University of Pompeu Fabra

Department of Political and Social Sciences

Georgia’s Ethnic Minorities: Problems and Perspectives

Bakur Tkeshelashvili

Master in Current Democracies: Political Theory in the 21st Century

April 2014

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Abstract

This paper aims to analyze main challenges of integration of ethnic minorities in Georgia, and try to

answer the problematic question – how to resolve Georgia‘s problem with ethnic/national minorities

– by looking into a certain form of autonomous governance as alternative to majority rule.

The important point here is to find out how would certain decentralizing approach possibly work in

terms of finding the solution to the existing problem, secession conflicts (Abkhazia and South

Ossetia) and to the issue of accommodation of minority ethnic groups in Georgia.

The first part of the paper will provide the historical background of ethnic minorities in Georgia and

discuss the problem associated with this issue. Afterwards, federalism as an institutional framework

will be evaluated in the context of a model for managing multi-ethnic state and its conformness to the

Georgian reality.

Introduction

“With the collapse of the Communist bloc, there was initially a great optimism that liberal

democracy would emerge around the world. Instead, what emerged was violent ethnic conflict,

particularly in the Balkans and Caucasus.”

Will Kymlicka 2007

Georgia is a multiethnic state and therefore civil integration of ethnic minorities is of special

concern. The issue of integration of ethnic minorities became of concern after dissolution of the

Soviet Union, when as a result of Georgia gaining independence in April 1991, ethnic groups turned

out to be in the minority and radically different environment.

Regardless of the fact that the government´s attention towards ethnic minorities

significantly grew in recent years, serious problems still remain with respect to elaboration of a long-

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term integration policy, implementation of which would considerably assist in enhancement of

democracy and effective governance in Georgia.

Because of lack of norms in Georgian constitution – which could possibly deal with

territorial problems – and existence of conflict regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) in Georgia, the

issue of territorial arrangement has become one of the important matters of concern in the country

since back from early 1990s. A lot of opinions have been expressed and initiatives made for

Georgia‘s territorial arrangement, amongst which majority of proposals have been connected to

federal model as the only way of resolving problem with ethnic minorities in Georgia. Those who

support Georgia‘s federalization, on the one hand focus only on positive aspects of federal structure

and negative sides of it are not properly analyzed – which is less objective – but they are based on

certain arguments. On the other hand, those who object the idea of Georgia‘s federalization –

considering unitary state model as being the best one for Georgia – are less argumented, or in

some cases even left on a wish level.

The pressure for larger political units has been generated by the goals shared by most Western and

non-Western societies today. As Watts (2002: 1) argues the desire for smaller, self-governing political

units has risen from the desire to make governments more responsive to the individual citizen and to

give expression to primary group attachments – linguistic and cultural ties, religious connections,

historical traditions and social practices – which provide the distinctive basis for a community's

sense of identity and yearning for self-determination. Several European countries have

experienced a spectacular rise in consciousness among national groups concerning their cultural

and linguistic distinctiveness and individuality. Centralised unitary states found themselves forced to

adapt their constitutional system according to this new trend. Belgium and Spain are typical examples

of it. The core of these reforms is the institutionalization of cultural diversity.

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Ethnic minorities and problem associated with this issue in Georgia

“National states no longer seem inclined to go to war with one another,

but ethnic groups fight all the time, leading to ethnic pandemonium.”

Daniel Moynihan 1993

The case of Georgia is rather unique in South Caucasus region, as other states are not so diverse

ethnically. Georgia has historically been multiethnic country which became Christian in the first half

of fourth century, and it has always been the home for people with different confessions, cultures

etc. It should be noted here that economic, cultural, linguistic or religious cleavages has never

been a source of instability in Georgia. Its transition towards a democratic regime started even before

independence, when the national opposition headed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia came to power

following parliamentary elections of October 1990. Further development in the process of

democratization has been marked by several interruptions followed by two secession conflicts – in

Abkazia in 1992-1993 and in South Ossetia in 1991-1992 – that occurred on the background of

intense political instability.

Against the background of conflicts emerged in the territories of Abkhazia and Former Autonomous

District of South Ossetia, Georgia managed to avoid conflicts with other minorities. However, due to

absence of state strategy in the field of integration of ethnic minorities and ineffective governance,

relations with ethnic minorities periodically became tense, which decreased a degree of their

participation in the processes ongoing in the country. Low degree of integration of ethnic minorities

led to the isolation of compactly settled ethnic groups. This, from its part, posed danger to democratic

and dynamic development of the state. In the absence of integration policies, a gap in the relations

between two parts of the society, majority nation – Georgians, and ethnic minorities broadened even

wider. The ethnic issue is one of the most important as two ethno-political conflicts that have

reflected in breakup of the country still remain to a frozen – neither war nor peace – status to this

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day. Thus, the integration of all ethnic groups (including Abkhazians and Ossetians) by an

appropriate model of governance is very important.

