Intuition in Induction

Michael Barron

May 22, 2013

Dr. Kelly Becker

Epistemology Seminar

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This paper argues that neither sensitivity nor safety based epistemological theory can

adequately address instances of what analytic philosophers call inductive knowledge or probabil-

istic knowledge. When these forms of inquiry are properly understood through John Dewey’s

theory of inquiry, as necessitated through the breakdown of the analytic consideration of induc-

tion, analytic epistemologists must necessarily take belief of any kind, unsafe, insensitive or true

or false, in the “barn facade” example as knowledge the same way that they take the intuition of

the likely probabilistic outcome of the “heart breaker” example as knowledge. First, sensitivity

and safety theories are identified. Second, the lottery example is identified and both safety and

sensitivity theories are applied to it. Third, the heartbreaker, uranium and chute problems are

identified and the same exercise is performed. It is argued via stock analytic literature that nei-

ther theory can adequately answer any of the problems presented by inductive knowledge. In

response to this evident conclusion, Dewey’s analysis of theoretical probability and psychologi-

cal attitude in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry is presented and used to reveal differences between

the lottery and other inductive examples, wrongly treated as structurally similar by some episte-

mologists. This analysis leads us to understand what is causing epistemologists to erroneously

believe that knowledge of the outcome of the heartbreaker example and others exists while

knowledge in the lottery case does not, a mystery they themselves acknowledge and do not

solve. Further, Dewey shows the implications of maintaining that knowledge of highly unlikely

statistical scenarios, and therefore of induction, exists means epistemological theory must, by its

own devices, take belief in the “barn facade” case as knowledge.

Sensitivity theory, first introduced by Robert Nozick, is a theory of knowledge seeking to

evaluate belief epistemically. Insofar as a belief that p is formed in a way that makes it so that if

p were false, not only could a person not know p, he would not even believe it in the first place.

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“A person knows that p when he not only does truly believe it, but also would truly believe it and

wouldn’t falsely believe it. He not only actually has a true belief, he subjunctively has one. . . .

To know that p is to be someone who would believe it [p] if it were true, and who wouldn’t be-

lieve it if it were false. It will be useful to have a term for this situation when a person’s belief is

thus subjunctively connected to the fact. . . . [H]is belief tracks the truth to be considered knowl-

edge in sensitivity theory.”1

The sensitivity principle is also known as “tracking”. A belief must epistemically track

the truth. Possible-worlds theory and specific issues related to “method” are involved in the gen-

eral discussion surrounding the theory. Possible-worlds theory is an evaluative standard meant to

show how rigorous a given belief or theory of knowledge is in the sense of how epistemically

involved they are in the object of belief and the truth thereof. A “close” possible world is a theo-

retical world that is structurally very similar to the original world in which the belief was initially

formed, except that epistemologists are free to alter the possible world in order to gauge the ve-

ridicality of a belief. When a true belief is derailed from “tracking” the object of its truth in a

possible-world, it is not considered knowledge if the belief is formed in the same way in the

truth-negative possible world as in the original world. That entails that the belief does not suffi-

ciently “track” the truth of its object. “Sensitivity is usually cashed out in modal terms as de-

manding that in the closest possible worlds in which what the agent believes is false, the agent no

longer believes it on the same basis as in the actual world.”2 If the agent no longer holds the

belief when the truth of a given belief is altered in an otherwise close possible-world, then he is

said to have knowledge in that the belief fulfills the requirements of the sensitivity principle.

“More generally, when one is sensitive to some state of affairs, one would react to a difference.

1 Nozick, 178. 2 Pritchard, “Anti-luck”, 174.

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That is, when one is sensitive, one reacts to how things are in fact, and would react another way

to a difference as well.”3

Safety theory takes a slightly different approach to knowledge. Safety-based epistemo-

logical theory competes with sensitivity theory. Safety theory suggests that knowledge resides in

belief not easily made falsely. “The spirit of a safety condition is that, in cases of knowledge, S

would not easily go wrong by believing as she does. That is, in cases of knowledge, S gets things

right in fact, and would not easily get things wrong either.”4 The emphasis is slightly different

from sensitivity theory. It is placed on how the belief is formed. Included in that, however, is the

truth of the belief. So long as the agent forms the belief in the same way in close possible-worlds,

it will not easily be false. “Safety is usually cashed out in modal terms as demanding that an

agent has a true belief such that, in nearby possible worlds, insofar as the agent forms her belief

on the same basis as in the actual world, then her belief continues to be true. In contrast [to sensi-

tivity theory], in order for a true belief (formed on a certain basis) to be sensitive, it must be such

that, had what the agent believed been false, she wouldn’t have believed it (on the same basis).”5

Safety is thus different from sensitivity theory. Sensitivity evaluates the epistemic value

of a belief by evaluating if a false belief could be formed in the same way in a close possible

world as a true belief. Safety, on the other hand, states that a belief is knowledge if a belief

formed in the same way continues to be true in nearby possible-worlds and if, should the belief

be false, the method for forming it is unavailable.

The lottery problem is a popular issue in contemporary epistemology. There are two ver-

sions of the problem. Pritchard gives us one version for our first analysis.

3 Greco, “Better Safe than Sensitive”, 195. 4 Ibid., 194. 5 Pritchard, “Anti-luck”, 175.

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LOTTERY: Lottie and Luttie have each bought a ticket for a fair lottery with very long odds of a million to one. The lottery has been drawn, but neither agent has heard the re-sult. Lottie reflects on the fact that the odds are massively stacked against her and so, solely on this basis, forms the (true) belief that her ticket has not won. Luttie, in contrast, doesn’t even know what the odds for the lottery are, and certainly isn’t the sort of a per-son to reflect on how these odds are stacked against her. But she reads the result of the lottery in a reliable newspaper, and so on this basis forms the (true) belief that her ticket has not won. (Pritchard, “Anti-luck”, 177.)

In epistemology, it is understood that Lottie does not know that she hasn’t won the lottery, but

Luttie does know she hasn’t won.6 This is an epistemic problem for several reasons. First, the

literature agrees that the chances that a misprint of the lottery numbers occurs are far greater than

actually winning the lottery.7 Therefore, Lottie’s belief is formed on a more robust probabilistic

foundation than Luttie’s. As we will see, there are many instances in which epistemologists say

that a belief a highly improbable occurrence won’t occur is knowledge.8 “[W]e tend to think that

knowledge is in some sense a function of the strength of the evidence that one has for one’s true

beliefs such that the greater the probability in favour of one’s true belief then the greater the like-

lihood that one has knowledge. If this were correct, however, then it would follow that forming

one’s true belief that one has lost a lottery by considering the odds involved would be far more

likely to yield one knowledge than forming that same true belief by reading the result in the

newspaper, and this is clearly contrary to intuition.”9

In Pritchard’s example, the problem is that the odds are higher that Luttie is wrong, but

epistemologists do not want to say that Lottie has knowledge simply by referring to the odds of

the lottery because that would mean they would have to admit that she has knowledge, which

6 I am assuming that this is an example of an analytic “stipulation” the origin and content of which will later form the basis of a great point of discussion in Dewey. 7 See Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 162-63. 8 Cf. Vogel, “Enduring Trouble,” 132, n. 19. “. . . tiny possibility of error is perfectly compatible with knowledge; for a similar point see the Heartbreaker Case.” There are many other examples involving quantum mechanics, etc. 9 Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 162-163.

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they don’t.10 The problem is completely isolated to the competing probabilistic frequency-

distributions of either belief being true. Pritchard refers to the problem as a problem of “luck.”

Both safety and sensitivity theory can handle the lottery problem as it is stated by Prit-

chard. In sensitivity theory, the lottery problem is solved by saying that one’s belief is not sensi-

tive if it is formed in reference to the mathematical odds of winning. This is because one could

refer to those odds in the same way in forming a false belief. In the lottery case, Pritchard notes

that the “closest possible-world where what these agents actually believe is false11 is where they

are in possession of a winning lottery ticket.”12 In this sense, the literature takes the evaluator of

whether their belief is true or not as if they win. In a winning world, the agent’s belief remains

static and the sensitivity principle does not confirm that belief as a case of knowledge.

