which is derived from its ideology and this

hostility continues to exist despite its success in predicting the acts of the state against

it. At the beginning of the conflict, the non-state adversary does not learn. This

demonstrates the intransigence of a terror guerilla organization.

In the continuation of the conflict we can differentiate between two phases.

In the first phase both sides move to adaptation with an escalation in their behavior

and no change in their system of beliefs.

The non-state actor widens the circle of attempts at attack in a variety of spheres and

at varying levels of intensity, along with warlike activity against the adversarial state.

The state attributes continuing acts of terrorism to the organization along with its

tendency to increase the range and intensity of terrorist attacks and its spheres of

activity.

Though each side has expectations of the other which are usually in line with their

actual behavior – the two sides are engaged in a process of adaptation: they continue

to maintain a negative perception of the adversary but they change their behavior

which becomes more violent.

In the second phase, learning can be understood from the rise of the relevancy of

psychological warfare in managing the conflict between the two sides, indicating

“competitive learning.” This stage of the conflict is characterized by the attempt of

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each of the sides to precede his adversary, undercutting his learning from success,

creating distorted perceptions in decision-making regarding what is attributed to the

other side, reducing his options and subordinating his control while the non-state

actor, himself, has become “evasive” from the perceptual standpoint. With this

advantage, one side will have more chance to succeed at learning and the other side

will fail. The decision-making of one side will aim to cause the other side to fail in its

prediction about the opposing side, meaning accumulating strategic surprise leading

to weakening awareness. At this stage we will expect learning from failure and from

success with changing frequency between the adversaries, while the side with the

advantage in learning is the one which improves at predicting the behavior of his

adversary while succeeding at causing his adversary to fail at predicting his behavior,

leading to negative surprise. At this stage, it is difficult to determine which of the

adversaries improves to a greater degree in learning from success and in causing the

other side to learn from failure. This stage is especially characterized by intensive

psychological warfare as an element in the conduct of the conflict ; it is not a stage

where learning from success is likely to moderate the image of the adversary or his

behavior. At this stage, the negative awareness component is especially strong with

both of the sides.

During the reduction stage of the conflict between a state and a non-state

organization, the two sides have gained great experience and have reached perceptual

symmetry as well as stabilizing the conflict between them. This paper posits that a

learning process begins according to the model of a conflict between states, including

learning with change in adversary perception and change in behavior.

It is proposed that a state has a greater chance at learning from success, meaning

congruence between the prediction which it ascribes to the non-state actor and this

actor’s actual behavior, a change in the perception of the adversary towards

moderation and reduction in violence.

The reasons proposed for understanding this development are:

1. State learning capability

The state has long historical and institutional experience in previous experiential

learning with other states with which it has had or is still involved with in a

conflict. The pattern of learning which moderates hostility is known to the state as

a gestalt or as a cognitive analogy by which it continues to manage conflict. As

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the emotional baggage of great hostility has been an acquired quality from its

conflict with the non-state actor, it is able to learn from success to moderate this

baggage and to manage the conflict more “coolly’.

2. The cognitive implications of asymmetry reduction between the opponents

The establishment and/or geographical territorial delineation of a non-state actor,

the existence of links between this actor and state and/or other non-state actors, its

unification as a political entity recognized by states and/or by the adversarial state,

its military armament, among others, reduce the existing asymmetry in a conflict

between a state and a non-state actor. The “virtuality” which it had enjoyed up to

now and its structural evasiveness as a terror/guerilla organization which supplied

it with an advantage in its psychological warfare and which caused the opposing

side to take risks in learning are gone; now the state is granted with a perceptual

and critical advantage for evaluating the options which it will implement and its

success in learning the organization. The organization’s visibility constitutes a

weak opening point for its ability to learn.

3. Shifting from irrelevance to relevance of deterrence in the conduct of the

conflict.

In contrast to the previous stages of the conflict, in this stage the deterrence

between the two sides is constructed in its conventional meaning, between

adversaries who have reached perceptual maturity as a dyad who have been able

to get to know each other better while the asymmetry which has characterized

their conflict is reduced. Each knows the abilities of the other, his determination,

and his red lines. In this situation, the ability of the two sides to deter not only

with military means, but also with diplomatic, economic, political and other

means supplies the point of stability of the conflict on the axis in which the

asymmetry is reduced. This does not mean that the two sides have now begun to

be a dyad with symmetrical abilities of these values, as, for instance, equal

military abilities or equal international status, but that each one of the dyad has a

greater advantage than the other in one ability. This advantage at times cancels the

advantage of the other side which has another ability (for example, the advantage

of the legal status of the civilian arena of the non-state actor versus the advantage

of use of force of the state actor).

Although the consolidation of the adversaries as a dyad with relative abilities

may allow the development of deterrence, this paper proposes that the creation of

17

similarity between the adversaries at their reference point to the conflict will ease

the creation of that point. This is the situation in which both sides grant similar

importance to the content of the conflict between them and its aims. For both sides

the conflict has evolved into a conflict of interest of which the value components

are perceived in similar terms by both sides (for example no longer an ideological

conflict but rather a territorial conflict…).

However, in creating the moment of deterrence, the great abilities of the state

actor should not be overlooked, including its structural and functional skills and

qualifications in this area. A state has a greater and more varied arsenal of means

of deterrence which can threaten to invalidate the achievements which the non-

state actor has just reached. These abilities can aid the state in its perceptual

advantage over the adversary and increased success in predicting his behavior. In

the process of creating deterrence, the state player will err less in the perception of

the adversary and the cost of error will be lessened. The opposite is true of the

non-state actor.

Conclusions

In a conflict between states- the states tend to learn identically and in identical

directions (from learning from failure to learning from success). In a conflict

between a state and a non-state actor, at the beginning of the conflict the state

learns as in the beginning of a conflict between the state and another state) while

the non-state actor does not learn (the prediction of behavior of the state is correct,

but this does not change the system of beliefs and does not change his behavior).

At the beginning of a conflict between a state and a non-state actor, the ability of

the sides to be correct in their predictions about the behavior of the adversary does

not ensure learning and does not moderate hostility. The fact that there seems to

be more control does not moderate the negative perception of the adversary. At

the stage of conflict reduction, it can be expected that perceptual control of the

adversaries will affect the reduction in the negative image of the adversary.

In a conflict between two states, the beginning of the conflict does not have to

involve significant hostility. Hostility is a developing component, which is

acquired. In a conflict between a state and a non-state organization, the hostility

18

component of the organization is congenital-generic in contrast to the state, in

which it is an acquired characteristic.

The role of conflict characteristics on a structural and functional level is

influential on the process of learning, as may be deduced from the decision

making of the sides. In a conflict between a state and a non-state actor asymmetry,

psychological warfare and deterrence dominantly affect the learning of the sides.

As for the conceptual, methodological, and practical value of this theoretical paper:

- The leaning terms do not refer only to each side’s learning. They also indicate

great cognitive tension.

- A clear differentiation between two different conflicts that allows for a

differentiation between two different decision systems and do not treat

different decisions under one theory.

- An opponent learning profile allows a psychological-cognitive strategic tool

that can help in narrowing unwanted optional behavior of the other opponent.

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