India's Counter Insurgency Experience

INDIA’S COUNTER-INSURGENCY EXPERIENCE

Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd.)Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi

Visiting Senior Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, London

OVERVIEW: INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

• NATION BUILDING PROCESS MARKED BY RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM, ETHNIC TENSIONS AND ECONOMIC DISPARITIES.

• CONTINUING MILITANCY/ INSURGENCY IN KASHMIR AND NORTH-EASTERN STATES.

• RISING MAOIST/ NAXAL INFLUENCE ACROSS CENTRAL INDIA AND LINKAGES WITH NEPAL.

• ISI CONTINUING TO EXPLOIT INTERNAL WEAKNESSES. MUMBAI BLASTS ARE LATEST MANIFESTATION OF ISI DESIGNS.

• ISI CONTINUING TO EXPLOIT INTERNAL WEAKNESSES.

The age of terrorism.

• ISI CONTINUING TO EXPLOIT INTERNAL WEAKNESSES.

Cult of the suicide bomber.

OUTLINE • STATE OF PROXY WAR IN J&K.

• INSURGENCY IN THE NORTH-

• MAOIST/ NAXALITE THREAT.

• EMERGING CHALLENGES.

• REASONS FOR SUCCESS.

• POLICY OPTIONS (??)

STATE OF STATE OF PROXY WAR PROXY WAR

IN J&KIN J&K

STATE OF STATE OF PROXY WAR PROXY WAR

IN J&KIN J&K

VICTIMS OF TERRORISM IN J&K

TOTAL: 10,739

March 31, 2006

TOTAL: 3,323

March 31, 2006

TOTAL: 12,389

TOTAL: 19,676

March 31, 2006

TOTAL: 15,712

TOTAL: 18,658

TOTAL: 6,234

Peak: 70 per cent in 2003

TOTAL: 3,616

WEAPONS WEAPONS RECOVEREDRECOVEREDWEAPONS WEAPONS

RECOVEREDRECOVERED

TOTAL RECOVERED: 27,735

TOTAL RECOVERED: 364

7.097 MILLION ROUNDS

TOTAL RECOVERED: 36,900 Kg

PRESENT SITUATION• Despite fencing, sensor technologies and three-tier deployment, 900 terrorists being killed annually and huge recoveries of arms and ammunition being made.

• ISI has succeeded in maintaining pool of about 1,500 terrorists in J&K.

• 59 camps are functional across LoC; 2,000 terrorists are ready for deployment.• Kill ratios are better this year – to 1:8 to 1:11 (Pak: 1:1.85 in NWFP and Balochistan). (Source: Maj Gen Ashok Mehta)

HOT PURSUIT?• Concept mooted by L. K. Advani, Home Minister, who subsequently backtracked.

• Civilian journalistic jargon, not military term.

• Gen Musharraf: “(hot pursuit) will be paid back in the same coin.”

• Pak Foreign office: “This (hot pursuit) could trigger a nuclear war.”

• Infiltration avenues: LoC, Nepal, Bangladesh, India’s western seaboard, legal Visas.

DEDUCTIONS• SEMBLANCE OF NORMALCY, MARKED BY:

– REASONABLY UN-INTERRUPTED CIVILIAN LIFE (EDUCATION, HOSPITALS, POLITICS).

– TOURISM FLOURISHING. (GRENADE BLASTS?)– ECONOMY LOOKING UP – J&K HAS HIGHEST PER

CAPITA INCOME AMONG AFFECTED STATES.– RELATIVELY LOWER INFILTRATION LEVELS.

• SPORADIC INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE; SOFT TARGETS.

• INCREASING NUMBER OF SURRENDERS.• POLITICAL DISAFFECTION CONTINUES.• SHAKY RAPPROCHEMENT PROCESS.

– TOURISM FLOURISHING.– ECONOMY LOOKING UP – HIGHEST PER CAPITA

INCOME AMONG AFFECTED STATES.

• LIMITED INFILTRATION.• SPORADIC INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE.• INCREASING NUMBER OF SURRENDERS.• THREE-WAY RAPPROCHEMENT PROCESS.• POLITICAL DISAFFECTION CONTINUES.

