Brunei: The Steady State

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BRUNEI: The Steady State Author(s): Tilak Doshi Source: Southeast Asian Affairs, utheast Asian Affairs (1991), pp. 71-80Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27912019Accessed: 30-11-2015 16:16 UTC

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Southeast Asian Affairs 1991

BRUNEI The Steady State

Tilak Doshi

On the world stage, the year 1990 will undoubtedly be noted for the portentous events of the Middle East. In whatever manner the Gulf crisis is eventually resolved,

Iraq's annexation of Kuwait has irrevocably marked the passing of the old Arab

order, having shattered the security and confidence of the oil-rich potentates in the

region. The effect that this evidence of the vulnerability of small states ? however

wealthy they may be ? has on the security perceptions of the Sultanate of Brunei

must be attenuated by the country's location in a demonstrably more stable region. A more direct and favourable effect of the Gulf crisis has been the windfall gains to the state associated with the sharp rise in oil prices. In the short and medium

term, Brunei's internal political stability seems assured. Notwithstanding the absence

of any move towards democracy, the high standard of living enjoyed by the bulk

of Bruneians obviates any significant opposition to the status quo. The steady state remains the exclusive preserve of the Sultan, his family, and a small coterie

of advisers.

The Petroleum Sector

Constituting 98 per cent of exports proceeds and 60 per cent of gross domestic

product, the exploitation of non-renewable hydrocarbon resources continues to be

the material basis of Brunei's existence. The surge in oil prices following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is expected to boost real GDP growth to over 3 per cent in

1990,1 in contrast to the 1.5 per cent average for the previous 5 years. Export revenues, which amounted to US$2.14 billion in 1989 according to the Finance

Ministry's statistics, are expected to be over the US$3 billion mark for 1990.2 While

the other net oil-exporters in the region, Indonesia and Malaysia, have substan

tially increased crude oil output following the Gulf crisis, Brunei Shell Petroleum

(BSP) ? the 50/50 joint venture between the state and Royal Dutch Shell which

has full monopoly over crude production in the country ? has maintained its

150,000 barrels per day level of recent years in accordance with the government's conservation policy. Annual LNG exports of 5 million tons, all of which go to

Japan under a single 20-year contract signed in 1973, have become as important to Brunei's trade account as crude petroleum since the adoption of the conservation

policy. The government has a 50 per cent stake, with Shell and Mitsubishi holding an equal share in the remainder, in Brunei LNG and Brunei Coldgas which process and market the country's natural gas resources.



72 Tilak Doshi

At current rates of extraction, Brunei's crude reserves, estimated at 1.4 billion

barrels, have a life expectancy of about 25 years; the country's reserves of natural

gas, at 300 billion cubic metres, should last for another 35 years. These estimates continue to be revised upwards. BSP has increased its estimates substantially, espe cially for natural gas. In April, Jasra-Elf

? a joint venture between Elf Aquitaine of France and locally-owned Jasra Jackson

? announced a major oil strike in its offshore concession, and recoverable reserves from the new find have been deemed to be as high as 50 million barrels.

The participation of Mitsubishi in the LNG industry and of Elf-Aquitane in an offshore concession has qualified Brunei's previous total dependence on Shell as the only foreign investor in the crucial oil and gas sector. Although complete nationalization of the oil and gas industries is not likely in the forseeable future, the participation of the Brunei Government in the sector has received a boost with the Jasra-Elf discovery.

The Construction Industry The year 1990 marked a severe recession in the construction industry, the most im

portant contributor to the GDP outside the petroleum sector. Construction became a major source of growth particularly in the period leading up to independence in

January 1984. By 1984, real output growth in the sector slowed to 6.7 per cent, from 19 per cent in the previous two years. Since its peak, with the completion of large construction works, this sector seems to have reached the margins of saturation.

According to a report by the Borneo Bulletin (14 April 1990), the industry was going into "a catastrophic tailspin" with most Bruneian-owned firms "out of business" and the remaining few "on the brink of collapse". The major companies still active are either foreign-owned or joint ventures with access to outside capital resources.