Crucially, though, while this will be a world in which the reliable newspaper prints the winning result, it will continue to be a world in which the odds in question overwhelm-ingly suggest that one has lost. Thus, if one forms one’s belief about whether one has lost on the basis of the odds concerned (as Lottie does), then one will form a false belief in this world [making the belief not sensitive]; but if one forms one’s belief by consulting a

10 Pritchard, “Anti-luck,” 177. 11 It is unclear to me how Luttie would form a false belief about winning the lottery by reading the newspaper if she had the winning ticket and thus I cannot understand why agents is in the plural in the quoted statement. If the analyt-ics are going to treat the truth-determinant of the agents’ beliefs as verifying one’s ticket with the winning lottery numbers, i.e., as a belief formed as a conclusion, which they do, then this kind of a priori generalized fixing should go away or, at least, they should pick one way of evaluating the belief. There is also a vagueness about whether both Lottie and Luttie (“these agents”) are holding a single lottery ticket together. This is another generalization that seems to me to indicate an unwillingness to fully acknowledge the qualitative difference in each agent’s case of be-lief to begin with in what Dewey calls the “continuity” of inquiry. One agent’s belief is formed without completing inquiry with a stipulation that cuts the inquiry off from completion. One is formed on the basis of a conclusion after inquiry is done. The epistemic evaluation of each belief involves the implicit recognition in stipulations that the be-liefs are qualitatively different in kind, but this is relegated to a superficial and unsupported “intuition” on the part of the epistemologists. It is worth mentioning that sensitivity and safety theories have absolutely no capability to de-scribe why or how the beliefs are different, which would make explicit the embedded intuitions of the epistemolo-gists and make them available for criticism. Instead, these subjective intuitions are exempted from theoretical and practical examination and criticism to begin with and await their assumed eventual confirmation. “As [dialectic] occurs in philosophic thought its dependence upon an original act of selective choice is often not avowed. Its prem-ises are alleged to be indubitable and self-guaranteeing. . . . Choice that is disguised or denied is the source of those astounding differences of philosophic belief that startle the beginner and that become the plaything of the expert. Choice that is avowed is an experiment to be tried on its merits and tested by its results. Under all the captions that are called immediate knowledge, or self-sufficient certitude of belief, whether logical, esthetic or epistemological, there is something selected for a purpose, and hence not simple, not self-evident and not intrinsically eulogizable.” (Dewey, Experience and Nature, 390) 12 Pritchard, “Anti-Luck,” 177.

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reliable newspaper (as Luttie does), then one will form a true belief. It is in this sense, claim sensitivity theorists, that Lottie’s belief that she has lost the lottery is only luckily true, even though the odds are massively in her favor when compared with Luttie, who, by consulting the reliable newspaper, really does know that she has lost. (Pritchard, “Anti-Luck,” 177.)

Sensitivity is capable, then, of establishing a difference between the cases even though the clos-

est possible-world where the eventual truth of each belief is false only entails changing the num-

bers on their tickets or the winning numbers of the lottery.13 The parameters that the theory con-

siders important for the formation of each belief stay the same, namely, that the newspaper con-

tinues to print the winning results and the odds continue to be overwhelmingly against winning.

So it seems that sensitivity theorists have a way of distinguishing an instance of belief informed

by probabilistic theory or luck as different from knowledge in other cases that seem likewise to

be informed by high levels of improbability.

Pritchard argues that safety can also handle the lottery case. The agent Lottie does not

know she lost the lottery because there are nearby possible-worlds where she wins. In those pos-

sible-worlds, the agent would form a belief that they lost using the same method that they did in

the world where they do not win. The possibility of their using that method to form beliefs is not

prevented by the conditions of the situation. “The agent who forms her belief that she has lost the

lottery purely on the basis of the odds involved lacks knowledge because her belief, whilst true

and matching the truth in most nearby possible worlds in which she forms her belief in the same

way as in the actual world, does not match the truth in a small cluster of nearby possible worlds

in which what she believes is false (i.e.[,] where she wins the lottery).”14 Safety theory responds

much the same way that sensitivity theory does. It is possible for the agent to form a false belief

as to whether they are going to win the lottery in the same way that she would form a true belief.

13 Even Vogel agrees. See Vogel, “Enduring Trouble”, 133. 14 Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 163.

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Therefore, the belief does not count as knowledge, making an important distinction that may

sufficiently answer why inductive knowledge is possible in one case and not in the other. So far,

so good for both sensitivity and safety.

There is absolutely no attempt in the theoretical consideration of this example, however,

to explain or justify why or how forming belief via referencing the probabilistic odds should not

result in knowledge versus forming belief based on referencing the reliable newspaper. It is evi-

dently enough for the literature to construe a theoretical formula that can merely indicate a dif-

ference, thereby “solving” the problem. Here, Dewey can step in to state exactly what the analyt-

ics are intuiting and give an explanation why the intuition is what it is. Making this intuition and

its philosophical components clear and overt is crucial for a robust consideration of the intuitions

in the rest of the analytic literature cited. Dewey argues sensitivity and safety theory, in this case

correctly if very clumsily, seem to respond to the fact that the mathematical odds of the lottery

have no existentially descriptive value. “[I]t is possible for mathematical theory, in ordered dis-

course, to reach certain propositions about what will necessarily occur as a matter of frequency-

distributions in an indefinite series of throws [of dice]. But no one today would hold that these

propositions “imply” what will existentially take place, or that the theory guarantees that the

conditions postulated actually exist. . . .”15 Mathematical propositions about probability, which is

necessarily what is under consideration in the knowledge-negative case of belief in the lottery

case, have a functional and instrumental character that can only apply a fortiori to the finite

preparation of actual existential conditions like a lottery. No one is denying that inferences --

predictions -- can be formed in relation to probability. That is their instrumental and functional

status. They do not, however, provide any basis of certainty regarding what will actually occur or

what actually occurs in the real world, nor do they have any bearing on whether those theoretical 15 Dewey, Logic, 476. Underlining added.

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odds apply to existential conditions. They are purely theoretical and are completely devoid of

descriptive or indicative power. The force of this is realized by the understanding that mathe-

matical probabilistic formulations are theoretically based upon an infinite set of outcomes. In

other words, probabilistic odds could only be “verified” in an infinite series of tests, which is

necessarily impossible. The mathematical propositions involved in probability are instrumental

and they have no operational influence on the outcome of any given applicable case.

The important logical consideration is that from the mathematical point of view the cal-culated frequency-distributions represent the limit of a mathematical infinite series, while the ratio of existential distributions [like the results of past lotteries] is a matter of a long-run finite series. Suppose, for example, that at the close of n throws [of n dice] (n being a finite number), actual results have a one-hundred-percent agreement with theoretically ar-rived at conclusions. The fallacy involved in stopping at that point and saying the theo-retical conclusion is now completely verified is evident. For the very next throw would upset the “verification” by complete agreement to an extent dependent upon the number of previous throws. It is, accordingly, impossible to give descriptive value to the mathe-matical conceptions and propositions. They have instrumental and functional status. What applies in this case of conditions, so prepared in advance as to come as close to a closed system as is possible, applies a fortiori to cases in which prior preparation of existential conditions cannot be instituted in the same degree. (Dewey, Logic, 476-477.)

If the current day’s odds of winning the Powerball lottery were given as a function of how many

winning tickets were sold since the lottery first began, including the total number of tickets sold

over time and the number of drawings, the odds would not match what the theoretical odds

show.16 Even if they did, the point is that the next lottery would serve to violate any false sense

that the theory is fully descriptive of what happens in the actual world. Pritchard makes a formu-

lation that begins to draw this aspect of probabilistic odds out, called L1.

16 An indication of this resides in the fact that there is not always a jackpot winner in some lotteries like the Power-ball because the winning number is not drawn from the pool of numbers issued on tickets. The winning number is randomly and independently generated. Practically speaking, it could be that there would never be another Powerball jackpot winner ever again even though the theoretical odds indicate that there is a chance of winning. Similarly, it is entirely possible that one could flip a coin for the rest of his life and only get heads even though the probability of hitting tails is 1 in 2.

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(L1) If an event is lucky, then it is an event that occurs in the actual world but which does not occur in a wide class of the nearest possible worlds where the relevant initial condi-tions for that event are the same as in the actual world. (Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 128)

Luck, then, does not include modally determinative or descriptive elements. This is an equiva-

lent, if vague, modal expression of a Deweyan interpretation of probability theory. Everything in

the world is kept the same and yet something different can still happen despite the fact that that

difference --the lucky event-- is not attached to determinative reasons why it occurred. It is not a

good thing that “luck” is like this.

