Upload
shukriadini
View
986
Download
1
Tags:
Embed Size (px)
DESCRIPTION
Citation preview
Env i r onmen t , C l ima te Change and Con f l i c t
ISSUE 2 , 2011
conflict trends I 1
EDITORIAL 2 byVasuGounden
3 ClimateChange–ConflictNexus:Frameworkfor
Policy-orientedAction
byWilliamTsuma
9 ClimateConflictsintheHornofAfrica?
byMarcelLeroyandFanaGebresenbet
16 TransboundaryRiversandClimateChange:Africanand
AsianRivers
byAshokSwainandFlorianKrampe
22 KeySocialVulnerabilitiestoClimateChangeinSouth
Africa’sCoastalZones:ThePotentialforConflict
byFathimaAhmed
29 AddressingClimate-relatedConflict:HumanSecurityand
LessonsfromtheSouthernSahelianBeltofSudan
bySaloméBronkhorst
38 AddressingCharcoalProduction,Environmental
DegradationandCommunalViolenceinSomalia:TheUse
ofSolarCookersinBanderBeyla
byShukriaDini
46 CollusionandCriminalisation:FuelConflictintheNiger
Delta
byMelissaCawthra
55 ClimateChangeinAfrica
byMaxwellG.Hardy
FEATURES
contentsct2|2011
BOOK REVIEW
2 I conflict trends
ByVASUgoUNDEN
editorial
VasugoundenistheFounderandExecutiveDirectorofACCoRD.
AsDurban,SouthAfrica,preparesforthe17thmeeting
oftheConferenceofthePartiestotheKyotoProtocolin
Novemberthisyear,theworldisrecoveringfromaseries
of climate and environmental-related disasters, which
haveoccurredoverthepastfewyears.TheIndianOcean
tsunami,HurricaneKatrina,theHaitiearthquake,theNew
Zealandearthquake, theJapanesetsunamiandnuclear
crisis,amongothers,havekilledandaffectedmillions.
At the same time, silent and slower disasters related
totheeffectsofnaturalandanthropogenicclimateand
environmentalchangesareaffectingbillions–especially
poor people who depend on the environment for their
livelihood.
Sudden disasters and slow-onset environmental
changeshavethepotentialtotriggerconflicts,especially
in situations where people are already vulnerable and
wherethesocio-economic,politicalandculturalcontext
exacerbatesexistingtensions.Watersecurityisarelated–
andperhapsoneof themostserious–strategic issues
ofourtime.Approximately18MiddleEasternandNorth
African countries – some already prone to instability
and conflict – are at extreme risk of water insecurity.
Notwithstandingthepotential forconflict intheMiddle
East and North Africa, some argue that water scarcity
andtheresultanthighfoodpricesarekeyfactorsinthe
MaghrebandMiddleEastuprisings.
InAsia,glacialretreat inKashmir isaffecting India–
Pakistanrelations,whileinAfricaitisuncertainwhether
the Nile Basin Initiative will weather climate change
challenges and other regional political tensions. The
ThirdPole–ortheHindu-KushHimalayaregioninAsia–
ishometo10majorriversystemsthatprovidewaterto
morethan20%oftheworld’spopulation–Bangladeshis,
Pakistanis, Afghans, Indians, Chinese, Nepalese and
others depend on it. The area is already susceptible
to natural disasters and high levels of warming,
earthquakes,glacialmeltingandsea-levelrise.
In Africa, in addition to serious water insecurity
predictedforsub-SaharanAfricaresultingfromdroughts,
desertificationandotherclimaticevents,theNileisthe
longest river in the world with the greatest number of
riparianstates(10)drawingonitswaterfor livelihoods
and as a source of energy for industry and homes.
Situatedinoneoftheharshestclimatesintheworld,the
Nile’ssensitivitytoclimatechangeandexistingtensions
overthesharingofitswatersalsocreatethepotentialfor
conflict.
Theseglobalchallengesaredaunting,andacademics,
practitioners and policy makers in conflict resolution
shouldnotonlyfocusonhumanresponsibilityforclimate
changebut,moreimportantly,ontheimplicationsofthe
environmentandclimatechangeforhumansecurityand
conflict.Ourfocusshouldbeonprovidingnewknowledge
andupdatedanalyses,newpoliciesandpracticaltoolsfor
conflict-sensitiveclimatechangeadaptation.Ourconcern
shouldbeforvulnerableindividualsandcommunities,to
reduce theirvulnerabilityandpreventandmitigate the
effects of environmental change and water insecurity,
and thus prevent related conflicts. Our assistance to
government and civil society in developing policies
and creating interventions to reduce vulnerability and
ensuringclimateandconflictsensitiveadaptationisvital.
As an African conflict resolution organisation that
aimstohaveaglobalimpactanddealwiththegreatest
conflict issues of our time, the African Centre for the
ConstructiveResolutionofDisputes’objectiveistoplay
a proactive role in mitigating and preventing climate
change-relatedconflicts.Weknow that climatechange
will, at the very least, increase existing stressors and
magnify current socio-economic and political factors
thatcouldtriggerandexacerbateconflict.Buthowwill
thishappen?Whatare thedynamicsatplay?Are there
lessonsfromexistingenvironmentalconflictsthatcould
be applied now and in the future to deal with such
challenges?Thesearejustsomeofthequestionsthatwe
seektoanswer,throughthispublication,andthroughour
ongoingworkonthiscriticaltopic.
conflict trends I 3
Introduction
“Thedevastatingdroughtthataffectedlargeareasof
Kenya in 2009 and the upsurge in inter-community
violence in the north of the country highlighted
an apparent connection between climate change
and conflict. However, the evidence-base for this
connectionislimitedanditisthereforeimperativeto
analyzehowthesefactorsinteractinrealityratherthan
tomakeassumptions.”1
The above quote provides the basis on which this
articleiswritten.Thisarticlebridgestheclimatechange-
conflict gap by providing a framework or lens through
whichpolicy-actionresearchonthenexusbetweenclimate
changeandconflictcanbedesignedand implemented.
Theframeworkthatissuggestedisderivedfromspecific
fieldcasesandexperiences,aswellasareviewofrelevant
literaturebybothacademicsandpractitionersinthefield.
Thearticlebeginswithabriefdiscussionoftheconcept
ofclimatechange,asprovidedbytheIntergovernmental
PanelonClimateChange(IPCC).Thisdiscussionisthen
linkedtoclimatechangehazards,whereitisarguedthat
climatechangedoesnothappeninavacuum,butratherit
Climate Change–ConfliCt nexus: framework for PoliCy-oriented aCtionByWILLIAmTSUmA
Above:TheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange’s2007reportrecognisedthatwaterscarcityhasincreasedand predicted that it will continue to increase inthefuture.
UN
PH
OT
O/C
AR
LPU
RC
ELL
4 I conflict trends
is embedded in a socio-ecological system. Climate
changehazards,therefore,createimbalancesinthesocio-
ecologicalsystemthathavethepotentialtoexacerbateor
eventriggerviolence insomecontexts.Having laid this
foundation, three analysis tools are suggested. These
provide a lens through which policy recommendations
onthenexusbetweenclimatechangeandconflictcanbe
properlyunderstood.
ClimateChange
AccordingtotheIPCC’shistoricaloverviewofclimate
science,inits2007report,onemustfirstunderstandthe
system of climate (see Figure 1) before understanding
whatismeantbyclimatechange.Climateinitselfrefers
totheaverageweather–includingtemperaturevariances,
precipitation and wind – over a select period of time.
It is important to understand that the earth’s climate
system evolves over time due to natural occurrences,
aswellasduetohuman influences.Anexampleof this
has led towhat isoften referred toasglobalwarming,
wherean increaseduseandcirculationof ‘greenhouse’
gases – which partially trap long-wave radiation to the
earth’s surface – have led to a warmer earth surface.
This, in turn,warmssurroundingecosystemsand leads
torapidlymeltingglaciers,whichaffectsalllevelsofthe
climate system.2 Climate change over a period of time
thendisruptsthenormalfunctioningoftheecosystemthat
interactswithhumans,andaffectshowtheyaccesscertain
vitalresourcesfortheirsurvival.
ClimateChangeHazardsasDriversforViolence
The disruption of the normal functioning of an
ecosystemdue toclimatechange iswhat is referred to
asclimatechangehazards.Theseincludefloodingdueto
heavyrains,erraticweatherseasonsand,insomeareas,
prolongeddryspells.Whatwevisualiseinrealityisthen
heavy droughts and famine, unproductive farmlands
duetowatershortageand,insomecaseslikeinSudan,
extended deserts. These climate change hazards or
impacts are rarely – if ever – the sole cause of violent
conflict.However,theincreasedevidenceofthesehazards
canbeimplicatedinallphasesoftheconflictcycle–from
contributingtotheoutbreakandperpetuationofviolence
to undermining prospects for peace and security.3
Inthefollowingsection,someofthesehazardsarebriefly
discussedandanargument forhowtheirmanifestation
Figure1:TheVaryingComponentsoftheClimateSystem4
Changes in the Ocean:Cirulation, Sea Level, Biogeochemistry
Changes in/on the Land Surface:Orography, Land Use, Vegetation, Ecosystems
Changes in the Cryosphere:
Snow, Frozen Ground, Sea Ice, Ice Sheets,
Glaciers
Changes in the Atmosphere:Composition, Cirulation
Changes in the Hydrological Cycle
N2, O2, Ar, H2O, Co2, CH4, N2O, O3 etc.
Aerosols
Human Influences
Atmosphere-Ice Interaction
Atmosphere-Biosphere Interaction La
nd-A
tmos
pher
e In
tera
ctio
n
Soil-Biosphere Interaction
Atmosphere
Biosphere
Land Surface
Volcanic Activity
SeaIce
Ice Sheet
Clouds
Glacier
Changes inSolar Inputs
Ice-Ocean Coupling
Hydrosphere:Ocean
Hydrosphere:Rivers and Lakes
Terrestrial Radiation
Precipitation Evaporation
Heat
Exc
hang
e
Win
d St
ress
conflict trends I 5
t
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
ExpansionofthedesertsinAfricahasledpastoraliststoencroachontofarmlandsforwaterandpasture.
has the potential for driving conflicts, especially in
developingcountries,ispresented.
1. ClimateChange-inducedEnvironmentalDegradation
Irregular weather patterns, influenced by heavy
rainfall in some regionsandstrongsunshine inothers,
leads to environmental degradation by lowering the
environmentalconditionsnecessaryforhumansurvival.
SuhrkehighlightstensionsinSudanduetotheexpansion
of the desert.5 According to his analysis, expansion of
thedesertdoesnotmanifestinavacuum,butratherina
socio-ecologicalsystemwherepeopleareforcedtoseek
alternativesourcesoflivelihood.Heusestheexampleof
nomadicpastoralists,whofoundthemselvesincreasingly
limitedandrestrictedintheirsearchforpastureandwater.
His analysis revealed that an increase in the incidents
of armed violence between pastoralist communities
and farming groups was largely due to pastoralists
encroachingontofarmlandsforwaterandpasture.This
wasbecausethespreadingdesertlinkedtoclimatechange
had eradicated all the pasture and water corridors that
servedasbuffersduringthedryseasons.Thisobservation
isverysimilar toSaferworld’s6viewofnorthernKenya,
aswellasWalker’s7perspectiveon thedrystretches in
Senegal,wherepastoralistandfarmingdisputeshaveled
toviolentconflicts.
CLIMATE CHANGE OVER A PERIOD OF
TIME THEN DISRUPTS THE NORMAL
FUNCTIONING OF THE ECOSySTEM
THAT INTERACTSWITHHUMANS,AND
AFFECTS HOW THEy ACCESS CERTAIN
VITALRESOURCESFORTHEIRSURVIVAL
6 I conflict trends
Erratic rainfallhas reduced theavailablewater for irrigating farmlandsandhindered theexpansionofpasturesforanimals.
2.ClimateChange-inducedNaturalResourceScarcity
Building on the discussion on environmental
degradation,climatechangedoesplayadirectroleinthe
shrinkage of key natural resources – for example, land
andwater.TheIPCC’s2007reportplacesspecialemphasis
onwaterby lookingatwatersystems, floodsandwater
sources. The report recognises that water scarcity has
increased – and is predicted to continue to increase
in the future. This can be argued to be an outcome of
unusualerraticrainfallpatterns,prolongeddryspellsand
drought.Forexample,floodingasaclimatechangehazard
reducestheamountoflandavailableforfoodproduction
and other farm-based activities, while droughts due to
erratic and irregular rainfall reduce the water available
to communities that depend on rain-fed agriculture
and animal-rearing for their livelihoods.8 This can be a
driverforsocialtensionsandviolenceinsomecontexts,
especiallythosepronetoresource-basedconflicts.
Agoodexample isdemonstrated in theKaseseand
ArualocationsofnorthernUganda.9Thesetwolocations
dependlargelyonrain-fedagricultureforboththeirfood
productionandincome-generationactivities.Asignificant
numberof inhabitants fromthese two locationsrelyon
large tracks of pasture and water for their pastoralist
livelihoods. Empirical evidence from these regions
demonstrates that, over a period of time, continued
climate change leading to erratic rainfall has not only
reducedtheavailablewaterforirrigatingfarmlands,but
hasalsohinderedtheexpansionofpasturesfortheanimal
keepers.Duringthedryseasons,pastoralistcommunities
havehadtoleadtheiranimalsintofarmlandsinsearchof
pasture–apracticethathasledtoincreasedtensionsand
conflictsbetween the farmingandpastoralistgroups.10
Competition over these scarce resources induced by
climatechangehas,insomecases,resultedinviolentand
destructiveconflict.
3.ClimateChange-inducedmigration
A third dimension for investigating the climate
change–conflict nexus is that of migration. Statistics
revealthat,in2008,1.4billionoftheworld’sinhabitants
in developing countries alone relied on agriculture for
their food production and income generation. Close to
98%ofthesamegroupwereemployedintheagricultural
sector.11 The climate change hazards described above
either leadto thedestructionof landresourcesthrough
flooding or desertification, on the one hand, and
shrinkage of available ecological resources like water,
ontheother.Thishasadirectimpactonfoodproduction
and income-generation efforts, while also reducing
employment opportunities for the majority of people
livingindevelopingcountries. Increasedfoodshortages
UN
PH
OT
O/JE
FFRE
yFO
xx
conflict trends I 7
andthereductionofemploymentopportunitiesasaresult
ofdiminishedfarm-basedactivitieshasbeenacauseand
source of rapid outward migration in Africa. In Ghana,
for example, the movement of rural communities from
thedrierpartsofthenorthernregion,wheretherainsare
erratic, to themoreecologicallystablesouth,hasbeen
arguedtobeathreattoexistingresourcesinthesouth–
leadingtosocialtensionsandconflicts.12In-migrationdue
toclimatechange-inducedfactorsisnowdrivingdebates
on climate change conflict issues. Increased migration
generally means that populated areas simply become
morepopulated–especiallywhen there isamovement
ofpeoplefromruralareastourbanareas.Theincreased
concentrationofpeople leads to increasedcompetition,
bothfornaturalresourcesandforgovernmentassistance.
Figure2:FrameworkfortheAnalysisandUnder-
standingoftheClimateChange–ConflictNexus.
Policyand
ResearchImplications
Thisarticlebeganby
arguingthatscientificandpolicy-relatedresearchneeds
to invest indocumentingspecific casesasevidence, to
demonstratethelinksbetweenclimatechangeandarmed
violence.Therelationshipneeds tobegroundedon the
systematic analysis of trends and how these relate to
humanbehaviourandchoices.Theframeworkproposed
inFigure2 is a frameworkof analysis that couldguide
theworkof such researchefforts.Whileunderstanding
that climate hazards provide useful evidence about
environmentalchange, investigatinghowthesehazards
influencehumanbehaviour intermsofpeople’schoices
andactionsinpursuitoftheirlivelihoodswillbecrucial.
Climate change, as discussed in this article, leads to
environmental degradation, which has an impact on
availablenaturalresources.Competinglivelihoodsystems
in communities – especially those residing in fragile
ecological systems–are subjected to stiff competition,
leading tosocial tensionsand, insomecases,violence.
Inotherincidences,environmentallyinducedmigration–
be it by nomadic communities, farming groups or
displacedpeople–hascontributed tocompetitionover
shrinkingresourcesinhostcommunities,andisarecipe
for violence. Policy research should, therefore, focus
on providing empirical evidence around these three
climate change hazards as building blocks towards
understanding the climate change
and conflict nexus. From a policy
perspective, investments geared
at address ing c l imate change
issues ought to integrate conflict-
sensitiveapproachestoresilienceor
adaptation, to ensure that conflict-
prevention measures become an
integralaspectofanyclimatechange
interventions.
WilliamTsumaistheProgrammemanager of global Partnershipfor the Prevention of ArmedConflict’s (gPPAC) PreventiveAction and Human SecurityPrograms. He also coordinatesgPPAC’sactivitiesinthesouthern
and western Africa regionsrespectively.Thisarticlerepresents
theviewsoftheauthoralone.
Endnotes1 Saferworld(2008)‘WaterandConflict:MakingWaterDelivery
Conflict-sensitiveinUganda’,Availableat:<http://www.safer-world.org.uk/publications.php/355/water_and_conflict>.
2 LeTreut,HerveandSomerville,Richardetal.(2007).HistoricalOverviewofClimateChange.InClimate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.ContributionofWorkingGroupItotheFourthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
3 Christensen,JensHesselbjergandHewitson,Bruceetal.(2007)RegionalClimateProjections.InClimate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.ContributionofWorkingGroupIto
Climate
changehazards
destabilisetheusual
functioningofasocial-
ecologicalsystem.This
couldbeacountry,
regionorvillage.
Climate
change–
naturalresource
scarcityand
conflict
Climate
change–
induced
migrationand
conflict
Climate
change–
environmental
degradationand
conflict
8 I conflict trends8 I conflict trends
theFourthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
4 Brzoska,Michael(2010)ClimateChangeasaDriverofSecurityPolicy.PaperpreparedforSGIR2010,heldon9–11September.Stockholm:InstituteforPeaceResearchandSecurityPolicy.
5 Suhrke,Astri(1993)Pressure Points:Environmental Degradation, Migration and Conflict.OccasionalPaperofProjectonEnvironmentalChangeandAcuteConflict.Washington,DC:AmericanAcademyofArtsandSciences.
6 TheConservationDevelopmentCentre(CDC),theInternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment(IISD)andSaferworld(2009)Climate Change and Conflict – Lessons from Community Conservancies in Northern Kenya.Nairobi,WinnipegandLondon:CDC,IISDandSaferworld.
7 Walker,B.H.,Anderies,J.M.,Kinzig,A.P.andRyan,P.(2006)ExploringResilienceinSocial-ecologicalSystemsThroughComparativeStudiesandTheoryDevelopment:IntroductiontotheSpecialIssue.Ecology and Society,11(1),p.12.Availableat:<http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art12/>.
8 OxfamNovib(2010)The Right to a Sustainable Rural Livelihood: Strategies, Lessons Learned and Actions (2008–2010).TheHague:OxfamNovib.
9 Saferworld(2008),op.cit.
10 Pantuliano,SaraandPavanello,Sara(2009)Taking Drought into Account: Addressing Chronic Vulnerability among Pastoralists in the Horn and East Africa.HPGPolicyBrief,35.London:OverseasDevelopmentInstitute.
11 OxfamNovib(2010),op.cit.
12 Laube,Wolfram,Awo,MarthaandBenjaminSchraven(2008)Erratic Rains and Erratic Markets: Environmental Change, Economic Globalisation and the Expansion of Shallow Groundwater Irrigation in West Africa.ZEFWorkingPaperSeries.Bonn:CentreforDevelopmentResearch,UniversitätBonn;andTsuma,W.(2010)Gold Mining in Ghana – Actors, Alliances and Power. Berlin:ZEFDevelopmentStudies.
Climatechange-inducedmigrationisasignificantconflictfactorinAfrica.Peoplemoveawayfromclimatechangehazardstomoreecologicallystableareas,buttheincreasedconcentrationofpeopleleadstoincreasedcompetitionforresourcesandtensions.
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
conflict trends I 9
Asclimatechangehasmovedupthepoliticalagenda
over the last twodecades, therehasbeenaconcomitant
increase in the number of scientific exercises dealing
withenvironmentalandclimatesecurity.On thebroader
issueofenvironmentalsecurity,therehasbeenagrowing
understandingofthewaysinwhichenvironmentalscarcity
may triggerviolentconflict.Before thisdebate regarding
theroleofenvironmentaldegradationandscarcity issues
inthecausationofconflictswasfullysettled,however,the
morespecificaspectofclimatechangecametothefore.The
phenomenonofclimatechangehassocio-economic,political
anddemographic(throughmigration)impacts,whichmany
fear will lead to increased societal tensions and violent
conflict.
Thisarticlefocusesontheclimatechange–conflictnexus
intheHornofAfrica(HoA)–aregionthathasexperienced
highconflictlevels,andisalsopronetoclimaticfluctuations
and natural disasters. Are the two phenomena causally
linked? Will the impact of climate change worsen the
prospectsforstabilityintheHoA?
Climate ConfliCts in the horn of afriCa?BymARCELLERoyANDFANAgEBRESENBET1
Above: Higher surface temperatures in Africa willnegativelyaffectagriculturalproductivityandeconomicperformance,therebyraisingtheincidenceofcivilunrestandconflicts.
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
10 I conflict trends
TheFearofClimateConflicts
Theyear2007wasawatershedintermsofliteratureon
thesecurityaspectsofclimatechange. Itwasinthisyear
thatboththeAfricanUnion(AU)andtheSecurityCouncil
oftheUnitedNations(UN)heldtheirfirst-everdebateson
thesecurityimplicationsofclimatechange.Thesentiment
duringtheAUdebatesisbestcapturedbythewordsofthe
Ugandanpresident,yoweriMuseveni.Helabelledclimate
change an “act of aggression by the developed world”
anddemandedcompensation.AtthedebateinNewyork,
the Namibian representative to the UN, Kaire Mbuende,
equatedthecontinuedemissionofgreenhousegasesbythe
developedworldwith“low-intensitybiologicalorchemical
warfare”. At the same meeting, Margaret Becket, former
UnitedKingdom(UK)ForeignSecretary,recognisedthatthe
“consequences[ofclimatechange]reachtotheveryheartof
thesecurityagenda”.2
Thesameyearalsosaw thecommissioningofmajor
worksonthesecurityimplicationsofclimatechangebythe
GermanandUnitedStates(US)governments.3TheGerman
studyfocusesonhowgovernanceandpoliticalsystemsare
expected tobeaffectedbyclimatechange,and identifies
fourpathwaysthroughwhichclimatechangeandconflict
risk may be linked: degradation of freshwater resources;
declining food production; increases in extreme weather
events;andenvironmentallyinducedmigration.Themilitary
officerscommissionedby theUSDepartmentofDefence
contendthat“projectedclimatechangeposesaseriousrisk
toAmerica’snationalsecurity”4,simultaneouslystatingthat
security impactswillbemoresevereunderconditionsof
weakgovernance,hencelikelytoaffectthedevelopingworld
moreprofoundly.
