Student number ID: 00409034

Module: Security Networks, Intelligence and Internal

Security

Critically analyse the benefits and dangers of

international intelligence liaison.  Use examples to

illustrate your answer.

International Intelligence liaison has become an

important discussed subject among academics, politicians,

and practitioners. As Adam Svendsen has argued: ‘Liaison

today represents the most significant dimension of

intelligence.’1 While global intelligence liaison is a

static phenomenon, its significance has been highlighted

as a result of 9/11, followed by the proclamation and

implementation of the so-called doctrine of ‘War on

Terror’ against the ‘Axis of Evil.’2 Intelligence liaison

has become a globalized phenomenon. In other words, the

current transition from a unipolar world, with America as

the only hegemon, to a multipolar world has produced some

major challenges regarding relationships within the

international system. If intelligence is seen as a tool

to gain power or security, this transition has resulted

in a strong need from countries to make alliances in

order to overcome and successfully respond to existing or1 Adam Svendsen, ‘Connecting Intelligence and Theory: IntelligenceLiaison and International Relations’, in Intelligence and National Security,2009, Vol. 24, Nr. 5, p. 700.2 Wyn Rees, ‘Securing the Homelands: Transatlantic Cooperation afterBush’, in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2009, Vol. 11,Nr. 1, pp. 109-110.

emerging threats. This need for global intelligence

liaison can be observed by looking at western societies’

policies, discussions, and actions against particular

terrorist groups such as ISIS or Al-Qaeda. Nevertheless,

while assessing the cases of international intelligence

cooperation, it can be observed that the historical

records are mostly focused on western countries such as

United Kingdom, United States, or New Zealand.3 It is for

this reason that global intelligence liaison is a new

phenomenon; while, its implications, these days, are

global. Despite its increasing importance, intelligence

liaison has demonstrated itself to be a non-static

phenomenon. The reason is that in different periods of

time the idea of international intelligence liaison was

either embraced or neglected by actors. Nevertheless, in

the current context the advantages and the disadvantages

of international intelligence cooperation are more

diverse than they used to be last century. As a result,

the essay will have the following structure. First, the

essay will illustrate the advantages of global

intelligence liaison. Additionally, the effects of the

privatisation of intelligence, the new campaign against

terrorism, and global SIGINT cooperation will be

discussed. Secondly, the essay will examine the

disadvantages of the global intelligence liaison. In

addition, the risks caused by different domestic

legislation regarding the liaison material, different

3 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Transatlantic Intelligence and SecurityCooperation’, in International Affairs, 2004, Vol. 80, Nr. 4, p. 751.

perspectives on threats, and different positions of the

actors towards accountability and transparency will be

addressed. In the end, the essay will conclude that

global intelligence liaison can be achieved by working

with secret agencies, where opportunities should not be

wasted and where the risks from the persisting dangers

must be significantly diminished.

The benefits of international intelligence cooperation

One reason for intelligence cooperation is that

there is always more information potentially available in

the world than any agency can collect by itself.4 Similar

to this idea, not all the states are using the same

collection tools for gathering intelligence material. It

is commonly known that the western states tend to rely on

SIGINT, while those states without the necessary

resources have chosen to focus only on HUMINT (Human

Intelligence). For example, the 9/11 Commission has

stated that: ‘USA [a priori the invasion of Iraq 2003] has

inclined to rely mainly on IMINT and SIGINT; while HUMINT

was significantly neglected.’5 Therefore, by working with

partners the intelligence material collected will be

increased, while the techniques employed will vary and

will more efficiently be used. The advantage of this

4 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power In Peace and War, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1996, p. 204.5 The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 334-336, vide http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report. pdf [Accessed on 21th February2015].

intelligence cooperation is that belligerents will fill

the void. As Bill Duff has argued during a class lecture

at Salford University: ‘Nowadays, in a globalized world,

local expertise has become one of the most important

components in producing the accurate intelligence product

for dissemination.’6 Focusing on USA, it is not enough for

its intelligence services to have the most advanced high-

tech equipment as an information source; they also have

to take into consideration that information, which could

not have been collected without HUMINT.

