GRP-MILF PEACE TALKS: Its Implication to Bangsamoro Struggle for Right to Self-Determination

Ismael G. Kulat[The author is the Peacebuilding and Southeast- Central Mindanao Regions Clustered

Coordinator of the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS)

INTRODUCTION

oncluding a conflict either violent or non-violent is a gigantic task much more for a deeply-rooted one such as the Bangsamoro problem

in Mindanao fashioned by time for almost five centuries now. It is said that a “conflict has a cycle of its own that only stops if its fundamental roots have been properly identified, diagnosed and solved.”1 On the contrary, negotiations in many instances may lead to tragic situation when it get out of hand of the negotiating parties as what happened in the “2000 All-Out War”, “2003 All-Out Military Offensive” and the “2008 Military Surgical Operation.” In situations like this, it only hardened premises that signing of an agreement or peace treaty alone does not end conflict.

C

Negotiation or peace talks, however, is undoubtedly the most effective way of resolving non-violent, violent or armed conflict both in contemporary world and in historical perspectives. However, the process had been proven long, tedious and winding that needs commitment, perseverance and determination from both parties of the conflict—state and non-state stakeholders alike. Crucial also to the process is support of the constituencies and the outside world for the success of a negotiation.

In Islam’s perspective, negotiation or peace talks play an important role in resolving conflicts as pointed out in the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah (teaching, saying and practice) of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) and his successors. And Allah says: 2

[But if the enemy inclines to peace do thou (also) incline towards peace and thrust Allah For He is the one that heareth and knoweth (all things)

And:

1 Quoted in Salah Jubair, THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process. Cotabato City: Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, 2007, p.1.2 Holy Qur’an – (Suratul Anfal) 8:61-62

1

(Should they intend to deceive thee verily Allah sufficeth thee. He it is that hath strengthened thee with His aid and with the (company) of the believers.)

These peace talks were applied in a conflict within and outside the realm of the Prophet Muhammad’s (Peace be upon him) dominion throughout his life and his successors (Rightly-Guided Caliphs) that ended in forging various agreements or treaties with their adversaries.

The current peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the GRP and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) combined exhausted more than three decades but until now it is still yet to prove its worth so that people without hesitation could say that negotiation is still the best option in resolving conflicts.

In the course of the above events, people from different strata of society developed diverse perceptions about the peace negotiation but can be largely qualified into positive and negative outlook. A portion of the people believed that the peace talks did not solve the age-old Bangsamoro problem nor improve their lot in society as a consequence of the negotiation. Another portion of the society thinks otherwise, claiming that the decades of talking peace yielded both big and small victories that strengthened both societal condition and that fashioned advancement of their struggle for right to self-determination. Obviously, the government and other stakeholders do believe that the peace process achieved something good; nevertheless, very few realized it. On the other hand, we find it rare if there is any document that amplifies those gains. As a matter of fact, this has been the reason that it became a favorite slogan of both the government and peace advocates to “uphold the primacy and gains of the peace process”3

In this monograph, we will try to present overview of the GRP-MILF Negotiation from the start, its ups and downs, the visible and invisible successes and its relation to the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination. In a hope that a deeper understanding of the peace process will build constituency supportive and participative to the mother of all peace advocacies related to the age-old Bangsamoro Question in Mindanao.

3 Cited in Salah Jubair, THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process , op. cit., p.151

2

THE INCEPTION OF THE GRP-MILF NEGOTIATION

he peace talks between the GRP and the MILF came at a time when the government was about to conclude its agreement with the MNLF

in 1996 and at a time when the MILF was in its stage of a “wait and see” attitude with the closure of the GRP-MNLF negotiation. The MILF did not want to complicate the GRP-MNLF peace talks as MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim said:

T

“The MILF is maintaining a consistent policy towards the peace process. We will reject any attempt by the Philippine government to open separate negotiations with the MILF unless the GRP-MNLF talk is finally concluded.”1

It is an accepted fact that the hardest thing in every endeavor is to start a something, more so with the resolution of complex and deeply-rooted problem such as that of the Bangsamoro. However, the government probably inspired by the positive developments in their negotiation with the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks ventured to start another negotiation. This time with the MILF that is perceived by many as more tough and with Islamic inclination than the MNLF which is known to be espousing a nationalistic tendency.

True to its essence, starting a negotiation is a tough job as very few people are aware that the government initiated informal contacts with the MILF as early as 1979 (with the then New MNLF Leadership) at the time of the then Presidents Ferdinand Marcos and Corazon Aquino. The most daring of these government attempts occurred during the time of then president Fidel Ramos Administration which was in anticipation for a closure of a peace deal with the MNLF.

In early 1996, the government sent several emissaries that mysteriously trekked to Camp Abubakar concealed from the searching eyes of the state forces that surrounded the camp. “Since then, a dozen or so prominent personalities were commissioned by the government to establish contact with the MILF

leadership. Among them Congressman Simeon Datumanong, Margarita ‘Tingting’ Cojuangco, Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., Executive Secretary Ruben Torres,

and several others.”2

1 Abhoud Syed M Lingga, An Account of the Mindanao Peace Process,– March 30, 2007, Cotabato City 2 The Truth, Vo.I No.1 – June 15, 2000

Pres. Fidel V. Ramos started the GRP-MILF

Peace Talks

3

The Exploratory Meetings

he above efforts yielded more concrete gains manifested by two informal exploratory meetings between the government and MILF

delegates. The “1st Exploratory Meeting” was done on August 3, 1996 held at the Insular Hotel, Davao City with the government delegates headed by Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the MILF by Vice-Chairman for Political Affairs Ghazali Jaafar. The meeting was purely for confidence-building purposes, familiarization of both parties and preliminary discussions of current issues as well as agreement to schedule another meeting in the near future.

T

The “2nd Exploratory Meeting” was composed of high profile delegates which produced tangible agreement that later often became controversial by the passing of time. The GRP delegation was headed by Executive Secretary Ruben Torres with members composed of retired Lt.Gen. Edgardo Batenga, Chief PMS Malacañang; Col. Guilermo Matiling, Chief Researcher and the Chief Intelligence Office; Atty. Jovenal Lazaga, Chief Finance–PMS, and six staff from the Office of the President.

On the MILF side was headed by Vice-Chairman for Political Affairs Ghazali Jaafar with Jun Abdulmanaf, Executive Director of the Office of Vice-Chairman for Political Affairs; Salihin Ali Ashgar, Intelligence Chief; Mike Pasigan, Chief Transcom; Mike Amolan, Head of Protocol; Big Boy Al-Walid and Al Sebangan, in-charge of Security and Amir Bangsa Compania as Finance Chief; Datumanong Bangon and Jake Masukat, Political Affairs Staff.

The first day of the exploratory talks marked the first semi-formal face to face contact between the leaders of the conflicting parties. The meeting was a round table discussion focused on the concept and interpretation of the root-cause of the Bangsamoro problem for purposes of coming out of a more unified understanding. The MILF in its presentation gave emphasis on oppression, injustices, religious suppression, political and socio-cultural neglect as major cause of the Moro predicament. The government party stood firm on its premise that the Moro problem is rooted on poverty, lack of education and less political partaking. The discussions, instead of arriving at a common term, only widened the disparity of outlooks of each party on the root-cause of the problem.

On the second day encounter, the government party applied more tricky “man-to-man” approach where all MILF delegates were assigned

4

partner from the GRP delegates. The discussion was almost manipulated by the GRP Party characterized by persuasive mode and laying down the merits of resolving the problem through negotiation. In fact, the MILF delegates were offered livelihood, foreign-assisted projects and scholarship programs at a tune of millions of pesos each, the moment they concur with the GRP’s proposition to negotiate.

Another irreconcilable issue that cropped up was that the GRP Party invoked on the “constitutional framework and territorial integrity of the Philippines” as the basis of negotiation. On the other hand, the MILF Party was firm on its position that only when the issue of “Bangsamoro self-determination or independence” as basis of the talks will they agree to negotiate. The incident only hardened doubts of the MILF group on the sincerity of the government. Majority if not all of the delegates on both sides almost lost hope of reconciling and finding common ground for starting the negotiation between the GRP and MILF.

The Gentleman’s Agreement

t the point when the two parties were about to depart with no substantial gains reached, a sober mind among the delegates

suggested that the two leaders (Sec. Torres and Vice-Chairman Ghazali Jaafar) should be allowed to have a one-on-one exclusive talks before the party depart. The two-hour “closed door” meeting of the two leaders gave birth to the so-called “Gentleman’s Agreement”. The verbal agreement stipulated that the GRP will not invoke on the “constitutional framework” and the MILF will not put forward the agenda of “independence or secession” all throughout the negotiation process. The circumstances set no parameter except the above cited conditions but each party committed to continue the talks, dialogues and meetings until they find common ground to start a more formal peace talks.

A

The “Gentleman’s Agreement” marked ceaseless phone contacts, letters and marathon meetings both between and within or among the GRP and MILF parties from September to December 1996. In these meetings the two parties were able to emplace their respective Negotiating Panels and Technical Committees namely: (1) Technical Committee on Agenda Setting (later the Technical Working Group), and (2) Technical Committee on Cessation of Hostilities that turned into now Coordinating Committee on Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH). It was also at these months where both parties established their agenda in preparation for their low level formal peace talks.

5

THE NEGOTIATION LANDSCAPE

Domestic Mode of Negotiation

earning hard lessons from the GRP-MNLF 1996 Final Peace Agreement which was under the auspices of the Organization of

Islamic Conference (OIC) and abiding by the principles of the “Gentleman’s Agreement” wherein the GRP and MILF delegates verbally committed to continue their informal talks without much concern on strict parameters due to many disagreements, the MILF refused any foreign interventions. Further, it refused to negotiate outside of the Moro Homeland. Their domestic and informal talks aimed to discover some common points that may lead towards the start of formal negotiation.

L

Under the above circumstances, the two parties agreed that all their talks will be held in the Homeland or any neutral ground within Mindanao. In addition, in order to avoid being influenced by outside force, the GRP and MILF ventured to start negotiation without foreign intervention. In other words, they applied a pure domestic approach in the first stage of their negotiation.

The Informal Domestic Negotiation

First Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assembly

mmediately after the leadership of the MILF ascertained its intent to talk peace with the government, and abiding by the rule of Islam on

‘Shura’ (consultation), the Ulama-Professionals Executive Council (UPEC) called for the “1st Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assembly on December 3 – 6, 1996 at Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao. The gathering was attended by 1,070,697 Bangsamoro coming from all walks of life all over the Bangsamoro homeland. The most significant outcome of the consultative assembly was the passage of a resolution granting mandate to the MILF “to negotiate with the government under condition that the authority will remain for as long as the MILF will not abandon the aspiration of the Bangsamoro for independence or self-determination.”3

I

Equipped with the above mandate, during the first official meeting of the GRP-MILF Technical Committees, the MILF through its Technical Committee on Agenda Setting submitted to their GRP counterpart a 3 Proceedings of the First Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assembly.

Only a portion of the more than one million

Bangsamoro participants to the assembly

6

single talking point which was “To Solve the Bangsamoro Problem” in exchange for the GRP’s proposed agenda. There was neither expounding nor discussion of the issue but all was set for a future deliberation. In his presentation, Mohagher Iqbal, Chairman of the current MILF Peace Panel, bared that:

“Later in February 25, 1997 the GRP-MILF Technical Committee Meeting was centered on expounding the single-point agenda submitted by the MILF which is ‘To solve the Bangsamoro problem’. The agenda was splitted into ‘9 Point Agenda’ as follows: ‘(1) Ancestral domain (2) Displaced and landless Bangsamoro (3) Destruction of properties and war victims (4) Human rights issues (5) Social and cultural discrimination (6) Corruption of the mind and the moral fiber (7) Economic inequities and widespread poverty (8) Exploitation of natural resources (9) Agrarian related issues.”

“The above issues and concerns are the effects of what we (the MILF) perceive to be the real Bangsamoro Problem, which is the ‘illegal and immoral annexation of Mindanao and Sulu into the national territory of the Philippines in the grant of independence in 1946.’ In essence, the problem is political in character that requires a political solution.”4

Meanwhile, while the GRP and MILF Panels were preoccupied by their efforts to establish confidence-building measures and ceasefire system, starting on October 18, 1996 “a fierce firefight between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) erupted in Baiwas, Sumisip, Basilan that lasted for 17 days. The encounter resulted to the destruction of five war tanks and 224 casualties on both sides.”5 The armed skirmishes escalated to other points in the municipalities of Carmen in North Cotabato, Buldon and Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao province and continued on until January of 1997.

Interim Ceasefire Agreements

n an attempt to halt the escalating armed conflicts between the AFP and BIAF, the GRP-MILF Technical Committees on Cessation of

Hostilities signed the “Agreement on Interim Cessation of Hostilities” in order to disengage the armed encounters in Buldon, Maguindanao on January 7, 1997. This interim ceasefire was further strengthened with the creation of Independent Monitoring Teams such as the “Interim Ceasefire Monitoring Committee” (ICMC) in their succeeding meetings on February 26 and March 25 of the same year.

I

4 Mohagher Iqbal - UPDATES OF THE GRP-MILF PEACE TALKS (January 26, 2008) KFI Resource and Training Center, Cotabato City, p.1515 Ibid

7

Unfortunately, 20 days after completion of the interim ceasefire mechanisms on March 16, 1997 an artillery shell exploded in one of the schools in Tugaig, Barira, Maguindanao killing all 10 female students aged 14 to 21 years old along with their teacher. This incident was later known as “Tugaig Bombing.” The tragic incident was followed by series of long accusations and counter accusations between the AFP and BIAF. The condition prompted the ICMC and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) through Commissioner Nasser Marohomsalic and sought the assistance of foreign experts to conduct post mortem examination of the victims as well as the recovered fragments in the scene. Later it was announced by the CHR that the artillery shells that hit the students were coming from 105mm Howitzers which can only be found in military arsenals.

The infamous incident was followed by military assault to MILF positions in different points in Buldon, Pagalungan and Sultan sa Barongis in Maguindanao province. The armed skirmishes escalated farther to Aleosan and Carmen in North Cotabato and later to Siraway and Siocon in Zamboanga del Norte from March to July 7, 1997.

The Permanent Ceasefire Accord

earning from the ‘interim ceasefire agreement’ and the seriousness of prevailing situation as well as

endangering discontinuance of the started low-level peace talks, the GRP and MILF Panels decided to forge a more permanent and enduring peace mechanism. So that on July 18, 1997 the two panels signed the “Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities” (AGCH). This time, instead of Technical Committees’ head as signatory, it was signed by former Ambassador and retired General Fortunato Abat as Chairman of the GRP Panel and Vice Chairman Ghazali Jaafar as Chairman of the MILF Panel and witnessed by their respective ranking officers.

L

In their succeeding meetings, they were able to establish the ‘Implementing Administrative and Operational Guidelines of the ceasefire agreement so with its structures and components such as the Coordinating Committee of Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and Independent Fact-Finding Committee (IFFC) from the period July 30, 1997 to November 14, 1997. It was in this period too that the

GRP-MILF Panels agreed the 16th Minor Agreement which is the “Acknowledgement of all MILF Camps” in order to finally avoid AFP encroachment offensives

Ghazali Jaafar – 1st MILF Panel

Chair

Amb. Fortunato Abat 1st GRP Panel

8

against BIAF elements and reduced the cases of AFP-BIAF encounters. It was stipulated under this agreement that once these MILF Camps be jointly verified, it should be recognized and respected by the AFP. Along with this agreement, the MILF submitted a total of 46 camps 7 were classified as Major Camps and the remaining 39 were classified as Minor Camps.

Despite the completion of ceasefire mechanism, the sporadic firefights between the AFP and BIAF continued so that the GRP-MILF Technical Committees on Cessation of Hostilities forged their 10th minor agreement dubbed as “Agreement to Sustain the Quest for Peace” by reiterating and strengthening GRP-MILF CCCH, IFFC expansion and in addition the formation of Quick Response Team (QRT) that took until May 11, 1998 for them to finally put in place.

Unfortunately, less than a month after emplacing the ceasefire mechanism on June 2, 1998 the AFP encroached and conducted offensives on MILF Camps in Daguma, Bagumbayan in Sultan Kudarat; Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur; renewed encounter in Garigayan, Buldon in Maguindanao province that lasted up to August 1998.

The sporadic encounters between AFP and BIAF elements re-erupted on November 2, 1998 in Meta–Maitumaig in Shariff Aguak which escalated to the whole coverage areas of MILF’s Camp Omar Ibn-Al Khattab covering the municipalities of Datu Piang, Shariff Aguak and Talayan in Maguindanao.

Practically, in 1998 alone the GRP-MILF Panel and their Technical Committees were able to signed seven minor and two major agreements and joint resolutions mostly in an attempt to stop the armed skirmishes mostly initiated by the AFP in compliance with their continued mandate on maintaining peace and order. But on the other hand, counting on the numbers of encounters in violation to the ceasefire agreement it almost doubled the number of forged interim truce.