Politicians and journalists often use more alarmist
languagewhenlinkingclimatechangeandconflict.In2007,
UNSecretary-GeneralBanKiMooncalledclimatechange
the“culprit”fortheDarfurcrisis.Followingthesamelineof
reasoning,FrenchpresidentNicolasSarkozywarned:“Ifwe
keepgoingdownthispath,climatechangewillencourage
migration….TheDarfurcrisiswillbeonlyonecrisisamong
dozensofothers.”5
IsThereEvidencetoLinkClimateChangetoConflict?
Globally, the most convincing work linking climate
change and conflict is based on data for the northern
hemisphere. Zhang et al.6 showed that the frequency of
conflictbetween1400and1900wasconsiderablyhigherin
colderyears.ThisfindingappliesbothtowesternEurope
andtoChina,withtheincidenceofconflictsduringtheLittle
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
The loss of household assets - in particular, livestock - due to droughts, has affected livelihoods and led towidespreadfamine.
Anarmedherderleadshisgoatsashelooksforpastureinadryregion.
conflict trends I 11
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
IceAge–inthefirsthalfofthe17thcentury–inbothregions
beingaboutdoublethatformilderperiods.
A substantial body of qualitative research tries to
establish a link between climate change and conflict,
focusing on Africa.7 Using different warming scenarios,
the researchers study which conditions will increase the
likelihoodand/ortheintensityofconflicts.Theyalsoattempt
toestablishpathwaysthroughwhichphysicalmanifestations
ofclimatechangemayleadtovarioussocio-economicand
political impacts – and, if not managed well, to violent
conflict.Theseresearcherscouldbecategorisedascautious
inlinkingclimatechangedirectlywithincreasedconflict.
Quantitativefindingsaboutthesecurityimplicationsof
climatechangeinAfricaarenotnumerousandarerather
contradictory.Burkeetal.8analysedhistoricaltemperature
and civil war linkages and concluded that temperature
increases coincided with a higher incidence of civil war.
TheyexpectthathighersurfacetemperaturesinAfricawill
negatively affect agricultural productivity and economic
performance, therebyraisingthe incidenceofcivilunrest
andofconflicts.
HendrixandGlaserarguethatconflictismorelikelyif
climateactsasatrigger(asaresultofextremesinclimate
variability)ratherthanasaresultoflong-termtrends(climate
change).Theyarguethatlowrainfallinagivenseasonor
yearyieldsahigherprobabilityofcausingconflict in the
followingyear thanacontinuouslydecreasingtrendover
decades.Severalauthorstrytoestablishmigration–induced
throughclimate-affectedchangesintheenvironment–as
themainpathwaythroughwhichclimatechangeleadsto
conflict.However,others report ratherdifferent findings,
arguingthatclimatechangecannotexplainAfrica’scivilwars
andthat–onthebasisofareviewofrainfalldataforseveral
decades – climate change is not the cause of the Darfur
crisis.9
ClimateChangeintheHornofAfrica
Lives and livelihoods in the HoA have been severely
affectedbydroughts,whichhaveledtowidespreadfamine,
oftenfannedbyill-conceivedsocio-economicpolicies.The
ensuinglossofhouseholdassets–inparticular,livestock–
meansthathouseholdsfacedifficultiesinrebuildingtheir
livelihoodsevenafterconditionshaveimproved.
TheHoAishometosomeofAfrica’spoorestpeople,and
isinhabitedbytheworld’slargestremainingconcentration
ofpastoralists.TheHoAalsoexhibitsahighlevelofhuman
insecurity,havingwitnessednumerouscivilandcommunal
wars,aswellasseveralinterstatewars–notablybetween
EthiopiaandSomalia(1977–78,1982)andbetweenEthiopia
andEritrea(1998–2002).
12 I conflict trends
A review by the Institute for Environmental Security
(IES)10notesthefollowingclimaticchangesintheHoAover
thepast fewdecades:highernight-timetemperatures;an
increase in rainfall in the northern areas and a decrease
insouthernareas;andanincreaseinwetextremes,often
causingflooding.Overall,acontinuedriseintemperatures
isexpected,alongsideanincreaseinrainfall,morefrequent
extreme weather events and rising sea levels, putting
largenumbersincoastalstatesatriskfrominundationand
intensificationofstormsurges.
Theseclimatechangeswillfurtheraffectfoodsecurity.
Pastoralistsandsubsistencefarmers,whoareparticularly
vulnerable, are likely to form the bulk of eco-migrants
in the HoA. Migration has been linked to an increased
risk of conflict, as it often results in people encroaching
onto the landofother tribesorgroups,amplifyingsocial
tensions.Thelowleveloftechnologicaldevelopmentand
limitedinstitutionalcapacitywill further limittheregion’s
ability to adapt to climate change, thereby amplifying
itsconsequences.
Some studies have looked at the relation between
climateandtheincidenceofconflictamongpastoralists.One
suchstudy11 found thatviolentsocialconflicts (including
cattleraiding)inEastAfricaaremostcommoninwetyears.
Itisnotclear,however,whethersuchaconclusionadvances
explanationofthelinkbetweenclimatechangeandconflict,
ascattleraidingislinkedtocomplexsocialtraditionssuchas
thepaymentofdowrytotheparentsofaprospectivebride.
Thepracticeseemsmorerelatedtoresourcepredationthan
to desperation resulting from resource scarcity. Another
study12,analysingdatafromtheConflictEarlyWarningand
ResponseMechanismof the IntergovernmentalAuthority
on Development (IGAD-CEWARN), found that vegetation
coverratherthanprecipitationisassociatedwithahigher
incidenceofcattleraidingintheKaramojaCluster,situated
intheborderzonesofKenya,Uganda,SudanandEthiopia.
Avoidingdetectionandalesserneedtowateranimalswhile
tracking them to another destination may have greater
explanatoryvaluethanthehigherrainfallitself.
Pastoralistsandsubsistencefarmers,whoareparticularlyvulnerabletoclimatechange,arelikelytoformthebulkofeco-migrantsintheHornofAfrica.
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
conflict trends I 13
IsClimateChangeattheHeartoftheDarfurConflict?
Given the amount of attention which has been paid
totheconflictinDarfur–especiallyinthemassmedia–a
certainamountofsimplificationoftheissuecanbeexpected,
includingpositingadirectcausallinkwithclimatechange.
Inreality,however,thecausalityoftheDarfurconflictcan
bedisaggregatedintodifferentlevels:theperennialnatural
resource conflicts, linked with land and water resources
andexacerbatedbyclimatechange;thestrugglebetween
thegovernmentandrebelgroupsoverpoliticalpowerand
wealth; and the regional cross-border conflicts involving
neighbouringstates,inparticularChadandLibya.
A researchproject carriedout through theUniversity
forPeaceAfricaProgrammehas focusedonhowclimate
change–aswellasenvironmentalandresourcefactors–
contribute to African conflicts, with particular focus on
Darfur.13OurownresearchagreeswithfindingsofDarfur-
basedacademicsandconclusionsofinternationalscholars
whohave spentmanyyearsdoing fieldwork inwestern
Sudan:whileclimatechangeandextremeweatherevents
mayhaveactedasariskmultiplier,theycannotprovidethe
soleexplanationfor thesharp increase in intensityof the
conflictstartingin2003.
Blamingonlyclimatechangereducestheconflict toa
processoverwhichtheactorsonthegroundhavelittleor
nocontrol,virtuallyabsolvingthemofresponsibility.Sucha
stepisnotagenuineexplanation:blamingallproblemson
naturebelittleshumaningenuityandignorestheroleplayed
bysocialfactorsandpoliticalinterests.
Lack of development, coupled with the absence
of efficient natural resource management, is the main
underlying cause of the Darfur crisis. Darfur and other
peripheralareashavebeenneglectedbytheGovernment
ofSudanfordecades, leadingtoenormousdifferencesin
income levels and political influence across the country.
Sudanese governing elites have promoted irrigation
schemeslocatedincentralSudanasawaytoboostfood
productionandtosupplycommoditiesforexport,neglecting
rain-fedagricultureandpastoralism,whichhadbeen the
strengthofDarfur’seconomy.
Climate,EnvironmentandgovernanceinDarfur
Darfurhasexperiencedsevereclimaticshiftsoverrecent
decades. Reduced rainfall has turned marginal grazing
landintodesert,placingsignificantstressonthelivelihood
systemsoflocalgroups.InnorthernDarfur,a30%dropin
precipitationwasrecordedover80years.Thedroughtsof
1974–75and1984–85havealtered thediverseecological
featuresoftheregion.14
BothpastoralistsandfarmersinDarfurhavesufferedas
aresultofgovernmentfailuretoensureanadequatesupply
ofwater,andhavebecomemorevulnerabletodrought.Until
the1970s,westernSudanhadagoodshareofSudan’stotal
numberofwaterworks,pondsandhafirs(excavatedwater
storagetanks).Sincethen,lackofmaintenanceandfailure
toprovideadditionalwaterpointshassignificantlyreduced
thecapacity forwatering livestockand forsustaining the
human population. This has hampered the traditional
migrationpatternsofpastoralists: if thenumberofwater
pointsisreduced,differentpopulationgroupsandlivestock
concentrate around the remaining water sources, which
leadstolocalisedenvironmentaldegradation,andpossibly
conflict.15
Competing legalsystemsand institutionsareanother
aspectof the failureofgovernance. InDarfur, traditional
mechanisms foraddressing resourceconflictshavebeen
supersededbyinstitutionsandlawsissuedundersuccessive
Sudaneseregimes.Likewise,land-usegrantsinaccordance
with customary law were issued by the Sultan of Darfur
prior to 1916, and remained in effect after the territory’s
incorporation into Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. This was the
hakura system, which governs rights for access to land
andbestowsresponsibilities formanaging it, rather than
grantingexclusiveuseorownership.Asaresultofdiverging
legislation issuedbypost-independenceadministrations,
conflicting land-use claims have increased the level of
uncertaintyandtension.
Thestrugglebetweensedentaryfarmersandnomads,
whichhasoftenbeenadvancedas themaincauseof the
conflict,hadbeencontainedforcenturiesthroughtraditional
conflict management mechanisms and established rules
for access to land and water. It is clear that climatic
variations, as well as the governance issues mentioned
above, have affected the intensity of disagreements
over access to resources. Moreover, a quadrupling of
populationand livestocknumbersover thepast50years
placed great strains on existing land-use arrangements.
Asaresultofovergrazing,low-qualityfodderthatincluded
invasivespeciesbegantodominate–which,inturn,ledto
intensificationof theconflictasherders lackingsufficient
grazing resources began to trespass onto the lands of
sedentary farmers. Simultaneously, there has been a
AT THE DEBATE IN NEW yORK, THE NAMIBIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN, KAIRE
MBUENDE, EQUATED THE CONTINUED EMISSION OF GREENHOUSE GASES By THE
DEVELOPEDWORLDWITH“LOW-INTENSITyBIOLOGICALORCHEMICALWARFARE”
14 I conflict trends
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
risingtendencyamongstfarmerstocultivatemorelandto
compensate fordecliningproductivity, thus reducing the
availablestockoflandforgrazingandaffectingthecorridors
through which nomads move during their annual north–
southmigrations.
AdaptingtoClimateChangeintheHornofAfrica
While climate change is undeniable, its impact
throughout Africa has been uneven, with some regions
receivinglessrainfallwhileothersreceivemore.Continuing
shiftswilloccur,andthefuturemightnotdevelopalongthe
linesthatarecurrentlybeingpredicted.Itremainsimportant
tocarryout‘realitychecks’andreviewadaptationstrategies
andplansonaregularbasis.
Thelinkbetweenclimatechangeandconflictsimilarly
needstobeapproachedwithcaution.Whileclimaticshifts
willstraindevelopmenteffortsandhumansecurity inthe
HoA, themanner inwhich theseeffects relate toconflict
risksneedstobeinvestigatedfurther.Governanceiscrucial.
Thegovernment’sabilitytomanageandregulateaccessto
naturalresourcescanprotectagainsttheill-effectsofclimate
changeandenvironmentaldegradation.Stronginstitutions
andleadershiplimittheconsequencesofconflict,drought
andfamine;weakgovernanceworsenstheoutcomes.
The adaptive capacities of communities in the Sahel
andinsub-SaharanAfricatorespondtochangingclimatic
and ecological conditions have been quite impressive.
Pastoralistshavebeenable tosurvivebymigratingover
ASudanesewomanfromthemahlivillageinthesouthernDarfurregioncollectsrainwatertobeusedfordrinkingandcooking.
conflict trends I 15
wideareasandbyadaptinglivelihoodstrategies.However,
state borders, population increase and global climate
changeareposingnewchallengestotraditionaladaptation
mechanisms.Itisimportanttounderstandhowandtowhat
extent impacts of climate change can be absorbed, and
underwhatcircumstancestheyarelikelytoleadtostrains
thatcontributetoconflicts.
Development efforts in the HoA will have to take
accountoftherisksresultingfromclimatechange.Policies
andprojectswillneed tobedesigned insuchaway that
theycaninstituteremedialmeasurestolimitthenegative
consequences of climate change. There is a growing
realisation about the need for mainstreaming such an
approach into development policy. However, concerted
efforts toacquire theunderstandinguponwhich tobase
policies to reduce thesecurity risksof climatechange in
Africaarejustgettingofftheground,suchasthroughthe
Africa, Climate Change and Security Dialogue Process
(ACCES),launchedinAddisAbabainOctober2010.16
Anychangepresentschallengesandoffersopportunities.
Increasedtemperaturesandalteredpatternsofprecipitation
intheHoAwillfurthercomplicatefoodsecurityandsocial
stability in the poorest part of the continent. yet climate
changealsooffersanopportunitytorethinkdevelopment
policy and land use. Adapting agricultural production
should be the first priority. While ‘climate wars’ are
ratherunlikely in theHoA,domesticstresses resulting in
populationdisplacementmaycauseasubstantialamount
ofupheaval.Approachestolandusethatallowthebulkof
theruralpopulationtoimprovetheirlivingstandardswhile
stayingput–suchasthroughagro-forestryandshort-cycle
vegetableandfodderproduction–wouldappeartobeafirst
lineofdefence.
Dr marcel Leroy is a Senior Researcher at theUniversityforPeace(UPEACE)AfricaProgramme.
Fana gebresenbet is a Research Assistant at theUPEACEAfricaProgramme.
Endnotes1 TheauthorswishtothankMarianneChaumelandIslay
Mactaggartfortheirvaluablecommentsandassistancewiththemanuscript.
2 Brown,O.,Hammill,A.andMcLeman,R.(2007)ClimateChangeasthe‘New’SecurityThreat:ImplicationsforAfrica.International Affairs,83(6),pp.1141–1154;andUNSCDPI,(2007)‘UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilHoldsFirstEverDebateonImpactofClimateChangeonPeace,Security,Hearingover50speakers’,Availableat:<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9000.doc.htm>Accessedon:17July2007.
3 CenterforNavalAnalysis(CNA)(2007)‘NationalSecurityandtheThreatofClimateChange’,Availableat:<www.SecurityAndClimate.cna.org>Accessedon:26March2011.
4 Thecommissionedworkscanbeaccessedat<http://eeac.hscglab.nl/files/D-WBGU_ClimateChangeRisk_Jun07.pdfandhttp://securityandclimate.cna.org/.GACGC>.
5 BanKiMoon’swordscanberetrievedfromthe15July2007editionofThe Washington Post(Availableat:<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061501857.html)>andthatofNicolasSarkozyfromAgenceFrance-Presse(AFP)(Availableat:<http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jbisWIJJP7g0ldhtFE1NE5AymCpg)>.
6 Zhang,D.D.,Brecke,P.,Lee,H.F.,He,y.andZhang,J.(2007)GlobalClimateChange,War,andPopulationDeclineinRecentHumanHistory.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,104(49).
7 SeeBrown,O.andCrawford,A.(2008)Assessing the Security Implications of Climate Change for West Africa: Country Case Studies of Ghana and Burkina Faso.IISD;Brown,O.,Hammill,A.andMcLeman,R.(2007)op.cit.;Buhaug,H.,Gleditsch,N.P.andTheisen,O.M.(2008)‘ImplicationsofClimateChangeforArmedConflict’,Availableat:<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ExTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/BGT_presentation.pdf>Accessedon:26March2011.
8 Burke,M.B.,Miguel,E.,Satyanath,S.,Dykema,J.A.andLobell,D.B.(2009)WarmingIncreasestheRiskofCivilWarinAfrica.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,106(49).
9 Thesourcesusedinthisparagraphare:Hendrix,C.andGlaser,S.(2007)TrendsandTriggers:Climate,ClimateChangeandCivilConflictinSub-SaharanAfrica.Political Geography,26(6),pp.695–715;formigration-relatedstudies,seeGleditsch,N.P.,Nordas,R.andSalehyan,I.(2007)Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration Link.CopingwithCrisisWorkingPaperSeries,May2007;andReuveny,R.(2007)ClimateChange-inducedMigrationandViolentConflict.Political Geography,26(6),pp.656–673.Forworksarguingthatthereisnolinkbetweenclimatechangeandconflict,seeBuhaug,H.(2010)ClimateNottoBlameforAfricanCivilWars.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,earlyedition;andKevane,M.andGray,L.(2008)Darfur:RainfallandConflict.Environmental Research Letters,3.
10 VandeGiessen,E.(2011)‘HornofAfrica:EnvironmentalSecurityAssessment’,Availableat:<http://www.envirosecurity.org/espa/PDF/ESA_HOA.pdf>Accessedon:26March2011.
11 Hendrix,C.andSalehyan,I.(2011)‘TheBrewingStorm?ClimateChange,Rainfall,andSocialConflictinAfrica’,Availableat:<http://ccaps.strausscenter.org/system/research_items/pdfs/43/original.pdf?>1299598361Accessedon:26March2011.
12 Meier,P.,Bond,D.andBond,J.(2007)EnvironmentalInfluencesonPastoralConflictintheHornofAfrica.Political Geography,26(6),pp.716–735.
13 Fortheproject’sconclusions,seeLeroy,M.(ed.)(2009)Environment and Conflict in Africa: Reflections on Darfur.UniversityforPeaceAfricaProgramme(alsoavailableat:<www.africa.upeace.org/documents/environment_files.pdf)>.TheprojectwassupportedbytheBelgianMinistryofForeignAffairs.
14 UNEP(2007)‘Sudan:Post-conflictEnvironmentalAssessment’,Availableat:<http://www.unep.org/sudan/>Accessedon:26March2011.
15 ElZain,M.(2009)TheOriginsofCurrentConflicts:RuralWaterProvisionandReshapingofHumanSettlementsandEnvironmentalResourcesinWestSudan.InLeroy,M.(ed.)Environment and Conflict in Africa: Reflections on Darfur.UniversityforPeaceAfricaProgramme,pp.123–160.
16 ACCES(2010)‘ClimateChangeandSecurityinAfrica:VulnerabilityReport’,Availableat:<http://www.gwiwater.org/en/node/126>Accessedon:26March2011.
16 I conflict trends
RiversandClimateChange
Water is a basic condition for life. It also plays a
fundamentalroleinhumandevelopment.Besidesdailyuse,
itiscrucialforagricultureandindustry.Inequalityofaccess
totheresourceaswellasitsmismanagementundermines
welfare,affectshumansecurityandcreatesriskofconflict.
Thus, water scarcity is not limited to environment and
developmentconcern, ithasbecomepartof thepolitical
agendaandanimportantnationalsecurityissue.However,
inspiteofmanyattemptsinthepost-ColdWarperiod,the
globalwatercrisisremainsunresolvedandwatershortages
havethepotentialtothreatenglobalpeace,prosperityand
stability.AstheWorldWaterCouncilargues:“Thiscrisishas
beenaggravatedbyfactorssuchasacceleratingpopulation
growth,increasinginequalities,nationalorregionalconflicts
andthe influenceofclimatechangeonthewatercycle.”1
Approximately900millionpeoplealreadylivewithoutclean
drinkingwater,2.6billionpeoplelackadequatesanitation,
and2.2millionchildrendieeveryyearfromunsafewater
relateddiseases.2
transboundary rivers and Climate Change: afriCan and asian rivers ByASHoKSWAINANDFLoRIANKRAmPE
Above:TheKaribaDam,oneofthelargestintheworld,isahydroelectricdamintheKaribagorgeoftheZambeziRiverbasinbetweenZambiaandZimbabwe.
“WHERE WATER IS BoSS, THE LAND MuST oBEy.”Africanproverb
GE
TT
yIM
AG
ES
conflict trends I 17
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
Theoriginsof theglobalwater crisis arewell known
andarenotlimitedtoclimatefactorsalone.However,the
crisisisofsuchamagnitudethatitisgrowingintoanissue
ofcommonglobalconcern.Thisperspectiveputsthefocus
oninternationalrivers,asapproximatelyhalfoftheglobal
freshwaterisavailablefrom263internationalbasinsinthe
world:ofthem,59areinAfricaand57inAsia.3About1400
millionpeople inhabit riverbasins thatsuffer fromwater
stress,definedas lessthan1000m3/capita/year.4National
politicscomplicatepolicies towardsenhancedriverbasin
managementofsharedrivers.Moreover,themanagement
ofinternationalriversindifferentpartsoftheworldcannot
followaparticulargoldenprinciple,asthevalueofwater,
itsdemandandsupplyvaryfromonebasintoanother.5The
existingknowledgeandinstitutionswehaverelatingtothe
governanceofinternationalriversareincreasinglyturning
volatile,duetotheincreaseddemandanddecreasedsupply
offreshwater.Furtheraddingtotheproblem,thethreatof
globalclimatechangehasstartedunderminingtheongoing
regimesandinstitutionsrelatingtowatersharingandthe
managementofinternationalrivers.6
While the exact impact of climate change is not yet
known, it will have clear bearing upon access to shared
waterresourcesasitaffectshydrologicalcyclesfromglobal
tolocallevels.Someregionswillbecomemuchdrier,some
wetter. The increase in the global surface temperature,
throughthegreenhouseeffect,isexpectedtoincreasethe
amount of water in the air. As a consequence, droughts
will become more frequent, with more and more water
vaporising from the land into the air. At the same time,
the larger amount of water in the air will produce more
intense,heavyprecipitationandtriggerfloods.Theresults
ofdroughtsandfloodswillcausetheresilienceofold–and
posenew–regionalsecuritychallengestostates,particularly
inAfricaandAsia.
