Memory Forensics and Incident Response

Robert Reed

Frequently when we think ofCyberCrime external intrusionsimmediately comes to mind, but weshould remember that “insiders”represent a significant threat toorganizations. Between 46 and 58percent of the incidents resulting in thelargest losses to organizations were“inside jobs.” This is particularlytroubling because in these incidents thelikely hood of identification of offendersand potential recovery of assets shouldbe easier.

Intrusions

Insiders

Outsiders

Global Economic Crime Survey 2011, PriceWaterhouse Cooper.

42%

40%

39%

12%

8%

6%

5%

4%

11%

20%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Damage levelinsufficient

Could not identify theindividual

Lack of evidence

negative publicity

Concerns about liability

competitors use foradvantage

Prior negativeresponse law…

Unaware crime wasreportable

Other

Don't know

Reason not Prosecuted

Damage level insufficient

Could not identify theindividual

Lack of evidence

negative publicity

Concerns about liability

competitors use foradvantage

Prior negative responselaw enforcement

Unaware crime wasreportable

Other

In “insider” incidents, 40 percent of the time those responsible are never identified, or insufficient evidence was obtained for prosecution. This is particularly troubling because in these incidents the likely hood of identification of offenders and potential recovery of assets should be easier

2011 CyberSecuirtyWatch Survey, CSO Magazine, U.S. Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Deloitte, January 2011.

Why are so many incidents not producing sufficient informationfor prosecutions? To some degree this makes sense when we digdeeper into the numbers, 61 percent businesses suffering fromCyberCrime indicated that “they don’t have, or are not aware ofhaving, access to forensic technology investigators.”

61

60

46

0 20 40 60 80

Not Aware of access toforensic investigators

No in-house forensics

No forensic IRproceedures

Business Forensic capabilities

Forensic Capabilities

Global Economic Crime Survey 2011, PriceWaterhouse Cooper

Objectives of incident response:• Collect as much evidence as possible• Minimize or eliminate changes made to

evidentiary information• Maintain the integrity of the investigation• Minimize the disruption to business processes • Obtain a successful outcome

Striking a balance

• Do we need to do a forensic examination?– Is there a statutory requirement to report?– Is there potential liability for not investigating?– Is there a broader objective in the investigation?– Is it fiscally responsible?

Typical Incident life cycle• Identify incident• Establish approach• Collect evidence• Analyze evidence• Document and report• Assess and follow-up

Traditional Computer Forensic Response

• Secure location• Document the scene• Pull the plug• Collect evidence• Image the media• Analysis• Reporting

Pro’s of the Approach

• Acceptable for most of the cases LE is presented with

• Easy to validate the information for court purposes

• Easy to establish and validate SOP’s

Con’s to Traditional Approach• Increasing drive capacities• Increased security

awareness– Encryption– Passwords– “Personal Privacy” Software

• Business Continuity • Misses /Destroys vital

information in RAM

Better Approach• Secure location• Photograph and document scene• Collect volatile data• Isolate from network??• Bring the machine down or live image??• Bit stream image• Analysis• Reporting

Order of volatility1. CPU cache and Register2. ARP cache, Routing and Process tables3. RAM4. Temp file systems, Swap and page files5. Fixed and removable media attached 6. Remotely logged data7. Archives

Collection of volatile data

Tool/s

Utilities

OSHardware

Results

Concerns• Reliability of local tools• Root kits• Integrity of evidence– Authenticity– Integrity

• Chains of custody• Security

Collection of Volatile data• cmd• tasklist• netstat• arp• Route• Net commands• etc

* The problem with using native commands is that we can not trust their results*

Collection of volatile data

Tool/s

Utilities

OSHardware

Results

Collection of volatile data

Tool/s

Utilities

OSHardware

Results

Kernel Space

Use

r Sp

ace

External tools• cmd ?? *are you bringing your own command console?*

• Sysinternals: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/default

• Nirsoft: http://www.nirsoft.net/

• Foundstone: http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/index.aspx

• WFT: http://www.foolmoon.net/security/wft/

• Tons of others out there

Collection of volatile data

Tool/s

Utilities

OSHardware

Results

Kernel Space

Use

r Sp

ace

API

Collection of volatile data

Tool/s

Utilities

OSHardware

Results

Kernel Space

Use

r Sp

ace

RAM / Image Analysis

tool

OS utilities

OSHardware

Results ?

Kernel Space

Use

r Sp

ace

Tool

Imaging and Analysis Tools

• Win32/64 dd• Dumpit• Man dd• FTK Imager• Belkasoft• Volatility

• Memoryze• Redline• HBGary

Responder• Encase• Etc….

Imaging and Analysis Tools

• Challenges– Varied Implementations– Anti-Forensics programs and

techniques

Direct Memory Access

tool

OS utilities

OSHardware

Results ?

Kernel Space

Use

r Sp

ace

Tool

http://www.breaknenter.org/projects/inception/

“Inception is a FireWire physical memory manipulation and hacking tool exploiting IEEE 1394 SBP-2 DMA. The tool can unlock (any password accepted) and escalate privileges to Administrator/root on almost* any powered on machine you have physical access to. The tool can attack over FireWire, Thunderbolt, ExpressCard, PC Card and any other PCI/PCIe interfaces.”

“Goldfish was a project by AfrahAlmansoori, Pavel Gladyshev, and Joshua James aimed at the extraction of user password and fragments of AIM instant messenger conversations directly from RAM of Apple Mac computers. Goldfish software can be used against 32 bit versions of Mac OS X up to and including Mac OS X (10.5) Leopard.”

http://digitalfire.ucd.ie/?page_id=430

Direct Memory Access

• Advantages– Bypass passwords to gain access– Recover passwords (keyboard buffers)– Evade current anti-forensics techniques

Direct Memory Access

• Challenges– Hardware dependent!– Physical access!– Disabled drivers?– 4GB of accessible space! 0>ffffffff

Direct Memory Access

• Mitigation– Windows

• Block SBP-2 drivers: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2516445

• Remove FireWire and thunderbolt drivers

Direct Memory Access

• Mitigation– Macs

• Filevault2 (OS X Lion) and screen locked• Firmware password

Direct Memory Access

• Mitigation– Linux

• Disable DMA• Remove FireWire drivers

Questions ??