While the cyclical nature of the industry makes it particularly susceptible to booms and busts, several other factors have also contributed to the industry's current state of crisis. In particular, the weak management practices of indigenous firms, the scarcity of bank financing, steep increases in the price of imported building

materials, the lack of an escalation clause in construction contracts commonly used in most other countries to allow for unforeseeable cost increases, and delayed payments by government departments to contractors have been cited as major causes of the crisis.

The Diversification Imperative Citing the finitude of the country's reserves of hydrocarbons, the "diversification

imperative" continues to be emphasized by the Sultanate's senior officials. The

past year has seen the Bruneian administration active in continuing efforts to

encourage foreign investment as a vehicle to reduce the country's dependence on its oil and gas exports. In March, Brunei sent its first economic mission to Europe.

Comprising senior officials and leading businessmen, the delegation headed by the Minister for Industry and Primary Resources addressed an investment seminar for a joint London Chamber of Commerce and Department of Trade and Industry group in London. In this and other forums, Brunei's officials have reiterated the



Brunei: The Steady State 73

government's commitment to diversifying its petroleum-based economy through the promotion of private foreign investments.

Brunei's financial incentives to promote foreign investments are competitive with neighbouring countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand which

have been undergoing unprecedented foreign investment booms in the past few

years. The standard corporate tax rate is 30 per cent, and no taxes are levied on

personal income, capital gains, or on remittances of foreign income. Companies awarded "pioneer status" can be exempt from the corporate tax for two to five years

(depending on the level of fixed capital expenditure), and from taxes on imported

capital goods and raw materials. The designated sectors eligible for pioneer status

include pharmaceuticals, cement, metal fabrication, industrial chemicals, paper and textile products, and food processing.

According to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Industry and Primary

Resources, the government has received an "encouraging response" from Taiwan

and Singapore.3 Despite the attractive fiscal incentives, however, Brunei's ability to elicit substantial foreign investments is severely constrained and the level of

foreign investments in the non-petroleum sectors of the economy remain minimal.

The lack of a sizeable domestic market, the relatively poor infrastructure, and

high labour and operating costs continue to be serious impediments to potential

foreign investors.

Despite the windfall gains accruing to the Brunei Government in the wake of

the Gulf crisis and escalating oil prices, the country's limited absorptive capacity ensures that government spending remains conservative if inflationary pressures are to be avoided. On the eve of National Day, the Sultan stated that restraints on

government expenditure, implemented in the context of the protracted fall in oil

prices since the peak of 1981, would persist.4 According to the Ministry of Industry and Primary Resources, the Fifth Five-year National Development Plan (running from 1986 through 1990) is to be followed by a programme which concentrates

on the development of small and medium-sized enterprises in several areas which

show commercial potential within manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and ceramics. The Ministry envisages that 30 per cent of its exports will derive

from the non-oil and gas sectors by the end of the century.5 Whether one is optim istic or otherwise with respect to Brunei's planned transition to a more diversified

economic base, the fact remains that the country's consumption requirements are

met overwhelmingly by imports, and the comparative advantage of its leading

exports remains squarely within the extractive hydrocarbons sector. Manufacturing

industry is still in its infancy, agriculture is of limited significance, and commercial

fisheries remain largely undeveloped.

Merchant Banker to ASEAN? For the economist, the primary policy issue faced by capital-surplus oil-exporting countries with small populations and limited domestic absorption capabilities such

as Brunei (and its Middle East counterparts such as Oman and Saudi Arabia) is the classic portfolio choice problem: how to optimally set the rate of resource

extraction until reserves are depleted and invest the massive sums of capital avail

able largely in foreign assets? In this context, one of the more interesting avenues



74 Tilak Doshi

proposed for achieving economic diversification lies in the services sector, more

specifically in the role of Brunei as a regional financier. The goal of being a mer

chant banker to ASEAN seems more within reach of Brunei's comparative advantage than industrialization is. Brunei's large and growing portfolio of foreign assets,

currently valued at US$25 to US$30 billion, already yield investment returns com

parable to its annual income from its oil and gas exports, and are enough to pay for the country's entire import bill. With capital reserves exceeding US$100,000 per

capita and a limited domestic absorption capability, Brunei is already a significant international investor. Brunei's foreign reserves are controlled by the Brunei Invest

ment Agency (BIA) with expertise from foreign fund-management institutions.