Duetomutualdependence,thewithdrawalorpollution
ofriverwaterofoneriparianstatecanpotentiallynotonly
lead todisputes,butalsobringcooperation in thebasin.
Particularly in the last two decades, several competing
ripariancountriesinAsiaandAfricahavemovedtowards
establishing regimes and institutions for cooperation.
River-sharingagreementsfortheZambeziandNileriversin
AfricaandMekongandGangesriversinAsiaincreasedin
the1990s.However,theseagreementsarepresentlybeing
severelystressed,duetoincreasingdemandanddecreasing
supplyofwaterresources.Moreover, the threatofglobal
climatechangehasraisedseriousdoubtsaboutthefuture
oftheseagreements.Thisarticletakesamacro-comparative
perspectiveontransboundaryriverissuesinAfricaandAsia,
andoutlines foreseeablechallenges for regionalsecurity,
consideringtheimpactofclimatechange.
Droughts,whichdryupmajorriversandsharedwaterresources,areoneofthesignificantimpactsofclimatechange.
18 I conflict trends
majorTransboundaryRiverBasinsinAfricaandAsia
andRiparianRelations
Thegeneralclimatetrendsuggestsanincreaseinglobal
surface temperatures, but climate data of the twentieth
century shows that Africa is and will continuously be
warming faster than the global average. Scholars are
certain that there will be no generalised, single effect
of climate change/variability on Africa, because of the
long geographical stretch of the continent. As per the
IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)findings,
two regional patterns are likely for Africa. Northern and
southernAfricawillbecomemuchhotter(minimumplus4°C)
anddrier(about10–20%lessrain).EasternandcentralAfrica
willexperienceincreasedrainfallbyabout15%.Ingeneral,
more regionswilloftensuffer fromdroughtsand floods.
Consideringtheexpectationofmorefrequentdroughtsand
floods,theforecastofriverflowsandtheirinteractionwith
extremevariationsinprecipitationbecomescrucial.
Progressing desertif ication through increased
vaporisationandchangingrainweatherpatternsarecause
forconcerninriparianstates,particularlyintheChadLake
Basin(Niger,Nigeria,Chad,CameroonandCentralAfrican
Republic);theZambeziBasin(Zambia,Angola,Zimbabwe,
Malawi,Botswana,MozambiqueandNamibia);andtheNile
Basin(Rwanda,Burundi,Congo,Tanzania,Kenya,Uganda,
Eritrea,Ethiopia,SudanandEgypt).Therealeffectofclimate
changeontheflowofriversystemsinAfricaisapparently
unpredictable. Nevertheless, specialists estimate that,
indrierareas,adecreaseinrainfallby10%wouldhavea
severeeffectonriversystemsliketheZambeziandLimpopo
insouthernAfrica.TheZambeziRiverwillbeparticularly
vulnerable to climate change, and already today causes
IntheIndusBasin,despiteasignedwater-sharingagreementbetweenIndiaandPakistanin1960,waterisoneoftheconflictissuesbetweentheseripariancountriesduetoincreasingwaterscarcityintheregion.
GE
TT
yIM
AG
ES
conflict trends I 19
Waterpollution,fromindustrialdevelopmentalongmajorriversbyupperripariancountries,affectslowerriparianstatessignificantly.
contestation among its riparian countries, particularly
betweenZambiaandZimbabwe.TheNileBasinisconsidered
bymanyofhavinghighpotentialtoinducewaterconflictsin
theregion,duetoincreasingwaterdemandandtheunequal
distributionofwaterandpowerinthebasin.In1999,when
theWorldBankencouragedtheNileBasinstatestoformthe
NileBasin Initiative, therewashopeandexpectationthat
sharedwaterresourceswouldbringpeaceandcooperation
inthebasin.However,morethanadecadelater,thatdream
hasnotyetbeenrealised.Inthefaceofmountingpressure
fromupstreamcountries,EgyptandSudanareworkinghard
tomaintaintheirhistoricrightsovertheNilewater.Ethiopia
istryingeverythingpossibletocaptureitsshareoftheNile
water,whichhasbeendeniedtoitinthepastduetoitsown
politicalandeconomicweaknesses.
Amajorchallengetotransboundaryrivercooperationis
rootedinnationalpolitics.Thedirectandimmediatenational
securitychallengesfortheeconomyandthepopulationis
sacrificingbasin-basedcooperation.Agriculture,asthemajor
economicactivityinAfrica,willbemoreseverelyaffectedby
changingclimatethantheindustrialsectors.About60%of
employmentinAfricaisprovidedbytheagriculturalsector–
and,inmanycountries,thissectoraccountsfor50%oftheir
grossdomesticproduct (GDP).7Theagriculturalsector is
verysensitivetochangesinclimate–especiallytoshifting
rainfallpatterns.Someresearchersclaimthat,by2020,the
cropyieldinsomecountrieswillhavehalvedandagricultural
profitsdecreaseby90%.TheSahararegionisseenasmost
vulnerabletoagriculturallosses,whichareexpectedtolose
about2–7%ofitsGDP.WesternandcentralAfricawilllose
about2–4%ofoverallGDP,whiletheimpactonnorthernand
southernAfricaisanticipatedtobeabout0.4%to1.3%of
overallGDP.Somemodelssuggestadecreaseinsuitable
rain-fedlandforcrops,anda5–8%increaseinaridorsemi-
aridlandby2080.Itispredictedthat,consequently,wheat
productionwilldisappearfromAfricaandmaizeproduction
insouthernAfricawillbenotablyreduced.8
In Africa, the scarcity of water resources will affect
regionalsecurityand increasepolitical tensions foremost
amongthesouthernAfricanandNileBasinstates.Thewater
scarcityofrain-fedriversinAfrica–suchastheNile,Orange
and Zambezi – will affect the agricultural sector, which
dominatesAfricaneconomies,particularlyseverely.Thiswill
leadtochallengesinfoodandwatersecurityintheregion.
GE
TT
yIM
AG
ES
20 I conflict trends
Topre-empttheimpactonitspopulations,stateswillmost
likelysecuritisewaterandwilltrytoannexasmuchwater
aspossibleunilaterallyfromthesharedsources.Thissortof
‘watercapture’policywillnotonlyharmtheexistingwater-
sharingagreements,itmightalsocreatenewconflictsover
waterissues.Duetoclimatechangechallenges,thescenario
ofwaterwarsinthenearfutureinpartsofAfricacannotbe
ruledout.
MostofAsiaishighlypopulatedandalsohousesalarger
numberof the world’spoor. In recent years,besides the
rapidlyincreasingpopulation,alargepartofthecontinent
isalsoexperiencingunprecedentedeconomicgrowth.The
impactsofglobalclimatechangearelikelytobeseverein
thenearfutureinmanyAsiancountries,wherepeopleare
highlydependentonnaturalresourcesfortheirlivelihoods.
Globalclimatechangepresentsseriousriskstotheaccessof
waterresourcesinsouthandsouth-eastAsia.Inparticular,
theimpactofclimatechangeonglacierswilldirectlyaffect
waterflowinmanyofthemajorinternationalriversinthese
regions.IntheHimalayanBasin,duetotheincreasedrate
ofmeltingoftheglacialarea,thewaterflowinspringhas
increasedandwaterflowduringtheremainingseasons–
especially during summer when it is most needed – has
decreased.ThesizeoftheHimalayanglaciershasdecreased
from 2 077 square kilometres in 1962 to 1 628 square
kilometres in 2007, an overall reduction of 21%.9 This
increasedrateinglaciermeltingmayaddtotherun-offof
theriversforsometimebut,atthesametime,itwillalso
bring more snow avalanches and glacial lake outburst
floods(GLOFs)athighelevation.Thisphenomenonwillnot
onlyposeariskfortheexistingdamsandotherprojectsat
theupperreachesoftheriversystems,butwillalsomake
itdifficult toplananyhydroprojects in the future. If the
presenttrendcontinues,riversoriginatingintheHimalayas
willsoonexperienceanincreaseinthefrequencyofspring
floodsandseriousflowreductioninthesummermonths.10
Climate change-induced glacier melting will impact
somemajorAsianriverbasins inparticular–suchasthe
GangesBasin(Nepal,IndiaandBangladesh);theIndusBasin
(IndiaandPakistan);andtheMekongRiver(China,Burma,
Thailand,Laos,CambodiaandVietnam).Thequantityand
nature of run-off is expected to change substantially in
theseHimalayanriversasaresultofclimatechange.While
uncertainty remains regarding the accuracy of various
climatechangepredictions,forecastsindicatethatchanges
inclimatewillfurtherexacerbatetheexistingvariabilityof
waterflowintherivers.Changesinthespatialandtemporal
distributionofprecipitationandtemperatureareexpectedto
interactincomplexwaysthatchangetheequilibriumand
attributesofrun-offthatreachestheserivers.
In the Ganges Basin, climate change is expected to
increasetemperatures,resultingintheretreatofglaciers;
increasedalterationintheprecipitationpattern,whichwill
resultinagreaterdegreeandrateofrecurrenceofdroughts
and floods; and even lead to a sea-level rise.11 There is
enoughwater in theGangesRiverduringthewetseason
forbothmajor ripariancountries (Bangladeshand India)
nottoargueoverthewatersupply; instead,floodcontrol
istheirpriority.Duringthedryseason(Decemberthrough
May),thewatersupplydwindles–andduringthisperiod,ice
andsnowmeltfromtheHimalayasbecomescritical.Inthe
IndusBasin,waterisoneofthemainconflictissuesbetween
India and Pakistan, with India securing water resources
foritsgrowingmetropolisareas.Whileboththesehostile
neighbourshavesignedawater-sharingagreementonthe
Indusin1960–duetoincreasingwaterscarcityintheregion–
internaloppositioninbothcountriesisgrowingagainstthe
agreement.IslamicfundamentalistgroupsinPakistanhave
beenusingthewaterissuetomobilisetheirsupportbase
against India. In theMekongBasin,upper riparianChina
requires huge amounts of water to support its immense
economic growth. This has severe effects on the lower
riparianstatesalongtheMekong,whichexperienceextreme
watervariabilitybecauseoftheconstructionofmajordams
ontheChineseside.TheMekong,IndusandGangesarealso
experiencingseverefloodsthroughheavyrains,asseenin
2010.Atthesametime,waterpollutionthroughindustrialuse
isextremeandaffectsthelowerriparianstates.Increasing
uncertainty over the availability of water from rainfall,
riverrun-offandgroundwaterrechargeduetotheimpact
ofclimaticchangeposesaseriousthreattofoodsecurity
in Asia. Overall, the management of international rivers
inAsiaisnotconducivetolong-termwatersustainability.
Due to climate change, increasing population growth
and growing economies, riparian countries are taking –
andwilltake–unilateralactionstosecurewaterresources,
whilepotentiallydamaging the river aswell as relations
betweenriparianstates.
ThesharingofinternationalriversinAsiainthefaceof
climatechangemightalsoleadtothesameregionalsecurity
tensionsas inAfrica, consideringAsia’sneed to feed its
largepopulation.Butsuchtensionsmightbenotofthesame
intensityasanticipatedforAfrica.Thereasonforthisisthat
theinternationalriverbasincountriesinAsiamaybeableto
adapttoclimatechangechallengesbetterthantheirAfrican
counterparts:
THE NILE BASIN IS CONSIDERED By
MANy OF HAVING HIGH POTENTIAL
TO INDUCE WATER CONFLICTS IN
THE REGION, DUE TO INCREASING
WATER DEMAND AND THE UNEQUAL
DISTRIBUTIONOFWATERANDPOWER
INTHEBASIN
conflict trends I 21
1. ManycountriesinthesemajorAsianriverbasins,
particularlyChinaandIndia,aregraduallyshifting
theireconomicfocusfromtheagriculturalsectorto
theindustrialsector.Industryconsumesmuchless
water than agriculture. Thus, this economic shift
mighthelpAsiancountriestoadaptbettertowater
scarcitychallenges.
2. Climate change raises the certain possibility of
large-scalevariationinthewaterflowofsharedriver
systems.Withthehelpoflargewaterdevelopment
projects,basincountriesmightbeabletoaddress
these run-off variations and uncertainty, at least
forsometime.MostAsiancountriesalsopossess
better technological strengthand larger financial
capability to meet these climate change-induced
watermanagementchallenges.
3. Climate change is rapidly emerging as a critical
issue in the sharing of international river water
negotiationprocesses.Many largeAsian riparian
countriespossesssufficientnumbersofqualified
diplomatstonegotiatesuccessfullycomplexclimate
changechallengesovertheirsharedwaterresources
comparedtoAfricanbasinstates,thusdecreasing
theirriskofviolentwaterconflicts.
AddressingClimateChangeChallenges
Withoutadoubt,AfricaandAsia’stransboundaryriver
managementisadvancingtowardsuncertaintimeswiththe
increasingimpactofclimatechange.Tosustainanddevelop
theresourcethatsatisfiesabasicconditionoflifewillbethe
biggestchallengeforbasinstatesinthiscentury.Thekey
to transboundaryrivermanagement towardscooperation
ratherthanconfrontationwillbethesmartgovernanceof
naturalresources,andhowpoliticsdealswithwaterissues
andemerging threats.WhileAsiamightbeslightlymore
resourceful, it is likely to face the same challenges and
tensionsthatarealmostinevitableforAfrica.
Theexistingwater-sharingregimesinAfricaandAsiado
nothavethecapacitytoaddresstheemergingchallenges
that climate change will pose. Most of the ongoing
cooperation in the international river basins in Asia and
Africaoriginatedfromtheactiveinvolvementofinternational
donoragencies.Manyoftheseinitiativesonlybarelysurvive
becauseofexternalhelpandassistance.Suchrelianceon
minimal external help alone exposes the lack of interest
of thebasinstates inAsiaandAfrica increatingeffective
and sustainable management of shared river resources.
To address the imminent problems of the existing water
crisis–andthemassivechangeintherun-offstructuredue
toclimatechange–theownershipand,mostimportantly,the
accountabilityof transboundarywatermanagementmust
berestoredbacktothecountriesintheregions.Ofcourse,
theinternationalcommunityshouldnotstayoutofregional
water-sharingpoliticsentirely,butmuststarttoencourage
ripariancountriestofinddistinctemancipatoryapproaches
tobasin-basedrivermanagement.Theseapproachesshould
addresstheregions’uniquecultureandhistory,aswellas
theireconomicdisparityandecologicalsensitivities.
DrAshokSwainisaProfessorinPeaceandConflictResearchandtheDirectoroftheUppsalaCentreforSustainableDevelopmentatUppsalaUniversity inSweden.
Florian Krampe is a Doctoral student at theDepartmentofPeaceandConflictResearch,andapre-DoctoralResearchFellowattheUppsalaCentreforSustainableDevelopmentatUppsalaUniversityinSweden.
Endnotes1 WorldWaterCouncil(2006)The Right to Water: From Concept to
Implementation.Marseilles:WorldWaterCouncil.
2 WHO(2010)uN-Water Global Annual Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking-Water (GLAAS).Geneva:WHO.
3 UNEP(2002)Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements.Nairobi:UnitedNationsPublications.
4 Arnell,N.W.(2004)ClimateChangeandGlobalWaterResources:SRESEmissionsandSocio-economicScenarios.Global Environmental Change,14,pp.31–52.
5 Swain,A.(2004)Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East.London:Routledge.
6 Drieschova,A.,Giordano,M.andFishhendler,I.(2009)ClimateChange,InternationalCooperationandAdaptioninTransboundaryWaterManagement.InAdger,W.N.,Lorenzoni,I.andO’Brien,K.(eds)Adapting to Climate Change: Threshold, Values, Governance.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.384–398;andGleick,P.(ed.)(2009)The World’ s Water 2008-2009.London:IslandPress.
7 Collier,P.,Conway,G.andVenables,T.(2008)ClimateChangeandAfrica.oxford Review of Economic Policy,24,pp.337–353.
8 Boko,M.,Niang,I.,Nyong,A.andVogel,C.(2007)Africa.InParry,M.L.,Canziani,O.F.,Palutikof,J.P.,VanderLinden,P.J.andHanson,C.E.(eds)Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.ContributionofWorkingGroupIItotheFourthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,2007.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
9 Kulkarni,A.V.,Bahuguna,I.M.,Rathore,B.P.,Singh,S.K.,Randhawa,S.S.,Sood,R.K.andDhar,S.(2007)GlacialRetreatinHimalayaUsingIndianRemoteSensingSatelliteData.Current Science,92(1);andHosterman,H.R.,McCornick,P.G.,Kistin,E.J.,Pant,A.,Sharma,B.andBharati,L.(2009)Water, Climate Change and Adaption: Focus on the Ganges River Basin.NicholasInstituteforEnvironmentalPolicySolutionsWorkingPaper,August2009.
10 Swain,A.(2010)EnvironmentandConflictinSouthAsia:Water-sharingBetweenBangladeshandIndia.South Asian Journal,28,pp.27–34.
11 Cruz,R.V.,Harasawa,H.,Lal,M.,Wu,S.,Anokhin,y.,Punsalmaa,B.,Honda,y.,Jafari,M.,Li,C.andNinh,N.H.(2007)Asia.InParry,M.L.,Canziani,O.F.,Palutikof,J.P.,VanderLinden,P.J.andHanson,C.E.(eds)Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.ContributiontoWorkingGroupIItotheForthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.469–506.
22 I conflict trends
Introduction
SouthAfrica’s3000kmcoastlineextendsfromNamibia’s
borderinthewesttoMozambiqueintheeast,andcomprises
diverse climatic and biodiversity patterns. These natural
endowmentshavefacilitatedcoastaldevelopmentintermsof
infrastructureandbusiness(industry,mining,ports,fisheries,
tourismandrealestate).SouthAfricaiscurrentlyemerging
asan important investordestinationwithanunparalleled
spatialfocusonthecoast,withmoredevelopmentimminent.
However,coastaldevelopmenttrendssuggestthatcoastal
areas are being largely transformed and that the natural
resource base is being degraded as a result.1Hence, the
coastisoftensubjecttoaplethoraofconflictingusergroups
competingforaccesstorelativelyunspoiledportionsofthe
coastline, but are frequently also exposed to ecosystem
degradationand/orover-exploitation.
South Africa is also diverse in terms of its socio-
economicand institutionalsettings, largelyreconstructed
in the aftermath of apartheid, which denied the majority
access to coastal resources and services. Apartheid’s
legacy has left sharply divided socio-spatial patterns of
developmentandunderdevelopmentalongthecoast,where
GE
TT
yIM
AG
ES
key soCial vulnerabilities to Climate Change in south afriCa’s Coastal Zones: the Potential for ConfliCtByFATHImAAHmED
Above:Coastaldevelopmenttrendsindicatethatcoastalareasarebeingsignificantlytransformedandthenaturalresourcebaseisbeingdegradedasaresult.
conflict trends I 23
GE
TT
yIM
AG
ES
themajority –mainlyblackAfricans – remain trapped in
viciouscyclesofpovertyandenvironmentaldegradation.2
Hence,SouthAfrica’scoastalsociety ismarkedbyvaried
levelsofinequalities,whichsuggestthatdivergentlevelsof
socialvulnerabilitiesrequireconsiderationinclimatechange
dialogues.Intermsofitsinstitutionalsetting,restructuring
since 1994 has witnessed significant changes in policy
and legislation,withspecificenvironmentalmanagement
mandatesandasignificantlyreviseddevelopmentagenda.
However,anundeniabletensionexistsbetweentheneedto
introduceenvironmentalissuesandconcernsintoplanning
anddecision-makingprocesses(oftenforthefirsttime),and
theneedtoacceleratedevelopmenttoaddresssignificant
socioeconomicneeds.3AsRobertsstates:“Thistensionis
exacerbatedby the fact that environmental concernsare
regardedasbeingof less significance thandevelopment
prioritiesinSouthAfrica.”4
Coastal poverty is particularly severe in rural coastal
areas(southernCape,EasternCapeandnorthernKwaZulu-
Natal),formerhomelandsandinformalsettlementswithin
cities.5AsituationanalysisconductedbytheUnitedNations
DevelopmentProgram(UNDP)in2006revealedthefollowing
onSouthAfrica:persistentlyhighunemploymentrate(29%);
poverty(34%subsistingonlessthanUS$2/day);largewealth
disparities(Ginicoefficientof0.59);highHIV/AIDSinfection
rates;adualformal/informaleconomy;lowskillsbaseand
wideurban/ruraldisparities.6Thecoastisahugecontributor
to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). The
economicbenefitsthatSouthAfricansocietyderivesfrom
itscoastalecosystemsreflectcontributionsofanestimated
35%(R168billion)annuallytotheGDPfromdirectbenefits,
and a further 28% (R134 billion) from indirect benefits.7
SouthAfrica’scoastalurbancentres(Durban,PortElizabeth,
CapeTownandRichardsBay)lendthemselvestoportsand
infrastructure,propertydevelopment,industry,tourismand
netin-migrationofjobseekers,andhaveasignificantrole
inmeetingthebasicneedsandimprovingthewell-beingof
coastalcommunities,where40%ofthecountry’spopulation
islocated.8However,GDPaloneisnotaneffectivemeasure
ofdevelopment.Itdoesnot,forexample,reflectsocialcosts
(healthproblemsresultingfromenvironmentaldegradation),
income distribution and the destruction of ecosystems,
bornelargelybythepoor.
Climatechangeisnowanacceptedrealityandisbeing
incorporated intopolicies inSouthAfrica,albeit focusing
largelyonmitigation(energyefficiency,powergeneration,
Coastalpovertyisparticularlysevereinruralcoastalareas.
24 I conflict trends
sustainabletransport,andwastemanagement)ratherthan
adaptation. While mitigation is necessary, South Africa’s
coastline is increasingly prone to the realities of climate
change impacts – including sea level rise, severe storm
events,shorelineerosionandcoastalresourcedegradation,
which is linked to increasing human transformation of
the coastline.9 Without adaptation, there will be dire
consequences forsocietyand theeconomy,exacerbating
alreadyexistinginequalitiesand,ultimately,sustainability.