Historical division

Georgian regional identities are very strong. Those who favor regional reforms in Georgia stress

the fact that these identities have developed over a long history. The first attempts to establish

regional administrations in Georgia date back to the third century B.C. when King Parnavaz created

three levels of territorial division: central, regional, and municipal. In the fifteenth century, the

Georgian territory was divided into the three kingdoms of Kartli, Kakheti, and Imereti and the

five counties of Samegrelo, Abkhazeti, Guria, Svaneti, and Samckhe.

This historical division of the Georgian territory in regions was abolished as a result of Georgia‘s

absorption into the Russian Empire during the first half of the nineteenth century. Each regional

entity had then been separately subordinated to Russian rule: Kartl- Kakheti in 1801, Samegrelo in

1803, Abkhazeti in 1809, Imereti in 1810, Guria in 1811, and Svaneti in 1856. These territories

were all reorganized according to the Russian model of territorial division. The country was

composed of the two gubernias (governmental areas) of Tbilisi and Kutaisi; the two okrugs (districts)

of Sukhumi and Sakatala; and the olki (region) of Batumi. During its short period of independence

(1918–21), Georgia was divided into two administrative entities. At present, Georgia consists of the

following regions (See Map 1): (1) Imereti, (2) Kvemo Kartli, (3) Samegrelo and Zemo Svaneti, (4)

Kakheti, (5) Shida Kartli (South Ossetia within this region – see Map 2), (6) Samckhe-

Javakheti, (7) Guria, (8) Mckheta-Mtianeti, (9) Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti, (10) Adjara

(autonomous republic), (11) Abkhazia. (Abkhazia and South Ossetia are conflicting regions,

currently out of control of Tbilisi, the capital city and a political centre of the country).

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Map 1

Map 2

According to the statistics office of Georgia, total population of Georgia as of January 2013 is

about 4 483 800 people (Table 1). Among them are 83.3% ethnic Georgians. Respective 16.7% of

the population are ethnic minorities and Azeri group is the largest – approximately 284 000 (6.5

%). The ethnic Armenians are approximately 250 000 (5.7%). The remaining 4.5% is made up of

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smaller groups, including Abkhaz, Ossetians, Russians, Ukrainians, Kurds/Yezids, Greeks, Jews,

etc. 120 nationalities in total reside Georgia (National Statistics Office of Georgia-web).

Source: State Department for Statistics of Georgia

(web)

*The 2012 population of Abkhazia refers to the preliminary results of the 2011

disputed census that took place from 21 to 28 February 2011

*The 2012 population figures of South Ossetia are rough estimates

All the ethnic minorities except Armenians, Azeri, Abkhaz and Ossetians live randomly in all

regions of Georgia, including the capital city Tbilisi. There are two regions of Georgia densely

populated by ethnic minorities where minorities actually account for the majority of the population:

Samtskhe-Javakheti which is Armenian-populated on the border to Armenia and Kvemo Kartli, Azeri

populated region on the border to Azerbaijan. There is one district of Georgia – Marneuli, which is

situated in the Kvemo-Kartli region territory and Azeri and Armenian population live there together.

Armenian population represents about 60% of Samtskhe-Javakheti residents and it is the

overwhelming majority (about 97%) of the population in two districts of Samtshe-Javakheti –

Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda. The Armenian population mainly live in Samtskhe-Javakheti after the

Ottoman aggression in the Russian-Turkish war in 1828 and the massive migration of Armenian

population from Turkish territories in the beginning of XX century. As about the Azeri living in

Table 1

Region Capital Km2 Population

(01.01.2013)

Tbilisi

Tbilisi

Tbilisi

Tbilisi

700

700

1,171,200

1,171,200 Imereti Kutaisi 6,475 703,900 Kvemo Kartli Rustavi 6,072 511,100 Samegrelo- Zemo svaneti Zugdidi 7,440 476,900 Kakheti Telavi 11,311 405,100 Adjara Batumi 2,880 394,200 Shida Kartli Gori 3,550 313,500 Abkhazia Sukhumi 8,640 242,862(?) Samtskhe-Javakheti Akhaltsikhe 6,413 213,500 Guria Ozurgeti 2,032 139,200 Mtskheta-Mtianeti Mtskheta 5,400 108,900 South Ossetia Tskhinvali 3,900 55,000(?)

Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svanet

Svaneti

Ambrolauri 4,850 46,300

Georgia Tbilisi 69,700 4,483,800

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Kvemo Kartli, they have more complicated identity, which has been formed during 400 years of

their living in Georgia. They are mainly refugees from Iran. In general Armenian and Azeri groups

live in Georgia from much earlier period, mainly in the capital city Tbilisi.

Source: State Department for Statistics of Georgia (web)

Nowadays the main problem, that minority faces in Georgia is the political exclusion.

Participation of minorities in governance is very limited. Traditionally Armenian populated region has

been politically more active than Azeri populated one. But still their representation in ruling political

parties (nowadays Georgian Dream with 85 and United National Movement 65 seats of all 150

seats to the Parliament as a result of October, 2012 election) and in political institutions on both,

central and on local level in Georgia is very low. Language barrier is the biggest issue for ethnic

minorities in this term. Since 1990s there have been claims for more rights for their own languages,

but the problem with this issue still remains unresolved.