Agreement of Intent between the GRP and MILF

s a consequence of the continuing deterioration of situation despite of emplacing the ceasefire implementing guidelines and mechanisms

brought about by firefights between AFP and BIAF and the danger of total collapsed of the started domestic negotiation, the GRP-MILF Panels come up with a meeting on August 27, 1998 and signed the “Agreement

A

The GRP-MILF Panels during the signing of Ceasefire

Agreement

9

of Intent between the GRP and MILF” whereby the two panels committed to “recognize that only negotiated political settlement will end the armed conflict in Mindanao.” And so, both agreed that the “parties commit to pursue the negotiation and resolutely continue until political settlement is reached. And to negotiate with sincerity and pledge to implement all previous signed interim agreement.” And also “the parties pledge to refrain from use of force while peace negotiation is on-going.”6

One of the important component of this agreement is recognition and inclusion of the “parties commits to protect and respect human rights” and policies and “Charter of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights” as among the parameters of the negotiation. The ‘Agreement on Intent’ was the 3rd major agreement forged by the two panels which was signed by GRP Panel Chairman Lt. General Orlando Soriano and MILF Panel Chairman Aleem Abdulazis Mimbantas.

Acknowledgement of MILF Camps

n pursuance to the terms of the “Agreement of Intent”, the two parties agreed to implement the ‘Joint Acknowledgement of MILF Camps as

agreed in November 1997. The implementation of the said agreement was delayed due to continued armed skirmishes in different parts of Mindanao.

I

It should be recalled that the MILF Panel submitted “forty six (46) camps and seven (7) were classified as Major Camps and the remaining thirty nine (39) were classified as Minor Camps” in their previous agreement.

In February 1999, among the MILF Camps listed, the two parties acknowledged the two main camps namely: (1) Camp Abubakre As-Siddique and (2) Camp Bushra Somiorang followed by five other major and minor camps in different parts of Mindanao. The acknowledgement of the MILF Camps was a strategy of both parties to lessen the cases of AFP encroachments to the above camps that resulted to continued encounters in violation to the ceasefire agreement.

Unfortunately, despite signing implementing guidelines of the agreement and recognition of the MILF camps, it did not deter sporadic firefights between the AFP and BIAF. Starting March 15, 1999 that lasted up to late August 1999, fierce encounters erupted in Pamatsaken, Sumisip, Basilan and escalated into other municipalities. Escalation of this war ended in Camp Salman Al-Farishi at sitio Tawantawan, Kayamkang, Zamboanga del Sur which is one of the recognized MILF 6 Mohagher Iqbal - UPDATES OF THE GRP-MILF PEACE TALKS (January 26, 2008) KFI Resource and Training Center, Cotabato City,

10

Camps. An account of the encounters in the above areas claimed 49 lives, 39 wounded on both sides including civilians and 34 civilian houses and a Madrasah were burned.

In Retrospect

he three-year (1996 -1999) low-level or informal negotiation, the parties signed 26 Interim Agreements, six of which are considered

Major Agreements and 20 are considered minor agreements. But while the negotiation was moving forward time and again it was disrupted by continuing armed confrontations between the AFP and BIAF. Sometimes either party had to delay the negotiation for a while and sometimes they had to allow cooling of heads to re-start again. In other words, the negotiation period was marred by “sporadic peace and continuing war” wherein the number of encounters and ceasefire violations surpassed the number of interim agreements signed between the GRP and MILF.

T

The Formal Domestic Negotiation

t should be recalled that the first three years of low-level and informal negotiation was a sort of a confidence building, ‘trial and error’ and

aim at discovering systems and strategies that is acceptable to both the GRP and MILF before finally entering into a more formal negotiation. Taking the three-year experiences of successes and failures, of peace, wars, emotions and patience; only then the GRP and MILF decided to enter into a formal negotiation.

I

The Opening Ceremony

t was only after three years of informal negotiation where the GRP and MILF decided to venture into more formal dealings with each other.

Probably, this was the only time the two parties able to build confidence and got assurance that they could be able to sustain the negotiation hardened by their experiences of continuing armed confrontations but able to move on with the peace talks. The editorial of Maradika stated:

I

“After almost three years of preliminary negotiations, the peace negotiating panels of both the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have finally agreed to elevate their negotiations to the level of formal peace talks…this occasion is

Brief Press Conference after the Formal Opening

Ceremony

11

significant in two ways: First, despite the series of armed clashes between the AFP and the BIAF, The GRP and MILF have clearly chosen a path of peace instead of war. Their negotiating panels have not wavered in their mandated tasks to pursue the negotiations at all times. And second, the holding of the GRP-MILF peace negotiation is a clear manifestation that this (Bangsamoro) problem, contrary to any claim, has never been fully addressed by any previous agreements arrangements or accommodations.”7

“However, while we marshal out time and resources to make this occasion a success, we must not be remiss on the fact that the road to peace, ‘long and winding’, has just started. Peace is harder to achieve rather than to make war. It only takes one to start war, but at least two to make peace. The difference lies the harsh reality that makes peace the harder nut to crack.”8

Although the affair was marked by simple programs, some significant changes in traditional opening of any occasion more so, on the side of the government. It was the practice ever since that important occasion such as this is always started with the singing of the Philippine national anthem and raising of the Philippine Flag. In this occasion, instead of the usual practice, the Opening Ceremony was started with a “Reading of the Verses from the Holy Qur’an” rendered by an international figure Ustadz Musa Panday. The ceremony was conducted at the Da’wah Center, Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on October 25, 1999.

The short and simple program was marked by the welcome remarks of Maguindanao Governor Zacaria Candao, Opening Statement of MILF Panel Chair Aleem Abdulazis Mimbantas, the messages of commitments by Ghazali Jaafar Vice Chairman for Political Affairs of the MILF and Ambassador Manuel Yan Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process of the government. After the ceremony, the two panels issued a joint press statement namely, Joint Press Statement of Formal Opening of Peace Talks.

First Round of the GRP-MILF Formal Peace Talks

he first round of formal negotiation came only after two months of its formal

opening ceremony due to the deteriorating situations in different parts of Mindanao brought about by skirmishes between the AFP and BIAF elements. To move forward the

T

7 Editorial Maradika – October 1999 Issue8 Quoted in Salah Jubair, THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process. Cotabato City: Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, 2007.

The first formal face to face encounter between the GRP

and MILF Panels

12

negotiation, the GRP-MILF Panels were able to sign four more agreements primarily for setting the parameters of the conduct of official negotiation, stopping armed confrontations and the security of the MILF Negotiating Panels among others.

Thus on January 20, 2000 GRP-MILF Panels signed a Joint Communiqué containing their first official agreement at the Da’wah Center, Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat in Maguindanao province. Among the significance of the agreement was the fact that it was the first document signed under the new parlance of negotiation that elevated the informal talks into formal dealings. Highlighted in the agreement was the approval of the “9-Point Agenda” which was previously submitted by the MILF as talking point as an elucidation of how “to solve the Bangsamoro problem.”

In an effort to move forward the formal peace talks, the parties conducted a meeting from January to March 2000 wherein they were able to sign seven more interim agreements, Joint Communiqués and resolutions.

The Joint Communiqué of March 2, 2000

he Joint Communiqué marked the second formal talks between the GRP-MILF Panels which was done at Estosan Garden Hotel, Cotabato

City signed by their respective Chairmen LtGen Edgardo Batatenga and Mohagher Iqbal acting in behalf of Aleem Abdulazis Mimbantas of the GRP and MILF Panels respectively.

T

Among the salient point agreed in the meeting was approval of the proposed MILF Draft on Immunity and Security Guarantee for the GRP-MILF Negotiating Panels and its component structures and drafting of the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and Humanitarian Laws.

Significantly, in this meeting it was agreed that “the two Parties clustered those agenda that are closely related to each other and the nine (9) issues and concerns reduced to six (6), as follows: (1) Ancestral Domain/Agrarian-related Issues (2) Destruction of Properties and War victims/Displaced and Landless Bangsamoro, (3) Human Rights Issues, (4) Social and Cultural Discrimination/Corruption of the Mind and Moral fiber (5) Economic Inequities and Widespread Poverty (6) Exploitation of Natural Resources”9

9 Mohagher Iqbal - UPDATES OF THE GRP-MILF PEACE TALKS KFI Resource and Training Center, Cotabato City - January 26, 2008

13

In summary, despite of the ever escalating armed confrontations between the AFP and BIAF elements in Mindanao, the GRP-MILF Panels managed to move on in setting up directions to the official negotiation. And from the opening ceremony, covering the period from October 25, 1999 to April 27, 2000; the two parties were able to sign 13 agreements, resolutions and Joint Communiqués principally geared towards establishment of systems, policies and mechanisms for the formal peace talks and stopping the war.

The Aide Memoire of 2000

n an attempt to prevent the eruption of a bigger war as a result of heavy military buildup surrounding Camp Abubakar and of the

government’s claimed of existence of highway extortions along the Narciso Ramos Highway, GRP-MILF Panels with their respective Technical Committees forged an important agreement better known as “Aide Memoire”. Among the salient content of the agreement which was signed by the two parties on April 27, 2000 at Estosan Garden Hotel in Cotabato City is the immediate deployment of Philippine National Police (PNP) along the disputed portions of the highway.

I

On April 28, 2000 “unfortunately, barely few hours after signing of the agreement, three truckloads of government soldiers attacked MILF positions at Buldon and Matanog in Maguindanao province under pretext of clearing the highway.”10

The attack triggered intense armed encounters in different areas and within the immediate peripheries of Camp Abubakar all the way to Lanao provinces. The wide scale skirmishes apparently spread throughout Mindanao which prompted civil, religious and peace advocates appealed to the GRP and MILF to stop the war and return to the negotiating table. The call was even boosted by “His Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin, former President Corazon Aquino, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, Alliance for Peace and Justice, Bishop-Ulama Conference, business and civic organizations.”11

In response to the call, on May 5, 2000 the MILF declared a “unilateral ceasefire among their forces” and eventually withdraw one kilometer away from the Narciso Ramos Highway on May 15, 2000 in order to pave the way for a peaceful resolution of the problem.

The 2000 All-Out War of Joseph ‘Erap’ Estrada

10 M.A. Jinnah – Truth Behind the Recent Skirmishes in Central Mindanao – An Analysis, May 200011 Al Haj Murad – MILF Unilateral Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities in Mindanao, May 5, 2000

14

rior to Joseph Estrada’s rise to presidency, there were high hope of resolving the age-old Bangsamoro problem as gleaned from his letter

to then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim dated March 8, 1998 which partly stated:

P“Rest assured I am personally committed to achieving unity among the people of Mindanao. And I know it can only be done thru a peaceful and comprehensive solution to the Bangsamoro problem.”

And ended with: “I look forward to sitting down with you in the near future to discuss possible solution to the problems besetting the Bangsamoro.”12

In response to the above letter and a breach of tradition as never in the past the MILF conveyed felicitation to the past presidents, after Joseph Estrada was proclaimed winner in the May 11, 1998 election, MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim sent a congratulatory note to the former that partly says:

“On behalf of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Bangsamoro People, I have the pleasure to convey our congratulation to Your Excellency upon your election and proclamation as the 13th President of the Republic of the Philippines.”

“We in the MILF look forward in anticipation of positive developments in the relation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF which has been seeking a more civilized and just approach to the still unresolved century-old Bangsamoro issue.”13

These exchanges of notes and the succeeding communications for the arrangements of the two leaders meeting were sufficient indicator for the people especially the Bangsamoro to pin high hope of resolving the Bangsamoro problem.

A sudden turn of events occurred that shocked the much optimistic spectators of a better relation between the Estrada administration and the MILF in dealing with the Moro problem when on March 21, 2000 President Estrada declared the “All-Out-War” policy in Mindanao at the town Hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. The

declaration came barely five days after the MILF declared “unilateral ceasefire” and repositioned its forces one kilometer away from the Narciso Ramos Highway in order to prevent further escalation of

armed skirmishes and resolve the problem peacefully as per requests 12 Copy, Letter of Vice Pres. Joseph Estrada to MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim – March 8, 199813 Maradika, June 1998 - Issue, p.3

Joseph E. Estrada, the 13th President of the

Ustadz Salamat Hashim, MILF

Chairman

15

from different peace advocates and religious sector. The declaration was triggered by the fact that: “One of the government casualties [in Inudaran, Kauswagan encounter] was the godson of President Joseph Estrada, 1st Lt. Don Alfonso Javier, which angered him so much”14

The declaration saw havoc and massive destruction to the lives and properties of civilians mostly of the Moro populace practically in many parts of Mindanao. In less than a month military offensive was aptly described by media entities that:

“Another name for all-out-war is ethnic cleansing with its accompanying havoc, displacement and destructions. About 416,763 people were displaced; 952 houses burnt, razed to the ground; 23 Mosques shattered; 17 Madaris burnt and about 5,000 casualties both combatants and non-combatants who are victims of the current all-out-war military campaign unleashed by Estrada government against the Muslims and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).”15 It also signaled the military attacks on all known MILF Camps which were already recognized and agreed to be respected by the government forces in their previous talks. The biggest blow inflicted on the MILF was the capture of its main Camp Abubakar As-Siddique on July 7, 2000 and eventually no less than Estrada visited the camp by July 10, and raised the Philippine flag there, symbolizing victory and celebrated with truckloads of beers and roasted pigs.

However, analysts and historians opined that:

“This setback, however, was not bad altogether. The MILF may have lost the conventional war but it got back at its nemesis with the full fury of guerilla warfare, the best tactic opened to a weaker force. Moreover, with the government as the clear aggressor, the MILF gained politically what it lost militarily. For the first time, the MILF was allowed to attend the 27th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on June 29, 2000…”16

The All-Out-Jihad

s “a logical consequence of persecution and violence committed against the Muslim

communities, Sheikh Salamat Hashim, the Amer-ul Jihad and Chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation

A14 Salah Jubair, THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process (2007) p. 3015 Homeland – Vol. VII, No.5 September – October 2000 Issue, p.316 Salah Jubair, THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process (2007) p. 34

Remnants of devastation brought about by the 2000

All Out War

MILF Chairman, Declared “All-Out

Jihad”

16

Front (MILF), declared ‘Jihad’ on July 11, 2000 in response to the all-out-war launched by the Estrada regime.”17

The MILF Chairman in voice-recorded message added:

“Let us not be saddened by intrusion to some portions of our camps by the government troops for some day we shall rise again…the government soldiers may be able to overrun our camps or controlled areas but not our hearts and minds. The most dangerous defeat is when the enemies of Islam conquer our hearts and minds’.”18

On this “declaration of all-out Jihad”, intellectuals and peace advocates among them former Congressman Rey Magno Teves exclaimed: “This is the logical and possible consequence of the government’s over emphasis on military action.” And added: “The consequences are going to be tragic not only for Mindanao but also for the Philippine economy.”19

Fr. Eliseo Mercado, Jr., OMI and active ceasefire mediator between the GRP and MILF, said this was an inevitable response of the MILF to the siege of Camp Abubakar. He added: “I am not surprised over this recent turn of events but I am sad because it could have been avoided.”20

In response to the call of the MILF Chairman for an all-out-Jihad, BIAF forces all over Mindanao shifted their war strategy from conventional type to guerilla warfare where forces were splintered into small groups with no identified camps and “intensified their guerilla offensive against AFP-CAFGU Vigilante deployment throughout, particularly in Muslim Mindanao since the month of July…”21

In terms of human displacement, different figures were accumulated both by different government agencies, the humanitarian entities and the non-government organizations placed at 740,000 to more than a million individuals uprooted, not less than 5,000 lives lost both combatants and non-combatants of AFP and MILF and billions of properties damaged and destroyed.

In the end, the respected analyst, Amando Doronila of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stated in his column: “Thus, when President Estrada triumphantly announce at

17 Homeland – Vol. VII, No.5 September – October 2000 Issue, p.318 Homeland – Vol. VII, No.5 September – October 2000 Issue, p.319 Ibid20 Ibid21 Homeland – Vol. VII, No.5 September – October 2000 Issue, p.4

Rey Magno Teves, a legislator turned

peace advocate

These shanties are typical replacements to thousands of civilian houses burned

during the war

17

Abubakar that, ‘this is the start of peace,’ and when Mercado declared that ‘the war is over’, they were making extravagant claims and announcing an empty victory… Abubakar merely marked a new episode opening a guerilla war.”22 And so the war in Mindanao continued with the MILF adopting the new guerilla tactics at their advantage, a state of affair that lasted until March 2001.

The Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo Presidency

he so-called celebrated victory of the Estrada administration did not last long as his term was cut short in a people power, thus “On

January 20, 2001, Estrada, was ousted from Office under degrading circumstances. Almost all his trusted friends who benefited much from his power including (General Angelo) Reyes and (DND Secretary Orlando) Mercado abandoned him when he needed them most and joined the ranks of the plotters.”23

T

Immediately, Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed the presidency and in no time reversed the “all-out-war” policy of her predecessor by announcing her “all-out-peace” policy. She then started establishing contacts with the MILF leadership for possible resumption of the stalled peace talks. At the outset, the MILF was hesitant to agree trying to recollect how the negotiation was breached by Estrada.

Later, the MILF yielded after President Arroyo asked Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table. The MILF concurred under certain conditions that redirected

the course of negotiation from purely domestic nature to a sort of internationally colored peace talks.

Despite of the continuing armed skirmishes amidst the negotiation, the GRP-MILF Panels were able to move on at snail-pace and brought the number of interim agreements into a total of 41 Interim Agreements.

INTERNATIONALLY FEATURED NEGOTIATION

ith the facilitation of the good office of Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammad, the MILF agreed to return to the

negotiating table and immediately convened its Central Committee to form a new set of negotiating team. The new GRP and MILF Panels met for the first time outside of the country in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on March 24, 2001, thus came up with the following preconditions to start

W

22 Amando Doronilla, After Abubakar, What Next? An Analysis, PDI – July 12, 200023 Salah Jubair, THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process (2007) p. 34

Gloria M. Arroyo, the 14th

President of the Philippines

18

the negotiation: (1) To respect and implement all previous agreements; (2) The venue of the talks shall be in a neutral foreign state; (3) The OIC or any member state acts as mediator or facilitator; and (4) The pullout of government forces from occupied acknowledged camps of the MILF. With the preconditions met, the two panels committed to continue the negotiation and this was also the start of Malaysia’s important role in the GRP-MILF Peace Talks.

The 2nd Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assembly

aking their part in the upcoming formal resumption of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks and spearheaded by the Ulama-Professionals Executive

Council, the Bangsamoro people convened the “2nd Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assembly” on June 1 – 3, 2001 at the Da’wah Complex Center, Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao.

T

Significantly, the assembly was attended by 2,627,345 delegates coming from all walks of life of the Bangsamoro society from different parts of Mindanao. At the end of the Plenary Session, the grand assembly concluded with the adoption of the resolutions aimed at resolving the age-old Bangsamoro problem which declared among others:

“(1) That the only just, meaningful and permanent solution to the Mindanao problem is the complete independence of the Bangsamoro people and the territories they now actually occupy from Republic of the Philippines; (2) That pursuant to this declaration of the Bangsamoro independence and in the spirit of justice and human brotherhood, we also extend recognition and support to the same right to self-determination for the indigenous highland tribal communities and the Christian settler people of Mindanao if and when they so opt to exercise this right; (3) That in view of the forthcoming peace negotiations between the MILF and GRP, we are giving our full support and mandate to the MILF to represent us [the Bangsamoro] in the negotiations, as well as in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the United Nations (UN) ; provided , however, that the MILF does not deviate from our demand for complete independence and accept a compromise short of this aforesaid demand. Should the MILF choose to deviate, these support and mandate are deemed automatically rescinded and withdrawn,

Portion of the more than two million Bangsamoro parti - cipants who gave

mandate to MILF to continue

19

and we shall pursue the struggle through any means open to us until Allah, the Most High, has given us victory or granted us the honor of martyrdom.”24 [Italics mine]

The Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001

quipped with the mandate from the Bangsamoro, the MILF ventured on the first formal negotiation in foreign land held at Tripoli, Libya

on June 22, 2001. Significantly, the talks yielded an agreement which was considered “Mother” of all GRP-MILF interim agreements that had been made reference to all succeeding agreements forged between the two parties.

E

It also trimmed-down the former 9-Point Agenda and later the 6-Point Agenda of the peace talks as previously agreed as follows:

(1) The Security Aspect: that paved the way for the implementation of the ceasefire agreements with and further strengthened the established ceasefire mechanism such as the GRP-MILF Coordinating Committees on Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs), AdHoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) for interdiction of criminals in MILF areas and later the International Monitoring Team (IMT).

One of the important developments attained under this aspect were strengthening of different ceasefire mechanism with implementing guidelines and structures and emplacement of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) headed by Malaysian contingent which virtually reduced the number armed confrontations in violation to the ceasefire accord from as high as more than three hundred encounters to less than ten in a year.

(2) The Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect : that gave rise to the establishment of the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) as an alter-ego of the MILF in developmental works within the conflict-affected areas. The most important substance of this aspect is the commitment of both GRP-MILF Panels to respect human rights and International Humanitarian Laws that substantiate claims of some pundits that the GRP-MILF Negotiation is of international character.

Aside from the above, there are provisions that the MILF through the BDA shall determine, lead and manage the implementation of all development projects within conflict-affected areas and that it will serve as ‘pipeline’ of all foreign assistance intended for the development of conflict-affected areas. Other than this, is the provision that the

24 Souvenir Booklet, Declaration of the Second Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assembly – June 3, 2001

20

government shall provide the war affected communities with “war reparations’.

(3) Ancestral Domain Aspect; the most critical aspect perceive to lead towards finding final political solution to the Bangsamoro Problem. The Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF negotiation was divided into four major strands: (1) Concept, (2) Territory, (3) Resources, and (4) Governance.

Practically, despite of the strengthened ceasefire, still greater part of Mindanao especially in areas identified as MILF controlled areas were spoiled by sporadic armed skirmishes between AFP and BIAF elements which was quoted by media as: “Two MG-520 attack Helicopters pounded rebel position in the villages of Tatapan in Shariff Aaguak and Pamalian in Datu Piang, Maguindanao.” And: “ Heavily armed Moro Islamic Liberation Front rebels pounded with B-40 rockets an army detachment in Pagalungan town in Maguindanao over the weekend, an army spokesman said.”25 This situation is also true in many areas in Mindanao.

Under the above atmosphere, the negotiation went on despite occasional armed confrontations, the scheduled 3rd round of talks outside the country between GRP-MILF Panel meeting set on October 15, 2001 at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia did not yield any good result due to the GRP Panel Chair Jesus Dureza’s attempt to change some provision of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 particularly on Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect that got the ire of the MILF Panel.

In an interview with the MILF Panel Chairman Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim about the GRP Panel’s alteration of agreed points, he said: “Unless the government conforms with the stipulation of the accord (The Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect)…early resumption of the talks is very unlikely. I don’t understand the government attitude on the peace process.”26 This delay in the continuance of the negotiation was further reinforced by the upcoming end of Ramadhan on December 15 and followed by Christmas and New Year seasons.

In summary, from June 15, 2000 to January 2003, the GRP-MILF negotiation revolved on strengthening and operationalizing the Security Aspect and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001. In addition, most if not all of the negotiations were done as exploratory or back-channel peace talks.

25 The Mindanao CROSS - October 23, 2002 Issue, p.1 26 Maradika – December 2001 Issue, p.5

21

The Buliok War of 2003

ust as when everyone is in high spirit and hope of advancing the gains of the ‘all-out peace policy’ of the Arroyo administration with the

forging of mechanisms of Security Aspect and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks when war loomed again in different parts of Mindanao.

J

Once again, people who expect and following the ups and down of the peace process were taken aback when the government ordered her ‘all-out military offensive’ in Barangay Buliok in boundaries of the municipalities of Pikit, Cotabato and Pagalungan, Maguindanao allegedly in pursuit of nine members of the Pentagon Kidnap for Ransom

Group. The military attack was a combined aerial and ground assault that was timed in into Eidel Adha Prayer while MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim was delivering Khutba (sermon) at the Islamic Center on February

11, 2003.

On this unprecedented military operation one writer had this to say:

“When the war between forces of the government military and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) erupted anew in February 2003 in Central Mindanao, it is a war of guesses why it happened. This was because the government military declared illogical objectives of its surprising offensive against the MILF Guerillas.”27

“The leadership of both the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Department of National Defense (DND) were at first categorical that the intensified military operation launched on February 11 was after a small band of kidnap for ransom Pentagon Group taking refuge in MILF camps. Later, they declared that MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim was in Pikit, North Cotabato leading in the massing up of MILF forces. They later averred that war will be over when they have taken over the Buliok Complex, the so called main MILF camp.”28

An updates of the current situation states that:

“President Gloria M. Arroyo had set forth her pace of the Moro war policy when she launched the attack on the positions of the MILF during the holding of the congregational prayer of the Eid ul-Adha on

27 Patrick I. Patino – The Changing Logic of the Mindanao War, uploaded April 2, 200328 Ibid

War renders Moro Peoples Indigent.

Unending IDP queue for relief assistance every time war

Erupts in Mindanao

22

February 11, 2003 at the so-called Buliok Complex in Pagalungan and Pikit in Maguindanao and North Cotabato respectively…”29

“The number of internally displaced persons or evacuees continued to rise in Mindanao as an offshoot of the current war launched by the Arroyo government. Badly affected areas comprised the provinces of Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), namely: Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur including Marawi City, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Basilan. The ARMM now hosted about 140,000 evacuees.”30

The Long Lethargic Stage of the Peace Process

s a result of the military attack in Buliok Complex on February 11, 2003 up to middle of the year 2005 could be considered the longest

idle phase of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks. Except for a couple of important matters that dealt with regaining confidence and re-assessment of previous agreements, nothing much went positively in the negotiation.

A

Despite of the government’s efforts to restart the negotiation, the MILF, speaking through Salah Jubair, was hesitant to accede due to past sad experiences as shown by the fact that:

“As is usual in military initiatives, the government was keener in initiating moves to reengage the parties in the talks. The government sent feelers through its contact with the MILF leaderships. First was DND Secretary Renato de Villa followed by DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong, who both explored with the MILF the possibility of reinstating the ceasefire. After a serious study, the MILF agreed to the proposal.”31

While several exploratory talks and back-channeling for around two and half years were confined only to the level of GRP-MILF Technical Committees and the Coordinating Committees on Cessation of Hostilities. On the other hand, war continued to engulf different parts of Mindanao.

Several roadblocks that contributed to this long limp period of the negotiation starting from Jesus Dureza’s attempt to annotate the GRP-MILF agreement particularly on Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect. There was also hard grappling between the GRP-MILF Panels on the withdrawal of AFP elements in Buliok, Pikit; the dropping of charges filed against MILF leaders and the withdrawal of bounties. It was also in this period when the Chairman of the MILF 29 Datu Jun Mantawil –Mindanao War 2003: Displacement, Rehabilitation and Development – An Update (2003)30 Ibid31 Salah Jubair, THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process (2007) p. 39

23

Central Committee, Ustadz Salamat Hashim died on July 13, 2003 in one of his lairs at the jungle of Lanao del Sur due to ailment and the outbreaks of the widespread bombings in different urban centers in Mindanao including the celebrated Sasa Wharf and Davao International Airport bombings in Davao City which were all being maliciously charged against the MILF.

On the part of the government had been preoccupied by the 2004 elections that installed Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for a full six-year term presidency. Her enthronement as the 14th president of the Philippine starting in its first day had been rocked with criticism and engulf with uncertainty and questions of illegitimacy due to electoral fraud as manifested by the “Hello Garci Tape” controversy. The emergence of coup plots among them the celebrated “Oakwood Mutiny” and looming impeachment complaints and continuing mass rallies. On the peace process, there was also continuing accusation by the government of the MILF allegedly cuddling criminals including elements of Jemaah Islamiya, Al-Qaeda and Abu Sayyaf aside from the continuing pocket wars in different parts of Mindanao.

The Emergence of CSOs: the “Missing Link” in the Peace Process

owever, the period is not at all worthless as the years saw the emergence of more active and concerted efforts with the

participation of the civil society organizations (CSOs) in the peace process—an occurrence that was absent in the past even during the government’s dealing with the MNLF that fashioned the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement of September 2, 1996. The reason why peace advocates tagged the CSOs as the “missing link” in the peace process.

H

The importance of CSOs’ role in the peace process was stressed by Major Ariel R. Caculitan in his master’s thesis which stated:

“Prendergast and Plumb underscore the capability of the civil society organizations in supporting the implementation of peace agreements towards sustainable peace for two reasons: firstly, they have the capability to bridge conflictual communities, and secondly, they can serve as a pressure group to political leaders to remain working toward the peaceful negotiation of the conflict. In relation to this, Santos sees the presence of peace advocates in Mindanao as one of the brightest hopes for the Mindanao peace process.”32

32 Major Ariel R. Caculitan – NEGOTIATING PEACE WITH THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES – A Thesis at Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California – December 5, 2005, p.57

24

This is not to say that CSOs in the past did not exist as an important stakeholders in shaping the contemporary setting in Mindanao but the fact lies in that most of them had been considered as ‘fly by night’ group organized just to acquire funds, preoccupied by programs related to developmental and livelihood programs. Or if there are among them concerned with the peace advocacy, it was on their individual initiatives which most often than not considered as ‘voices lost in the wilderness.’ On this, one known and veteran CSO leader Guiamel Alim, has this to say:

“The sudden growth of NGOs was mainly due to the call for more aggressive ‘development’ efforts that was to follow after the signing of the peace accord. Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs) from among MNLF cadres were trained to organize Peace and Development Communities (PDCs) who will pursue development work in MNLF areas. Efforts then were mainly focused on livelihood and infrastructure projects. Unfortunately, the NGOs were not concerned about monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement.”33

The worst is that CSO works in most of the time were considered by some critics to be strengthening counter-insurgency program of the government. One MILF Official also opined that:

“The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has called on the various non-government organizations (NGOs) operating in Mindanao to support the GRP-MILF Peace Talks, instead of subverting the struggle of the Bangsamoro people for self-determination and freedom by way of superficially creating a transition from war to peace situation through the policy of ‘demilitarization’, ‘demobilization’ and

‘reintegration’ or DDR. Khaled Musa, deputy chairman of the MILF committee on Information, told Luwaran that this policy of some NGOs is totally unacceptable and should be stopped immediately before they can create havoc in the ranks of our people and fighters.”34

33 Guiamel M. Alim - The Civil Society and the Peace Process in Mindanao, A Paper presented to COP 3, Penang, Malaysia, `January 12-15, 200934 http://www.luwaran.com/modules.- January 15, 2006

CSO Leaders coordinating efforts to stop war and continue peace talks

with the MILF

One CSO strategy to pressure adversaries in war

is bringing their stakeholders’ leaders in one

25

Challenged by the continuing war, the impasse on the peace process and the increasing number of languishing IDPs in different evacuation centers that already surged to more than 203,000 and the recorded deaths in different IDP Centers also increased to 117, mostly children and women gave impetus to more concerted efforts from the CSOs.

Thus, on May 13 - 15, 2003 seven large peace advocates networks convened in what was tagged as ‘MindaNow Peace Conference’ in Apo View Hotel, Davao City, in order to fuse their efforts towards peace process particularly on the dragging GRP-MILF Peace talks. These networks were cited as:

“Networking for peace became an advocacy for seriously concerned groups to support the process through a coalition known as Mindanaw Peaceweavers. The coalition includes the Agong Network, Bishops-Ulama Forum (BUF), Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS), Mindanao Peace Advocates Conference (MPAC), Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC), Mindanao People’s Peace Movement (MPPM), Mindanao Solidarity Network (MSN), and Peace Advocates Zamboanga (PAZ).”35

It was in this conference where the now Mindanao Peaceweavers was established and appointed Guiamel Alim, Chairperson of the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS) as the first lead convener of the group. As an acid test to the newly-born peace advocacy group was the adoption of multi-prong approach campaign to “stop the on-going war and return to negotiating table of the GRP-MILF Panels.”

In the implementation of the pilot advocacy was that every network was given respective assignments. Some were tasked to lobby to the Legislators and Local Government Officials in war devastated areas; others were assigned with different foreign embassies on possible continuance of the stalled peace talks. Mindanao Peaceweavers was able to connect to Malacañang through then Secretary Corazon ‘Dinky’ Soliman and Teresita ‘Ging’ Deles of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), respectively. The agreement then was that for the peace groups to convince the MILF to declare ceasefire and that the government should reciprocate by declaring their own cessation of military operation.The Bakwit Power I: Exodus for Peace

35 Major Ariel R. Caculitan – NEGOTIATING PEACE WITH THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES – A Thesis at Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California –December 5, 2005, p.57

Guiamel Alim leading CSO Leaders in a dialogue with AFP High Command in the

locality

26

odesty aside, CBCS with Saligan-Mindanaw was given the hardest of tasks and these were negotiating with the MILF leaderships who

already went on hiding due to the charges filed and the bounties put over the heads of their top leaders that consequently made them quite strict and limit their contacts on outside people and groups. The other task was mobilization of the IDPs and CSO groups which resulted to the successful

launching of the “1st Bakwit Power I: Exodus for Peace” that produced thousands and thousands of unbroken ‘human-chain’ and occupied half-lane of the Cotabato-Davao national highway portion covering the municipalities of Pikit, Pagalungan and Datu

Montawal in the second day. And the third task given to CBCS was a dialogue with President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo that was successfully undertaken in Iligan City on June 14, 2003.