Competition for resources in the coastal zone and
divergentinstitutionalfactors,setagainstthebackdropof
climatechange,cantriggerandexacerbateconflictsover
naturalresources.10Attheirmostextreme,environmental
conflicts can escalate into violence, but often emerge as
nonviolent,yetdestructiveissuesthatimpedesocialequality
andsustainabledevelopment.11
SocialVulnerabilitiestoEcosystemChangeand
PotentialConflicts
BarnettandAdger12drawsignificantnegativefeedback
betweenincreasedhumandependenceonclimate-sensitive
formsofnaturalcapital(suchascoastalzones)asopposed
to economic and/or social capital, and exposure to risk
fromclimatechangeandtheabilitytoadapttochangesin
ecosystemgoodsandservices.CelliersandMackay13 link
therapidtransformationofSouthAfrica’scoastlinedirectly
tohumandependenceon thecoast’s relativelyuntapped
naturalcapital,thatis,“thenaturalcoastalenvironment…
[with]mostvaluableandmarketableassets”.Theyassert
thatkeyeconomicsectors–suchasmining–arebecoming
coastal dependent, and are severely exploiting and
degradingthenaturalresourcebase.Ecosystemdegradation
onacontinualandlong-termbasis–suchaspoor-quality
water supply, energy overuse with dependence on
non-renewablesupplies,andevenpoverty–couldincrease
society’sinabilitytocopewithclimatechange.Manyaspects
ofsuchecosystemdegradationareapartoflifeforlarger
society.
Green14arguesthattechnicallanguageusedbyscience
tocommunicateadaptation is lessaction-oriented,anda
middlegroundcanbefoundintheconceptof‘risk’asamore
effectivecommunicationstrategy(“riskofwhat?”,“riskto
whom?”and“riskwhen?”)whenidentifyingvulnerability
to climate change. Green expands: “Furthermore, ‘risk’
capturestheinherentlyuncertainnatureofthefuture,andis
widelygraspedbystakeholdersingovernment,theprivate
sectorandthepublic.”15
Cartwright16statesthatdirectrisksfromtheimpactsof
climatechangearenotbornebythepoor,asthelegacyof
apartheid’sspace-economywitnessesmuchofthecountry’s
coastalpropertyundertheownershipofaffluentpeopleand
localauthorities.Thelocalauthoritiesexperiencerisk,either
directlyorindirectly,as:
Shoreline erosion is a reality of climate change andimpactsSouthAfrica’scoastline.
COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES IN
THE COASTAL ZONE AND DIVERGENT
INSTITUTIONALFACTORS,SETAGAINST
THE BACKDROP OF CLIMATE CHANGE,
CAN TRIGGER AND ExACERBATE
CONFLICTSOVERNATURALRESOURCES
GE
TT
yIM
AG
ES
conflict trends I 25
• vulnerabilitytodirectphysicalimpacts,whichinvolves
risktoinfrastructure,amenities,propertyandlossof
humanlife,typicallymanifestingduringorinthehours
immediatelyafteranextremeevent;and
• vulnerability to indirect impacts, resulting from
biophysicalrisks,andsometimesastheresultofthe
biophysicalrisksonmarketsandgovernance–which
includestourismlosses,thereallocationofthefiscus
towards disaster relief at the expense of planned
development,higher insurancepremiums for costal
property,impactsonfisheriesandwithheldinvestment.
However,thevulnerabilityofthepoortoclimatechange
impacts(includingunderminingsecurity)manifestindirectly
through maladaptation, by way of access to housing,
insurance, mobility and migration, resource degradation
(particularly linked to the quantity and quality of water)
andlosstolivelihoods.Thisisalldisproportionatelyborne
bypoorpeople.Green17 identifieswaterasSouthAfrica’s
keyadaptationchallenge to climate change,highlighting
the detrimental impacts currently witnessed with water:
flooding,shortagesleadingtopowercuts,interruptionsto
suppliersofkeyinputsandincreasesinstakeholderconflict.
Furthermore,detrimentalimpactsrelatingtowateralready
suffered represent 88% of the South African average, as
comparedto39%globally.18
The combination of non-climatic stressors acting on
ecosystemssuchaspoverty, inequalitiesandinstitutional
weaknesses are significant in developing countries –
particularlyonthepoorwithinthesecountries–andcould
heighten social vulnerability and potential conflict under
conditions of climate change. Barnett and Adger19 draw
attention to the imminent interaction between climate
change,humansecurityandconflictby integrating three
keyaspectsofresearchonthevulnerabilityoflocalplaces
and social groups to climate change, on livelihoods and
conflict, and the role of the state in development and
peacemaking(seeTable1).Whattheauthorsfailtointegrate
are thegender implicationsofclimatechangeonsociety
andlivelihoods.Womeninsub-SaharanAfricahaveahigher
prevalenceofHIV/AIDSthanmen,and80%ofthe45million
refugeesarewomenandchildren.Inaddition,womenare
under-representedindecision-making,representtwo-thirds
of theworld’s illiterate,are increasinglybecomingheads
of households and are often more subject to violence.20
Women’s situations are often characterised by a lack of
factors affecting conflict Processes that climate change could affect/exacerbate
Vulnerablelivelihoods Climatechangeislikelytohavewidespreadimpactsonwateravailabilityincoastalregionsandfoodsecurity,andcauseextremeeventsanddiseases.Impactsonlivelihoodswillbesignificantamongst thepopulationwithhigh resourcedependency,and inmoreenvironmentallyandsociallymarginalisedareas.Someclimate-drivenimpactsarelong-termandchronic(decliningproductivityofagriculturalland),whileothersareepisodic(floods).
Poverty(relative/chronic/transitory)
Poverty (particularly relativedeprivation) isaffectedby thespatialdifferentiationofclimateimpactsandthesensitivityofplacestothem.Climatechangemaydirectlyincreaseabsolute,relativeandtransientpovertybyunderminingaccesstonaturalcapital.Itmayindirectlyincreasepovertythroughitseffectsonresourcesectorsandtheabilityofgovernmentstoprovidesocialsafetynets.Stresses fromclimatechangewilldifferentiallyaffect thosemadevulnerablebypolitical-economicprocesses.
Weakstates Theimpactsofclimatechangearelikelytoincreasethecostsofprovidingpublicinfrastructuresuch as water resources and services, and may decrease government revenues, therebydecreasinggovernmentcapacitiestoadaptandrespondtoclimatechange.
Migration Migration,inconjunctionwithpoliticallyinducedlossofsocio-economicopportunities,maybearesponseofpeoplewhoselivelihoodsareunderminedbyclimatechange,andmayincreasetheriskofconflictinhostcommunities.
Table1:TheRelationshipbetweenDeterminantsofHumanInsecurity,ConflictandClimateChange
Source:adaptedfromBarnettandAdger21
CLIMATE CHANGE IS NOW AN
ACCEPTED REALITy AND IS BEING
INCORPORATED INTO POLICIES IN
SOUTH AFRICA, ALBEIT FOCUSING
LARGELy ON MITIGATION (ENERGy
EFFICIENCy, POWER GENERATION,
SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORT, AND
WASTE MANAGEMENT) RATHER THAN
ADAPTATION
26 I conflict trends
controlor ownershipof, andaccess to, resources – and,hence,theyrepresentthemostvulnerableofthevulnerable.
Cumulatively,non-climatic stressorshave sensitisedclimate change agendas from being perceived as anenvironmental risk to becoming a growing threat todevelopmentandsustainability.Therelationshipbetweenthedeterminantsofhumaninsecurity,conflictandclimatechangehaveparticularsignificancetoSouthAfrica,whichisconstitutionallyarights-basedsocietyandalocalpartnerin theglobalcompactconcernedwithhumanrightsandsustainability;forexample,thePlanofImplementationandtheUnitedNationsMillenniumDeclaration.CelliersandMacKay22caution that thecurrentSouthAfricancoastalsocio-spatialstatusisunsustainable,wheredevelopmentforprogress (benefits for all) anddevelopment causingcommunalregression(benefittoaselectfewintheshortterm) are likely to accrue impacts for both present andfuturegenerations.
AdaptationtoClimateChangeAdaptationreferstotheabilityofasystem(ecological,
social or economic) to respond to actual or expectedclimate change impacts in order to mitigate potentialdamages and/or leverage opportunities. It necessitateschange in the processes, practices and structuresthat perpetuate the problems. Activities required forthe enhancement of adaptive capacity are essentiallyequivalenttothosepromotingsustainabledevelopment,including:23
• Economic wealth – There is a wide perception thatwealthycountries,withbettereconomicresources,arebetterpreparedtofitthecostsofadaptationtoclimatechange impacts and risks than poorer countries.24There is also evidence that poorer countries anddisadvantaged groups within them are especiallyvulnerabletodisasters.25
• Technology – Adaptive capacity is likely to vary,dependingonavailabilityandaccess to technology(warning systems,protective structures, settlementrelocation)atvariouslevelsandinallsectors.26
• Informationandskills–Thereneedstobeadequatecapacity to respond to climate change adaptation.Skills enable people to diversify livelihoods andoptions, thereby reducing their vulnerability. Thereneeds to be collaboration between science and theeconomicsofclimatechangeinadaptationplanning,andstakeholderparticipation isa requirement.Theawarenessandeducationofstakeholderstoimpactsofclimatechange,mitigationandadaptationiscrucial.
• Infrastructure–Thepoorsitingof infrastructurecancontributetoimpactsofclimatechange,suchastheerectionofartificialstructurestocombatsea-levelriseortheplanningofdevelopmentinsensitivelocations.Alackofnecessaryinfrastructure–suchasdrainage–canamplify impactssuchasflooding. Infrastructureincludesnaturalcapitalsuchasdunecordons,whichshould be maintained to buffer impacts of change.Furthermore, access to public infrastructure like
Waterisakeyadaptationchallengetoclimatechange.oneofthesignificantdetrimentalimpactsthatisexperiencedinSouthAfrica’scoastalareasisflooding.
GE
TT
yIM
AG
ES
conflict trends I 27
UN
PH
OT
O/B
WO
LFF
housingandtransportequipspeoplebettertoadapt
tochanges.
• Institutions–Ingeneral,countrieswithwell-developed
social institutions tend to have greater adaptive
capacity than those with less effective institutional
arrangements. The South African institutional and
policy environment indicates that a middle ground
needs to be identified between prioritising either
‘environment’ or ‘development’. Disclosure – by
government,institutionsandsectors–overthestate
ofnaturalresources,forexample,water,needstobe
evident. There is, furthermore, a lack of discussion
onbusinessasastakeholder inclimatechange.By
contributingtoclimatechange,businessispartofthe
problem–andalsopartofthesolution.Arecognition
oftheroleofbusinessasasourceoffinance,provider
ofsolutionsandthebearerofrisksisneeded.27
• Equity–Entitlementandaccesstoresourcesneedto
beequitablydistributed.Thebenefitsareimmediate
aswellaslongterm.
AccordingtoTheronandRossouw,28“locallyapplicable
methodstomitigatetheimpactsofclimatechangehaveto
bedevelopedurgentlytoquantifyrealisticallytheimpacts
along South Africa’s coast.” Furthermore, the authors
state that mitigation necessitates “an understanding of
theadaptationoptionsavailabletoSouthAfricansociety,
whichisconsiderablydifferentfromfirstworldapproaches
andstilllargelyundefined”.29
Conclusion
South Africa’s coastal zones reflect characteristics
that define both their value and vulnerability, which
challengesthenotionofdisaggregatingtheroleofclimate
change from other environmental, socio-economic and
political factors, if at all possible.Ecosystemsunderpin
socio-economicdevelopment;however,almostexclusive
relianceonecosystemsthataresubjecttoclimatechange
cancreaterisksfordevelopmentandexacerbateconflicts.
Thisarticleunderlinesthepremisethatwaterpresentsthe
biggestchallengetoclimatechangeadaptation.Green30
underscores the need to consider aspects such as the
geographyofwater,natureandsource,impactsonother
sectorsandstakeholders.Furthermore,whileasituation
analysis is readilyavailable, thereexistsa researchgap
onactualandperceivedvulnerabilitiestoclimatechange
impacts in the South African coastal context, and this
requiresmoredetailedandcontext-specificresearch.
Adaptation strategies are likely to be implemented
only if they are integrated with decisions that address
non-climaticstresses,andnecessitatetheinclusionofall
stakeholders.Burton31suggeststhefollowingfactorsfor
urgentaction-orientedadaptation:
• Climatechangecannotbetotallyavoided.
• Anticipatory and precautionary adaptation is more
effectiveandlesscostlythanlast-minute,emergency
adaptationorretrofitting.
• Climatechangemaybemorerapidandpronounced
than current estimates suggest, and unexpected
eventsarepossible.
• Immediate benefits can be gained from better
adaptationtoclimatevariabilityandextremes.
• Immediate benefits can be gained by removing
maladaptivepoliciesandpractices.
• Climatechangebringsopportunitiesaswellasthreats.
• Futurebenefitscanresultfromclimatechange.
Withregardtothelastthreepointsabove(immediate
andfuturebenefits),althoughclimatechangeexacerbates
impacts,itmayunderscorethesignificanceofadaptation
enough – and set the level of ambition higher within
institutionsandthepublic–tohelpavoiddamagefromfar
morethanextremeclimateevents.Forexample,preparing
foraonce-in-100-yearseventmeansthatpeopleareready
foraonce-in-10-yearsevent.32
Climatechangeislikelytohavewidespreadimpactsonwateravailabilityandfoodsecurity,incoastalregions.
28 I conflict trends
In order to endorse the welfare and livelihoods of
the poorest and most susceptible members of South
African society and mitigate potential conflicts, climate
adaptationstrategiescannotobviate fromaligningwith
equity goals – for example, by improving food security
and improving access to safe water and healthcare.
Astrategyis,therefore,requiredthatwillenabletheuseof
coastalresourcestotakeplaceinamannerwhichisboth
constitutionallydemocraticandessential.
DrFathimaAhmedisageographerwholecturesattheSchoolofEnvironmentalSciences,UniversityofKwaZulu-NatalinSouthAfrica.
Endnotes1 Celliers,L.andMacKay,F.(2005)‘CoastlineforSale:TheReal
Coast?’African Wildlife,59,Availableat:<http://www.wessa.org.za/publicationsAWLcoastline.asp>Accessedon:14October2006.
2 May(1998);McCarthyetal.(1998)citedinGlavovic,B.andBoonzaier,S.(2007)ConfrontingCoastalPoverty:BuildingSustainableCoastalLivelihoodsinSouthAfrica,ocean and Coastal Management,50,pp.1–23.
3 Roberts,D.(2008)‘ThinkingGlobally,ActingLocally–InstitutionalizingClimateChangeattheLocalGovernmentLevelinDurban,SouthAfrica’,Availableat:<http://eau.sagepub.com/content/20/2/521>Accessedon:2March2011.
4 Ibid.
5 Glavovic,B.andBoonzaier,S.(2007)op.cit.
6 UNDP(2006)Country Programs and Related Matters, Draft Country Program Document for South Africa (2007–2010),NewyorkSecondRegularSession.Newyork:UNDP.
7 DEAT(2000)The White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development in South Africa.Pretoria:GovernmentPrinter.
8 DEAT(2006)South African Environment outlook: A Report on the State of the Environment Report,Chapter7.Pretoria:DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairsandTourism.
9 Cartwright,A.(2008)‘CoastalVulnerabilityintheContextofClimateChange:ASouthAfricanPerspective’,Availableat:<http://www.90x2030.org.za/oid%5Cdownloads%sccoastal%20vulnerability%20South%20African%20perspective.pdf>Accessedon:2April2011.
10 Homer-Dixon(1994);Hellstrom(2001)citedinWhite,R.M.,Fischer,A.,Marshall,K.,Travis,J.M.J.,Webb,T.J.,DiFalco,S.,Redpath,S.M.andVanderWal,R.(2009)DevelopinganIntegratedConceptualFrameworktoUnderstandBiodiversityConflicts.Land use Policy,26,pp.242–253.
11 Woodroffeetal.(2005)citedinWhite,R.M.,Fischer,A.,Marshall,K.,Travis,J.M.J.,Webb,T.J.,DiFalco,S.,Redpath,S.M.andVanderWal,R(2009)op.cit.
12 Barnett,J.andAdger,W.N.(2007)ClimateChange,HumanSecurityandViolentConflict.Political Geography,26,pp.639–655.
13 Celliers,L.andMacKay,F.(2005)op.cit.
14 Green,V.(2011)TheSouthAfricanBusinessResponsetoClimateChangeMitigationandAdaptation.WIOMSAConference,23March2011,Mauritius.
15 Ibid.
16 Cartwright,A.(2008)op.cit.
17 Green,V.(2011)op.cit.
18 Ibid.
19 Barnett,J.andAdger,W.N.(2007)op.cit.
20 Murray,S.andStewart,M.(2002)Gender, Population and the Environment: Finding Common Ground for Coastal Managers.RhodeIsland,USA:Intercoast.
21 Barnett,J.andAdger,W.N.(2007)op.cit.
22 Celliers,L.andMacKay,F.(2005)op.cit.
23 Smit,B.,Pilifosova,O.,Burton,I.,Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,R.,yohe,G.,Adger,N.,Downing,T.andHarvey,E.(2001)AdaptationtoClimateChangeintheContextofSustainableDevelopmentandEquity.InMcCarthy,J.J.,Canziani,O.,Leary,N.A.,Dokken,D.J.andWhite,K.S.(eds)Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,p.893.
24 Goklany(1995);Burton(1996)citedinSmit,B.,Pilifosova,O.,Burton,I.,Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,R.,yohe,G.,Adger,N.,Downing,T.andHarvey,E.(2001)op.cit.,p.896.
25 Banuri(1998);Munasinghe(2000)citedinSmit,B.,Pilifosova,O.,Burton,I.,Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,R.,yohe,G.,Adger,N.,Downing,T.andHarvey,E.(2001)op.cit.,p.896.
26 Burton(1996)citedinSmit,B.,Pilifosova,O.,Burton,I.,Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,R.,yohe,G.,Adger,N.,Downing,T.andHarvey,E.(2001)op.cit.,p.896.
27 Green,V.(2011)op.cit.
28 Theron,A.andRossouw,M.(2008)‘AnalysisofPotentialCoastalZoneClimateChangeImpactsandPossibleResponseOptionsintheSouthernAfricanRegion’,Availableat:<http://researchspace.csir.co.za/dspace/bitstream/10204/2561/1/Theron_2008.pdf>Accessedon:2April2011.
29 Ibid.
30 Green,V.(2011)op.cit.
31 Burton(1996)citedinSmit,B.,Pilifosova,O.,Burton,I.,Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,R.,yohe,G.,Adger,N.,Downing,T.andHarvey,E.(2001)op.cit.,p.891.
32 Ibid.
conflict trends I 29
Introduction
Whilescepticsandalarmistswaste timeoverwhether
humansareresponsibleforclimatechange,wehavebeen
presentedwithstrongevidencethatourworldwillexperience
arangeofpositiveandnegativeclimaticeffectswhichwill
affectthelivesofmillions.Someregionswillbecomedryer,
withmore rapiddesertification;otherswillgetwetterand
warmer,improvingconditionsandextendingplantingseasons.
The effects of climate change – droughts, desertification,
precipitationchangesandotherweatherevents–especially
affectsocietieswherepeopledependontheenvironmentto
makealivingandwheretheylackthecapacitytocope,prevent
oradapttosuddenorslower,systematicchanges.InAfrica,
andespeciallysub-SaharanAfrica,wheretheenvironment
is the main source of livelihood for the poor, conflicts –
related to theenvironmentandother socio-economicand
political factors – are common. It is likely, therefore, that
additional environmental stress factors brought about by
climatic changes will exacerbate conflicts or lead to new
ones.1Practitionersandpolicymakersinthefieldsofconflict
resolution,peacebuilding,developmentandadaptation, to
name a few, should therefore develop measures to assist
Africancommunities topreventandmitigateenvironment
andotherrelatedconflictsandtocreateconditionsforstability
andpeace.
This article makes two arguments. First, given the
complexity of conflicts and climate–conflict linkages the
UN
PH
OT
O/B
WO
LFF
addressing Climate-related ConfliCt: human seCurity and lessons from the southern sahelian belt of sudanBySALoméBRoNKHoRST
Above:Theeffectsofclimatechangeespeciallyaffectsocietieswherepeopledependontheenvironment tomakealiving.
30 I conflict trends
AC
CO
RD
FILE/S
ALO
Mé
BR
ON
KH
OR
ST
resultantneedforinterdisciplinaryhumansecurityapproaches,
with theirwiderapplicability,maybeparticularly suitable
forresearch,policydevelopmentandpracticalintervention.
Second,byapplyingarevisedhumansecurityframeworkin
astudyofinterventionsbynon-governmentalorganisations
(NGOs)thataddressenvironmentalconflictsinthesouthern
SahelianbeltofSudan,potentiallessonsforclimatechange
adaptationpolicyandconflictresolutionhavebeenidentified.
Thisarticlefocusesononeofthehighlightsfromthatstudy,
andarguesthattheuseoftraditionalconflictresolution(TCR)
mechanismsreducevulnerabilityandimprovehumansecurity
inthesouthernSahelianbeltofSudan–and,therefore,may
contributetotheresolutionoffutureclimate-relatedconflicts.
Areportoftheaforementionedstudywillbepublishedby
theAfricanCentrefortheConstructiveResolutionofDisputes
(ACCORD)in2011.Thestudywasdrivenbythepremisethat
important lessons for addressing climate-related conflicts
maybeidentifiedfrominterventionsinenvironment-related
conflicts.Inthereport(andthisarticle),‘climatechange’refers
tonaturalchangesinclimateovertime,orchangesinclimate
thatresultfromhumanactivity.‘Environmentalchange’refers
toclimatechangeanditseffectsontheenvironmentand/orto
nonclimate-relatedchangesintheenvironmentasaresultof
humanactivity–suchasdeforestation.
The study focuses on the southern Sahelian belt that
stretchesacrossAfricaandacrossSudan–inparticular,the
semi-arid state of Southern Kordofan and its neighbours.
Thisgeographicalareaispotentiallyrelevantforidentifying
howmeasurestoresolveenvironment-relatedconflictscan
beapplied inotherareas,whereclimatechangeimpacts–
drought, desertification, water scarcity, competition over
grazing and pasture – can contribute to conflict. These
Sahelianareashavealreadyexperiencedclimaticchanges,2
historicalenvironmentalstressessuchasdesertification,and
competitionbetweenfarmersandpastoralistsoverwaterand
arablelandforgrazingandfarming.Theconflictdynamics,
coping and conflict resolution mechanisms communities
havedeveloped,andongoingworkbycivil societyacross
the Sahelian belt of Sudan to address such conflicts may
provide us with a wealth of new knowledge and lessons,
applicableforresolvingclimate-relatedconflicts.Theresearch
focusedonconflictsbetweenandwithinpastoralandfarmer
groups where climate and environmental factors are key
conflict drivers. The approach taken, therefore, is that we
SouthernKordofanisasemi-aridstateanddesertificationisanotableenvironmentalstress.
conflict trends I 31
may not know which climate and environmental changes
areanthropogenicornot,but theconflicts thatstemfrom
themprovide instructiveexamplesof theirsocial,political,
economic and other impacts; and what has worked in
resolvingsuchconflicts.