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Abkhazian and South Ossetian Cases

Cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be of special concern because of the well known

conflict problem between Georgia and these regions. The Ossetians and the Abkhaz do not consider

themselves to be national minorities, despite their small numbers (164,000 Ossetians and 96,000

Abkhaz in the 1989 census. In 1989, Ossetians comprised 66 percent of the population of the South

Ossetian region, whereas the Georgians constituted 29 percent). In the Soviet federal tradition, they

were considered to be the native population and therefore the titular nationalities of their own

autonomous entity. As autonomies subordinated to the Georgian Republic, however, they lacked

full sovereignty. Ossetians, who are mainly concentrated in South Ossetian region of Georgia are an

ethnic Iranian group that became Christian in the early middle ages under Georgian and Byzantine

influence. A consolidated Ossetian Kingdom was created in the eighth century A.D., but in the

thirteenth century, having been driven out by invading Mongols, by help of the Georgian king at a

time they arrived from the north to the area where they now reside, establishing large Ossetian

communities in Georgia. After the Soviet troops occupied Georgia in 1921 and included the country

in the Soviet Union as a constituent republic, the South Ossetian Autonomous District was

established in 1922 in the territory of the Central Province of Georgia (it should be noted here that

this territory had never been a separate principality before). A similar North Ossetian Autonomous

District was created within the Russian Federation, dividing an established ethnic group by a

state border (Lortkipanidze, M., Djaparidze, O., Muskhelishvili, D., Metreveli, R., 2012).

Regardless of active ethnic interaction during the Soviet period, many all-Georgian villages existed

in South Ossetia, and the Ossetian population was mainly concentrated in the towns of Tskhinvali and

Java. In the early 1990s (before the recent conflicts), two-thirds of the region‘s population was

Ossetian and one-third Georgian, while about 100,000 ethnic Ossetians continued to live in Georgia

outside the South Ossetian region. In the 1990s, a secession movement was initiated in South

Ossetia. The intent was to unite the two provinces, North and South. Georgian actions aimed at

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returning the region to Tbilisi‘s control triggered a conflict in which thousands of people were killed.

In June, 1992 ceasefire agreement was concluded, however, the conflict has lingered on, with

occasional flare-ups, leading to the conflict of 2008 which resulted in thousands more forcefully

displaced ethnic Georgians from South Ossetian region and from Kodori gorge of Eastern

Abkhazia – strategically very important – which was under control of Tbilisi before the conflict.

Another secession conflict which broke out in August 1992 in Abkhazia, lasting for 13 months, one

of the bloodiest in the Post-Soviet area, resulting in more than 20,000 killed and up to 250,000 ethnic

Georgians‘ expulsion, remains unresolved.

It is generally not denied that the Abkhaz constitute a population native to the region of Abkhazia.

From Georgians‘ perspective, the Abkhaz claim for full sovereignty in name of the principle of self-

determination is, however, undermined by the fact that Georgians should also be considered as native

to the region of Abkhazia. Georgian side tries to point this out by making use of demographic data.

As opposed to the situation in South Ossetia, Georgians constituted a relative majority of the

population of Abkhazia: in 1989, Georgians formed the single largest ethnic group in pre-war

Abkhazia, with a 45.7% Georgians; 17.8% Abkhazians; 14.6% Armenians; 14.3% Russians; 2.7%

Greek; and 4.9% other (population census of 1989). Abkhazia has historically always been a part of

the Georgian state. But Georgian authorities believe that the Abkhaz community should receive more

than just minority rights. Abkhaz claims for sovereignty, and the right to secession are based on the

principles of national self- determination and equality among nations, independent from demographic

data. Abkhaz believe that their situation as a numerical minority in their republic was a result of

successive waves of immigration and forced colonization under both tsarist and Soviet rule.

Therefore, the Abkhaz see the numerical preponderance of the Georgian, Russian, Armenian, and

other non-Abkhaz nationalities as the unjust result of the occupation of their territory.

The problems discussed above raises concerns about irredentism and Georgia‘s territorial integrity,

a subject of great concern considering the two provinces currently outside the de facto authority of

the country (South Ossetia and Abkhazia). The fears and insecurities associated with the ethno

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territorial turmoil of the early 1990s still largely define the attitudes and actions towards national

minorities both on the state and, to some degree, even on the personal level. This kind of attitude

could be understood to some degree when realizing national security policy. In this context as

Kymlicka correctly argues “most post-communist states have one or more enemies on their borders

who would like to destabilize the state with familiar tactic of recruiting minorities within the state and

encouraging them to engage in destabilizing protest, even armed insurrection”. By contrast Kymlicka

notes that Western countries are surrounded by allies, not enemies, and are integrated into broader

regional security alliances and no Western state today has an incentive to destabilize its neighbours by

using discontended national minorities as a vehicle within a neighbouring state.