M

These CSO active engagements on the peace process were aptly described as:

“After focused group discussions among the evacuees, and meeting with local government units, business groups and peace advocates, ‘Bakwit Power’ was conducted on June 24 -25, (2003). It was first time in the history of evacuations in Central Mindanao that the evacuees openly denounced the war and violence happening in their own communities through a public protest.”36

The MILF’s SOMA & GRP’s SOMO

hough there are other players, through the above undertakings greatly influenced the MILF’s declaration of a ten-day “Suspension of

Military Action (SOMA)” starting on June 2, 2003.T

A sudden change of event took place that put CBCS under hot-water, when after the government’s Cluster-E Cabinet meeting was conducted and they refused to reciprocate with the MILF’s SOMA, claiming that the MILF’s SOMA is already a sign of defeat and that the AFP is already on the upper hand in Buliok War.

The refusal of the government to reciprocate as previously agreed with their emissaries was perceived by the MILF as treachery of the

36 Atty. Mary Ann Arnado –Addressing Humanitarian Protection and Human Security in Mindanao: A CHALLENGE TO CIVIL SOCIETY –Bangsamoro Journal, December 2004 Issue, p.11

Portion of the “human chain” that traversed 3 municipalities of Pikit,

Pagalungan and

27

CSOs and CBCS. This forced the latter to pursue with mobilization of the IDPs and masses in the second week of June 2003 an undertaking preceded by the dialogue with president Arroyo on the same month of June 2003 to demand for the government to reciprocate the cessation of hostilities.

As a consequence of government’s refusal to respond the MILF’s SOMA, CBCS had to renegotiate again with the MILF for extension of their SOMA while other member networks of the Mindanao Peaceweavers are busy exerting all their level best to pressure the government to reciprocate in the cessation of hostilities. To this, after CSOs compliance with multi-level requirements set by the MILF, the latter extended their SOMA for another ten days and to end on June 22, 2003.

After a long hurdle and pressure from peace advocates and religious sectors, the government finally gave in and on July 19, 2003 announced its own version of suspension of military operation (SOMO) where “the President directed the AFP to shift from ‘punitive action’ to active defense.”37 The situation paved the way for settling down of differences and insured necessary mechanisms for the continuance of the high level peace talks.

The Advent of the International Monitoring Team (IMT)

nother milestone in GRP-MILF negotiation in this period, idle as it was due to all negotiation were done on low level that means on the

level of Technical and Ceasefire Committees, the agreement on the entrance of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) added international color to the negotiation.

A

The new event came after the GRP-MILF established Terms of Reference (TOR) for monitoring the implementation of the Security Aspect especially the ceasefire agreements. Consequently, the TOR for the IMT was signed on September 8 and the Advance Survey Team followed on September 10, 2004 which was later followed by its Administrative and Logistics Team.

“The first batch of the Malaysian-led international peace monitors had arrived on October 9, 2004 at the Villamor Airbase in Manila, while those from the government of Brunei Darussalam came in October 22, 2004.”38 37 OPAPP – Updates of the Status of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks, November 4, 200438 Libya to Join IMT Soon – Maradika, November 2004 Issue, p.4

28

This batch was followed soon by other IMT contingent until it was completed and immediately deployed to their respective sites.

The entrance of the IMT as part of the peace mechanisms gave a different façade to the GRP-MILF negotiation as it was only during their stay that people saw tremendous decrease of ceasefire violations and armed confrontations between the AFP and BIAF until their pull out September of 2008.

Significantly, “with the advent of the IMT, there was a tremendous reduction of armed confrontation in violation to the ceasefire agreement between the GRP-MILF Forces. The reduction was from as high as six hundred ninety eight (698) encounters in 2002, five hundred fifty nine (559) encounters in 2003 to as low as fifteen (15) in 2004, ten (10) in 2005.”39 Finally, the first half of year 2008, there was only eight (8) ceasefire violations if not for the government’s order of ‘military surgical operation’ in August of that year.

In the later part of the IMT stint in the Mindanao peace process they started to share important role in pacifying the rising notion on clan conflicts being popularize as “rido” among the Bangsamoro society.

Operationalization of the GRP-MILF Ad Hoc Joint Action Group

nother significant achievement of the GRP-MILF low-level and exploratory talks was the adoption of interim agreement to

operationalize the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) as contained in the Joint Communiqué on May 2002 but was set aside due to the continuing impasse on the negotiation. GRP-MILF AHJAG is meant to interdict criminals that had been indicted by the government to the MILF.

A

It should be recalled that most if not all of the big wars that erupted in violation to the ceasefire accord the likes of the 1997 MalMar War, 2000 all-out war, 2003 all out military offensives and several others all started by the state forces allegedly in pursuit of criminal and terrorists elements being suspected lingering or worst cuddled by the MILF in their controlled areas. The AFP had all the reason in their operations since “maintenance of peace and pursuit of criminalities” was their continuing mandate as stipulated in the AGCH Implementing Operational and Administrative Guidelines.

39 Reference: OPAPP - UPDATES ON THE PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN THE GRP AND MILF, 2005

CSO Leaders collaborate with IMT in monitoring

works

29

In totality, the two and a half year period and seeing the negotiation on this view it could be the most frustrating event since no formal and high level talks occurred. This has been the reason many of the peace advocates who eagerly engaged with this peace process expressed annoyance over the prolong impasse. “The peace advocates calling themselves, (Mindanao Peaceweavers) ‘networks of networks’ aired their impatience over the non-resumption of peace talks despite alleged repeated claims by both the government and the MILF of the immediate holding of the negotiations.”40

Mohagher Iqbal, Chairman of the MILF Panel, appealed to the peace advocates to be patient and understanding, saying that the peace process is progressing well forward.41 Considering the above statement, there might be truth in it that although being looked upon by outsiders as the idle period there were substantial agreements forged on low-level talks as follows:

The MILF General Consultation

s the negotiation is nearing to its closure period and with some feeling of uncertainty on the real outcome of the negotiation, the

MILF leadership called the MILF General Consultation for their leaders and the Bangsamoro as a whole in order to refresh their mandate as well as to comprehend the real sentiment of the people at the crucial moment of the peace talks.

A

There is other reason for the MILF leadership to ascertain support and confidence of the Moro People due to the recent change of leadership as a result of the death of Chairman Salamat Hashim on July 13, 2003. With the appointment of Chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim as the new Chairman of the MILF was only more than a year and perhaps they want to prove whether same support still exists as his predecessor.

It should be recalled that already two big consultative assemblies had been done on similar occasion but those were sponsored by peace groups and civil society organizations. This General Consultation of the Bangsamoro was initiated by the MILF Leadership in a short span of preparations and really proven successful as it surpassed the numbers of participants to those previous assemblies.

Related to this, Muhammad Ameen, chairperson of the MILF Central Committee Secretariat, was quoted as saying:

40 Ibid41 Peace Talks is Alive and Kicking, MILF Says – Maradika, October 2004 Issue, p.4

30

“The purpose of the consultation according to was to get fresh mandate direct from the people in view of the crucial development in the peace talks particularly after the April

(2005) meeting of the two parties in Kuala Lumpur which yielded some important outputs.”42

“Based on records from the registration and accommodation, the General Consultation had mustered a total of 3,934,065 guests and participants coming from all walks of life travelling through land and seas as far as Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Palawan, Basilan, Davao Oriental, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Sarangani and South Cotabato with Maguindanao, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur and Sultan Kudarat serving as the main bulk of the delegations including all the cities situated thereat. The two Lanaos alone said Aleem Abdulazis Mimbantas, vice chair for military affairs, went through with about 4,123 transport cars and trucks, which constituted the major participants of the MILF General Consultation.”43

The assembly ended with the passage of Resolution No. 001-05 titled “Resolution granting new and fresh mandate to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the ongoing peace talks with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) in order to achieve a negotiated political settlement of the conflict in Mindanao and of the Bangsamoro Problem.” Dispositive portion of the Resolution stated:

“Now therefore, we the Bangsamoro people assembled in plenary session under the auspices of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front at Camp Darapanan, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao in the Bangsamoro Homeland, resolved and hereby unanimously decree and adopt this resolution, through our respective deputies and representatives, representing the various provincial, municipal and barangay political committees, together and in solidarity with the base and sector commanders of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, and all the various committees as follows: Resolve as it is hereby resolved that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is hereby granted full power and authority and unconditional mandate by the Bangsamoro people meeting in a plenary session to pursue and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive negotiated political

42 Salah Jubair, THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process (2007) p.12043 Jun Mantawil – MILF General Consultation: A Historic Landmark of Clear Mandate of Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Bangsamoro Journal – September 2005 Issue, p.5

MILF Chair Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim

addressing the General Assembly

Part of around four million Bangsamoro who gave fresh

mandate to MILF to negotiate with GRP

31

settlement of the Mindanao conflict and of the Bangsamoro problem.” 44

The Smooth Navigation of the Peace Process

quipped with the fresh mandate from the Bangsamoro, the MILF confidently returned to the negotiating table and despite occasional

outbreak of armed confrontations and on and off divergence, the peace talks moved on in the discussion of what was believed to be the “most crucial and contentious” issue of the GRP-MILF peace talks - the Ancestral Domain Aspect.

E

The 7th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks just concluded had been

considered by both the government and MILF as major breakthrough since they started talking in 1997. In their media statements, the GRP and MILF Panels claimed that 60% and 80% respectively had been achieved in their talks on concept, territory, resources and governance strands of the ancestral domain aspect.

On this progress, Mohagher Iqbal, head of the MILF Peace Panel, in an interview on the eve of the talks, described the issue of ancestral domain, the first substantive agenda of the peace process as ‘make or break’, saying it touched on various matters considered by both the MILF and government as ‘sensitive and crucial’.45

Amidst the positive development and at the back of the minds of the MILF leaders are great skepticism which aptly depicted by Chairman Iqbal as a “make or break”. For they know that in every negotiation, the most crucial episode in settlement of any problem is to start and end the process.

And so the bright prospect of the negotiation continued on with the conclusion of the 8th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks done on June 21, 2005 at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

and the 9th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks held at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on September 16, 2005 virtually resolve contentious issues especially on the strand of governance which was left untouched during

the 7th Exploratory Talks. With this development the two parties as well as those closely following the trends of negotiation were happy and optimistic on the looming closure of the peace talks.

44 Salah Jubair, THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process (2007) p.12345 Breakthrough on Ancestral Domain MILF Says 80%, GRP Sees 60% - Maradika May 2005 Issue pp.1-5.

Mohagher Iqbal the current and longest serving chair of MILF

Panel

32

Meanwhile, the MILF Chairman stated in his message to the General Consultation that “Peace is partly at hand.”46 He further elaborated this statement during the press conference called after such consultation held at Camp Darapanan, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao. This optimism was reinforced further at the 10th, 11th and 12th Exploratory Talks that ironed out some disparities and technicalities between the two panels that set the negotiation towards the conclusion of the 3rd Aspect which is related to the agenda on Ancestral Domain.

The Pocket Wars of 2006

rior to the long impasse in the negotiation, there was an outbreak of

pocket war occurred in the quarter-boundaries of municipalities of Mamasapano, Shariff Aguak, Datu Unsay and Datu Saudi Ampatuan in Maguindanao between CAFGU/CVOs under Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. and elements of 105th Base Command of the MILF-BIAF under Sheikh Amelil Umbra Kato. The armed skirmishes started when the government militias encroached on the MILF area allegedly to serve “arrest warrants” against elements of 105th Base Command charged with multiple murders as a result of bomb explosion in Poblacion Shariff Aguak on June 23, 2006, thus the militia offensive on June 29, 2006.

P

This is a glaring example of how government militias or paramilitary plays role both in conflict and the peace talks in Mindanao as the pocket war did inflict great damages to the lives of civilians and endanger smooth sail of the peace talks. The armed skirmishes were never ordinary occurrence as it left thousands of civilians uprooted as stated:

“It was difficult to determine the number of evacuees at the early stage of the fighting as humanitarian and relief organizations were not allowed entry to the so called ‘danger zone,’ but when the skirmishes stopped, around 4,936 families or approximately 24,680 individuals were recorded to have vacated their homes from 13 villages of six neighboring Maguindanao towns, namely, Shariff Aguak, Mamasapano, Datu Unsay Ampatuan, Datu Saudi Ampatuan.”47

46 Murad: Peace is partly at Hand in Mindanao – Maradika, June 2005 Issue p.147 Bantay Ceasefire Report - Skirmishes and Displacement of Civilians in Maguindanao, June – July 2006.

One of the more than 400 civilians’ houses razed to

the ground during the 2006 pocket war

33

In addition, even the Joint Monitoring Action Team (JMAT) Center of the GRP-MILF-IMT and Bantay Ceasefire was razed to the ground, thus:

“The Bantay Ceasefire has recorded a total of 251 houses, which include at least four rice mills, that were razed and still undetermined number of farm machineries and implements destroyed, burned or carted away by the armed men. There are, however, conflicting reports as to the number of houses burned as the GRP-IMT came out with a total of 215 while other government sources put the figure at 405 houses.”48

Back to the Long Impasse in the Peace Talks s usual, just when everyone was on high spirit on the satisfactory development in the negotiation as the two parties were on their

wrapping up of the draft Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain that will lead the two parties into formal talks on Comprehensive Compact when the impasse came. We have to bear in mind that the Ancestral Domain Aspect is not the final political settlement of the Bangsamoro problem but rather only a conclusion of the 3rd Agenda of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks along with the Security and Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspects. Further, all the recent interim agreements and consensus point forged related to the Ancestral Domain issues were done at low-level or “exploratory talks”.

A

The sudden impasse came during their 13th Exploratory Talks. Maulana Alonto of the MILF Peace Panel stated:

“In the 13th Exploratory Talks held from September 6-7, (2006) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia between the MILF and GRP Panels, a snag developed which has curtailed what would have been a 4-day deliberation on the remaining ‘technical’ matters that had to be sorted out before a memorandum of agreement on the ancestral domain aspect can be drafted and signed by both parties.”49

The Malaysian facilitator was quoted as saying:

“It is a breakdown that could end in a breakup of the talks if no significant positive results are achieved to push the negotiation forward. Indeed, the seriousness of the situation is underscored by the fact that Malaysia, which has been brokering the talks since 2003 upon the imploration of the Arroyo regime, has threatened to

48 Ibid49 Maulana M. Alonto – Breakdown of GRP-MILF Negotiation: Will It Result in a Breakup?, Bangsamoro Journal – December 2006 Issue, p.4

34

terminate the negotiations and pull out the International Monitoring Team (IMT) from the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao.”50

Despite of the deteriorating state of the negotiation, it continued on what is termed as “Question and Answer” meetings followed by “Exploratory Talks” which was non-formal and low-level nature with no formal agenda being tackled. The two panels met with the continued ushering of the Malaysian facilitator whenever the two panels find it necessary.

On the long impasse, OPAPP was quoted as saying: “Secretary Jesus Dureza, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process assessed the impasse as ‘among the most serious to stall the rocky talks, a big bump’ upon which the Philippine government has ‘no magic formula’ while ‘looking for a way out.’”51

This statement of the OPAPP was reinforced further by MILF Panel statement that there is “serious uncertainty” in the talks. The statement added that “the chair of the peace panel of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) said on the status of the peace talks with the government as he charged the Arroyo administration of allegedly treating the peace process as a mere counter-insurgency measure that seeks to restore peace in Mindanao without addressing the real cause of the conflict.”52

One Peace Advocate leader seriously lamented:

“When impasse took place (that shaken the entire peace process) in the peace negotiation between the GRP and MILF last September 2006 because of the issue of constitution, the MILF again issued an official statement informing the government that ‘the GRP-MILF peace process is passing through a turbulent area.’ It was an expression of strong protest against the use of constitution as bound of the process.”53

Notably, the long stalled talks through informal, backdoor and exploratory meetings still yielded significant achievements.

The Perceived “Breakthrough” in the Long Impasse

inally, in the February 1, 2008 meeting of the GRP-MILF Panels, it was thought by the peace spectators that the negotiation will finally F

50 Ibid51 CBCS Official Statement – A Call for Sincerity and Political Will – Bangsamoro Journal, March 2008, pp. 8 & 9. 52 GRP-MILF talks – where to?, MindaNews, September 15, 200653 Rahib Kudto – Break the Stumbling Block that Derails the Way to Peace, Bangsamoro Journal, March 2008 Issue. P.4

35

come into conclusion with the resolution of all consensus points on the Ancestral Domain aspect. The GRP-MILF Panel without necessarily explaining the details of their agreed “Consensus Points” but announced they were able to agree with 29 major provisions on the strands of Concept, Territory, Resources and Governance of the Ancestral Domain issue. It ended in the finalization of the framework and content of the draft Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain.