HumanSecurity
Although environmental change is not a new
phenomenon, the likely scale, suddenness and depth of
changespredictedandtheireffectsareunprecedented.Our
existingtoolsandsolutionsmayverywellnotbeabletocope
withorbesuitablefortheadditionalcomplexity–especially
atalocallevel,wheretheimpactsofclimatechangewillbe
felt first.Moreover, themagnified impactsandeffectswill
givemoreprominencetosecurityandothermultidisciplinary
dimensionsofclimatechange.Also,thereisalreadybroad
consensusthattheenvironmentandclimatecancontributeto
conflict–orbeanunderlyingtrigger–butthatitwillrarely
betheonlyvariableinquestion,increasingthecomplexity.In
response,weneedapproachesthatwillhelpindividualsand
communitiescope,preventoradapttoclimatechange,and
whichtakeintoconsiderationeachuniqueandcomplexsocio-
economic,political,culturalandstructuralcontext.
Human security approaches help us deal with these
complexitiesandchallengesbyprovidingamultidisciplinary
and normative approach that considers ‘hard security’
(monopolyovertheuseofforceandmilitarypower),butalso
humandevelopmentandwell-being.Therefore,itmaybean
idealapproachtoprevent,analyseandinterveneincomplex
conflictsrelatedtoclimatechange.Givenprominencebythe
UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) in1994,
human security refers to “the security of individuals and
communities,expressedasboth‘freedomfromfear’[broadly,
security]and‘freedomfromwant’[broadly,development]”.3
Itmovesbeyondtraditionalhardsecuritytoincludepolitical
security (humanrights, theruleof law)andsocialsecurity
(alternatives, such as economic and social safety nets or
development).4Byplacingagreaterfocusonthesecurityof
individualsratherthanthestate,theUNDPproposedthatthe
scopeofsecurityshouldbebroadenedtoincludeseventhreats
toanindividualorcommunity’shumansecurity–economic,
food,personal,environment,health,communityandpolitical
security.
HumansecurityisalsoparticularlyappropriateforAfrica.
Climatechangeaside,Africanshaveexperiencedanentire
range of social, economic, political, environmental and
ThegrasslandsinSouthSudanareburnedseasonallybypastoraliststobringonaflushofgreengrassfortheircattle.
GE
TT
yIM
AG
ES
32 I conflict trends
culturalhardshipsasaresultofinterstateandintrastatewars,
environmental degradation, poor governance, economic
uncertainty, inequalityandamyriadotherglobal,national
andlocalreasons.Humansecurity’swiderapplicabilityand
broaderfocusis,therefore,particularlyappropriateforsuch
complexity,which isexacerbatedby theeffectsofclimate
change,andbytheuncertaintyaroundthefutureimpactsof
climatechange.Moreover,humansecurityisalsocompatible
withthenaturalhumanismtraditionofAfrica,whichfocuses
onphilosophiesthatechohumansecurity–suchasmental,
physicalandspiritualhealth;foodandenvironmentalsecurity;
protectionfromcriminalandexternalthreats;andaccessto
socialandcommunityservices.5
That said, human security as an approach to security
hasgainedsignificantmomentumover theyears,buthas
alsoelicitedcriticismfromnumerousresearchersindifferent
fields, including security and development practitioners
and feminists.6 Many argue that the academic and policy
communitiesstill lack rigorous tools foranalysisand that,
althoughhumansecurity’swideapplicability isuseful ina
numberofissues,thesheernumberofthreatsorvariables
required toaccount for theseven threatsproposedby the
UNDP,limittheapplicabilityandaffecttherigourofhuman
security.Othershaveworkedtonarrowtheconcepttomakeit
moreworkableandrigorous,7withmostresearchersseeking
toreducethenumberofvariablesorthreats,andintroducing
different indicators and frameworks to operationalise the
conceptbetter.
The ‘deprivation–vulnerability’ approach, proposed
by Busumtwi-Sam, is a framework to operationalise a
development-oriented approach to human security that
establishesclearresearchandpolicypriorities.8Byproviding
a narrower conceptualisation of human security, the
approachaddressestheinherentweaknessesofthebroader
conceptualisation.Itmakesaconceptualdistinctionbetween
humandevelopmentandhumansecurityand,asa result,
highlights the usefulness of the human security concept.
Theauthorargues that,whilehumansecurityandhuman
development are discrete, they are mutually reinforcing.
Humandevelopmentisalonger-termprocessthatworksto
improvehealthandwell-being,livelihoods,dignity,survival,
safety and knowledge, for example. Human security is a
conditionthatexpressesthe“relativepresence/absence(or
increase/decrease)of contingencies that threatenphysical
AC
CO
RD
FILES
/SA
LOM
éB
RO
NK
HO
RS
T
AyoungpastoralistcarriesanAK-47rifle.ConflictbetweenpastoralistsandfarmersoverwaterandarablelandforgrazingandfarmingiscommonintheSahelianregion.
conflict trends I 33
andpsychosocialharmsaffectinghumandignity,livelihoods,
safety, survival and health and well-being in the political,
economic,socio-culturalandecologicalcontextswithinwhich
processesofhumandevelopment takeplace”.9 In simpler
terms,human(in)security isastate,determinedbythreats
thatcancauseharm,butthosethreatscanonlyharmifthe
uniquecontextapersonfindthemselvesindoesnotprovide
themwiththemeans/abilitytocopewithormitigatethethreat.
Whether thatperson is inastateofsecurityor insecurity,
therefore, depends on a minimum threshold of ‘dignity,
safety/survival,healthandwell-beingand livelihood’.The
authorarguesthatthresholdswilleffectivelybedetermined
bytheinstitutions(governments,internationalorganisations
andNGOs,forinstance)addressingtheissueofhuman(in)
securityatthatpointintime.Theunderlyinglogicofthisis
thatthesamethreatindifferentcontextsmayleadpeopleto
experiencedifferentstatesofeithersecurityorinsecurity.
The deprivation–vulnerability approach thus considers
threats, deprivations and exclusions, and vulnerability. In
the study and this article, ‘environmental threats’ refer to
theimpactsofclimaticand/orenvironmentalchange–such
as water scarcity, droughts, desertification – and includes
competitionoverlandforgrazingandfarming,andhuman-
inducedchanges suchasdeforestation. ‘Deprivationsand
exclusions’refertodevelopmentindicatorsandotherforms
ofhorizontalorverticalinequalities–includingpoverty,social
exclusion,marginalisation,alackoflivelihoodalternatives,
andsoon.‘Vulnerability’herehasbeendefinedasaperson
orgroup’s ‘exposure,sensitivityandresilience’toathreat,
inthecontextofdeprivationsandexclusions.Vulnerability
isessentiallythelikelihoodofsufferingharmfromaspecific
threatinthecontextofparticulardeprivationsandexclusions.
FindingsandRecommendations
Thisframeworkofanalysiswasappliedtotheworkoflocal
andinternationalNGOsthatresolveclimate-andenvironment-
relatedconflict.Theoutcomesfromthestudyhighlightthat
NGO projects which focus on addressing vulnerabilities,
deprivations and exclusions, and environmental threats,
improve human security and, therefore, may prevent or
mitigateconflicts.Giventhecomplexityofconflicts,projects
rarelyfocusononeelementofhumaninsecurity.Therefore,
asuccessfulinterventionmaybetheresultofdifferentproject
elements working concurrently and at different scales to
improvehumansecurity.Thefindingsarediscussedindetail
intheaforementionedreport.Theremainderofthisarticlewill
focusononeofthekeyfindingsfromthestudy:thepotential
utilityofTCRmethodsinresolvingclimate-relatedconflicts.
However,itwouldbeinstructivetoconsidersomeoftheother
findingsofthestudybriefly.
First,someNGOsinthestudyareasuccessfullyaddress
environmentalconflictsandhumaninsecuritybyintervening
directlyatthe‘threat’level.Inotherwords,ifwaterscarcity
is identifiedas thekeyconflictdriver,NGOprojectsmay
employanumberofstrategiestoaddressthisthreat–for
instance, by drawing on innovative technologies and by
creating alternative water sources along livestock routes
and near farms. Others may draw on natural resource
management approaches to improve the management
of the resource,bybuilding thecapacityof communities
AC
CO
RD
FILE/S
ALO
Mé
BR
ON
KH
OR
ST
“Hafir”istheSudanesenameforawaterreservoir,whichisdesignedtostorewaterrunoffafterarainyseason.
34 I conflict trends
or providing funding and technical expertise or support
to local government, to address the threat directly. An
exampleofthis isa ‘WaterforPeace’project inSouthern
Kordofan,whichworkswithcommunitiesandgovernment
toensureenhancedaccesstosafeandadequatewaterfor
human and animal consumption, to reduce the conflict
betweenpastoralistsandfarmers.Thisisdoneindifferent
ways: the project provides affordable water at strategic
points along the livestock routes, and works towards
separating water sources for humans and livestock,
easing congestion and preventing conflict by creating
alternativewatersourcesinareasofhighdemand.Italso
provides capacity and funding to the local government
water committee to restore and maintain artesian wells.
As noted before, these projects are not undertaken in
isolation fromothers thataddressother formsofhuman
insecurity.Infact,theWaterforPeaceprojectalsofocuses
on reducing vulnerabilities, deprivations and exclusions.
By disseminating environmental and health messages,
supplementedwithindigenousknowledge,andbybuilding
toiletsandteachingpeoplehowtobuildthemcheaply,the
overallhealthandwell-beingofcommunitiesareimproved,
aswellastheirwaterresources. Ineachvillage,about20
households are supported by the project to construct
toilets,andoneselectioncriterioniseconomic:thepoorest
households – including those that are female-headed –
getpriority.
Approaches for reducingdeprivationsandexclusions
arisefromthe‘development’aspectofhumansecurity,and
appeartobeimportantadditionalelementstoprojectsthat
addressenvironmental conflict. For instance, someNGO
projectsalsofocusonthecreationofalternativelivelihoods,
byteachingwomenhowtoprocessandsellmilkproducts,
orbytrainingmalemembersofcommunitiesasparavets.
Bycreatingalternatives,NGOsaimtoreducecompetition
overscarceresources,addresspovertyand,thus,improve
humansecurity. InaprojectinGedarifstate,forinstance,
onestrategyforresolvingenvironmentalconflictsinvolves
addressingdeforestationandthevulnerabilityofwomenby
introducingbutanegasforcooking.Thecommunitieswere
involvedinthedesign,implementationandmonitoringof
thebutanegasproject,andaprojecttostartaseedbank.
Boththeseprojectsrequiredaninitialoutlayoffunds,inthe
formofmicrocreditprovidedbytheNGOtoindividualswho,
oncetheyreceivedanincome,thenpaidbackthemoneyor
seedsthatwereloaned.
TraditionalConflictResolution(TCR)
Inanotherapproach,NGOsreducevulnerability,improve
humansecurityandcontributetotheresolutionofconflicts
bybuildingthecapacityofcommunitiesandgovernmentto
resolveenvironment-relatedconflicts.Tothisend,another
element of successful NGO interventions in conflicts
involvesthereintroductionofTCRmechanisms,andtheir
enhancementorsupplementationwithmodernparticipatory
methods.
In the past, TCR and customary land tenure systems
prevented and mitigated conflicts between pastoralists
andfarmersinSudan.Sadly,however,thedrawn-outcivil
warandsmallarmsproliferation,andgreatercompetition
over more scarce resources and ever larger herds, have
increased the stakes in conflict and have led to some
erosion of TCR methods.10 These methods have been
underminedfurtherbycompetingmodernandtraditional
legal systems, the inevitable rise of modernity, and the
weakeningofcustomarymediationbythegovernmentand
politicalinterestgroups.11Thenativeauthority,forinstance,
although recently reinstated, was absent for 20 years
andpresentlysuffers froma lackofhumanand financial
resources,“undermin[ing]itspositioninthepeople’sminds
andsentiments... in20yearsofitsabsencetheworldhas
A Sudanese woman uses a Water Roller for easy andefficientcarryingofwater.
NGO PROJECTS WHICH FOCUS ON
ADDRESSING VULNERABILITIES,
DEPRIVATIONSANDExCLUSIONS,AND
ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS, IMPROVE
HUMAN SECURITy AND, THEREFORE,
MAyPREVENTORMITIGATECONFLICTSU
NP
HO
TO
/ALB
ER
TG
ON
ZA
LEZ
FAR
RA
N
conflict trends I 35
changedandnativeauthoritiesneedtoupgradetheirhuman
capabilities and technical capacities to match the new
realitiesofconflictanditsresolution.”12
In Southern Kordofan, however, NGO projects that
reintroduceTCRwhileenhancingorsupplementingTCRwith
modernparticipatorymethods,reportsuccess inresolving
environmentalconflict.ByemployingTCRinGoodiya–the
local formofmediation–whileenhancing thiscustomary
methodwithconflicttreeanalysesandparticipatoryaction
plandevelopment,conflictsrelatedtotheenvironmentare
often successfully resolved. Despite the reported decline
in popularity, customary mediation or Goodiya is used
extensively in Southern Kordofan to resolve climate- and
environment-relatedconflictsbetweenandwithinpastoral
and farmer groups. For example, with the assistance and
fundingofinternationalorganisations,theSouthernKordofan
stategovernmentusuallyfacilitatesreconciliationconferences
to resolve major conflicts – most of which have a strong
environmental dimension. In working to resolve conflict
relatedtowaterscarcityandalackoflandforgrazingbetween
theGawamaa,SebeihatandBaggaratribes inGargur,one
NGO employed Goodiya – but used modern participatory
techniques to strengthen this TCR mechanism. The
participatorytechniqueshelpedcommunitiestodistinguish
betweenandagreeonrootconflictcauses,coreproblemsand
effects;tostartadialogue;andtorealisethatcollaboration
wouldleadtoconflictresolution.Techniquesusedincluded
conflictmapping,atimelineofeventsandaconflicttree13–
which reportedly, when drawn by conflicting parties and
compared,showedbothpartieshowtheirperceptionsofa
conflictdiffered.Then,duringthenegotiationstage,thetwo
communitieschoseacommitteeandachairmanthattheyfelt
representedthemfairlytomediate.Fromthispoint,alocal
formofGoodiyawasused.Finally,anagreementacceptable
tobothpartieswasreached,andsignedbyrepresentativesof
thetwoparties.14
AnotherorganisationutilisestheParticipatoryActionPlan
Development(PAPD)asaconsensus-buildingvehicle in its
worktoresolveenvironmentalconflicts.PAPDcombineswith
GoodiyaandAjaweed(mediators),andisdeemedparticularly
usefulinNorthDarfur,wherewatersecurityforgrazingand
pastureisakeyissue.ThePAPDcomplementstheAjaweedto
reduceresourceconflicts,andassistsinsensitisationandthe
developmentofmeasurestoimplementAjaweeddecisions.
ThesixstagesofPAPDinclude:
1. preparation(collectionofgoodbackgroundknowledge);
2. problemcensusandproblemprioritisation(bydifferent
groups);
3. informationgatheredaboutrelevantproblems;
4. analysisbythecommunitytoidentifypossiblesolutions;
5. consultation of the wider community for input; and
finally,
6. developmentandimplementationofanactionplan.
As a tool used by governments and communities to
resolvefutureclimate-relatedconflicts,TCRhasthepotential
toreducevulnerabilityandimprovehumansecurity.Itmay
beespeciallyeffectiveifusedalongsidemeasurestoaddress
GoodiyaGoodiya(alsoJudiya/Judiyya)isusedtoresolveconflictsinmanypartsofSudanbyanAjawi(singular,mediator)or
Ajaweed(mediators).AformofcustomarymediationorTCR,Goodiyaintheformofreconciliationconferencesorcouncils,
forinstance,isusedtoresolvemajorconflictsamongsttribes.Ajaweed(mediators)areinvolved,whocallonconcerned
parties,somedignitariesandtriballeadersinareconciliationconference.Theconferencesuggestssolutionsthatsatisfy
bothparties.Ifagreementsarenotreached,otherpeopleareinvited“whoareknownfortheirwisdom,foresightedness
(sic)andtheabilitytofindsuitablesolutionsfortheproblems.Inmostcases,suchconflictsrarelyreachtheofficialchannels
ofconflictresolution.Thisisduetothegeneralconventionthatitisshamefultoletoutsidersinterfereinlocalaffairs.”15
Minorconflictsarenormallyresolvedbythevillagesheikhswho,forcasessuchascropdamage,may,forexample,
determinetheamountofcropdamageandthecompensationrequired.GoodiyaisbasedontheKoranandtheteachingsof
ProphetMohammed,andmediatorscanbepersonsofhighstandinginthecommunity,suchasvillageorreligiousleaders.
Themediationusuallyinvolvesanumberofsteps:
1. expressionofmutualforgivenessbybothparties;
2. examplesofconflictresolutionfromtheperspectiveoftheKoranarehighlighted;
3. adiscussionbyeachofthepartiesoftheirsideofthestory;
4. awayforwardisproposedbythemediatoranddiscussed;and
5. themediationisthenconcludedbyareadingfromtheKoran.16
Aspartoftheprocess,themediatorswilldividethemselvesinto‘doves’and‘hawks’.Thedovesaretheonesthatworkto
createpeace,byencouragingpartiestoforgiveandforget,makefriendlyorsymbolicgestures,andprovideexamplesof
peacefulcoexistenceinthepast–withconsiderablereferencestotheKoran,Sudaneseproverbsandevenexplaininghow
feudscanaffecttheafterlife.Thehawksaretheenforcers–theonesthathighlightthedrawbacksorrepercussionsofnot
acceptingtherulingoftheAjaweed.17
36 I conflict trends
otherformsofhumaninsecuritythatcontributetoaconflict–
such as environmental threats, and deprivations and
exclusions.Sudan’srichhistoryofTCRwithmanyremote
andtradition-boundcommunitiesmeansthatincorporating
TCR methods in conflict-sensitive climate adaptation
planningforSudan is likely toreceivesupport fromstate
and federal government, communities and other actors.
Thatsaid,therearealsothosewhoarguethatgovernment-
sponsoredmediationstoresolvemajorconflictsinSudan
maybepronetomanipulationbygovernmentandothers,
and may exacerbate conflict. The Sudanese government
thushasakeyrole toplay insupportingandsponsoring
TCRmeasures–if itcanremainimpartialandensurethat
ethnicandpoliticalrivalriesdonotderailtheprocess.For
the resolution of present environment-related conflicts
betweenpastoralistsandfarmers,andto improvehuman
securityandpreventfutureconflicts,investmentshouldbe
madebythefederalandSouthernKordofangovernments,
and international funders, to strengthen existing conflict
resolutionmechanismsandsecuretheir legitimacy,while
improvingcoordinationbetweendifferentconflictresolution
institutions thatoperateat local,stateand federal levels.
This should be done as part of Sudan’s climate change
adaptation agenda, and as part of regional cooperation
initiatives,giventhecross-bordernatureofpastoralismin
theHornofAfrica.
Moreover,withoutdealingwithotherformsofhuman
insecurity,itislikelythatTCRmechanismsmaytemporarily
haltconflict,butnotresolvethem–hence,thereisaneed
formultiprongedapproachestodealwithhumaninsecurity
in the complex context of climate change. For climate
changeconflicts, further research isneededonhowTCR
methodscouldbeenhancedbymodernmethodsandvice
versa,withoutlosingthespiritandlegitimacyofTCR.The
useofTCRinotherenvironmentalconflictsshouldalsobe
analysed,withaviewtodeterminingtheconditionsinwhich
certainTCRmechanismsmaybemoreusefulthanothersfor
resolvingclimate-relatedconflict.
Conclusion
Thecomplexityof climateandenvironmental conflict
dynamicsrequiresapproachesthatareabletomakesense
of the unique impacts of climate change on individuals
andcommunities,andprovidetoolsforpolicy-makersand
practitionerstorespondtosuchconflicts.Thedeprivation–
vulnerability approach to human security provides a
Themisseriyacommunityingolehvillage,Sudan,listentoaNgokDinkatraditionalcommunityleaderadvocatingforpeacefulco-existencebetweenthemisseriyaandtheirDinkaneighboursontheroutetheyshareinsearchofpastureandwater.
UN
PH
OT
O/FR
ED
NO
y
conflict trends I 37
framework that takes account of this complexity, but
reconceptualises human security by considering threats,
deprivations and exclusions, and vulnerability. This
approach,whichwasappliedinSudan,yieldedinteresting
findings18 and shows real potential for the study and
preventionoffutureclimate-relatedconflicts.Moreover, theworkofNGOs toaddress climate- and
environment-relatedconflict inthesouthernSahelianbeltemphasisesthatprojectsthatfocusonaddressinghumaninsecuritymaysuccessfullyresolvesuchconflicts.Projectsthatfocusonaddressingthreatstohumansecurity–orwhichaddressvulnerability,deprivationsandexclusions–reportthatenvironmentalconflictsaresuccessfullyresolvedintheshorttomediumterm.Thisarticlehighlighted,forinstance,thepotentialutilityofTCRmechanismstoaddresspresentenvironment-related and possible future climate-relatedconflictsinSudan.IncontextswhereTCRenjoyslegitimacyandissupportedbyotherinstitutionalframeworks,itmaycontribute to the resolution of environmental conflicts.However,customarymechanismshavebecomeerodedovertime,andalthoughtheycontinuetobewidelyusedinSudan,their efficacy is sometimes questioned. Enhancing TCRmethodsbysupplementingthemwithmodernparticipatoryapproachesallowssuchTCRmechanismstobestrengthenedandtocontributetotheresolutionofenvironmentalconflicts.Otherapproaches topreventandmitigateenvironmentalconflicts involve intervening inenvironmental threats,oraddressingdeprivationsandexclusions.