Resolving a problem in Georgia in this context should be understood in terms of restoring the

jurisdiction of Tbilisi over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and, no less important, making it possible for

refugees and forcibly displaced persons to return; as well as accomodating all the ethnic minorities in

the country through a model of governance that would increase the level of democracy and security

for the state is very important. Dealing with the destabilizing factors discussed above by adopting a

certain form of governance and its consequences in Georgian reality will be further analyzed below.

Federalism: A way out of problem?

A federal state requires for its formation two conditions. There must exist in the

first place, a body of countries... so closely connected by locality, by race, or the

like, as to be capable of bearing in the eyes of their inhabitants, an impress of

common nationality... A second absolutely essential to the founding of a federal

system is the existence of a very peculiar ... sentiment

... the inhabitants ... must desire union, and must not desire unity ...

Albert Venn Dicey (1915: 75)

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A theory of contemporary federalism, which came about from the writings of Alexander Hamilton,

John Jay and James Madison, being inspired by the Lockean liberal tradition, in terms of individual

freedom - written in defence of the American federation, established in 1787, were brought

togather in the federalist under pseudonym Publius. The success of federal system in the light of

America‘s case was so influential that it became a source of inspiration for many of the federations

that were established later in the nineteenth century, such as Switzerland, Canada, Germany, Brazil

and Argentina (Requejo 2001). According to Requejo, Immanuel Kant refers to federalism in the

normative sense in his perpetual peace (1795), in which he argues for a peaceful world which can

only be achieved by establishment of a supranational federal world structure.

Etymologically, the term federalism derives from the Latin foedus, meaning treaty or contract

(Requejo and Wynants 2001: 289). It is a normative political philosophy that recommends the

use of federal principles – that is, combining joint action and self- government (King 1982).

Federal political system is a descriptive catch-all term for all political organisations that combine

what Daniel Elazar called shared rule and self-rule. Federal political systems, thus broadly construed,

include federations (symmetrical – asymmetrical), confederations, unions, federacies, associated

states, condominiums, leagues, and cross-border functional authorities (Elazar 1987).

Federalism, like democracy, freedom and liberty, is a disputed value concept having no universally

accepted meaning. The federal principle is a vertical division of power, the method of dividing

powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinated and

independent (Wheare 1963). Wheare stresses the fact that formal institutional requirements are basic

to federations. A constitutional delimitation of powers, financial autonomy, bicameral

legislation, independent elections for both levels of government and a multi-party system

are the institutional building-blocks of federations (Khubua 2000). Federalism is defined as a legal

manifestation of balanced relations between the powers of the central government and the

autonomy of the constituent units. Such a system of government can be distinguished from a

simple application of majority rule based on central decision-making by the existence of two distinct

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legal systems, that of central government and that of sub-national units, each having its own system

of organs and laws. Those two tiers have independent legitimacy and a constitutionally guaranteed

place in the overall system, as well as their own set of institutions, powers and responsibilities. Their

autonomous rights are fixed and legally determined in constitutions and other enactments.

Federalism is a special form of segmental autonomy... not only the granting autonomy to the

constituent parts of the state, which is its most important feature, but also the over- representation of

the smaller subdivisions in the federal chamber (Lijphart 1977: 42). According to Carl Friedrich (in

Ursula Hicks 1978: 20-21), the process of federalism is the organizational counterpart of communal

development or the organised co-operation of groups. He also argues that the whole process

of federalization is strongly linked with territorially diversified values, interests and beliefs

overarched by joint values and beliefs.

Traditionally, federations as a form of territorial political organization have seemed to be most

applicable where diversities are territorially concentrated so that distinct groups can exercise their

autonomy through regional units of self-government. According to Watts (2002) extent to which

federation is the appropriate model to accommodate and manage diversity in a particular situation

will depend on the extent to which the social diversity is amenable to the institutional features of

federations, and to which a federation can accommodate political diversity is likely to depend not just

on the adoption of federal arrangements, but upon whether the particular form or variant of federation

that is adopted or evolved gives adequate expression to the desires and requirements of the particular

society in question. Here Watts interestingly notes that there are many variations possible in the

application of the federal idea in general or even within the more specific category of

federations. Ultimately the application of federalism involves a pragmatic prudential approach,

and its continued applicability in different or changing circumstances in the twenty- first century may

well depend upon further innovations in its application (Watts 2002: 11). According to Simeon and

Conway (2001) the logic in support of federalism is that it helps conflicts to be reduced by a measure

of disengagement of seperation. Stability will be increased in a system in which territorially

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concentrated minorities are able to exercise autonomy or self-determination on matters crucial to

their identity and continued existence, without a fear of being overridden or vetoed by the majority

group. Similarly, the federal system will limit the ability of the majority to impose its will on the

minorities. Hence they will be reconciled to the system – realizing both the agvantages of autonomy

and the benefits – economic, social and otherwise – of participation in a larger political entity. Thus,

in a federal system, a national state majority cannot prevail over a minority, that happens to constitute

a majority in one of the local communities that is constitutionally privileged (Dahl, in Linz 1997: 14).

