Ct 2011 2(1)

Env i r onmen t , C l ima te Change and Con f l i c t

ISSUE 2 , 2011

conflict trends I 1

EDITORIAL 2 byVasuGounden

3 ClimateChange–ConflictNexus:Frameworkfor

Policy-orientedAction

byWilliamTsuma

9 ClimateConflictsintheHornofAfrica?

byMarcelLeroyandFanaGebresenbet

16 TransboundaryRiversandClimateChange:Africanand

AsianRivers

byAshokSwainandFlorianKrampe

22 KeySocialVulnerabilitiestoClimateChangeinSouth

Africa’sCoastalZones:ThePotentialforConflict

byFathimaAhmed

29 AddressingClimate-relatedConflict:HumanSecurityand

LessonsfromtheSouthernSahelianBeltofSudan

bySaloméBronkhorst

38 AddressingCharcoalProduction,Environmental

DegradationandCommunalViolenceinSomalia:TheUse

ofSolarCookersinBanderBeyla

byShukriaDini

46 CollusionandCriminalisation:FuelConflictintheNiger

Delta

byMelissaCawthra

55 ClimateChangeinAfrica

byMaxwellG.Hardy

FEATURES

contentsct2|2011

BOOK REVIEW

2 I conflict trends

ByVASUgoUNDEN

editorial

VasugoundenistheFounderandExecutiveDirectorofACCoRD.

AsDurban,SouthAfrica,preparesforthe17thmeeting

oftheConferenceofthePartiestotheKyotoProtocolin

Novemberthisyear,theworldisrecoveringfromaseries

of climate and environmental-related disasters, which

haveoccurredoverthepastfewyears.TheIndianOcean

tsunami,HurricaneKatrina,theHaitiearthquake,theNew

Zealandearthquake, theJapanesetsunamiandnuclear

crisis,amongothers,havekilledandaffectedmillions.

At the same time, silent and slower disasters related

totheeffectsofnaturalandanthropogenicclimateand

environmentalchangesareaffectingbillions–especially

poor people who depend on the environment for their

livelihood.

Sudden disasters and slow-onset environmental

changeshavethepotentialtotriggerconflicts,especially

in situations where people are already vulnerable and

wherethesocio-economic,politicalandculturalcontext

exacerbatesexistingtensions.Watersecurityisarelated–

andperhapsoneof themostserious–strategic issues

ofourtime.Approximately18MiddleEasternandNorth

African countries – some already prone to instability

and conflict – are at extreme risk of water insecurity.

Notwithstandingthepotential forconflict intheMiddle

East and North Africa, some argue that water scarcity

andtheresultanthighfoodpricesarekeyfactorsinthe

MaghrebandMiddleEastuprisings.

InAsia,glacialretreat inKashmir isaffecting India–

Pakistanrelations,whileinAfricaitisuncertainwhether

the Nile Basin Initiative will weather climate change

challenges and other regional political tensions. The

ThirdPole–ortheHindu-KushHimalayaregioninAsia–

ishometo10majorriversystemsthatprovidewaterto

morethan20%oftheworld’spopulation–Bangladeshis,

Pakistanis, Afghans, Indians, Chinese, Nepalese and

others depend on it. The area is already susceptible

to natural disasters and high levels of warming,

earthquakes,glacialmeltingandsea-levelrise.

In Africa, in addition to serious water insecurity

predictedforsub-SaharanAfricaresultingfromdroughts,

desertificationandotherclimaticevents,theNileisthe

longest river in the world with the greatest number of

riparianstates(10)drawingonitswaterfor livelihoods

and as a source of energy for industry and homes.

Situatedinoneoftheharshestclimatesintheworld,the

Nile’ssensitivitytoclimatechangeandexistingtensions

overthesharingofitswatersalsocreatethepotentialfor

conflict.

Theseglobalchallengesaredaunting,andacademics,

practitioners and policy makers in conflict resolution

shouldnotonlyfocusonhumanresponsibilityforclimate

changebut,moreimportantly,ontheimplicationsofthe

environmentandclimatechangeforhumansecurityand

conflict.Ourfocusshouldbeonprovidingnewknowledge

andupdatedanalyses,newpoliciesandpracticaltoolsfor

conflict-sensitiveclimatechangeadaptation.Ourconcern

shouldbeforvulnerableindividualsandcommunities,to

reduce theirvulnerabilityandpreventandmitigate the

effects of environmental change and water insecurity,

and thus prevent related conflicts. Our assistance to

government and civil society in developing policies

and creating interventions to reduce vulnerability and

ensuringclimateandconflictsensitiveadaptationisvital.

As an African conflict resolution organisation that

aimstohaveaglobalimpactanddealwiththegreatest

conflict issues of our time, the African Centre for the

ConstructiveResolutionofDisputes’objectiveistoplay

a proactive role in mitigating and preventing climate

change-relatedconflicts.Weknow that climatechange

will, at the very least, increase existing stressors and

magnify current socio-economic and political factors

thatcouldtriggerandexacerbateconflict.Buthowwill

thishappen?Whatare thedynamicsatplay?Are there

lessonsfromexistingenvironmentalconflictsthatcould

be applied now and in the future to deal with such

challenges?Thesearejustsomeofthequestionsthatwe

seektoanswer,throughthispublication,andthroughour

ongoingworkonthiscriticaltopic.

conflict trends I 3

Introduction

“Thedevastatingdroughtthataffectedlargeareasof

Kenya in 2009 and the upsurge in inter-community

violence in the north of the country highlighted

an apparent connection between climate change

and conflict. However, the evidence-base for this

connectionislimitedanditisthereforeimperativeto

analyzehowthesefactorsinteractinrealityratherthan

tomakeassumptions.”1

The above quote provides the basis on which this

articleiswritten.Thisarticlebridgestheclimatechange-

conflict gap by providing a framework or lens through

whichpolicy-actionresearchonthenexusbetweenclimate

changeandconflictcanbedesignedand implemented.

Theframeworkthatissuggestedisderivedfromspecific

fieldcasesandexperiences,aswellasareviewofrelevant

literaturebybothacademicsandpractitionersinthefield.

Thearticlebeginswithabriefdiscussionoftheconcept

ofclimatechange,asprovidedbytheIntergovernmental

PanelonClimateChange(IPCC).Thisdiscussionisthen

linkedtoclimatechangehazards,whereitisarguedthat

climatechangedoesnothappeninavacuum,butratherit

Climate Change–ConfliCt nexus: framework for PoliCy-oriented aCtionByWILLIAmTSUmA

Above:TheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange’s2007reportrecognisedthatwaterscarcityhasincreasedand predicted that it will continue to increase inthefuture.

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is embedded in a socio-ecological system. Climate

changehazards,therefore,createimbalancesinthesocio-

ecologicalsystemthathavethepotentialtoexacerbateor

eventriggerviolence insomecontexts.Having laid this

foundation, three analysis tools are suggested. These

provide a lens through which policy recommendations

onthenexusbetweenclimatechangeandconflictcanbe

properlyunderstood.

ClimateChange

AccordingtotheIPCC’shistoricaloverviewofclimate

science,inits2007report,onemustfirstunderstandthe

system of climate (see Figure 1) before understanding

whatismeantbyclimatechange.Climateinitselfrefers

totheaverageweather–includingtemperaturevariances,

precipitation and wind – over a select period of time.

It is important to understand that the earth’s climate

system evolves over time due to natural occurrences,

aswellasduetohuman influences.Anexampleof this

has led towhat isoften referred toasglobalwarming,

wherean increaseduseandcirculationof ‘greenhouse’

gases – which partially trap long-wave radiation to the

earth’s surface – have led to a warmer earth surface.

This, in turn,warmssurroundingecosystemsand leads

torapidlymeltingglaciers,whichaffectsalllevelsofthe

climate system.2 Climate change over a period of time

thendisruptsthenormalfunctioningoftheecosystemthat

interactswithhumans,andaffectshowtheyaccesscertain

vitalresourcesfortheirsurvival.

ClimateChangeHazardsasDriversforViolence

The disruption of the normal functioning of an

ecosystemdue toclimatechange iswhat is referred to

asclimatechangehazards.Theseincludefloodingdueto

heavyrains,erraticweatherseasonsand,insomeareas,

prolongeddryspells.Whatwevisualiseinrealityisthen

heavy droughts and famine, unproductive farmlands

duetowatershortageand,insomecaseslikeinSudan,

extended deserts. These climate change hazards or

impacts are rarely – if ever – the sole cause of violent

conflict.However,theincreasedevidenceofthesehazards

canbeimplicatedinallphasesoftheconflictcycle–from

contributingtotheoutbreakandperpetuationofviolence

to undermining prospects for peace and security.3

Inthefollowingsection,someofthesehazardsarebriefly

discussedandanargument forhowtheirmanifestation

Figure1:TheVaryingComponentsoftheClimateSystem4

Changes in the Ocean:Cirulation, Sea Level, Biogeochemistry

Changes in/on the Land Surface:Orography, Land Use, Vegetation, Ecosystems

Changes in the Cryosphere:

Snow, Frozen Ground, Sea Ice, Ice Sheets,

Glaciers

Changes in the Atmosphere:Composition, Cirulation

Changes in the Hydrological Cycle

N2, O2, Ar, H2O, Co2, CH4, N2O, O3 etc.

Aerosols

Human Influences

Atmosphere-Ice Interaction

Atmosphere-Biosphere Interaction La

nd-A

tmos

pher

e In

tera

ctio

n

Soil-Biosphere Interaction

Atmosphere

Biosphere

Land Surface

Volcanic Activity

SeaIce

Ice Sheet

Clouds

Glacier

Changes inSolar Inputs

Ice-Ocean Coupling

Hydrosphere:Ocean

Hydrosphere:Rivers and Lakes

Terrestrial Radiation

Precipitation Evaporation

Heat

Exc

hang

e

Win

d St

ress

conflict trends I 5

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ExpansionofthedesertsinAfricahasledpastoraliststoencroachontofarmlandsforwaterandpasture.

has the potential for driving conflicts, especially in

developingcountries,ispresented.

1. ClimateChange-inducedEnvironmentalDegradation

Irregular weather patterns, influenced by heavy

rainfall in some regionsandstrongsunshine inothers,

leads to environmental degradation by lowering the

environmentalconditionsnecessaryforhumansurvival.

SuhrkehighlightstensionsinSudanduetotheexpansion

of the desert.5 According to his analysis, expansion of

thedesertdoesnotmanifestinavacuum,butratherina

socio-ecologicalsystemwherepeopleareforcedtoseek

alternativesourcesoflivelihood.Heusestheexampleof

nomadicpastoralists,whofoundthemselvesincreasingly

limitedandrestrictedintheirsearchforpastureandwater.

His analysis revealed that an increase in the incidents

of armed violence between pastoralist communities

and farming groups was largely due to pastoralists

encroachingontofarmlandsforwaterandpasture.This

wasbecausethespreadingdesertlinkedtoclimatechange

had eradicated all the pasture and water corridors that

servedasbuffersduringthedryseasons.Thisobservation

isverysimilar toSaferworld’s6viewofnorthernKenya,

aswellasWalker’s7perspectiveon thedrystretches in

Senegal,wherepastoralistandfarmingdisputeshaveled

toviolentconflicts.

CLIMATE CHANGE OVER A PERIOD OF

TIME THEN DISRUPTS THE NORMAL

FUNCTIONING OF THE ECOSySTEM

THAT INTERACTSWITHHUMANS,AND

AFFECTS HOW THEy ACCESS CERTAIN

VITALRESOURCESFORTHEIRSURVIVAL

6 I conflict trends

Erratic rainfallhas reduced theavailablewater for irrigating farmlandsandhindered theexpansionofpasturesforanimals.

2.ClimateChange-inducedNaturalResourceScarcity

Building on the discussion on environmental

degradation,climatechangedoesplayadirectroleinthe

shrinkage of key natural resources – for example, land

andwater.TheIPCC’s2007reportplacesspecialemphasis

onwaterby lookingatwatersystems, floodsandwater

sources. The report recognises that water scarcity has

increased – and is predicted to continue to increase

in the future. This can be argued to be an outcome of

unusualerraticrainfallpatterns,prolongeddryspellsand

drought.Forexample,floodingasaclimatechangehazard

reducestheamountoflandavailableforfoodproduction

and other farm-based activities, while droughts due to

erratic and irregular rainfall reduce the water available

to communities that depend on rain-fed agriculture

and animal-rearing for their livelihoods.8 This can be a

driverforsocialtensionsandviolenceinsomecontexts,

especiallythosepronetoresource-basedconflicts.

Agoodexample isdemonstrated in theKaseseand

ArualocationsofnorthernUganda.9Thesetwolocations

dependlargelyonrain-fedagricultureforboththeirfood

productionandincome-generationactivities.Asignificant

numberof inhabitants fromthese two locationsrelyon

large tracks of pasture and water for their pastoralist

livelihoods. Empirical evidence from these regions

demonstrates that, over a period of time, continued

climate change leading to erratic rainfall has not only

reducedtheavailablewaterforirrigatingfarmlands,but

hasalsohinderedtheexpansionofpasturesfortheanimal

keepers.Duringthedryseasons,pastoralistcommunities

havehadtoleadtheiranimalsintofarmlandsinsearchof

pasture–apracticethathasledtoincreasedtensionsand

conflictsbetween the farmingandpastoralistgroups.10

Competition over these scarce resources induced by

climatechangehas,insomecases,resultedinviolentand

destructiveconflict.

3.ClimateChange-inducedmigration

A third dimension for investigating the climate

change–conflict nexus is that of migration. Statistics

revealthat,in2008,1.4billionoftheworld’sinhabitants

in developing countries alone relied on agriculture for

their food production and income generation. Close to

98%ofthesamegroupwereemployedintheagricultural

sector.11 The climate change hazards described above

either leadto thedestructionof landresourcesthrough

flooding or desertification, on the one hand, and

shrinkage of available ecological resources like water,

ontheother.Thishasadirectimpactonfoodproduction

and income-generation efforts, while also reducing

employment opportunities for the majority of people

livingindevelopingcountries. Increasedfoodshortages

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conflict trends I 7

andthereductionofemploymentopportunitiesasaresult

ofdiminishedfarm-basedactivitieshasbeenacauseand

source of rapid outward migration in Africa. In Ghana,

for example, the movement of rural communities from

thedrierpartsofthenorthernregion,wheretherainsare

erratic, to themoreecologicallystablesouth,hasbeen

arguedtobeathreattoexistingresourcesinthesouth–

leadingtosocialtensionsandconflicts.12In-migrationdue

toclimatechange-inducedfactorsisnowdrivingdebates

on climate change conflict issues. Increased migration

generally means that populated areas simply become

morepopulated–especiallywhen there isamovement

ofpeoplefromruralareastourbanareas.Theincreased

concentrationofpeople leads to increasedcompetition,

bothfornaturalresourcesandforgovernmentassistance.

Figure2:FrameworkfortheAnalysisandUnder-

standingoftheClimateChange–ConflictNexus.

Policyand

ResearchImplications

Thisarticlebeganby

arguingthatscientificandpolicy-relatedresearchneeds

to invest indocumentingspecific casesasevidence, to

demonstratethelinksbetweenclimatechangeandarmed

violence.Therelationshipneeds tobegroundedon the

systematic analysis of trends and how these relate to

humanbehaviourandchoices.Theframeworkproposed

inFigure2 is a frameworkof analysis that couldguide

theworkof such researchefforts.Whileunderstanding

that climate hazards provide useful evidence about

environmentalchange, investigatinghowthesehazards

influencehumanbehaviour intermsofpeople’schoices

andactionsinpursuitoftheirlivelihoodswillbecrucial.

Climate change, as discussed in this article, leads to

environmental degradation, which has an impact on

availablenaturalresources.Competinglivelihoodsystems

in communities – especially those residing in fragile

ecological systems–are subjected to stiff competition,

leading tosocial tensionsand, insomecases,violence.

Inotherincidences,environmentallyinducedmigration–

be it by nomadic communities, farming groups or

displacedpeople–hascontributed tocompetitionover

shrinkingresourcesinhostcommunities,andisarecipe

for violence. Policy research should, therefore, focus

on providing empirical evidence around these three

climate change hazards as building blocks towards

understanding the climate change

and conflict nexus. From a policy

perspective, investments geared

at address ing c l imate change

issues ought to integrate conflict-

sensitiveapproachestoresilienceor

adaptation, to ensure that conflict-

prevention measures become an

integralaspectofanyclimatechange

interventions.

WilliamTsumaistheProgrammemanager of global Partnershipfor the Prevention of ArmedConflict’s (gPPAC) PreventiveAction and Human SecurityPrograms. He also coordinatesgPPAC’sactivitiesinthesouthern

and western Africa regionsrespectively.Thisarticlerepresents

theviewsoftheauthoralone.

Endnotes1 Saferworld(2008)‘WaterandConflict:MakingWaterDelivery

Conflict-sensitiveinUganda’,Availableat:<http://www.safer-world.org.uk/publications.php/355/water_and_conflict>.

2 LeTreut,HerveandSomerville,Richardetal.(2007).HistoricalOverviewofClimateChange.InClimate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.ContributionofWorkingGroupItotheFourthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

3 Christensen,JensHesselbjergandHewitson,Bruceetal.(2007)RegionalClimateProjections.InClimate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.ContributionofWorkingGroupIto

Climate

changehazards

destabilisetheusual

functioningofasocial-

ecologicalsystem.This

couldbeacountry,

regionorvillage.

Climate

change–

naturalresource

scarcityand

conflict

Climate

change–

induced

migrationand

conflict

Climate

change–

environmental

degradationand

conflict

8 I conflict trends8 I conflict trends

theFourthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

4 Brzoska,Michael(2010)ClimateChangeasaDriverofSecurityPolicy.PaperpreparedforSGIR2010,heldon9–11September.Stockholm:InstituteforPeaceResearchandSecurityPolicy.

5 Suhrke,Astri(1993)Pressure Points:Environmental Degradation, Migration and Conflict.OccasionalPaperofProjectonEnvironmentalChangeandAcuteConflict.Washington,DC:AmericanAcademyofArtsandSciences.

6 TheConservationDevelopmentCentre(CDC),theInternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment(IISD)andSaferworld(2009)Climate Change and Conflict – Lessons from Community Conservancies in Northern Kenya.Nairobi,WinnipegandLondon:CDC,IISDandSaferworld.

7 Walker,B.H.,Anderies,J.M.,Kinzig,A.P.andRyan,P.(2006)ExploringResilienceinSocial-ecologicalSystemsThroughComparativeStudiesandTheoryDevelopment:IntroductiontotheSpecialIssue.Ecology and Society,11(1),p.12.Availableat:<http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art12/>.

8 OxfamNovib(2010)The Right to a Sustainable Rural Livelihood: Strategies, Lessons Learned and Actions (2008–2010).TheHague:OxfamNovib.

9 Saferworld(2008),op.cit.

10 Pantuliano,SaraandPavanello,Sara(2009)Taking Drought into Account: Addressing Chronic Vulnerability among Pastoralists in the Horn and East Africa.HPGPolicyBrief,35.London:OverseasDevelopmentInstitute.

11 OxfamNovib(2010),op.cit.

12 Laube,Wolfram,Awo,MarthaandBenjaminSchraven(2008)Erratic Rains and Erratic Markets: Environmental Change, Economic Globalisation and the Expansion of Shallow Groundwater Irrigation in West Africa.ZEFWorkingPaperSeries.Bonn:CentreforDevelopmentResearch,UniversitätBonn;andTsuma,W.(2010)Gold Mining in Ghana – Actors, Alliances and Power. Berlin:ZEFDevelopmentStudies.

Climatechange-inducedmigrationisasignificantconflictfactorinAfrica.Peoplemoveawayfromclimatechangehazardstomoreecologicallystableareas,buttheincreasedconcentrationofpeopleleadstoincreasedcompetitionforresourcesandtensions.

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conflict trends I 9

Asclimatechangehasmovedupthepoliticalagenda

over the last twodecades, therehasbeenaconcomitant

increase in the number of scientific exercises dealing

withenvironmentalandclimatesecurity.On thebroader

issueofenvironmentalsecurity,therehasbeenagrowing

understandingofthewaysinwhichenvironmentalscarcity

may triggerviolentconflict.Before thisdebate regarding

theroleofenvironmentaldegradationandscarcity issues

inthecausationofconflictswasfullysettled,however,the

morespecificaspectofclimatechangecametothefore.The

phenomenonofclimatechangehassocio-economic,political

anddemographic(throughmigration)impacts,whichmany

fear will lead to increased societal tensions and violent

conflict.

Thisarticlefocusesontheclimatechange–conflictnexus

intheHornofAfrica(HoA)–aregionthathasexperienced

highconflictlevels,andisalsopronetoclimaticfluctuations

and natural disasters. Are the two phenomena causally

linked? Will the impact of climate change worsen the

prospectsforstabilityintheHoA?

Climate ConfliCts in the horn of afriCa?BymARCELLERoyANDFANAgEBRESENBET1

Above: Higher surface temperatures in Africa willnegativelyaffectagriculturalproductivityandeconomicperformance,therebyraisingtheincidenceofcivilunrestandconflicts.

