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Detecting Bad Mouthing Behavior in Reputation Systems Kuan-Ta Chen (Chun-Yang Chen) 1 , Cheng-Chun Lou 2 , Polly Huang 2 , and Ling-Jyh Chen 1 1 Academia Sinica, 2 National Taiwan University Background • MMORPGs (Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games) have become extremely popular • Game bots ○ Auto-playing game clients ○ One of the greatest threats of MMORPGs • Detection of Game Bots ○ Manual detection (game master) [1] ○ Traffic analysis approach [2] ○ Voting-based system [3] - Each player votes the suspicious player as a game bot Motivation • Problem in voting-based system User BO T BOT BO T BO T BOT B O T BOT B O T B O T General Case Malicious Case • Collusion ○ A secret agreement between two or more parties for a fraudulent, illegal, or deceitful purpose [4] - Unfairly low ratings – bad mouthing - Unfairly high ratings – ballot stuffing • Only can vote negatively (game bot) This study focuses on bad-mouthing attacks Problem Formulation • Bad-Mouthing ○ A malicious group deliberately vote a legitimate player as a game bot • Terms ○ Collusion Cluster: a bad-mouthing group ○ Victim: the legitimate players who are under bad-mouthing attacks • Goal To Detect the Collusion Clusters Hypothesis • The most voters of legitimate players are likely collusion cluster • In case if a collusion cluster attacks for several times 1. Collusion Cluster has more common votees than random voter cluster 2. Victims have more common voters than random votee cluster • Based-on ○ The voters & votees id of each player • Note ○ When not attack, a collusive player acts as a legitimate player Voter-Based Collusion Cluster Detection The relationship of collusion cluster is stronger than random voter cluster Take the voters with more common votees between each other • form the collusion cluster. ID Votee List 1 11, 12, 13, 14, 17 2 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18 3 9, 13, 14, 15 4 11, 12, 13, 14 5 12, 13, 14, 15, 25, 60 9 17, 25, 30 10 17, 18, 50, 56 11 17, 18, 70, 44 12 17, 20, 35 13 40, 45, 50 14 55, 80, 90 15 20, 30, 40 17 1 18 17, 60 ID Votee List 1 11, 12, 13, 14, 17 2 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18 3 9, 13, 14, 15 4 11, 12, 13, 14 5 12, 13, 14, 15, 25, 60 9 17, 25, 30 10 17, 18, 50, 56 11 17, 18, 70, 44 12 17, 20, 35 13 40, 45, 50 14 55, 80, 90 15 20, 30, 40 17 1 18 17, 60 10 2 5 4 3 9 1 11 12 13 14 17 18 3 4 4 4 2 3 4 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 1 1 1 Weight (A, B): # of common votees of A and B while end end while n n conditio terminatio while G edge while Algorithm output weight largest with the edge outlier the Take ) (not weight largest with the edge the Take ) ) ( ( Φ > < Terminal Condition: a < S S u, v v) weight (u, S u, v v) weight (u, } | { } ' | { Votee-Voter-based Collusion Cluster Detection The relationship of victim group is stronger than random votee cluster First take the votees with more common voters • form the victim group Then take union of the voters of the victim group • form the collusion cluster candidate Apply Voter-based Collusion Cluster Detection Performance Evaluation Results Voter-Based scheme: Robust to the size of collusion cluster Voter-Votee-Based scheme: Robust to the number of attacks Conclusion • Two mechanisms to detect the collusion cluster ○ Based on the voting history ○ Single cluster or multiple clusters • Accuracy ○ Attack more than three times: 83%+ ○ Attack more than five times: 97%+ • Adjust other experimental factors ○ Only collusion cluster size and prob. of collusive player attack vote have the obvious influence to the accuracy Furture Work Detecting players who participate in multiple collusion clusters [1] I. MacInnes and L. Hu, “Business models and operational issues in the chinese online game industry,” Telematics and Informatics, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 130-144, 2007 [2] K.-T. Chen, J.-W. Jiang, P. Huang, H.-H. Chu, C.-L. Lei, and W.-C. Chen, “Identifying mmor - pg bots: A traffic analysis approach,” in Proceedings of ACM SIGCHI ACE, 2006 [3] Blizzard, http://www.blizzard.com/war3/ [4] http://www.answers.com/collusion?cat=biz-fin Voter-Based Votee-Voter-Based Comparison # of Attack (Single CC or Multiple CC) More attacks higher accuracy Votee-Voter > Voter Collusion Cluster Size No influence high accuracy Need more than 3 high accuracy Voter > Votee-Voter Prob. of Collusive Player Attack Vote Higher Prob. higher accuracy Votee-Voter > Voter Voter-Based Votee-Voter-Based Comparison # of Attack (Single CC or Multiple CC) More attacks higher accuracy Votee-Voter > Voter Collusion Cluster Size No influence high accuracy Need more than 3 high accuracy Voter > Votee-Voter Prob. of Collusive Player Attack Vote Higher Prob. higher accuracy Votee-Voter > Voter

Detecting Bad Mouthing Behavior in Reputation Systems

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Page 1: Detecting Bad Mouthing Behavior in Reputation Systems

