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supply chain management in China
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Course website: http://ihome.cuhk.edu.hk/~b103313/index.htm
• Offices:• Prof. Xiande Zhao, Room 906• Cheng Yu Tong Building• Email: [email protected]• Tel. 2609-7650• Mr. Bochao Zhuang, Room 941• Cheng Yu Tong Building Email:
[email protected]• Tel. 2696-1657
1
Welcome to
Prof. Xiande Zhao Director, Center for Supply Chain Management & Logistics Li & Fung Institute of Supply Chain Management/ Logistics
Chinese University of Hong Kong
http://lf-scml.baf.cuhk.edu.hk/index/
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DSME6932W Supply Chain and Logistics Management
- Managing Supply Chains in China
Organization Structure
Li & Fung Institute of Supply ChainManagement & Logistics
Center for Supply ChainManagement & Logistics
Center for Logistics Technology & Supply Chain Optimization
Joint R & D Center for Supply Chain & Logistics (with Tsinghua)
Supply Chain Management Research Center
Cyber-logistics Research Center
Knowledge Transfer Office
3
Course Overview and Objectives • Understand the business environment in China and
roles that China plays in global supply chains.• Comprehend Chinese culture and traditions and how
they influence supply chain operations and decisions• Make important decisions related to the choice of
supply chain strategies, design and improvements of supply chain processes
• Learn how to select supply chain partners and manage supply chain relationships in the dynamic business environment of china
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Course Assessments
• Items Weight• Case reports 50%• Final project report and presentation 30%• Attendance and class participation 20%
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Managing Chinese Supply Chains: Challenges and Opportunities
Dr. Xiande ZhaoProfessor and Director
Center for Supply Chain Management and LogisticsLi& Fung Institute of Supply Chain Management and Logistics
Chinese University of Hong KongTel. 2609-7650, Email: [email protected]
6
A Brief History
• The world’s oldest surviving civilization– Evidence of communities from almost 6000 years
ago
• Dynasties dating back to 2200BC• 1908: fall of the Qing dynasty• Last Emperor Puyi
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Dr. Sun Yatsen
• Father of Modern China• First Provisional President of
Republic of China in 1912• Quickly fell out of power• Respected in both Mainland
China and Taiwan
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Kuomintang (KMT)国民党
• Nationalist Party• 1920: dominant political force in eastern China• 1925: power struggle within KMT
– Those sympathetic to communists– Those who favored a capitalist state supported by a
military dictatorship• Chiang Kaishek tried to stop growing influence of the
communists• 1928, Chiang held both military and political leadership
– Half of China ruled by local warlords
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Chinese Communist Party
• Made of Chinese Marxist groups which joined together in 1921
• Deeply concerned with social problems in China
• 1927: Mao Zedong advocated rural-based revolt
10
The Long March
• Chiang Kaishek led series of extermination campaigns against CCP
• 1934: CCP suffered heavy losses, hemmed into an small area in Jiangxi
• Marched north to Shaanxi to join other CCP armies
• Took a year to complete, 8000 miles• Established Mao as paramount leader of CCP
11
Japanese Invasion
• 1931: invaded and occupied Manchuria• Chiang , still obsessed with threat of communists, did
nothing to resist• Kuomintang bitterly criticized for not defending
against the Japanese• KMT forced to unite with CCP to resist Japan• 1937: rest of China invaded by Japan
– “Burn all, loot all, kill all” campaign
• KMT forced into retreat
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Post WWII
• CCP expanded enormously during WWII years, filling vacuum in local government in vast areas behind and beyond Japanese lines
• 1946: civil war– Thousands of KMT troops defected to CCP– KMT defeated– Chiang Kaishek and KMT fled to Taiwan– USA dismayed by KMT’s failure, refused further
support
13
Birth of People’s Republic of China (PRC)
• 1949: Mao Zedong founded PRC and start to rule mainland China
• President Truman ordered a protective US naval blockade to prevent attack from mainland
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Early Days of PRC
• KMT legacy: unbridled inflation, economic mismanagement, shortage of materials
• Crumbling infrastructure, plummeting agricultural output
• With the help and support of the worker and the factory owners, CCP improved the economy
• By 1953, inflation halted, industrial production back to prewar levels, land redistributed to peasants
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Hundred Flowers Campaign
• 1956-57: CCP encouraged a variety of views, welcomed open criticism
• Many overseas Chinese intellectuals returned to help with reconstruction
• Many KMT intellectuals stayed, rather than flee to Taiwan
• 600,000 intellectuals incarcerated or sent to labor camps for thought reform
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The Great Leap Forward
• One of the greatest failed economic experiments in history
• CCP told everyone to build backyard blast furnaces to increase steel production– “Take steel as the key link, leap forward in all fields”
• Massive slump in grain output• 30 million Chinese starved to death
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The Cultural Revolution• Differences in opinions as to how
to develop the economy between Mao and other leaders such as Liu Shao Qi and Deng Xiao Ping
• Power struggle within the parties • Mao started to purge other
leaders and establish personal worship
• Little red book of Mao’s selected thoughts