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10 I conflict trends

TheFearofClimateConflicts

Theyear2007wasawatershedintermsofliteratureon

thesecurityaspectsofclimatechange. Itwasinthisyear

thatboththeAfricanUnion(AU)andtheSecurityCouncil

oftheUnitedNations(UN)heldtheirfirst-everdebateson

thesecurityimplicationsofclimatechange.Thesentiment

duringtheAUdebatesisbestcapturedbythewordsofthe

Ugandanpresident,yoweriMuseveni.Helabelledclimate

change an “act of aggression by the developed world”

anddemandedcompensation.AtthedebateinNewyork,

the Namibian representative to the UN, Kaire Mbuende,

equatedthecontinuedemissionofgreenhousegasesbythe

developedworldwith“low-intensitybiologicalorchemical

warfare”. At the same meeting, Margaret Becket, former

UnitedKingdom(UK)ForeignSecretary,recognisedthatthe

“consequences[ofclimatechange]reachtotheveryheartof

thesecurityagenda”.2

Thesameyearalsosaw thecommissioningofmajor

worksonthesecurityimplicationsofclimatechangebythe

GermanandUnitedStates(US)governments.3TheGerman

studyfocusesonhowgovernanceandpoliticalsystemsare

expected tobeaffectedbyclimatechange,and identifies

fourpathwaysthroughwhichclimatechangeandconflict

risk may be linked: degradation of freshwater resources;

declining food production; increases in extreme weather

events;andenvironmentallyinducedmigration.Themilitary

officerscommissionedby theUSDepartmentofDefence

contendthat“projectedclimatechangeposesaseriousrisk

toAmerica’snationalsecurity”4,simultaneouslystatingthat

security impactswillbemoresevereunderconditionsof

weakgovernance,hencelikelytoaffectthedevelopingworld

moreprofoundly.

Politicians and journalists often use more alarmist

languagewhenlinkingclimatechangeandconflict.In2007,

UNSecretary-GeneralBanKiMooncalledclimatechange

the“culprit”fortheDarfurcrisis.Followingthesamelineof

reasoning,FrenchpresidentNicolasSarkozywarned:“Ifwe

keepgoingdownthispath,climatechangewillencourage

migration….TheDarfurcrisiswillbeonlyonecrisisamong

dozensofothers.”5

IsThereEvidencetoLinkClimateChangetoConflict?

Globally, the most convincing work linking climate

change and conflict is based on data for the northern

hemisphere. Zhang et al.6 showed that the frequency of

conflictbetween1400and1900wasconsiderablyhigherin

colderyears.ThisfindingappliesbothtowesternEurope

andtoChina,withtheincidenceofconflictsduringtheLittle

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The loss of household assets - in particular, livestock - due to droughts, has affected livelihoods and led towidespreadfamine.

Anarmedherderleadshisgoatsashelooksforpastureinadryregion.

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IceAge–inthefirsthalfofthe17thcentury–inbothregions

beingaboutdoublethatformilderperiods.

A substantial body of qualitative research tries to

establish a link between climate change and conflict,

focusing on Africa.7 Using different warming scenarios,

the researchers study which conditions will increase the

likelihoodand/ortheintensityofconflicts.Theyalsoattempt

toestablishpathwaysthroughwhichphysicalmanifestations

ofclimatechangemayleadtovarioussocio-economicand

political impacts – and, if not managed well, to violent

conflict.Theseresearcherscouldbecategorisedascautious

inlinkingclimatechangedirectlywithincreasedconflict.

Quantitativefindingsaboutthesecurityimplicationsof

climatechangeinAfricaarenotnumerousandarerather

contradictory.Burkeetal.8analysedhistoricaltemperature

and civil war linkages and concluded that temperature

increases coincided with a higher incidence of civil war.

TheyexpectthathighersurfacetemperaturesinAfricawill

negatively affect agricultural productivity and economic

performance, therebyraisingthe incidenceofcivilunrest

andofconflicts.

HendrixandGlaserarguethatconflictismorelikelyif

climateactsasatrigger(asaresultofextremesinclimate

variability)ratherthanasaresultoflong-termtrends(climate

change).Theyarguethatlowrainfallinagivenseasonor

yearyieldsahigherprobabilityofcausingconflict in the

followingyear thanacontinuouslydecreasingtrendover

decades.Severalauthorstrytoestablishmigration–induced

throughclimate-affectedchangesintheenvironment–as

themainpathwaythroughwhichclimatechangeleadsto

conflict.However,others report ratherdifferent findings,

arguingthatclimatechangecannotexplainAfrica’scivilwars

andthat–onthebasisofareviewofrainfalldataforseveral

decades – climate change is not the cause of the Darfur

crisis.9

ClimateChangeintheHornofAfrica

Lives and livelihoods in the HoA have been severely

affectedbydroughts,whichhaveledtowidespreadfamine,

oftenfannedbyill-conceivedsocio-economicpolicies.The

ensuinglossofhouseholdassets–inparticular,livestock–

meansthathouseholdsfacedifficultiesinrebuildingtheir

livelihoodsevenafterconditionshaveimproved.

TheHoAishometosomeofAfrica’spoorestpeople,and

isinhabitedbytheworld’slargestremainingconcentration

ofpastoralists.TheHoAalsoexhibitsahighlevelofhuman

insecurity,havingwitnessednumerouscivilandcommunal

wars,aswellasseveralinterstatewars–notablybetween

EthiopiaandSomalia(1977–78,1982)andbetweenEthiopia

andEritrea(1998–2002).


A review by the Institute for Environmental Security

(IES)10notesthefollowingclimaticchangesintheHoAover

thepast fewdecades:highernight-timetemperatures;an

increase in rainfall in the northern areas and a decrease

insouthernareas;andanincreaseinwetextremes,often

causingflooding.Overall,acontinuedriseintemperatures

isexpected,alongsideanincreaseinrainfall,morefrequent

extreme weather events and rising sea levels, putting

largenumbersincoastalstatesatriskfrominundationand

intensificationofstormsurges.

Theseclimatechangeswillfurtheraffectfoodsecurity.

Pastoralistsandsubsistencefarmers,whoareparticularly

vulnerable, are likely to form the bulk of eco-migrants

in the HoA. Migration has been linked to an increased

risk of conflict, as it often results in people encroaching

onto the landofother tribesorgroups,amplifyingsocial

tensions.Thelowleveloftechnologicaldevelopmentand

limitedinstitutionalcapacitywill further limittheregion’s

ability to adapt to climate change, thereby amplifying

itsconsequences.

Some studies have looked at the relation between

climateandtheincidenceofconflictamongpastoralists.One

suchstudy11 found thatviolentsocialconflicts (including

cattleraiding)inEastAfricaaremostcommoninwetyears.

Itisnotclear,however,whethersuchaconclusionadvances

explanationofthelinkbetweenclimatechangeandconflict,

ascattleraidingislinkedtocomplexsocialtraditionssuchas

thepaymentofdowrytotheparentsofaprospectivebride.

Thepracticeseemsmorerelatedtoresourcepredationthan

to desperation resulting from resource scarcity. Another

study12,analysingdatafromtheConflictEarlyWarningand

ResponseMechanismof the IntergovernmentalAuthority

on Development (IGAD-CEWARN), found that vegetation

coverratherthanprecipitationisassociatedwithahigher

incidenceofcattleraidingintheKaramojaCluster,situated

intheborderzonesofKenya,Uganda,SudanandEthiopia.

Avoidingdetectionandalesserneedtowateranimalswhile

tracking them to another destination may have greater

explanatoryvaluethanthehigherrainfallitself.

Pastoralistsandsubsistencefarmers,whoareparticularlyvulnerabletoclimatechange,arelikelytoformthebulkofeco-migrantsintheHornofAfrica.

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IsClimateChangeattheHeartoftheDarfurConflict?

Given the amount of attention which has been paid

totheconflictinDarfur–especiallyinthemassmedia–a

certainamountofsimplificationoftheissuecanbeexpected,

includingpositingadirectcausallinkwithclimatechange.

Inreality,however,thecausalityoftheDarfurconflictcan

bedisaggregatedintodifferentlevels:theperennialnatural

resource conflicts, linked with land and water resources

andexacerbatedbyclimatechange;thestrugglebetween

thegovernmentandrebelgroupsoverpoliticalpowerand

wealth; and the regional cross-border conflicts involving

neighbouringstates,inparticularChadandLibya.

A researchproject carriedout through theUniversity

forPeaceAfricaProgrammehas focusedonhowclimate

change–aswellasenvironmentalandresourcefactors–

contribute to African conflicts, with particular focus on

Darfur.13OurownresearchagreeswithfindingsofDarfur-

basedacademicsandconclusionsofinternationalscholars

whohave spentmanyyearsdoing fieldwork inwestern

Sudan:whileclimatechangeandextremeweatherevents

mayhaveactedasariskmultiplier,theycannotprovidethe

soleexplanationfor thesharp increase in intensityof the

conflictstartingin2003.

Blamingonlyclimatechangereducestheconflict toa

processoverwhichtheactorsonthegroundhavelittleor

nocontrol,virtuallyabsolvingthemofresponsibility.Sucha

stepisnotagenuineexplanation:blamingallproblemson

naturebelittleshumaningenuityandignorestheroleplayed

bysocialfactorsandpoliticalinterests.

Lack of development, coupled with the absence

of efficient natural resource management, is the main

underlying cause of the Darfur crisis. Darfur and other

peripheralareashavebeenneglectedbytheGovernment

ofSudanfordecades, leadingtoenormousdifferencesin

income levels and political influence across the country.

Sudanese governing elites have promoted irrigation

schemeslocatedincentralSudanasawaytoboostfood

productionandtosupplycommoditiesforexport,neglecting

rain-fedagricultureandpastoralism,whichhadbeen the

strengthofDarfur’seconomy.

Climate,EnvironmentandgovernanceinDarfur

Darfurhasexperiencedsevereclimaticshiftsoverrecent

decades. Reduced rainfall has turned marginal grazing

landintodesert,placingsignificantstressonthelivelihood

systemsoflocalgroups.InnorthernDarfur,a30%dropin

precipitationwasrecordedover80years.Thedroughtsof

1974–75and1984–85havealtered thediverseecological

featuresoftheregion.14

BothpastoralistsandfarmersinDarfurhavesufferedas

aresultofgovernmentfailuretoensureanadequatesupply

ofwater,andhavebecomemorevulnerabletodrought.Until

the1970s,westernSudanhadagoodshareofSudan’stotal

numberofwaterworks,pondsandhafirs(excavatedwater

storagetanks).Sincethen,lackofmaintenanceandfailure

toprovideadditionalwaterpointshassignificantlyreduced

thecapacity forwatering livestockand forsustaining the

human population. This has hampered the traditional

migrationpatternsofpastoralists: if thenumberofwater

pointsisreduced,differentpopulationgroupsandlivestock

concentrate around the remaining water sources, which

leadstolocalisedenvironmentaldegradation,andpossibly

conflict.15

Competing legalsystemsand institutionsareanother

aspectof the failureofgovernance. InDarfur, traditional

mechanisms foraddressing resourceconflictshavebeen

supersededbyinstitutionsandlawsissuedundersuccessive

Sudaneseregimes.Likewise,land-usegrantsinaccordance

with customary law were issued by the Sultan of Darfur

prior to 1916, and remained in effect after the territory’s

incorporation into Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. This was the

hakura system, which governs rights for access to land

andbestowsresponsibilities formanaging it, rather than

grantingexclusiveuseorownership.Asaresultofdiverging

legislation issuedbypost-independenceadministrations,

conflicting land-use claims have increased the level of

uncertaintyandtension.

Thestrugglebetweensedentaryfarmersandnomads,

whichhasoftenbeenadvancedas themaincauseof the

conflict,hadbeencontainedforcenturiesthroughtraditional

conflict management mechanisms and established rules

for access to land and water. It is clear that climatic

variations, as well as the governance issues mentioned

above, have affected the intensity of disagreements

over access to resources. Moreover, a quadrupling of

populationand livestocknumbersover thepast50years

placed great strains on existing land-use arrangements.

Asaresultofovergrazing,low-qualityfodderthatincluded

invasivespeciesbegantodominate–which,inturn,ledto

intensificationof theconflictasherders lackingsufficient

grazing resources began to trespass onto the lands of

sedentary farmers. Simultaneously, there has been a

AT THE DEBATE IN NEW yORK, THE NAMIBIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN, KAIRE

MBUENDE, EQUATED THE CONTINUED EMISSION OF GREENHOUSE GASES By THE

DEVELOPEDWORLDWITH“LOW-INTENSITyBIOLOGICALORCHEMICALWARFARE”


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risingtendencyamongstfarmerstocultivatemorelandto

compensate fordecliningproductivity, thus reducing the

availablestockoflandforgrazingandaffectingthecorridors

through which nomads move during their annual north–

southmigrations.

AdaptingtoClimateChangeintheHornofAfrica

While climate change is undeniable, its impact

throughout Africa has been uneven, with some regions

receivinglessrainfallwhileothersreceivemore.Continuing

shiftswilloccur,andthefuturemightnotdevelopalongthe

linesthatarecurrentlybeingpredicted.Itremainsimportant

tocarryout‘realitychecks’andreviewadaptationstrategies

andplansonaregularbasis.

Thelinkbetweenclimatechangeandconflictsimilarly

needstobeapproachedwithcaution.Whileclimaticshifts

willstraindevelopmenteffortsandhumansecurity inthe

HoA, themanner inwhich theseeffects relate toconflict

risksneedstobeinvestigatedfurther.Governanceiscrucial.

Thegovernment’sabilitytomanageandregulateaccessto

naturalresourcescanprotectagainsttheill-effectsofclimate

changeandenvironmentaldegradation.Stronginstitutions

andleadershiplimittheconsequencesofconflict,drought

andfamine;weakgovernanceworsenstheoutcomes.

The adaptive capacities of communities in the Sahel

andinsub-SaharanAfricatorespondtochangingclimatic

and ecological conditions have been quite impressive.

Pastoralistshavebeenable tosurvivebymigratingover

ASudanesewomanfromthemahlivillageinthesouthernDarfurregioncollectsrainwatertobeusedfordrinkingandcooking.


wideareasandbyadaptinglivelihoodstrategies.However,

state borders, population increase and global climate

changeareposingnewchallengestotraditionaladaptation

mechanisms.Itisimportanttounderstandhowandtowhat

extent impacts of climate change can be absorbed, and

underwhatcircumstancestheyarelikelytoleadtostrains

thatcontributetoconflicts.

Development efforts in the HoA will have to take

accountoftherisksresultingfromclimatechange.Policies

andprojectswillneed tobedesigned insuchaway that

theycaninstituteremedialmeasurestolimitthenegative

consequences of climate change. There is a growing

realisation about the need for mainstreaming such an

approach into development policy. However, concerted

efforts toacquire theunderstandinguponwhich tobase

policies to reduce thesecurity risksof climatechange in

Africaarejustgettingofftheground,suchasthroughthe

Africa, Climate Change and Security Dialogue Process

(ACCES),launchedinAddisAbabainOctober2010.16

Anychangepresentschallengesandoffersopportunities.

Increasedtemperaturesandalteredpatternsofprecipitation

intheHoAwillfurthercomplicatefoodsecurityandsocial

stability in the poorest part of the continent. yet climate

changealsooffersanopportunitytorethinkdevelopment

policy and land use. Adapting agricultural production

should be the first priority. While ‘climate wars’ are

ratherunlikely in theHoA,domesticstresses resulting in

populationdisplacementmaycauseasubstantialamount

ofupheaval.Approachestolandusethatallowthebulkof

theruralpopulationtoimprovetheirlivingstandardswhile

stayingput–suchasthroughagro-forestryandshort-cycle

vegetableandfodderproduction–wouldappeartobeafirst

lineofdefence.

Dr marcel Leroy is a Senior Researcher at theUniversityforPeace(UPEACE)AfricaProgramme.

Fana gebresenbet is a Research Assistant at theUPEACEAfricaProgramme.

Endnotes1 TheauthorswishtothankMarianneChaumelandIslay

Mactaggartfortheirvaluablecommentsandassistancewiththemanuscript.

2 Brown,O.,Hammill,A.andMcLeman,R.(2007)ClimateChangeasthe‘New’SecurityThreat:ImplicationsforAfrica.International Affairs,83(6),pp.1141–1154;andUNSCDPI,(2007)‘UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilHoldsFirstEverDebateonImpactofClimateChangeonPeace,Security,Hearingover50speakers’,Availableat:<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9000.doc.htm>Accessedon:17July2007.

3 CenterforNavalAnalysis(CNA)(2007)‘NationalSecurityandtheThreatofClimateChange’,Availableat:<www.SecurityAndClimate.cna.org>Accessedon:26March2011.

4 Thecommissionedworkscanbeaccessedat<http://eeac.hscglab.nl/files/D-WBGU_ClimateChangeRisk_Jun07.pdfandhttp://securityandclimate.cna.org/.GACGC>.

5 BanKiMoon’swordscanberetrievedfromthe15July2007editionofThe Washington Post(Availableat:<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061501857.html)>andthatofNicolasSarkozyfromAgenceFrance-Presse(AFP)(Availableat:<http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jbisWIJJP7g0ldhtFE1NE5AymCpg)>.

6 Zhang,D.D.,Brecke,P.,Lee,H.F.,He,y.andZhang,J.(2007)GlobalClimateChange,War,andPopulationDeclineinRecentHumanHistory.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,104(49).

7 SeeBrown,O.andCrawford,A.(2008)Assessing the Security Implications of Climate Change for West Africa: Country Case Studies of Ghana and Burkina Faso.IISD;Brown,O.,Hammill,A.andMcLeman,R.(2007)op.cit.;Buhaug,H.,Gleditsch,N.P.andTheisen,O.M.(2008)‘ImplicationsofClimateChangeforArmedConflict’,Availableat:<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ExTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/BGT_presentation.pdf>Accessedon:26March2011.

8 Burke,M.B.,Miguel,E.,Satyanath,S.,Dykema,J.A.andLobell,D.B.(2009)WarmingIncreasestheRiskofCivilWarinAfrica.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,106(49).

9 Thesourcesusedinthisparagraphare:Hendrix,C.andGlaser,S.(2007)TrendsandTriggers:Climate,ClimateChangeandCivilConflictinSub-SaharanAfrica.Political Geography,26(6),pp.695–715;formigration-relatedstudies,seeGleditsch,N.P.,Nordas,R.andSalehyan,I.(2007)Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration Link.CopingwithCrisisWorkingPaperSeries,May2007;andReuveny,R.(2007)ClimateChange-inducedMigrationandViolentConflict.Political Geography,26(6),pp.656–673.Forworksarguingthatthereisnolinkbetweenclimatechangeandconflict,seeBuhaug,H.(2010)ClimateNottoBlameforAfricanCivilWars.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,earlyedition;andKevane,M.andGray,L.(2008)Darfur:RainfallandConflict.Environmental Research Letters,3.

10 VandeGiessen,E.(2011)‘HornofAfrica:EnvironmentalSecurityAssessment’,Availableat:<http://www.envirosecurity.org/espa/PDF/ESA_HOA.pdf>Accessedon:26March2011.

11 Hendrix,C.andSalehyan,I.(2011)‘TheBrewingStorm?ClimateChange,Rainfall,andSocialConflictinAfrica’,Availableat:<http://ccaps.strausscenter.org/system/research_items/pdfs/43/original.pdf?>1299598361Accessedon:26March2011.

12 Meier,P.,Bond,D.andBond,J.(2007)EnvironmentalInfluencesonPastoralConflictintheHornofAfrica.Political Geography,26(6),pp.716–735.

13 Fortheproject’sconclusions,seeLeroy,M.(ed.)(2009)Environment and Conflict in Africa: Reflections on Darfur.UniversityforPeaceAfricaProgramme(alsoavailableat:<www.africa.upeace.org/documents/environment_files.pdf)>.TheprojectwassupportedbytheBelgianMinistryofForeignAffairs.

14 UNEP(2007)‘Sudan:Post-conflictEnvironmentalAssessment’,Availableat:<http://www.unep.org/sudan/>Accessedon:26March2011.

15 ElZain,M.(2009)TheOriginsofCurrentConflicts:RuralWaterProvisionandReshapingofHumanSettlementsandEnvironmentalResourcesinWestSudan.InLeroy,M.(ed.)Environment and Conflict in Africa: Reflections on Darfur.UniversityforPeaceAfricaProgramme,pp.123–160.

16 ACCES(2010)‘ClimateChangeandSecurityinAfrica:VulnerabilityReport’,Availableat:<http://www.gwiwater.org/en/node/126>Accessedon:26March2011.


RiversandClimateChange

Water is a basic condition for life. It also plays a

fundamentalroleinhumandevelopment.Besidesdailyuse,

itiscrucialforagricultureandindustry.Inequalityofaccess

totheresourceaswellasitsmismanagementundermines

welfare,affectshumansecurityandcreatesriskofconflict.

Thus, water scarcity is not limited to environment and

developmentconcern, ithasbecomepartof thepolitical

agendaandanimportantnationalsecurityissue.However,

inspiteofmanyattemptsinthepost-ColdWarperiod,the

globalwatercrisisremainsunresolvedandwatershortages

havethepotentialtothreatenglobalpeace,prosperityand

stability.AstheWorldWaterCouncilargues:“Thiscrisishas

beenaggravatedbyfactorssuchasacceleratingpopulation

growth,increasinginequalities,nationalorregionalconflicts

andthe influenceofclimatechangeonthewatercycle.”1

Approximately900millionpeoplealreadylivewithoutclean

drinkingwater,2.6billionpeoplelackadequatesanitation,

and2.2millionchildrendieeveryyearfromunsafewater

relateddiseases.2

transboundary rivers and Climate Change: afriCan and asian rivers ByASHoKSWAINANDFLoRIANKRAmPE

Above:TheKaribaDam,oneofthelargestintheworld,isahydroelectricdamintheKaribagorgeoftheZambeziRiverbasinbetweenZambiaandZimbabwe.