Federalism provides protection against domination by majority through institutions that it controls,

while maintaining the ability of both groups to pursue common goals (Simeon and Conway 2001:

340). However, in another line it is argued that given the widely varying models of federalism,

and the differences in the societal conditions in which federalism may be implemented, it is

virtually impossible to make broad generalization about the effectiveness of federalism in

multinational societies. In this contrasting arguments Maynes (1993), contend that specialists in

ethnic conflicts are wary of federal solutions because they tend to promote secession. Herewith, as

Kymlicka notes there are fears that post-communist world claims for self-government often occurs

prior to the emergence of a democratic political culture, that accordingly increases the risks where

could be fewer guarantees that minorities that receive autonomy will exercise their powers in a way

that respects human rights, rather than creating islands of local tyranny.

Generally used argument that federalism can powerfully influence societal divisions and the ways

in which they are mobilized and expressed, privileging some, and undercutting others (Cairns 1976),

leads some to assert that federalism can perpetuate and intensify the very conflicts it is designed to

manage… and that it can empower minority elites who have a vested interests in sustaining and

perhaps exacerbating the conflict (Simeon and Conway 2001). At the extreme federalism can

provide the institutional tools and resources for nation-building, a base that can make a move towards

secession plausible and viable in the future (Dion 1992). Thus, the stability that federalism creates

may be only temporary, it can easily become a framework for further demands and may not

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constitute a stable, durable solution (Linz 1997: 411). This suggests that federalism is not enough

(Cairns 1995). By themselves, federal institutions are no guarantee of either success or failure. As

argued by Simeon and Conway they need to be reinforced by other factors, both societal and

institutional. Given that federalism is a process of building out it needs to be balanced by a process

of building in, which means that the success of federalism depends, to a large extent, on the

integrative counterweights to the process (Simeon and Conway 2001). Watts notes that the nature of

the common federative institutions: While the constitutional establishment of regional units with self-

government is an essential feature of federations in order to accommodate diversity, the character of

representation and power-sharing within the federal institutions is also an important aspect in the

ability of federations to manage and reconcile diversity (Watts 2002: 8) and importantly to prevent

any possible secessionist movement.

Examples of secession or fragmentation in the West Indies Federation, Rhodesia and Nyasaland,

Pakistan, the USSR and Czechoslovakia have led some critics to argue that federations are prone to

instability and secession. It should be noted, however, that all these cases of failed federations have

occurred where democratic institutions were weak or lacking. Their failure may be attributed more to

their undemocratic character than to their federal character. Indeed, there have not yet been any

cases of genuinely democratic federations, no matter how diverse, that have disintegrated. This

suggests that fully democratic processes are a fundamental prerequisite to effective federation.

Cultural diversity may lead to instability, when ethnic groups start to believe in their

exclusiveness, in their being oppressed or threatened by other groups, or when a dominating majority

starts to consider them as potential traitors to the nation. It is sometimes possible to reduce tension

through negotiation, but differences may also turn into a violent conflict.

The claims of ethnic minorities to have their differences acknowledged and respected, challenges

the principle of majority rule. In particular a type of conflict regulation will be dealt with that is

used in non-majoritarian forms of democracy. In this term federalism is a distinctive form of political

organization.

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Federal system can be multi-national/multi-ethnic or mono-national in character. In the former, the

boundaries of the internal units are usually drawn in such a way that at least some of them are

controlled by national or ethnic minorities. Multinational federal states are, as Linz put it, an effort

to hold together within the state those who are thought to be separate nations, and who therefore find

an unitary state unacceptable (Linz 1997: 25). National federations may be nationally

homogeneous (or predominantly so), or they are organized, often consciously, so as not to

recognize more than one official nationality. Often, this happens in such a way that the state´s

national and ethnic minorities are also minorities in each of the constituent units. The official goal

behind national federation is nation building, the elimination of internal national differences. The

one of the founding and paradigmatic examples of a national federation is the United States. Its

model was adapted by some Latin American, European, and Asian federations (McGarry; O´Leary).

It is interesting here to note that multinational federations have been proposed for a significant

number of devided places, including Georgia (O´Leary 2005).

Case of Georgia

Political models, based on the experience of developed democratic countries cannot be

implemented in Georgia without taking into account its cultural heritage and traditions of statehood.

The willingness of public opinion and the ability of political elites to contribute to a process of

accommodation of differences are extremely important in this respect. The lack of a strong civil

society, of tradition of tolerance and of the rule of law are serious impediments to the

implementation of any democratic model. A nationalist ideology based on a doctrine of blood and

soil would make any accommodation of differences almost impossible. Political choices should

be based on criteria of efficiency and on the principle that political form is better that best applies

(Sartori 1994: 3). Multi-national states have greater difficulties in reaching democratic outcomes than

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ethnically homogeneous ones. Pronounced cultural diversity entails the presence of diverging and

often incompatible interests. Processing different identity-based interests into widely accepted

political decisions is a particularly cumbersome exercise (Lijphart 1969).