There are, of course, problems with this partial specification of luck, one of which is the inherent vagueness involved in the demand that the relevant initial conditions of the event should be the same in all the nearby possible worlds under consideration. I think we have an intuitive grasp of what this involves (such as the purchase of a lottery ticket in the ‘lot-tery’ example . . .), but as it stands it is an uncomfortably open-ended constraint on the condition. For example, if one includes in the initial conditions for the event the demands that the balls fall into the lottery machine in a certain way, then one will no longer gener-ate the desired result that the event is lucky in light of (L1) because the specification of the initial conditions will determine the event in question. . . . What we have in mind by this clause [L1] is some conception of the initial conditions which does not understand them in such a way that, individually or collectively, they determine the event in ques-tion. The problem, however, is to specify this ‘non-determining’ feature of the clause. . . . (Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 131-132)

Thus, if you construe an understanding of luck that contains descriptive elements, you lose the

aspect that makes luck lucky. The “non-determining” feature of the L1 clause is the fact that

theoretical probabilities do not involve the conditions of the world in their formulation. In L1 the

probabilities themselves are mistakenly converted into “initial conditions” of the world which is

the classic and problematic reversal of the Deweyan position. “No one today would hold that

these propositions ‘imply’ what will existentially take place, or that the theory guarantees that

the conditions postulated actually exist.” Lucky belief formation is lucky precisely because it is

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described in reference to mathematical frequency-distributions17 that are theoretical in nature and

have no existentially descriptive or determinative value. That is an indisputable fact. The con-

trived problem of “luck” appears when “lucky” non-descriptive probabilities are construed in a

way that tries unknowingly or secretly to force them into descriptive roles either as “initial con-

ditions” of the world or as being about the actual (not the theoretical) occurrence of the event in

question. The “proof,” if you will, in the literature is demonstrated in that “luck,” a modal ex-

pression constructed in an attempt to contain and regulate the indeterminate and non-explanatory

nature of probabilistic expressions, necessarily defies expression that contains deterministic or

descriptive elements. Following Pritchard, the intuition that belief formation done by referencing

the newspaper is knowledge, then, is not an issue of the probability of the newspaper’s printing

the correct numbers, as Pritchard acknowledges.18 The question is then, “What is the intuition

drawing on?” In actuality, the intuition is a hidden, imbedded crystallization of the everyday atti-

tude that a newspaper has descriptive force or value in relation to the actual world. This opposes

the intuition regarding the descriptively neutral probabilistic odds used in the formation of the

lucky belief. The examples and Pritchard’s theoretical discussion of the example at best fail to

acknowledge this simple fact, instead standing content erroneously to relocate, and perhaps

magically teleport and forcibly constrain the discussion to a classic red herring: the probability

that the newspaper printed the correct result. This then results in the completely artificial and

contrived problem as to how or why the beliefs carry with them the different intuitive values that

17 Again, this description is problematically capable of application to cases of belief formation regardless of whether this description matches the actual operational way in which the belief is formed. This is covered in the Garbage Chute case later. The Garbage Chute is erroneously construed to involve statistical functions. 18 “If this were correct . . . then it would follow that forming one’s true belief that one has lost a lottery by consider-ing the odds involved would be far more likely to yield one knowledge than forming that same true belief by reading the result in the newspaper, and this is clearly contrary to intuition” (Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 163). See also Prit-chard again. “[W]e have to suppose that the agent who forms her belief that she has lost the lottery by reading the result in the newspaper does not reflect on the probabilities involved. . . .” (Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 163, n. 15. Printed on page 179.)

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they do when they are supposed in the first place to be validly measured only in the single sense

of their probabilistic value. The beliefs are both artificially and erroneously evaluated relative to

a common standard despite the fact that the forces of their correlating intuitions are different,

making the subjective, qualitative differences in the ways they were formed irrelevant. In the

analytic treatment of the lottery example, the different intuitions regarding the example are only

considered to confirm the example as a valid problem with absolutely no care as to whether the

actual force of the intuitions is authentically represented in the form of probabilistic odds. The

critical examination of the intuitions is, I presume since nothing suggests otherwise, covertly

relegated to the propositional value of the intuitions. One intuition says “false” regarding knowl-

edge, the other, “true.” These values do not provide any description of the content or origin of

the intuition or the belief under intuitive consideration that could potentially inform and con-

strain the way that they are represented in the counterfactual example. It only matters that they

are expressed in a way that makes their contradiction modally and propositionally obvious. This

is evident in the way intuitions, the referential contents of which are in actuality different (news-

paper versus odds), are judged in an identical matter. This point is later made more obvious by

Greco’s formulation of the lottery example. The “solution” of the problem, then, can only take

the superficial form of a modal construct like the sensitivity principle or safety theory. At best,

those ways of approaching the problem only superficially and even tautologically confirm the

original embedded intuition operating in the lottery case which is that a belief formed in refer-

ence to purely probabilist odds is inherently different from a belief formed in reference to a

newspaper.19 This characterization -- the characterization that the sensitivity principle and safety

19 Tautological because the problem is confirmed in reference to the intuitions and the intuitions in reference to the modal “solution” which is valued because it propositionally expresses an intuitive distinction. Any modal theory like that then acts as a third wheel in the closed, self-affirming system. The theory is confirmed in reference to the fact it

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theory give the lottery example -- has absolutely no ability whatsoever to address the how or why

issues leading to the difference between the intuitions at work in the example or how they relate

to the beliefs in question. In light of Dewey’s analysis, it is simply uninformed to say that a be-

lief is “safe” or a belief “tracks” the truth actually explains why the intuitions involved are what

they are and how they relate to the beliefs in question. The theoretical mechanisms only make a

distinction in a modal, propositional sense. They do not provide an account of why that distinc-

tion is made in the first place.20 The most important aspect of introducing Dewey at this point is

to reveal the existence and activity of the personal, private intuitions at work in these examples

and the way those intuitions relate to theoretical constructs like the sensitivity principle and

safety theory in the analytic treatment of the lottery case. The analytic theories of safety and sen-

sitivity are working to justify subjective intuition in the lottery case without explaining how or

why the intuition is what it is.

The literature presents other ways of stating the lottery problem. Greco gives us another

version of the problem and things start getting really complicated.

The Lottery Case. S buys a ticket for a lottery in which the chances of winning are ten million to one. A few minutes later, reasoning on the basis of past experience and rele-vant background knowledge, S forms the true belief that she will lose the lottery. Of course, her grounds for so believing are merely inductive: it is possible that she buys the winning ticket, although this is extremely unlikely. (Greco, “Worries,” 300.)21

can respond to the problem which is confirmed in reference to intuition which is confirmed in reference to the the-ory. 20 This issue is not deflected by indicating the newspaper in the counterfactual accounts for the difference in the in-tuitive judgments. That does not resolve the issue because the question then becomes, “Why the newspaper?” If the rebuttal indicates the probabilistic odds of the newspaper’s reliability account for the difference the fallacy presents itself because the probabilistic interpretation of the newspaper only goes to indicate, by intuition, that there is some-thing special about the newspaper not accounted for in its probabilistic description, hence, the lottery problem. 21 In this form of the lottery case, the epistemic evaluation of the belief is mysteriously quarantined to the com-pletely nonexistent and impossible relationship it has at the moment it is formed with what is in actuality a future event (the lottery drawing) that has yet to take place and therefore has a value that is indeterminate. This is espe-cially evident in the treatment of the belief’s being “stipulated” as true before the lottery drawing even takes place. There is absolutely no other way to characterize this treatment of the belief, because you can’t play a lottery after the drawing takes place! Dewey calls this the philosophic fallacy; “converting an eventual function into antecedent existence” (Dewey, Experience and Nature, 34, 17). A more pervasive, corrosive and stubbornly perpetuated ten-dency in philosophy one cannot find, according to Dewey and epistemology based on certainty is built squarely

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Greco argues that safety deals adequately with this form of the lottery case. Simply put, there are

close possible-worlds where, in spite of the odds, the agent’s ticket wins in spite of holding a be-

lief that they lost which is formed in the same way in the possible-world where they lost.22 Safety

theory, again, does not problematically result in knowledge in the lottery example or collapse

when exposed to induction in this example. Note that Greco mentions that the grounds for belief

in this case are “inductive” and “based on past experience and relevant background knowledge.”