“WHERE WATER IS BoSS, THE LAND MuST oBEy.”Africanproverb

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Theoriginsof theglobalwater crisis arewell known

andarenotlimitedtoclimatefactorsalone.However,the

crisisisofsuchamagnitudethatitisgrowingintoanissue

ofcommonglobalconcern.Thisperspectiveputsthefocus

oninternationalrivers,asapproximatelyhalfoftheglobal

freshwaterisavailablefrom263internationalbasinsinthe

world:ofthem,59areinAfricaand57inAsia.3About1400

millionpeople inhabit riverbasins thatsuffer fromwater

stress,definedas lessthan1000m3/capita/year.4National

politicscomplicatepolicies towardsenhancedriverbasin

managementofsharedrivers.Moreover,themanagement

ofinternationalriversindifferentpartsoftheworldcannot

followaparticulargoldenprinciple,asthevalueofwater,

itsdemandandsupplyvaryfromonebasintoanother.5The

existingknowledgeandinstitutionswehaverelatingtothe

governanceofinternationalriversareincreasinglyturning

volatile,duetotheincreaseddemandanddecreasedsupply

offreshwater.Furtheraddingtotheproblem,thethreatof

globalclimatechangehasstartedunderminingtheongoing

regimesandinstitutionsrelatingtowatersharingandthe

managementofinternationalrivers.6

While the exact impact of climate change is not yet

known, it will have clear bearing upon access to shared

waterresourcesasitaffectshydrologicalcyclesfromglobal

tolocallevels.Someregionswillbecomemuchdrier,some

wetter. The increase in the global surface temperature,

throughthegreenhouseeffect,isexpectedtoincreasethe

amount of water in the air. As a consequence, droughts

will become more frequent, with more and more water

vaporising from the land into the air. At the same time,

the larger amount of water in the air will produce more

intense,heavyprecipitationandtriggerfloods.Theresults

ofdroughtsandfloodswillcausetheresilienceofold–and

posenew–regionalsecuritychallengestostates,particularly

inAfricaandAsia.

Duetomutualdependence,thewithdrawalorpollution

ofriverwaterofoneriparianstatecanpotentiallynotonly

lead todisputes,butalsobringcooperation in thebasin.

Particularly in the last two decades, several competing

ripariancountriesinAsiaandAfricahavemovedtowards

establishing regimes and institutions for cooperation.

River-sharingagreementsfortheZambeziandNileriversin

AfricaandMekongandGangesriversinAsiaincreasedin

the1990s.However,theseagreementsarepresentlybeing

severelystressed,duetoincreasingdemandanddecreasing

supplyofwaterresources.Moreover, the threatofglobal

climatechangehasraisedseriousdoubtsaboutthefuture

oftheseagreements.Thisarticletakesamacro-comparative

perspectiveontransboundaryriverissuesinAfricaandAsia,

andoutlines foreseeablechallenges for regionalsecurity,

consideringtheimpactofclimatechange.

Droughts,whichdryupmajorriversandsharedwaterresources,areoneofthesignificantimpactsofclimatechange.


majorTransboundaryRiverBasinsinAfricaandAsia

andRiparianRelations

Thegeneralclimatetrendsuggestsanincreaseinglobal

surface temperatures, but climate data of the twentieth

century shows that Africa is and will continuously be

warming faster than the global average. Scholars are

certain that there will be no generalised, single effect

of climate change/variability on Africa, because of the

long geographical stretch of the continent. As per the

IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)findings,

two regional patterns are likely for Africa. Northern and

southernAfricawillbecomemuchhotter(minimumplus4°C)

anddrier(about10–20%lessrain).EasternandcentralAfrica

willexperienceincreasedrainfallbyabout15%.Ingeneral,

more regionswilloftensuffer fromdroughtsand floods.

Consideringtheexpectationofmorefrequentdroughtsand

floods,theforecastofriverflowsandtheirinteractionwith

extremevariationsinprecipitationbecomescrucial.

Progressing desertif ication through increased

vaporisationandchangingrainweatherpatternsarecause

forconcerninriparianstates,particularlyintheChadLake

Basin(Niger,Nigeria,Chad,CameroonandCentralAfrican

Republic);theZambeziBasin(Zambia,Angola,Zimbabwe,

Malawi,Botswana,MozambiqueandNamibia);andtheNile

Basin(Rwanda,Burundi,Congo,Tanzania,Kenya,Uganda,

Eritrea,Ethiopia,SudanandEgypt).Therealeffectofclimate

changeontheflowofriversystemsinAfricaisapparently

unpredictable. Nevertheless, specialists estimate that,

indrierareas,adecreaseinrainfallby10%wouldhavea

severeeffectonriversystemsliketheZambeziandLimpopo

insouthernAfrica.TheZambeziRiverwillbeparticularly

vulnerable to climate change, and already today causes

IntheIndusBasin,despiteasignedwater-sharingagreementbetweenIndiaandPakistanin1960,waterisoneoftheconflictissuesbetweentheseripariancountriesduetoincreasingwaterscarcityintheregion.

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Waterpollution,fromindustrialdevelopmentalongmajorriversbyupperripariancountries,affectslowerriparianstatessignificantly.

contestation among its riparian countries, particularly

betweenZambiaandZimbabwe.TheNileBasinisconsidered

bymanyofhavinghighpotentialtoinducewaterconflictsin

theregion,duetoincreasingwaterdemandandtheunequal

distributionofwaterandpowerinthebasin.In1999,when

theWorldBankencouragedtheNileBasinstatestoformthe

NileBasin Initiative, therewashopeandexpectationthat

sharedwaterresourceswouldbringpeaceandcooperation

inthebasin.However,morethanadecadelater,thatdream

hasnotyetbeenrealised.Inthefaceofmountingpressure

fromupstreamcountries,EgyptandSudanareworkinghard

tomaintaintheirhistoricrightsovertheNilewater.Ethiopia

istryingeverythingpossibletocaptureitsshareoftheNile

water,whichhasbeendeniedtoitinthepastduetoitsown

politicalandeconomicweaknesses.

Amajorchallengetotransboundaryrivercooperationis

rootedinnationalpolitics.Thedirectandimmediatenational

securitychallengesfortheeconomyandthepopulationis

sacrificingbasin-basedcooperation.Agriculture,asthemajor

economicactivityinAfrica,willbemoreseverelyaffectedby

changingclimatethantheindustrialsectors.About60%of

employmentinAfricaisprovidedbytheagriculturalsector–

and,inmanycountries,thissectoraccountsfor50%oftheir

grossdomesticproduct (GDP).7Theagriculturalsector is

verysensitivetochangesinclimate–especiallytoshifting

rainfallpatterns.Someresearchersclaimthat,by2020,the

cropyieldinsomecountrieswillhavehalvedandagricultural

profitsdecreaseby90%.TheSahararegionisseenasmost

vulnerabletoagriculturallosses,whichareexpectedtolose

about2–7%ofitsGDP.WesternandcentralAfricawilllose

about2–4%ofoverallGDP,whiletheimpactonnorthernand

southernAfricaisanticipatedtobeabout0.4%to1.3%of

overallGDP.Somemodelssuggestadecreaseinsuitable

rain-fedlandforcrops,anda5–8%increaseinaridorsemi-

aridlandby2080.Itispredictedthat,consequently,wheat

productionwilldisappearfromAfricaandmaizeproduction

insouthernAfricawillbenotablyreduced.8

In Africa, the scarcity of water resources will affect

regionalsecurityand increasepolitical tensions foremost

amongthesouthernAfricanandNileBasinstates.Thewater

scarcityofrain-fedriversinAfrica–suchastheNile,Orange

and Zambezi – will affect the agricultural sector, which

dominatesAfricaneconomies,particularlyseverely.Thiswill

leadtochallengesinfoodandwatersecurityintheregion.

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Topre-empttheimpactonitspopulations,stateswillmost

likelysecuritisewaterandwilltrytoannexasmuchwater

aspossibleunilaterallyfromthesharedsources.Thissortof

‘watercapture’policywillnotonlyharmtheexistingwater-

sharingagreements,itmightalsocreatenewconflictsover

waterissues.Duetoclimatechangechallenges,thescenario

ofwaterwarsinthenearfutureinpartsofAfricacannotbe

ruledout.

MostofAsiaishighlypopulatedandalsohousesalarger

numberof the world’spoor. In recent years,besides the

rapidlyincreasingpopulation,alargepartofthecontinent

isalsoexperiencingunprecedentedeconomicgrowth.The

impactsofglobalclimatechangearelikelytobeseverein

thenearfutureinmanyAsiancountries,wherepeopleare

highlydependentonnaturalresourcesfortheirlivelihoods.

Globalclimatechangepresentsseriousriskstotheaccessof

waterresourcesinsouthandsouth-eastAsia.Inparticular,

theimpactofclimatechangeonglacierswilldirectlyaffect

waterflowinmanyofthemajorinternationalriversinthese

regions.IntheHimalayanBasin,duetotheincreasedrate

ofmeltingoftheglacialarea,thewaterflowinspringhas

increasedandwaterflowduringtheremainingseasons–

especially during summer when it is most needed – has

decreased.ThesizeoftheHimalayanglaciershasdecreased

from 2 077 square kilometres in 1962 to 1 628 square

kilometres in 2007, an overall reduction of 21%.9 This

increasedrateinglaciermeltingmayaddtotherun-offof

theriversforsometimebut,atthesametime,itwillalso

bring more snow avalanches and glacial lake outburst

floods(GLOFs)athighelevation.Thisphenomenonwillnot

onlyposeariskfortheexistingdamsandotherprojectsat

theupperreachesoftheriversystems,butwillalsomake

itdifficult toplananyhydroprojects in the future. If the

presenttrendcontinues,riversoriginatingintheHimalayas

willsoonexperienceanincreaseinthefrequencyofspring

floodsandseriousflowreductioninthesummermonths.10

Climate change-induced glacier melting will impact

somemajorAsianriverbasins inparticular–suchasthe

GangesBasin(Nepal,IndiaandBangladesh);theIndusBasin

(IndiaandPakistan);andtheMekongRiver(China,Burma,

Thailand,Laos,CambodiaandVietnam).Thequantityand

nature of run-off is expected to change substantially in

theseHimalayanriversasaresultofclimatechange.While

uncertainty remains regarding the accuracy of various

climatechangepredictions,forecastsindicatethatchanges

inclimatewillfurtherexacerbatetheexistingvariabilityof

waterflowintherivers.Changesinthespatialandtemporal

distributionofprecipitationandtemperatureareexpectedto

interactincomplexwaysthatchangetheequilibriumand

attributesofrun-offthatreachestheserivers.

In the Ganges Basin, climate change is expected to

increasetemperatures,resultingintheretreatofglaciers;

increasedalterationintheprecipitationpattern,whichwill

resultinagreaterdegreeandrateofrecurrenceofdroughts

and floods; and even lead to a sea-level rise.11 There is

enoughwater in theGangesRiverduringthewetseason

forbothmajor ripariancountries (Bangladeshand India)

nottoargueoverthewatersupply; instead,floodcontrol

istheirpriority.Duringthedryseason(Decemberthrough

May),thewatersupplydwindles–andduringthisperiod,ice

andsnowmeltfromtheHimalayasbecomescritical.Inthe

IndusBasin,waterisoneofthemainconflictissuesbetween

India and Pakistan, with India securing water resources

foritsgrowingmetropolisareas.Whileboththesehostile

neighbourshavesignedawater-sharingagreementonthe

Indusin1960–duetoincreasingwaterscarcityintheregion–

internaloppositioninbothcountriesisgrowingagainstthe

agreement.IslamicfundamentalistgroupsinPakistanhave

beenusingthewaterissuetomobilisetheirsupportbase

against India. In theMekongBasin,upper riparianChina

requires huge amounts of water to support its immense

economic growth. This has severe effects on the lower

riparianstatesalongtheMekong,whichexperienceextreme

watervariabilitybecauseoftheconstructionofmajordams

ontheChineseside.TheMekong,IndusandGangesarealso

experiencingseverefloodsthroughheavyrains,asseenin

2010.Atthesametime,waterpollutionthroughindustrialuse

isextremeandaffectsthelowerriparianstates.Increasing

uncertainty over the availability of water from rainfall,

riverrun-offandgroundwaterrechargeduetotheimpact

ofclimaticchangeposesaseriousthreattofoodsecurity

in Asia. Overall, the management of international rivers

inAsiaisnotconducivetolong-termwatersustainability.

Due to climate change, increasing population growth

and growing economies, riparian countries are taking –

andwilltake–unilateralactionstosecurewaterresources,

whilepotentiallydamaging the river aswell as relations

betweenriparianstates.

ThesharingofinternationalriversinAsiainthefaceof

climatechangemightalsoleadtothesameregionalsecurity

tensionsas inAfrica, consideringAsia’sneed to feed its

largepopulation.Butsuchtensionsmightbenotofthesame

intensityasanticipatedforAfrica.Thereasonforthisisthat

theinternationalriverbasincountriesinAsiamaybeableto

adapttoclimatechangechallengesbetterthantheirAfrican

counterparts:

THE NILE BASIN IS CONSIDERED By

MANy OF HAVING HIGH POTENTIAL

TO INDUCE WATER CONFLICTS IN

THE REGION, DUE TO INCREASING

WATER DEMAND AND THE UNEQUAL

DISTRIBUTIONOFWATERANDPOWER

INTHEBASIN


1. ManycountriesinthesemajorAsianriverbasins,

particularlyChinaandIndia,aregraduallyshifting

theireconomicfocusfromtheagriculturalsectorto

theindustrialsector.Industryconsumesmuchless

water than agriculture. Thus, this economic shift

mighthelpAsiancountriestoadaptbettertowater

scarcitychallenges.

2. Climate change raises the certain possibility of

large-scalevariationinthewaterflowofsharedriver

systems.Withthehelpoflargewaterdevelopment

projects,basincountriesmightbeabletoaddress

these run-off variations and uncertainty, at least

forsometime.MostAsiancountriesalsopossess

better technological strengthand larger financial

capability to meet these climate change-induced

watermanagementchallenges.

3. Climate change is rapidly emerging as a critical

issue in the sharing of international river water

negotiationprocesses.Many largeAsian riparian

countriespossesssufficientnumbersofqualified

diplomatstonegotiatesuccessfullycomplexclimate

changechallengesovertheirsharedwaterresources

comparedtoAfricanbasinstates,thusdecreasing

theirriskofviolentwaterconflicts.

AddressingClimateChangeChallenges

Withoutadoubt,AfricaandAsia’stransboundaryriver

managementisadvancingtowardsuncertaintimeswiththe

increasingimpactofclimatechange.Tosustainanddevelop

theresourcethatsatisfiesabasicconditionoflifewillbethe

biggestchallengeforbasinstatesinthiscentury.Thekey

to transboundaryrivermanagement towardscooperation

ratherthanconfrontationwillbethesmartgovernanceof

naturalresources,andhowpoliticsdealswithwaterissues

andemerging threats.WhileAsiamightbeslightlymore

resourceful, it is likely to face the same challenges and

tensionsthatarealmostinevitableforAfrica.

Theexistingwater-sharingregimesinAfricaandAsiado

nothavethecapacitytoaddresstheemergingchallenges

that climate change will pose. Most of the ongoing

cooperation in the international river basins in Asia and

Africaoriginatedfromtheactiveinvolvementofinternational

donoragencies.Manyoftheseinitiativesonlybarelysurvive

becauseofexternalhelpandassistance.Suchrelianceon

minimal external help alone exposes the lack of interest

of thebasinstates inAsiaandAfrica increatingeffective

and sustainable management of shared river resources.

To address the imminent problems of the existing water

crisis–andthemassivechangeintherun-offstructuredue

toclimatechange–theownershipand,mostimportantly,the

accountabilityof transboundarywatermanagementmust

berestoredbacktothecountriesintheregions.Ofcourse,

theinternationalcommunityshouldnotstayoutofregional

water-sharingpoliticsentirely,butmuststarttoencourage

ripariancountriestofinddistinctemancipatoryapproaches

tobasin-basedrivermanagement.Theseapproachesshould

addresstheregions’uniquecultureandhistory,aswellas

theireconomicdisparityandecologicalsensitivities.

DrAshokSwainisaProfessorinPeaceandConflictResearchandtheDirectoroftheUppsalaCentreforSustainableDevelopmentatUppsalaUniversity inSweden.

Florian Krampe is a Doctoral student at theDepartmentofPeaceandConflictResearch,andapre-DoctoralResearchFellowattheUppsalaCentreforSustainableDevelopmentatUppsalaUniversityinSweden.

Endnotes1 WorldWaterCouncil(2006)The Right to Water: From Concept to

Implementation.Marseilles:WorldWaterCouncil.

2 WHO(2010)uN-Water Global Annual Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking-Water (GLAAS).Geneva:WHO.

3 UNEP(2002)Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements.Nairobi:UnitedNationsPublications.

4 Arnell,N.W.(2004)ClimateChangeandGlobalWaterResources:SRESEmissionsandSocio-economicScenarios.Global Environmental Change,14,pp.31–52.

5 Swain,A.(2004)Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East.London:Routledge.

6 Drieschova,A.,Giordano,M.andFishhendler,I.(2009)ClimateChange,InternationalCooperationandAdaptioninTransboundaryWaterManagement.InAdger,W.N.,Lorenzoni,I.andO’Brien,K.(eds)Adapting to Climate Change: Threshold, Values, Governance.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.384–398;andGleick,P.(ed.)(2009)The World’ s Water 2008-2009.London:IslandPress.

7 Collier,P.,Conway,G.andVenables,T.(2008)ClimateChangeandAfrica.oxford Review of Economic Policy,24,pp.337–353.

8 Boko,M.,Niang,I.,Nyong,A.andVogel,C.(2007)Africa.InParry,M.L.,Canziani,O.F.,Palutikof,J.P.,VanderLinden,P.J.andHanson,C.E.(eds)Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.ContributionofWorkingGroupIItotheFourthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,2007.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

9 Kulkarni,A.V.,Bahuguna,I.M.,Rathore,B.P.,Singh,S.K.,Randhawa,S.S.,Sood,R.K.andDhar,S.(2007)GlacialRetreatinHimalayaUsingIndianRemoteSensingSatelliteData.Current Science,92(1);andHosterman,H.R.,McCornick,P.G.,Kistin,E.J.,Pant,A.,Sharma,B.andBharati,L.(2009)Water, Climate Change and Adaption: Focus on the Ganges River Basin.NicholasInstituteforEnvironmentalPolicySolutionsWorkingPaper,August2009.

10 Swain,A.(2010)EnvironmentandConflictinSouthAsia:Water-sharingBetweenBangladeshandIndia.South Asian Journal,28,pp.27–34.

11 Cruz,R.V.,Harasawa,H.,Lal,M.,Wu,S.,Anokhin,y.,Punsalmaa,B.,Honda,y.,Jafari,M.,Li,C.andNinh,N.H.(2007)Asia.InParry,M.L.,Canziani,O.F.,Palutikof,J.P.,VanderLinden,P.J.andHanson,C.E.(eds)Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.ContributiontoWorkingGroupIItotheForthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.469–506.


Introduction

SouthAfrica’s3000kmcoastlineextendsfromNamibia’s

borderinthewesttoMozambiqueintheeast,andcomprises

diverse climatic and biodiversity patterns. These natural

endowmentshavefacilitatedcoastaldevelopmentintermsof

infrastructureandbusiness(industry,mining,ports,fisheries,

tourismandrealestate).SouthAfricaiscurrentlyemerging

asan important investordestinationwithanunparalleled

spatialfocusonthecoast,withmoredevelopmentimminent.

However,coastaldevelopmenttrendssuggestthatcoastal

areas are being largely transformed and that the natural

resource base is being degraded as a result.1Hence, the

coastisoftensubjecttoaplethoraofconflictingusergroups

competingforaccesstorelativelyunspoiledportionsofthe

coastline, but are frequently also exposed to ecosystem

degradationand/orover-exploitation.

South Africa is also diverse in terms of its socio-

economicand institutionalsettings, largelyreconstructed

in the aftermath of apartheid, which denied the majority

access to coastal resources and services. Apartheid’s

legacy has left sharply divided socio-spatial patterns of

developmentandunderdevelopmentalongthecoast,where

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key soCial vulnerabilities to Climate Change in south afriCa’s Coastal Zones: the Potential for ConfliCtByFATHImAAHmED

Above:Coastaldevelopmenttrendsindicatethatcoastalareasarebeingsignificantlytransformedandthenaturalresourcebaseisbeingdegradedasaresult.


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themajority –mainlyblackAfricans – remain trapped in

viciouscyclesofpovertyandenvironmentaldegradation.2

Hence,SouthAfrica’scoastalsociety ismarkedbyvaried

levelsofinequalities,whichsuggestthatdivergentlevelsof

socialvulnerabilitiesrequireconsiderationinclimatechange

dialogues.Intermsofitsinstitutionalsetting,restructuring

since 1994 has witnessed significant changes in policy

and legislation,withspecificenvironmentalmanagement

mandatesandasignificantlyreviseddevelopmentagenda.