Sharing intelligence as information between liaison

partners reduces fog of the war7 and decides the outcome of a

battle. In other words, the advantage of international

intelligence liaison, for example during a military

confrontation, is that the actors involved can exchange

information, assessments, and products for understanding

and responding more efficiently against a particular

threat. The relevance of this mentioned advantage is that

the intelligence support received can place,

strategically speaking, the receiver actor in a better

position during a confrontation or a war. Take as an

example, the value of the intelligence shared between the

USA and UK during the Second World War. In fact, Allies

won the war because of the value of ULTRA, which had

played a significant role in sustaining Allied shipping

and impeding the transportation of Axis supplies across6 Bill Duff, ‘Avoiding the void’, Class lecture, at SalfordUniversity, Greater Manchester, 9th February 2015. 7 Gregory Elder, ‘Intelligence in War: It Can Be Decisive’, in Studies in Intelligence, 2007, Vol. 50, Nr. 2, p. 24.

the Mediterranean.8 Moreover, through ULTRA, UK and USA

were aware both of their own position, and of the

adversary’s interpretation of it. This knowledge,

compared to Axis states’ partial understanding, provided

the Allied forces with the opportunity to reroute their

naval armies and to preserve their lines of support to

their troops in North Africa.9 As these events have

demonstrated, international intelligence cooperation can

help the actors involved to understand and more

efficiently manage their troops and resources in

responding to a specific threat or enemy, as the Axis

Powers did for the Allied forces.

The resources available for the intelligence

services are limited and sometimes insufficient. As

Stéphane Lefebvre has stated in his article ‘no

intelligence service has all the resources - financial,

human, and technical - to be entirely self sufficient in

all areas.’10 Therefore, working with partners on similar

matters, the resources will be increased, while

simultaneously the intelligence coverage of the globe

will be expanded. A public declaration of the former head

of MI6 (Secret Intelligence Service) Sir John Sawers

highlighted the importance that sharing intelligence can

have, these days, within the realm of cyber-security.

8 Maria Robson, ‘Signals in the sea: the value of Ultra intelligencein the Mediterranean in World War II’, in Journal of Intelligence History,2014, Vol. 13, Nr. 2, p. 178.9 Ibidem, p. 179.10 Stéphane Lefebvre, ‘The Difficulties and Dilemmas of InternationalIntelligence Cooperation’, in International Journal of Intelligence andCounterIntelligence, 2nd February 2015, Vol. 16, Nr. 4, pp. 536-537.

Sawers emphasised one of the advantages of intelligence

liaison by declaring that: ‘Cooperation in technology and

in communications are vastly advantageous to our

economies and to our way of life and to family

cohesion.’11 It is for this reason that global

intelligence cooperation is the main imperative for

assuring security, protection, and integrity.

The advantage of intelligence liaison collaboration

is that actors involved can receive intelligence support

through which the receiver partner can identify its

organizational deficiencies and better manage its

activities. This collaboration form is similar to the

idea of sharing information, but in this case the liaison

is characterised by a dominant-subordinate pattern in

which the receiver partner is more dependent on the donor

than vice-versa.12 For example, this type of liaison was

obvious during the 1940s, when Britain offered

intelligence to America’s intelligence services with the

aim of what H. Bradford Westerfield entitled “the pre-

Pearl Harbor covert propaganda collaboration between MI6-

CIA and MI5-FBI.”13 The advantage of this support was also

11 Sir John Sawers apud ‘Ex-MI6 chief Sir John Sawers: We cannot stopterrorism unless we spy on innocent people’ in The Telegraph, 20th

January 2015, vide http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews /terrorism-in-the-uk/11356645/Ex-MI6-chief-Sir-John-Sawers-We-cannot-stop-terrorism-unless-we-spy-on-innocent-people.html [Accessed on 21th

February 2015]. 12 Jennifer E. Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, andDetails’, in International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 19,Nr. 6, pp. 197-198.13 H. Bradford Westerfield, ‘America and the world of intelligenceliaison’, in Intelligence and National Security, 1996, Vol. 11, Nr. 3, pp.532-534.

