Elsa/Oink/Cqual++: Open-Source Static Analysis for C++ Scott McPeak Daniel Wilkerson work with Rob...

Elsa/Oink/Cqual++:Open-Source Static Analysis for C++

Scott McPeak Daniel Wilkerson

work with Rob Johnson

CodeCon 2006

Goals

• Build extensible infrastructure to

• Find certain categories of bugs– Exhaustively, within some constraints

• At compile time

• In real-world C and C++ programs

• Using composable analyses

Components

• Elkhound: Generalized LR Parser Generator

• Elsa: C++ Parser

• Oink: Whole-program dataflow

• Cqual++: Type qualifier analysis

Elkhound: GLR Parser Generator

• GLR eliminates the pain of LALR(1)– Unbounded lookahead– Allows ambiguous grammars!

• 10x faster than other GLR implementations– Novel combination of GLR and LALR(1)

• User-defined disambiguation– Early: during parsing– Late: after generating AST w/ambiguities

Example: ‘>’ ambiguity

new C < 3 > + 4 > + 5 ;

new C < 3 > + 4 > + 5 ;

Expr

Type

Expr

Type

Example: ‘>’ ambiguity

new C < 3 > + 4 > + 5 ;

new C < 3 > + 4 > + 5 ;

Expr

Type

Expr

Type

unparenthesized ‘>’ symbol

Correct

Incorrect

Example: Type vs. Variable

• In C & C++, sometimes hard to tell whether a name refers to a type or a variable

(a) & (b) (a) & (b)

Expr Expr Type Expr

or

Example: Type vs. Variable

• In C & C++, sometimes hard to tell whether a name refers to a type or a variable

int a; // hiddenclass C { int f(int b) { return (a) & (b); } typedef int a; // visible};

Elsa: Extensible C++ Front-end

• Parses ANSI C++ with GNU extensions

• Uses GLR to handle the ambiguities

• Extensible components:– flex lexer– Elkhound parser– AST defined with custom tool– Type checker

The Elsa Block Diagram

Lexer

preproc’dsource

Parser

tokenstream

TypeChecker

possiblyambiguousAST

PostProcess

annotatedunambiguousAST

finalAST

No lexer feedback hack!

Extending the Syntax

• ANSI or GNU? Both!– Declarative language– Extend simply by concatenating

nonterm ConditionalExp { -> Exp {...} -> Exp "?" Exp ":" Exp {...}}

ANSI Base:

nonterm ConditionalExp { -> Exp "?" ":" Exp {...}}

GNU Extension:

Declarative Abstract Syntax

class Statement (SourceLoc loc) { -> S_compound(ASTList<Statement> stmts); -> S_if(Condition cond, Statement thenBranch, Statement elseBranch);

-> S_while(Condition cond, Statement body);

// ...}

superclass name superclass ctor parameter

subclass names

subclass ctor parameter

subclass ctor list parameter

Extending the Abstract Syntax

• ANSI or GNU? Both!– Declarative language– Extend simply by concatenating

ANSI Base: GNU Extension:

class Statement { -> S_decl(Declaration decl); -> S_expr(Expression expr); -> S_if(...); -> S_for(...); }

class Statement { -> S_function(Function f);}

GNU nested functions

Semantic Analysis

• Disambiguate

• Compute types

• Resolve overloading

• Insert implicit conversions

• Instantiate templates

Disambiguation

Ambiguous syntax example: return (x)(y);

S_return

E_cast

TypeId

x

E_funCall

E_variable E_variable E_variable

y

ambiguity link

expr

exprtype func arg

Lowered Output: Simplified C++

• Original or Lowered output can be printed

• Lowering always done:– Templates are instantiated– Implicit type conversions inserted

• Lowering optionally done:– Implicit member functions created– Implicit ctor/dtor calls inserted

C++ or XML, In and Out

Elsa

C++

XML

C++

XML

First pass renders to a canonical form.Serialization commutes with lowering.

Cqual++: Dataflow

• Dataflow Analysis on Type Qualifiers

• Successor to Cqual: Jeff Foster, Alex Aiken

char $tainted *getenv();

void printf(char $untainted *fmt, ...);

int main() { char *x = getenv(“foo”));

printf(x);}

Feature: Polymorphic Dataflow

int f(int x) {return x;}

int main() { int $tainted t = ...;

int a = f(t);

int $untainted u = f(3);

}

Feature: “Funky Qualifiers”:Fake Function Bodies

char $_1_2 *strcat(char $_1_2 *dest,

const char $_1 *src);int main() { char $tainted *x; char $untainted *y; strcat(y, x);}

{1} ½ {1,2}

Feature: Separate Compilation for Scalability

• “Compile” each file to a dataflow graph– only flow behavior between external symbols

matters– compress by finding smaller graph with same

flow behavior; typically saves factor of 12

• “Link” each graph– AST is gone at linking so we save even more

space

Non-Feature: Cqual++ Is Not Flow-Sensitive

q = p;... time passes ...

p->s = read_from_network();use_in_untrusting_way(p->s);

// does p == q still??q->s = "innocuous";use_in_trusting_way(p->s);

$tainted??

What Exactly Is ‘Data-Flow’?

char *launderString(char *in) { int len = strlen(in); char *out = malloc(len+1); for (int i=0; i<len; ++i) { out[i] = 0; for (int j=0; j<8; ++j) if (in[i] & (1<<j)) out[i] |= (1<<j); } out[len] = '\0'; return out;}

Application: Finding Format-String Vulnerabilities

• Printf() is an interpreter

• the format string is a program– %n writes number of bytes written to memory

pointed to by the arg– ex: printf(“stuff%n”, p) means *p = 5

• if no argument p, printf() writes through some pointer on the stack– do not allow untrusted data in first arg to printf

Application: Finding User-Kernel Vulnerabilities

• Kernel must check user pointers are valid– must point to memory mapped into user

process’s address space– otherwise could manipulate the kernel data

• This is also a dataflow/taint analysis

Rob’s Cqual LinuxUser-Kernel Results

• 2.4.20, full config, 7 bugs, 275 false pos.

• 2.4.23, full config, 6 bugs, 264 false pos.

• including other trials on same kernels:– found 17 different security vulnerabilites– found bugs missed by other tools and manually– all but one bug confirmed exploitable– significant “bug churn” across kernel versions

Linus’s “Sparse” Toolfor User-Kernel Vulnerabilities

• Linus also has a tool using type qualifiers– it requires manual annotation of every var

• In contrast, Cqual++ infers the qualifiers– only sources and sinks need be annotated– and any “sanitizer” functions:

• Linus says this “is not the C way”– ok, he can write all the annotations

Future Application: Finding Character-Set Confusions

• Microsoft confusing ASCII and UCS2

• Mozilla has 20-ish differnt charcter sets

• they should only flow together through conversion functions

• if array sizes differ, confusions can be a security hole too

Oink Vision:Composable Analysis Tools

• Compilers refuse to compile bugs– well, some classes of bugs– and you may have to wait until tomorrow

morning to find out

• Correctness analysis is expected as part of any compiler toolchain

• The analyses are composable and extensible