On this development, the Head Secretariat of the MILF Panel was quoted as saying:

“Practically the proposed text of the memorandum of agreement (MOA) on ancestral domain has been agreed by the government and the MILF after the January 31 – February 1 (2008) special meeting in Kuala Lumpur.” And he added: that this was secured after the Malaysian chief facilitator had shuttled between Manila and Darapanan, Sultan Kudarat in Shariff Kabunsuan from January 19-22, talking and smoothening all the unresolved minor points with both the government and MILF Peace Negotiators.”54

Just when everything on the negotiation was all set for the signing of the memorandum of agreement on ancestral domain, the government established a “Team of Legal Experts” purposely to study the legality and legal implications of the draft MOA. The legal experts started to scrutinize the document in February 19, 2008 and their study lasted for more than three months that prolong the continuing impasse in the peace talks. Luckily, early July 2008 they came out of opinion that the document was in order both in form and substance.

The Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain

mmediately after the legal experts dispatched their findings on the consensus points on the strands of the ancestral domain, the GRP-

MILF Panels met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and finalized all the remaining issues pertaining to it.

IThus, on July 27, 2008 the two parties initialed the proposed

Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). Initialing the final draft MOA-AD for the government was Rodolfo Garcia, Chairman of the GRP Panel and Mohagher Iqbal, Chairman of the MILF Panel. Also initialing as witness to the signing was Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Facilitator of the Talks and Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, and Office on Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Secretary Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. for the government of the

54 Jun Mantawil – Government Accused of Sitting on Peace Talks, Maradika, April 2008 p.6

36

Philippines. Eventually, they set the date of signing on August 5, 2008 in Putrajaya, Malaysia.

With this development, it seems everybody is in high spirits that the eleven-year negotiation marred by war and peace will find its end in settling the centuries old Moro problem in Mindanao. One peace worker remarked:

“After the GRP and MILF peace panels finally broke the impasse on the contentious Ancestral Domain aspect of the negotiations during their meeting on July 27 with the initialing of the MOA-AD, euphoria was high in Mindanao, particularly among the Bangsamoro people, who were then looking forward to the fulfillment of their long–cherished recognition and restoration of their right to self determination.”55

The Wrath of “Spoilers” of Peace

poilers and spoiling in Mindanao peace process is already an ugly spouse of the peace process since its inception. These spoilers are

aptly described as: S

“Spoilers and spoiling are groups and tactics that actively seek to hinder, delay or undermine conflict settlement through a variety of means and for a variety of motives (Newman and Richmond, 2006)”56 and “Spoilers as leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace threatens their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it (Stedman, 2000).”57

Newman and Stedman were true in their presentation as shortly before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, spoilers led in filing a petition in the Supreme Court on July 23, 2008 to stop the signing of the MOA-AD. The petition states among others:” Vice Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition (G.R. No. 183591) in Supreme Court seeking relief: (1) for the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and, in the alternative, writ of preliminary injunction against public respondents to formally signing the MOA; (2) requiring the latter to furnish petitioner the copy of 55 Daniel Ong – Aborted MOA-AD Signing Sparks Hostilities, Renewed war in Mindanao, Bangsamoro Journal, October 2008 Issue, p.456 Prof. Rufa Caguco-Guiam - Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: perspectives, prospects and options for the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination, Ppt Presentation, Davao City, December 6, 2007 57 Ibid

Leaders of the spoilers of GRP-MILF Peace Talks delighted

during Supreme Court’s promulgation of TRO against

signing of MOA-AD: From L-R Franklin Drilon, Mar Roxas,

Manny Piñol &

37

the MOA inclusive of its annexes; and, (3) prohibiting it to sign the MOA pending its disclosure to the public as well as its public consultation and hearing.” 58

On July 30, 2008 allies of Piñol in Zamboanga City led by its City Mayor, Celso Lobregat filed their own petition at the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 183752 which contained substantially the same allegations and causes of actions with the July 23 petition of North Cotabato.”59 And the respondents in both the July 23 and 30 petitions was the GRP peace-negotiating panel as represented by Rodolfo Garcia, Leah Armamento, Sedfrey Candelaria, Mark Ryan Sullivan and Hermogenes Esperon, presidential adviser on the peace process.”60

Meanwhile, Local Government Units (LGU) sponsored simultaneous protest rallies in the cities of Kidapawan in North Cotabato, Iligan in Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga headed by Piñol, Cruz and Lobregat respectively from July 30, 2008 to August 4, 2008. The rally was meant to dramatize their move to stop the government from signing the MOA-AD as contained in their petition filed before the Supreme Court earlier. Piñol in their rally was overheard by spectators and over a local TV station saying: “We will stop them (GRP-MILF) in signing the peace agreement at all cost!” He was also quoted to have said in vernacular:” Kung kailangan magbuwis tayo ng dugo para sila mahadlangan ay gagawin natin (if we need to shed our blood just to stop them, we will do so). And: “Masarap magbuwis ng dugo kung ito ay para sa kapayapaan at sa bayan (it is sweeter to shed blood in the name of peace and country).

In the national level, Senator Mar Roxas went on an hourly national TV advertisement on his criticism, baseless assumptions and biases against MOA-AD. He was quoted to have said that he would ask the Supreme Court to nullify the MOA-AD between the government and the MILF for being ‘unconstitutional’, saying it will create a ‘state within a state’ and the MOA-AD was a product of ‘coercion’ by MILF, thus, ‘a negotiation in bad faith.”61 Former Senate President Franklin Drilon went on in his own way of “1-Page Advertisement” in national daily and posted issues of ‘dismemberment’ with similar issues and languages as all the other spoilers of the GRP-MILF peace process.

The truth of the matter was that as early as 2005, the “spoilers” of peace already came out of an 8-paged paper criticizing point by point the “consensus points” of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain. The document was distributed in different local media outlets in

58 CBCS Secretariat -The Bangsamoro History: The Struggle for Self Determination, Bangsamoro Journal, October 2008 Issue, p.31 59 Ibid, p.3260 Ibid, p.3561 Ibid, p.35

38

the locality signed by Fernando Somejo claiming to be the spokesman of “Mindanao Christian Highlanders Alliance” (MICHA) base in Midsayap, North Cotabato. In the transmittal of this document, they stressed in bold letters a strongly worded call “We shall OPPOSE the consensus points made and the eventual signing of the Pact between GRP and MILF”62, referring to the ongoing peace talks between the GRP and MILF on the just started discussion of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001. Coincidentally or deliberately, this was very similar words uttered by vice Governor Emmanuel Piñol in his closing statement during their protest rally in Kidapawan City shortly before the scheduled signing of MOA-AD.

Some peace advocates on the other hand did their part in an attempt to avert the voices of spoilers as stated: “Civil society groups urged the government and the MILF to ‘stay the course’ and not get distracted from the desperate, though deliberating gasps of spoilers and those thrive on unpeace.”63 It seems their efforts turned into voices lost in the wilderness and the anti-peace prevailed.

Supreme Court Discarded the Negotiation

n August 4, 2008 a day before the scheduled signing ceremony of MOA-AD and acting on the petitions, “a Resolution in Supreme Court

was promulgated consolidating the July 23 North Cotabato petition and July 30 Zamboanga City petition; issuing temporary restraining order (TRO) directing public respondents to cease and desist from signing the MOA.”64

O

And so in a 89-page decision penned by Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, the Court, granting the main and intervening petitions, enjoined the respondents and their agents from signing and executing the MOA-AD or similar agreements. Joining the majority who favored the petitioners against MOA-AD signing were: “Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, and Justice Ruben T. Reyes, joining the majority vote, all wrote separate opinions. Also joining the majority are Senior Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez.”65

62 Fernando Somejo – Transmittal Letter of Document POSITION AND COMMENTS TO THE CONSENSUS POINTS ON THE ANCESTRAL DOMAIN CLAIMS AT THE GRP-MILF TALKS, Midsayap, Cotabato, January 30, 200563 CBCS Secretariat -The Bangsamoro History: The Struggle for Self Determination, Bangsamoro Journal, October 2008 Issue, p.3264 Ibid65 Jay B. Rempillo - SC Declares MOA-AD Unconstitutional, Posted at kusogmindanaw@ yahoogroups. com, October 14, 2008

39

“Those who voted for the dismissal of the petition and wrote dissenting opinions are Justice Dante O. Tinga, Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr., Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, and Justice Arturo D. Brion. Justice Renato C. Corona joined Justice Tinga's dissent.”66

A closer look at how the justices voted in favor and against the petition were tied at 7 – 7 but Chief Justice Reynato Puno acted as “tie-breaker” in favor of the petition. On the other hand their decision too could be considered “double dissenting decision” as even those who voted in favor of the petition has their own dissenting opinions and so with those who were for the dismissal of the petition. Nevertheless, just the same, “[t]he Court struck down the MOA-AD as unconstitutional instead of withholding judgment until the GRP and MILF peace panels could complete the series of negotiations that should have ended with the Comprehensive Compact. In doing so, the Court opted to cut off the peace process.”67

Aborted MOA-AD Signing

n August 4, 2008 at the time the Supreme Court of the Philippines is promulgating their TRO for the signing of the MOA-AD, both the

GRP and MILF Panels with around fifty invitees each party were already in Malaysia and the venue of historic signing was arranged to accommodate 350 guests were all set in the Marriott Hotel in Putrajaya, Malaysia’s administrative capital.

O

The diplomatic communities including members of the 57-Nation Organization of Islamic Conference headed by Ambassador Sayed El-Masry, Adviser to the OIC Secretary General and Special Envoy to the Southern Philippines has been invited to the signing prepared to sign the document under the heading “Endorsed by”.

Among those foreign dignitaries already in Kuala Lumpur were US Ambassador to the Philippines Kristie Kenney, Ambassador Sayed El-Masry, the Ambassadors of Australia and Japan to the Philippines. Ranking Officials of the Malaysian government were also ready for the momentous signing ceremony.

Prominent political leaders of the country the likes of delegation from party-list Anak Mindanaw headed by Mujiv Hataman, Bayan Muna

66 Ibid67 Patricio Diaz - Looking into SC Decision (5P), A Commentary, MindaNews, - 13 November 2008

40

Satur Ocampo, the MNLF represented by Cotabato City Mayor Muslimen Sema and many others were all in the venue.

On the part of the CSOs were also in the venue to witness their long cherished dream of ending the centuries-old armed conflict in Mindanao. An achievement they could proudly claim they are part of. CBCS alone was able to send three representatives and a number of their networks as well.

On the eve of August 5, 2008 the members of the GRP Panel were officially informed of the decision of the Supreme Court ordering them to

restrain from signing the MOA-AD. And on August 5, 2008 everyone was taken aback with mixed reactions when they were informed that no signing was to take place. This was the ending of the eleven years painstaking negotiation between the government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

CONCLUSION

n summary, the aborted MOA-AD definitely earned mixed feelings of frustrations, discouragement and loss of hope. For some reacted

calmly while other burst their emotions violently, at least for the majority of the Bangsamoro and peace advocates. While on the other hand, the anti-peace and spoilers of peace conducted “mass celebrations” of thanks-giving and victory celebrations officiated by their church leaders in major urban centers in Mindanao in commemoration for the alleged death of MOA-AD and the 11-year old peace talks. However, it should be emphasized that “the government has succeeded to stop the signing of the MOA-AD but it has failed to stop the armed conflict or war for freedom and self-determination in South of the Philippines ".

I

The status of the negotiation and the situation was described by one writer as: “The peace negotiation between the government and the MILF has been going on and off. Despite the ceasefire inked in [1997] 2001, sporadic military hostilities occur. The government frames the peace settlement with the MILF within the parameters of the GRP-MNLF Peace Accord. On the other hand, the MILF framework for peace settlement goes beyond the 1992 Accord. The MILF charges that the Peace Accord has been a total failure.”68 This writer added:

68 Patrick I. Patino – The Changing Logic of the Mindanao War, uploaded April 2, 2003.

The CBCS delegates to the aborted MOA-

AD signing

41

“The Mindanao war has become a lucrative project for promotions of military officers. The 2000 all-out offensive of the Estrada administration against the MILF produced military luminaries in the national scene. Then AFP Chief Angelo Reyes was promoted to Defense Secretary; General Diomedio Villanueva who was then Commanding Officer of the Southern Command was awarded the Chief of Staff. Upon his retirement, Villanueva was designated Officer in Charge in the Public Estates Authority. Then Commander of the Southcom Infantry Division, General Roy Cimatu took the helm of the Southcom and was promoted to AFP Chief of Staff before he retired from the service. Cimatu is now the Special Envoy to the Middle East. Current Southcom Chief Lt. Gen. Narciso Abaya is one of the contenders to replace retiring AFP Chief of Staff Antonio Defensor while Soutcom Infantry Division Chief Major Gen. Generoso Senga is being eyed to replace Abaya”69 as Chief of Staff of the AFP.

And describing the effects of war while negotiation is going on and said: “[w]hile the war rages in Central Mindanao, the war budget costs for equipments, bullets and explosives, gasoline and medicines depletes national treasury; human costs in terms of civilians maimed and killed and dislocated lives continue unabated; the material costs in terms of destroyed infrastructures, farm crops, livestocks and forest damages, community life and landscapes; corruption in the delivery of relief goods exacerbates; the cultural costs further alienates the Muslims and inflames Muslim-Christian animosity; uncertainty costs in terms of loss of business investments, loss of productions and loss of trade; diminishes the future of people. When war lulls, reconstruction costs may never come or not enough to prepare citizens in the next war.”70

A quick glance at the GRP-MILF Peace Talks might lead us to conclude that it does nothing to appease the centuries’ old torment, war of defense and struggle for restoration of lost cherished identity, ways of lives and homeland of the Bangsamoro.

As innate consequences of this perceived futility of the GRP-MILF peace talks, other peace processes and the struggle of the Bangsamoro in the past have implicit upshots to the Bangsamoro and the Filipino nation as a whole. First as this developed in minds of people there were weak support to the peace processes itself and the apathy of people to get involved or even understanding the substance of the negotiation. Secondly, the indifference to the peace process is being reinforced that increased the numbers of “spoilers” of peace. And the worst, this gave opportunity to the military “hawks” both of the state and non-state actors to propagate armed conflicts that slow down or often times endangered

69 Ibid70 Ibid

42

the existence of the negotiation and devastates the lives of hundreds of thousands civilians notwithstanding losses on the government.

Be this as it may, under the principle of “upholding the primacy and gains of the peace process” it is worth exploring both explicit and implicit gains of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks. After all, we still anchor our belief on the notion that “still the best solution to the Bangsamoro Question is through negotiated political settlement.” And besides, this might be enough reason for the Bangsamoro and every peace loving people to hope for the best and continue supporting the peace process for somehow we can still safely say that “there is still light at the end of the tunnel.”

APPENDICES

A. The Gains of the peace processes and the Moro Struggles

B. List of GRP-MILF Signed Interim Agreements

C. The Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination

D. Text of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain

E. Declaration for Continuity for Peace Talks between GR-MILF

F. Closure Statement of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks

43

APPENDIX A

THE GAINS OF THE PEACE PROCESSES AND THE MORO STRUGGLES

At a quick glance, it is worth recollecting the gains of the past Moro struggles before we finally turn our attention to the current peace processes particularly the GRP-MILF Peace Talks. Despite of the century’s war of defense waged by the Moro peoples, it is still hard to identify its tangible gains and achievements in relation to its struggle for right to self determination. Part of the reason for this was that very few of even in the level of educated Moros in the past endeavored to write events and facts of their history. The truth of the matter is that the

44

Moro’s heroism in defense of their homeland, identity and ways of lives against invaders and conquerors are far more superior to the present days known national heroes of the Filipino nation.

The Past Struggles

Relevant to this, it cannot be denied that various steps undertaken by the government even under American and the succeeding Philippine regimes were no doubt was in recognition of the Bangsamoro struggle and their existence as separate and distinct people from the Filipino. Among those notable recognition and achievements that could be attributed to the consistent struggle which was said: “the passage of Legislative Act No. 787 by the Philippine Commission creating the ‘Moro Province’ (1903-1913), which comprised the districts of Sulu, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Lanao and Davao. Both the Moros and other native inhabitants or Indigenous Peoples were placed under the administration of the Moro province, which had reached a high degree of an autonomous government during the American mandate in the Moroland.”71

However, during the Commonwealth Government, the Moros and other native inhabitants were lumped together into the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (1917-1936) under the Department of Interior. In 1937, their administration was placed under the Commission of Mindanao and Sulu in the Department of Interior which head was with a rank of Undersecretary. Similar agencies were created one after the other in post-war Philippine administration in the administration of the affairs of the Moros and Tribal Peoples of the National Cultural Communities.”72

In addition to this, there were other administrative legislations undertaken specifically created for the Moro welfare like the Commission on National Integration (CNI) in 1957 and followed by establishment of the Office of the Regional Commissioner for Southern Philippines. In contemporary period, was the creation of the Office of the Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC) that evolved into the recent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) and Office on Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC) and eventually the present National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).