obvious through W. Churchill’s letter, in 1942, when he

advised President Roosevelt about the weaknesses of

America’s diplomatic codes that must urgently be

improved. As Churchill wrote: ‘From the moment when we

became allies […] the danger of our enemies having

achieved a measure of success cannot […] be [admitted].’14

In today’s context this information support has two

advantages, similar to what the example outlined has

indicated. First, the intelligence provided from another

agency, in this case United Kingdom’s agencies, helps the

partner agency, America, to better understand the

realities and organize a successful operation. In other

words, the relevance of this advantage is that America

can receive insight of an event that otherwise could have

been misinterpreted.15 Secondly, through this support the

receiver partner manages to identify its deficiencies in

order to undertake policies of improving the services of

its intelligence agencies. As professor Damon Wells has

argued: ‘[…] the USA-UK intelligence liaison is the main

reason why the Americans were appreciative, lastingly so,

and to a remarkable degree.’16

14 Stephen Budiansky, ‘The Difficult Beginnings of US-British Codebreaking Co-operation’, in David Stafford & Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones(eds.), American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939-2000, London: FRANKCASS, 2000, pp. 52-53.15 Eric Rosenbach, ‘Intelligence and International Cooperation’, inConfrontation of Collaboration in Congress and the Intelligence Community, July 2009,pp. 50-53, vide http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19153/intelligence_and_international_cooperation.html [Accessed on 21st February 2015]. 16 Damon Wells apud Westerfield, op. cit., p. 534.

The benefit of international intelligence liaison is

that it reduces the costs for high-tech equipment needed

by the intelligence agencies. Nowadays, SIGINT (signals

intelligence) satellites and their ground processing

facilities are extremely costly, especially if a global

coverage is needed. These huge costs, around 1 billion

dollars apiece, are obvious as a result of Britain’s

attempts to design its own SIGINT satellite, known as

Zircon. But the cost of owning such a satellite by the

GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) is simply

unaffordable. 17 Therefore, the United Kingdom agreed to

contribute to USA satellite programmes through developing

different technological platforms, human capital, and

investments. As a consequence, this arrangement provided

the UK with time-share operational control over a global

SIGINT satellite capability. The negative aspect of this

arrangement for UK is that the American secret

intelligence will remain the decisive actors in

positioning, targeting, and collecting information

through USA’s satellites.18 This dependency on USA’s

satellite capabilities is obvious by examining other

European states’ SIGINT capabilities, such as France or

Germany. However, in the context of the war on terrorism,

the existing intelligence liaison agreement is of great

17 Maciej Osowski, ‘EU-US intelligence sharing post 9/11: predictionsfor the future’, in E-International Relations Students, 8th March 2011, videhttp://www.e-ir.info/2011/03/08/eu-us-intelligence-sharing-post-911-predictions-for-the-future/ [Accessed on 21st February 2015].18 Martin Rudner, ‘Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence CoalitionAgainst Islamic Terrorism’, in International Journal of Intelligence andCounterIntelligence, 17th August 2010, Vol. 17, Nr. 2, pp. 200-201.

value even for USA taking into consideration the

weaknesses outlined by the Silberman-Robb Reports (2005)

regarding USA’s performances in areas such as HUMINT a

priori the invasion of Iraq in 2003.19 Therefore, if the

answer to the terrorism as a threat is global

intelligence liaison; then, the collaboration between USA

and other states is a necessity. As former intelligence

director of MI5, Dame Stella Rimington, has stated: ‘[…]

in a world where the threats get more sophisticated and

more global, the intelligence task gets more difficult,

and cooperation between intelligence allies is vital.’20

International intelligence cooperation helps actors,

such as super powers, to be present everywhere across the

globe.21 Even those states, such as USA or UK, with

overwhelming intelligence machinery in terms of resources

and capabilities still need liaison partners and

intelligence cooperation. Geographically speaking, it is

hard for a super power such as USA or UK to be present in

all the regions of the globe. As professor Barry Buzan

has stated in his works: ‘In todays’ context, it is

impossible to talk about a hegemon [as USA has proved to

be] that can intervene everywhere and at anytime across

the globe. [More precisely,] the world nowadays is

composed of regions with specific actors [states] within

19 Silberman-Robb Reports (2005) apud Mark Phythian, ‘The PerfectIntelligence Failure? U.S. Pre-War Intelligence on Iraqi Weapons ofMass Destruction’, in Politics & Policy, 2006, Vol. 34, Nr. 2, pp. 406-410.20 Dame Stella Rimington, Open Secret: The Autobiography of the Former DirectorGeneral of MI5, London: Hutchinson, 2001, p. 205. 21 Michael Herman, op. cit., p. 207.