The counter-proxy war strategy of fighting militancy within India’s borders has yielded only marginal returns.

The situation has reached “strategic stalemate”.

The army and other security forces can do no more by way of counter-proxy war operations and WHAM.

Political divisiveness, intransigence of Hurriyat, lackadaisical governance and continued Pakistan support are hampering reconciliation efforts.

Remaining roots of militancy/ terrorism are mostly in POK and Pakistan.

BANGLADESH

SRI LANKA

MAHARASTRA - SMUGGLING &GUJARAT OF ARMS/RDX

AP - LINKS WITH COMMUNAL ELEMENTS AND MAOISTS

J&K - ARMS, TERRORISTS, PROXY WAR

UP - ASSIST FUNDAMENTALIST ORG ALONG INDO-NEPAL BORDER

NE - TRG, SUPPORT TO INSURGENTS LIKE ULFA, NSCN(IM), PLA

ISI LINKAGES

THREAT FROM PAKISTAN

Ways and means need to be found to raise the cost for Pakistan to wage its proxy war against India.

INSURGENCY INSURGENCY IN THE IN THE

NORTH-EASTNORTH-EAST

INSURGENCY INSURGENCY IN THE IN THE

NORTH-EASTNORTH-EAST

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Incidents 1,335 1,312 1,332 1,234 1,332

Extremists 572 571 523 404 405 killed

Security 175 147 90 110 70 Forces killed

Civilians 600 454 494 414 393 killed

VIOLENCE IN THE NORTH EAST

PRESENT SITUATION• All seven NE states have been engulfed in insurgencies that have paralysed admin-istration, law and order and development.

• Main causes: • Failure of State and Central governments to integrate isolated region with national mainstream – feeling of alienation. • Ethnic tensions.• Socio-economic deprivation.• Failure of political leadership.

PRESENT SITUATION• Main causes (continued):

• Domination of economy by outsiders.• Demographic shift due to illegal migration from Bangladesh. Foreigners Act approved by the Government favours migrants.• External exploitation: ISI aid, shelter provided by Bangladesh (new hub of international terrorism).• Vote-bank politics. Imposition of CMs from outside.

PRESENT SITUATION

• Autonomous Councils (VI Schedule of Constitution) have failed due to poor management at political and bureaucratic level.

• Poor governance and rampant corruption in utilising government grants.

• Lack of employment opportunities for the youth make them vulnerable to exploitation.

PRESENT SITUATION• Approach of Central and State Governments:

• Neither the Centre nor the states have ever had a coherent, consistent policy to deal with the insurgencies.

• On-off counter-insurgency policies: Op Bajrang, Op Rhino.

• State police is incapable of dealing with externally aided insurgencies.

PRESENT SITUATION

• Centre’s view is that law & order is a state subject and the Centre’s job is to provide additional paramilitary forces.

• ‘Peace talks’ have been stagnating in various NE states for decades with virtually no progress except that in some cases the cease-fire has held.

• ‘Packages’ announced by visiting PMs are mostly for political gains.

PRESENT SITUATION

These movements are having a crippling impact on national unity.

PRESENT SITUATION

The insurgencies need to be tackled by the Centre and the States on priority basis through a comprehensive national-level strategy.

MAOIST/ MAOIST/ NAXALITENAXALITETHREATSTHREATS

TD• Jehanbad:

jail break

• Latehar:

train hijack

• Udaygiri:

jail break

NAXAL VIOLENCE (STATE VISE)

2002 2003 2004 2005 Inci- Deaths Inci- Deaths Inci- Deaths Inci- Deaths dents dents dents dents

Andhra 346 96 577 140 310 74 532 206

Chhattisgarh 304 55 256 74 352 83 380 165

Jharkhand 353 157 342 117 379 169 308 118

Bihar 239 117 250 128 323 171 183 94

Maharashtra 83 29 75 31 84 15 95 53

Orissa 68 11 49 15 35 8 42 14

Madhya. P 17 3 13 1 13 4 20 3

Uttar Pradesh 20 6 138 15 26 10 1 -

West Bengal 17 7 6 1 11 15 14 7

Other States 18 1 16 - 11 1 10 8

(Kerala, Karnataka,

Tamil Nadu)

Total 1,465 482 1,597 515 1,533 566 1,594 669

PRESENT SITUATION• Naxalite movement began in 1967; gained momentum in recent years.