One Bangsamoro leader emphasized that “Thus the issue of Right to Self Determination for the Bangsamoro involves two important

71 Jun Mantawil - MORO-LUMAD HISTORY OF CO-EXISTENCE AND COOPERATION, A Document delivered before Moro-Lumad Peace Summit , April 4-6, 2005 72 Ibid

45

aspects, namely; defining their political relations (political status) with the Philippine government and designing their own development agenda. The issue on achieving some degree of political status is being pursued through the armed and peace negotiations between the Moro fronts and the government. Among those political structures tried in the past and at present included a special legislation which established the administrative autonomous regions lX and Xll during the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos. R.A. 6734, otherwise known as the Organic Act, which created the ARMM during the administrations of Pres. Cory Aquino, Fidel Ramos and Joseph Estrada covered four Moro-dominated provinces and one city. The 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) signed by the MNLF and the GRP became a law through RA 9054 which expanded the areas of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) to include one more province and one city in its constituencies. An on-going review by the GRP, MNLF and the OIC is being pursued after the MNLF protested the alleged unilateral implementation of the 1996 FPA to their disadvantage.”73

The above undertakings, although blended with counter-insurgency and integration purposes if not for continuing marginalization of the Bangsamoro and their Homeland was definitely in recognition and response to the continuing assertion for their right to self determination. And in most cases, if not all were unilateral move of the government to finally subjugate the Bangsamoro was no doubt in response to the struggle of the Bangsamoro for the return of their illegally usurped nationhood.

Implicit Gains of the Current GRP-MILF Peace Talks

Dealing with the current negotiation and with the dismal end of the 11-years GRP-MILF Negotiation, a superficial outlook may give us an idea that it has done nothing to advance the quest for right to self determination of the Bangsamoro especially so with distressing end of the most hoped Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) aborted signing in August 2008.

Nevertheless, a profound scrutiny of the negotiation shows that there are implicit changes in the attitude both judging from the perspectives of the government and substantial number within the Filipino level and within the Bangsamoro circle itself.

73 Guiamel M. Alim - BANGSAMORO STRUGGLE FOR SELF DETERMINATON AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: Articulation and Expressions – An Input Delivered at the Mindanao Peoples Peace Agenda Network Consultation sponsored by Mindanao Peaceweavers (MPW) and Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS) held at KFI Resource and Training Center, Cotabato City on September 24, 2008

46

Noticeable among these changes in recognition to Bangsamoro’s way of life is that it was the practice of the government to use “Republic of the Philippines” in all its official documents’ heading. This practice has been altered starting from their dealing with the MILF and they used “In the Name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful” which is equivalent to Moro or Muslim’s official utterance at the start of doing anything in Arabic “Bismillahi Rahmani Rahiim”. On the other hand, it has been the traditional way of the government to start any program by singing the national anthem of the Philippines but in several occasions they used to read verses from the Holy Qur’an or the traditional prayers in the start of GRP-MILF Panel’s important activities.

Another implicit gain of the GRP-MILF Negotiation is the issue of “status of belligerency” of the Bangsamoro which earned some controversial discourse among intellectuals and legal minded personalities. Of course the government and the majority Filipinos could never accord nor accept that the MILF leading the Bangsamoro quest attained the status of belligerency. Nonetheless, implicitly it was, otherwise there was no negotiation if the government did not looked upon the MILF as its equal. Negotiation could not succeed if one party considers the other party as inferior one.

The government’s recognition of the Bangsamoro problem as legitimate and continuation of their ancestors’ past struggle for self determination could be a significant milestone of the peace talks. This can be gauge from the fact that, it was the government who initiated it in hard and long attempts before the MILF finally agreed to talk peace.

Without elaborating further, it is believed that if we examine closely the trends of the peace talks, we can still lists numerous elements and components leading towards achieving and enjoying the much-awaited right to self determination. These elements may not be substantial or deficient but worth developing and can now or even under status quo may be fully or partly carried out by every Bangsamoro. Even, granting for the sake of argument that the government is “pulling around” the negotiation, it cannot be denied that whatever gains attained by the Bangsamoro through the GRP-MILF Talks were properly documented and become part of history of their struggle that can be made as reference and resource materials for the next generation.

Explicit Milestones of the GRP-MILF Negotiation

Undoubtedly, the past struggle of the Moro Peoples for their freedom and self determination achievements started from simple legislations, administrative issuances such as that of the Moro Province,

47

creation of administrative regions manifested by the two Regional Autonomous Governments IX and XII and concurrently establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) covered by Republic Acts are all manifestation and form of self determination.

Accordingly, the expressions of self determination varied from: “Special Legislation such as the Office on Southern Cultural Communities, Office on Muslim Affairs, the Regional Autonomous Governments and the codification of Muslim Customary Laws. The second level may include ‘Autonomy’, the likes of the Republic Act No. 6734 (Organic Act) Republic Act No. 9054 (Expanded ARMM) and the Cordillera Autonomous or Administrative Region.”74 Explicitly, all of the above were already attained and tried but somehow people felt it didn’t solved the Moro problem nor did it help in the attainment of their quest for self determination.      

“Other yet unexplored expression of self determination that might be ranked third is in the form of ‘Federalism’ followed by a ‘State within a State’ or maybe what had been inscribed in the MOA-AD as ‘associative relations’ and the highest expression of self determination is ‘independence’.”75

Drawing from the above presentation, the Bangsamoro struggle for self determination and the peace processes is slowly progressing positively, though already marked centuries long. By careful scrutiny, notwithstanding the distressing end of the MOA-AD where the Supreme Court issued TRO for its signing and subsequently declaring it unconstitutional coupled with the GRP’s abandoning of the initialed but unsigned document, it is still an important milestone in history of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks in relation to Bangsamoro aspiration for self determination.

First and foremost, the MOA-AD is clearly gearing towards a Bangsamoro status described by some as a political status higher than autonomy but lower than independence. This matter was stressed by one known lawyer as: “[t]he settlement reached with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) since 1996, resulting in a new Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), has proven to be inadequate. Thus, the subsequent and ongoing negotiations by/with the MILF for a higher and better form of self-governance or self-determination for which the GRP usually draws the line at independence or secession.”76 And further: “[t]o sum up, the BJE under the MOA-AD is neither 74 Guiamel M. Alim - BANGSAMORO STRUGGLE FOR SELF DETERMINATON AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: Articulation and Expressions – An Input Delivered at the Mindanao Peoples Peace Agenda Network Consultation sponsored by Mindanao Peaceweavers (MPW) and Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS) held at KFI Resource and Training Center, Cotabato City on September 24, 2008 75 Ibid76 Atty Soliman Santos Jr- BJE and the Question of Independent Statehood, An Opinion, August 12, 2008

48

independent nor a full-fledged state.  Given ‘shared authority and responsibility,’ it may be safer to refer to it as a ‘semi-state’ or ‘quasi-state.’  Being sub-national in its territory, we might also call it a ‘sub-state.’77

Another veteran journalist said: “the MOA-AD has synthesized all previous efforts of Moro leaders to recover their lost heritage. It reflects the agitation of Moro leaders for a separate state; the June 9, 1921 Sulu Petition; the February 1, 1924 Dansalan Declaration; Datu Udtog Matalam’s MIM Manifesto; the Tripoli Agreement of 1976; the Final Peace Agreement of 1996; and R.A. 6734 as amended by R.A. 9054.”78[Bold face mine]

One may asked, but of what used to be when the MOA-AD was already declared by the Supreme Court unconstitutional and already abandoned by the government? Again looking back at the dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court, it said: “As part of its 14-paragraph summary, the Court said: ‘The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001.  Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.”79[Italics and bold face mine]

Most importantly, the MOA-AD is so far the best framework for peace and resolution of the Bangsamoro problem which was bilaterally defined both by the government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front for eleven years. And a permanent document that could be a useful guide to both the present Bangsamoro and their next generation in search for long lasting peace in Mindanao. No wonder a notable remarked says: “[f]or the Bangsamoro, ‘Long Live MOA’, for it doesn’t matter whether it is signed or not, but what is definite is that it already became a significant landmark in the centuries-old struggle for self determination of the Moro People. It will become a momentous rallying point in the continuance of their aspiration for recognition as unique and distinct people. The distressing event is blessing in disguise for it gave the Bangsamoro a time to rethink and search for other options. It could also be a fresh opportunity to the MILF as armed revolutionary movement to choose other options if peaceful means is not possible, or shift their struggle to higher pedestal since solution within the ambit of Philippine context is seemingly impossible.”80

77 Ibid78 Patricio P. Diaz -COMMENT: MOA-AD Must Live, MindaNews - Wednesday, 15 October 200879 Ibid80 Mike G. Kulat – Shutdown of MOA-AD: A Mockery of the Century, Bangsamoro Journal, March 2009 Issue, p.10

49

Undisputedly, there are other political gains which the GRP-MILF Peace talks yielded. Foremost is the International Community’s support as manifested by the relentless facilitating role of the Malaysian government and leading the International Monitoring Team contingent with Brunei, Libya and Japan. There is also remarkable increasing support being afforded by International Communities to the peace talks like the European Union, the United States and Japan to mention few of them. Even former Secretary General of the United Nations, Koffi Anan and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair openly expressed their willingness to support or take part in the GRP-MILF Peace Process.

Remarkable too is raising concern and direct engagement of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and other groups both in monitoring and pushing forward the peace process towards signing a final agreement. It is also worth mentioning important roles being exerted by intellectuals both groups and individuals through their analysis and opinions in every

intricacies of the negotiation.

50

APPENDIX B

THE SIGNED GRP-MILF INTERIM AGREEMENTS

1. Joint Press Statement : Submission of MILF single point agenda – “To Solvethe Bangsamoro Problem” signed by the Committee on Agenda Setting Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Panels Asec. Jovenal Lazaga and Prof. Moner Bajunaid respectively on January 7, 1997 at Da’wah Center, Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao.

2. Interim Cessation of Hostilities in Buldon, Maguindanao : signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Committee on Cessation of Hostilities MGen Joselin Nazareno and Atty. Lanang Ali respectively at Da’wah Center, Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on January 27, 1997.

3. Administrative Procedures in the Conduct of GRP-MILF Technical Committee Meetings : signed by ASEC Jovenal Lazaga and Sheik Moner Bajunaid respectively at Da’wah Center, Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on February 26, 1997.

4. GRP-MILF RESOLUTION NO.1 : Composition, Task and Functions of the Interim Ceasefire Monitoring Committee signed by the Chairmen of the Committee on Cessation of Hostilities MGen Joselin Nazareno and Sheik Moner Bajunaid respectively at Da’wah Center, Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on March 25, 1997.

5. Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities : signed by GRP-MILF Panels former Ambassador and retired General Fortunato Abat and Ghazali Jaafar respectively at Cagayan de Oro City on July 18, 1997.

6. Agreement on the Return of Evacuees in Pikit, North Cotabato : signed by Chairmen of the Committee on Cessation of Hostilities MGen Joselin Nazareno and Atty. Omar Umpar respectively at Cotabato City on September 3, 1997.

7. Implementing Administrative Guidelines of the GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities : signed by Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Committee on Cessation of Hostilities MGen Joselin Nazareno and Atty. Omar Umpar respectively at Cotabato City on September 12, 1997.

8. GRP-MILF Joint Press Release : On Recent Development (Tension) in Barira, Buldon and Matanog areas signed by GRP-MILF

51

representatives MGen Joselin Nazareno and Atty. Lanang Ali respectively at Cotabato City on October 21, 1997.

9. Implementing Operational Guidelines of the GRP-MILF Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities : signed by Chairmen of the Committee on Cessation of Hostilities MGen Joselin Nazareno and Atty. Omar Umpar respectively at Marawi City on November 14, 1997.

10. Agreement (To Sustain the Quest for Peace): Signed by Chairmen of GRP-MILF Technical Committee ASEC Jovenal Lazaga and Sheik Moner Bajunaid respectively at Marawi City on February 6, 1998.

11. Joint Action on the QRT Report : Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Committee on Cessation of Hostilities MGen Joselin Nazareno and Atty. Lanang Ali respectively at Marawi City on April 23, 1998

12. Agreement: (Creating a Quick Response Team) . Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Technical Committee ASEC Jovenal Lazaga and Atty. Lanang Ali respectively at Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on March 11, 1998.

13. General Framework of Intent between GRP-MILF : Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Panels LtGen Orlando Soriano and Aleem Abdilazis Mimbantas respectively at Da’wah Center, Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on August 27, 1998.

14. Joint Statement : Implementation of AFP Repositioning in Upper Minabay, Buldon and other matters. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Technical Committee USEC Alma Evangelista and Sheik Moner Bajunaid respectively at the Da’wah Center, Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on September 17, 1998.

15. Resolution No.2: Creating Joint Monitoring Contingent to Oversee the Peace Situation Upper Minabay, Buldon in Maguindanao. Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF Committee on Cessation of Hostilities MGen Santos Gabison and Atty. Lanang Ali respectively at Da’wah Center, Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on October 16, 1998.

16. Resolution No. 3: For Immediate Cessation of Hostilities in Datu Piang, Shariff Aguak and Talayan in Maguindanao. Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF Committee on Cessation of Hostilities MGen Santos Gabison and Atty. Lanang Ali respectively at Cotabato City on October 24, 1998.

52

17. Agreement to Reaffirm the Pursuit of Peace : Acknowledgement of Camp Abubakre As-Siddique and Camp Bushra Somiorang. Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF Panels LtGen Orlando Soriano and Ghazali Jaafar respectively at Da’wah Center, Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on February 10, 1999.

18. Internal Procedures in the Conduct of GRP-MILF CCCH Meetings : Signed by the Chairmen GRP-MIL CCCH BGen Jose Torrelavega and Sultan Saifodin Tomawis respectively at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City on February 17, 1999.

19. Rules and Procedures in the Determination and Verification of the Coverage of Cessation of Hostilities : Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF CCCH BGen Jose Torrelavega and Sultan Saifodin Tomawis respectively at Estosan Hotel, Cotabato City on May 18, 1999.

20. Rules and Procedures in the Administration of the Joint Secretariat of the GRP-MILF CCCH: Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF CCCH BGen Jose Torrelavega and Sultan Saifodin Tomawis respectively at Estosan Hotel, Cotabato City on May 18, 1999.

21. Agreement: To hold the Opening of Formal Negotiation . Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF Panels LtGen Orlando Soriano and Ghazali Jaafar respectively at Da’wah Center, Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on September 2, 1999.

22. Joint Statement: Setting the date of the Opening Ceremony . Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Technical Committees ADG Leonida Brosas and Prof. Moner Bajunaid respectively at Provincial Capitol Complex of Maguindanao on September 15, 1999.

23. Second Joint Acknowledgement : For effective implementation of the ceasefire agreement in five (5) major MILF Camps. Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF Panels LtGen Orlando Soriano and Ghazali Jaafar respectively at at Provincial Capitol Complex of Maguindanao on October 6, 1999.

24. Joint Statement: Agreements on the pursuance of the Opening Ceremony. Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF Panels LtGen Orlando Soriano and Ghazali Jaafar respectively at Provincial Capitol Complex of Maguindanao on October 6, 1999.

25. Agreement: Relay Orders to GRP-MILF Field Commanders to abide by the rules of the Ceasefire agreement. Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF Panels LtGen Orlando Soriano and Ghazali

53

Jaafar respectively at Provincial Capitol Complex of Maguindanao on October 6, 1999.

26. Joint Press Statement: Announcing the start of formal negotiation. Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF Panels LtGen Orlando Soriano and Aleem Abdulazis Mimbantas respectively at Da’wah Center, Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on October 25, 1999.

27.Agreement on the Rules and Procedures on the Conduct of the Formal Peace Talks: Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF Panels LtGen Orlando Soriano and Aleem Abdulazis Mimbantas respectively at Sultan Kudarat, Maguindana on December 17, 1999.

28. TheFormal Peace Talks : Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF Panels LtGen Orlando Soriano and Aleem Abdulazis Mimbantas respectively at Sultan Kudarat, Maguindana on December 17, 1999.

29. Joint Statement: Commitment of the GRP-MILF to assure the people of peaceful observance of Ramadhan and Christmas. Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF Panels LtGen Orlando Soriano and Aleem Abdulazis Mimbantas respectively at the Provincial Capitol, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on December 18, 1999.

30. Agreement: Commitment for Cessation of Fighting along the National Highway from Cotabato City to Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF Panels LtGen Orlando Soriano and Ghazali Jaafar respectively at the Provincial Capitol, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on January 12, 2000.

31. Joint Communiqué: Adoption of the Agenda of the Formal Peace Talks among others. Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF Panels LtGen Orlando Soriano and Aleem Abdulazis Mimbantas respectively at the Da’wah Complex, Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on January 20, 2000.

32. First Round of the GRP-MILF Formal Peace Talks: Approval of Agenda for the next GRP-MILF Panel Meeting. Signed by the GRP-MILF Technical Committee Chairmen ADG Zenonida Brosas and Sheik Moner Bajunaid respectively at Estosan Hotel, Cotabato City on February 14, 2000.