An ethnic understanding of nationhood implies that nations consist of ethnic groups. Membership

of the nation is accorded on the basis of ascriptive criteria such as common descent, language and

religion. In societies where such an understanding prevails, all relations and attitudes are seen as

primordially determined. It is assumed that the people are born into particular cultural identities and

that their deepest commitments and most strongly held values are determined by the inherited

identities (Przeworski 1995: 20). Therefore ethnic cleavages are seen as more objective than the

interests of different social groups, classes or parties, despite the fact that they are cultural products

of particular societies. Cultural diversity does not only refer to national or linguistic differences; it

also relates to the distinctive sets of attitudes, opinions and values that persist for a relatively long

period of time in the field of a country and give individuals in a particular sub-culture a sense of

identity that distinguishes them from individuals in other sub-cultures (Dahl 1966: 371). In this

respect the size of the cultural community is not so important as its strength and distinctiveness, since

the stronger and more distinctive a sub-culture, the more its members identify and interact with

one another, and the less they identify and interact with non-members (Dahl 1989: 255). All

relations in political, cultural, family and economic life are connected to the members of the same

group.

It should be stressed that rigidity of the legal system itself is the best safeguard for the integrity of

the state and the protection of minorities. The means and aims are legally defined and fixed. The

laws are meant to be the result of negotiations and based on a consensus among different

interest groups. Such freely chosen rules are usually thought to have some independent moral value.

Federalism gives constitutional guarantees to the consensus reached and imposes responsibilities on

the parties.

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The first step in the design of federal arrangements in Georgia could be to define the main political

actors and the principles on which its relations will be based. Here it is important to uphold two

fundaments: first, regardless how powers are divided between the constituent units and the centre, the

extant distribution of powers can not be altered without mutual agreement; and second, that the

original pact be drawn up between the different units on equal terms (Elazar 1987: 166) The different

segments of society (national communities, regions, etc.) should be regarded as equal partners

(regions) in the political process with varying competences. The central government may be

considered as a governing body (result of the pact) created on the basis of a contract in order to

regulate various issues of common concern. The participants/partners (all regions of Georgia – see

map 1) should each have a right to veto any proposed legislation or policy. This means that Georgia

facing long-lasting and severe conflicts should go beyond the state model created during its struggle

for independence, and to think in more consensual terms when building a state based on the rule of

law. It should be considered that a maximum degree of stability may be reached by grand coalitions

based on agreements such as the allocation of top governmental offices – like the presidency or the

offices of Prime Minister or Speaker of the Assembly – to specific groups.

The principle of power-sharing might be introduced both at the level of top governmental offices

and at all levels of the state. In Switzerland this principle applies both to the seven- member Federal

Council and to all important institutions. Even the Swiss army selects its seven three-star generals on

the base of that principle. The Swiss federal postal service is headed by three directors sharing the

position according to their linguistic affiliations.

A grand coalition principle contradicts a presidential system of government, where power is

concentrated in the hands of one person (in many centralised multi-ethnic states) and which does not

leave much room for segmental representation. In that respect a federal system could be more

efficient in allowing the various segments to express their interests. A system may also be envisaged

where each segment has guaranteed shares of representation by way of reserved seats, i.e. seats for

which only the members of the particular groups are allowed to present candidates at the elections.

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The segments may also acquire a proportional share in civil service appointments. These rights may

be implemented through a balanced bicameral system and through minority representation in the

second chamber.

Direct democracy through referenda is majoritarian in character. It can be argued that the

possibility for a minority to initiate a nation-wide referendum or a referendum on a smaller scale

may be a positive factor. Of course, this does not mean that such referenda would lead to a decision in

favour of minority claims. However, the right to initiate, or participate in, a referendum does give a

minority a voice, and there is more chance that its problem will become public and be heard. It might

also be regarded as a preventive measure warning public opinion and the political establishment of

the possible difficulties and potential controversies which need to be addressed.

All the partners have to agree on some fundamental principles for the arrangements of the state

concerned. These should include the following basic objectives:

To ensure the national security of the common state, which implies the necessity for a

unified army, secure protection of the state frontiers and a national security system

protecting the country from foreign military threats and war;

democratic governance at all levels of power and in all institutions of the state;

Uniform guarantees for the protection of human rights and freedoms, independent of the

goodwill of particular regional governments and protected by the entire state. All the

citizens and residents of Georgia should enjoy the same rights of political and economic

participation;

Strong mechanisms for economic growth and prosperity and for co-operative

economic relations in the country, including a national currency and an adequate banking,

financial and taxation system.

19

All member states, as well as minorities should enjoy a minority veto power, which protects

national communities by allowing them to block any attempts to eliminate or reduce their autonomy.

Only such a veto can give each segment the complex qualities of political protection. It provides all

sub-groups with the power of protecting itself and places the rights and safety of each where only

they can be securely placed, under its own guardianship; without this there can be no

systematic, peaceful, or effective resistance to the natural tendency of each to come into conflict

with the others (Calhoun 1953: 28).