However,anundeniabletensionexistsbetweentheneedto

introduceenvironmentalissuesandconcernsintoplanning

anddecision-makingprocesses(oftenforthefirsttime),and

theneedtoacceleratedevelopmenttoaddresssignificant

socioeconomicneeds.3AsRobertsstates:“Thistensionis

exacerbatedby the fact that environmental concernsare

regardedasbeingof less significance thandevelopment

prioritiesinSouthAfrica.”4

Coastal poverty is particularly severe in rural coastal

areas(southernCape,EasternCapeandnorthernKwaZulu-

Natal),formerhomelandsandinformalsettlementswithin

cities.5AsituationanalysisconductedbytheUnitedNations

DevelopmentProgram(UNDP)in2006revealedthefollowing

onSouthAfrica:persistentlyhighunemploymentrate(29%);

poverty(34%subsistingonlessthanUS$2/day);largewealth

disparities(Ginicoefficientof0.59);highHIV/AIDSinfection

rates;adualformal/informaleconomy;lowskillsbaseand

wideurban/ruraldisparities.6Thecoastisahugecontributor

to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). The

economicbenefitsthatSouthAfricansocietyderivesfrom

itscoastalecosystemsreflectcontributionsofanestimated

35%(R168billion)annuallytotheGDPfromdirectbenefits,

and a further 28% (R134 billion) from indirect benefits.7

SouthAfrica’scoastalurbancentres(Durban,PortElizabeth,

CapeTownandRichardsBay)lendthemselvestoportsand

infrastructure,propertydevelopment,industry,tourismand

netin-migrationofjobseekers,andhaveasignificantrole

inmeetingthebasicneedsandimprovingthewell-beingof

coastalcommunities,where40%ofthecountry’spopulation

islocated.8However,GDPaloneisnotaneffectivemeasure

ofdevelopment.Itdoesnot,forexample,reflectsocialcosts

(healthproblemsresultingfromenvironmentaldegradation),

income distribution and the destruction of ecosystems,

bornelargelybythepoor.

Climatechangeisnowanacceptedrealityandisbeing

incorporated intopolicies inSouthAfrica,albeit focusing

largelyonmitigation(energyefficiency,powergeneration,

Coastalpovertyisparticularlysevereinruralcoastalareas.


sustainabletransport,andwastemanagement)ratherthan

adaptation. While mitigation is necessary, South Africa’s

coastline is increasingly prone to the realities of climate

change impacts – including sea level rise, severe storm

events,shorelineerosionandcoastalresourcedegradation,

which is linked to increasing human transformation of

the coastline.9 Without adaptation, there will be dire

consequences forsocietyand theeconomy,exacerbating

alreadyexistinginequalitiesand,ultimately,sustainability.

Competition for resources in the coastal zone and

divergentinstitutionalfactors,setagainstthebackdropof

climatechange,cantriggerandexacerbateconflictsover

naturalresources.10Attheirmostextreme,environmental

conflicts can escalate into violence, but often emerge as

nonviolent,yetdestructiveissuesthatimpedesocialequality

andsustainabledevelopment.11

SocialVulnerabilitiestoEcosystemChangeand

PotentialConflicts

BarnettandAdger12drawsignificantnegativefeedback

betweenincreasedhumandependenceonclimate-sensitive

formsofnaturalcapital(suchascoastalzones)asopposed

to economic and/or social capital, and exposure to risk

fromclimatechangeandtheabilitytoadapttochangesin

ecosystemgoodsandservices.CelliersandMackay13 link

therapidtransformationofSouthAfrica’scoastlinedirectly

tohumandependenceon thecoast’s relativelyuntapped

naturalcapital,thatis,“thenaturalcoastalenvironment…

[with]mostvaluableandmarketableassets”.Theyassert

thatkeyeconomicsectors–suchasmining–arebecoming

coastal dependent, and are severely exploiting and

degradingthenaturalresourcebase.Ecosystemdegradation

onacontinualandlong-termbasis–suchaspoor-quality

water supply, energy overuse with dependence on

non-renewablesupplies,andevenpoverty–couldincrease

society’sinabilitytocopewithclimatechange.Manyaspects

ofsuchecosystemdegradationareapartoflifeforlarger

society.

Green14arguesthattechnicallanguageusedbyscience

tocommunicateadaptation is lessaction-oriented,anda

middlegroundcanbefoundintheconceptof‘risk’asamore

effectivecommunicationstrategy(“riskofwhat?”,“riskto

whom?”and“riskwhen?”)whenidentifyingvulnerability

to climate change. Green expands: “Furthermore, ‘risk’

capturestheinherentlyuncertainnatureofthefuture,andis

widelygraspedbystakeholdersingovernment,theprivate

sectorandthepublic.”15

Cartwright16statesthatdirectrisksfromtheimpactsof

climatechangearenotbornebythepoor,asthelegacyof

apartheid’sspace-economywitnessesmuchofthecountry’s

coastalpropertyundertheownershipofaffluentpeopleand

localauthorities.Thelocalauthoritiesexperiencerisk,either

directlyorindirectly,as:

Shoreline erosion is a reality of climate change andimpactsSouthAfrica’scoastline.

COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES IN

THE COASTAL ZONE AND DIVERGENT

INSTITUTIONALFACTORS,SETAGAINST

THE BACKDROP OF CLIMATE CHANGE,

CAN TRIGGER AND ExACERBATE

CONFLICTSOVERNATURALRESOURCES

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• vulnerabilitytodirectphysicalimpacts,whichinvolves

risktoinfrastructure,amenities,propertyandlossof

humanlife,typicallymanifestingduringorinthehours

immediatelyafteranextremeevent;and

• vulnerability to indirect impacts, resulting from

biophysicalrisks,andsometimesastheresultofthe

biophysicalrisksonmarketsandgovernance–which

includestourismlosses,thereallocationofthefiscus

towards disaster relief at the expense of planned

development,higher insurancepremiums for costal

property,impactsonfisheriesandwithheldinvestment.

However,thevulnerabilityofthepoortoclimatechange

impacts(includingunderminingsecurity)manifestindirectly

through maladaptation, by way of access to housing,

insurance, mobility and migration, resource degradation

(particularly linked to the quantity and quality of water)

andlosstolivelihoods.Thisisalldisproportionatelyborne

bypoorpeople.Green17 identifieswaterasSouthAfrica’s

keyadaptationchallenge to climate change,highlighting

the detrimental impacts currently witnessed with water:

flooding,shortagesleadingtopowercuts,interruptionsto

suppliersofkeyinputsandincreasesinstakeholderconflict.

Furthermore,detrimentalimpactsrelatingtowateralready

suffered represent 88% of the South African average, as

comparedto39%globally.18

The combination of non-climatic stressors acting on

ecosystemssuchaspoverty, inequalitiesandinstitutional

weaknesses are significant in developing countries –

particularlyonthepoorwithinthesecountries–andcould

heighten social vulnerability and potential conflict under

conditions of climate change. Barnett and Adger19 draw

attention to the imminent interaction between climate

change,humansecurityandconflictby integrating three

keyaspectsofresearchonthevulnerabilityoflocalplaces

and social groups to climate change, on livelihoods and

conflict, and the role of the state in development and

peacemaking(seeTable1).Whattheauthorsfailtointegrate

are thegender implicationsofclimatechangeonsociety

andlivelihoods.Womeninsub-SaharanAfricahaveahigher

prevalenceofHIV/AIDSthanmen,and80%ofthe45million

refugeesarewomenandchildren.Inaddition,womenare

under-representedindecision-making,representtwo-thirds

of theworld’s illiterate,are increasinglybecomingheads

of households and are often more subject to violence.20

Women’s situations are often characterised by a lack of

factors affecting conflict Processes that climate change could affect/exacerbate

Vulnerablelivelihoods Climatechangeislikelytohavewidespreadimpactsonwateravailabilityincoastalregionsandfoodsecurity,andcauseextremeeventsanddiseases.Impactsonlivelihoodswillbesignificantamongst thepopulationwithhigh resourcedependency,and inmoreenvironmentallyandsociallymarginalisedareas.Someclimate-drivenimpactsarelong-termandchronic(decliningproductivityofagriculturalland),whileothersareepisodic(floods).

Poverty(relative/chronic/transitory)

Poverty (particularly relativedeprivation) isaffectedby thespatialdifferentiationofclimateimpactsandthesensitivityofplacestothem.Climatechangemaydirectlyincreaseabsolute,relativeandtransientpovertybyunderminingaccesstonaturalcapital.Itmayindirectlyincreasepovertythroughitseffectsonresourcesectorsandtheabilityofgovernmentstoprovidesocialsafetynets.Stresses fromclimatechangewilldifferentiallyaffect thosemadevulnerablebypolitical-economicprocesses.

Weakstates Theimpactsofclimatechangearelikelytoincreasethecostsofprovidingpublicinfrastructuresuch as water resources and services, and may decrease government revenues, therebydecreasinggovernmentcapacitiestoadaptandrespondtoclimatechange.

Migration Migration,inconjunctionwithpoliticallyinducedlossofsocio-economicopportunities,maybearesponseofpeoplewhoselivelihoodsareunderminedbyclimatechange,andmayincreasetheriskofconflictinhostcommunities.

Table1:TheRelationshipbetweenDeterminantsofHumanInsecurity,ConflictandClimateChange

Source:adaptedfromBarnettandAdger21

CLIMATE CHANGE IS NOW AN

ACCEPTED REALITy AND IS BEING

INCORPORATED INTO POLICIES IN

SOUTH AFRICA, ALBEIT FOCUSING

LARGELy ON MITIGATION (ENERGy

EFFICIENCy, POWER GENERATION,

SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORT, AND

WASTE MANAGEMENT) RATHER THAN

ADAPTATION


controlor ownershipof, andaccess to, resources – and,hence,theyrepresentthemostvulnerableofthevulnerable.

Cumulatively,non-climatic stressorshave sensitisedclimate change agendas from being perceived as anenvironmental risk to becoming a growing threat todevelopmentandsustainability.Therelationshipbetweenthedeterminantsofhumaninsecurity,conflictandclimatechangehaveparticularsignificancetoSouthAfrica,whichisconstitutionallyarights-basedsocietyandalocalpartnerin theglobalcompactconcernedwithhumanrightsandsustainability;forexample,thePlanofImplementationandtheUnitedNationsMillenniumDeclaration.CelliersandMacKay22caution that thecurrentSouthAfricancoastalsocio-spatialstatusisunsustainable,wheredevelopmentforprogress (benefits for all) anddevelopment causingcommunalregression(benefittoaselectfewintheshortterm) are likely to accrue impacts for both present andfuturegenerations.

AdaptationtoClimateChangeAdaptationreferstotheabilityofasystem(ecological,

social or economic) to respond to actual or expectedclimate change impacts in order to mitigate potentialdamages and/or leverage opportunities. It necessitateschange in the processes, practices and structuresthat perpetuate the problems. Activities required forthe enhancement of adaptive capacity are essentiallyequivalenttothosepromotingsustainabledevelopment,including:23

• Economic wealth – There is a wide perception thatwealthycountries,withbettereconomicresources,arebetterpreparedtofitthecostsofadaptationtoclimatechange impacts and risks than poorer countries.24There is also evidence that poorer countries anddisadvantaged groups within them are especiallyvulnerabletodisasters.25

• Technology – Adaptive capacity is likely to vary,dependingonavailabilityandaccess to technology(warning systems,protective structures, settlementrelocation)atvariouslevelsandinallsectors.26

• Informationandskills–Thereneedstobeadequatecapacity to respond to climate change adaptation.Skills enable people to diversify livelihoods andoptions, thereby reducing their vulnerability. Thereneeds to be collaboration between science and theeconomicsofclimatechangeinadaptationplanning,andstakeholderparticipation isa requirement.Theawarenessandeducationofstakeholderstoimpactsofclimatechange,mitigationandadaptationiscrucial.

• Infrastructure–Thepoorsitingof infrastructurecancontributetoimpactsofclimatechange,suchastheerectionofartificialstructurestocombatsea-levelriseortheplanningofdevelopmentinsensitivelocations.Alackofnecessaryinfrastructure–suchasdrainage–canamplify impactssuchasflooding. Infrastructureincludesnaturalcapitalsuchasdunecordons,whichshould be maintained to buffer impacts of change.Furthermore, access to public infrastructure like

Waterisakeyadaptationchallengetoclimatechange.oneofthesignificantdetrimentalimpactsthatisexperiencedinSouthAfrica’scoastalareasisflooding.

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housingandtransportequipspeoplebettertoadapt

tochanges.

• Institutions–Ingeneral,countrieswithwell-developed

social institutions tend to have greater adaptive

capacity than those with less effective institutional

arrangements. The South African institutional and

policy environment indicates that a middle ground

needs to be identified between prioritising either

‘environment’ or ‘development’. Disclosure – by

government,institutionsandsectors–overthestate

ofnaturalresources,forexample,water,needstobe

evident. There is, furthermore, a lack of discussion

onbusinessasastakeholder inclimatechange.By

contributingtoclimatechange,businessispartofthe

problem–andalsopartofthesolution.Arecognition

oftheroleofbusinessasasourceoffinance,provider

ofsolutionsandthebearerofrisksisneeded.27

• Equity–Entitlementandaccesstoresourcesneedto

beequitablydistributed.Thebenefitsareimmediate

aswellaslongterm.

AccordingtoTheronandRossouw,28“locallyapplicable

methodstomitigatetheimpactsofclimatechangehaveto

bedevelopedurgentlytoquantifyrealisticallytheimpacts

along South Africa’s coast.” Furthermore, the authors

state that mitigation necessitates “an understanding of

theadaptationoptionsavailabletoSouthAfricansociety,

whichisconsiderablydifferentfromfirstworldapproaches

andstilllargelyundefined”.29

Conclusion

South Africa’s coastal zones reflect characteristics

that define both their value and vulnerability, which

challengesthenotionofdisaggregatingtheroleofclimate

change from other environmental, socio-economic and

political factors, if at all possible.Ecosystemsunderpin

socio-economicdevelopment;however,almostexclusive

relianceonecosystemsthataresubjecttoclimatechange

cancreaterisksfordevelopmentandexacerbateconflicts.

Thisarticleunderlinesthepremisethatwaterpresentsthe

biggestchallengetoclimatechangeadaptation.Green30

underscores the need to consider aspects such as the

geographyofwater,natureandsource,impactsonother

sectorsandstakeholders.Furthermore,whileasituation

analysis is readilyavailable, thereexistsa researchgap

onactualandperceivedvulnerabilitiestoclimatechange

impacts in the South African coastal context, and this

requiresmoredetailedandcontext-specificresearch.

Adaptation strategies are likely to be implemented

only if they are integrated with decisions that address

non-climaticstresses,andnecessitatetheinclusionofall

stakeholders.Burton31suggeststhefollowingfactorsfor

urgentaction-orientedadaptation:

• Climatechangecannotbetotallyavoided.

• Anticipatory and precautionary adaptation is more

effectiveandlesscostlythanlast-minute,emergency

adaptationorretrofitting.

• Climatechangemaybemorerapidandpronounced

than current estimates suggest, and unexpected

eventsarepossible.

• Immediate benefits can be gained from better

adaptationtoclimatevariabilityandextremes.

• Immediate benefits can be gained by removing

maladaptivepoliciesandpractices.

• Climatechangebringsopportunitiesaswellasthreats.

• Futurebenefitscanresultfromclimatechange.

Withregardtothelastthreepointsabove(immediate

andfuturebenefits),althoughclimatechangeexacerbates

impacts,itmayunderscorethesignificanceofadaptation

enough – and set the level of ambition higher within

institutionsandthepublic–tohelpavoiddamagefromfar

morethanextremeclimateevents.Forexample,preparing

foraonce-in-100-yearseventmeansthatpeopleareready

foraonce-in-10-yearsevent.32

Climatechangeislikelytohavewidespreadimpactsonwateravailabilityandfoodsecurity,incoastalregions.


In order to endorse the welfare and livelihoods of

the poorest and most susceptible members of South

African society and mitigate potential conflicts, climate

adaptationstrategiescannotobviate fromaligningwith

equity goals – for example, by improving food security

and improving access to safe water and healthcare.

Astrategyis,therefore,requiredthatwillenabletheuseof

coastalresourcestotakeplaceinamannerwhichisboth

constitutionallydemocraticandessential.

DrFathimaAhmedisageographerwholecturesattheSchoolofEnvironmentalSciences,UniversityofKwaZulu-NatalinSouthAfrica.

Endnotes1 Celliers,L.andMacKay,F.(2005)‘CoastlineforSale:TheReal

Coast?’African Wildlife,59,Availableat:<http://www.wessa.org.za/publicationsAWLcoastline.asp>Accessedon:14October2006.

2 May(1998);McCarthyetal.(1998)citedinGlavovic,B.andBoonzaier,S.(2007)ConfrontingCoastalPoverty:BuildingSustainableCoastalLivelihoodsinSouthAfrica,ocean and Coastal Management,50,pp.1–23.

3 Roberts,D.(2008)‘ThinkingGlobally,ActingLocally–InstitutionalizingClimateChangeattheLocalGovernmentLevelinDurban,SouthAfrica’,Availableat:<http://eau.sagepub.com/content/20/2/521>Accessedon:2March2011.

4 Ibid.

5 Glavovic,B.andBoonzaier,S.(2007)op.cit.

6 UNDP(2006)Country Programs and Related Matters, Draft Country Program Document for South Africa (2007–2010),NewyorkSecondRegularSession.Newyork:UNDP.

7 DEAT(2000)The White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development in South Africa.Pretoria:GovernmentPrinter.

8 DEAT(2006)South African Environment outlook: A Report on the State of the Environment Report,Chapter7.Pretoria:DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairsandTourism.

9 Cartwright,A.(2008)‘CoastalVulnerabilityintheContextofClimateChange:ASouthAfricanPerspective’,Availableat:<http://www.90x2030.org.za/oid%5Cdownloads%sccoastal%20vulnerability%20South%20African%20perspective.pdf>Accessedon:2April2011.

10 Homer-Dixon(1994);Hellstrom(2001)citedinWhite,R.M.,Fischer,A.,Marshall,K.,Travis,J.M.J.,Webb,T.J.,DiFalco,S.,Redpath,S.M.andVanderWal,R.(2009)DevelopinganIntegratedConceptualFrameworktoUnderstandBiodiversityConflicts.Land use Policy,26,pp.242–253.

11 Woodroffeetal.(2005)citedinWhite,R.M.,Fischer,A.,Marshall,K.,Travis,J.M.J.,Webb,T.J.,DiFalco,S.,Redpath,S.M.andVanderWal,R(2009)op.cit.

12 Barnett,J.andAdger,W.N.(2007)ClimateChange,HumanSecurityandViolentConflict.Political Geography,26,pp.639–655.

13 Celliers,L.andMacKay,F.(2005)op.cit.

14 Green,V.(2011)TheSouthAfricanBusinessResponsetoClimateChangeMitigationandAdaptation.WIOMSAConference,23March2011,Mauritius.

15 Ibid.

16 Cartwright,A.(2008)op.cit.

17 Green,V.(2011)op.cit.

18 Ibid.

19 Barnett,J.andAdger,W.N.(2007)op.cit.

20 Murray,S.andStewart,M.(2002)Gender, Population and the Environment: Finding Common Ground for Coastal Managers.RhodeIsland,USA:Intercoast.

21 Barnett,J.andAdger,W.N.(2007)op.cit.

22 Celliers,L.andMacKay,F.(2005)op.cit.

23 Smit,B.,Pilifosova,O.,Burton,I.,Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,R.,yohe,G.,Adger,N.,Downing,T.andHarvey,E.(2001)AdaptationtoClimateChangeintheContextofSustainableDevelopmentandEquity.InMcCarthy,J.J.,Canziani,O.,Leary,N.A.,Dokken,D.J.andWhite,K.S.(eds)Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,p.893.

24 Goklany(1995);Burton(1996)citedinSmit,B.,Pilifosova,O.,Burton,I.,Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,R.,yohe,G.,Adger,N.,Downing,T.andHarvey,E.(2001)op.cit.,p.896.

25 Banuri(1998);Munasinghe(2000)citedinSmit,B.,Pilifosova,O.,Burton,I.,Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,R.,yohe,G.,Adger,N.,Downing,T.andHarvey,E.(2001)op.cit.,p.896.

26 Burton(1996)citedinSmit,B.,Pilifosova,O.,Burton,I.,Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,R.,yohe,G.,Adger,N.,Downing,T.andHarvey,E.(2001)op.cit.,p.896.


28 Theron,A.andRossouw,M.(2008)‘AnalysisofPotentialCoastalZoneClimateChangeImpactsandPossibleResponseOptionsintheSouthernAfricanRegion’,Availableat:<http://researchspace.csir.co.za/dspace/bitstream/10204/2561/1/Theron_2008.pdf>Accessedon:2April2011.

29 Ibid.


31 Burton(1996)citedinSmit,B.,Pilifosova,O.,Burton,I.,Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,R.,yohe,G.,Adger,N.,Downing,T.andHarvey,E.(2001)op.cit.,p.891.