When considering conflict-sensitive climate changeadaptations, these findings highlight that solutions toenvironmentalconflictsarerarelysimpleandusuallyneedtobecontext-specificiftheyaregoingtobesuccessful.Thefindingsalsoemphasisethatdifferentapproachestoaddresshuman insecuritywillbesuccessful indifferentcontexts.Therefore,inthestudyarea,NGOprojectsoftenemployamixtureof elements thataddress threats, vulnerabilities,deprivations and exclusions, with priorities determinedbythecontext.Therearethosewhowouldarguethatthisuncertaintyispreciselywhyhumansecurityapproachesarenotuseful–moresogiventhateveryelementofinterventioncanthenbeseenasaddressinghumaninsecurity,andthatit is impossible todeterminewhich interventionwas theonethat ‘resolved’theconflict.Admittedly,foracademicsseeking to find direct causality between a specific setof human security indicators and conflict, this may beproblematic.However,forpolicymakersandpractitioners,the NGO projects themselves provide the answers, byaccommodating and tending to this uncertainty in theirprojectandprogrammedevelopment.Organisations thatreport success in resolving environment-related conflictunderstand theconflictswithwhich theyaredealing, theunderlying issues and the environment in which theyoperate.Theyavoidover-simplifyingconflicts,andthislikelycontributestotheirsuccess.Humansecurity-relatedanalysesandinterventionsmay,thus,betheidealapproachtopreventandresolvepresentandfutureclimate-andenvironment-related conflicts. This approach certainly deservesfurtherreflection.
Salomé Bronkhorst is a Senior Researcher in theKnowledgeProductionDepartmentatACCoRD.
Endnotes1 Nordås,R.andGleditsch,N.(2007)ClimateChangeandConflict.
Political Geography,26,pp.627–638;Barnett,J.andAdger,W.N.(2007)ClimateChange,HumanSecurityandViolentConflict.Political Geography,26,pp.639–655.
2 Saeed,A.(2009a)Study to Assess FactorsContributing to Conflict among Pastoralists, Agro-Pastoralists and Sedentary Farmers: Stage I Report.EgisBceomInternationalandSudanMinistryofAnimalResourcesandFisheries.AlsoseeGlobalEnvironmentalFacility(2007)Least Developed Countries Fund: Project Identification Form for Sudan,Availableat:<http://207.190.239.143/uploadedFiles/Focal_Areas/Climate_Change__%28PDF_DOC%29/LDCF1/Sudan%20-%20LDCF-PIF-Implementing%20NAPA%20Priority-REV.pdf>Accessedon:14February2010.
3 Kaldor,M.,Martin,M.andSelchow,S.(2007)HumanSecurity:ANewStrategicNarrativeforEurope.International Affairs,83:2.
4 Hutchful,E.(2008)FromMilitarytoHumanSecurity.InAkokpari,J.etal.(eds)The African union and its Institutions.AucklandPark:JacanaMedia,pp.63–81.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 See,forexample,HumanSecurityCommission(2003);Busumtwi-Sam(2008);HumanSecurityResearchUnit(2006);KingandMurray(2001).
8 Busumtwi-Sam,J.(2007)ContextualisingHumanSecurity:A‘Deprivation-vulnerability’Approach.Policy and Society,27,pp.15–28.Refertoarticleformorein-depthdiscussion.
9 Ibid.
10 AliSiddiq,E.F.,El-Harizi,K.andPrato,B.(2007)Managing Conflict over Natural Resources in Greater Kordofan, Sudan: Some Recurrent Patterns and Governance Implications.Availableat:<http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/42402/2/ifpridp00711.pdf>Accessedon:8February2011.
11 Mohammed,A.A.(2002)IntergroupConflictsandCustomaryMediation.African Journal on Conflict Resolution,2(2).Seethisarticleforanin-depthdiscussionofcustomarymediationinSudan,theroleofthegovernmentinunderminingthistraditionalmechanism,howtostrengthenitandtheapplicabilityofitelse-whereinAfricaandbeyond.
12 Wadi,E-T.I.,ElHillo,M.andHadi,M.B.(2005)Resource-based Conflict and Mechanism of Conflict Resolution in North Kordofan, Gedarif and Blue Nile States.Khartoum:SudanEnvironmentalConservationSociety,p.35.
13 The‘conflicttree’isaparticipatoryapproachwhereatreewithroots,atrunkandbranchesaredrawn.Theparticipantsshoulddecidewhichissuesaretheultimatecausesofaconflict(thesearetheroots).Thebranchesaretheimpactsorresultsoftheconflict,whilethetrunkdescribesthequalitiesoftheconflict(forexample:violent,mayinvolvesmallarms,andsoon).
14 Egeimi,O.,Mahmood,M.A.andAhmed,A.S.(2003)ConflictTransformation:PastoralistsandSettledFarmers.Compass Magazine,pp.22–23.
15 Wadi,E-T.I.,ElHillo,M.andHadi,M.B.(2005)op.cit.
16 Egeimi,O.,Mahmood,M.A.andAhmed,A.S.(2003)op.cit.
17 Mohamed,A.A.(2002)op.cit.
18 Theapproachalsohaditslimitations,asoutlinedinAnnex1ofthereporttobepublishedbyACCORDin2011.
38 I conflict trends
addressing CharCoal ProduCtion, environmental degradation and Communal violenCe in somalia: the use of solar Cookers in bander beyla1
BySHUKRIADINI
Introduction
Since 1990, Somalia has experienced statelessness,
compounded with armed violence that has led to a high
unemploymentrate.Butanotherkindofwarisgoingonin
Somalia–onethatisbeingwagedagainstthealreadyfragile
environment.Thiswarinvolvesthedestructionofacaciatrees
toproducecharcoalforthelocalandinternationalmarket.
Since thecollapseof theSomali state,a largenumberof
unemployedmenhavemadetheirlivelihoodfromcharcoal
production. In the absence of government environmental
regulation and protection, acacia trees are cut and burnt
onalargescaleforcharcoal,leadingtothedegradationof
Somalia’snatural resources.Due topoverty,unemployed
Above:Charcoal,whichisreferredtoasdhuxulinSomali,hasbeenthemaincookingenergyusedbymillionsofhouseholdsinSomaliaforcenturies.
UN
PH
OT
O/S
OP
HIA
PAR
IS
conflict trends I 39conflict trends I 39
youngmenaswellasoldermen–desperatetosurviveand
feedtheirfamilies–areforcedtoengageinthisbusiness.
Charcoalproductionasalivelihoodhasledtoenvironmental
destruction–andevendeath.
The firstsectionof thisarticlediscusses theeffectsof
charcoalproductionontheenvironment,itsdirectandindirect
contributionstoviolence,anditsoveralleffectonthehealth
ofwomenandgirlsinwar-tornSomalia.Thesecondpartof
thisarticlediscussesasolarcookerprojectimplementedin
2005inBanderBeylabyHornReliefInternationalandSunFire
CookingLtd,tobenefit950tsunami-affectedfamiliesinthe
area.Giventhatcharcoalproductionleadstoenvironmental
degradationandconflictasaresultofcompetitionforscarce
resources–aswellasaffectingthehealthofthoseexposedto
itsuse,anditshighcost–thelastpartofthisarticleassesses
theimpactofsolarcookersasanalternativetousingcharcoal
ascookingfuel.
CharcoalProduction:ASourceofEnvironmental
DestructionandCommunalViolence
Charcoal,whichisreferredtoasdhuxul (andfirewood
asqoryo)inSomali,hasbeenthemaincookingenergyused
by millions of households in Somalia for centuries – and
will remainso ifnoalternativeenergy is introduced. It is
becomingdifficultforwomen,whocollectfirewood,tofind
itduetodenudation.Charcoalproduction,which involves
cuttingtreesandburningthem,ispredominantlyundertaken
bymen.Themajorityofcharcoaltradersarealsomen,but
therearesomewomeninvolvedinthistrade.Dependency
onfirewoodandcharcoalisnotonlydestroyingSomalia’s
environment but also negatively impacting the health of
women,whoareitsmainusers.
In the last two decades, charcoal production has
intensified and continues to destroy trees in Somalia,
forcingwomenandyounggirlstowalklonghourstocollect
firewood.Themaintreestargetedforcharcoalproductionare
acacias,knowninSomaliasqurac.Thesetreesaresignificant
tothesurvivalofthisnomadicsociety,astheyprovideshade
toherds,particularlygoats,sheep,cowsanddonkeys.Qurac
treesarealsousedtoconstructtraditionalhouses.Whenthe
Somalistatecollapsed,menandwomenwholosttheirjobs
andweredisplacedturnedtocharcoalproduction–ajobat
whichevenpreviouslyunskilledworkerscouldsucceed.The
requirement for charcoal production is simply the ability
tousephysicalenergytocutdownandburntreestomake
charcoal.Asaresultofmassivecharcoalproduction,trees
arenowrare.Infact,therearetownsandvillageswhereno
treesareleftstanding–atestimonytocharcoalandfirewood
dependencyandconsumption.
DiscussionswithwomeninBanderBeylarevealedthat
firewoodisbecomingscarceinthisregion,andthatmany
familieshavenochoicebuttobuythecommodityfromother
locales.Interviewswithtraditionalleadersinthearearevealed
that,withoutenvironmentallegislation,charcoalproducers–
whoarenotconcernedaboutthelong-termeffectsoftheir
actionsontheenvironment–willcontinuefellinglivetrees.
“Thecharcoal tradersbehaveas though theenvironment
isinsensitivetotheirgreed,”saidanelderlymaninBander
Beyla.“Theirultimategoalistomakemoney,obliviousto
thedevastationtheyarecausingtotheenvironment.Their
primarygoalistomakeprofitsfromcuttingandburningtrees
tomakethousandsofcharcoalsacks.”2
The massive destruction of acacia trees will have
profoundenvironmentalconsequencesfornomadicfamilies,
whosesurvivalislinkedtotheenvironmenttheyinhabit.One
man,whoownsasmallherdofgoats,said:“Thereareno
trees left inmycommunitywherebothpeopleandherds
canfindshade.Treesarestrippedoffandarenowrare.We
cannotlivewithouttrees,butwecontinuetodestroythem.”3
When–andif–durablepeaceisachievedinSomalia,the
citizens of this war-ravaged country will face enormous
environmentalinsecurity,whichalreadythreatenstheirwell-
beingandrecovery.Environmentalinsecuritywillnegatively
Acaciatreesarecutandburnedonamassivescale,toproducecharcoalinSomalia.
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
40 I conflict trends
affecttheabilityofawar-affectedpopulationtorecoverfrom
theirlossesandsurvivethepost-conflictstage.
CharcoalproductioninSomaliahasledtowhatareknown
as‘charcoalwars’,wherethosewhoareinvolvedincharcoal
productionclashwithinhabitantsoftheareawherethetrees
arebeingcutforcharcoalproduction.Themakersofcharcoal
and those4 who feel their territory is being invaded by
outsidersarearmed–asituationthatoftenleadstoviolence,
displacementandevendeath.Discussionswithtraditional
leaderswhoare involved in traditional conflict resolution
highlightedthattherehavebeenanumberofconflictsover
charcoalproduction.Forexample,twogroupscompetingto
accessaparticularlocationwithmanytreesoftenendupin
aviolentclash.Sometimes,theinhabitantsoftheareamay
riseagainstthecharcoalproducerswhodestroytheirtrees.
Charcoalwarsperpetuatetensionsamongcertainclans,and
areathreattooverallsecurityinsomeregions.Interviews
with residentsofBanderBeyla townand thesurrounding
villagesnotedthat,wheneverthereisacharcoalconflictin
anareafilledwithtrees,thesupplyofcharcoalisinterrupted,
and remote towns and villages that rely on charcoal for
cookingareadverselyaffected.Thephenomenonofcharcoal
warsneedstobeinvestigatedmore,asthereisnotenough
informationonit–particularlythenumberofdisplacements
and deaths caused. More elaborate research will provide
betterinsightsontheimpactofsuchconflictsoncommunities
andtheenvironment.
FirewoodandCharcoalConsumption,andtheHealth
ofWomenandgirls
Dependenceoncharcoal forcooking isverycostly for
impoverished families.Womenandgirlswalk longhours
tocollect firewoodtosupplement theexpensivecharcoal.
Firewoodcollectionisanarduous,back-breakingtask,andis
dangerousinaconflictenvironmentwheremanypeopleare
armed.Thefurtherwomenandgirlstravelinsearchofscarce
firewood,themorevulnerabletheyaretoarmedmen,who
maysexuallyabusethem.Interviewswithwomenandgirls
whocollectfirewoodinBanderBeylaandfourothervillages
revealedthattheysufferfoot,ankleandeyeinjuries–and
evensnakebites–astheyremoveandcuttoughanddead
woodwithaxes.Inunderdevelopedtownsandvillageswhere
therearenohospitals,suchinjuriescanbedeadlyforwomen
andgirls,ormayleavepermanentinjuriesthataffecttheir
mobilityand,hence,theirabilitytocareforthemselvesand
theirfamilies.
Itisestimatedthateachhouseholdneedsfivetoseven
sacks of charcoal per month, and each sack of charcoal
costsaboutUS$8toUS$10–averyexpensivecommodity
for poor families with scant resources who barely cope,
and in an armed conflict context. Due to the absence of
pricecontrol,millionsofSomalihouseholdsthatdependon
charcoalforenergyareatthemercyofcharcoalsellers,who
gaugethepricesforcharcoaldaily,forcingpoorfamiliesto
spendmoremoneyoncharcoalthanonothernecessities.
Onewomanpointsout:“Imagineyouhave todivertyour
meagreresourcestopurchasingsacksofcharcoalbecause
there is no firewood available in the area where we live,
andyouhavenomoneylefttobuyfoodforyourfamily.you
willseemanyneighbourswhohavecharcoalbutnofoodto
cook.”5Anotherwomansays:“Afterwepurchasecharcoal,
we may only afford to prepare one meal a day.”6 Money
neededtopurchasefoodischannelledtobuyingcharcoal
and,therefore,charcoalconsumptionnegativelyaffectsthe
food consumption of poor families. In addition, charcoal
usagedirectlyaffectsthehealthofwomenandgirls,whodo
thecookingfortheirfamilies.Theyareexposedtoblackdust,
smokeandsoot inhalation,whichaffects their respiratory
systemandeyesight.
Thegoodnewsisthatthereisalternativecookingenergy
availableintheformofsolarpower,whichisenvironmentally
friendlyandsafe,forthehealthandwell-beingofwomen,
UN
PH
OT
O/K
Ay
MU
LDO
ON
Firewoodcollectionisanarduous,back-breakingtask,andisdangerousinaconflictenvironmentwheremanypeoplearearmed.
conflict trends I 41
Awomanbuyscharcoalfromatraderatacharcoalmarket;eachbagcostsaboutUS$8toUS$10.
girlsandtheirfamilies.Solarcookersalsoenablehouseholds’
dependencyoncharcoalandfirewoodtobeminimisedand,
consequently,theirfoodconsumptiontobeimproved.
The followingsectiondiscussesasolarcookerproject
implementedinBanderBeylaandfourneighbouringvillages
affected by the 2004 tsunami, and its impact on these
communities.
PreventingViolenceandProtectingtheEnvironment
throughSolarCookers
Horn Relief International and Sun Fire Cooking Ltd’s
solarcookerprojectwasunique,andwas the firstproject
of this scale in war-torn Somalia. The project – which
provided beneficiary families with alternative cooking
energyintheformofsolarcookersandnewcookingpots–
was implemented between November 2005 and March
2006,and950 familiesresiding inBanderBeyla townand
four surrounding villages – Dhuur, Dhuudo, Eldhidir and
Kulule–benefitedfromtheproject.7Thebeneficiarieswere
carefully selected8 based on their economic vulnerability,
female-headedhouseholds, lossofassets(suchasfishing
gearandboats)duringthe2004tsunami,lackofcapital,and
minority and marginalised group membership. A survey
wasconductedwiththesehouseholdstocollectinformation
onwhocooksandbuyscharcoal, thenumberofsacksof
charcoalusedbyeachhousehold,and the families’basic
awareness of the importance of trees and environment.
Membersofthebeneficiaryhouseholdswerethentrainedon
howtouseandmaintaintheirsolarcookers,andtheheadsof
familiesweretrained9onthebenefitsofusingsolarcookers–
the health of their families, saving time and being more
economicallyviable.
While it is too early to determine the extent to which
the introduction and distribution of solar cookers has
minimisedviolenceandconflictovercharcoalandfirewood,
discussionswithtraditionalleaders,womenandmeninthese
communitiesindicatethat,priortothedistributionofsolar
cookersintheirlocales,conflictsovercharcoalandaccessto
firewoodoccurredbetweenindividualsandgroupsfromtime
totime.Therecipientsofsolarcookersinthefourlocaleshold
theviewthatcasesofsuchconflictshavereducedwiththe
introductionofsolarcookers.Halima,aresidentofEldhidir
village,said:“Scarcityoffirewoodleadstofiercecompetition,
whichmaycausethosecompetingforthesecommoditiesto
resort toviolence.Eachgroupwantstohavemoreaccess
tofirewoodandmay,attimes,usearmstoscareoffother
interestedgroups.Insomeincidences,whereviolencehas
ledtoseriousinjuryorevendeath,thoseaffectedoftentimes
movetoavengeonbehalfofthevictims’familiesandclans,
leading to deadly violence. A traditional leader in Kulule
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
42 I conflict trends
villageconfirmed:“Withthesolarcookersnowavailablein
anumberofhouseholds inmyvillage,weareseeing less
quarrelsandconflictsoverfirewoodandcharcoalproduction.
Theuseofsolarcookershasreducedthedemandforscarce
firewood and charcoal in our village, as well as in other
places where distribution of solar cookers were made.”10
A resident in Dhuur village explained how dependency
oncharcoal impactsonpoorfamilies,andsaid:“Charcoal
sellersoftenquarrelwithfamiliesthattakecharcoaloncredit
over payment. This at times leads to serious conflicts.”11
Consistent use of solar cookers can ease competition
over scarce firewood and lessen conflicts over firewood
andcharcoal.
By using solar cookers, families have reduced their
dependencyoncharcoalandfirewoodfortheirdailycooking,
enablingthemtoaffordmorenutritiousfoods.Forexample,
afterreceivingasolarcooker,averagecharcoalusedecreased
bythreetofoursacksamonthineachfamily.“Throughour
newsolarcooker,myfamily isabletosavemoney,which
wepreviouslyspentonpurchasingsacksofcharcoal,”one
recipientsaid.12Anotherwomanasserted:“Mysolarcooker
has eased my family’s reliance on expensive charcoal.”13
AccordingtoHaweya,amotherofsix,sheisnowabletobuy
goatmilk,meatandotherfooditemsforherchildren.“Ihave
savedthousandsofshillingssinceIstartedusingthesolar
cooker.Before,Icouldnotpurchasethoseitems,”shesaid.14
The introductionanddistributionof solarcookershas
also increased theparticipationofmenandolderboys in
householdcookingactivities.Amotheroffourboysnoted
thatherhusbandandsonsarekeenoncookingsinceher
familyreceiveditssolarcookerthroughthisproject.“Because
thesolar iscleanandeasy for themtouse, theycannow
maketea,coffeeandlightmealsforus,”sheadded.15Theuse
ofsolarcookerscanaltersociallydefinedgenderrolesand
mayencouragemenandboystoparticipateincooking–and,
assuch,freewomenandgirlsfromspendinglonghoursin
foodpreparationandcooking.Domesticchoresthatrequire
manyhoursofworkdenywomenandgirlstheopportunity
AwomaninBanderBeylacookslunchforherfamilyusingasolarcooker.
SH
UK
RIA
DIN
I
conflict trends I 43
toobtainaneducationandparticipate indecision-making
processes,buttheuseofsolarcookersmayprovidewomen
andgirlssuchspace,andtheopportunitytobeeducatedand
toparticipateactivelyinactivitiesinwhichtheypreviously
couldnot.
With the introduction of solar cookers to the 950
households,charcoaltraderswerefindingitdifficulttosell
charcoal totheir formercustomers.Therewerealsomore
sacksofcharcoalatthemarkets:asignthatsolarrecipients
werenolongerpurchasingasmuchcharcoal.This,ofcourse,
infuriated the charcoal traders,whobegananaggressive
campaign to reclaim their customers. Discussions with
recipientsofsolarcookersindicatedthatcharcoaltraderswere
discouragingthemfromusingsolarcookers,andreducedthe
priceofcharcoalsackstoattractformerconsumers.Some
charcoaltraderswentasfarasspreadingrumoursthatthe
glarefromsolarcookerswasharmfultohealth.However,the
project’sstaff,whovisitedthesolarcookerusersfrequently,
continuedtosupportthemandencouragetheuseofthisform
ofenergy.
Familiesusingthesecookershavemanagedtopayoff
debtsandstartincome-generatingactivities,thusimproving
theirlivelihoods.“WiththesavingsthatImadesinceIstarted
usingmysolarcooker, Iwasabletosavesomemoneyto
payoffmydebts,”testifiedamotheroffour.16“Themore
Iused the cooker, themoremoney I saved, andwith the
money Ihavebeenable tobuyclothingandmedicine for
mychildren,”anotherwomancommented.17Byswitchingto
amoreefficientandmodernformofcookingenergy,these
familieswereabletokeeptheirhard-earnedmoneyfortheir
ownbenefitratherthanpayingcharcoaltraders,whohave
contributedtothedestructionoftreesandcommunityconflict
overtheyears.Solarcookershaveprovidedthesefamilies
witharesponsibleformofenergythatsafeguardsthewell-
beingofthecommunity,particularlywomenandgirls.The
useofsolarcookershasalsofreedwomenandgirls from
thedifficultanddangeroustaskofcollectingfirewood,and
introduced them toanenvironmentally friendlyandsafer
formofenergy.
The solar cooker project was not just about the
distributionofsolarcookers.Italsoraisedtheawarenessof
therecipientsandtheircommunitiesabouttheirimpacton
theenvironment.Ashasbeendescribedabove,firstasurvey
capturedinformationonfamilies’charcoalconsumptionand
theamountofmoneyspentoncharcoaleverymonth.This
information,whenshared,enlightened thecommunityas
totheirimpactontheenvironmentandtheoverallamount
ofresourcesspentonthisunsustainablecommodity.Next,
the benefits of using solar cookers and the importance
of protecting the environment were communicated to
beneficiaryfamilies.Environmentalprinciples18andmessages
were also created and communicated to members of the
community, particularly to women, youth and traditional
and religious leaders.Theprojectunitedmembersof the
community on how to reduce charcoal consumption and
protecttheirenvironmentthroughtheuseofsolarcookers.