those regions that can influence the interactions,

events, or respectively the dynamics of a particular

region.’22 Shortly, according to Barry Buzan’s

perspective, global intelligence similar to global

security can only be formed through world cooperation.

This can be only achieved by working with other actors,

which are located in different regions of the globe. It

is for this reason that the number of intelligence-

security partnerships has recently increased dramatically

in the world. In this sense, there are multifarious

examples of intelligence cooperation such as the NATO

Special Committee, the Club of Berne, the CAZAB Club, the

Kilowatt Group, UK-USA Agreement, or the Egmont Group of

Financial Intelligence Units. As Stéphane Lefebvre has

illustrated in his article regarding the need of

intelligence liaison: ‘Most intelligence agencies have

recently accepted the idea that their needs, goals, and

aims can be only accomplished by relying on allied

intelligence services to fill the void.’23

In a globalized context, intelligence liaison is an

advantage because in this way belligerents involved can

more successfully conduct and undertake special or

counter-intelligence operations. Even if the idea of

intelligence liaison is not something new for the

intelligence literature24, its importance has been22 Barry Buzan & Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of InternationalSecurity, London: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 40-51.23 Lefebvre, op. cit., p. 533.24 There are examples of intelligence liaison from the early stages ofhuman history such as the moment illustrated in the Old Testamentwhen Moses sent spies to gather information about the land of Canaan;

highlighted especially as a result of the globalization

of terrorist activities. As former DCI R. James Woolsey

has famously argued: ‘We live now in a jungle filled with

a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes.’25 The

statement is important because of two reasons. First, it

reveals in an indirect manner that the threats nowadays

have a different nature, fluctuating from the traditional

threats specific before 9/11 to those emerging in today’s

context. Secondly, it outlines that the answer to these

emerging threats is influenced by the intensity of global

intelligence cooperation amongst belligerents. As EU’s

Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, has

repeatedly emphasised: ‘The key to counter-terrorism is

the global [intelligence] liaison between actors.’26 In

essence, these ideas, outlined as a response against

terrorist groups, were materialised through the creation

of a multilateral intelligence cooperation named the

Alliance Base. As 2006 Pulitzer Prize winner Dana Priest

has stated: ‘the CIA has established joint operation

centres in more than two-dozen countries […], where the

or more recent moments such as the American Revolution, when theContinental Army used for-hire spy networks to supplement militaryreconnaissance and information gathering operations. Also, vide GlennJ. Voelz, ‘Contractors and Intelligence: The Private Sector in theIntelligence Community’, in International Journal of Intelligence andCounterIntelligence, 2009, Vol. 22, Nr. 4, pp. 586-589.25 James R. Woolsey apud Loch K. Johnson, ‘America’s IntelligenceLiaison with International Organisations’, in Ben de Jong, WiesPlatje, Robert David Steele (eds.), Peacekeeping Intelligence: EmergingConcepts for the Future, Virginia: OSS International Press, April 2003, p.363.26 Gilles de Kerchove apud Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Internationalintelligence cooperation in practice’, in Born, Hans, and Leigh, Ianand Wills, Aidan (eds.), International intelligence cooperation and accountability.Studies in Intelligence, New York: Routledge, 2011, p 18.

intelligence agencies involved work side by side for

identifying, tracking, and capturing or killing those

committed jihadists [who are willing to undertake

terrorist activities].’27 This strategy of global

intelligence liaison proved to be a great advantage for

the actors involved. As Zivanovic Katrina has illustrated

in her article ‘Global intelligence liaison is the best

strategy in fighting against terrorism.’28 Moreover, the

value of intelligence liaison was also strengthened by

the declaration of the CIA’s Deputy Director of

Operations in 2005: ‘Virtually every capture or killing

of a suspected terrorist outside Iraq since September,

11, 2001, attacks - more than 3,000 - was a result of

foreign services working alongside the agency.’29 It is

for this reason that global intelligence liaison is a

great advantage for all the actors involved.