Detecting Bad Mouthing Behavior in Reputation SystemsKuan-Ta Chen (Chun-Yang Chen)1, Cheng-Chun Lou2, Polly Huang2, and Ling-Jyh Chen1

1Academia Sinica, 2National Taiwan UniversityBackground

• MMORPGs (Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games) have become extremely popular

• Game bots ○ Auto-playing game clients ○ One of the greatest threats of MMORPGs

• Detection of Game Bots ○ Manual detection (game master) [1] ○ Traffic analysis approach [2] ○ Voting-based system [3] - Each player votes the suspicious player as a game bot

Motivation

• Problem in voting-based system

User

BOT

BO

T

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BO

T

BOT

BOT

General Case Malicious Case

• Collusion ○ A secret agreement between two or more parties for a fraudulent, illegal, or deceitful purpose [4] - Unfairly low ratings – bad mouthing - Unfairly high ratings – ballot stuffing • Only can vote negatively (game bot) ○ This study focuses on bad-mouthing attacks

Problem Formulation • Bad-Mouthing ○ A malicious group deliberately vote a legitimate player as a game bot• Terms ○ Collusion Cluster: a bad-mouthing group ○ Victim: the legitimate players who are under bad-mouthing attacks • Goal To Detect the Collusion Clusters

Hypothesis • The most voters of legitimate players are likely collusion cluster• In case if a collusion cluster attacks for several times 1. Collusion Cluster has more common votees than random voter cluster 2. Victims have more common voters than random votee cluster

• Based-on ○ The voters & votees id of each player• Note ○ When not attack, a collusive player acts as a legitimate player

Voter-Based Collusion Cluster DetectionThe relationship of collusion cluster is stronger than random voter clusterTake the voters with more common votees between each other • form the collusion cluster.

ID Votee List

1 11, 12, 13, 14, 17

2 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18

3 9, 13, 14, 15

4 11, 12, 13, 14

5 12, 13, 14, 15, 25, 60

9 17, 25, 30

10 17, 18, 50, 56

11 17, 18, 70, 44

12 17, 20, 35

13 40, 45, 50

14 55, 80, 90

15 20, 30, 40

17 1

18 17, 60

ID Votee List

1 11, 12, 13, 14, 17

2 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18

3 9, 13, 14, 15

4 11, 12, 13, 14

5 12, 13, 14, 15, 25, 60

9 17, 25, 30

10 17, 18, 50, 56

11 17, 18, 70, 44

12 17, 20, 35

13 40, 45, 50

14 55, 80, 90

15 20, 30, 40

17 1

18 17, 60

10

25

4

3

9

1

11 12

13

14

17

18

3

44

4

2

34

23

1

1

1

1

1

3

1

1

1

1

1

11

1

1 1

15

1

1

1

Weight (A, B): # of common votees of A and B

whileend

end while

nn conditioterminatiowhile

GedgewhileAlgorithm

output

weightlargest with the edgeoutlier theTake )(not

weightlargest with the edge theTake ))(( Φ∉

><

Terminal Condition:

a<⊂−⊂∑ ∑

SSu, vv)weight (u,Su, vv)weight (u, }|{}'|{

Votee-Voter-based Collusion Cluster DetectionThe relationship of victim group is stronger than random votee cluster

First take the votees with more common voters • form the victim group

Then take union of the voters of the victim group • form the collusion cluster candidate

Apply Voter-based Collusion Cluster Detection

Performance Evaluation Results

Voter-Based scheme: Robust to the size of collusion cluster Voter-Votee-Based scheme: Robust to the number of attacks

Conclusion• Two mechanisms to detect the collusion cluster ○ Based on the voting history ○ Single cluster or multiple clusters

• Accuracy ○ Attack more than three times: 83%+ ○ Attack more than five times: 97%+

• Adjust other experimental factors ○ Only collusion cluster size and prob. of collusive player attack vote have the obvious influence to the accuracy

Furture WorkDetecting players who participate in multiple collusion clusters

[1] I. MacInnes and L. Hu, “Business models and operational issues in the chinese online game industry,” Telematics and Informatics, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 130-144, 2007[2] K.-T. Chen, J.-W. Jiang, P. Huang, H.-H. Chu, C.-L. Lei, and W.-C. Chen, “Identifying mmor-pg bots: A traffic analysis approach,” in Proceedings of ACM SIGCHI ACE, 2006[3] Blizzard, http://www.blizzard.com/war3/ [4] http://www.answers.com/collusion?cat=biz-fin

Voter-Based Votee-Voter-Based Comparison

# of Attack(Single CC or Multiple CC)

More attacks higher accuracy Votee-Voter > Voter

Collusion Cluster SizeNo influence high accuracy

Need more than 3 high accuracy

Voter > Votee-Voter

Prob. of Collusive Player Attack Vote

Higher Prob. higher accuracy Votee-Voter > Voter

Voter-Based Votee-Voter-Based Comparison

# of Attack(Single CC or Multiple CC)

More attacks higher accuracy Votee-Voter > Voter

Collusion Cluster SizeNo influence high accuracy

Need more than 3 high accuracy

Voter > Votee-Voter

Prob. of Collusive Player Attack Vote

Higher Prob. higher accuracy Votee-Voter > Voter