The description of the lottery case is phrased differently from Pritchard’s. Greco interprets the

problem of the lottery example as an issue with what the literature calls “induction.” “How can it

be both (1) that we can have knowledge on inductive grounds, but (2) that we don’t know we

will lose the lottery, even though our inductive grounds for believing this are excellent?”23 This

is different than Pritchard’s treatment which strives to distinguish theoretically different odds-

criteria for each agent. The issue is, first, if Greco’s move is justified. Is one way of looking at

the lottery case better than the other? Pritchard seems to make a statement to the effect that the

“true” issue at stake in the lottery example is one of luck, comparing an instance of belief forma-

tion driven by high levels of probability with one driven by reading a newspaper (also admitted

to contain probabilistic elements) but this is not addressed by Greco.24 It certainly seems that

way when the example is phrased the way Pritchard phrases it but is there anything keeping

Greco from phrasing it his way? I see no reason in the analytic literature under consideration for

upon it. See Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 56-57 ff. One may say that the lottery, as in Pritchard’s statement, has already taken place and the ticket holders simply don’t know the winning numbers, but again, this is only a more subtle and disguised way of bypassing any consideration of the subjective nature, value and operational function of the belief in question by erroneously making what is in actuality an eventually occurring reference with an indeter-minate value into a concrete antecedent existence. Moreover, the fact that no one would dare to call a belief formed in reference to probabilistic odds knowledge even when the lottery is over only goes to further indicate the inherent uncertainty involved in a lottery. 22 Greco, “Worries”, 300. 23 Greco, “Worries”, 300. 24 Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 162.

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denying there are not inferential elements in Pritchard’s phrasing of the case. This also applies to

Greco’s way of framing the case. After all, the beliefs in all instances have to be formed some-

how. Indicating their referential material (odds, newspaper, past experience) simply does next to

nothing to explain explicitly how the belief is formed in the technical, functional sense and, by

virtue of revealing that explicit process, to justify any use of the references in the examples to the

exclusion of any other use. The same applies to the way that the lottery example is phrased. In

other words, the analytic literature does not provide the tools required for forming reasons to in-

dicate if one example is legitimate over the other. This is problematic and grounds for introduc-

ing a third party, namely, Dewey, to help move this issue forward.25

We already know that intuitions regarding the non-existence of knowledge in beliefs

formed by reference to probability are based on the fact that mathematical frequency-

distributions -- probabilistic odds -- have no existentially determining force. They have no bear-

ing on what actually takes place and are not, in a strict sense, valid grounds for basing descrip-

tions of what will occur in actuality. This fact is both indicated by Pritchard and Dewey. Sensi-

tivity and safety theories are successful to the analytics in that they can distinguish this fact and

not erroneously, as decided by subjective intuition or choice, indicate knowledge is formed in

reference to probability. All of that is compatible with Greco’s lottery problem where “we don’t

know we will lose the lottery.” Nothing just stated is compatible with his statement that “our in-

ductive grounds for believing this are excellent.” Our inductive grounds for believing we won’t

win the lottery are not excellent because they are based on probabilistic theory with no existen-

tially descriptive force. Notice, however, that probability is not the evaluative standard that

Greco employs in his lottery example. Proof of this lies in the most obvious fact that he com-

25 Sensitivity theory and safety theory necessarily end up taking a beating based on induction anyway, even if Dewey is not introduced. See Vogel, “Enduring Problems.”

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pares the lottery example with other examples having absolutely nothing explicitly to do with

probability like the monkey case and rookie cop case.26 The evaluative standard in Greco’s lot-

tery case is something vaguely called “past experience and relevant background knowledge.”

Greco does not explicitly acknowledge this stark difference in the way the lottery example is

phrased. The most troubling aspect of the discrepancy lies in the fact that Greco makes his criti-

cism of Pritchard’s application of safety theory to the lottery case using his own proprietary for-

mulation of the lottery case. What exactly are his grounds for this? Remember that the analytics

in Pritchard’s example are operating on intuition to build the lottery case. The answer is, “intui-

tion.” The prior analysis indicated the modal expression of intuitions leaves out what makes

them what they are, reducing them to a binary true/false relationship with what is intuited to be

knowledge. That connection, as evidenced by the earlier treatment of Pritchard’s lottery case,

does not logically constrain the counterfactual expression of that relationship because those val-

ues do not carry with them any reason for how or why they are what they are. This is perfectly

demonstrated by the arbitrary differences spontaneously generated in Greco’s proprietary version

of what is a lottery case allegedly analogous to Pritchard’s example. Greco’s intuition in this

case, instead of being that a belief formed in virtue of a newspaper is different from a belief

formed in virtue of probabilistic odds, says that belief formed on the basis of past experience and

relevant background knowledge, undefined and vague in the example, involves another equally

undefined and vague process called “induction” and this combination results in “knowledge.”

Induction as it applies to a belief about a lottery ticket is paired with past experience and relevant

background knowledge, which could be anything from the odds read in a book (Pritchard’s ex-

ample?), to the memories of lotteries past (won or lost, or not participated in), to the lucky num-

bers in a fortune cookie, is intuited to be “excellent” grounds for belief. The stable similarity be- 26 Greco, “Worries”, 300-301.

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tween the two examples is simply that a “true” and a “false” belief stand modally correlated to a

common referent whether or not that connection holds in actuality. In the case of Pritchard’s lot-

tery case, the referent is probability, in Greco’s, past experience and relevant background knowl-

edge. The difference between the examples is deceptively masked by, again, a red herring: “a

lottery in which the chances of winning are ten million to one”. That has no epistemic force in

the example and certainly no force that should be considered “excellent”. This is indicated by

Dewey in the sense already established that mathematical frequency-distributions have no exis-

tential descriptive value27 and in another way that her belief based on past experience and

knowledge could possibility have anything else to do with the odds of a lottery being ten million

to one. Even if Greco was to circumvent the Deweyan roadblock and say that the agent’s past

experience and knowledge were relevant to that aspect of the example by stipulating that she had

played the lottery ten million times, only won once and was now playing for her ten millionth

and first time that would only indicate both the immediate practical absurdity of saying so and, in

virtue of that, the absurdity of thinking that the odds of the lottery have any kind of involvement

with her “past experience and relevant background knowledge” that has any epistemic force.

Greco then, secretly converts the lottery example as it exists in Pritchard’s case into a case about

the intuition that knowledge on the basis of historical precedent exists. The conversion to induc-

tion is snuck in behind the statement of the lottery odds in the beginning of the example. In ma-

gician’s terms, the statement of the lottery odds is a form of classic “misdirection”. This move to

27 Even if the belief is colloquially formed in reference to the odds in ignorance of this technical, philosophical fact we cannot say that the belief formed is any better off and certainly not on “excellent” grounds for that is taking a colloquial intuition, as the analytic literature in this paper so readily takes them, as superior or equal to grounds un-covered and supported by serious philosophical discussion. The point is that the literature is taking belief formed via probability in the wrong functional sense, or, really that they fail to take into account the functional sense of the be-lief at all. The intuition in Pritchard’s lottery case is formed from the feeling that probability does not have descrip-tive force of what will necessarily occur in the real world. That does not make the belief under consideration unreal or invalid, it simply indicates it needs more refined consideration.

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induction is very curious and deeply problematic.28 Greco either made this move knowingly or

unknowingly. Unknowingly, the move at best indicates an uninformed author and at worst,

sloppy philosophy. Knowingly, it indicates at best Greco’s philosophical limitations and at worst

perhaps the implementation of a diabolical plot. The present analysis only means to ironically

justify taking Greco seriously on induction on the basis that it is both theoretically and practi-

cally impossible, or, at the very least, useless to take him seriously on probability.

With that established, there is no shortage of counterfactual instances of induction which

are stated to be structurally similar to the lottery case.29 One case to take into specific considera-

tion is the “Heartbreaker” example. According to the literature, the Heartbreaker is an instance of

an inductive operation and is universally agreed upon to end in knowledge.30 The only problem

is no one knows how it does. The Heartbreaker case is brought up by Vogel and Greco.