The risks of international intelligence cooperation

The paramount disadvantage of intelligence liaison

is that actors involved are at the risk of being

penetrated by third parties. As expert Jennifer E. Sims

has argued: ‘The most important aspect for the actors

involved in intelligence liaison is security.’30 In other27 Dana Priest, ‘Foreign Network at Front of CIA's Terror Fight’, inWashington Post, 18 November 2005, p. A01, videhttp://www.pulitzer.org/archives/6957 [Acessed on 22th February 2015].28 Zivanovic Katrina, ‘International Cooperation of IntelligenceAgencies against Transnational Terroris Targets’, in The QuarterlyJournal, 2008, Vol. 8, Nr. 1, pp. 134-135.29 Priest, op. cit., p. A01. 30 Sims, op. cit., p. 197.

words, the actors involved are never sure about the

effectiveness of their counter-intelligence operations.

As Stéphane Lefebvre has argued in his writings ‘[…]

there is a ubiquitous fear among the participants that the

intelligence exchanged, or knowledge acquired, through

intelligence liaison can be compromised or passed on to a

third party without the originator’s consent.’31 There are

multifarious examples of penetration, but one of the most

important is the case of Kim Philby and Guy Burgess.32

Philby was a British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)

officer who secretly worked as a mole for the KGB

(Committee for State Security); while, he was officially

serving as a liaison officer to the CIA (Central

Intelligence Agency). In essence, he used his knowledge

to derail a joint SIS-CIA infiltration operation in

Albania, thereby leading to the death of at least 300

individuals.33 As a consequence because CIA was

penetrated, Russia managed to accomplish its political

interests in Albania after World War II. However, the

Philby case is paramount because it illustrates one of

the disadvantages of international intelligence liaison,

and also, why actors are sceptical about sharing

intelligence.

31 Lefebvre, op. cit., p. 535.32 Stan A. Taylor & Daniel Snow, ‘Cold War Spies: Why they Spied andHow They Got Caught’, in Intelligence and National Security, April 1997, Vol.12, Nr. 2, pp. 105-110.33 Lefebvre, op. cit., pp. 535-536.

Moreover, H. Bradford Westerfield, an expert in

intelligence liaison, goes event further in explaining

another risk as a result of being penetrated:

“The risk is not just that one’s people who are

conducting the liaison may become vulnerable, and end

being recruited as ‘moles’. The other service can also

work through its liaison partner connections for extending

its information-collection goals but also for extending

its influence goals.”34

According to Bradford Westerfield, immediately after

an intelligence service is penetrated, there is a huge

possibility that the penetrated system is going to be

used as a tool for accomplishing the goals of the actor

who penetrated that agency. In other words, the

disadvantage is that the intelligence exchanged through a

liaison relationship can be used for unintended purposes,

while one of the actors manages to achieve his security

goals and political aims. ‘This was the case in June 1981

when Israel, the USA’s intelligence liaison partner,

attacked Iraq’s Osirak reactor, thanks to the SIGINT

(satellite imagery) obtained from the CIA.’35 It is for

this reason, of not being used as tool for accomplishing

partner’s goals, why actors are sceptical in sharing

critical intelligence information with its liaison

partners.