According to the Asia 1989 Yearbook, about 35 per cent of the reserves are managed

by BIA itself, and the rest is allocated to eight foreign banks. The latter, as part of their management contracts, are required to train Bruneians so that the BIA

will be increasingly endowed with its own fund-management expertise and better

equipped to downgrade the role of foreign advisers. The installation of modern

telecommunications, the rapid growth of the Royal Brunei Airlines, and the Brunei

zation of locally-incorporated financial institutions (viz., the International Bank

of Brunei) are among the prerequisites of a regional finance and banking sector.

The Sultan, with a large but undisclosed personal wealth, is an active investor

in his own right. The various business investments (particularly in the premium

property markets) by the Sultan, his appointees, and members of the royal family have been noted in the press over the years. In 1990, the most noteworthy item

in this respect came with the publication of the full report of an investigation

appointed by the British Government on the 1985 takeover of the House of Fraser, the group which includes the famous Harrods store in London. It concluded with

"the clear opinion that the funds with which the Al-Fayeds acquired the House of

Fraser accrued to them through Mohamed's (Al-Fayed) association with the Sultan

of Brunei", and despite the denials and the refusal of the Sultan to assist in the

enquiry, it noted that w[t]he evidence pointing to Brunei is very strong indeed".6

Another significant development with respect to the business affairs of the ruling

family concerns Prince Haji Mohamad's (brother to the Sultan) purchase of a

majority share in QAF Holdings.7 Incorporated in Brunei in December 1982 to

integrate close to twenty enterprises wholly-owned by the royal family or joint ven

tures with royalty interests, QAF Holdings encompasses a wide range of businesses

including consultancy services and offshore drilling contracts for the petroleum

industry, the manufacturing and sale of industrial gases, newspaper publishing and

commercial printing, retailing and catering services. Through its many subsidiaries

and associated companies, QAF Holdings is the country's third largest employer, after BSP and the state itself.

The "Bruneization" of private sector institutions has, in effect, increased the stake of the royalty in the various sectors of the economy. The issue of financial

propriety, in particular of those who have close links with royalty, has gained Brunei

much public exposure in the press. Since the scandals associated with the National Bank of Brunei (fraud charges were brought against its Chairman in 1988) and the House of Fraser purchase, no official steps have been taken to tighten up financial

monitoring and regulations. Furthermore, opinions differ as to whether Brunei's




foreign reserves are effectively at the Sultan's personal disposal. It appears that

although the BIA is allowed to operate within the terms of its reference as it sees

fit most of the time, the agency is also clearly bound by the Sultan's bidding. This

ambiguity in decision-making procedure over the disposition of Brunei's large capital reserves and in the distinction between the monarch's private wealth and that of

the state is an inherent weakness of the Sultanate. In the absence of a wider public accountability, it will remain a potential source of inefficiencies and, at worst, of criminal breaches of trust.

The Unemployment Problem Given the massive foreign reserves Brunei already has, and the fact that these will expand substantially over the next two to three decades with the continued

exploitation of its remaining oil and gas reserves, it is conceivable that Brunei's needs can be entirely met by the state's investment earnings. It is this very affluence, however, combined with a dimunitive population base, that constitutes the country's severe manpower development problems. With an estimated total population of

240,000 and a labour force of 90,000, Brunei depends heavily on foreign labour. There are about 36,000 foreign workers mostly employed in the private sector in the petroleum, construction, and service industries. In a country which continues to face an acute shortage of labour at all levels of skills and where foreigners con

stitute almost 40 per cent of the total employed, the concerns over unemployment which have continued to be expressed by senior officials over the past year may seem misdirected.