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Red Guards
• Students issued red armbands and took to the streets• Went on rampage, shutting down schools, intellectuals
re-educated, publications ceased, temples ransacked• Physical reminders of China’s past destroyed• Neighbors and family turned each other in• Millions of people died
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Stages of economic development in China
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Stage 1: State-Planned Economy (pre-1978)
• Several measures introduced by the central government to discredit and abolish individual commerce
• Private enterprises largely replaced by state- or collectively-owned entities
• Economic activities were governed by the State Plan
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Principles of the State Plan
• Reallocation of resources to the people, following Socialist principles
• Socialist focus on providing employment for the entire population
• self-reliance and control• What’s missing?
– Efficiency– Meeting market needs
22
Factories• Needed only to follow the
State Plan• Strategic and operational
issues decided centrally• Typical plant manager selected
for political savvy• Little incentive to produce new
products• Often operated at a constant
level• Huge shortages and excess
inventories common23
Quality• Operations existed in a
noncompetitive environment• No clear definition of quality or
quality consciousness• Defects inspected out• Modern quality control introduced
in the 1950s, only in selected pilot companies– Workers formed teams to discuss
problems– Several SPC tools introduced
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Distribution• Not the concern of plant managers• Resources reallocated centrally• Little or no support for marketing
activities• Ministry of Commerce developed
various corporations to handle specific categories or product lines
• Materials and goods are allocated by a bureau of material management
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Three-Tier Vertical Distribution
• Tier 1: large, mostly coastal cities– Purchased goods from all over China– Accepted imported goods
• Tier 2: Received goods from Tier 1 distributors, according to the State Plan– Located mostly in provincial capitals
• Tier 3: Wholesalers in the cities and counties– Redistributed to state- or collective-owned
retailers• Each tier added 5-17% margins
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HRM Practices
• “Iron rice bowl” employment– Young workers allocated jobs by local labor bureau– Guaranteed job until retirement– Children could inherit retired worker’s job
• Limited incentives for good performance• Little incentive to improve performance• Enterprises often hired more people than
needed
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Stage 2: Economic Reform and Rapid Development (1978-2001)
• 1978, Deng Xiaoping opened China to market competition– Reduced reliance on central planning– Moving factories closer to their markets– Stimulating competition between
organizations– Developing managers who were more
autonomous and accountable– Restructuring state-owned enterprises– Introducing contract responsibility system– Establishing privately-owned enterprises– Encouraging foreign direct investment 28
Special Economic Zones
• Established four SEZs as laboratory for economic reform policy experiments– Xiamen, Shantou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai– Preferential treatment for foreign investors– Local governments and enterprises given more
freedom to make economic decisions
• 14 economic development areas (EDAs)– Helped to attract significant FDI
29
30
Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment
• Established modern manufacturing facilities• Brought badly needed technology and
management know-how• Brought knowledge
– How a market economy works– How a business enterprise should compete in a
market economy
• Some economic zones developed very rapidly
31
Quality
• Beginning in 1978, quality concepts applied rapidly
• Modern quality control reintroduced• Exposure to knowledge, expertise and high-
quality products of foreign organizations• Laws established quality management
standards• Shanghai companies took the lead in TQC
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Reforms in Other Areas of China• Reduce reliance on central planning • Control of manufacturing and logistics gradually
shifted to provinces and municipalities• Dual distribution system – 1986
– Manufacturers expected to supply products to central government in specified amounts
– Permitted to develop supplementary plan for meeting market needs of privately owned retailers
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Logistics• Substantial improvement, with shift of
control away from central planners• Still major problems
– Unreliable and slow rail transport– Poor road conditions– Lack of bridges– Many toll roads– Numerous roadblocks and checkpoints
• Better matching of supply with demand than before
• But still substantial mismatch
34
Logistics
• Strong regional and provincial loyalties– Boundaries for distributors set by old systems– Stiff tariffs, mountains of red tape
• Cargoes offloaded at regional boundaries• Severe restrictions on distribution activities of
foreign distributors
35
Regional Protectionism
• Affected manufacturing and sales• Local governments encouraged to focus on
local economic growth• Many state-owned enterprises controlled by
local governments
36
Major Progress
• Privately owned enterprises allowed to grow, state-owned enterprises reformed
• 1990s: opened SOEs to the markets, held responsible for their profits and losses
• Iron rice bowls gradually smashed– Labor contracts– Higher pay for those with more knowledge– Challenge of recruitment, training, development
37
• What to do with workers who were no longer needed?