32 Ibid.


Introduction

Whilescepticsandalarmistswaste timeoverwhether

humansareresponsibleforclimatechange,wehavebeen

presentedwithstrongevidencethatourworldwillexperience

arangeofpositiveandnegativeclimaticeffectswhichwill

affectthelivesofmillions.Someregionswillbecomedryer,

withmore rapiddesertification;otherswillgetwetterand

warmer,improvingconditionsandextendingplantingseasons.

The effects of climate change – droughts, desertification,

precipitationchangesandotherweatherevents–especially

affectsocietieswherepeopledependontheenvironmentto

makealivingandwheretheylackthecapacitytocope,prevent

oradapttosuddenorslower,systematicchanges.InAfrica,

andespeciallysub-SaharanAfrica,wheretheenvironment

is the main source of livelihood for the poor, conflicts –

related to theenvironmentandother socio-economicand

political factors – are common. It is likely, therefore, that

additional environmental stress factors brought about by

climatic changes will exacerbate conflicts or lead to new

ones.1Practitionersandpolicymakersinthefieldsofconflict

resolution,peacebuilding,developmentandadaptation, to

name a few, should therefore develop measures to assist

Africancommunities topreventandmitigateenvironment

andotherrelatedconflictsandtocreateconditionsforstability

andpeace.

This article makes two arguments. First, given the

complexity of conflicts and climate–conflict linkages the

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addressing Climate-related ConfliCt: human seCurity and lessons from the southern sahelian belt of sudanBySALoméBRoNKHoRST

Above:Theeffectsofclimatechangeespeciallyaffectsocietieswherepeopledependontheenvironment tomakealiving.


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resultantneedforinterdisciplinaryhumansecurityapproaches,

with theirwiderapplicability,maybeparticularly suitable

forresearch,policydevelopmentandpracticalintervention.

Second,byapplyingarevisedhumansecurityframeworkin

astudyofinterventionsbynon-governmentalorganisations

(NGOs)thataddressenvironmentalconflictsinthesouthern

SahelianbeltofSudan,potentiallessonsforclimatechange

adaptationpolicyandconflictresolutionhavebeenidentified.

Thisarticlefocusesononeofthehighlightsfromthatstudy,

andarguesthattheuseoftraditionalconflictresolution(TCR)

mechanismsreducevulnerabilityandimprovehumansecurity

inthesouthernSahelianbeltofSudan–and,therefore,may

contributetotheresolutionoffutureclimate-relatedconflicts.

Areportoftheaforementionedstudywillbepublishedby

theAfricanCentrefortheConstructiveResolutionofDisputes

(ACCORD)in2011.Thestudywasdrivenbythepremisethat

important lessons for addressing climate-related conflicts

maybeidentifiedfrominterventionsinenvironment-related

conflicts.Inthereport(andthisarticle),‘climatechange’refers

tonaturalchangesinclimateovertime,orchangesinclimate

thatresultfromhumanactivity.‘Environmentalchange’refers

toclimatechangeanditseffectsontheenvironmentand/orto

nonclimate-relatedchangesintheenvironmentasaresultof

humanactivity–suchasdeforestation.

The study focuses on the southern Sahelian belt that

stretchesacrossAfricaandacrossSudan–inparticular,the

semi-arid state of Southern Kordofan and its neighbours.

Thisgeographicalareaispotentiallyrelevantforidentifying

howmeasurestoresolveenvironment-relatedconflictscan

beapplied inotherareas,whereclimatechangeimpacts–

drought, desertification, water scarcity, competition over

grazing and pasture – can contribute to conflict. These

Sahelianareashavealreadyexperiencedclimaticchanges,2

historicalenvironmentalstressessuchasdesertification,and

competitionbetweenfarmersandpastoralistsoverwaterand

arablelandforgrazingandfarming.Theconflictdynamics,

coping and conflict resolution mechanisms communities

havedeveloped,andongoingworkbycivil societyacross

the Sahelian belt of Sudan to address such conflicts may

provide us with a wealth of new knowledge and lessons,

applicableforresolvingclimate-relatedconflicts.Theresearch

focusedonconflictsbetweenandwithinpastoralandfarmer

groups where climate and environmental factors are key

conflict drivers. The approach taken, therefore, is that we

SouthernKordofanisasemi-aridstateanddesertificationisanotableenvironmentalstress.


may not know which climate and environmental changes

areanthropogenicornot,but theconflicts thatstemfrom

themprovide instructiveexamplesof theirsocial,political,

economic and other impacts; and what has worked in

resolvingsuchconflicts.

HumanSecurity

Although environmental change is not a new

phenomenon, the likely scale, suddenness and depth of

changespredictedandtheireffectsareunprecedented.Our

existingtoolsandsolutionsmayverywellnotbeabletocope

withorbesuitablefortheadditionalcomplexity–especially

atalocallevel,wheretheimpactsofclimatechangewillbe

felt first.Moreover, themagnified impactsandeffectswill

givemoreprominencetosecurityandothermultidisciplinary

dimensionsofclimatechange.Also,thereisalreadybroad

consensusthattheenvironmentandclimatecancontributeto

conflict–orbeanunderlyingtrigger–butthatitwillrarely

betheonlyvariableinquestion,increasingthecomplexity.In

response,weneedapproachesthatwillhelpindividualsand

communitiescope,preventoradapttoclimatechange,and

whichtakeintoconsiderationeachuniqueandcomplexsocio-

economic,political,culturalandstructuralcontext.

Human security approaches help us deal with these

complexitiesandchallengesbyprovidingamultidisciplinary

and normative approach that considers ‘hard security’

(monopolyovertheuseofforceandmilitarypower),butalso

humandevelopmentandwell-being.Therefore,itmaybean

idealapproachtoprevent,analyseandinterveneincomplex

conflictsrelatedtoclimatechange.Givenprominencebythe

UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) in1994,

human security refers to “the security of individuals and

communities,expressedasboth‘freedomfromfear’[broadly,

security]and‘freedomfromwant’[broadly,development]”.3

Itmovesbeyondtraditionalhardsecuritytoincludepolitical

security (humanrights, theruleof law)andsocialsecurity

(alternatives, such as economic and social safety nets or

development).4Byplacingagreaterfocusonthesecurityof

individualsratherthanthestate,theUNDPproposedthatthe

scopeofsecurityshouldbebroadenedtoincludeseventhreats

toanindividualorcommunity’shumansecurity–economic,

food,personal,environment,health,communityandpolitical

security.

HumansecurityisalsoparticularlyappropriateforAfrica.

Climatechangeaside,Africanshaveexperiencedanentire

range of social, economic, political, environmental and

ThegrasslandsinSouthSudanareburnedseasonallybypastoraliststobringonaflushofgreengrassfortheircattle.

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culturalhardshipsasaresultofinterstateandintrastatewars,

environmental degradation, poor governance, economic

uncertainty, inequalityandamyriadotherglobal,national

andlocalreasons.Humansecurity’swiderapplicabilityand

broaderfocusis,therefore,particularlyappropriateforsuch

complexity,which isexacerbatedby theeffectsofclimate

change,andbytheuncertaintyaroundthefutureimpactsof

climatechange.Moreover,humansecurityisalsocompatible

withthenaturalhumanismtraditionofAfrica,whichfocuses

onphilosophiesthatechohumansecurity–suchasmental,

physicalandspiritualhealth;foodandenvironmentalsecurity;

protectionfromcriminalandexternalthreats;andaccessto

socialandcommunityservices.5

That said, human security as an approach to security

hasgainedsignificantmomentumover theyears,buthas

alsoelicitedcriticismfromnumerousresearchersindifferent

fields, including security and development practitioners

and feminists.6 Many argue that the academic and policy

communitiesstill lack rigorous tools foranalysisand that,

althoughhumansecurity’swideapplicability isuseful ina

numberofissues,thesheernumberofthreatsorvariables

required toaccount for theseven threatsproposedby the

UNDP,limittheapplicabilityandaffecttherigourofhuman

security.Othershaveworkedtonarrowtheconcepttomakeit

moreworkableandrigorous,7withmostresearchersseeking

toreducethenumberofvariablesorthreats,andintroducing

different indicators and frameworks to operationalise the

conceptbetter.

The ‘deprivation–vulnerability’ approach, proposed

by Busumtwi-Sam, is a framework to operationalise a

development-oriented approach to human security that

establishesclearresearchandpolicypriorities.8Byproviding

a narrower conceptualisation of human security, the

approachaddressestheinherentweaknessesofthebroader

conceptualisation.Itmakesaconceptualdistinctionbetween

humandevelopmentandhumansecurityand,asa result,

highlights the usefulness of the human security concept.

Theauthorargues that,whilehumansecurityandhuman

development are discrete, they are mutually reinforcing.

Humandevelopmentisalonger-termprocessthatworksto

improvehealthandwell-being,livelihoods,dignity,survival,

safety and knowledge, for example. Human security is a

conditionthatexpressesthe“relativepresence/absence(or

increase/decrease)of contingencies that threatenphysical

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AyoungpastoralistcarriesanAK-47rifle.ConflictbetweenpastoralistsandfarmersoverwaterandarablelandforgrazingandfarmingiscommonintheSahelianregion.


andpsychosocialharmsaffectinghumandignity,livelihoods,

safety, survival and health and well-being in the political,

economic,socio-culturalandecologicalcontextswithinwhich

processesofhumandevelopment takeplace”.9 In simpler

terms,human(in)security isastate,determinedbythreats

thatcancauseharm,butthosethreatscanonlyharmifthe

uniquecontextapersonfindthemselvesindoesnotprovide

themwiththemeans/abilitytocopewithormitigatethethreat.

Whether thatperson is inastateofsecurityor insecurity,

therefore, depends on a minimum threshold of ‘dignity,

safety/survival,healthandwell-beingand livelihood’.The

authorarguesthatthresholdswilleffectivelybedetermined

bytheinstitutions(governments,internationalorganisations

andNGOs,forinstance)addressingtheissueofhuman(in)

securityatthatpointintime.Theunderlyinglogicofthisis

thatthesamethreatindifferentcontextsmayleadpeopleto

experiencedifferentstatesofeithersecurityorinsecurity.

The deprivation–vulnerability approach thus considers

threats, deprivations and exclusions, and vulnerability. In

the study and this article, ‘environmental threats’ refer to

theimpactsofclimaticand/orenvironmentalchange–such

as water scarcity, droughts, desertification – and includes

competitionoverlandforgrazingandfarming,andhuman-

inducedchanges suchasdeforestation. ‘Deprivationsand

exclusions’refertodevelopmentindicatorsandotherforms

ofhorizontalorverticalinequalities–includingpoverty,social

exclusion,marginalisation,alackoflivelihoodalternatives,

andsoon.‘Vulnerability’herehasbeendefinedasaperson

orgroup’s ‘exposure,sensitivityandresilience’toathreat,

inthecontextofdeprivationsandexclusions.Vulnerability

isessentiallythelikelihoodofsufferingharmfromaspecific

threatinthecontextofparticulardeprivationsandexclusions.

FindingsandRecommendations

Thisframeworkofanalysiswasappliedtotheworkoflocal

andinternationalNGOsthatresolveclimate-andenvironment-

relatedconflict.Theoutcomesfromthestudyhighlightthat

NGO projects which focus on addressing vulnerabilities,

deprivations and exclusions, and environmental threats,

improve human security and, therefore, may prevent or

mitigateconflicts.Giventhecomplexityofconflicts,projects

rarelyfocusononeelementofhumaninsecurity.Therefore,

asuccessfulinterventionmaybetheresultofdifferentproject

elements working concurrently and at different scales to

improvehumansecurity.Thefindingsarediscussedindetail

intheaforementionedreport.Theremainderofthisarticlewill

focusononeofthekeyfindingsfromthestudy:thepotential

utilityofTCRmethodsinresolvingclimate-relatedconflicts.

However,itwouldbeinstructivetoconsidersomeoftheother

findingsofthestudybriefly.

First,someNGOsinthestudyareasuccessfullyaddress

environmentalconflictsandhumaninsecuritybyintervening

directlyatthe‘threat’level.Inotherwords,ifwaterscarcity

is identifiedas thekeyconflictdriver,NGOprojectsmay

employanumberofstrategiestoaddressthisthreat–for

instance, by drawing on innovative technologies and by

creating alternative water sources along livestock routes

and near farms. Others may draw on natural resource

management approaches to improve the management

of the resource,bybuilding thecapacityof communities

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“Hafir”istheSudanesenameforawaterreservoir,whichisdesignedtostorewaterrunoffafterarainyseason.


or providing funding and technical expertise or support

to local government, to address the threat directly. An

exampleofthis isa ‘WaterforPeace’project inSouthern

Kordofan,whichworkswithcommunitiesandgovernment

toensureenhancedaccesstosafeandadequatewaterfor

human and animal consumption, to reduce the conflict

betweenpastoralistsandfarmers.Thisisdoneindifferent

ways: the project provides affordable water at strategic

points along the livestock routes, and works towards

separating water sources for humans and livestock,

easing congestion and preventing conflict by creating

alternativewatersourcesinareasofhighdemand.Italso

provides capacity and funding to the local government

water committee to restore and maintain artesian wells.

As noted before, these projects are not undertaken in

isolation fromothers thataddressother formsofhuman

insecurity.Infact,theWaterforPeaceprojectalsofocuses

on reducing vulnerabilities, deprivations and exclusions.

By disseminating environmental and health messages,

supplementedwithindigenousknowledge,andbybuilding

toiletsandteachingpeoplehowtobuildthemcheaply,the

overallhealthandwell-beingofcommunitiesareimproved,

aswellastheirwaterresources. Ineachvillage,about20

households are supported by the project to construct

toilets,andoneselectioncriterioniseconomic:thepoorest

households – including those that are female-headed –

getpriority.

Approaches for reducingdeprivationsandexclusions

arisefromthe‘development’aspectofhumansecurity,and

appeartobeimportantadditionalelementstoprojectsthat

addressenvironmental conflict. For instance, someNGO

projectsalsofocusonthecreationofalternativelivelihoods,

byteachingwomenhowtoprocessandsellmilkproducts,

orbytrainingmalemembersofcommunitiesasparavets.

Bycreatingalternatives,NGOsaimtoreducecompetition

overscarceresources,addresspovertyand,thus,improve

humansecurity. InaprojectinGedarifstate,forinstance,

onestrategyforresolvingenvironmentalconflictsinvolves

addressingdeforestationandthevulnerabilityofwomenby

introducingbutanegasforcooking.Thecommunitieswere

involvedinthedesign,implementationandmonitoringof

thebutanegasproject,andaprojecttostartaseedbank.

Boththeseprojectsrequiredaninitialoutlayoffunds,inthe

formofmicrocreditprovidedbytheNGOtoindividualswho,

oncetheyreceivedanincome,thenpaidbackthemoneyor

seedsthatwereloaned.

TraditionalConflictResolution(TCR)

Inanotherapproach,NGOsreducevulnerability,improve

humansecurityandcontributetotheresolutionofconflicts

bybuildingthecapacityofcommunitiesandgovernmentto

resolveenvironment-relatedconflicts.Tothisend,another

element of successful NGO interventions in conflicts

involvesthereintroductionofTCRmechanisms,andtheir

enhancementorsupplementationwithmodernparticipatory

methods.

In the past, TCR and customary land tenure systems

prevented and mitigated conflicts between pastoralists

andfarmersinSudan.Sadly,however,thedrawn-outcivil

warandsmallarmsproliferation,andgreatercompetition

over more scarce resources and ever larger herds, have

increased the stakes in conflict and have led to some

erosion of TCR methods.10 These methods have been

underminedfurtherbycompetingmodernandtraditional

legal systems, the inevitable rise of modernity, and the

weakeningofcustomarymediationbythegovernmentand

politicalinterestgroups.11Thenativeauthority,forinstance,

although recently reinstated, was absent for 20 years

andpresentlysuffers froma lackofhumanand financial

resources,“undermin[ing]itspositioninthepeople’sminds

andsentiments... in20yearsofitsabsencetheworldhas

A Sudanese woman uses a Water Roller for easy andefficientcarryingofwater.

NGO PROJECTS WHICH FOCUS ON

ADDRESSING VULNERABILITIES,

DEPRIVATIONSANDExCLUSIONS,AND

ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS, IMPROVE

HUMAN SECURITy AND, THEREFORE,

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changedandnativeauthoritiesneedtoupgradetheirhuman

capabilities and technical capacities to match the new

realitiesofconflictanditsresolution.”12

In Southern Kordofan, however, NGO projects that

reintroduceTCRwhileenhancingorsupplementingTCRwith

modernparticipatorymethods,reportsuccess inresolving

environmentalconflict.ByemployingTCRinGoodiya–the

local formofmediation–whileenhancing thiscustomary

methodwithconflicttreeanalysesandparticipatoryaction

plandevelopment,conflictsrelatedtotheenvironmentare

often successfully resolved. Despite the reported decline

in popularity, customary mediation or Goodiya is used

extensively in Southern Kordofan to resolve climate- and

environment-relatedconflictsbetweenandwithinpastoral

and farmer groups. For example, with the assistance and

fundingofinternationalorganisations,theSouthernKordofan

stategovernmentusuallyfacilitatesreconciliationconferences

to resolve major conflicts – most of which have a strong

environmental dimension. In working to resolve conflict

relatedtowaterscarcityandalackoflandforgrazingbetween

theGawamaa,SebeihatandBaggaratribes inGargur,one

NGO employed Goodiya – but used modern participatory

techniques to strengthen this TCR mechanism. The

participatorytechniqueshelpedcommunitiestodistinguish

betweenandagreeonrootconflictcauses,coreproblemsand

effects;tostartadialogue;andtorealisethatcollaboration

wouldleadtoconflictresolution.Techniquesusedincluded

conflictmapping,atimelineofeventsandaconflicttree13–

which reportedly, when drawn by conflicting parties and

compared,showedbothpartieshowtheirperceptionsofa

conflictdiffered.Then,duringthenegotiationstage,thetwo

communitieschoseacommitteeandachairmanthattheyfelt

representedthemfairlytomediate.Fromthispoint,alocal

formofGoodiyawasused.Finally,anagreementacceptable

tobothpartieswasreached,andsignedbyrepresentativesof

thetwoparties.14

AnotherorganisationutilisestheParticipatoryActionPlan

Development(PAPD)asaconsensus-buildingvehicle in its

worktoresolveenvironmentalconflicts.PAPDcombineswith

GoodiyaandAjaweed(mediators),andisdeemedparticularly

usefulinNorthDarfur,wherewatersecurityforgrazingand

pastureisakeyissue.ThePAPDcomplementstheAjaweedto

reduceresourceconflicts,andassistsinsensitisationandthe

developmentofmeasurestoimplementAjaweeddecisions.

ThesixstagesofPAPDinclude:

1. preparation(collectionofgoodbackgroundknowledge);

2. problemcensusandproblemprioritisation(bydifferent

groups);

3. informationgatheredaboutrelevantproblems;

4. analysisbythecommunitytoidentifypossiblesolutions;

5. consultation of the wider community for input; and

finally,

6. developmentandimplementationofanactionplan.

As a tool used by governments and communities to

resolvefutureclimate-relatedconflicts,TCRhasthepotential

toreducevulnerabilityandimprovehumansecurity.Itmay

beespeciallyeffectiveifusedalongsidemeasurestoaddress

GoodiyaGoodiya(alsoJudiya/Judiyya)isusedtoresolveconflictsinmanypartsofSudanbyanAjawi(singular,mediator)or

Ajaweed(mediators).AformofcustomarymediationorTCR,Goodiyaintheformofreconciliationconferencesorcouncils,

forinstance,isusedtoresolvemajorconflictsamongsttribes.Ajaweed(mediators)areinvolved,whocallonconcerned

parties,somedignitariesandtriballeadersinareconciliationconference.Theconferencesuggestssolutionsthatsatisfy

bothparties.Ifagreementsarenotreached,otherpeopleareinvited“whoareknownfortheirwisdom,foresightedness

(sic)andtheabilitytofindsuitablesolutionsfortheproblems.Inmostcases,suchconflictsrarelyreachtheofficialchannels

ofconflictresolution.Thisisduetothegeneralconventionthatitisshamefultoletoutsidersinterfereinlocalaffairs.”15

Minorconflictsarenormallyresolvedbythevillagesheikhswho,forcasessuchascropdamage,may,forexample,

determinetheamountofcropdamageandthecompensationrequired.GoodiyaisbasedontheKoranandtheteachingsof

ProphetMohammed,andmediatorscanbepersonsofhighstandinginthecommunity,suchasvillageorreligiousleaders.

Themediationusuallyinvolvesanumberofsteps:

1. expressionofmutualforgivenessbybothparties;

2. examplesofconflictresolutionfromtheperspectiveoftheKoranarehighlighted;

3. adiscussionbyeachofthepartiesoftheirsideofthestory;

4. awayforwardisproposedbythemediatoranddiscussed;and

5. themediationisthenconcludedbyareadingfromtheKoran.16

Aspartoftheprocess,themediatorswilldividethemselvesinto‘doves’and‘hawks’.Thedovesaretheonesthatworkto

createpeace,byencouragingpartiestoforgiveandforget,makefriendlyorsymbolicgestures,andprovideexamplesof

peacefulcoexistenceinthepast–withconsiderablereferencestotheKoran,Sudaneseproverbsandevenexplaininghow

feudscanaffecttheafterlife.Thehawksaretheenforcers–theonesthathighlightthedrawbacksorrepercussionsofnot

acceptingtherulingoftheAjaweed.17


otherformsofhumaninsecuritythatcontributetoaconflict–

such as environmental threats, and deprivations and

exclusions.Sudan’srichhistoryofTCRwithmanyremote

andtradition-boundcommunitiesmeansthatincorporating

TCR methods in conflict-sensitive climate adaptation

planningforSudan is likely toreceivesupport fromstate

and federal government, communities and other actors.