Heartbreaker. Sixty golfers are entered in the Wealth and Privilege Invitational Tourna-ment. The course has a short but difficult hole, known as the “Heartbreaker.” Before the round begins, you think that, surely, not all sixty players will get a hole-in-one on the Heartbreaker. (Vogel, “Enduring Trouble”, 132)

Vogel sums the objection up fairly nicely. “I [Vogel] think you know that not all the players will

get a hole-in-one. But what if, by a startling coincidence, your belief turned out to be false? You

would still have believed (on the basis of your actual evidence31) that not all golfers will get a

hole-in-one when they play the Heartbreaker. The tracking account goes wrong here. It has the

28 Dewey, Logic, 426, 476-77. “It should be evident, without argument, that any theory which fails to take as basic in its conception of induction experimental operations of transformation of given objects of perception, and institu-tion of new orders of data, is radically defective” (426). In Dewey’s theory the lottery example constitutes a predic-tion made on the basis of mathematical frequency-distributions with no existentially descriptive value. In other words, the probability of the lottery does not describe what will happen in the lottery drawing. Induction is only at-tained in reference to a known, existential problem the particulars of which suggest possible solutions to the prob-lem. I have no intention, however, of attempting to claim the easy victory by simply dismissing the analytics’ idea of induction as wrongly construed and undeveloped. 29 Greco, “Worries”, 300. 30 See Vogel, “Enduring Trouble”, 132., Greco, “Worries”, 301. There are many others. 31 I do not know what Vogel means by evidence here but apparently he does.

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consequence that you don’t know something you do know.”32 It appears that Vogel has a point,

since there is nothing to suggest that it is impossible for all the golfers to make a hole-in-one be-

side the probabilistic odds. Impossibility is not even “stipulated” in this case. The point is, to the

contrary, that Vogel is intuitively choosing to call the Heartbreaker an instance of knowledge

despite the fact that all the golfers could make the hole-in-one. In the event that the Heartbreaker

case did result in all of the golfers getting a hole-in-one, we would have had a false belief and

thus our belief would not be sensitive. It is now important to mention that Vogel does not explic-

itly state that the Heartbreaker is a case of inductive knowledge even though it is treated as such

by Greco. Its analogy is the lottery example.33 It seems to have features of induction, however,

when compared to Greco’s lottery case because Greco covertly embeds induction in with prob-

ability. It is obvious the case also has very unlikely odds that are treated as the only reference for

belief evaluation. Note that sensitivity does not, and cannot provide a reason for determining

why knowledge is desirable in this case or how the Heartbreaker is different in any way from

both Greco’s and Pritchard’s lottery cases, in both of which sensitivity wastes little time in de-

termining that knowledge is simply impossible in cases of highly unlikely events. What is so dif-

ferent about this case that it is a priori assumed to contain knowledge? Why is the intuition about

knowledge in this case different in the sense that it works against the probability and the modal

indications of sensitivity? At the very least, the Heartbreaker example calls into question the

adequacy of sensitivity to deal with probabilistic scenarios. Do they constitute knowledge or not?

If so, how? If not, why not? These questions remain unanswered in the analytic literature.

Dewey, however, can once again step up to clarify the issues in play.

32 Vogel, “Enduring Trouble”, 132. Note the explicit statement of using a recognized private intuition to now con-demn instead of justify the modal outcome of the sensitivity principle as in Pritchard’s case. Considering that ana-lytic epistemology has never produced anything even remotely close to a consensual, widely agreed upon theory of knowledge, I think it is fair for me to say that Vogel is on thin ground here. 33 Greco, “Worries”, 300. See also, Vogel, “Enduring Trouble”, 132.

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In actuality the Heartbreaker is an instance of probability. That does not mean, however,

that it is exactly like the lottery case. The lottery case brings out the fact that mathematical prob-

ability theory cannot provide descriptions of what actually takes place in reality. The Heart-

breaker is slightly different in that it is a case of probability determined by interpreting past ob-

servable phenomenon with abstract, statistical relations; it takes into account past events to make

a proposition about future occurrences. This is different than the lottery example because, as is

already established, the odds of the lottery are produced by mathematical theory which does not

imply or take into consideration any aspect of the operation of the world. The Heartbreaker does

take the prior operation of the world into account. I would argue this aspect of the heartbreaker is

what leads to the intuition that it results it knowledge as opposed to the lottery case. This is not

explicit realized by the analytic literature, but, otherwise, how would the knowledge-positive in-

tuition be justified in superseding the knowledge-negative outcome of the sensitivity principle

when the sensitivity principle falls in line with the intuition in the lottery case? Predictions about

the weather are almost analogous to the Heartbreaker example in the way they are propositions

involving past occurrences interpreted by a formal set of abstract relations.

I now turn to another kind of proposition . . . in that (1) it is based upon definite data of observation which, moreover, are gathered and ordered with special reference to institu-tion of a proposition as to the probability of a specified event; and in that (2) the data are ordered and interpreted by means of explicit conceptual, or theoretical, propositions. The prediction of the probability of the kind of which tomorrow’s weather will be is an exem-plary specimen. The data in this case are provided by observation of existing conditions with respect to such matters as temperature, direction and velocity of winds, rain and clouds, over a wide range of territory and for a long period of time. The significance of the data thus obtained, what they point to, does not, however, reside in [those] mere facts in their isolation. They are ordered in relation to one another by a systematized concep-tual structure (of which the conception of areas of high and low pressure is an instance), while the indicative force of the data thus ordered is determined by certain physical laws, of which formulae regarding relations of heat, pressure and motion are examples. (Dewey, Theory of Inquiry, 473)

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The Heartbreaker example is slightly less complicated and slightly less regimented than what

predictions of the weather involve.34 In the Heartbreaker, the past observations at work in the

example are of the frequency of holes-in-one over a “wide range” of circumstantial conditions

like weather, course description, length of the fairway, etc. Those observations are then “or-

dered”. In the Heartbreaker, the conception of difficulty could be a conception used to order how

the scores of golfers and rates of holes-in-one relate to the hole in question as in the saying “a

difficult hole.” Physical laws like the law of gravity and those of Newtonian physics are most

likely the ones in play in the “indicative force” of the ordering of the data. Those laws indicate

that the hole has physical characteristics that have made it “difficult” in the past.

These physical laws have the form of universal propositions since their content is an in-terrelation of abstract characters. No one would dream of supposing that as such they “imply” the state of weather that will probably be found the next day in some specified area. They are not descriptive but instrumental. They are operatively applied, in the first place, in deciding the special sort of data to be observationally procured – the particular occurrences that are to be discriminated out of the total welter of events actually occur-ring; and, in the second place, in interpretation of what the recorded events signify. . . . While the proposition is about a singular [event], frequency-distributions of conjunctions that have been observed in the past are the decisive factor in determining the special ap-plication of conceptual material to the case in hand. (Dewey, Logic, 473)

The laws are not what make the hole “difficult”. The fact that it has proven difficult in the past is

what determines the hole’s difficulty. The laws are instrumental devices that are used to express

predictions and explain the ordering of past phenomena. They apply to the future in an instru-

mental sense that may indicate the functional “need” for an umbrella. The need, however, is not

generated by how those laws abstractly interact for the interaction of the laws themselves are

34 Predicting the weather is an almost scientific affair today involving, in some cases in studies of climate change, supercomputers and very highly refined mathematical models. In the over fifty years since the publication of Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, the radical refinement of weather prediction goes to show the acuity of Dewey’s view. There are more past observations to consider in our predictions along with infinitely more refined abstract formulas of rela-tions. Dewey’s case is also held up by the seeming inability of scientists to reach a consensus about future climate change. It is naturally the case that the statistical consideration of past holes-in-one is of a much more crude order. That fact is evident in how it is necessarily the case that weather affects the flight of a golf ball and the scores of golfers, but the circumstantial inspection of these elements is never analyzed to the extent in meteorology.