• > 150 districts in 12 states, 35% of population affected.

• 39 left wing extremist groups. PWG and MCC merged to form CPI (Maoists).

• Policy of ‘militarisation’ since 2001. People’s Guerrilla Army formed to act as ‘revolutionary vanguard’.

PRESENT SITUATION• Naxalite movement began in 1967; gained momentum in recent years.

• > 150 districts in 12 states, 35% of population affected.

• 39 left wing extremist groups. PWG and MCC merged to form CPI (Maoists).

• Policy of ‘militarisation’ since 2001. People’s Guerrilla Army formed to act as ‘revolutionary vanguard’.

Maoist incidents account for over 60% of the violence: killings, kidnappings, extortion, abduction, IED blasts and destruction of property.

PRESENT SITUATION• Naxalites do not belong to any religion or community. They are mainly Dalits, Adivasis or other marginalised sections of society totally indoctrinated by the teachings of Mao and Marx.

• Links with Nepalese Maoists, ULFA, and LTTE for training and modern weapons.

• Links with Turkish and Philippine terrorist organisations likely.

• Strength: 20,000 UG, 50,000 OG and more than 1,00,000 in frontal organisations.

PRESENT SITUATION• Growth of Naxalite movement due the exploitation and oppression of Dalits, Adivasis and other landless people by feudal agrarian system with strong interface of caste and class.

• Mine owners, contractors and forest mafia are using the Naxal muscle power to extort money from corporate world, businessmen and government officials.

• It is estimated that PWG and MCC extort between Rs 5,000 to 7,000 million annually.

PRESENT SITUATION• Growth of Naxalite movement due the exploitation and oppression of Dalits, Adivasis and other landless people by feudal agrarian system with strong interface of caste and class.

• Mine owners, contractors and forest mafia are using the Naxal muscle power to extract money from corporate world, businessmen and government officials.

• It is estimated that PWG and MCC collect between Rs 5,000 to 7,000 million annually.

Next step: Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) extending from Nepal, Bihar, Dandakaranya regions to Tamil Nadu to gain access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

ANALYSIS• Different states have dealt with the situation differently – but always with vote banks in mind.

• In Orissa there is a proposal to raise battalions from Adivasis of Naxal region to deal with Naxals because the police ‘cannot enter the area’ due to ‘logistical difficulties’!

• In Andhra Pradesh when the Congress government came to power peace was declared by them as the Naxals were considered ‘our own misguided people’.

• This view quickly changed to an all out offensive by the state when the Naxals killed a Congress leader!

ANALYSIS• Salwa Judum (purification hunt) is a government-sponsored peace campaign – neither voluntary nor spontaneous.

• It is also without protection. 27 participants were killed near Dharbaguda (Konta) in IED blast. Several other incidents.

• State police are unable to cope with these raiders of the night and keep losing weapons.

• Clearly, concerned state governments are at their wits’ end.

ANALYSIS• Central Government is apathetic though it claims that it has a policy. (“Status Paper on Naxal Problem” issued by MHA, March 13, 2006).

• Three main reasons:

• Naxal menace not an emotive issue like Kashmir.

• Confusion whether Naxals are “terrorists” or not – “social justice” tag.

• Notion that Naxal menace is “not as bad as it seems”.

FUNDS RELEASED

State 2001-02 2002-03 2003-2004 2004-05 2005-06 2005-06

• Andhra Pradesh 4 193.82 217.35 221.00 282.00 601.85

• Bihar 3,885.10 180.00 43.68 60.41 184.99 250.00

• Madhya Pradesh 711.06 82.37 139.82 23.52 8.00 100.00

• Maharashtra 262.66 - 81.42 125.55 72.16 200.00

• Orissa 567.29 168.00 86.85 65.77 54.60 200.00

• Chhattisgarh 32.25 36.83 160.87 200.00 200.14 500.00

• Jharkhand 18.80 54.00 98.07 341.27 166.90 200.00

• Uttar Pradesh - 29.17 - - 96.30 100.00

• West Bengal - - - - 77.53 150.00

Total 9,670.98 954.38 831.71 1,098.52 1,462.47 2,000.00• (Crore)

• Also without protection. 27 participants were killed near Dharbaguda (Konta) in IED blast. Several other incidents.