• How to deal with workers whose companies had gone bankrupt?
• Created need for social welfare and insurance• Income disparity between state/collectively
owned enterprises and foreign owned• Uneven economic development across regions
Social Problems
38
Stage 3: WTO Membership and Continued Rapid Development (2002-present)
• December, 2001: member of WTO– Signaled presence as a player in the global
economy– Large step forward toward increased economic
exchange with international trading partners
• Growth and development have accelerated at an astonishing pace
• Vast improvements in market access
39
Stage 3: WTO Membership and Continued Rapid Development (2002-present)
• Substantial increase in exports to industrialized markets
• Fierce competition in domestic markets• Attractive target for FDI• The largest exporter of many consumer
products– Electronics– Toys– Garments
40
Manufacturing
• Developed competence in low-cost manufacturing• QM is becoming increasingly imperative• Incentive systems started to be changed for effective
implementation of QM • Quality Management practices are being implemented to an
increasing degree in different enterprises• Usually the state owned and collectively owned are more
behind• Wide variation for privately owned companies • Foreign owned and joint venture companies are more
advanced in QM and have more modern plants and advanced technology
41
Logistics• Many problems from earlier stages continue• Sheer size presents formidable logistics barrier• Most distributors quite small, specialize in limited range of goods
and regions• Large foreign companies start enter into china• Some domestic ones also grow bigger• But the really big ones are still controlled by the state such as
COSCO, China Overseas, China Merchant• The government still controls the railway, most airport, container
terminals • Number of airlines and airport increases rapidly• Road improved dramatically but with many toll roads and bridges
42
Emerging Issues
• Construction projects everywhere• Environmental issues have accompanied rapid
modernization and growth• Shortages of energy• Widening income disparity between urban and
rural areas• Vast migration to urban areas
43
Emerging Issues
• Houkou system makes migration difficult– Leads to labor exploitation
• Living and working conditions of the “mobile population”– Unsafe working conditions, unmonitored work hours,
delay of wage payments, wage level– Schooling of Children
• SOEs facing increased competitione pressure to improved or be closed
• More people “off post” 44
China’s Emerging Role in the Global Economy
• Largest emerging economy in the world• GDP growth of 10%/yr. since 1978• Ranks third in the world in total world
trade•Exports growing faster than imports, $61.5 billion trade surplus•Over $600 billion in FDI, ~200 countries
45
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
Year
GD
P (i
n bi
llio
n of
RM
B)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
GD
P g
row
th r
ate
/ %
GDP (in billion of RMB) GDP growth rate
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of China Between 1952 - 2006
2006
Economic Growth in ChinaEconomic Growth in China
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China’s Emerging Role in the Global Economy
• Similar in size to the US, but much larger in population– US: 296 million– China: 1.3 billion
• 20% of the world’s population• Personal incomes rapidly increasing• Economic development a top priority
•Able to affect change very quickly
51
Pearl River Delta• The first to develop after open-
door policy in 1978• Following the lead of Shenzhen,
other cities transformed from rural areas into modern manufacturing bases
•Light industry dominates•Among highest percent of private and foreign-owned companies in China
52
53
The PRD
Guangdong Province
Map of Pearl River Delta
Pearl River Delta
• Shenzhen is one of China’s financial centers• Beginning to eliminate trade barriers, free
labor movement• Problems
– Worsening pollution– Labor shortage– Rising wages
•Guangdong province accounts for 36.4% of total value of China export
55
59
Yangtze River Delta
• Gateway – Central and northern China’s industries– Vast interior markets and natural resources
• In some areas, an average of one new plant opens per day
• Shanghai: major financial, logistical and manufacturing center
• Designated as region for high technology and heavy manufacturing
60
61
Bohai Sea Area