33. Joint Press Statement: Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the municipalities of North Cotabato and Maguindanao. Signed by the GRP-MILF Technical Committee Chairmen ADG Zenonida Brosas and Sheik Moner Bajunaid respectively at Estosan Hotel, Cotabato City on February 15, 2000.

54

34. Joint Communiqué : Parties commitment on Cessation of Hostilities in Carmen, North Cotabato; Shariff Aguak, Datu Piang, Talayan, Kabuntalan, Ampatuan in Maguindanao province and Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. Signed by the GRP-MILF Panel Chairmen LtGen Edgardo Batenga and Aleem Abdualazis Mimbantas respectively at Cagayan de Oro City on February 23, 2000.

35. Joint Communiqué: Approval of the Six Clustered agenda in the 3rd GRP-MILF Formal Peace Talks. Signed by the GRP-MILF Panel Chairmen LtGen Edgardo Batnga and Mohagher Iqbal respectively at Cotabato City on March 2, 2000.

36. Highlights of the 21 st GRP-MILF Technical Committee Meeting: Signed by the GRP-MILF Technical Committee Chairmen EDIR Alma Evangelista and Sheik Moner Bajunaid respectively at Estosan Hotel, Cotabato City on March 7, 2000.

37. Joint Communiqué : Approval and signing of Agreement on Security and Safety Guarantee. Signed by the GRP-MILF Panel Chairmen LtGen Edgardo Batenga and Ghazali Jaafar respectively at Estosan Garden Hotel, Cotabato City on March 9, 2000.

38. Resolution No.1 : Setting Parameters of the Next Round of Formal Talks. Signed by the GRP-MILF Panel Chairmen LtGen Edgardo Batenga and Ghazali Jaafar respectively at Estosan Garden Hotel, Cotabato City on March 9, 2000.

39. Agreement of Safety and Security Guarantee : Intended for the Both Panel Members. Signed by the GRP-MILF Panel Chairmen LtGen Edgardo Batenga and Ghazali Jaafar respectively at Estosan Garden Hotel, Cotabato City on March 9, 2000.

40. Highlight of the GRP-MILF Panels Special Meeting: Agreement on Maintaining Law and Order along Narciso Ramos Highway. Signed by the GRP-MILF Technical Committee Chairmen EDIR Alma Evangelista and Sheik Moner Bajunaid respectively at Estosan Hotel, Cotabato City on April 27, 2000.

41. Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of the Peace Talks between the GRP and MILF: Signed by OPPAP Secretary Eduardo Ermita and MILF Vice Chairman for Military Affairs Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim respectively at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on March 24, 2001.

42. Joint Communique: GRP Panel submitted package Proposed Autonomy embodied in House Bill 7883. Signed by LtGen Eduardo Batenga and Prof. Moner Bajunaid Chairmen of the GRP and MILF

55

Panels respectively at Estosan Garden Hotel, Cotabato City on June 1, 2000.

43. Memorandum: GRP-MILF Exchange of Position Papers on the Six clustered agenda. Signed by GRP-MILF Technical Committees Chairmen Executive Director Alma Evangelista and Dr. Dingan Ali respectively at Cotabato City on June 14, 2000.

44. Agreement on Peace Between GRP and MILF: Signed by GRP-MILF Peace Panels Jesus Dureza and Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim respectively and witnessed by Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Chairman of Gaddafi Foundation for International Charitable Associations at Tripoli, Libya on June 22, 2001.

45. Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of GRP- MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001: Signed by the Chairmen of GRP-MILF Technical Committees Irene Santiago and Atty. Musib Buat and attested by Panel Chairmen Atty. Jesus Dureza and Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim at Putrajaya, Malaysia on August 7, 2001.

46. Agreement on Manual of Instructions for CCCHs and LMTs: Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Panels Jesus Dureza and Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim at Selangor, Malaysia on October 18, 2001.

47. Joint Statement: 2nd GRP-MILF CCCH Joint Meeting establishing Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs). Signed by GRP-MILF CCCH Chairmen Romeo Calizo and Tops Julhani respectively at Estosan Garden Hotel, Cotabato City on February 11, 2002.

48. Joint communiqué: Formation of the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) for Interdiction of Criminals. Signed by GRP-MILF representatives Sec. Norberto Gonzales and Atty. Lanang Ali respectively and attested by Panel Chairmen Eduardo Ermita and Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim at Cyberjaya, Malaysia on May 6, 2002.

49. Implementing Guidelines on Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001: Signed by GRP-MILF representatives Norberto Gonzales and Atty. Musib Buat and attested by their respective Panel Chairmen Eduardo Ermita and Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim at Putrajaya, Malaysia on May 7, 2002.

50. Joint Statement : Agreement and Commitment of the GRP-MILF for the Resumption of the Peace Talks signed by PA Jesus Dureza and Atty. Lanang Ali respectively at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on March 28, 2003.

56

51. 11 th GRP-MILF Joint CCCH Meeting: Adoption of Mechanisms for operationalization of AHJAG. Signed by GRP-MILF CCCH Chairmen LtGen Rodolfo Garcia and Benjie Midtimbang at Cotabato City on September 4, 2003.

52. GRP-MILF EXPLORATORY TALKS: Agreement for Judicial Lifting of Warrant of Arrests to MILF Leaders and withdrawal of AFP elements in Buliok Complex in Malaysia on September 6, 2003.

53. 12 th GRP-MILF Joint CCCH Meeting: Establishment of CCCH Offices and commitment to implement ceasefire policies and guidelines. Signed by GRP-MILF CCCH Chairmen Rodolfo Garcia and Benjie Midtimbang at Waterfront Hotel, Davao City on October 4, 2003.

54. 13 th GRP-MILF Joint CCCH Meeting: Actions on submitted cases of ceasefire violations and the procedures on conduct of information campaign on the peace process. Signed by GRP-MILF CCCH Chairmen Rodolfo Garcia and Benjie Midtimbang at Cagayan de Oro City on October 23, 2003.

55. 14 th GRP-MILF Joint CCCH Meeting: Reports on Action Taken on cases of reported ceasefire violations. Signed by GRP-MILF CCCH Chairmen Rodolfo Garcia and Benjie Midtimbang at Davao City on December 2, 2003.

56. Joint Statement: [15th Joint CCCH Meeting] Cessation of Hostilities in Talitay, Talayan, Datu Piang, Datu Saudi in Maguindanao. Signed by GRP-MILF CCCH Chairmen Rodolfo Garcia and Benjie Midtimbang respectively at Estosan garden Hotel, Cotabato City on December16, 2003.

57. 5 th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks: Implementation of the Joint Needs Assessment in Conflict-Affected Areas. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Panels Silvestre Afable Jr and Mohagher Iqbal respectively in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on February 20, 2004.

58. Statement of Understanding Between GRP and MILF: Establishment of Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Panels Silvestre Afable, Jr. and Mohagher Iqbal respectively at Camp Abubakre As-Siddique, Maguindanao, Bangsamoro Homeland and Pasig City on April 5 and 6, 2004 respectively.

59. Joint Statement: [17th Joint CCCH Meeting] Verification of the AFP Withdrawal at Buliok Complex and reports of investigation on

57

apprehended MILF elements. Signed by GRP-MILF CCCH Chairmen LtGen Rodolfo Garcia and Benjie Midtimbang respectively at Marco Polo Hotel, Davao City on May 4, 2004.

60. Joint Statement: [18th Joint CCCH Meeting] Establishment of CCCH Joint Interim Action Team and Increase frequency of visits to Conflict-Affected areas. Signed by GRP-MILF CCCH Chairmen LtGen Rodolfo Garcia and Benjie Midtimbang respectively at Marco Polo Hotel, Davao City on June 15, 2004.

61. Joint Statement: [19th Joint CCCH Meeting] Appointment of GRP CCCH Chairman and Security Preparation for the Joint Needs Assessment Team. Signed by GRP-MILF CCCH Chairmen BGen Alexander Yano and Benjie Midtimbang respectively at Orchid Garden Hotel, Zamboanga City July 30, 2004.

62. Joint Statement: Establishment of Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Posts and final plan on ocular visit to Mt. Cararao. Signed by GRP-MILF CCCH Chairmen Bgen Alexander Yano and Benjie Midtimbang respectively at East Asia Royale Hotel, General Santos City September 23, 2004.

63. Resolution: Dismantling of MILF Camp in Datu Tumanggong, Tungawan, Zamboanga Sibugay. Signed by GRP-MILF CCCH Chairmen Bgen Alexander Yano and Benjie Midtimbang respectively in Manila on October 1, 2004.

64. Implementing Guidelines to IMT TOR: Signed by GRP-MILF CCCH Chairmen BGen Alexander Yano and Benjie Midtimbang respectively at OPAPP, Ortigas Center, Pasig City on October 11, 2004.

65. Guidelines for Observers to the GRP-MILF Formal Peace Talks: Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Panels Silvestre Afable, Jr. and Mohagher Iqbal respectively in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia December 21, 2004.

66. Joint Statement of the 6 th Exploratory Talks: Commitments of both parties to reactivate their respective Technical Working Groups in preparation for the discussion of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the negotiation. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Panels Silvestre Afable, Jr, and Mohagher Iqbal respectively in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia December 21, 2004.

67. Joint Statement: [25th Joint CCCH Meeting] Strengthened Coordination and communication efforts on Troops Movements.

58

Signed by GRP-MILF CCCH Chairmen BGen Alexander Yano and Von Al Haq respectively at Pryce Plaza Hotel, Cagayan de Oro City on February 10, 2005.

68. Joint Statement of the 7 th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks: Preliminary Discussions of the four Strands (Concept, Territory, Resources and Governance) of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the negotiation. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Panels Silvestre Afable, Jr. and Mohagher Iqbal respectively at Port Dickson, Malaysia on April 20, 2005.

69. Joint Statement: 8 th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks. Setting Parameters for the discussion of the strand on governance of the ancestral domain aspect of the negotiation. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Panels Silvestre Afable, Jr. and Mohagher Iqbal respectively in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on June 21, 2005.

70. Joint Statement of the 9 th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks: Adoption of the Consensus Points on strand on governance. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Panels Silvestre Afable, Jr. and Mohagher Iqbal respectively in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on September 16, 2005.

71. Joint Statement of the 30 th Joint GRP-MILF CCCH Meeting: Commitment to strengthen “normalization of situation” and expansion of Joint Monitoring Ceasefire Posts. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF CCCH BGen Ramon Santos and Von Al-Haq respectively at Estosan Hotel, Cotabato City on November 9, 2005.

72. Joint Statement of the 31 st Joint GRP-MILF Meeting: Commitment to improve coordination mechanisms. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF CCCH BGen Ramon Santos and Von Al-Haq respectively at Royal Mandaya Hotel, Davao City on December 11, 2005.

73. Joint Statement of the 10 th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks: Wrapping up of the consensus points of the ancestral domain issue. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Panels Silvestre Afable, Jr. and Mohagher Iqbal respectively at Port Dickson, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on February 7, 2005.

74. 11 th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks: Conducted on March 20-21, 2006. No agreement signed as the Meeting was marred by unresolved issues on “associative ties” and “wealth sharing”.

59

75. 12 th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks: Conducted on May 2 -4, 2006. The talks again was blocked on the issue of “territorial delineation and demarcation” issues.

76. Joint Satement of the 35 th Joint GRP-MILF CCCH Meeting : Recommendation to their respective panels to include the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in the TOR of the IMT. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF CCCH BGen Ramon Santos and Von Al-Haq respectively at Garden Orchid Hotel on June 3, 2006.

77. 13 th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks: The start of the longest “breakdown” in the peace talks as the government is back on its “constitutional parameter” for any expansion of the ARMM areas and offered “leopard skin” Barangays to compose the BJE areas.

78. Joint Statement: GRP-MILF Panel Commitment to move forward in the peace process and expand areas of coverage of the IMT to include Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Panels Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal respectively at Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 27, 2007.

79. Joint Statement: Culmination of the GRP-MILF Panel’s Exploratory Talks and the resolution of major issues to overcome the long impasse. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Panels Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal respectively in October 24, 2007.

80. Joint Statement: 14th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks. Affirmation of previous consensus points on strand of Territory of the Ancestral Domain Aspect. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF Panels Silvestre Afable, Jr. and Mohagher Iqbal respectively in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on November 15, 2007.

81. Joint Statement: GRP-MILF CCCH Meeting. Commitment to strengthen their advocacy to prevent armed confrontations. Signed by the Chairmen of the GRP-MILF CCCH BGen Reynaldo Sealana and Von Al-Haq respectively in Zamboanga City on February 9, 2008.

60

APPENDIX C

THE BANGSAMORO RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATIONBy Abhoud Syed M. Lingga

[Paper read during the International Roundtable Conference on Right to Self-determination of Peoples, July 16-18, 2007 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines]. The author is executive director of the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies based in Cotabato City, Philippines. He can be contacted in this email address: aslingga@yahoo.com.]

This paper suggests that recognition of the fundamental right of peoples to self-determination opens a window of opportunity to resolve conflicts peacefully, whether or not they are explicitly stated as a struggle for self-determination. This is particularly true in Mindanao, where the Bangsamoro liberation fronts assert sovereign rights in the same territory over which the Philippine government already exercises sovereign power. Implementing the right of self-determination of the Bangsamoro people can usher in peace in Mindanao.

Self-determination as a Right

The right to self-determination is the right of peoples everywhere to freely determine their political status, and to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. The right to self-determination has political, economic, social and cultural aspects. For this right to be fully effective, the realization of the political, economic, social and cultural sovereignty of peoples is crucial.

Self-determination is a continuing process where people continue to

make choices to achieve their security and to fulfill their human needs. The right of peoples to self-determination is enshrined in many United

Nations instruments, among which are:

61

Article 55 of the United Nations charter, which provides that the world body shall create “conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . .”

General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, which states that, “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”

Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and repeated in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which makes this statement: “All peoples have the right of self-determination, including the right to determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”

On the other hand, there are U.N. instruments that uphold the principle of territorial integrity of existing states.

Whether people who claim right to self-determination and are living within the boundary of existing states are prohibited to disrupt the territorial integrity of a country is not clear in the U.N. Resolutions. The assertion of minorities to self-determination is usually not only a claim to determine the political status of a people but also includes a claim to territory. If minorities are defined as people and they decided to form their own states, this will result to dismemberment of existing states.

Article 2 (4) of the U.N. charter provides, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . .” This provision clearly applies only as between states. It prohibits member states from using force to threaten the political independence and territorial integrity of any state.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 2625 (Declaration of Principles Concerning Friendly Relations among States) advised that right of self-determination shall not be construed as

“authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples … and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.”

62

However, this U.N. resolution reiterating the territorial integrity of

states is made contingent on the government being representative of the whole people and non-discriminatory. There is substantial debate as to the scope of “a government representing the whole people”. Hannun, for example, is for the “limited requirement of non-discrimination only on the grounds of race, creed or colour.” But Buchheit “sees it simply as a component of a larger theory based on the premise that oppression legitimizes secession.”81

Other commentators, like Musgrave,82 interpreted Resolution No.

2625 as implying that “international law permits secession as a legal remedy in certain circumstances”. He also contends that secession is also permissible “by virtue of the ‘oppression theory’ when part of a population suffers gross oppression: in these circumstances secession is permitted primarily to prevent the abuse of human rights.” In Allen Buchanan’s83 remedial right theory of secession, separation would be acceptable if there are systematic violations of human rights or unjust annexation of territories.

There are attempts to resolve the conflict between demands for self-

determination and the principle of the territorial integrity of states. Hannun84 puts forward the idea of autonomy as a “less-than-sovereign self-determination.” However, Musgrave85 says that “Some jurists contend that autonomy is not a principle of international law but a matter which falls within the domestic jurisdiction of a state.” He opines that “autonomy within an independent state cannot be part of self-determination for the purposes of international law.”

The problem in understanding many formulations on the right to self-determination is it is being equated to secession. In making decision as to their political status, people may opt for separation from the parent state but it is not always the case. Consequently, the assertions of a people to exercise their right to collectively determine their political status are always clouded by fear of states that their boundaries will be reconfigured once right of self-determination is granted to peoples even if they are entitled to it. The essential issue, which is the right of a people to choose their political status, and decide on their economic, social and cultural development, is placed at the margin.

81 Quoted in Musgrave, Thomas D. 1997. Self-Determination and National Minorities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 188.82 Musgrave 1997: 20983 Buchanan, Allen. 2003. “Secession”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/secession/ index.html 84 Quoted in Musgrave 1997: 20885 Ibid

63

Holders of the Right of Self-determination

According to the Report of the International Conference of Experts organized by UNESCO on November 21-27, 1998, the holder of the right of self-determination are a people (a group of individual human beings) who have some or all of the following common features: (1) common historical tradition; (2) racial or ethnic identity; (3) cultural homogeneity; (4) linguistic unity; (5) religious or ideological affinity; (6) territorial connection; and (7) common economic life.86

Additionally, the UNESCO experts stated that “the group as a whole

must have the will to be identified as a people or the consciousness of being a people.” The people, according to the experts, must be of a certain number, which need not be large but must be more than “a mere association of individuals within a state.” The existence of “institutions or other means of expressing its common characteristics and will for identity” is also important.