The situation is gradually but perceptibly spinning out of control.

• Also without protection. 27 participants were killed near Dharbaguda (Konta, C’garh) in IED blast. Several other incidents.

How long will it be before the army is whistled-in to stem the rot?

• Also without protection. 27 participants were killed near Dharbaguda (Konta, C’garh) in IED blast. Several other incidents.

Can the army take on another major internal security commitment?

ANALYSTS’ PRESCRIPTIONS

• K. Subrahmanyam: If the war against terrorism is to be won, Jehadi extremists in Pakistan have to be liquidated. International pressure…• Maj Gen Ashok Mehta: We can control terror in two ways… pre-emptive action and investing money…• Maj Gen Afsir Karim: Create a backlash among terrorists… incremental and pragmatic offensive action…

• Lt Gen V K Sood: Take pre-emptive action and outsmart them before they can attack us…• K P S Gill: Tough action… (Punjab style), foolproof security measures, constant supervision of arrangements, plugging of loopholes (better coordination).• Cmde C. Uday Bhaskar: Legitimate use of force… empathetic use of ‘soft power’ to win against ideology.

The Maoist threat is real and imminent. Overall, the national response to the problem has been inadequate, if not flawed, both at policy formulation and policy execution levels. To cope with the threat, India needs a well-deliberated and finely calibrated response strategy with compatible operating doctrines, structures, resources and expertise.

COUNTER-COUNTER-TERRORISM TERRORISM

ARRANGEMENTSARRANGEMENTS

COUNTER-COUNTER-TERRORISM TERRORISM

ARRANGEMENTSARRANGEMENTS

COUNTER-TERRORISM ARRANGEMENTS

• Joint Task Force on Terrorism– Set up to overcome Centre-State jurisdiction

problems in combating terrorism.– Has identified 56 vulnerable places.– In each a Special Action Group (SAG) set up.– Each comprises six hand-picked state police

officials and two IB officials for rapid action on information becoming available.

– Could draw on resources of Multi-Action Group (MAG) that also has military representation and a data bank.

– SAGs have withered under present NSA.

• Intelligence Coordination Group–Set up on recommendations of GoM

after Kargil conflict.–Task: Intelligence tasking and

reviews.–Headed by NSA. Members: Cabinet

Secretary, Secretaries Home, Defence and Foreign Ministries, Intelligence Chiefs.

–Regular meetings held under Brajesh Mishra. Present NSA not keen on it.

• Technical Coordination Group–Initiated by Brajesh Mishra for

enhancing technical capabilities for intelligence gathering.

–Headed by NSA. Includes Cab Secretary, Principal Scientific Advisor, SA to RM, Intelligence Chiefs, Proposed CDS.

–National Technical Facilities Organisation (NTFO) set up for gathering signals intelligence, but yet to take off.

• National Information Board–Apex body in India’s information

security architecture.–Headed by NSA. –Has met only once under J N Dixit in

July 2004. Inactive since then.–Its absence sorely felt with recent

espionage cases: Navy War Room leak; cyber spy case at NSC Secretariat.

EMERGING EMERGING CHALLENGESCHALLENGESEMERGING EMERGING

CHALLENGESCHALLENGES

EMERGING CHALLENGES

• Sectarian and caste violence – average 600 cases of communal riots each year.

• Organised crime – film, construction industries, others. International links.

• Subversion – 200 ISI modules detected and dismantled so far.

• New forms of terrorism.

EMERGING CHALLENGESNew forms of Terrorism:

• Cyber-terrorism.

• RDDs (Radiological dispersal devices).

• Threats to India’s nuclear installations.

• Threats to India’s maritime assets (offshore oil platforms, attractive commercial targets like VLCCs).

• Bio-terrorism.

• Nuclear terrorism??