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based a fortiori on prior existential conditions. There are no laws which necessarily determine

what is possible in golf. There are laws which explain what is pertinent to what has happened in

golf and provide the basis for instrumental predictions of what could happen, but what could

happen is only probabilistic in nature. That “is due to the fact that the data (here and in any case)

are existential events and qualities discriminately selected from out of a total existential percep-

tual field; selected on the ground of their evidential value with respect to a special problem – that

of determining what will take place at some specified time and place.”35 Because our perceptual

field is necessarily limited to the past and present in the instrumental predictions of what may

happen in the future, there can be upsets in what takes place in actuality. The same is true of the

Heartbreaker case. Nothing in the past necessarily implies what will occur in the future and the

very sense in which we can think of things as being “likely” in the future in cases like the Heart-

breaker is based on the past. A great example of surprising future outcomes in golf came when

Tiger Woods started doing things in golf that no one had ever done before. If what had happened

in golf before Tiger Woods dictated what would necessarily happen during his lifespan, then Ti-

ger Woods would not have broken so many records or become arguably the best golfer who ever

lived. If someone had asked the top golf experts, the top physicists and the top biologists at the

time about what the best golfer would look like, how he would hit the ball and what kind of

scores he would make, the predictions would probably look fairly laughable compared to what

actually took place in golf in the early 2000s. It is entirely possible that the Heartbreaker chal-

lenge is met as it is stated in the example and therefore there is no absolute certainty about what

will occur. For the “probability coefficient is rooted in the nature of the existential conditions,

not in the attitude of the inquirer towards them.”36 With that stated, I do not know why Vogel has

35 Dewey, Logic, 474. 36 Dewey, Logic, 474.

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the intuition that the Heartbreaker results in knowledge except to say that he is unknowingly im-

porting past existential occurrences into his intuition and therefore thinks that we can “know”

that no one will nail the Heartbreaker in the example even though he seems to recognize the

Heartbreaker is not theoretically or practically impossible. I, presume, as it is not clear in the ex-

ample, it just hasn’t been done before. Above all, the example stands as an instance where the

private intuition of a philosopher supersedes the modal indication of the sensitivity principle. The

justification for that is not clear in the literature and therefore problematic.37

Past occurrences have to do with another example of induction Vogel brings up to criti-

cize sensitivity theory called the “Uranium Case.”

Uranium. Roger places a piece of uranium on a photographic plate, and discovers that the plate has become fogged. He repeats the experiment many times. Roger knows, by induc-tion, that the newly exposed plate is now fogged, even before he inspects it.38 (Vogel, “Enduring Trouble”, 131)

Vogel argues sensitivity cannot handle the Uranium case because Roger would “know” that the

plate was fogged even if it weren’t. This is because Roger has repeatedly seen that the plate fogs

up in the past. Sensitivity says that Roger only knows if he doesn’t believe that the plate is

fogged when it isn’t. “But Roger knows the plate is fogged even though R is false. If the plate

weren’t fogged, Roger would believe falsely that the plate was fogged. R is false, yet Roger

knows. The Uranium case is therefore a counterexample to the tracking account. In the same

37 One may say that predictions about the weather are not analogous to predictions about the Heartbreaker because they are much more refined. The result is the same when the example is made similar. “It is a simpler matter to pre-dict the occurrence of an event in the case of an astronomical phenomenon like an eclipse of the moon than it is of tomorrow’s weather in, say, San Francisco. For in the former case, it is easier to select certain conditions as relevant to the inferred proposition and to rule out others as irrelevant. . . . But nonetheless there is a certain arbitrary or con-tigent element in the case of the proposition about the time and place of an eclipse. For, to take an extreme example, there is no theoretical justification for the proposition that the moon will even be in existence at the time to which the prediction occurs. The probability that it will be in existence is of a very high order. But there is no logical ne-cessity in the matter” (Dewey, Logic, 474). Pritchard’s peculiar response: “. . . it is not lucky that the sun rose this morning. . .” (Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 129). 38 I want to mention for any readers not acquainted with the literature that I did, in fact, quote the entire example.

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fashion, much if not all knowledge via induction is inconsistent with the tracking condition.”39 I

cannot find any reason to disagree with Vogel on these points speaking in the verse of analytic

epistemology except to point out that his intuition about the Uranium case directly contradicts

the direction of the sensitivity theory and I am left wondering what the methodological basis is

for placing subjective intuition in front of a theoretical construct. There is no discussion of that

fact in the literature. I argue the concealed basis for overriding the sensitivity principle in this

case is past experience or the historical precedent of the plate being fogged, similar to the his-

torical precedents at work in the Heartbreaker. It seems that because induction using the past in-

volves a predictive element and there is always room for the actual world to deviate from the

predictions that induction makes based on past experience without getting into very, very serious

and very flawed Laplacian deterministic ontology which would necessarily render induction, or

what the analytics are calling induction, effectively nonexistent.40 This seems to be the point that

sensitivity theory and the analytics have a difficult time accounting for. It is noteworthy in this

instance that Vogel chooses to make the historical precedent of the plate being fogged a founda-

tion for knowledge.

Can safety fair any better with intuitive knowledge based on historical precedent? Safety

can treat induction sufficiently and preserve it as a case of knowledge if it is placed “modally far

away” in the possible-worlds theory. Pritchard presents the “Chute” example to demonstrate that

safety theory does not have problem with ordinary instances of knowledge while remaining

compatible with the Pritchard lottery example.

CHUTE: Ernie drops a bag of rubbish into the garbage chute next to his high-rise apart-ment, and a few moments later forms the true belief that the rubbish is now in the base-ment. The rubbish cute is in fact very reliable in this regard -- indeed, it has never failed to deliver rubbish to the basement, over a long history -- and it is well maintained and

39 Vogel, “Enduring Trouble”, 132. 40 For a rebuttal of a Laplacian model of the universe see Dewey’s essay, “Time and Individuality”.

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serviced. Ernie knows about all this. Moreover, there is nothing amiss with the rubbish chute on this occasion, nor any reason for Ernie to worry about the reliability of the rub-bish chute in this specific instance. (Pritchard, “Anti-luck”, 175-76)

Pritchard wants to maintain that Ernie has inductive knowledge in this case. “Inuitively, Ernie

has knowledge in this case. Indeed, if Ernie doesn’t have knowledge, then it would appear that

inductive knowledge is very hard to come by, since Ernie’s inductive basis for his true belief is

about as good as an inductive basis can be.”41 Similar to the Uranium case, his belief that the

garbage makes it down to the basement is insensitive “in that if the rubbish hadn’t made it to the

basement for some reason – had it somehow snagged on something on the way down, say – then

Ernie would continue to believe . . .” that the garbage made it down.42 The belief is insensitivity,

but not unsafe, says Pritchard. The belief is an instance of knowledge in safety theory because

the possible world where the garbage snags is a much farther away than, say, the possible world

where one wins a lottery. “We noted earlier that on the face of it we would imagine a version of

the CHUTE case where it was plausible that there be some nearby possible worlds were Ernie

forms his belief on the same inductive basis and yet believes falsely. I think that’s right, but no-

tice that such error had better not be taking place in very close possible worlds, which is what

happens in the LOTTERY case. . . .”43 For Pritchard, the obvious conclusion is to simply make

sure that the reason for Ernie’s belief being false is placed in a modally far away possible world

(making it less lucky) and that negates the possibility that safety theory would produce a non-

knowledge result in the CHUTE case as in the LOTTERY case. “So construed, however, we can

allow that Ernie has knowledge without this causing problems for our diagnosis of the LOT-

TERY case. In particular, allowing that Ernie has knowledge under this reading of CHUTE is

41 Pritchard, “Anti-luck”, 176. 42 Pritchard, “Anti-luck”, 176. 43 Pritchard, “Anti-luck”, 180.

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entirely compatible with claiming that Lottie lacks knowledge [in the LOTTERY case].”44 Note

that there is no consideration of how history plays into the formation of the belief in the Chute

example besides the perfunctory instance in the example itself (“The rubbish chute is very reli-

able . . . it has never failed . . . over a long history”). The fact that a historical precedent is a part

of the belief formation is undeniable, however. Likewise, the fact that both Vogel and Pritchard

want to maintain that beliefs formed on the basis of historical precedent are instances of knowl-

edge is evident as well. Pritchard is reluctant, however, to go as far as Vogel does in saying that

we could “know” something when it isn’t true. Pritchard peculiarly denies the priority of the his-

torical precedent in play in Ernie’s belief when his belief becomes “just too lucky”.

[S]uppose the reason for the error is that there is an imperfection in the shaft of the chute such that the rubbish very nearly snags on it each time (but so far hasn’t). In this case the error in question would be modally very close, and thus analogous to the degree of modal closeness of error when it comes to Lottie’s belief. Crucially, however, on this reading of the example I take it that there is no longer any reason to think that Ernie has knowledge, since his cognitive success is just too lucky. Safety thus delivers the same result both in this case and the Lottie case. (Pritchard, “Anti-luck”, 181)

According to Vogel, however, there is reason for thinking that Ernie has knowledge and that is

precisely in the sense in which his belief is too luckily false. In Vogel’s treatment of induction he

seems to focus more on the historical precedents at work in the formation of belief. In Pritchard’s

case the historical precedent is used only to the extent that it delivers modally satisfactory results

despite the fact, like Greco states, that inductive basis is taken as “about as good as can be.”