Yet, with almost 40 per cent of its population under 15 years of age, and about

3,000 school leavers entering the job market annually, "the immediate need of the

country is to create meaningful employment in the private sector for the growing and better educated population" as pointed out by Dato Malai, the Permanent

Secretary to the Ministry of Industry and Primary Resources.8 According to official

figures, Brunei's unemployment rate in 1989 was 6.1 per cent, almost twice the

previous year's rate.9 Of the 299 vacancies in the state sector in 1989, only 111 were filled; of 632 in the private sector, only 106 were filled.10 The large public sector (employing primarily Bruneians) already accounts for about half of the total labour force. Sooner or later, Dato Malai adds, "there will come a point when

people will have to choose between the private sector and not having any job".11 High salaries and the security of tenure associated with public sector employment have led most Bruneians to prefer government jobs over those in the private sector. This entirely rational preference for public sector employment has hindered the

government's long-standing campaign to encourage a greater involvement in the

private sector on the part of Brunei Malays. According to Dato Abdul Rahman, Minister for Industry and Primary Resources,

Bruneians lack both the interest and the commitment to succeed in the private sector.12 However one views this judgement, the issue of economic incentives is a fundamental one for an affluent society which has provided those with citizenship (itself a privilege largely reserved for Bruneian Malays) free education, health, tenured jobs, and other perquisites of a "cradle-to-grave" welfare system. The Min ister for Education, Dato Abdul Aziz, recently called for an end to the "subsidy



76 Tilak Doshi

mentality", stating that "it was time Bruneians begin standing on their own feet".13

With an "alarming rise in school dropouts and unemployment among young people", the authorities are planning to establish two "job-oriented" vocational schools by 1992.14 Manpower development, in particular the inculcation of skills and motiva tion among the country's youth, may indeed be one of Brunei's most pressing needs.

MIB: The Malay Islamic Monarchy To one observer, it was "increasingly clear" by early 1989 that the Brunei polity was

moving away from a reliance on tradition as its sole source of legitimacy towards the model of a conservative Islamic monarchy (along the lines of Saudi Arabia,

Oman, and hitherto Kuwait).15 In the past year, this trend has continued with the Brunei regime adopting more of the trappings of a conservative Islamic state. In a televised speech to mark the new year in the Muslim calendar, the Sultan stated that existing laws would be "brought in line" with the teachings of Islam in a bid to conform the country to its status as an Islamic state.16 Perhaps most indicative of the polity's move in this direction has been a special government decree, issued towards the close of the year, that all licences to process, sell or serve all types of

liquor in the country would be annulled from 1 January 1991. Neither hotels nor

clubs, currently the only places allowed to serve alcoholic beverages under special licences, will be able to do so when the decree takes effect.

The cast of the Brunei state as Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB or Malay Islamic

Monarchy) has been officially enunciated since independence. The trio of adject ives ? Malay, Islamic, and Monarchic ? have been consistently utilized by the Sultan and his senior officials to define the unique and fundamental character of Negara Brunei Darussalam. In a speech to celebrate the Prophet Muhamad's

birthday on 1 October 1990, the Sultan declared that MIB was God's will and should not be questioned.17 The MIB characterization of the Sultanate attempts to link the roots of tradition and legitimacy inherent in the popular precepts of Malay culture and the Islamic religion with the institution of the monarchy

? which itself boasts a continuous line of succession stretching back to the 15th century

with His Majesty Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah as the 29th ruler. Given the absence of

any process of democratization, and hence of formal channels of communication and representation in the polity, MIB has been interpreted as a state ideology or "legitimacy formula" instrumental in urging Bruneians to support a national creed aimed at binding Brunei Malay society closer to the monarchy.18 While it is apparent that Brunei Muslims enjoy the numerous benefits of an oil-rich state and have little reason to agitate for radical change, the heightened emphasis on conservative Islamic values can nonetheless be seen as a means to distract Muslims from the politics of a more fundamentalist sort.