REASONS REASONS FOR FOR

SUCCESSSUCCESS

REASONS REASONS FOR FOR

SUCCESSSUCCESS

Reasons for Success

• Realisation that insurgents are our own misguided youth. Complete lack of ‘occupation forces’ syndrome.• Hence, use of minimum force:

• Small arms only.• NO area weapons; not even 2 and 3 inch (81 mm) mortars.• Rare use of rocket launchers – with Brigade Commander’s approval.

Reasons for Success

• Artillery, helicopter gunships and ground strike fighter aircraft have never been used.• Immense emphasis on winning the battle of ‘hearts and minds’:

• Help in building schools, computer centers, dispensaries, micro-hydel projects in rural areas.• Medical camps.• Disaster relief.

Reasons for Success

• Stress on Rear Area Security: • Road clearance operations. • Anti-ambush drills.• Quick reaction teams.• Vigorous patrolling.

• Coordinated intelligence acquisition (humint, electronic).• Resilience of individual soldiers.• Regimental system.

Reasons for Success

Human Rights:• Specialised training in Corps Battle Schools before induction into deployment areas.• Operations planned carefully to avoid undue inconvenience to people.• Each soldier carries ‘10 Commandments’.• Full access to state and central Human Rights Commissions. • Transparent investigation of allegations of human rights abuses and exemplary punishment to defaulters.

Reasons for Success

Human Rights:• Very strong media presence and complete freedom to report.• Vocal advocacy of human rights by various NGOs.• Commanders personally charged with responsibility for protection of human rights.

COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL STRATEGY

INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION

SURRENDERREHABILITATION

SOCIO-ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT

PRO-ACTIVE

STRATEGIC

CULTURE

INTERNAL SECURITY

Your turn!

POLICYPOLICYOPTIONSOPTIONSPOLICYPOLICY

OPTIONSOPTIONS

POLICY OPTIONS

Pro-active counter-proxy war, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations combined with comprehensive socio-economic development and political efforts to end alienation.

Except Naxalite/Maoist terrorism, roots of terrorism in India lie across the border in Pakistan and even Bangladesh.

Covert offensive methods are necessary to destroy these roots. Trans-LoC strikes to raise the cost for Pakistan should be an option.

POLICY OPTIONS

• Need to reduce army’s involvement in internal security duties.• New national-level IS Force??

• Under MoD – 5th armed force.• With army’s ethos and training.• Under army’s operational control.• Could be initially based on present RR and some AR battalions.

POLICY OPTIONS

• Under MoD – 5th armed force.• With army’s ethos and training.• Under army’s operational control.• Could be initially based on present RR.

Sub-conventional warfare is here to stay.

POLICY OPTIONS

• Under MoD – 5th armed force.• With army’s ethos and training.• Under army’s operational control.• Could be initially based on present RR.

Need for unconventional, out-of-the-box thinking.

THREATTHREATFROMFROM

PAKISTANPAKISTAN

THREATTHREATFROMFROM

PAKISTANPAKISTAN

THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• NUCLEAR-CAPABLE PAKISTAN REMAINS INDIA’S

MAJOR MILITARY THREAT IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

• PAKISTAN ARMY’S STATED AIM:– WREST KASHMIR FROM INDIA THROUGH

PROXY WAR AND POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE.

– CONTAIN INDIA IN COLLUSION WITH CHINA TO PREVENT INDIA FROM EMERGING AS A SOUTHERN ASIAN POWER.

– DESTABILISE AND WEAKEN INDIA INTERNALLY.

THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• TO OFFSET CONVENTIONAL ASYMMETRY,

PAKISTAN ARMY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO RESORT TO SUB-CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, INCLUDING ACTS OF TERRORISM, TO ENSURE INDIAN ARMY REMAINS COMMITTED IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS.

SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM • PAKISTAN IS WAGING A LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AGAINST INDIA THRU SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY.

• THE AIM IS TO DEGRADE INDIA’S INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND MILITARY ASSETS BY A GRADUAL PROCESS OF ATTRITION AND COERCIVE STRATEGIES THAT INCLUDE MASS CASUALTY ATTACKS, DESTABILISATION AND SUBVERSION OF ADMINISTRATION.