Thatsaid,therearealsothosewhoarguethatgovernment-

sponsoredmediationstoresolvemajorconflictsinSudan

maybepronetomanipulationbygovernmentandothers,

and may exacerbate conflict. The Sudanese government

thushasakeyrole toplay insupportingandsponsoring

TCRmeasures–if itcanremainimpartialandensurethat

ethnicandpoliticalrivalriesdonotderailtheprocess.For

the resolution of present environment-related conflicts

betweenpastoralistsandfarmers,andto improvehuman

securityandpreventfutureconflicts,investmentshouldbe

madebythefederalandSouthernKordofangovernments,

and international funders, to strengthen existing conflict

resolutionmechanismsandsecuretheir legitimacy,while

improvingcoordinationbetweendifferentconflictresolution

institutions thatoperateat local,stateand federal levels.

This should be done as part of Sudan’s climate change

adaptation agenda, and as part of regional cooperation

initiatives,giventhecross-bordernatureofpastoralismin

theHornofAfrica.

Moreover,withoutdealingwithotherformsofhuman

insecurity,itislikelythatTCRmechanismsmaytemporarily

haltconflict,butnotresolvethem–hence,thereisaneed

formultiprongedapproachestodealwithhumaninsecurity

in the complex context of climate change. For climate

changeconflicts, further research isneededonhowTCR

methodscouldbeenhancedbymodernmethodsandvice

versa,withoutlosingthespiritandlegitimacyofTCR.The

useofTCRinotherenvironmentalconflictsshouldalsobe

analysed,withaviewtodeterminingtheconditionsinwhich

certainTCRmechanismsmaybemoreusefulthanothersfor

resolvingclimate-relatedconflict.

Conclusion

Thecomplexityof climateandenvironmental conflict

dynamicsrequiresapproachesthatareabletomakesense

of the unique impacts of climate change on individuals

andcommunities,andprovidetoolsforpolicy-makersand

practitionerstorespondtosuchconflicts.Thedeprivation–

vulnerability approach to human security provides a

Themisseriyacommunityingolehvillage,Sudan,listentoaNgokDinkatraditionalcommunityleaderadvocatingforpeacefulco-existencebetweenthemisseriyaandtheirDinkaneighboursontheroutetheyshareinsearchofpastureandwater.

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framework that takes account of this complexity, but

reconceptualises human security by considering threats,

deprivations and exclusions, and vulnerability. This

approach,whichwasappliedinSudan,yieldedinteresting

findings18 and shows real potential for the study and

preventionoffutureclimate-relatedconflicts.Moreover, theworkofNGOs toaddress climate- and

environment-relatedconflict inthesouthernSahelianbeltemphasisesthatprojectsthatfocusonaddressinghumaninsecuritymaysuccessfullyresolvesuchconflicts.Projectsthatfocusonaddressingthreatstohumansecurity–orwhichaddressvulnerability,deprivationsandexclusions–reportthatenvironmentalconflictsaresuccessfullyresolvedintheshorttomediumterm.Thisarticlehighlighted,forinstance,thepotentialutilityofTCRmechanismstoaddresspresentenvironment-related and possible future climate-relatedconflictsinSudan.IncontextswhereTCRenjoyslegitimacyandissupportedbyotherinstitutionalframeworks,itmaycontribute to the resolution of environmental conflicts.However,customarymechanismshavebecomeerodedovertime,andalthoughtheycontinuetobewidelyusedinSudan,their efficacy is sometimes questioned. Enhancing TCRmethodsbysupplementingthemwithmodernparticipatoryapproachesallowssuchTCRmechanismstobestrengthenedandtocontributetotheresolutionofenvironmentalconflicts.Otherapproaches topreventandmitigateenvironmentalconflicts involve intervening inenvironmental threats,oraddressingdeprivationsandexclusions.

When considering conflict-sensitive climate changeadaptations, these findings highlight that solutions toenvironmentalconflictsarerarelysimpleandusuallyneedtobecontext-specificiftheyaregoingtobesuccessful.Thefindingsalsoemphasisethatdifferentapproachestoaddresshuman insecuritywillbesuccessful indifferentcontexts.Therefore,inthestudyarea,NGOprojectsoftenemployamixtureof elements thataddress threats, vulnerabilities,deprivations and exclusions, with priorities determinedbythecontext.Therearethosewhowouldarguethatthisuncertaintyispreciselywhyhumansecurityapproachesarenotuseful–moresogiventhateveryelementofinterventioncanthenbeseenasaddressinghumaninsecurity,andthatit is impossible todeterminewhich interventionwas theonethat ‘resolved’theconflict.Admittedly,foracademicsseeking to find direct causality between a specific setof human security indicators and conflict, this may beproblematic.However,forpolicymakersandpractitioners,the NGO projects themselves provide the answers, byaccommodating and tending to this uncertainty in theirprojectandprogrammedevelopment.Organisations thatreport success in resolving environment-related conflictunderstand theconflictswithwhich theyaredealing, theunderlying issues and the environment in which theyoperate.Theyavoidover-simplifyingconflicts,andthislikelycontributestotheirsuccess.Humansecurity-relatedanalysesandinterventionsmay,thus,betheidealapproachtopreventandresolvepresentandfutureclimate-andenvironment-related conflicts. This approach certainly deservesfurtherreflection.

Salomé Bronkhorst is a Senior Researcher in theKnowledgeProductionDepartmentatACCoRD.

Endnotes1 Nordås,R.andGleditsch,N.(2007)ClimateChangeandConflict.

Political Geography,26,pp.627–638;Barnett,J.andAdger,W.N.(2007)ClimateChange,HumanSecurityandViolentConflict.Political Geography,26,pp.639–655.

2 Saeed,A.(2009a)Study to Assess FactorsContributing to Conflict among Pastoralists, Agro-Pastoralists and Sedentary Farmers: Stage I Report.EgisBceomInternationalandSudanMinistryofAnimalResourcesandFisheries.AlsoseeGlobalEnvironmentalFacility(2007)Least Developed Countries Fund: Project Identification Form for Sudan,Availableat:<http://207.190.239.143/uploadedFiles/Focal_Areas/Climate_Change__%28PDF_DOC%29/LDCF1/Sudan%20-%20LDCF-PIF-Implementing%20NAPA%20Priority-REV.pdf>Accessedon:14February2010.

3 Kaldor,M.,Martin,M.andSelchow,S.(2007)HumanSecurity:ANewStrategicNarrativeforEurope.International Affairs,83:2.

4 Hutchful,E.(2008)FromMilitarytoHumanSecurity.InAkokpari,J.etal.(eds)The African union and its Institutions.AucklandPark:JacanaMedia,pp.63–81.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 See,forexample,HumanSecurityCommission(2003);Busumtwi-Sam(2008);HumanSecurityResearchUnit(2006);KingandMurray(2001).

8 Busumtwi-Sam,J.(2007)ContextualisingHumanSecurity:A‘Deprivation-vulnerability’Approach.Policy and Society,27,pp.15–28.Refertoarticleformorein-depthdiscussion.

9 Ibid.

10 AliSiddiq,E.F.,El-Harizi,K.andPrato,B.(2007)Managing Conflict over Natural Resources in Greater Kordofan, Sudan: Some Recurrent Patterns and Governance Implications.Availableat:<http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/42402/2/ifpridp00711.pdf>Accessedon:8February2011.

11 Mohammed,A.A.(2002)IntergroupConflictsandCustomaryMediation.African Journal on Conflict Resolution,2(2).Seethisarticleforanin-depthdiscussionofcustomarymediationinSudan,theroleofthegovernmentinunderminingthistraditionalmechanism,howtostrengthenitandtheapplicabilityofitelse-whereinAfricaandbeyond.

12 Wadi,E-T.I.,ElHillo,M.andHadi,M.B.(2005)Resource-based Conflict and Mechanism of Conflict Resolution in North Kordofan, Gedarif and Blue Nile States.Khartoum:SudanEnvironmentalConservationSociety,p.35.

13 The‘conflicttree’isaparticipatoryapproachwhereatreewithroots,atrunkandbranchesaredrawn.Theparticipantsshoulddecidewhichissuesaretheultimatecausesofaconflict(thesearetheroots).Thebranchesaretheimpactsorresultsoftheconflict,whilethetrunkdescribesthequalitiesoftheconflict(forexample:violent,mayinvolvesmallarms,andsoon).

14 Egeimi,O.,Mahmood,M.A.andAhmed,A.S.(2003)ConflictTransformation:PastoralistsandSettledFarmers.Compass Magazine,pp.22–23.

15 Wadi,E-T.I.,ElHillo,M.andHadi,M.B.(2005)op.cit.

16 Egeimi,O.,Mahmood,M.A.andAhmed,A.S.(2003)op.cit.

17 Mohamed,A.A.(2002)op.cit.

18 Theapproachalsohaditslimitations,asoutlinedinAnnex1ofthereporttobepublishedbyACCORDin2011.


addressing CharCoal ProduCtion, environmental degradation and Communal violenCe in somalia: the use of solar Cookers in bander beyla1

BySHUKRIADINI

Introduction

Since 1990, Somalia has experienced statelessness,

compounded with armed violence that has led to a high

unemploymentrate.Butanotherkindofwarisgoingonin

Somalia–onethatisbeingwagedagainstthealreadyfragile

environment.Thiswarinvolvesthedestructionofacaciatrees

toproducecharcoalforthelocalandinternationalmarket.

Since thecollapseof theSomali state,a largenumberof

unemployedmenhavemadetheirlivelihoodfromcharcoal

production. In the absence of government environmental

regulation and protection, acacia trees are cut and burnt

onalargescaleforcharcoal,leadingtothedegradationof

Somalia’snatural resources.Due topoverty,unemployed

Above:Charcoal,whichisreferredtoasdhuxulinSomali,hasbeenthemaincookingenergyusedbymillionsofhouseholdsinSomaliaforcenturies.

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conflict trends I 39conflict trends I 39

youngmenaswellasoldermen–desperatetosurviveand

feedtheirfamilies–areforcedtoengageinthisbusiness.

Charcoalproductionasalivelihoodhasledtoenvironmental

destruction–andevendeath.

The firstsectionof thisarticlediscusses theeffectsof

charcoalproductionontheenvironment,itsdirectandindirect

contributionstoviolence,anditsoveralleffectonthehealth

ofwomenandgirlsinwar-tornSomalia.Thesecondpartof

thisarticlediscussesasolarcookerprojectimplementedin

2005inBanderBeylabyHornReliefInternationalandSunFire

CookingLtd,tobenefit950tsunami-affectedfamiliesinthe

area.Giventhatcharcoalproductionleadstoenvironmental

degradationandconflictasaresultofcompetitionforscarce

resources–aswellasaffectingthehealthofthoseexposedto

itsuse,anditshighcost–thelastpartofthisarticleassesses

theimpactofsolarcookersasanalternativetousingcharcoal

ascookingfuel.

CharcoalProduction:ASourceofEnvironmental

DestructionandCommunalViolence

Charcoal,whichisreferredtoasdhuxul (andfirewood

asqoryo)inSomali,hasbeenthemaincookingenergyused

by millions of households in Somalia for centuries – and

will remainso ifnoalternativeenergy is introduced. It is

becomingdifficultforwomen,whocollectfirewood,tofind

itduetodenudation.Charcoalproduction,which involves

cuttingtreesandburningthem,ispredominantlyundertaken

bymen.Themajorityofcharcoaltradersarealsomen,but

therearesomewomeninvolvedinthistrade.Dependency

onfirewoodandcharcoalisnotonlydestroyingSomalia’s

environment but also negatively impacting the health of

women,whoareitsmainusers.

In the last two decades, charcoal production has

intensified and continues to destroy trees in Somalia,

forcingwomenandyounggirlstowalklonghourstocollect

firewood.Themaintreestargetedforcharcoalproductionare

acacias,knowninSomaliasqurac.Thesetreesaresignificant

tothesurvivalofthisnomadicsociety,astheyprovideshade

toherds,particularlygoats,sheep,cowsanddonkeys.Qurac

treesarealsousedtoconstructtraditionalhouses.Whenthe

Somalistatecollapsed,menandwomenwholosttheirjobs

andweredisplacedturnedtocharcoalproduction–ajobat

whichevenpreviouslyunskilledworkerscouldsucceed.The

requirement for charcoal production is simply the ability

tousephysicalenergytocutdownandburntreestomake

charcoal.Asaresultofmassivecharcoalproduction,trees

arenowrare.Infact,therearetownsandvillageswhereno

treesareleftstanding–atestimonytocharcoalandfirewood

dependencyandconsumption.

DiscussionswithwomeninBanderBeylarevealedthat

firewoodisbecomingscarceinthisregion,andthatmany

familieshavenochoicebuttobuythecommodityfromother

locales.Interviewswithtraditionalleadersinthearearevealed

that,withoutenvironmentallegislation,charcoalproducers–

whoarenotconcernedaboutthelong-termeffectsoftheir

actionsontheenvironment–willcontinuefellinglivetrees.

“Thecharcoal tradersbehaveas though theenvironment

isinsensitivetotheirgreed,”saidanelderlymaninBander

Beyla.“Theirultimategoalistomakemoney,obliviousto

thedevastationtheyarecausingtotheenvironment.Their

primarygoalistomakeprofitsfromcuttingandburningtrees

tomakethousandsofcharcoalsacks.”2

The massive destruction of acacia trees will have

profoundenvironmentalconsequencesfornomadicfamilies,

whosesurvivalislinkedtotheenvironmenttheyinhabit.One

man,whoownsasmallherdofgoats,said:“Thereareno

trees left inmycommunitywherebothpeopleandherds

canfindshade.Treesarestrippedoffandarenowrare.We

cannotlivewithouttrees,butwecontinuetodestroythem.”3

When–andif–durablepeaceisachievedinSomalia,the

citizens of this war-ravaged country will face enormous

environmentalinsecurity,whichalreadythreatenstheirwell-

beingandrecovery.Environmentalinsecuritywillnegatively

Acaciatreesarecutandburnedonamassivescale,toproducecharcoalinSomalia.

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affecttheabilityofawar-affectedpopulationtorecoverfrom

theirlossesandsurvivethepost-conflictstage.

CharcoalproductioninSomaliahasledtowhatareknown

as‘charcoalwars’,wherethosewhoareinvolvedincharcoal

productionclashwithinhabitantsoftheareawherethetrees

arebeingcutforcharcoalproduction.Themakersofcharcoal

and those4 who feel their territory is being invaded by

outsidersarearmed–asituationthatoftenleadstoviolence,

displacementandevendeath.Discussionswithtraditional

leaderswhoare involved in traditional conflict resolution

highlightedthattherehavebeenanumberofconflictsover

charcoalproduction.Forexample,twogroupscompetingto

accessaparticularlocationwithmanytreesoftenendupin

aviolentclash.Sometimes,theinhabitantsoftheareamay

riseagainstthecharcoalproducerswhodestroytheirtrees.

Charcoalwarsperpetuatetensionsamongcertainclans,and

areathreattooverallsecurityinsomeregions.Interviews

with residentsofBanderBeyla townand thesurrounding

villagesnotedthat,wheneverthereisacharcoalconflictin

anareafilledwithtrees,thesupplyofcharcoalisinterrupted,

and remote towns and villages that rely on charcoal for

cookingareadverselyaffected.Thephenomenonofcharcoal

warsneedstobeinvestigatedmore,asthereisnotenough

informationonit–particularlythenumberofdisplacements

and deaths caused. More elaborate research will provide

betterinsightsontheimpactofsuchconflictsoncommunities

andtheenvironment.

FirewoodandCharcoalConsumption,andtheHealth

ofWomenandgirls

Dependenceoncharcoal forcooking isverycostly for

impoverished families.Womenandgirlswalk longhours

tocollect firewoodtosupplement theexpensivecharcoal.

Firewoodcollectionisanarduous,back-breakingtask,andis

dangerousinaconflictenvironmentwheremanypeopleare

armed.Thefurtherwomenandgirlstravelinsearchofscarce

firewood,themorevulnerabletheyaretoarmedmen,who

maysexuallyabusethem.Interviewswithwomenandgirls

whocollectfirewoodinBanderBeylaandfourothervillages

revealedthattheysufferfoot,ankleandeyeinjuries–and

evensnakebites–astheyremoveandcuttoughanddead

woodwithaxes.Inunderdevelopedtownsandvillageswhere

therearenohospitals,suchinjuriescanbedeadlyforwomen

andgirls,ormayleavepermanentinjuriesthataffecttheir

mobilityand,hence,theirabilitytocareforthemselvesand

theirfamilies.

Itisestimatedthateachhouseholdneedsfivetoseven

sacks of charcoal per month, and each sack of charcoal

costsaboutUS$8toUS$10–averyexpensivecommodity

for poor families with scant resources who barely cope,

and in an armed conflict context. Due to the absence of

pricecontrol,millionsofSomalihouseholdsthatdependon

charcoalforenergyareatthemercyofcharcoalsellers,who

gaugethepricesforcharcoaldaily,forcingpoorfamiliesto

spendmoremoneyoncharcoalthanonothernecessities.

Onewomanpointsout:“Imagineyouhave todivertyour

meagreresourcestopurchasingsacksofcharcoalbecause

there is no firewood available in the area where we live,

andyouhavenomoneylefttobuyfoodforyourfamily.you

willseemanyneighbourswhohavecharcoalbutnofoodto

cook.”5Anotherwomansays:“Afterwepurchasecharcoal,

we may only afford to prepare one meal a day.”6 Money

neededtopurchasefoodischannelledtobuyingcharcoal

and,therefore,charcoalconsumptionnegativelyaffectsthe

food consumption of poor families. In addition, charcoal

usagedirectlyaffectsthehealthofwomenandgirls,whodo

thecookingfortheirfamilies.Theyareexposedtoblackdust,

smokeandsoot inhalation,whichaffects their respiratory

systemandeyesight.

Thegoodnewsisthatthereisalternativecookingenergy

availableintheformofsolarpower,whichisenvironmentally

friendlyandsafe,forthehealthandwell-beingofwomen,

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Firewoodcollectionisanarduous,back-breakingtask,andisdangerousinaconflictenvironmentwheremanypeoplearearmed.


Awomanbuyscharcoalfromatraderatacharcoalmarket;eachbagcostsaboutUS$8toUS$10.

girlsandtheirfamilies.Solarcookersalsoenablehouseholds’

dependencyoncharcoalandfirewoodtobeminimisedand,

consequently,theirfoodconsumptiontobeimproved.

The followingsectiondiscussesasolarcookerproject

implementedinBanderBeylaandfourneighbouringvillages

affected by the 2004 tsunami, and its impact on these

communities.

PreventingViolenceandProtectingtheEnvironment

throughSolarCookers

Horn Relief International and Sun Fire Cooking Ltd’s

solarcookerprojectwasunique,andwas the firstproject

of this scale in war-torn Somalia. The project – which

provided beneficiary families with alternative cooking

energyintheformofsolarcookersandnewcookingpots–

was implemented between November 2005 and March

2006,and950 familiesresiding inBanderBeyla townand

four surrounding villages – Dhuur, Dhuudo, Eldhidir and

Kulule–benefitedfromtheproject.7Thebeneficiarieswere

carefully selected8 based on their economic vulnerability,

female-headedhouseholds, lossofassets(suchasfishing

gearandboats)duringthe2004tsunami,lackofcapital,and

minority and marginalised group membership. A survey

wasconductedwiththesehouseholdstocollectinformation

onwhocooksandbuyscharcoal, thenumberofsacksof

charcoalusedbyeachhousehold,and the families’basic

awareness of the importance of trees and environment.

Membersofthebeneficiaryhouseholdswerethentrainedon

howtouseandmaintaintheirsolarcookers,andtheheadsof

familiesweretrained9onthebenefitsofusingsolarcookers–

the health of their families, saving time and being more

economicallyviable.

While it is too early to determine the extent to which

the introduction and distribution of solar cookers has

minimisedviolenceandconflictovercharcoalandfirewood,

discussionswithtraditionalleaders,womenandmeninthese

communitiesindicatethat,priortothedistributionofsolar

cookersintheirlocales,conflictsovercharcoalandaccessto

firewoodoccurredbetweenindividualsandgroupsfromtime

totime.Therecipientsofsolarcookersinthefourlocaleshold

theviewthatcasesofsuchconflictshavereducedwiththe

introductionofsolarcookers.Halima,aresidentofEldhidir

village,said:“Scarcityoffirewoodleadstofiercecompetition,

whichmaycausethosecompetingforthesecommoditiesto

resort toviolence.Eachgroupwantstohavemoreaccess

tofirewoodandmay,attimes,usearmstoscareoffother

interestedgroups.Insomeincidences,whereviolencehas

ledtoseriousinjuryorevendeath,thoseaffectedoftentimes

movetoavengeonbehalfofthevictims’familiesandclans,

leading to deadly violence. A traditional leader in Kulule

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villageconfirmed:“Withthesolarcookersnowavailablein

anumberofhouseholds inmyvillage,weareseeing less

quarrelsandconflictsoverfirewoodandcharcoalproduction.