34 Westerfield, op. cit., p. 539.35 Lefebvre, op. cit., p. 536.

The disclosure policy of classified liaison material

can be a real risk for the partners involved in

international intelligence liaison. This risk appears

because of the differences between an actors’ domestic

legislation and legal intervention compared to those of

its liaison partners. For example,

“The Binyam Mohamed case is an evidence of UK’s

judicial policies concerning international intelligence’s

shared material, and demonstrates that the courts from UK

do not recognise the principle according to which liaison

material should not be disclosed without the producers’

consensus.”36

Therefore, if a state cannot provide a guarantee to

its liaison partners that sensitive material will not be

disclosed during different trials then the international

intelligence liaison is unlikely to exist. For example,

due to UK’s policies on public disclosure, foreign

partners, such as USA, will choose not to share sensitive

intelligence that could be important for its safety,

accountability, and security. This reluctance from USA

towards UK was emphasised in a letter from USA

authorities regarding UK-USA intelligence liaison. The

latter emphasised clearly the SUA position: ‘If it is

determined that your service is unable to protect

information […] because of your judicial system, we will

review with greatest care the sensitivity of information

36 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Annual Report2009-2010, 2010, pp. 17.

we can provide in the future.’37 Therefore, the Binyam

Mohamed case highlighted what risks an actor assumes when

it chooses to liaise with a partner that has a different

juridical system and policy towards the disclosure of

classified liaison material.

Another disadvantage for sharing information and

conducting collaborative analysis is the very real danger

of what Irving Janis has described as groupthink.38 Shortly,

groupthink is a mode of behaviour where individuals, in

this case states that are engaged, are more willing to

maintain the group’s cohesiveness than to consider

alternative perspectives. In this case, if the

intelligence disseminated by one of the intelligence

services is incorrect, then it will produce a domino

effect that will put in danger all the operations mounted

against a specific threat. This disadvantage of

international intelligence cooperation was acknowledged

after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. As former UNSCOM

weapons inspector David Kay has argued: “The US

intelligence was ‘dead wrong’ in almost every respect,

causing series of [intelligence] failures and mistakes in

motivating and planning the invasion of Iraq.”39 In

essence, the problem was that the other intelligence

services from Europe choose to rely on US’s intelligence

products, while neglecting their conclusions and

potential arguments against US’s intelligence products.37 Ibidem, p. 18.38 Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes,Second Edition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982, p. 9. 39 David Kay apud Phythian, op. cit., pp. 408-409.

It is for this reason that intelligence liaison is of

great risk, and a potential disadvantage for the actors

willing to engage in an international intelligence

partnership.

Organizational behaviour is another major reason for

why intelligence liaison is a great risk. As Talcott

Parson has argued: ‘organizations are social units (or

human groupings) deliberately constructed and

reconstructed to achieve specific aims.’40 According to

Parson’s definition the risk of sharing intelligence

appears under the following two forms: First of all,

organizations are comprised of individuals, each with

specific tasks and needs; secondly, the organizations

exist for a specific reason, without which the

organization would not have been created. This

organizational risk can be especially observed by

examining US’ intelligence community. For example, US’

intelligence community is composed of fifteen different

agencies. All these agencies have specific tasks and

mandates to accomplish them. But, when it comes to

categorizing these intelligence agencies, it can be seen

that some of these agencies have a double membership.

This is the case of the State Deparment’s Bureau of

Intelligence and Research (State/INR), which is

simultaneously a member of the intelligence community and

also a part of the overall Department of State.41 Its40 Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, Glencoe: The FreePress, 1960, p. 17.41 Major Andrew W. Green, Why the US Intelligence Community does not Shareinformation, A Research Report, Alabama: Maxwell Air Force Base, July

employees are bound by the rules and regulations of the

State Department. Therefore, if an external intelligence

agency is exchanging intelligence as information with the

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, then the possibility

of that information to be politicised is very high. In

the end, the receiver can become what Michael Herman has

named: ‘the foreign political tool of an actor [operating

from shadow].’42

As Jennifer E. Sims has argued in her article:

‘[Another disadvantage or risk] regarding intelligence

liaison is related to the transparency and accountability

from the actors involved.’43 This is the case of the

democratic states, which, based on democratic principles,

have to demonstrate high ethical standards and compliance

with human rights and human dignity. In this sense, the

issue is that some democratic states, such as USA, have

chosen to encourage unethical behaviour towards its

prisoners as a result of the privatisation of

intelligence44 and an immediate need for intelligence

material. The alleged abuse of prisoners by contract

interrogators at Abu Ghraib is the perfect example in

this sense.45 As a consequence, the recent accusations

against USA have raised discussions and issues concerning

the use of torture in interrogation. Moreover, these

unorthodox interrogation methods have led to rekindled

2005, p. 8, vide http://www.au.af.mil/au /awc/awcgate/saas/green.pdf[Accessed on 9th March 2015].42 Michael Herman, op. cit., p. 210.43 Sims, op. cit., p. 211.44 Voelz, op. cit., p. 586.45 Ibidem, p. 598.

debates about whether actors should refuse or not an

international intelligence liaison with these partners.

