David Frost. FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM 1)Are free will and causal determinism incompatible?...

David Frost

FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM

1) Are free will and causal determinism incompatible?

FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM

1) Are free will and causal determinism incompatible?

2) If yes, which obtains?

FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM

1) Are free will and causal determinism incompatible?

2) If yes, which obtains?

Libertarianism: Free will obtains; causal determinism does not.

FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM

1) Are free will and causal determinism incompatible?

2) If yes, which obtains?

Libertarianism: Free will obtains; causal determinism does not.

Hard Determinism: Causal determinism obtains; free will does not.

FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM

1) Are free will and causal determinism incompatible?

2) If yes, which obtains?

Libertarianism: Free will obtains; causal determinism does not.

Hard Determinism: Causal determinism obtains; free will does not.

Compatibilism: Free will and causal determinism both obtain.

FREE WILL AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

• For Ayer:

– It is a mistake to contrast freedom with causation.

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

• For Ayer:

– It is a mistake to contrast freedom with causation.

– Freedom is properly contrasted with constraint.

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

• For Ayer:

– It is a mistake to contrast freedom with causation.

– Freedom is properly contrasted with constraint.

– Every event is caused. Free events are caused in a special way.

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

A Free Action An Unfree Action

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

is

caused

A Free Action An Unfree Action

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

is

caused

is

caused

A Free Action An Unfree Action

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

is

caused

in a special way

is

caused

A Free Action An Unfree Action

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

is

caused

in a special way

is

caused

in a different special way

A Free Action An Unfree Action

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

is

caused

in a special way

i.e., in an “unconstraining” way

is

caused

in a different special way

A Free Action An Unfree Action

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

is

caused

in a special way

i.e., in an “unconstraining” way

is

caused

in a different special way

i.e., in a constraining way

A Free Action An Unfree Action

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

is

caused

in a special way

i.e., in an “unconstraining” way

e.g., by my own desire

is

caused

in a different special way

i.e., in a constraining way

A Free Action An Unfree Action

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

is

caused

in a special way

i.e., in an “unconstraining” way

e.g., by my own desire

is

caused

in a different special way

i.e., in a constraining way

e.g., by some one else

A Free Action An Unfree Action

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

Part II: Early Paragraphs

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

Notes on reading Ayer: it might be difficult to follow him since he doesn’t come right out and say what he believes. Instead he follows a common philosopher’s style of proceeding through a network or series of ideas – making each seem as plausible as possible. Some will seem plausibly to be counterexamples to the idea that came before, until Ayer argues just as plausibly or even more so that it is no counterexample at all and is even irrelevant. You may bristle after that – if it’s irrelevant, then why have we been talking about it? But it is a way of pro-actively undermining an opponent’s potential counterexample. Someone might be tempted, for instance, to argue that humans are free because science can’t always show that what they did was causally determined or lawfully predictable. Ayer maps out this trajectory of thought only to reject it. “But this does not give the moralist what he wants.”

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• The problem of free will is the conflict between

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• The problem of free will is the conflict between

– our sense that every event has a cause and

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• The problem of free will is the conflict between

– our sense that every event has a cause and

– our sense that we possess freedom of the will.

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• Every event has a cause

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• Every event has a cause

– Or, at least, in principle, everything is explainable (paragraphs 3-4)

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• In principle, everything is explainable.

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• In principle, everything is explainable. • Deny the “in principle.”

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• In principle, everything is explainable. • Deny the “in principle.”

– Perhaps freedom exists where explanation ends (paragraph 5)

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• In principle, everything is explainable. • Deny the “in principle.”

– Perhaps freedom exists where explanation ends (paragraph 5)

• “But that does not give the moralist what he wants,” (paragraph 6).

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• In principle, everything is explainable. • Deny the “in principle.”

– Perhaps freedom exists where explanation ends (paragraph 5)

• “But that does not give the moralist what he wants,” (paragraph 6).

– i.e., it doesn’t give the possibility of moral responsibility

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• In principle, everything is explainable. • Deny the “in principle.”

– Perhaps freedom exists where explanation ends (paragraph 5)

• “But that does not give the moralist what he wants,” (paragraph 6).

– i.e., it doesn’t give the possibility of moral responsibility

– “he’s free because there is no explanation of what he does,” doesn’t sound free

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• The moralist doesn’t want actions to come from randomness

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• The moralist doesn’t want actions to come from randomness

• The moralist wants actions to come from choices

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• The moralist doesn’t want actions to come from randomness

• The moralist wants actions to come from choices

– “For when he makes it a condition of my being morally responsible that I should act freely…. What he wishes to imply is that my actions are the result of my own free choice: and it is because they are the result of my own free choice that I am held morally responsible for them,” (Ayer, pp. 112-113).

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• But what about the causal history of that choice?

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• But what about the causal history of that choice?• Ayer says that the choice is either an accident or it is not.

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• But what about the causal history of that choice?• Ayer says that the choice is either an accident or it is not.

– If it is an accident, then the moralist does not get the freedom he’s looking for.

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• But what about the causal history of that choice?• Ayer says that the choice is either an accident or it is not.

– If it is an accident, then the moralist does not get the freedom he’s looking for.

– If it is not an accident, then it has a cause and we are back to the Hard Determinist line.