Theuseofsolarcookershasreducedthedemandforscarce

firewood and charcoal in our village, as well as in other

places where distribution of solar cookers were made.”10

A resident in Dhuur village explained how dependency

oncharcoal impactsonpoorfamilies,andsaid:“Charcoal

sellersoftenquarrelwithfamiliesthattakecharcoaloncredit

over payment. This at times leads to serious conflicts.”11

Consistent use of solar cookers can ease competition

over scarce firewood and lessen conflicts over firewood

andcharcoal.

By using solar cookers, families have reduced their

dependencyoncharcoalandfirewoodfortheirdailycooking,

enablingthemtoaffordmorenutritiousfoods.Forexample,

afterreceivingasolarcooker,averagecharcoalusedecreased

bythreetofoursacksamonthineachfamily.“Throughour

newsolarcooker,myfamily isabletosavemoney,which

wepreviouslyspentonpurchasingsacksofcharcoal,”one

recipientsaid.12Anotherwomanasserted:“Mysolarcooker

has eased my family’s reliance on expensive charcoal.”13

AccordingtoHaweya,amotherofsix,sheisnowabletobuy

goatmilk,meatandotherfooditemsforherchildren.“Ihave

savedthousandsofshillingssinceIstartedusingthesolar

cooker.Before,Icouldnotpurchasethoseitems,”shesaid.14

The introductionanddistributionof solarcookershas

also increased theparticipationofmenandolderboys in

householdcookingactivities.Amotheroffourboysnoted

thatherhusbandandsonsarekeenoncookingsinceher

familyreceiveditssolarcookerthroughthisproject.“Because

thesolar iscleanandeasy for themtouse, theycannow

maketea,coffeeandlightmealsforus,”sheadded.15Theuse

ofsolarcookerscanaltersociallydefinedgenderrolesand

mayencouragemenandboystoparticipateincooking–and,

assuch,freewomenandgirlsfromspendinglonghoursin

foodpreparationandcooking.Domesticchoresthatrequire

manyhoursofworkdenywomenandgirlstheopportunity

AwomaninBanderBeylacookslunchforherfamilyusingasolarcooker.

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toobtainaneducationandparticipate indecision-making

processes,buttheuseofsolarcookersmayprovidewomen

andgirlssuchspace,andtheopportunitytobeeducatedand

toparticipateactivelyinactivitiesinwhichtheypreviously

couldnot.

With the introduction of solar cookers to the 950

households,charcoaltraderswerefindingitdifficulttosell

charcoal totheir formercustomers.Therewerealsomore

sacksofcharcoalatthemarkets:asignthatsolarrecipients

werenolongerpurchasingasmuchcharcoal.This,ofcourse,

infuriated the charcoal traders,whobegananaggressive

campaign to reclaim their customers. Discussions with

recipientsofsolarcookersindicatedthatcharcoaltraderswere

discouragingthemfromusingsolarcookers,andreducedthe

priceofcharcoalsackstoattractformerconsumers.Some

charcoaltraderswentasfarasspreadingrumoursthatthe

glarefromsolarcookerswasharmfultohealth.However,the

project’sstaff,whovisitedthesolarcookerusersfrequently,

continuedtosupportthemandencouragetheuseofthisform

ofenergy.

Familiesusingthesecookershavemanagedtopayoff

debtsandstartincome-generatingactivities,thusimproving

theirlivelihoods.“WiththesavingsthatImadesinceIstarted

usingmysolarcooker, Iwasabletosavesomemoneyto

payoffmydebts,”testifiedamotheroffour.16“Themore

Iused the cooker, themoremoney I saved, andwith the

money Ihavebeenable tobuyclothingandmedicine for

mychildren,”anotherwomancommented.17Byswitchingto

amoreefficientandmodernformofcookingenergy,these

familieswereabletokeeptheirhard-earnedmoneyfortheir

ownbenefitratherthanpayingcharcoaltraders,whohave

contributedtothedestructionoftreesandcommunityconflict

overtheyears.Solarcookershaveprovidedthesefamilies

witharesponsibleformofenergythatsafeguardsthewell-

beingofthecommunity,particularlywomenandgirls.The

useofsolarcookershasalsofreedwomenandgirls from

thedifficultanddangeroustaskofcollectingfirewood,and

introduced them toanenvironmentally friendlyandsafer

formofenergy.

The solar cooker project was not just about the

distributionofsolarcookers.Italsoraisedtheawarenessof

therecipientsandtheircommunitiesabouttheirimpacton

theenvironment.Ashasbeendescribedabove,firstasurvey

capturedinformationonfamilies’charcoalconsumptionand

theamountofmoneyspentoncharcoaleverymonth.This

information,whenshared,enlightened thecommunityas

totheirimpactontheenvironmentandtheoverallamount

ofresourcesspentonthisunsustainablecommodity.Next,

the benefits of using solar cookers and the importance

of protecting the environment were communicated to

beneficiaryfamilies.Environmentalprinciples18andmessages

were also created and communicated to members of the

community, particularly to women, youth and traditional

and religious leaders.Theprojectunitedmembersof the

community on how to reduce charcoal consumption and

protecttheirenvironmentthroughtheuseofsolarcookers.

ChallengesFacedbyRecipientsofSolarCookers

Despite the benefits of using solar cookers, certain

challengesaffectedthewaytherecipientsadaptedtotheuse

ofsolarcookersfortheirdailycookingactivities.Thetypeof

solarcookersdistributedrequiredaspaciousandcemented

area.However, themajorityof families hadno cemented

areasintheirhomes,andthesolarcookerwheelseasilysank

By USING SOLAR COOKERS, FAMILIES

HAVEREDUCEDTHEIRDEPENDENCyON

CHARCOALANDFIREWOODFORTHEIR

DAILy COOKING, ENABLING THEM TO

AFFORDMORENUTRITIOUSFOODS

ASomaliwomanproudlyshowsoffthesmallamountofcharcoalshenowuses,sincereceivinghersolarcooker.

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intothesandandcouldnotstanduprightwell.Asaresult,the

recipientswerehesitanttousethecookersandcomplained

thattheyweretooheavytomovearoundtheircompounds.

Sanderodedthelowermetalofthesolarcookers,andthe

project’sbudgetdidnotallowforthebuildingofcemented

spacesforeachoftherecipients.Themajorityofhouseholds

alsolackedclosedcompoundswheretheycouldensurethe

security of their solar cookers, and they were concerned

abouttheft.Recipientsalsocomplainedabouttheglareof

thecookers,andsomefearedlosingtheireyesight.Ongoing

dependenceoncharcoalwasalsoahindering factor, and

somefamilies–evenoncetheyhadreceivedsolarcookers–

struggledtochangethisdestructiveandexpensivehabit.

Conclusion

The use of solar power in Somalia can reverse the

problemsofdesertificationcausedbycharcoalproduction.

Ithasthepotentialtofreecharcoalandfirewood-dependent

familiestoutiliseenergythatisclean,freeanddoesnotaffect

theirhealth.Thisprojectprovided950 families inBander

Beylaandsurroundingvillageswithalternativeclean,cheap,

environmentallyfriendlycookingenergy,andthroughtheir

usageeasedsomeof thecommunal conflictsoverscarce

firewood and charcoal production. Through this project,

householdssavedmoneyandincreasedtheirenvironmental

awareness.Thefinancialsavingsenabledfamiliestopurchase

much-neededitemstheywereunabletoaffordpriortothe

distributionofthesolarcookers.Inaddition,theintroduction

ofsolarcookershasbroughtpositivechangetothelivesof

womenandgirls,whopreviouslyspentsixtosevenhoursa

daycookingfortheirfamiliesandbeingexposedtosmoke

and soot inhalation. The use of solar cookers has given

womenandgirlsmoretime,whichtheycanusetoattend

schoolandbeactiveintheircommunityaffairs.Throughsolar

cookers,womenandgirlshavebecomeawareofthenegative

effectsoffirewoodandcharcoalontheirhealthandontheir

manyfamilieslackedclosedcompoundsandcementedareastoensurethesecurityoftheirsolarcookersandtopreventsanddamagetothecooker.

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family’ssavings–whichheightenedtheirunderstandingof

thebenefitsofusingsolarcookers.

The introduction and distribution of solar cookers

was intended to reverse the long-term environmental

degradationcausedbytheproductionanduseofcharcoal

for cooking energy. This project was implemented more

thanfiveyearsagoanditsfindingswererelevantto2006.

Thelong-termimpactofthisprojectneedstobeexplored

toestablishiftheearlierresultsoftheprojectstillremain.

Updated researchwill reveal thepercentageof recipients

whoarestillusingtheirsolarcookers,theamountofsavings

each household continues to experience, and the extent

to which the continued use of solar cookers still reduces

environmentaldegradationandcommunalconflict.Inorder

tosavemoretreesandreverseenvironmentaldegradation,

moresolarcookersneedtobedistributedtomanyregions

ofSomalia.CharcoalproductionandconsumptioninSomalia

isnotsustainable– ifcharcoaldependencycontinues, the

fewremaining treesand rangelandswillbedenudedand

destroyed,leadingtofurthersoilerosion.

Charcoal production and consumption provides

livelihoods to many people. Without creating alternative

employmentopportunitiesforthesepeople,andwithoutthe

useofalternativecookingenergy–suchassolarcookers–

theproductionandconsumptionofcharcoalandfirewood

willpersistinSomalia.Furthermore,alllevelsofauthorityin

Somalia–fromvillageleveltonationallevel–mustimplement

andenactenvironmentalpoliciesthatwillprotecttreesand

preventsoilerosion(anoutcomeofcharcoalproduction)and

providealternativelivelihoodsforthoseinvolvedincharcoal

production. Immediate action must be taken to minimise

theever-growingdependencyoncharcoal,andtherelated

conflictandviolencethatoccursincommunities.Raisingthe

awarenessofeveryoneinvolvedincharcoalproductionand

consumption–buyers,consumers,sellersandthegeneral

public–particularly theirunderstandingof thebenefitsof

protectingtheirownenvironment,isalsourgentlyneededin

war-tornSomalia.

DrShukriaDiniwastheProjectmanageroftheSolarCookerProjectandimplementeditonbehalfofHornRelief International in theKarKaar region,Puntland,SomaliafromNovember2005tomarch2006.SheisanindependentResearcherwholivesinNairobi,Kenya.

Endnotes1 BanderBeylaisacoastaltownontheIndianOceaninSomalia’s

north-easternregionofPuntland.Thetownwasaffectedbythe2004tsunamianditsinhabitantslosttheirfishingboats,gear,homesandtheiroveralllivelihoods.

2 Ali,Hussein(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.AliisanelderinBanderBeylatown.Fictitiousnameshavebeenusedtoprotecttherealidentityofallindividualsquotedinthisarticle.

3 Salad,Ali(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.

4 Armedmenwhoresideneartheareaswherecharcoalisproducedmayrefuseoutsiderstocuttreesintheirregion.Thesemenarguethattheyareprotectingtheenvironment.Theyarenotenvironmentalistsandtheyarguethattheysimplywanttoprotectthetreesfortheirowninterests:tomakecharcoalorusetreesasfirewoodforthemselves.

5 Jelle,Fatuma(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.

6 Suldaan,Jimco(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.

7 Atotalof612familiesinBanderBeylatownreceivedsolarcookers.Dhuuris56kmfromBanderBeyla,and55familiesinDhuurbenefitedfromthisproject.Eldhidiris38kmfromBanderBeylatown,andtherewere86familiesinEldhidirthatreceivedcookers.Kululeis70kmfromBanderBeyla,and155familieswereselectedandreceivedsolarcookers.

8 Theprocessofselectingbeneficiarieswasparticipatoryandinclusive.Communitymembers–includinglocalleaders,womenandyouth–inallfiveareasweremobilisedandinvitedtochoosethemostdeservingfamiliesforthesolarcookers.Theycameupwithaguidelineforselectingthemostdeservingfamiliesintheirrespectivecommunities.

9 Throughsuchtrainings,theheadofeachfamilywasprovidedwithinformationontheimportanceofpreparingnutritiousmeals,howtocooknutritiousandaffordablemealsthroughchannellingresourcesspentoncharcoaltofood,andtheimportanceofboilingdrinkingwater.

10 Abdulle,Odowa(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.Kululevillage.

11 Daud,Hindiya(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.Dhuurvillage.

12 Abdi,Jamila(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.

13 Abdikarim,Suad(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.

14 Adan,Haweya(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.

15 Farah,Zeinab(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.

16 Isak,Dahabo(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.

17 Ismail,Hawa(2005)InterviewwiththeauthorinNovember.BanderBeylatown.

18 Environmentalprinciplesformedincluded:humanbeingscanonlysurviveandbesecurewhentheyprotect,respectandbecomethecustodiansoftheirenvironment;theyneedtorecognisethat,ashumans,cuttingandburningtreestoproducecharcoalimpactsnegativelyontheenvironment;charcoalproductionhasmultipleimplicationsforpeopleandanimals;andthateverypersonhastheresponsibilitytoprotectandminimisetheirnegativeimpactontheenvironment.

FAMILIES USING THESE COOKERS

HAVE MANAGED TO PAy OFF DEBTS

AND START INCOME-GENERATING

ACTIVITIES, THUS IMPROVING THEIR

LIVELIHOODS


Collusion and Criminalisation: fuel ConfliCt in the niger deltaBymELISSACAWTHRA

Theeconomicdisparitiesandsocial inequalities that

havebeenbroughtaboutbytheextractionindustryinthe

NigerDeltastandinstarkcontrasttothisregion’smassive

contribution to the world oil economy. The expansion

of theactivitiesofoilandgasmultinationals inNigeria,

helped by the collusion of government officials, has

playedadirectroleinfuellingcorruptionandviolenceand

creatingaseeminglyparadoxicalsituation,characterised

bythesimultaneousenrichmentofforeigncompaniesand

theimpoverishmentoflocalpopulations.

However, one must be cautious to avoid simplistic

readingsthatattributetheongoingconflictintheoil-rich

Niger Delta to a single cause by calling for a nuanced

analysisofthe“complexwebofpetro-violence”1,based

ontheinterplayofavarietyofdomesticandinternational

factors. This article seeks to identify factors that have

combined to fuel conflict in the Niger Delta. Beginning

withanaccountof thebackgroundtotheconflict, itwill

thereafter provide an overview of recent developments

that have served to exacerbate tensions in the Niger

Deltaregion.Thearticlewill thenexaminetheshortfalls

of measures that have thus far been put in place by

Above: Frequent oil leaks have wreaked widespreaddamageontheecosystemoftheDeltastates.

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the extraction industry and the state, in response to

widespreadinternationalcondemnationofenvironmental

andhumanrightsviolationsincurredbycorporationsand

theNigeriangovernment.

BackgroundtotheConflict

TheNigerDeltaisaregionmadeupofninestateswitha

combinedpopulationof31millionintheswampycoastlands

in thesouthofNigeria.Theregionoccupiesaprominent

strategicpositionbothnationallyandinternationallyashost

toNigeria’svastoilindustry,andaccountsforover75%of

thecountry’spetroleumproductionandexports.Inspiteof

itsconsiderablecontributiontothenationaleconomy,the

NigerDeltaisoneoftheleastdevelopedareasinNigeria–

themajorityoflocalcommunitiesdonothaveaccesstoclean

drinkingwaterorelectricity.Traditionally,localpopulations

have reliedonsubsistenceactivities suchas fishingand

farmingtomakealiving.However,thelivelihoodsofthese

localcommunitiesarethreatenedbytheactivitiesofforeign

oil and gas corporations such as Shell, Chevron-Texaco,

Exxon-MobilandBritishPetroleum(BP).Failuretomaintain

oil facilitiesadequately, frequentoil leaksandgas flares

havewreakedwidespreaddamageontheecosystemofthe

Kajama

Sokoto

Katsina

Dutse Damaturu

Birnin Kebbi

Bauchi

Jalingo

Minna

Ilorin

AkureAdo-Ekiti

Lokaja

Enugu

Awka

Makurdi

Abeokuta

PortHarcourt

Benin CityAsaba

Ikeja

Jos

Owerri

YenagoaCalabar

Yola

Umuahia

Uyo

Gombe

Gusau

Lafia

Abakaliki

Douala

Bafoussam

Kumba

Nikongsamba

Garoua

Maroua

Aba

Lagos

Ogbomosho

Ife

Onitsha

Kano Maiduguri

OshogboIbadan

Zaria

Kaduna

Abuja

Porto-Novo

N'Djamena

KainjReservoir

Niger

Niger

Benue

Bénoué

Komadugu

KomaduguGana

Yedseram

Sanaga

Mbam

Kaduna

Gon

gola

Hadejia

Sokoto

Zamfara

Gulbin Ka

Sokoto

Gul f of Guinea

Bight of Benin

Bight of Biafra

Lake Chad

Nig

er

Nige r

D e l ta

Quémé

Lake Bamendjing

SOKOTO

ZAMFARA

KATSINA

KANO

JIGAWA Y O B E B O R N O

K E B B I

KADUNA B A U C H I

ADAMAWA

KWARA

K O G I

O Y O

P L AT E AU

NASSARAWA

T A R A B A

B E N U E

N I G E R

ABUJA CAPITAL TERRITORY

OSUN

O G U NONDO

E D O

GOMBE

DELTA

ENUGU

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ABIACROSS RIVERS

AKWA IBOM

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0 50 100 150 200 km

0 50 100 mi

NIGERIA

NIGERIA

National capitalState capitalTown, villageMajor airportInternational boundaryState boundaryHighwayMain roadSecondary roadRailroad

AsatelliteimageoftheNigerDelta.

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Deltastates,andlocalcommunitiesfindthemselvesinthe

precarious situationofhaving their villagesbulldozed to

makewayforfurtherexpansionofenergyinfrastructure–as

hasbeenthecaseseveraltimesinthepast.Unfortunately,

theNigerianstate, reluctant to turndownthesubstantial

economicgainsofferedbythislucrativeindustry,hasdone

little–ifnothing–toalleviatehumansufferingandmitigate

environmentaldamage.Infact,ithasoftenbeencomplicit

in allowing multinationals to pursue their activities with

impunity.Poorregulationandexpropriationoflandforoil

productionhaveledtothechronicunderdevelopmentofthe

Deltastates,inspiteoftheregion’sconsiderableoilwealth.

The current situation in the Niger Delta stems from

decadesofneglectof localcommunitiesandviolentstate

repression. The combined result of this has been a full

insurgency since 2006, in which the Movement for the

EmancipationoftheNigerDelta(MEND)andvariousother

politicalandcriminalgroupshaveresortedtoviolentmeans

toprotestenvironmentalandhumanrightsabusesandgain

access to revenues generated by the oil-rich region. The

complexityandscaleoftheconflictinthisregionissuchthat

theInternationalCrisisGrouppublishedareportinAugust

2006inwhichitdescribedthevolatilenatureofthesituation

asa“potentcocktailofpoverty,crimeandcorruption”.2

TheStrategicImportanceofoilinNigeria

InNigeria,oilmakesupthefiscalbasisofstatepower,

federal power and economic development. The Delta’s

long history of neglect stems in large part from the

state’s perceptions of the economic irrelevance of local

communities: as a rentier state that derives 80% of its

official revenuesand95%of itsexportearnings fromthe

sale of oil, the government does not rely on taxes from

its citizens and, therefore, does not feel bound by any

obligation to provide its people with basic public goods

like education, improved health facilities and security.3

William Reno’s theory of ‘warlord politics’ as the modus

operandiinmanyweakAfricanstatesturnstheconventional

notionofstatehoodonitshead.ForReno,corruptleaders,

facedwith insurgenciesandwarring factionswithin their

countries, seekself-enrichmentandbuildup theirpower

basesbyaccumulatingrentstofightoffthreatsfromlocal

strongmenandpacifyinsurgenciesattheexpenseofstate

building and development.4 Following World Bank and

International Monetary Fund (IMF) prescriptions to trim

bureaucraciesandprivatisepublic-sectorcompanies,these

leadershavecometoreplaceColdWarpatronagenetworks

with partnerships with unscrupulous foreign firms. As is

thecasewithoilmultinationalsinNigeria,thesefirmsfulfil

PortHarcourtintheNigerDelta,theoilcapitalofAfrica,isacrowdedcityplaguedbycrimewheremostpeoplelivewellbelowthepovertyline.

GE

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surrogatestatefunctionsbyprovidingbureaucraticservices

(inthiscase,security)inareaswherevaluableresourcesare

extracted.5Thiscollusionbetweenstateandmultinationals

is particularly troubling as it fosters an unhealthy

interdependence between the two entities, and reduces

transparency in business operations and the regulation

of industrypractices.On thispoint,Ukejehasnoted that

“multinationalandlocaloilcompaniesandtheNigerianstate

arelockedinacomplex,opaqueandveryoftenincestuous

relationshipinwhicheachpartylookstotheothertosustain

andadvancemutualinterests”.6

TheanalysisoftheongoingviolenceintheNigerDelta

isframedbytracingtheprogressionandescalationofthe

conflictalongaspectrumofthreephases.

marginalisationandthePeacefulPursuitof

Autonomy

TheNigerDelta ishome toethnicminoritieswhose

grievances extend to the pre-independence period.