For instance, the Belgian constitutional reform of 1970 has introduced a minority veto power

over any bill affecting the cultural autonomy of the linguistic groups. Every law, with the exception

of budgetary and special laws, may be subjected to a special procedure, referred to as the alarm bell

pocedure. Three quarters of the members of a linguistic group in either the Chamber or the Senate

may pass a motion declaring that a bill or proposal threatens to cause serious damage to the relations

between the communities. In such a case the legislative procedure is suspended. The cabinet, in

which linguistic groups are equally represented, also exercises a kind of political arbitration.

Each segment (in federal structure) is given a high degree of autonomy in running its internal

affairs, especially concerning education, religion and culture. Cultural autonomy for religious and

linguistic groups has taken three main forms in power-sharing democracies: 1) a federal arrangement

in which the linguistic boundaries coincide with sub-state boundaries, thus providing a high degree

of linguistic autonomy, as in Spain, Belgium or Canada; 2) the right of religious or linguistic

communities to establish and administer their own autonomous schools, fully supported by public

funds, as for instance in Belgium; and the Netherlands (religious only); 3) a different Civil Law

for each of the segments, regarding marriage, divorce, custody and adoption of children.

Federation must guarantee the principle of territorial integrity for Georgia and the right to return of

all refugees. In Georgian case it can be argued that federalism may provide a means to find the right

balance between the principles of territorial integrity on the one hand and the right to national self-

determination on the other. For the Georgian perspective, the reunification with Abkhazia and

20

South Ossetia would pave the way for a general process of federalization and regionalization that

would include the mkhareebi (regional entities in Georgia). This arrangement would allow regional

and local authorities to be more responsive to the needs of the population.

For Georgia, we may consider two models of distribution of power in a federal system:

Asymmetrical and Symmetrical. Requejo and Wynants (2001: 290) note that symmetrical character

of the federation lies in the fact that relations between the federal government and the federal units

on the one hand, and between the federal units on the other hand, are more or less uniform. Examples

of such symmetrical federations are Australia, Austria, Germany and the USA. Herewith, in

asymmetrical federal agreements one should distinguish between two types of agreements:

asymmetrical federations and specific asymmetrical agreements between different types of units such

as federacies and associated states (Requejo 2001). Asymmetrical federations have the same general

characteristics of federations, but they differ from symmetrical federations with regard to the

asymmetrical character of their relations, especially between the federal government and the

federated units, but also regarding relations with each other. In this term different relations are

established for certain units by federal constitution that can be reflected in a varying degree and form

of participation in the representation of state abroad, in the symbolic and institutional framework and

so on. The reasons for considering on governing through asymmetries are various, but they are all

based on the de facto asymmetries, for example: cultural, geographic, historical and so on (Requejo

2001).

The applicability of any of these models will depend upon the particular circumstances of each

case. Factors that need to be taken into account include the nature and strength of the motives for

common action and shared-rule and the intensity and distribution of the pressures and motives in the

constituent units for autonomous policy making and self-rule. The applicability of federation as a

political solution in Georgia may also depend upon the particular form of federation that is

adopted (Watts 2002: 5).

21

As Watts argues, federations, essentially a territorial form of political organization, as a means of

safeguarding distinct groups or minorities, do this best when those groups and minorities are

geographically concentrated in such a way that they may achieve self-governance as a majority

within a regional unit of government. Consequently, in some federations where the intensity of

the pressure for autonomous self-government has been much stronger in some constituent units

than in others, asymmetrical constitutional arrangements or practices have been adopted. Among the

examples are the Canadian, Indian, Malaysian, Belgian, and Spanish federations (Watts 2002: 7).

When the national reality of a state is plural and asymmetrical, establishing symmetrical federal

agreements is ill-advised (Requejo 2001: 125). Charles Tarlton (in Simeon and Conway 2001)

points out that the federal systems are never fully symmetrical. In this term Watts (2002)

notes that asymmetrical arrangements have been seen as transitional, intended to arrive ultimately at

a more uniform autonomy, but at "varying speeds". Analysis of the various examples of asymmetry

within federations suggests that asymmetrical arrangements may become complex and contentious,

as exemplified by the efforts in the last three decades within Canada to increase the autonomy of

Quebec. But experience suggests that there may be cases where constitutional asymmetry is the only

way to resolve sharp differences when much greater impulses for non-centralization exist in some

regions than in others within a federal system (Watts 2002). According to the line of argument that

authors use and as far as the structural characteristics of the two models are concerned, the

asymmetrical model could be more appropriate for Georgia. There are a number of reasons for this.

The first model favors the inclusion of Georgia‘s regions in the federalization process, thereby

acknowledging their political relevance and separate identities. Additionally, the federalization

process should not be restricted to the problems of unification and conflict management only. Apart

from that, a large number of federated units would facilitate alliances among those units and

contribute to the stability of the federal system over the long term. However, an asymmetrical

federal system may lead to difficult negotiations between the federal government and the federated

entities (as can be illustrated by the example of Spain and Canada).