• Beijing: political, economic and cultural center• Tianjin: one of largest ports in northern China• Designated as a main focus for economic
development in 11th Five Year Plan• Third highest in GDP per capita
• Increasing emphasis on this area in the future
62
PRD+YRD+BHSA
• Three major economic powers• Account for 3% of the total area of China• Account for 46.5% of the GDP• Higher income and cost of labour • Future emphasis in development: optimization• Help to lead and help developments in other
areas63
64
66
68
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Unbalanced Economic Development
• PRD, YRD, BSE: faster pace of development– Earliest beneficiary of economic reform
efforts• Vast inland region: slower pace of
development• Relatively greater focus on agriculture• Significant disparity in standard of living
72
Impact of Culture on SCM
• What are some of the major cultural issues related to managing supply chains in China?
73
Guanxi
• Granting of preferential treatment to business partners, in exchange for favors and obligations
• Morally binding social norm• Requires reciprocity among business associates• If obligation isn’t fulfilled within a short amount
of time, social harmony between the managers will be disturbed– Non-reciprocating manager will lose face
74
Guanxi
• If a foreign purchasing manager doesn’t not reciprocate a favor within an appropriate amount of time, his company could become the target for opportunistic behavior by the supplier
• Guanxi can be transferred between social networks
• Use of China-based agents may be essential to improve trust and supplier relationships
75
Collectivism
• At the heart of guanxi• Characteristics of Chinese national culture
– Preference for tightly knit social networks– Expectation that in-group members will support
each other– Strong urge to maintain social harmony and
interdependence within the in-group• Expectation of support by in-group members• Lack of obligation to those who are not
members of in-group76
Power Distance• Expectation that power is distributed evenly• Chinese people accept and expect that power is
distributed unevenly• Naturally defer to those they perceive to be
their superiors– Expect superiors to be benevolent, provide them
with stability, close supervision, explicit rules• Chinese suppliers expect to be closely
supervised and provided with very explicit rules• More difficult with deep supply chains
78
Uncertainty Avoidance
• Society’s tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity
• Comfort in unstructured situations• High: belief in absolute truth, try to avoid risks
in business • Low: more tolerant of opinions different from
what you are accustomed to, as few rules as possible
79
Masculinity/Femininity
• Distribution of roles between genders• Masculine national cultures
– Assertive, competitive, driving for success
• Feminine national cultures– Modest, caring, nurturing
• Greatest gender differences are in masculine national cultures
80
Long Term Orientation
• Valuing stability over change• Reflected in
– Bureaucracy– Difficulty incorporating voice of the customer– Dedication to a lasting guanxi relationship
• Long history of reliance on central planning• Passive working behavior, lack of incentives,
poor product quality, bureacractic bloating
81
82
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84
85
86
The effects of Ownership• Joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned
companies are much more advanced in adopting modern management principles
• Importance of being selected as a supplier to US-owned company
• Private and SOEs may be much farther behind– May make promises, honestly believe it is capable of
producing desired quality level
87
Contracts
• US: belief that a good contract will ensure that customer’s specifications will be met
• China: lack of enforcement of contractual provisions
• In the absence of a facilitative government, informal relationships more important
• Historical perception of contracts as a means for foreigners to take advantage of Chinese
88
Conclusions
• China is not like the rest of the world and never will be
• Manufacturing in China is heavily influenced by the past
• Think long and hard about where to locate and source in China
• Relationships may be difficult to understand or participate in satisfactorily
89
Conclusions
• Chinese manufacturing dragon is raising its head and isn’t going to back off
• To truly understand it, need to understand– Where it comes from– What it has been through in its life– The culture that it lives in
90