ChallengesFacedbyRecipientsofSolarCookers
Despite the benefits of using solar cookers, certain
challengesaffectedthewaytherecipientsadaptedtotheuse
ofsolarcookersfortheirdailycookingactivities.Thetypeof
solarcookersdistributedrequiredaspaciousandcemented
area.However, themajorityof families hadno cemented
areasintheirhomes,andthesolarcookerwheelseasilysank
By USING SOLAR COOKERS, FAMILIES
HAVEREDUCEDTHEIRDEPENDENCyON
CHARCOALANDFIREWOODFORTHEIR
DAILy COOKING, ENABLING THEM TO
AFFORDMORENUTRITIOUSFOODS
ASomaliwomanproudlyshowsoffthesmallamountofcharcoalshenowuses,sincereceivinghersolarcooker.
SH
UK
RIA
DIN
I
44 I conflict trends
intothesandandcouldnotstanduprightwell.Asaresult,the
recipientswerehesitanttousethecookersandcomplained
thattheyweretooheavytomovearoundtheircompounds.
Sanderodedthelowermetalofthesolarcookers,andthe
project’sbudgetdidnotallowforthebuildingofcemented
spacesforeachoftherecipients.Themajorityofhouseholds
alsolackedclosedcompoundswheretheycouldensurethe
security of their solar cookers, and they were concerned
abouttheft.Recipientsalsocomplainedabouttheglareof
thecookers,andsomefearedlosingtheireyesight.Ongoing
dependenceoncharcoalwasalsoahindering factor, and
somefamilies–evenoncetheyhadreceivedsolarcookers–
struggledtochangethisdestructiveandexpensivehabit.
Conclusion
The use of solar power in Somalia can reverse the
problemsofdesertificationcausedbycharcoalproduction.
Ithasthepotentialtofreecharcoalandfirewood-dependent
familiestoutiliseenergythatisclean,freeanddoesnotaffect
theirhealth.Thisprojectprovided950 families inBander
Beylaandsurroundingvillageswithalternativeclean,cheap,
environmentallyfriendlycookingenergy,andthroughtheir
usageeasedsomeof thecommunal conflictsoverscarce
firewood and charcoal production. Through this project,
householdssavedmoneyandincreasedtheirenvironmental
awareness.Thefinancialsavingsenabledfamiliestopurchase
much-neededitemstheywereunabletoaffordpriortothe
distributionofthesolarcookers.Inaddition,theintroduction
ofsolarcookershasbroughtpositivechangetothelivesof
womenandgirls,whopreviouslyspentsixtosevenhoursa
daycookingfortheirfamiliesandbeingexposedtosmoke
and soot inhalation. The use of solar cookers has given
womenandgirlsmoretime,whichtheycanusetoattend
schoolandbeactiveintheircommunityaffairs.Throughsolar
cookers,womenandgirlshavebecomeawareofthenegative
effectsoffirewoodandcharcoalontheirhealthandontheir
manyfamilieslackedclosedcompoundsandcementedareastoensurethesecurityoftheirsolarcookersandtopreventsanddamagetothecooker.
SH
UK
RIA
DIN
I
conflict trends I 45
family’ssavings–whichheightenedtheirunderstandingof
thebenefitsofusingsolarcookers.
The introduction and distribution of solar cookers
was intended to reverse the long-term environmental
degradationcausedbytheproductionanduseofcharcoal
for cooking energy. This project was implemented more
thanfiveyearsagoanditsfindingswererelevantto2006.
Thelong-termimpactofthisprojectneedstobeexplored
toestablishiftheearlierresultsoftheprojectstillremain.
Updated researchwill reveal thepercentageof recipients
whoarestillusingtheirsolarcookers,theamountofsavings
each household continues to experience, and the extent
to which the continued use of solar cookers still reduces
environmentaldegradationandcommunalconflict.Inorder
tosavemoretreesandreverseenvironmentaldegradation,
moresolarcookersneedtobedistributedtomanyregions
ofSomalia.CharcoalproductionandconsumptioninSomalia
isnotsustainable– ifcharcoaldependencycontinues, the
fewremaining treesand rangelandswillbedenudedand
destroyed,leadingtofurthersoilerosion.
Charcoal production and consumption provides
livelihoods to many people. Without creating alternative
employmentopportunitiesforthesepeople,andwithoutthe
useofalternativecookingenergy–suchassolarcookers–
theproductionandconsumptionofcharcoalandfirewood
willpersistinSomalia.Furthermore,alllevelsofauthorityin
Somalia–fromvillageleveltonationallevel–mustimplement
andenactenvironmentalpoliciesthatwillprotecttreesand
preventsoilerosion(anoutcomeofcharcoalproduction)and
providealternativelivelihoodsforthoseinvolvedincharcoal
production. Immediate action must be taken to minimise
theever-growingdependencyoncharcoal,andtherelated
conflictandviolencethatoccursincommunities.Raisingthe
awarenessofeveryoneinvolvedincharcoalproductionand
consumption–buyers,consumers,sellersandthegeneral
public–particularly theirunderstandingof thebenefitsof
protectingtheirownenvironment,isalsourgentlyneededin
war-tornSomalia.
DrShukriaDiniwastheProjectmanageroftheSolarCookerProjectandimplementeditonbehalfofHornRelief International in theKarKaar region,Puntland,SomaliafromNovember2005tomarch2006.SheisanindependentResearcherwholivesinNairobi,Kenya.
Endnotes1 BanderBeylaisacoastaltownontheIndianOceaninSomalia’s
north-easternregionofPuntland.Thetownwasaffectedbythe2004tsunamianditsinhabitantslosttheirfishingboats,gear,homesandtheiroveralllivelihoods.
2 Ali,Hussein(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.AliisanelderinBanderBeylatown.Fictitiousnameshavebeenusedtoprotecttherealidentityofallindividualsquotedinthisarticle.
3 Salad,Ali(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.
4 Armedmenwhoresideneartheareaswherecharcoalisproducedmayrefuseoutsiderstocuttreesintheirregion.Thesemenarguethattheyareprotectingtheenvironment.Theyarenotenvironmentalistsandtheyarguethattheysimplywanttoprotectthetreesfortheirowninterests:tomakecharcoalorusetreesasfirewoodforthemselves.
5 Jelle,Fatuma(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.
6 Suldaan,Jimco(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.
7 Atotalof612familiesinBanderBeylatownreceivedsolarcookers.Dhuuris56kmfromBanderBeyla,and55familiesinDhuurbenefitedfromthisproject.Eldhidiris38kmfromBanderBeylatown,andtherewere86familiesinEldhidirthatreceivedcookers.Kululeis70kmfromBanderBeyla,and155familieswereselectedandreceivedsolarcookers.
8 Theprocessofselectingbeneficiarieswasparticipatoryandinclusive.Communitymembers–includinglocalleaders,womenandyouth–inallfiveareasweremobilisedandinvitedtochoosethemostdeservingfamiliesforthesolarcookers.Theycameupwithaguidelineforselectingthemostdeservingfamiliesintheirrespectivecommunities.
9 Throughsuchtrainings,theheadofeachfamilywasprovidedwithinformationontheimportanceofpreparingnutritiousmeals,howtocooknutritiousandaffordablemealsthroughchannellingresourcesspentoncharcoaltofood,andtheimportanceofboilingdrinkingwater.
10 Abdulle,Odowa(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.Kululevillage.
11 Daud,Hindiya(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.Dhuurvillage.
12 Abdi,Jamila(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.
13 Abdikarim,Suad(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.
14 Adan,Haweya(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.
15 Farah,Zeinab(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.
16 Isak,Dahabo(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.
17 Ismail,Hawa(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.
18 Environmentalprinciplesformedincluded:humanbeingscanonlysurviveandbesecurewhentheyprotect,respectandbecomethecustodiansoftheirenvironment;theyneedtorecognisethat,ashumans,cuttingandburningtreestoproducecharcoalimpactsnegativelyontheenvironment;charcoalproductionhasmultipleimplicationsforpeopleandanimals;andthateverypersonhastheresponsibilitytoprotectandminimisetheirnegativeimpactontheenvironment.
FAMILIES USING THESE COOKERS
HAVE MANAGED TO PAy OFF DEBTS
AND START INCOME-GENERATING
ACTIVITIES, THUS IMPROVING THEIR
LIVELIHOODS
46 I conflict trends
Collusion and Criminalisation: fuel ConfliCt in the niger deltaBymELISSACAWTHRA
Theeconomicdisparitiesandsocial inequalities that
havebeenbroughtaboutbytheextractionindustryinthe
NigerDeltastandinstarkcontrasttothisregion’smassive
contribution to the world oil economy. The expansion
of theactivitiesofoilandgasmultinationals inNigeria,
helped by the collusion of government officials, has
playedadirectroleinfuellingcorruptionandviolenceand
creatingaseeminglyparadoxicalsituation,characterised
bythesimultaneousenrichmentofforeigncompaniesand
theimpoverishmentoflocalpopulations.
However, one must be cautious to avoid simplistic
readingsthatattributetheongoingconflictintheoil-rich
Niger Delta to a single cause by calling for a nuanced
analysisofthe“complexwebofpetro-violence”1,based
ontheinterplayofavarietyofdomesticandinternational
factors. This article seeks to identify factors that have
combined to fuel conflict in the Niger Delta. Beginning
withanaccountof thebackgroundtotheconflict, itwill
thereafter provide an overview of recent developments
that have served to exacerbate tensions in the Niger
Deltaregion.Thearticlewill thenexaminetheshortfalls
of measures that have thus far been put in place by
Above: Frequent oil leaks have wreaked widespreaddamageontheecosystemoftheDeltastates.
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
conflict trends I 47
the extraction industry and the state, in response to
widespreadinternationalcondemnationofenvironmental
andhumanrightsviolationsincurredbycorporationsand
theNigeriangovernment.
BackgroundtotheConflict
TheNigerDeltaisaregionmadeupofninestateswitha
combinedpopulationof31millionintheswampycoastlands
in thesouthofNigeria.Theregionoccupiesaprominent
strategicpositionbothnationallyandinternationallyashost
toNigeria’svastoilindustry,andaccountsforover75%of
thecountry’spetroleumproductionandexports.Inspiteof
itsconsiderablecontributiontothenationaleconomy,the
NigerDeltaisoneoftheleastdevelopedareasinNigeria–
themajorityoflocalcommunitiesdonothaveaccesstoclean
drinkingwaterorelectricity.Traditionally,localpopulations
have reliedonsubsistenceactivities suchas fishingand
farmingtomakealiving.However,thelivelihoodsofthese
localcommunitiesarethreatenedbytheactivitiesofforeign
oil and gas corporations such as Shell, Chevron-Texaco,
Exxon-MobilandBritishPetroleum(BP).Failuretomaintain
oil facilitiesadequately, frequentoil leaksandgas flares
havewreakedwidespreaddamageontheecosystemofthe
Kajama
Sokoto
Katsina
Dutse Damaturu
Birnin Kebbi
Bauchi
Jalingo
Minna
Ilorin
AkureAdo-Ekiti
Lokaja
Enugu
Awka
Makurdi
Abeokuta
PortHarcourt
Benin CityAsaba
Ikeja
Jos
Owerri
YenagoaCalabar
Yola
Umuahia
Uyo
Gombe
Gusau
Lafia
Abakaliki
Douala
Bafoussam
Kumba
Nikongsamba
Garoua
Maroua
Aba
Lagos
Ogbomosho
Ife
Onitsha
Kano Maiduguri
OshogboIbadan
Zaria
Kaduna
Abuja
Porto-Novo
N'Djamena
KainjReservoir
Niger
Niger
Benue
Bénoué
Komadugu
KomaduguGana
Yedseram
Sanaga
Mbam
Kaduna
Gon
gola
Hadejia
Sokoto
Zamfara
Gulbin Ka
Sokoto
Gul f of Guinea
Bight of Benin
Bight of Biafra
Lake Chad
Nig
er
Nige r
D e l ta
Quémé
Lake Bamendjing
SOKOTO
ZAMFARA
KATSINA
KANO
JIGAWA Y O B E B O R N O
K E B B I
KADUNA B A U C H I
ADAMAWA
KWARA
K O G I
O Y O
P L AT E AU
NASSARAWA
T A R A B A
B E N U E
N I G E R
ABUJA CAPITAL TERRITORY
OSUN
O G U NONDO
E D O
GOMBE
DELTA
ENUGU
EBONY
IMO
RIVERS
BAYELSA
ABIACROSS RIVERS
AKWA IBOM
LAGOS
EKITI
AN
AM
BRA
N I G E RCHAD
CHAD
CAMEROON
BEN I N
C.A.R.
0 50 100 150 200 km
0 50 100 mi
NIGERIA
NIGERIA
National capitalState capitalTown, villageMajor airportInternational boundaryState boundaryHighwayMain roadSecondary roadRailroad
AsatelliteimageoftheNigerDelta.
NA
SA
|WIK
IME
DIA
CO
MM
ON
S
48 I conflict trends
Deltastates,andlocalcommunitiesfindthemselvesinthe
precarious situationofhaving their villagesbulldozed to
makewayforfurtherexpansionofenergyinfrastructure–as
hasbeenthecaseseveraltimesinthepast.Unfortunately,
theNigerianstate, reluctant to turndownthesubstantial
economicgainsofferedbythislucrativeindustry,hasdone
little–ifnothing–toalleviatehumansufferingandmitigate
environmentaldamage.Infact,ithasoftenbeencomplicit
in allowing multinationals to pursue their activities with
impunity.Poorregulationandexpropriationoflandforoil
productionhaveledtothechronicunderdevelopmentofthe
Deltastates,inspiteoftheregion’sconsiderableoilwealth.
The current situation in the Niger Delta stems from
decadesofneglectof localcommunitiesandviolentstate
repression. The combined result of this has been a full
insurgency since 2006, in which the Movement for the
EmancipationoftheNigerDelta(MEND)andvariousother
politicalandcriminalgroupshaveresortedtoviolentmeans
toprotestenvironmentalandhumanrightsabusesandgain
access to revenues generated by the oil-rich region. The
complexityandscaleoftheconflictinthisregionissuchthat
theInternationalCrisisGrouppublishedareportinAugust
2006inwhichitdescribedthevolatilenatureofthesituation
asa“potentcocktailofpoverty,crimeandcorruption”.2
TheStrategicImportanceofoilinNigeria
InNigeria,oilmakesupthefiscalbasisofstatepower,
federal power and economic development. The Delta’s
long history of neglect stems in large part from the
state’s perceptions of the economic irrelevance of local
communities: as a rentier state that derives 80% of its
official revenuesand95%of itsexportearnings fromthe
sale of oil, the government does not rely on taxes from
its citizens and, therefore, does not feel bound by any
obligation to provide its people with basic public goods
like education, improved health facilities and security.3
William Reno’s theory of ‘warlord politics’ as the modus
operandiinmanyweakAfricanstatesturnstheconventional
notionofstatehoodonitshead.ForReno,corruptleaders,
facedwith insurgenciesandwarring factionswithin their
countries, seekself-enrichmentandbuildup theirpower
basesbyaccumulatingrentstofightoffthreatsfromlocal
strongmenandpacifyinsurgenciesattheexpenseofstate
building and development.4 Following World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) prescriptions to trim
bureaucraciesandprivatisepublic-sectorcompanies,these
leadershavecometoreplaceColdWarpatronagenetworks
with partnerships with unscrupulous foreign firms. As is
thecasewithoilmultinationalsinNigeria,thesefirmsfulfil
PortHarcourtintheNigerDelta,theoilcapitalofAfrica,isacrowdedcityplaguedbycrimewheremostpeoplelivewellbelowthepovertyline.
GE
TT
yIM
AG
ES
conflict trends I 49
surrogatestatefunctionsbyprovidingbureaucraticservices
(inthiscase,security)inareaswherevaluableresourcesare
extracted.5Thiscollusionbetweenstateandmultinationals
is particularly troubling as it fosters an unhealthy
interdependence between the two entities, and reduces
transparency in business operations and the regulation
of industrypractices.On thispoint,Ukejehasnoted that
“multinationalandlocaloilcompaniesandtheNigerianstate
arelockedinacomplex,opaqueandveryoftenincestuous
relationshipinwhicheachpartylookstotheothertosustain
andadvancemutualinterests”.6
TheanalysisoftheongoingviolenceintheNigerDelta
isframedbytracingtheprogressionandescalationofthe
conflictalongaspectrumofthreephases.
marginalisationandthePeacefulPursuitof
Autonomy
TheNigerDelta ishome toethnicminoritieswhose
grievances extend to the pre-independence period.
The Deltans’ struggle for autonomy and self-rule dates
back toNigeria’s colonisation in1914,when theBritish
relegated Delta populations to ethnic minority status
relative tonumericallysuperiorethnicities in thenorth,
east and west of the country. The marginalisation of
local Delta communities was cemented in 1969, when
thefederalmilitarygovernmenttookcontrolofallpetrol-
producing territories through Decree No. 51/Petroleum
Actof1969.UnderthisAct, thefederaloilministerwas
granted“thesole right tograntoilmining leases tooil
VastareasoffarmlandlayscorchedafteranexplosiononarupturedpipelineinoviricourtinAdedjeintheNigerDeltaareathatclaimedthelivesof250peopleanddestroyedcashcrops(2000).
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
50 I conflict trends
companies”.7Revenueallocationtoethnicminoritystates
was progressively reduced from 50% in 1966 to 3% in
themid-1990s,thenincreasedto13%in19998following
intensifiedopposition–butlocalcommunitieshavethus
farderivedno tangiblegains fromthis increase,due to
mismanagement and misappropriation of revenues by
state governments. The government has controlled the
energypursestringssinceitnationalisedtheoilindustry
in 1971 and owns between 55% and 60% of onshore
multinationaloiloperations inthenameof theNigerian
NationalPetroleumCorporation,according to the terms
ofa jointventurearrangementwithoilmultinationals.9
This arrangement generated US$60 billion in revenues
fortheNigerianstatein2005.10Theshiftfrommilitaryto
democratic rule in1999hasdonenothing toameliorate
widespreadinstitutionalisedcorruptionbystateofficials,
with the head of Nigeria’s anti-corruption agency
estimatingthat70%ofoilrevenueswerestolenorwasted
in2003.11
Furthermore, the Land Use Act – which effectively
placedallofNigeria’slandunderthecontrolofthestate
government–waspassedin1979,therebycompounding
thedisempowermentandeconomicmarginalisationofthe
Deltacommunities.12This legalprovisionhas facilitated
theexpropriationofNigerDelta land foroilproduction
anddevelopmentbyoilmultinationals.Almostexclusively
dependent on oil rents and bound to multinationals
by contract, the Nigerian state has thus come to fulfil
a gatekeeper role for oil multinationals operating in
theDelta.
Itwaswithinthiscontextofalienationandexclusion
of localDeltapopulations thatKenSaro-Wiwa,awriter
andOgoniethnicminorityrightsactivist,ledanon-violent
campaignbytheMovementfortheSurvivaloftheOgoni
People(MOSOP)inthe1990stoprotestagainstviolations
ofenvironmentalandhumanrightsinOgoniland.MOSOP
drew up a Bill of Rights in which it targeted abuses by
ShellanddemandedautonomyandlocalcontrolofNiger
Delta oil revenues. MOSOP’s initial local non-violent
protestevolvedintoaglobalcampaign,bylinkingupwith
internationaladvocacygroupswhichexertedpressureon
ShellandtheNigeriangovernmenttoputanendtohuman
rightsabuses, exploitationandwidespreadpollution in
Ogoniland.
IncreasedStateRepressionandResorttoViolent
Protest
In spite of the apparent success of the MOSOP
campaignintheearly1990s,peacefulprotestsmetwith
state repressionandculminated in thepublicexecution
ofSaro-Wiwaandothermembersofthe‘OgoniNine’ in
1995 under Abacha’s military regime. The brutal state
repressionofMOSOP informedthe Ijawethnicminority
movement in Niger Delta, which issued an ultimatum
for all oil companies to leave the region by December
1998.Thegovernmentrespondedbydeclaringastateof
emergency in the Niger Delta; the protest was crushed
and grievances left unaddressed. Many hoped that the
transition tocivilian ruleanddemocracy in1999would
bringaboutgreaterdialoguebetweenstateandcitizens,
butithas,infact,ledtohigherlevelsofviolenceaslocal
politicians began to co-opt insurgents, arming Delta
Political and militant groups in the Niger Delta haveresorted to violent means to protest environmentalandhumanrightsabusesandgainaccesstorevenuesgeneratedbytheoil-richregion.
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
HAVE INFLICTED WIDESPREAD ENVI-
RONMENTAL AND SOCIAL DAMAGES
ON THE NIGER DELTA OVER THE
COURSE OF MANy yEARS, AND THE
CONFLICT IS LIKELy TO PERSIST
AND INTENSIFy AS LONG AS THE
GRIEVANCES OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES
FAILTOBEADEQUATELyADDRESSED
conflict trends I 51
resistancegroups inexchange forpoliticalsupport.Nor
hastheendoftheAbachadictatorshipin1999hadmuch
effectoncurbingtheexcessesofthemilitary,whoreceive
generouscompanyallowancesforprovidingsecurityatoil
plantsandsilencingprotestors.
Attempts by disenfranchised local communities to
voice their grievances and assert their rights have thus
beenquashedconsistently.Inthislight,itisnotsurprising
that,afterdecadesofpeacefulcampaigning,theoppressed
peoplesoftheDeltacametoviewviolenceasalegitimate
weaponofprotest.Theincreasedresorttoviolencemust
also be seen in the context of an entrenched culture of
violenceandmilitarisminNigeriathatisanextensionof
the colonial state, as well as the product of decades of
post-colonialmilitaryrule.13Thiscultureofviolenceisso
ingrainedinNigeriansocietythatithascometodominate
relationsbetweenstateandlocalcommunities,insurgents
and corporations and, more recently, intracommunal
relations. The combination of the state’s pacification
techniques,intensifiedmilitarydeploymentininsurgency
zones by state and corporations, and the widespread
beliefamongstDeltayouth thatacquiringweaponswill
earnthemrespectandlendlegitimacytotheircausehas
resulted inaproliferationofsmalland lightweapons in
this region. These conditions led to a full insurgency
in 2006, with resistance movements such as MEND
frequently carrying out attacks on oil infrastructure in
their struggle to control oil revenues in the Delta and
forcetheevictionofoilmultinationalsfromtheregion–
particularly in light of the widespread environmental
degradationthattheiroperationshavecaused.TheMEND
insurgency was initially framed in political terms, with
the movement claiming to disrupt operations with the
intentionofcripplingtheNigerianstateandoilindustries’
capacitytoproduceoilintheNigerDelta.Sincethistime,
however,theconflicthasevolvedandbecomeincreasingly
complex as a multiplication of criminal elements and
gangs have followed suit, conducting acts of sabotage
and oil bunkering purely for economic gains, with the
consequence that therehasbeenablurringof the lines
betweencriminalandmilitantgroups.