An academy of Brunei studies has been set up in Brunei Darussalam University, and all students at the institution are required to attend courses in the state ideo

logy. Holidays associated with the Muslim calender are receiving greater official

emphasis, with the upholding of MIB against materialism and other alleged profane values of the outside world inevitably being the main theme of speeches during such occasions. At his 44th birthday speech, the Sultan stated that the "Brunei way of life", which was strongly faithful to Islam and loyal to the monarchy, must be




continued and not defiled by anyone; Brunei's harmony and prosperity, His Majesty reasoned, was only possible because monarchy and religion served as the foundation

of Brunei's existence.19

To underline the notion of pemedulian or benevolence implicit in state ideology, the Sultan and senior officials of the Sultanate have also emphasized the role of a

"caring and considerate" civil service. According to a correspondent to the Far Eastern Economic Review, the Sultan himself appears to have adopted a more pious image of late, exercising more direct, "face-to-face" rule in the traditional Malay manner.20

Speaking at a meeting of the Islamic Religious Council, the Sultan advised officials to be more attentive to the opinions and views of their subordinates in the interests of the community.21 At a national Koran reading competition, the Sultan warned his lay audience against "troublemakers" who planted doubts in people's minds as to the sincerity of the government in attending to the needs of Bruneians.22

Defence and International Relations Brunei's limited ability to conduct international relations in its most vital dimen sion ? military power

? has been traditionally compensated by its intimate links with the United Kingdom. Brunei's special security relationship with the United

Kingdom, signified most concretely by the continued deployment of a battalion of Gurkha troops ever since the aborted 1962 rebellion, was marked in mid-1990 by the three-day visit of the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth

Affairs for talks on bilateral matters. The visit coincided with a joint defence exer cise between Britain's HMS Plover and the Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) flotilla. The tenure of the battalion of Gurkha troops is, however, subject to un

certainty arising from the future role of the Gurkhas under British command with the reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty.

The period since independence has seen the broadening of Brunei's international relations. The upholding of the legitimacy and stability of the Sultanate in the post independence period has required its own "diversification imperative": the traumatic

cutting of the apron strings linking Brunei to Mother England. In a recent visit to

Singapore, the British Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Archibald Hamilton, expressed his opinion that Brunei should consider membership of the Five-Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) formed in 1971 which links Britain, New Zealand, and Australia with Singapore and Malaysia.23 Brunei, widely considered as the next member of the FPDA, attended the November 1989 meeting of the defence alliance as an observer. A Far Eastern Economic Review report that the United States was

considering Brunei as a possible alternative to its military bases in the Philippines has been discounted by the U.S. Ambassador to Brunei as well as by Brunei defence officials.24

The close bilateral ties Brunei enjoys with Singapore and Indonesia have often been noted by observers of the ASEAN region. Singapore remains Brunei's closest ASEAN neighbour, both in terms of a somewhat similar historical experience vis-?-vis the formation of Malaysia and in the close personal ties between Senior Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the Sultan. The recent leadership succession in Singapore is not expected to affect the current levels of co-operation that exist



78 Tilak Doshi

between the two countries. The links that bind the two countries include Singapore's extensive entrep?t trading links with Brunei; the large investments by the Brunei

royalty in the Singapore property market; the convertibility at par of the Brunei

dollar with that of Singapore; the training of RBAF cadets in Singapore; and the

complementarity of their economies (one essentially with financial largesse and the other with technical and commercial acumen). In August 1990, the Singapore

Armed Forces and the RBAF held the 12th annual naval exercise reaffirming the "warm and longstanding" ties between the two armed forces.25 The Brunei navy

already has three Singapore-made fast patrol boats armed with Exocet missiles. Brunei's military ties with Indonesia were marked during the year by a four-day visit to the Sultanate by an Indonesian navy convoy as well as by reports that the RBAF is planning to purchase four maritime patrol craft from Indonesia.26

Indonesia, like Singapore, also provides training courses for Bruneian military personnel, and the Sultan is known to have close personal relations with President Soeharto and other members of the Indonesian political ?lite.