• PAKISTAN BELIEVES THAT INDIA’S SECURITY APPARATUS AND COHESION AS A STATE WILL EVENTUALLY COLLAPSE UNDER THE ONSLAUGHT OF TERRORISM, INTERNAL TURMOIL AND ETHNIC AND COMMUNAL TENSIONS.

THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• TO OFFSET CONVENTIONAL ASYMMETRY,

PAKISTAN ARMY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO RESORT TO SUB-CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, INCLUDING ACTS OF TERRORISM, TO ENSURE INDIAN ARMY REMAINS COMMITTED IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS.

• PLAY NUCLEAR CARD WHEN IT SUITS PAKISTANI INTERESTS (KASHMIR AS NUCLEAR FLASHPOINT).

• EMPLOY ISI TO SPAWN MADRASA CULTURE AND CREATE A COMMUNAL/ SECTARIAN DIVIDE.

THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• FIND NEW MEANS TO DESTABILISE INDIA AND ITS ECONOMY:– CIRCULATION OF FAKE CURRENCY.– CYBERWAR TO DISRUPT INDIAN

NETWORKS.

• CONTINUE EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT INDIA’S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.

• MAKE POLITICAL OVERTURES TO KASHMIRIS.

NETWORKS.

The Pakistan army has a stranglehold over the nation’s polity.

NETWORKS.

The army dictates the country’s Kashmir policy and nuclear policy.

NETWORKS.

The real threat to peace and stability between India and Pakistan is the Pakistan army.

NETWORKS.

The Pakistan army will decide whether the present peace process will be allowed to proceed.

NETWORKS.

Assessment: The Pakistan army cannot fight on three fronts: Kashmir, western border and internal unrest.

NETWORKS.

Assessment: The present peace process is a tactical ploy – not a strategic change of heart.

NETWORKS.

Assessment: Pakistan’s proxy war will become more sophisticated -- focus on easy deniability.

POLICY OPTIONS

However, does India’s strategic culture permit such a course of action?

INDIA’S INDIA’S STRATEGIC STRATEGIC

CULTURECULTURE

INDIA’S INDIA’S STRATEGIC STRATEGIC

CULTURECULTURE

INDIA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE• ANCIENT EMPIRES ENDED WITH ASHOKA

THE GREAT WHO RENOUNCED WAR AND EMBRACED BUDDHISM.

• INDIA WAS DIVIDED INTO SMALL KINGDOMS AND PRINCIPALITIES.

• HIMALAYAN SHIELD FORM THE NORTH.• INDIAN KINGS FAILED TO MODERNISE

THEIR ARMIES AND SUFFERED CONSECUTIVE DEFEATS.

• CONQUERORS ENTERED INDIA MOSTLY THROUGH KHYBER PASS IN THE WEST.

Panipat Syndrome

India lacks a strategic culture.

-- George Tanham

TANHAM’S ARGUMENT • Indian elites… "show little evidence of having

thought coherently and systematically about national strategy.'‘

• Tanham gave four key reasons:– Geography lent Indian thinking an "insular perspective

and a tradition of localism and particularism.'' – The discovery of history by Indian elites in the past 150

years was the second element. – This leads inexorably to the third: the primacy of culture

in India's world outlook and the "assumed superiority'' of this culture.

– The British Raj nurtured in Indian thinkers a predisposition toward a predominately defensive, land-dominated strategic orientation.

INDIA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE • ANCIENT EMPIRES ENDED WITH ASHOKA

• HIMALAYAN SHIELD FORM THE NORTH.• CONQUERORS ENTERED INDIA MOSTLY

THROUGH KHYBER PASS IN THE WEST. • INDIAN KINGS FAILED TO MODERNISE

India has a very well-defined strategic culture.

• ANCIENT EMPIRES ENDED WITH ASHOKA THE GREAT WHO RENOUNCED WAR AND EMBRACED BUDDHISM.

• HIMALAYAN SHIELD FORM THE NORTH.• CONQUERORS ENTERED INDIA MOSTLY

THROUGH KHYBER PASS IN THE WEST. • INDIAN KINGS FAILED TO MODERNISE

Offer the other cheek when slapped on one.

INDIA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE

India's Counter Insurgency Experience

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