Post9/11Developments
Theprevailingvolatilityofthisregionmustbeseenin
thecontextofitsincreasingstrategicimportanceasaglobal
energysupplier.DuetoheightenedinstabilityintheMiddle
Eastandadecrease in theUnitedStates’ (US)popularity
inthatregionintheaftermathof9/11andtheIraqWar,the
USand its ‘coalition’counterpartshave tended to favour
oilexplorationandinvestmentinAfricainthepastdecade
(whichimpliessteppingupsecuritytoprotecttheregion’s
abundant oil reserves and combat the rise of terrorism).
Ijawmilitantsguardtheoporozacreeksingbaramatukingdom,inthevolatileNigerDeltaregion.
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
52 I conflict trends
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
ThepastdecadehasseenagrowingtendencyofWesterngovernments to help Nigerian and other Gulf of Guineastatesbuildtheirmilitaryandnavalcapabilities,strengthentheirsecuritysectorsthrougharmssalesandreinforcetheirregionalmilitarypresenceforthepurposesofdeterrence.14TheincreasingvisibilityoftheUSNavyintheGulfofGuinea,theestablishmentofAFRICOM(theUSAfricanCommand)andtheUnitedKingdom(UK)navy’spromiseofmilitaryaidtoNigeria in2008areproofofdirectcontributions to themilitarisationofNigeriabyWesternnations.15
AnotherrecentgeopoliticaldevelopmentistheGulfofGuinea’s rising importance as a hub for drug smugglingand related forms of transnational criminal activity. TheUNODC World Drug Report, published in 2010, indicatesthat, whereas cocaine consumption has dropped 50% intheUS in thepast10years, ithas increased inEurope.16This shift in geographic patterns of demand for cocaineaccounts for a diversion of drug trafficking routes in thepastdecade, asdrugsare increasingly smuggledvia theWestAfricanGulfofGuineaintransitfromSouthAmericatoEurope,whereas10yearsagotheycommonlytransitedfromSouthAmericatotheUSviaCentralAmerica.Inlightofthesenewdevelopmentsoverthepastdecade,Westernpowers–notablytheUS–haverespondedbysteppingup
the militarisation and ‘securitisation’ of the region in aneffort to police crime and arm the Nigerian governmentagainstattacksby insurgents.Themotivationbehindthisisquitesimple: thesepowers realise that theNigerDeltaisvital inensuringtheiroilsupply,andtheyareonly tooawareofthedisastrousimpactthatinstabilityandinsurgentactivity(suchasactsofpipelinesabotageincurredbytheMENDrebelmovement)canhaveonglobaloilprices.These‘securitisation’policies,advancedintheinterestsof‘energysecurity’ but essentially designed to protect the West’seconomicinterests,haveultimatelyfuelledtheconflictintheNigerDelta,leadingtoover-militarisationandaproliferationofsmallarms.Theseareusedtosustaintheconflict,therebyprotracting the fighting and intensifying the unrelentingstrugglebetweenvariousarmedfactions,corruptNigerianstateofficialsandmultinationalcorporationsforthecontrolofresources.
Attempts at ‘securitisation’ in the oil-rich Niger Deltahave,therefore,hadpreciselytheoppositeeffect:byarmingthe security apparatus of the Nigerian state, developednationsaredirectlylegitimisingincreasedresortingtostaterepressionofinsurgencies.Insodoing,theyarefuellingtheinternalconflictbetweenthegovernmentandtheinsurgents,aggravatingtheresentmentfeltbythe insurgentsagainst
Nigerian soldiers aboardapatrol boatkeepwatchover anatural gas loading terminal inBonny, in theoil richNigerDelta.
conflict trends I 53
those inpower inNigeria,andhardeningtheirresistance
to the presence of foreign multinationals. This serves to
perpetuatethecycleofviolenceintheregion.
IndustryResponses:LimitedCorporateSocial
ResponsibilityandCriminalisation
Multinational corporations have inflicted widespread
environmentalandsocialdamagesontheNigerDeltaover
thecourseofmanyyears,andtheconflictislikelytopersist
andintensifyaslongasthegrievancesoflocalcommunities
failtobeadequatelyaddressed.Environmentaldegradation
hashaddisastrousconsequencesforthelivelihoodsofthe
Deltapeopleandrequiresurgentattention.Thegovernment’s
policyofevictinglocalpopulationstomakewayforfurther
expansionofoiloperationshasdeprivedsubsistence-based
communitiesoftheabilitytofishorfarm.Today,themajority
oflocalpeoplefromformerfishingcommunitiesareforced
todependonfrozenfish,whichissoldforclosetoUS$1a
pieceand,therefore,generallyunaffordabletoDeltalocals–
mostofwhomliveonlessthanUS$1aday.17Hundredsof
gasflareshaveburnedcontinuouslyfordecades,causing
acidrainandreleasinggreenhousegases;leaksfromwells
and pipelines and the construction of roads and canals
havedisruptedfragilewetlandecosystems;andfrequentoil
spillsdestroycroplandandpollutegroundwater.Theextent
oftheenvironmentaldamageisstaggering:roughly5400
oilspillswereofficiallyrecordedbetween2000and2004,18
but analysts suspect that the real figure is much higher.
Corporatesocialresponsibility(CSR)measuresthattakeinto
account the far-reachingconsequencesof suchprofound
damageonthelivesoflocalcommunitiesarelongoverdue.
Greater progress seems to have been made in terms
of addressing social and human rights abuses, but the
measuresadopted thus fararebynomeanssufficient in
resolvingtheconflict.Followingwidespreadcondemnation
ofShell’sallegedcomplicityinthe‘OgoniNine’executions
in1995byadvocacyandhumanrightsgroups,thecompany
responded by withdrawing operations from Ogoniland.
Chevronalsocameunderattackin1998forrecruitingand
supplyingNigerianmilitaryforcesintheshootingandkilling
ofprotestersinMay1998.19Then,in2000,oilmultinationals
operatingintheNigerDeltasignedtheVoluntaryPrinciples
on Security and Human Rights with the governments
of the US and the UK and prominent international
non-governmentalorganisations (NGOs)which,“withan
interestinhumanrightsandcorporatesocialresponsibility
…engagedinadialogueofsecurityandhumanrights”.20
However, thesigningof thisagreementhasdone little to
reduce theconflict in theNigerDelta,andagapremains
betweendesignandimplementationoftheprinciples.
SomearguethatCSRpoliciesadoptedseveralyearsago
have been insufficiently implemented and have failed to
reduceviolence,asmultinationals’agendasareessentially
skewedinfavourofenablingcontinuedbusinessoperations
withoutaddressingthekeyissueslinkedtolocalcommunity
development in a meaningful way.21 When questioned,
industry has tended to put the blame on the Nigerian
state’s monopoly of sovereignty, and claimed reluctance
toundermineNigerianauthority.Inthislight,onemayask
whether these corporations are genuinely committed to
communitydevelopmentorwhetherCSRpoliciesserveasa
smokescreentopursueprofits.
The primary strategy employed by multinationals in
theNigerDeltahasbeentocriminalisetheactionsoflocal
communities.Framingactsofsabotagebymilitantsinthe
Niger Delta as criminal acts is a means of downplaying
thepoliticalandsocial-economicgrievancesofinsurgents
anddepriving their causeof legitimacy, therebyevading
responsibility for addressing the root causes of conflict.
Criminalisation has largely been achieved by two
mechanisms of industrial intervention: the Legaloil.com
initiative and the signature of a Global Memorandum
of Understanding (GMoU) in 2004 between local Delta
communities,theNigeriangovernmentandmultinationaloil
corporations.22TheLegaloil.cominitiativehascriminalised
resistance groups in two ways: first, the website links
bunkeringtothetradeinconflictdiamonds,therebyframing
bunkeringactivitiesas illicit and formalextractionbyoil
multinationalsaslicit;andsecond,thiscampaigncitesoil
bunkeringastheculpritandthecauseofsocio-economic
breakdown in the Niger Delta – while such activities
have,infact,arisenasaconsequenceof,andreactionto,
INNIGERIA,OILMAKESUPTHEFISCALBASISOFSTATEPOWER,FEDERALPOWER
ANDECONOMICDEVELOPMENT.THEDELTA’SLONGHISTORyOFNEGLECTSTEMS
INLARGEPARTFROMTHESTATE’SPERCEPTIONSOFTHEECONOMICIRRELEVANCE
OFLOCALCOMMUNITIES,THEGOVERNMENTDOESNOTRELyONTAxESFROMITS
CITIZENSAND,THEREFORE,DOESNOTFEELBOUNDByANyOBLIGATIONTOPROVIDE
ITS PEOPLE WITH BASIC PUBLIC GOODS LIKE EDUCATION, IMPROVED HEALTH
FACILITIESANDSECURITy
54 I conflict trends
extractionbyoilcompanies.23Ontheotherhand,theGMoU
fosterscollectivepunishmentinthecaseofanydisruption
to industry operations, and forbids collective action by
“makingnon-violentprotesteffectivelycriminal”.24Arecent
reportpublishedbyAmnestyInternationalhasexposedthis
criminalisationbymultinationals,citingShell’sfalsification
offiguresinanattempttoblamethemajorityofoilpollution
onsaboteurs(asopposedtoindustrialoilspills).Twoleading
advocacy groups – Amnesty International and Friends
of the Earth International – filed a complaint in January
2011 inwhich theyclaimthatShell’sactionsconstitutea
breachoftheOrganisationofEconomicCo-operationand
Development’sGuidelinesforMultinationalEnterprises.25
ConclusionWhile this strategy of criminalising insurgents and
implementing limited CSR measures may be a usefulway for corporations to avoid blame, abdicate socialresponsibility and continue to pursue their businessoperationsintheDelta,itpointstoamuchwiderproblemintermsoftransparencyandaccountability.TheNigerianstate’s response to criminalisation has thus far beento increase militarisation, which feeds back into theviciouscircleofself-perpetuatingviolence.Unlesstheseissuesareaddressed, thechronic lackofstateoversightand insufficient CSR implementation on the part ofmultinational corporations will continue to stoke theflamesofresistanceandresentmentinthisalreadyover-militarisedandhighlyvolatilezone.
melissaCawthra is pursuing amaster’s degree ininternationalaffairs,withafocusonsecurityissuesinWestAfrica,atSciencesPoinParis,France.
Endnotes1 Obi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(2011)Petro-violenceinthe
NigerDelta–TheComplexPoliticsofanInsurgency.InObi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(eds)oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence.LondonandNewyork:ZedBooks.
2 InternationalCrisisGroup(2006)‘TheSwampsofInsurgency:Nigeria’sDeltaUnrest’,AfricaReportNo.115,3August2006,Availableat:<http://www.crisisgroup.org>Accessedon:12March2011.
3 O’Neill,Tom(2007)‘CurseoftheBlackGold:HopeandBetrayalontheNigerDelta’,Availableat:<http://www.nationalgeo-graphic.com>Accessedon:3April2011.
4 Reno,William(1998)Warlord Politics and African States.Boulder,COandLondon:LynneRienner.
5 Ibid.
6 Ukeje,Charles(2011)ChangingtheParadigmofPacification:OilandMilitarizationinNigeria’sNigerDelta.InObi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(eds)op.cit.,p.94.
7 Obi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(2011)Petro-violenceintheNigerDelta–TheComplexPoliticsofanInsurgency.InObi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(eds)op.cit.,p.6.
8 Ibid.,p.7.
9 O’Neill,Tom(2007)op.cit.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Obi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(2011)Petro-violenceintheNigerDelta–TheComplexPoliticsofanInsurgency.InObi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(eds)op.cit.p.6.
13 Duquet,Nils(2011)SwampedwithWeapons:TheProliferationofIllicitSmallArmsandLightWeaponsintheNigerDelta.InObi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(eds)op.cit.
14 Ukeje,Charles(2011)op.cit.
15 Zalik,Anna(2011)LabellingOil,ContestingGovernance:LegalOil.com,theGMoUandProfiteeringintheNigerDelta.InObi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(eds)op.cit.
16 UNODC(2010)‘TheDestabilizingInfluenceofDrugTrafficking:TheCaseofCocaine’,UNODCWorldDrugReport2010,Availableat:<http://www.unodc.org>Accessedon:18February2011.
17 O’Neill,Tom(2007)op.cit.
18 Idemudia,Uwafiokun(2011)CorporateSocialResponsibilityandtheNigerDeltaConflict:IssuesandProspects.InObi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(eds)op.cit.
Nigeria’sOilDictatorship’,(video)Availableat:<http://www.democracynow.org>Accessedon:26February2011.
20 (2000)‘VoluntaryPrinciplesonSecurityandHumanRights’,Availableat:<http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org>Accessedon:2April2011.
21 Idemudia,Uwafiokun(2011)op.cit.
22 Zalik,Anna(2011)op.cit.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.p.199
25 AmnestyInternational(2011)‘ShellAccusedoverMisleadingFiguresonNigeriaOilSpills’,AmnestyInternationalReport,25January2011,Availableat:<http://www.amnesty.org>Accessedon:19February2011.
FAILURE TO MAINTAIN OIL FACILITIES
ADEQUATELy, FREQUENT OIL LEAKS
AND GAS FLARES HAVE WREAKED
WIDESPREAD DAMAGE ON THE
ECOSySTEM OF THE DELTA STATES,
AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES FIND
THEMSELVES IN THE PRECARIOUS
SITUATIONOFHAVINGTHEIRVILLAGES
BULLDOZED TO MAKE WAy FOR
FURTHER ExPANSION OF ENERGy
INFRASTRUCTURE–ASHASBEENTHE
CASESEVERALTIMESINTHEPAST
conflict trends I 55
For centuries, the world has become dependent on
energyproductionandconsumptiontopropelitseconomic
growth.StartingwiththeDutchpeatindustry,andevolving
fromBritishcoal toAmericanoil, fossil fuelshavedriven
states to world dominance and commercial expansion.
It is “through new energy sources, new tools, and new
marketconnections”thattheworldhas“acquiredgreater
and greater leverage over the environment”, the effects
of which were almost entirely ignored.1 yet many of the
benefitsrealisedbythisprocessofindustrialisationcameat
theexpenseoftheAfricancontinent–aprocessthatbegan
a trend of ostracising local people from discussions on
resourcedistribution.
It is this relationship between the global north and
AfricathatCamillaToulminbuildsuponin Climate Change
in Africa.Shearguesearlyonthatthosewhobenefitfrom
accesstocertainresourcesaretypicallythosewhohavethe
least tosayabout theirmanagement inAfrica.Toulmin’s
bookfocusesonkeyenvironmentalfactorsthatplayarole
inshapingthecontinentastheglobalclimatechanges.Her
chaptersexaminefood,water,forests,cities,conflict,climate
trendsandcarboneconomiestohighlighthowthosewho
willbemostpronetotheeffectsofglobalclimatechange
willultimatelyhavetheleasttosayabouttheirmanagement.
She offers a comprehensive look at each dilemma, and
suggests tangible ways to improve the situation. The
author recognises the hype about “global warming”,
but sets herself apart by establishing an unambiguous
frameworktohelpreadersunderstandwhatisgoingonand
howproblemsmightbeaddressed.Asthedirectorofthe
InternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopmentin
London,UnitedKingdom,shehasadiversebackgroundin
economicsanditsrelationshiptotheenvironment.Muchof
Climate Change in Africalooksatbroadertrends,usingcase
studiesandotherexamplestohighlighttheurgencyofthese
problemsandthepossibilitiesfortheirimprovement.
Toulmin’s organisation of the book helps lay out a
foundationforheranalysis.Shepositionsthecasestudies
she presents with an overview of climate change in the
firstandsecondchapters,providingacontextforAfrica’s
environmentalstanding.Sheemphasisesthatsmallchanges
intemperaturecanhavevasteffectsacrossthecontinent.
Increasedaridity,sealevelrise,limitationsonfreshwater
anddeforestationareonlysomefactorsthatwillaffectthe
continentinthenearfuture.Muchoftherestofthebookis
dedicatedtolookingatspecificresourcesandareaswhere
theymaybecomestrained.Forexample,sheexaminesthe
importanceofplanning forwatershortagesata regional
level anddiscusseshowagricultural scienceshavedone
littletobenefitAfrica.Inthechapteraboutforests,Toulmin
discusses how deforestation has reduced the ability for
the earth to absorb carbon and to regulate moisture
in local ecosystems. Her analyses are detailed, yet not
overwhelming.Shehasclearlymadeanefforttopackage
theeffectsofclimateconcisely,butprovidessignificantdata
andevidencetoargueherthesiswell.Complementingher
Author CamillaToulminyear 2009Publisher ZedBooksISBN 9781848130159Pages 172
Book reviewREVIEWEDBymAxWELLg.HARDy
climate change in africa
56 I conflict trends conflict trends I 56
CONFLICT TRENDS
Editor-In-Chief
VasuGounden
managingEditor
VenashriPillay
LanguageEditor
HaleyHarvey
Design&Layout
ImminsNaudé
Contributors
FathimaAhmed
SaloméBronkhorst
MelissaCawthra
ShukriaDini
FanaGebresenbet
MaxwellG.Hardy
FlorianKrampe
MarcelLeroy
AshokSwain
WilliamTsuma
SaloméBronkhorstisacknowledgedforherassistanceinplanningthisIssue.
Publisher
TheAfricanCentreforthe
ConstructiveResolutionofDisputes
(ACCORD)
PrivateBagx018
UmhlangaRocks4320
SouthAfrica
Tel:+27-031-5023908
Fax:+27-031-5024160
Email:[email protected]
Website:<www.accord.org.za>
ACCORDisanon-governmental,
non-alignedconflictresolution
institutionbasedinDurban,South
Africa.Theinstitutionisconstituted
asaneducationaltrust.Views
expressedinthispublicationare
theresponsibilityoftheindividual
authorsandnotofACCORD.
ConflictTrendsisaquarterly
publication.Backissuescanbe
downloadedfromtheACCORD
websiteat<www.accord.org.za>
ISSN1561-9818
PrintingColourPlanet,Durban,SouthAfrica
evidenceinthechaptersaresectionswithexamplesthatcontributetoherargument.Asan
example,partofthechapteraboutcitiesdiscussesGaborone–thecapitalofBotswana–where
thereisa47%povertyrate,poorsanitationandlowwatersupply.Thesefactshelpsolidify
Toulmin’soverallargumentaboutthevulnerabilityofcitiestoclimatechange.
Anotherimportantchapteroutlinesthetrendsbetweenconflictandenvironmentalscarcity–
or the lack thereof.Toulminweighs inonadebate thatwasstarted largelywithThomas
Homer-Dixon’sworkbeginningintheearly1990s.Hearguedthatenvironmentalpushfactors
contributeddirectlyto“acuteconflict”,including“scarcitydisputesbetweencountries,clashes
betweenethnicgroups,andcivilstrifeandinsurgency.”2Toulminassertsthatthelinksthat
Homer-Dixonandothersdrewbetweenenvironmentandconflictare largelyexaggerated
andthattheirpathofcausalityisfrequentlyflawed.“Thisapparentcausallinkisnotsoclear
inpractice,”sheargues,andpointsoutexampleswhereviolencedidnotevolveintimesof
resourcescarcity(p.216).Sheiscarefulnottodebunktheideacompletelythattheenvironment
caneventuallycontributetotensionthough,andoutlinesseveralflashpointswhereviolence
couldoccurinthefuture,ifcoupledwithpoorgovernance.
Toulmin’scentralargumentispersuasivethroughout.Sheisdeliberateinoutliningwhat
areasarepronetotransformationastheglobalclimatechanges,andprovidesspecificsteps
thatnationscantaketoaddresstheseproblems. Climate Change in Africadiscussesmany
programmesandinternationalagreementsthatareconstructiveorhaveshortcomings.As
awomanwithabackgroundineconomics,sheis interestedinexploringdifferentwaysto
priceecologicalgoodsandservices.Inherchapteraboutforests,forexample,shediscusses
proposalsforaReducedEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradation(REDD)scheme.The
systemisbasedonthevalueofcarboninexistingtrees,assumingthattreesareworthmore
aliveandstandingthandeadandasourfurniture.But,asshepointsout,assigningvalueto
differentpartsofanecosystemislargelydependentonthestakeholdersinvolved.Thereason
Ethiopiancoffeeissoprofitableisbecauseitisassignedapricebytheglobalmarket,touse
oneexample.Itemslikelivingforestsorflowingriversseemtoholdlessvaluebecausethese
factorsholdnomonetaryvaluetomany.Asaneconomist,Toulmincanwriteaboutinternational
agreementsornewpricingschemes,butmanyoftheproblemsAfricafacesarefarmorelocal
thantheseapproacheswouldletusbelieve–afactsheherselfpointsout. Climate Change
in Africalooksatregionalissues,butfrequentlyseemstosuggesttop-downapproachesas
solutions.Atonepoint,Toulminaddsthe“informaleconomy”toalistofproblemsinGaborone,
Botswana.yettheso-calledinformalsectorinmanywayspromotesupwardmobilityitself,of
whichDurban,SouthAfrica–acityshehighlightsastheonlyofitskindtohaveaspecificplan
tobattleglobalclimatechange–isagreatexample.Thebookdoesagreatjobofexamining
solutionsusingtheformaleconomyandinternationalagreements,butperhapsinarevisionof
thebookToulminmightaddmorecasestudiesthatlookatbottom-upsolutionsaswell.
ClimateChangeinAfricaisanexcellentoverallguidetoclimatechangeonthecontinent,
andappropriatelyarguesthatmanyofthecountriesmostpronetoradicalchangesintheir
environmentsoftenhave the leastability tospeakabout it.Thisbook isauseful tool for
anyonestartingresearchonenvironmentallymotivatedissuesinAfrica,andinmanyplaces
focusesevenmoredeeplyandmoreeloquentlythanotherbodiesofliteratureonthesame
topic.ThecombinationofasignificantrelianceoncasestudiesandexpertisemakesToulmin’s
bookessentialforunderstandingglobalclimatechange,andforadvocatingtheimportanceof
includingcountriesmostlikelytofeelitseffectsintotheglobalconversation.
maxwell Hardy was a Research Intern at ACCoRD’s Knowledge ProductionDepartment, and studies InternationalRelations andEnvironmentalStudies atRhodesCollegeintheUnitedStates.
Endnotes1 McNeill,JohnRobert(2001)Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-
Century World.Newyork:W.W.Norton&Company,p.297.
2 Homer-Dixon,ThomasF.(1991)OntheThreshold:EnvironmentalChangesasCausesofAcuteConflict.International Security,16(2).