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• But:

– “Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9).

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• But:

– “Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9).

• But in what way am I responsible for my character?

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• But:

– “Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9).

• But in what way am I responsible for my character?

– “Only, surely, in the sense that there is a causal connection between what I do now and what I have done in the past…” (p. 113, paragraph 9).

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• But:

– “Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9).

• But in what way am I responsible for my character?

– “Only, surely, in the sense that there is a causal connection between what I do now and what I have done in the past…” (p. 113, paragraph 9).

– If I have “made myself what I am,” then I caused my character.

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• But:

– “Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9).

• But in what way am I responsible for my character?

– “Only, surely, in the sense that there is a causal connection between what I do now and what I have done in the past…” (p. 113, paragraph 9).

– If I have “made myself what I am,” then I caused my character.

• But there’s causation again.

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• But:

– “Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist’s case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character,” (Ayer, p. 113, paragraph 9).

• But in what way am I responsible for my character?

– “Only, surely, in the sense that there is a causal connection between what I do now and what I have done in the past…” (p. 113, paragraph 9).

– If I have “made myself what I am,” then I caused my character.

• But there’s causation again.

– “Once more, either it is an accident or it is not.”

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• So, Ayer considers a final attempt to create an account satisfying what the moralist wants.

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• So, Ayer considers a final attempt to create an account satisfying what the moralist wants.

• Consciousness of necessity.

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• Constraining

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• Constraining • Non-constraining

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• Constraining

– Another person compels you

• Non-constraining

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• Constraining

– Another person compels you

– Hypnosis

• Non-constraining

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• Constraining

– Another person compels you

– Hypnosis

– Pistol to the head

• Non-constraining

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• Constraining

– Another person compels you

– Hypnosis

– Pistol to the head

– Kleptomania

• Non-constraining

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• Constraining

– Another person compels you

– Hypnosis

– Pistol to the head

– Kleptomania

• Non-constraining

– Deliberative process of deciding

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• Constraining

– Another person compels you

– Hypnosis

– Pistol to the head

– Kleptomania

• Non-constraining

– Deliberative process of deciding

– Myself, not another person

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• Constraining

– Another person compels you

– Hypnosis

– Pistol to the head

– Kleptomania

• Non-constraining

– Deliberative process of deciding

– Myself, not another person

– Unlike the kleptomaniac

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

• Constraining

– Another person compels you

– Hypnosis

– Pistol to the head

– Kleptomania

• Non-constraining

– Deliberative process of deciding

– Myself, not another person

– Unlike the kleptomaniac

– Could have done otherwise

AYER’S FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

is

caused

in a special way

i.e., in an “unconstraining” way

e.g., by my own desire

is

caused

in a different special way

i.e., in a constraining way

e.g., by some one else

A Free Action An Unfree Action

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

is

caused

in a special way

i.e., in an “unconstraining” way

e.g., by my own desire

better, by a desire I identify with

is

caused

in a different special way

i.e., in a constraining way

e.g., by some one else

A Free Action An Unfree Action

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

is

caused

in a special way

i.e., in an “unconstraining” way

e.g., by my own desire

better, by a desire I identify with

is

caused

in a different special way

i.e., in a constraining way

e.g., by some one else

possibly, by a desire I don’t identify with

A Free Action An Unfree Action

AYER’S COMPATIBILISM

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

• Consider the addicted smoker example.

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

• Consider the addicted smoker example.

– The addiction is a desire within him

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

• Consider the addicted smoker example.

– The addiction is a desire within him

– But he wants to quit, which is also a desire within him

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

• Consider the addicted smoker example.

– The addiction is a desire within him

– But he wants to quit, which is also a desire within him

• We might say that he does not identify with his addiction

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

• First order desire: a want to do something

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

• First order desire: a want to do something• First order volition: an effective first order desire, my

will

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

• First order desire: a want to do something• First order volition: an effective first order desire, my

will• Second order desire: a want to have a certain want

(rare)

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

• First order desire: a want to do something• First order volition: an effective first order desire, my

will• Second order desire: a want to have a certain want

(rare)• Second order volition: a want that a certain first order

desire be effective

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

• Consider, again, the addicted smoker

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

• Consider, again, the addicted smoker

– He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

• Consider, again, the addicted smoker

– He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke

– But he also has a second order volition or an attitude towards which of these wants he prefers or identifies with

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

• Consider, again, the addicted smoker

– He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke

– But he also has a second order volition or an attitude towards which of these wants he prefers or identifies with

• He has a SOV that his want to not smoke be his will

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

• Consider, again, the addicted smoker

– He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke

– But he also has a second order volition or an attitude towards which of these wants he prefers or identifies with

• He has a SOV that his want to not smoke be his will

• Frankfurt says that you are free when your SOV is satisfied

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

• Consider, again, the addicted smoker

– He has two conflicting FODs: he wants to smoke and he wants not to smoke

– But he also has a second order volition or an attitude towards which of these wants he prefers or identifies with

• He has a SOV that his want to not smoke be his will

• Frankfurt says that you are free when your SOV is satisfied

– i.e., when the FOD you second-order wanted to be your will becomes your will

FRANKFURT’S COMPATIBILISM

LECTURE ON AYER AND FRANKFURT

THE END