Bangsamoro Right to Self-determination

The Bangsamoro people qualify as people who hold the right of self-determination because they have a common historical tradition and religious affinity and share many cultural practices. They occupy contiguous territory (maritime societies are connected by the sea) with rich natural resources.

Before the arrival of the Spanish colonialists, the Bangsamoro were already in the process of state formation, while Luzon and the Visayas were still in the barangay stage of political development. The Bangsamoro had their own government and engaged in trade and diplomatic relations with other countries. They had developed well-organized administrative and political systems; and strong maritime and infantry forces that defended the Bangsamoro territories from Western colonial intrusion, preserving the continuity of their independence.87

During the American occupation the Bangsamoro homeland was administered separately from the Philippines. When the U.S. later decided to grant independence to the Philippines, Bangsamoro leaders asked the United States not to include the Bangsamoro territories in the would-be Philippine Republic.88 Even when their territories were made

86 Van Walt van Praag, Michael C. and Onno Seroo, eds. 1999. The Implementation of the Right toSelf-determination as a Contribution to Conflict Prevention. Report of the International Conference of Experts held in Barcelona on November 21-27, 1998, organized by the UNESCO Division of Human Rights, Democracy and Peace and the UNESCO Centre of Catalonia.87 See Lingga, Abhoud Syed M. 2004. “Understanding Bangsamoro Independence as Mode of Self-determination.” Mindanao Journal XXVII.88 See “ Petition to the President of the United States of America from the People of the Sulu Archipelago,” June 9, 1921;

64

part of the Philippines in 1946, the Bangsamoro people continued to assert their right to independence.

Other than their historical experience in state formation, Bangsamoro liberation movements and people’s movements cite the discrimination and oppression experienced by the Bangsamoro people under the Republic of the Philippines as justifications of their claim for self-determination. Often alluded to are the biases and prejudices of the majority population towards the Bangsamoro people; the minoritization of the Bangsamoro people in their own homeland due to government policies; government neglect; and failure of the government to protect the persons and properties of the Bangsamoro people.89

Whether the Bangsamoro people are entitled to self-determination or

not is no longer debatable for the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) recognizes that. This was clear in one of the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 between the GRP and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which states that “the observance of international humanitarian law and respect for internationally recognized human rights instruments and the protection of evacuees and displaced persons in the conduct of their relations reinforce the Bangsamoro people’s fundamental right to determine their own future and political status.” (Underscoring supplied)

The recognition of the Bangsamoro right to self-determination was affirmed by Secretary Silvestre C. Afable, Jr., Chairman of the Government Peace Negotiating Panel in the talks with the MILF, in his letter to Mohagher Iqbal, Chairman of the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel, dated November 9, 2006, which stated that the GRP would like to explore with the MILF in the next round of talks, “the grant of self-determination and self-rule to the Bangsamoro people based on an Organic Charter to be drafted by representatives of the Bangsamoro people.” In Tokyo last May 2007, he again reiterated the Philippine government position: “On the negotiating table, we have offered a political settlement based on self-determination that strives to unify the Bangsamoro people rather than divide them, for them to finally live in a homeland rather than a rented territory paid for in blood and suffering. We are crossing bridges of understanding that others have never ventured to do in the past.”90

and “A Declaration of Rights and Purposes Addressed to the Congress of the United States of America,” February 1, 1924” in Jubair, Salah. 1999. Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless Tyranny. Kuala Lumpur: IQ Marin, SDN BHD, pp. 293-303.89 On the minoritization of the Bangsamoro people, see Rodil, B.R. 1994. The Mionoritization of the Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Davao City: Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao, Inc. Christian prejudices against Muslims were revealing in Filipinas Foundation, Inc. 1975. Philippine Majority-Minority Relations and Ethnic Attitudes. Makati, Rizal, and Philippine Development Network, Philippine Human Development Report 2005 (PHDR 2005). 90 Quoted by Abinales in his column, “The Separatist”, Mindanews, May 21, 2007. Also in Philippine Free Press, May 15,

65

The issue that concerns us now is the expression of the Bangsamoro right of self-determination that can lead to a democratic and peaceful resolution of the conflict between the Philippine government and the Bangsamoro people.

Determination of Political Status

The core issue in the right to self-determination is determination of a people political status. How is the political status of a people determined? The UNESCO experts were of the opinion that a people should be able to achieve self-determination through a fully participatory and democratic process. The experts said: “Self-determination is achieved by fully participatory democratic processes among the people who are seeking the realization of self-determination, including referenda where appropriate.”91

To determine the wishes of the Bangsamoro people as to their political status, referendum has to be resorted to. This is also the position of the government. The above cited letter of Secretary Afable stated further that the Bangsamoro people shall decide on their political status in a referendum to be held after certain period. What are the choices are not clear as of this writing. To avert the worry of some that the referendum may turn into an all-out, winner-take-all contest the range of choices should include all possible political arrangements, such as independence, autonomy, free association, consociational arrangement, federal arrangement, and other power sharing arrangements.

In order for a referendum to be participatory and democratic process,

it is useful to be preceded by lengthy political debate and dialogue within the given communities to ensure that citizens are aware of what the options are, are fully informed about their implications, and are as ready as possible to vote in a referendum. In Southern Sudan, the referendum will take place after the interim period of six years. The referendum on Bougainville’s future political status will be held not earlier than ten years but not later than fifteen years after the signing of the agreement.

In the case of the Bangsamoro, I agree with the recommendations of the Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assembly and the Mindanao People’s Peace Movement that the referendum shall be held not earlier than five years but not more than ten years after decision is made to give enough time for people to understand the pros and the cons of every proposition, and to provide the Philippine government time to 2007.91 Van Walt van Praag, Michael C. and Onno Seroo, 1999.

66

demonstrate to the Bangsamoro people once again that they will be in better condition if they remain part of the Philippines.

Considering the bad experiences we always have in Philippine elections, the referendum will be credible if supervised by third party from the international community. The third party can be the United Nations, European Community, Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), or joint efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other multilateral groupings.

Before holding a referendum the issue of territory has to be resolved by the GRP and MILF negotiating panels because the area where referendum will be conducted has to be definite. Likewise, the two panels have to decide on the mechanism on how to conduct the exercise that it has to be democratic and participatory. The political, economic and cultural arrangements during the interim period preceding the referendum have to be agreed by the GRP and MILF peace panels as well. On the participation of the Indigenous Peoples of Mindanao, the principle of “free choice” has to apply.92

Window of Opportunity

Allowing people to enjoy the right to self-determination does not automatically result in the separation of the claimed territory from the parent state, as feared by those who put a high value on the sanctity of borders, although this may be one of the possible outcomes. Referendum on Puerto Rico’s political status was held in 1967 but 60% of the voters preferred continued commonwealth status. Leaders of the province of Nivis wanted to separate from the federation of St. Kitts and Nivis but the citizens of the province voted to stay with the federation. Although not binding, the two referenda in Quebec illustrated that referendum does not inevitably translate to separation. On the contrary, denying a people the opportunity to exercise this right, or failing to make available the mechanism to exercise the right to self-determination, will make peaceful resolution of armed conflicts more difficult. Many of the conflicts today are taking place within and across states and the roots of many of these intra-state conflicts can be traced to the denial of state authorities of their citizens’ assertion that they have a right to self-determination.93

Since undeniably the Mindanao problem is rooted in the Bangsamoro aspiration for self-determination, the implementation of this fundamental

92 The GRP and MILF Technical Working Groups arrived at a consensus during the 7th Exploratory Talks on April 18-20, 2005 affirming “the rights of non-Islam professing indigenous tribes to free choice.” 93 Harris, Peter and Ben Reilly, eds. 2003. Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

67

right of peoples to determine their political status will certainly open a window of opportunity to resolve the long-drawn conflict peacefully. As signatory to United Nations instruments on right to self-determination, the Philippines has the obligation to uphold, respect and promote this right. Constitutional and institutional barriers cannot be made the excuse to deny the Bangsamoro people this right. Sudan amended its constitution to give way to a referendum in the South, and Papua New Guinea promised “to move amendments to the National Constitution to guarantee a referendum on Bougainville’s future political status” when it signed the Bougainville Peace Agreement in 2001.

The opinion of the UNESCO experts that “the peaceful implementation of the right to self-determination in its broad sense is a key contribution to the prevention and resolution of conflicts, especially those which involve contending interests of existing states and peoples, including indigenous peoples, and minority communities”94 is a wisdom that has to be seriously considered.

APPENDIX D

94 Van Walt van Praag, Michael C. and Onno Seroo, 1999.

68

MEMORANDUMM OF AGREEMENT ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN

69

(MOA-AD)

70

71

72

Closure and Transition StatementHON. RAFAEL E. SEGUISChairman, Government Peace Negotiating PanelIn Talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front2 June 2010, Kuala Lumpur

Datuk Othman bin Abd Razak, Chief Facilitator,Honorable Chairman of the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel, Mohagher IqbalHonorable Members of the MILF Peace Negotiating PanelDistinguished Members of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel,Distinguished Members of the International Contact Group,Excellencies,

Assamalu Alaykum wa Rahmatullaha wa Barakatu.We all desire peace in Mindanao. But the road towards it has been characterized by alternating chapters of talks and impasse. Since the talks with the MILF began in 1996 there have been several roadblocks that led to standoff in the negotiations. In August 2008, after the Supreme Court decided on the unconstitutionality of the MOA-AD, some MILF commanders attacked villages and communities in protest of decision. The talks were stalled once more.Peace, however, has been a constant policy of President Gloria MacapagalArroyo since she assumed office in 2001. Despite the challenges, she remainedcommitted to achieving peace. She convened the new GRP Panel to start the peace talks.

Against all doubts and cynicism, the GRP and MILF Panels were able to pickup the talks from the unfortunate consequences of the MOA-AD decision and the

73

violence that erupted thereafter. What ensued are months of serious and extensive negotiations.

Today, we are about to conclude this chapter of the negotiations.Before we step further, I would like to trace back our footsteps in thisjourney, if I may call it so. For in retrospect, none can argue the fact that we havedone so much within a relatively short time.

From the beginning, I was very much aware of the formidable challenges ofengaging in this negotiations, and in particular in searching for a negotiatedpolitical settlement to the conflict in Mindanao. During our first formal meeting in July last year, as again reiterated in the succeeding meetings especially during the formal resumption of our Talks in December, I was given enormous hope by the statement of Chairman Iqbal and Datuk Mike Mastura – that the MILF hasdropped the option of independence, and that it is not negotiating forindependence but for the highest form of autonomy.

Of course, in what design the highest form of autonomy may be realizedwould still be the subject of laborious discussions. However, this declaration,insofar as the GRP Panel is concerned, opened up an entire spectrum of possibility that a negotiated peace agreement may be forged. And it continues to be so.

Armed with that hope, the GRP Panel negotiated with utmost good faith, andin a manner that would positively and constructively contribute to the process and move the negotiations forward.

And so on 28-29 July 2009, the first official meeting between the Chairmenof GRP and MILF Panels took place in Kuala Lumpur, marking the formal reestablishment of communication lines between the two sides after almost a year of impasse in the talks. I am equally proud that since the declaration of SOMO by the GRP last 23 July 2009 and the MILF’s SOMA two (2) days later, we have been able to keep the peace. There has been to this date no major incident of armed clashes between the Government and MILF forces. We all desire that this continues through the new administration.

On 15 September 2009, we signed the Framework Agreement on the

74

Formation of the International Contact Group (ICG) for the GRP-MILF PeaceProcess. This gave birth to a pioneering mechanism in peace negotiations whichbrings together state and non-state actors in aid of the negotiating process. Andconsidering that this is the first time for this kind of role, our gratitude go to thehard-working members of the ICG – the United Kingdom, Japan, Turkey, The Asia Foundation, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Conciliation Resources, andMuhammadiyah.

On 27 October 2009, we signed the Agreement on the Civilian ProtectionComponent (CPC) of the International Monitoring Team (IMT). Later, we renewed the Terms of Reference of the IMT on 9 December 2009, and agreed on the Terms of Reference of Civilian Protection Component of the IMT last 5 May 2010.

Today, we signed the Guidelines for the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development (HRD) Component of the IMT. The IMT, with its untiring efforts and invaluable contribution, has indeed made the ceasefire agreement work. For this reason, we thank our partners for their indelible mark in maintaining peace in Mindanao: Malaysia, Brunei, Libya, Japan, and soon, the EU, Norway, Indonesia, and Qatar. We also thank in advance and look forward to the engagement of the following Philippine-based organizations as members of the Civilian Protection Component of the IMT – the Non-Violent Peace Force Philippines, Mindanao People’s Caucus, Muslim Organization of Government Officials and Professionals (MOGOP), and Mindanao Human Rights Action Center (MINHRAC).

We also signed on 5 May 2010 a very significant agreement on the clearingof landmines/unexploded ordnances in conflict-affected areas in Mindanao – theGuidelines for the Implementation of the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines – Fondation Suisse de Deminage (PCBL-FSD) Project. This will allow affectedcivilians to return to their villages and resume the tilling of their farms.

These agreements are of great significance to the civilian population who arethe unfortunate victims of armed conflict. In concrete terms, they have obtained

75

the commitment of both Parties to respect the universally-accepted human rightsof the civilians notwithstanding the conflict.

For the past six months since we formally resumed peace talks, we haveundoubtedly accomplished worthy and noble feats, which add up to the past gains of signed agreements between the previous Peace Panels, namely:

• Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities, 18 July 1997• Tripoli Agreement on Peace, 22 June 2001• Implementing Guidelines for the Security Aspect, 7 August 2001• Implementing Guidelines of the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and

Development Aspects, 7 May 2002 • Operational Guidelines of the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), 21 December 2004

These agreements notwithstanding, we are aware that the parties have stillsome distance to go to ultimately secure peace and development in Mindanao.Indeed, we have tried to negotiate and conclude a final peace agreement, butit is a Herculean task that requires more give-and-take, and most of all, patience,understanding and time. We tried to bargain an interim agreement. This tooproved to be similarly difficult as the concepts and principles involved are delicate and complex, as they affect numerous communities, sectors and stakeholders.

Both Panels bargained hard because we would like to ensure that the agreement would be acceptable to all concerned, notably to those in Mindanao. From the start, the GRP Panel declared its intention to respect the fundamental law of the land while opening the possibility for a negotiated solution that may require Constitutional change. It is of course guided by the Supreme Court’s pronouncement on the MOA-AD case.

At this juncture of the peace process, we make a choice which path to take,what to look back on, and what to look forward to. But for me, only one path, onechoice is in clear sight – and that is to preserve our past gains and to ensure thatthe negotiations continue on with the next administration.

76

With this in our minds, we sign this Declaration. We consider this Declaration a document to preserve the past gains and provide a smooth transition to the next administration. It is a retrospective affirmation of our accomplishments, and a recapitulation of our past discussions as we toiled to come up with an agreement.

My Panel has always been guided by adherence to the Constitution. In particular, we have abided by the Supreme Court decision in Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain. Reframing the consensus points on ancestral domain will have to follow such guidance. To ensure that, we have consulted and obtained a legal opinion from the Department of Justice forsome of the clauses that are in this declaration.

Thus, in the phrase “to exercise self-governance on the basis of consent in accordance to an agreed framework”, we understand the word “framework” asreferring to the Constitution. We cannot negotiate and adopt an agreement that isoutside the boundaries of the Constitution.

Also, we agreed to consider “new formulas that permanently respond to thelegitimate aspirations of the Bangsamoro”. For us, it is clear that these “newformulas” and “new modalities to end the armed hostilities” should respect theConstitution. “New formulas” may include enhanced autonomy while “newmodalities” may include innovations such as “all party talks”.

We interpret the phrase “building on prior consensus points achieved” asreferring to the overall gains in the process since 1997. We commend the inclusion of the protection of the rights of the indigenous peoples both under the IPRA law, which we understand as being referred to by the phrase “respect the existing property and community rights”, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples. The declaration does not have an “s” in the first instance. “Indigenous People” is used but we assume that the right phrase is “Indigenous Peoples” and not “Indigenous People”.

While we have advanced these formulations in our discussions, it is up tothe next administration to make the final decisions on what should be in apolitical settlement.

77

Today, we put closure to this stage of the peace negotiations with a clearstatement by both Parties that we will preserve our gains and accomplishments,and work our best for the continuation of the talks. We give honor to our past,and anticipate the future with great hope. It has been a privilege to have sat across this negotiating table with you all, and an honor to be in the company of distinguished men and women.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank most sincerely our ChiefFacilitator Datuk Othman bin Abd Razak for his tenacity and dedication forhelping us finally sign this Declaration.

Thank you.

78