Military expenditures have not been subject to the continued restraints on govern ment spending of the last two years. Although Brunei's security requirements have been met by only a modest defence force of its own, the wealthy Sultanate has been considerably ahead of its ASEAN neighbours (including Singapore) by the criteria of military outlays per capita since the mid-60s.27 Brunei concluded its

largest ever arms deal, valued at US$400 million, in October 1989. Under the defence contract, British Aerospace, Britain's largest defence and aviation contractor, will supply the RBAF 16 Hawk 100-series fighter-trainers and three 1,000-tonne Corvettes for coastal patrol duties. The Hawks will be fitted with advanced avionics and Sidewinder missiles, and the Corvettes will be armed with Exocet anti-ship missiles and 76-mm guns. The squadron of fighter jets and three ships are expected to be in operation by 1992.

The Steady State ? But for How Long? This question is almost invariably posed by outside observers. Yet, despite its tone, there seems to be no reason to suggest that the monarchy

? an institution com

monly considered an anachronism in the modern world of nation-states ? is

incapable of enhancing its longevity in the face of the inevitable stresses and strains of economic growth that Brunei will undergo over the coming years. A palace coup, a possibility inherent in all monarchies, poses no threat to the institution of monarchy per se. The release in March of two leaders of the Brunei National Democratic Party after more than two years of imprisonment, and the subsequent death of one of them, Abdul Latif Hamid, founding member arid party President, marked another year of domestic political quietitude.

If, freed from the "rude threat" of Saddam Hussein, the handful of families that rule the Arabian peninsula are readier to experiment with democracy,28 the Brunei situation certainly betrays no necessity for such experiments. Financial riches, along

with expanding bilateral and regional ties with other states, provide the Sultanate with a measure of autonomy from the political and economic vicissitudes of history. Reducing voluntary unemployment, and the wider question of the quality of human



Brunei; The Steady State 79

capital, constitute major challenges to economic policy in the Sultanate. Yet, if Brunei's "steady state" ? bouyed as it is by massive capital reserves ? exercises at least a modicum of fiscal propriety and expertise in economic management (particularly in developing its human resources), there is every reason to believe that the monarchy will weather the uncertain consequences of modern economic

growth.

Notes

1. According to a consultant with Arthur D. Little, cited in Business Times (Singapore), 15 November 1990.

2. Private communication from Mr Alan Troner, the Singapore bureau chief for Petroleum

Intelligence Weekly. 3. Business Times, 16 October 1990.

4. Economist Intelligence Unit, Malaysia/Brunei Country Report, No. 2, 1990.

5. Business Times, 16 October 1990.

6. See Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), 22 March 1990. 7. Borneo Bulletin, 24 February 1990.

8. Business Times (Singapore), 15 November 1990. 9. Ibid.

10. Borneo Bulletin, 10 February 1990.

11. Business Times, 15 November 1990.

12. Borneo Bulletin, 14 April 1990. 13. Straits Times (Singapore), 9 December 1990. 14. Ibid.

15. See Menon (1989). 16. Borneo Bulletin, 28 July 1990. 17. F E ER, 15 November 1990. 18. For instance, ibid.; Menon (1989). 19. Borneo Bulletin, 21 July 1990. 20. FEER, 15 November 1990. 21. Borneo Bulletin, 27 September 1990.

22. Ibid., 7 April 1990. 23. Ibid., 11 October 1990. 24. Ibid., 10 February, 1990.

25. Borneo Times, 1 September 1990.

26. Borneo Bulletin, 6 January 1990.

27. See Huxley (1988). 28. As The Economist argues in its 1 September J990 issue.

References

Borneo Bulletin. Various issues.

Business Times (Singapore). Various issues.

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Malaysia/Brunei Country Report. Various issues.

Huxley, T. Bruneis Defence Policy and Military Expenditure. Working Paper No. 166. Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, September 1988.

Menon, K. "Brunei Darussalam in 1988: Aging in the Wood". Asian Survey XXIX, no. 2

(1989).



80 Tilak Doshi

Straits Times (Singapore). Various issues.

Thambipillai, P. "Foreign Workers and Development in ASEAN: The Brunei Context".

Working Paper. Department of Public Policy and Administration, University Brunei

Darussalam, February 1990.

Ti LAK DOSHI is a Research Associate with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

Singapore.



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Brunei: The Steady State