Therefore, as a reaction the UK, as an intelligence

actor, has stated clearly that its secret services will

not share intelligence with partners that cannot

guarantee a decent treatment for those people detained.46

It is for this reason that some international

intelligence liaison between actors can be impossible to

continue, as in the UK-USA case, or exist, as in the case

between potential future partners.

Conclusion

This essay has provided an insight into the

importance of international intelligence liaison in

today’s context. Apart from the mentioned facts that

explained why the intelligence liaison had been partly

neglected before 9/11, the recent events have shown that

global intelligence liaison has become a characteristic

of the current international system. As professor Adam

Svendsen has argued: ‘Liaison today represents the most

significant dimension of intelligence.’47 Moreover, as

Richard J. Aldrich has argued: “Intelligence cooperation

is the most important weapon in the struggle to contain

the ‘new’ terrorism, but its significance is even greater

than that.”48 However, as any intelligence activity, when46 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Annual Report2012-2013, 2013, pp. 15-18.47 Svendsen, op. cit., p. 700.48 Aldrich, op. cit., p. 754.

it comes to assessing the advantages and disadvantages,

international intelligence liaison is similar to a ‘coin’.

Consequently, actors willing to form a global

international intelligence have to manage the risk in

order for the advantages to be illustrative for their

activities. In other words, the majority of dangers or

disadvantages underlined within this essay can be

effectively managed by undertaking the appropriate

measures. In this sense, effective counter-intelligence

operations can be organised to counter the threats

emerging from any hostile intelligence agency; while the

impact of false or vague shared information can be

reduced by specialised analytical methods combined with

double-checking that piece of information received with

other reliable sources. Some risks can also constitute

opportunities, for example intelligence partnerships can

improve both the security and the services. In this

sense, USA’s intelligence services are the perfect

example. Additionally, using private contractors can also

be an advantage in achieving those aims that a democratic

state such as USA cannot achieve without protests towards

its actions or foreign policies. For actors, the key to

outweighing the disadvantages caused by international

intelligence liaison is by acting to achieve their

primary goals and managing to cope with the risks.

Bibliography

Books and Chapters in books:

1) Aldrich J. Richard, ‘International

intelligence cooperation in practice’, in

Born, Hans, and Leigh, Ian and Wills,

Aidan (eds.), International intelligence cooperation

and accountability. Studies in Intelligence, New York:

Routledge, 2011.

2) Budiansky Stephen, ‘The Difficult

Beginnings of US-British Code breaking Co-

operation’, in David Stafford & Rhodri

Jeffreys-Jones (eds.), American-British-

Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939-2000, London:

FRANK CASS, 2000.

3) Buzan Barry & Waever Ole, Regions and Powers:

The Structure of International Security, London:

Cambridge University Press, 2003.

4) Herman Michael, Intelligence Power In Peace and

War, Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1996.

5) Janis L. Irving, Groupthink: Psychological Studies

of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, Second Edition,

Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982.

6) Johnson K. Loch, ‘America’s Intelligence

Liaison with International Organisations’,

in Ben de Jong, Wies Platje, Robert David

Steele (eds.), Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging

Concepts for the Future, Virginia: OSS

International Press, April 2003.

7) Parsons Talcott, Structure and Process in Modern

Societies, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960.

8) Rimington Dame Stella, Open Secret: The

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London: Hutchinson, 2001.

Articles:

1) Aldrich J. Richard, ‘Transatlantic

Intelligence and Security Cooperation’, in

International Affairs, 2004, Vol. 80, Nr. 4.

2) Elder Gregory, ‘Intelligence in War: It

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