There is a tension in how Pritchard treats the historical aspect of induction.

Pritchard thinks that he can handle the [Chute] case by disambiguating with respect to an important detail. Specifically we can ask whether the garbage bag gets hung up in close worlds. If the answer is no, then there is a relevant difference with the Lottery Case: S’s belief now satisfies the safety condition and we can say that S knows. If the answer is yes, however, then according to Pritchard we lose the intuition that S knows in the case. Either way, Pritchard argues, his safety condition gives us the right result. (Greco, “Wor-ries”, 300.)

44 Pritchard, “Anti-luck”, 181.

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Greco argues that Pritchard’s distinction does not hold up when compared with cases like the

Heartbreaker. The Uranium case is also similar. This comparison is justified by the fact that the

cases are similar in the way “there is a very close world where a highly improbable possibility is

actual.”45 Greco argues the lottery problem remains through Pritchard’s formulation of safety

because in the strong formulation of safety, knowledge is not possible in any of the above exam-

ples which is contrary to intuition in the cases of the Chute, Heartbreaker and Uranium. In the

weak formulation of safety, all of the examples produce knowledge which is contrary to intuition

in the lottery case.46 I agree with Greco’s analysis to the extent that it makes Pritchard’s treat-

ment of the Chute case problematic, especially when compared with Vogel’s intuition in the

Uranium case and the Heartbreaker. Ernie’s belief in the Chute example is apparently formed on

the exact same basis when it is very lucky as it is when it isn’t very lucky. Intuition says that his

belief, as it is formed in the first instance is an instance of knowledge. In the second instance

safety theory modally indicates that Ernie’s belief is too lucky and “analogous” to the lottery ex-

ample to be knowledge. What is going on here?

According to Dewey and Pritchard’s consideration of the lottery case we know that the

Chute and Lottery case are not congruous. In fact, they can’t be congruous in the sense in which

Ernie necessarily cannot reflect on the probabilities involved in the operation of the garbage

chute, and, even if he could, those probabilities would not have any inductive value as to his be-

lief formation that belongs in a serious philosophical discussion.47 In fact, there are embedded

differences in almost every single example in this paper which are overlooked by the analytics;

one more is now introduced. Not only are the Chute and lottery cases not congruous on the issue

45 Greco, 301. 46 Greco, 301. 47 See page 10 and 16, note 28.

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of probability, they are not congruous on the issue of historical precedent. In the Chute case, his-

torical precedent is operating to form the basis of the intuition that such a case leads to knowl-

edge. The operation of historical precedent is not analogous to the statistical aspect of the Heart-

breaker, however. The Chute case is an instance of what Dewey calls apprehension. It is tradi-

tionally taken to be “immediate knowledge.” This is also the same for the Uranium case.

But “knowledge” also means understanding, and an object, or an act (and its object) that may be – and has been called apprehension. I can understand what the word and idea of centaur, sea-serpent, transmutation of chemical elements, mean, without thereby knowing them in the sense of having grounds for asserting their existence. No intelligent search for a new invention, no controlled inquiry to discover whether a certain conception of, say, the nature of atoms is or is not borne out by the facts, can be conducted without a direct grasp or understanding of some idea. As the very description of this kind of “knowledge” shows, it is not knowledge in the sense of justified assertion that a state of existence is thus-and-so. It is easy, however, as the history of philosophy illustrates, to carry over the first meaning into the second. Since the first is direct or immediate when it occurs, it is assumed that the second also has the same properties. Just as, after considerable experi-ence, we understand meanings directly, as when we hear conversation on a familiar sub-ject or read a book, so because of experience we come to recognize objects on sight. I see or note directly that this is a typewriter, that is a book, the other thing is a radiator, etc. This kind of direct “knowledge” I shall call apprehension; it is seizing or grasping, intel-lectually, without questioning. But it is a product, mediated through certain organic mechanisms of retention and habit, and it presupposes prior experiences and mediated conclusions drawn from them. (Dewey, “Logic”, 144.)

The Chute and Uranium cases are perfect examples of apprehension in the Deweyan sense.48

There is an acquaintance built up over time with an object in question, either a garbage chute or a

foggy plate. Inference is made upon this acquaintance and a belief is formed. In some cases in

the analytic literature, like in Vogel, private intuition affirms that operation as resulting in

48 The way that the analytic literature calls them instances of “induction” is based on an outdated notion of induction based on Aristotelian logic. “It has become traditional to repeat the statement that induction goes from particulars to the general and deduction from the general to the particulars. The extent to which these conceptions are valid, i.e, in harmony with scientific practice is not critically examined. The result too frequently is that actual scientific proce-dure is forced into the straightjacket of irrelevant preconceptions. . . . The traditional and still current conceptions of induction are derived from Aristotelian logic, which, as has been shown, was a systemization of logical forms on the basis of certain cosmological beliefs. Since the actual progress of scientific inquiry has led to an abandonment of these underlying beliefs concerning the structure of Nature, it might be antecedently expected that the doctrines about induction and deduction, which are found in Aristotelian logic, will be so irrelevant to existing scientific prac-tice as to be the source of confusion and uncertainty when they are employed as rubrics of interpretation. Discussion will not, however, be based upon this antecedent probability” (Dewey, Logic”, 419-20).

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knowledge no matter what. In some cases, like Pritchard, intuition is problematically reserved

only for those cases that are likely to result in an affirmation of the belief in the actual world.

How is it plausible to evaluate belief on how it was formed in one instance and, in another in-

stance, on the basis that belief is false and “too lucky” even though it was formed on the same

basis? We either need to take intuition primary in these cases, or not. Better yet, we should inves-

tigate what is operating in the formation of these intuitions so that we can understand what is at

stake in them and if they are valid. The intuition is built upon the realization that immediate

knowledge in the Deweyan form of acquaintance or apprehension has operative value. It works

and exists. The problem is apprehension and acquaintance are considered in ways that make it

desirable for them to indicate what is factually the case about the world. This jump is made when

the literature is faced with the implication of condemning knowledge status of all belief formed

on the basis of historical precedent and familiarity which it clearly does not want to do.49

There are two problems involved in such an intuition. One is more rudimentary and more

indicative of a certain kind of attitude. The fact that this attitude is not fully embraced by Prit-

chard or Vogel shows the shallow consideration of their own intuitions when placed alongside

the second problem.

[T]he important point . . . is that either an immediate overt response occurs, like using a typewriter or picking up the book (in which cases the situation is not a cognitional one), or that the object directly noted is part of an act of inquiry directed toward knowledge as warranted assertion. In the latter case, the fact of immediate apprehension is no logical guarantee that the object or event directly apprehended is that part of the “facts of the case” it is prima facie taken to be. There is no warrant for assuming that it is evidential with respect to the final assertion to be reached. . . . In other words, immediate apprehen-sion of an object of event is no more identical with knowledge in the logical sense re-quired than is immediate understanding or comprehension of a meaning. (Dewey, Logic, 144)

49 See Pritchard’s reluctant and sorrowful treatment of induction. “The choice is thus between the possibility of knowledge and the useful employment of our epistemic practices on one hand, and the guarantee of no knowledge and no useful employment of our epistemic practices on the other” (Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 244).

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Strictly and sympathetically speaking, neither Pritchard nor Vogel want to take the apprehension

of an object like a foggy plate or garbage chute as evidence of what its actual state is at a given

time. This is evidenced by Pritchard and Vogel’s recognitions that the plate may not be fogged,

that the garbage may not fall all the way down and that the Heartbreaker could happen. There is

still the odd sense that Vogel wants to say knowledge still exists when the plate is not fogged and

when the Heartbreaker does happen. This is likely a manifestation of the intuitions involved in

saying that we can have knowledge of the Heartbreaker in other instances of induction. This is

problematic in two ways. One is the sense of how a conception of knowledge like that could ever

be construed because it would undermine the very doctrine of “immediate knowledge” that all of

the other considerations of “induction” in this paper seek to preserve. Thus, the other, more seri-

ous breach in the move made by Vogel is the sense in which familiarity with an object and its

behavior is somehow taken as praiseworthy of knowledge in and of itself when it is 1) divorced

from any kind of conclusive confirmation through inquiry and 2) in itself recognized not to nec-

essarily imply what is factually the case in the world.