22

Simeon and Conway stress the fact that in addition to strong national or community

loyalties and identities, federalism can only survive if these are paralleled by significant elements of

shared or overarching identities and values (Simeon and Conway 2001: 361). Federalism is

predicated on the existence of nested identities (Smith 1995), the ability to maintain dual loyalties,

a sense of simultaneous difference and of commonalities. Miller argues that nested nationalities

think of themselves as belonging both to the smaller community and to the larger one, and they do

not experience this as schizophrenic, because their two identities fit together reasonably well

(Miller 1998). Once this symbiosis erodes, then federalism is indeed likely to give way to

secession. Such feelings of common interest are critical conditions for the success of federalism in

any multi-ethnic state in the world.

Conclusion

Kymlicka notes that “if international standards are to be useful in resolving ethnic conflicts, they

need to address the specific types of claims and specific types of groups involved in these conflicts,

and that requires shifting towards a scheme of targeted minority rights.”

Undertaking measures in the Georgian regions where ethnic minorities are concentrated for

integrating them through federal model I think should be one of the priority tasks for the state. In

order to accommodate group rights in ethnically divided societies, alternatives to majority rule and to

the concentration of power in the centre have to be envisaged. The recognition and respect of

legitimate claims is a precondition for the settlement of ethno-cultural diversities. Timing is an

important factor in this process: If the differentiation is not recognised in time, a grouping, a cultural

community, a region, will refuse to identify with the values, the culture, the language of the dominant

group, thus challenging the legitimacy of the state.

Michel Seymour argues that if the primary right of internal self-determination, that is the right of a

nation to develop economically, socially and culturally and determine its own political status within

the encompassing state is violated for the nations this should be an additional just cause for seceding,

23

when at the same time there is an unfair representation within the encompassing state and systematic

violation of human rights. Thus, accommodation of ethnic and regional diversities in Georgia

according to a federal framework, which best addresses the needs of the different segments of the

society, could be a solution that can ensure the participation of all political and social forces and

guarantee that all interests will be taken into consideration. All partners in the process have to be

treated as equal and must enjoy a similar degree of security. Formal rules to accommodate conflicting

interests have to be agreed by all parties on the basis of consensus and not by simple majority

vote, where minority interests are not taken into consideration. As federation necessarily requires

redistribution of state posts according to ethnic criteria, establishment of certain parity

principles must be ensured. This means that the language barrier, which limits participation of non-

ethnic Georgians in public life, would need to be addressed.

The implementation of federal arrangements is possible if political elites have the will to guarantee

the agreements and if the population is ready to support them. At least two further conditions have to

be met as prerequisites for successful state building along this line.

A. Far-reaching economic reform, to ensure an equal distribution of economic resources to the

constituents of the state. A co-operative form of federalism needs economic resources in order to

ensure effective implementation of the rights and competences conferred by the constitution or

special laws. Such an economic reform must be built on full recognition of property rights and on the

principle of free competition.

B. Regional or federal arrangements have to be built on a culture of self-governance. Local

government gives the local population an understanding of the basic principles of good

governance. Without the active participation of the citizens, any type of arrangement or allocation of

competences is a blank sheet of paper, with no vital force in public life.

The state, which is obliged to protect all of its citizens regardless of ethnic belonging, will not

develop democratically and harmonically without integration of ethnic minorities. In case this

problem is unresolved or status quo is maintained, in ethnically mixed region of the Caucasus, where

24

the interests of many states and political groups cross, there will be a constant probability of

emerging danger.

Georgia will always have a crisis of state legitimacy while those demanding self-determination

for the ethno-minority do not feel that they are co-founders and sovereign citizens of the common

state. It is important to achieve trust and to recreate some common political structures with

conflicting regions first. If Georgia keeps to the path of democracy and develops economically,

co-operation among its constituent units and their voluntary integration on an equal footing will

increase.

The continuation of a situation that is neither peace nor war is dangerous and hopeless for

conflicting sides in Georgia; it has also become a substantial barrier on the way to pan-Caucasian

stability and co-operation. It is logical that fears may increase as power in the regions really begins to

take shape. However, it is perfectly clear that genuine federalism is impossible without

decentralization and a high degree of democracy. A federation can only be based on the mutual desire

and the mutual trust of the constituents and the Centre; this will be possible only if Georgian society

can free itself of the fear of the country breaking up.

Simeon and Conway argue that the territorial sharing of power that federalism represents is

essentian in any formula for managing geographically concentrated ethnolinguistic divisions within a

state. Federalism does not guarantee success, but it is hard to see any form of successful

accommodation of multiple ethnic groups within a single state that does not include federalism

(Simeon and Conway 2001: 364). So while federalism may not be stable outcome, it is not clear it is

any less stable than alternatives (McGarry; O‘Leary 1993). We can agree with Linz here in that

federalism, rather than self-determination and independence, is a more constructive, less conflictual,

and often a more democratic solution, although it will never fully eliminate the tensions in multi-

ethnic societies, but it can make them more manageable, providing a positive response to one of the

great problems of our time (Linz 1997: 15; 41; 45).

25

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