Acquaintance-knowledge has a directness and intimacy lacking in knowledge-about. The latter can only be expressed in propositions that certain things are so-and-so. The former is expressed in actual commerce with an individual. . . . The immediacy [in acquaintance-knowledge] involved is that of intimate connection with emotion and ability to act. In the first place, acquaintance-knowledge is not primitive, but acquired, and in so far depends upon prior experiences into which mediation has entered. In the second place (and of more importance for the present point) acquaintance-knowledge is frequently not knowl-edge in the sense of being warrantably assertible. It enables us to form practical expecta-tions which are perhaps often fulfilled. But the familiarity that attends acquaintanceship often blinds us to things of primary importance in reaching conclusions. Acquaintance with certain habits of speech is no guarantee against blunders and solecisms; it may be their source. From a logical point of view acquaintance-knowledge is subject to critical inquiry and revision. As a rule, it invites it. (Dewey, Logic, 151-52)

Vogel traps knowledge in a void between a conception that takes simple acquaintance to be

enough evidence to guarantee how things are and a conception that relies on inquiry based on

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simple acquaintance and subsequent revision of the nature of that acquaintance in a view of

knowledge that is based on reaching a conclusion. Does he really mean to suggest that we still

know the plate is fogged once we go into the room and see that it isn’t?50 Surely not. Does he

mean, then, that acquaintance gives us everything we need for knowledge? No, because Vogel

recognizes that what we are acquainted with can change like when the Heartbreaker happens and

the plate is not fogged. We get to this increasingly absurd position from the literature taking less

and less rigorous forms of historical precedent and familiarity increasingly more seriously as a

legitimate basis of knowledge when it should be taken less seriously, doing so all the while under

the false and superficial understanding that the form of “inductive knowledge” under considera-

tion in the Chute and Uranium cases is analogous to the Lottery and Heartbreaker cases. There is

familiarity working within all of the cases in which knowledge is intuited: in belief formed in

reference to the reliable newspaper in the lottery example, in Greco’s lottery example, in the

Heartbreaker, and in the Uranium and Chute cases. Sometimes the precedent is taken very seri-

ously, as in Vogel, and knowledge is intuited to exist even when the historical basis of it is coun-

terfactually established to give a false result. Dewey was able in the cases above to tease out the

historical aspects operating in each case and uncover differences ignored by their analytic con-

sideration. In Pritchard’s lottery example, which was devoid of historical reference in the sense

that it misplaces the evaluation of belief onto probability, he was able to give an explanatory

framework that explained why and how the intuitions worked with the sensitivity and safety

theories in that case. Finally, we have come to kinds of examples that the analytic literature con-

siders intuitive examples of knowledge on the basis of rudimentary acquaintance and familiarity

like the Chute and Uranium cases. Pragmatically, it is already established that this is problematic

50 A very interesting question would be what Roger would know if he sometimes saw the plate was fogged and sometimes saw that it wasn’t. In other words, what would Roger “know” if he did see the plate wasn’t fogged even though he “knew” it was fogged beforehand?

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through Vogel’s mysterious and untenable notion of knowledge. To drive the point home on

strictly analytic terms let us look at another type of example where familiarity is in similar opera-

tion but the intuitive judgment of the case is very different.

In the Uranium and Chute examples, the level of familiarity and acquaintance is fairly

easy to see at work. It is even overtly established in the Uranium example and implicitly recog-

nized by the Chute example. There is another example in the literature, however, where this is

not the case even though historical precedent and familiarity are employed in an identical fashion

to the Uranium and Chute cases. The example is called the “barn-façade” example.

In this example we are asked to consider the epistemic status of Henry’s true belief that there is a barn before him. The twist in the tale is that although Henry happens to be look-ing at a genuine barn, he is currently in ‘Barn Façade County’ where, unbeknownst to him, all the other barns are fake. Furthermore, the ‘fake’ barns are such good fakes that Henry would not have been able to tell the difference simply by looking at them in the way that he looked at the real barn. Hence, had he happened to have looked at one of the many fake barns surrounding him rather than the real one, then he would have formed a false belief in this regard rather than a true one. Intuitively, although Henry has a true be-lief based (by hypothesis) on impeccable evidence, it is not an instance of knowledge. (Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 162.)

Pritchard states that the case is not, intuitively, a case of knowledge. He explains this intuition

using the safety theory “by noting that there are going to be a great many nearby possible worlds

where Henry forms the same belief on the same basis (by simply looking at the ‘barns’) and yet

his belief is false.”51 That makes his belief too lucky for knowledge in safety theory. Likewise,

his belief is not sensitive because his belief is formed in the same way when it is false as it is

when it is true. No one bothers to ask the simple question, “Why is this the case?” Why does

Henry do that? He forms his belief in the same way looking at the identical fake and real barns

because he is acquainted with what a barn is and how it looks. He is acquainted in the same way

that Ernie is acquainted with the garbage chute and Roger with the Uranium plate. The intuitions

51 Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 162.

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in both of those cases were always that they resulted in knowledge. We know from the prior

Deweyan analysis those intuitions had to be formed in virtue of historical acquaintance built up

over time. Now, we have a case where acquaintance is entirely ignored even though it would be

an absurdity to think that it is not in operation leading to yet another contradictory ad hoc intui-

tion. For the sake of consistency and the avoidance of complete absurdity, the analytics must

consider this case as identical to the Uranium and Chute cases. When the barn case is taken for

what it is, which is an instance of belief formed by inference on the basis of simple familiarity

and acquaintance, we see that the intuition in this case should necessarily be that the barn façade

case results in knowledge no matter what barn Henry looks at. I do not imagine that there is any

analytic epistemologist who would want to do that. Furthermore, it was already established dur-

ing the consideration of Vogel’s notion of knowledge that making acquaintance into a case of

knowledge as something that is divorced from inquiry while taking into account the flimsy basis

of its formation is absurd. On the other hand, if we are to avoid those problems, follow Pritchard

and artificially evaluate the belief formed based on its luckiness, we see that we should, as Greco

points out, abandon not only the barn façade case as a case of knowledge, but also the Uranium

case, the Chute case and the Heartbreaker case and arguably all other cases of induction. With-

out finer-grained philosophy, such as that of John Dewey, it is either all or nothing. Both are

equally undesirable and actually untenable in analytic epistemology.

In conclusion, the way that the analytic epistemologists rely on intuition in the examples

and arguments examined in this paper is not only confusing, but also contradictory and some-

times absurd. When the analytic literature came up short as to certain problems or differences

unaccounted for like in the lottery cases, Dewey was used to clarify the issues involved and force

the analytic literature forward. In doing so, the weight and force of Dewey’s work on knowledge

Barron 34

was obliquely made clear and justified as useful in this paper. Other issues in the literature be-

came obvious as the paper progressed using the clarifications justifiably introduced by Dewey. It

was demonstrated that the analytic literature had no resources to deal with the plentiful and obvi-

ous problems that emerged as a result of introducing Dewey to help the literature on its own

terms. Dewey then continued to provide astute diagnoses of those issues as they became apparent

and continued to provide clarification as needed. When these diagnoses were brought to bear on

the literature considered in this paper, more deep problems and hidden, problematic forces like

intuition were revealed at work in the literature. These problems were not simply recycled prag-

matic indictments of analytic epistemology. They, instead, resided squarely in the analytic litera-

ture and sloppy, insecure methodology itself, which then, due to irresponsibly employed and un-

critically examined private choice in the form of intuition, collapsed on itself like a house of

cards.

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Works Cited

Dewey, John. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938.

Dewey, John. Experience and Nature. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008.

Greco, John. "Worries about Pritchard's Safety." Synthese. no. 2 (2007): 299-302.

Greco, John. “Better Safe than Sensitive”. The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. Edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Pritchard, Duncan. “In Defence of Modest Anti-luck Epistemology”. The Sensitivity Principle in

Epistemology. Edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Vogel, Jonathan. “The Enduring Trouble with Tracking.” The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemol-

ogy. Edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Pritchard, Duncan. Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press, 1981.