The Deltans’ struggle for autonomy and self-rule dates

back toNigeria’s colonisation in1914,when theBritish

relegated Delta populations to ethnic minority status

relative tonumericallysuperiorethnicities in thenorth,

east and west of the country. The marginalisation of

local Delta communities was cemented in 1969, when

thefederalmilitarygovernmenttookcontrolofallpetrol-

producing territories through Decree No. 51/Petroleum

Actof1969.UnderthisAct, thefederaloilministerwas

granted“thesole right tograntoilmining leases tooil

VastareasoffarmlandlayscorchedafteranexplosiononarupturedpipelineinoviricourtinAdedjeintheNigerDeltaareathatclaimedthelivesof250peopleanddestroyedcashcrops(2000).

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companies”.7Revenueallocationtoethnicminoritystates

was progressively reduced from 50% in 1966 to 3% in

themid-1990s,thenincreasedto13%in19998following

intensifiedopposition–butlocalcommunitieshavethus

farderivedno tangiblegains fromthis increase,due to

mismanagement and misappropriation of revenues by

state governments. The government has controlled the

energypursestringssinceitnationalisedtheoilindustry

in 1971 and owns between 55% and 60% of onshore

multinationaloiloperations inthenameof theNigerian

NationalPetroleumCorporation,according to the terms

ofa jointventurearrangementwithoilmultinationals.9

This arrangement generated US$60 billion in revenues

fortheNigerianstatein2005.10Theshiftfrommilitaryto

democratic rule in1999hasdonenothing toameliorate

widespreadinstitutionalisedcorruptionbystateofficials,

with the head of Nigeria’s anti-corruption agency

estimatingthat70%ofoilrevenueswerestolenorwasted

in2003.11

Furthermore, the Land Use Act – which effectively

placedallofNigeria’slandunderthecontrolofthestate

government–waspassedin1979,therebycompounding

thedisempowermentandeconomicmarginalisationofthe

Deltacommunities.12This legalprovisionhas facilitated

theexpropriationofNigerDelta land foroilproduction

anddevelopmentbyoilmultinationals.Almostexclusively

dependent on oil rents and bound to multinationals

by contract, the Nigerian state has thus come to fulfil

a gatekeeper role for oil multinationals operating in

theDelta.

Itwaswithinthiscontextofalienationandexclusion

of localDeltapopulations thatKenSaro-Wiwa,awriter

andOgoniethnicminorityrightsactivist,ledanon-violent

campaignbytheMovementfortheSurvivaloftheOgoni

People(MOSOP)inthe1990stoprotestagainstviolations

ofenvironmentalandhumanrightsinOgoniland.MOSOP

drew up a Bill of Rights in which it targeted abuses by

ShellanddemandedautonomyandlocalcontrolofNiger

Delta oil revenues. MOSOP’s initial local non-violent

protestevolvedintoaglobalcampaign,bylinkingupwith

internationaladvocacygroupswhichexertedpressureon

ShellandtheNigeriangovernmenttoputanendtohuman

rightsabuses, exploitationandwidespreadpollution in

Ogoniland.

IncreasedStateRepressionandResorttoViolent

Protest

In spite of the apparent success of the MOSOP

campaignintheearly1990s,peacefulprotestsmetwith

state repressionandculminated in thepublicexecution

ofSaro-Wiwaandothermembersofthe‘OgoniNine’ in

1995 under Abacha’s military regime. The brutal state

repressionofMOSOP informedthe Ijawethnicminority

movement in Niger Delta, which issued an ultimatum

for all oil companies to leave the region by December

1998.Thegovernmentrespondedbydeclaringastateof

emergency in the Niger Delta; the protest was crushed

and grievances left unaddressed. Many hoped that the

transition tocivilian ruleanddemocracy in1999would

bringaboutgreaterdialoguebetweenstateandcitizens,

butithas,infact,ledtohigherlevelsofviolenceaslocal

politicians began to co-opt insurgents, arming Delta

Political and militant groups in the Niger Delta haveresorted to violent means to protest environmentalandhumanrightsabusesandgainaccesstorevenuesgeneratedbytheoil-richregion.

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MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

HAVE INFLICTED WIDESPREAD ENVI-

RONMENTAL AND SOCIAL DAMAGES

ON THE NIGER DELTA OVER THE

COURSE OF MANy yEARS, AND THE

CONFLICT IS LIKELy TO PERSIST

AND INTENSIFy AS LONG AS THE

GRIEVANCES OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES

FAILTOBEADEQUATELyADDRESSED


resistancegroups inexchange forpoliticalsupport.Nor

hastheendoftheAbachadictatorshipin1999hadmuch

effectoncurbingtheexcessesofthemilitary,whoreceive

generouscompanyallowancesforprovidingsecurityatoil

plantsandsilencingprotestors.

Attempts by disenfranchised local communities to

voice their grievances and assert their rights have thus

beenquashedconsistently.Inthislight,itisnotsurprising

that,afterdecadesofpeacefulcampaigning,theoppressed

peoplesoftheDeltacametoviewviolenceasalegitimate

weaponofprotest.Theincreasedresorttoviolencemust

also be seen in the context of an entrenched culture of

violenceandmilitarisminNigeriathatisanextensionof

the colonial state, as well as the product of decades of

post-colonialmilitaryrule.13Thiscultureofviolenceisso

ingrainedinNigeriansocietythatithascometodominate

relationsbetweenstateandlocalcommunities,insurgents

and corporations and, more recently, intracommunal

relations. The combination of the state’s pacification

techniques,intensifiedmilitarydeploymentininsurgency

zones by state and corporations, and the widespread

beliefamongstDeltayouth thatacquiringweaponswill

earnthemrespectandlendlegitimacytotheircausehas

resulted inaproliferationofsmalland lightweapons in

this region. These conditions led to a full insurgency

in 2006, with resistance movements such as MEND

frequently carrying out attacks on oil infrastructure in

their struggle to control oil revenues in the Delta and

forcetheevictionofoilmultinationalsfromtheregion–

particularly in light of the widespread environmental

degradationthattheiroperationshavecaused.TheMEND

insurgency was initially framed in political terms, with

the movement claiming to disrupt operations with the

intentionofcripplingtheNigerianstateandoilindustries’

capacitytoproduceoilintheNigerDelta.Sincethistime,

however,theconflicthasevolvedandbecomeincreasingly

complex as a multiplication of criminal elements and

gangs have followed suit, conducting acts of sabotage

and oil bunkering purely for economic gains, with the

consequence that therehasbeenablurringof the lines

betweencriminalandmilitantgroups.

Post9/11Developments

Theprevailingvolatilityofthisregionmustbeseenin

thecontextofitsincreasingstrategicimportanceasaglobal

energysupplier.DuetoheightenedinstabilityintheMiddle

Eastandadecrease in theUnitedStates’ (US)popularity

inthatregionintheaftermathof9/11andtheIraqWar,the

USand its ‘coalition’counterpartshave tended to favour

oilexplorationandinvestmentinAfricainthepastdecade

(whichimpliessteppingupsecuritytoprotecttheregion’s

abundant oil reserves and combat the rise of terrorism).

Ijawmilitantsguardtheoporozacreeksingbaramatukingdom,inthevolatileNigerDeltaregion.

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ThepastdecadehasseenagrowingtendencyofWesterngovernments to help Nigerian and other Gulf of Guineastatesbuildtheirmilitaryandnavalcapabilities,strengthentheirsecuritysectorsthrougharmssalesandreinforcetheirregionalmilitarypresenceforthepurposesofdeterrence.14TheincreasingvisibilityoftheUSNavyintheGulfofGuinea,theestablishmentofAFRICOM(theUSAfricanCommand)andtheUnitedKingdom(UK)navy’spromiseofmilitaryaidtoNigeria in2008areproofofdirectcontributions to themilitarisationofNigeriabyWesternnations.15

AnotherrecentgeopoliticaldevelopmentistheGulfofGuinea’s rising importance as a hub for drug smugglingand related forms of transnational criminal activity. TheUNODC World Drug Report, published in 2010, indicatesthat, whereas cocaine consumption has dropped 50% intheUS in thepast10years, ithas increased inEurope.16This shift in geographic patterns of demand for cocaineaccounts for a diversion of drug trafficking routes in thepastdecade, asdrugsare increasingly smuggledvia theWestAfricanGulfofGuineaintransitfromSouthAmericatoEurope,whereas10yearsagotheycommonlytransitedfromSouthAmericatotheUSviaCentralAmerica.Inlightofthesenewdevelopmentsoverthepastdecade,Westernpowers–notablytheUS–haverespondedbysteppingup

the militarisation and ‘securitisation’ of the region in aneffort to police crime and arm the Nigerian governmentagainstattacksby insurgents.Themotivationbehindthisisquitesimple: thesepowers realise that theNigerDeltaisvital inensuringtheiroilsupply,andtheyareonly tooawareofthedisastrousimpactthatinstabilityandinsurgentactivity(suchasactsofpipelinesabotageincurredbytheMENDrebelmovement)canhaveonglobaloilprices.These‘securitisation’policies,advancedintheinterestsof‘energysecurity’ but essentially designed to protect the West’seconomicinterests,haveultimatelyfuelledtheconflictintheNigerDelta,leadingtoover-militarisationandaproliferationofsmallarms.Theseareusedtosustaintheconflict,therebyprotracting the fighting and intensifying the unrelentingstrugglebetweenvariousarmedfactions,corruptNigerianstateofficialsandmultinationalcorporationsforthecontrolofresources.

Attempts at ‘securitisation’ in the oil-rich Niger Deltahave,therefore,hadpreciselytheoppositeeffect:byarmingthe security apparatus of the Nigerian state, developednationsaredirectlylegitimisingincreasedresortingtostaterepressionofinsurgencies.Insodoing,theyarefuellingtheinternalconflictbetweenthegovernmentandtheinsurgents,aggravatingtheresentmentfeltbythe insurgentsagainst

Nigerian soldiers aboardapatrol boatkeepwatchover anatural gas loading terminal inBonny, in theoil richNigerDelta.


those inpower inNigeria,andhardeningtheirresistance

to the presence of foreign multinationals. This serves to

perpetuatethecycleofviolenceintheregion.

IndustryResponses:LimitedCorporateSocial

ResponsibilityandCriminalisation

Multinational corporations have inflicted widespread

environmentalandsocialdamagesontheNigerDeltaover

thecourseofmanyyears,andtheconflictislikelytopersist

andintensifyaslongasthegrievancesoflocalcommunities

failtobeadequatelyaddressed.Environmentaldegradation

hashaddisastrousconsequencesforthelivelihoodsofthe

Deltapeopleandrequiresurgentattention.Thegovernment’s

policyofevictinglocalpopulationstomakewayforfurther

expansionofoiloperationshasdeprivedsubsistence-based

communitiesoftheabilitytofishorfarm.Today,themajority

oflocalpeoplefromformerfishingcommunitiesareforced

todependonfrozenfish,whichissoldforclosetoUS$1a

pieceand,therefore,generallyunaffordabletoDeltalocals–

mostofwhomliveonlessthanUS$1aday.17Hundredsof

gasflareshaveburnedcontinuouslyfordecades,causing

acidrainandreleasinggreenhousegases;leaksfromwells

and pipelines and the construction of roads and canals

havedisruptedfragilewetlandecosystems;andfrequentoil

spillsdestroycroplandandpollutegroundwater.Theextent

oftheenvironmentaldamageisstaggering:roughly5400

oilspillswereofficiallyrecordedbetween2000and2004,18

but analysts suspect that the real figure is much higher.

Corporatesocialresponsibility(CSR)measuresthattakeinto

account the far-reachingconsequencesof suchprofound

damageonthelivesoflocalcommunitiesarelongoverdue.

Greater progress seems to have been made in terms

of addressing social and human rights abuses, but the

measuresadopted thus fararebynomeanssufficient in

resolvingtheconflict.Followingwidespreadcondemnation

ofShell’sallegedcomplicityinthe‘OgoniNine’executions

in1995byadvocacyandhumanrightsgroups,thecompany

responded by withdrawing operations from Ogoniland.

Chevronalsocameunderattackin1998forrecruitingand

supplyingNigerianmilitaryforcesintheshootingandkilling

ofprotestersinMay1998.19Then,in2000,oilmultinationals

operatingintheNigerDeltasignedtheVoluntaryPrinciples

on Security and Human Rights with the governments

of the US and the UK and prominent international

non-governmentalorganisations (NGOs)which,“withan

interestinhumanrightsandcorporatesocialresponsibility

…engagedinadialogueofsecurityandhumanrights”.20

However, thesigningof thisagreementhasdone little to

reduce theconflict in theNigerDelta,andagapremains

betweendesignandimplementationoftheprinciples.

SomearguethatCSRpoliciesadoptedseveralyearsago

have been insufficiently implemented and have failed to

reduceviolence,asmultinationals’agendasareessentially

skewedinfavourofenablingcontinuedbusinessoperations

withoutaddressingthekeyissueslinkedtolocalcommunity

development in a meaningful way.21 When questioned,

industry has tended to put the blame on the Nigerian

state’s monopoly of sovereignty, and claimed reluctance

toundermineNigerianauthority.Inthislight,onemayask

whether these corporations are genuinely committed to

communitydevelopmentorwhetherCSRpoliciesserveasa

smokescreentopursueprofits.

The primary strategy employed by multinationals in

theNigerDeltahasbeentocriminalisetheactionsoflocal

communities.Framingactsofsabotagebymilitantsinthe

Niger Delta as criminal acts is a means of downplaying

thepoliticalandsocial-economicgrievancesofinsurgents

anddepriving their causeof legitimacy, therebyevading

responsibility for addressing the root causes of conflict.

Criminalisation has largely been achieved by two

mechanisms of industrial intervention: the Legaloil.com

initiative and the signature of a Global Memorandum

of Understanding (GMoU) in 2004 between local Delta

communities,theNigeriangovernmentandmultinationaloil

corporations.22TheLegaloil.cominitiativehascriminalised

resistance groups in two ways: first, the website links

bunkeringtothetradeinconflictdiamonds,therebyframing

bunkeringactivitiesas illicit and formalextractionbyoil

multinationalsaslicit;andsecond,thiscampaigncitesoil

bunkeringastheculpritandthecauseofsocio-economic

breakdown in the Niger Delta – while such activities

have,infact,arisenasaconsequenceof,andreactionto,

INNIGERIA,OILMAKESUPTHEFISCALBASISOFSTATEPOWER,FEDERALPOWER

ANDECONOMICDEVELOPMENT.THEDELTA’SLONGHISTORyOFNEGLECTSTEMS

INLARGEPARTFROMTHESTATE’SPERCEPTIONSOFTHEECONOMICIRRELEVANCE

OFLOCALCOMMUNITIES,THEGOVERNMENTDOESNOTRELyONTAxESFROMITS

CITIZENSAND,THEREFORE,DOESNOTFEELBOUNDByANyOBLIGATIONTOPROVIDE

ITS PEOPLE WITH BASIC PUBLIC GOODS LIKE EDUCATION, IMPROVED HEALTH

FACILITIESANDSECURITy


extractionbyoilcompanies.23Ontheotherhand,theGMoU

fosterscollectivepunishmentinthecaseofanydisruption

to industry operations, and forbids collective action by

“makingnon-violentprotesteffectivelycriminal”.24Arecent

reportpublishedbyAmnestyInternationalhasexposedthis

criminalisationbymultinationals,citingShell’sfalsification

offiguresinanattempttoblamethemajorityofoilpollution

onsaboteurs(asopposedtoindustrialoilspills).Twoleading

advocacy groups – Amnesty International and Friends

of the Earth International – filed a complaint in January

2011 inwhich theyclaimthatShell’sactionsconstitutea

breachoftheOrganisationofEconomicCo-operationand

Development’sGuidelinesforMultinationalEnterprises.25

ConclusionWhile this strategy of criminalising insurgents and

implementing limited CSR measures may be a usefulway for corporations to avoid blame, abdicate socialresponsibility and continue to pursue their businessoperationsintheDelta,itpointstoamuchwiderproblemintermsoftransparencyandaccountability.TheNigerianstate’s response to criminalisation has thus far beento increase militarisation, which feeds back into theviciouscircleofself-perpetuatingviolence.Unlesstheseissuesareaddressed, thechronic lackofstateoversightand insufficient CSR implementation on the part ofmultinational corporations will continue to stoke theflamesofresistanceandresentmentinthisalreadyover-militarisedandhighlyvolatilezone.

melissaCawthra is pursuing amaster’s degree ininternationalaffairs,withafocusonsecurityissuesinWestAfrica,atSciencesPoinParis,France.

Endnotes1 Obi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(2011)Petro-violenceinthe

NigerDelta–TheComplexPoliticsofanInsurgency.InObi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(eds)oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence.LondonandNewyork:ZedBooks.

2 InternationalCrisisGroup(2006)‘TheSwampsofInsurgency:Nigeria’sDeltaUnrest’,AfricaReportNo.115,3August2006,Availableat:<http://www.crisisgroup.org>Accessedon:12March2011.

3 O’Neill,Tom(2007)‘CurseoftheBlackGold:HopeandBetrayalontheNigerDelta’,Availableat:<http://www.nationalgeo-graphic.com>Accessedon:3April2011.

4 Reno,William(1998)Warlord Politics and African States.Boulder,COandLondon:LynneRienner.

5 Ibid.

6 Ukeje,Charles(2011)ChangingtheParadigmofPacification:OilandMilitarizationinNigeria’sNigerDelta.InObi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(eds)op.cit.,p.94.

7 Obi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(2011)Petro-violenceintheNigerDelta–TheComplexPoliticsofanInsurgency.InObi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(eds)op.cit.,p.6.

8 Ibid.,p.7.

9 O’Neill,Tom(2007)op.cit.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Obi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(2011)Petro-violenceintheNigerDelta–TheComplexPoliticsofanInsurgency.InObi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(eds)op.cit.p.6.

13 Duquet,Nils(2011)SwampedwithWeapons:TheProliferationofIllicitSmallArmsandLightWeaponsintheNigerDelta.InObi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(eds)op.cit.

14 Ukeje,Charles(2011)op.cit.

15 Zalik,Anna(2011)LabellingOil,ContestingGovernance:LegalOil.com,theGMoUandProfiteeringintheNigerDelta.InObi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(eds)op.cit.

16 UNODC(2010)‘TheDestabilizingInfluenceofDrugTrafficking:TheCaseofCocaine’,UNODCWorldDrugReport2010,Availableat:<http://www.unodc.org>Accessedon:18February2011.

17 O’Neill,Tom(2007)op.cit.

18 Idemudia,Uwafiokun(2011)CorporateSocialResponsibilityandtheNigerDeltaConflict:IssuesandProspects.InObi,CyrilandRustad,SiriAas(eds)op.cit.

Nigeria’sOilDictatorship’,(video)Availableat:<http://www.democracynow.org>Accessedon:26February2011.

20 (2000)‘VoluntaryPrinciplesonSecurityandHumanRights’,Availableat:<http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org>Accessedon:2April2011.

21 Idemudia,Uwafiokun(2011)op.cit.

22 Zalik,Anna(2011)op.cit.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.p.199

25 AmnestyInternational(2011)‘ShellAccusedoverMisleadingFiguresonNigeriaOilSpills’,AmnestyInternationalReport,25January2011,Availableat:<http://www.amnesty.org>Accessedon:19February2011.

FAILURE TO MAINTAIN OIL FACILITIES

ADEQUATELy, FREQUENT OIL LEAKS

AND GAS FLARES HAVE WREAKED

WIDESPREAD DAMAGE ON THE

ECOSySTEM OF THE DELTA STATES,

AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES FIND

THEMSELVES IN THE PRECARIOUS

SITUATIONOFHAVINGTHEIRVILLAGES

BULLDOZED TO MAKE WAy FOR

FURTHER ExPANSION OF ENERGy

INFRASTRUCTURE–ASHASBEENTHE

CASESEVERALTIMESINTHEPAST


For centuries, the world has become dependent on

energyproductionandconsumptiontopropelitseconomic

growth.StartingwiththeDutchpeatindustry,andevolving

fromBritishcoal toAmericanoil, fossil fuelshavedriven

states to world dominance and commercial expansion.

It is “through new energy sources, new tools, and new

marketconnections”thattheworldhas“acquiredgreater

and greater leverage over the environment”, the effects

of which were almost entirely ignored.1 yet many of the

benefitsrealisedbythisprocessofindustrialisationcameat

theexpenseoftheAfricancontinent–aprocessthatbegan

a trend of ostracising local people from discussions on

resourcedistribution.

It is this relationship between the global north and

AfricathatCamillaToulminbuildsuponin Climate Change

in Africa.Shearguesearlyonthatthosewhobenefitfrom

accesstocertainresourcesaretypicallythosewhohavethe

least tosayabout theirmanagement inAfrica.Toulmin’s

bookfocusesonkeyenvironmentalfactorsthatplayarole

inshapingthecontinentastheglobalclimatechanges.Her

chaptersexaminefood,water,forests,cities,conflict,climate

trendsandcarboneconomiestohighlighthowthosewho

willbemostpronetotheeffectsofglobalclimatechange

willultimatelyhavetheleasttosayabouttheirmanagement.

She offers a comprehensive look at each dilemma, and

suggests tangible ways to improve the situation. The

author recognises the hype about “global warming”,

but sets herself apart by establishing an unambiguous

frameworktohelpreadersunderstandwhatisgoingonand

howproblemsmightbeaddressed.Asthedirectorofthe

InternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopmentin

London,UnitedKingdom,shehasadiversebackgroundin

economicsanditsrelationshiptotheenvironment.Muchof

Climate Change in Africalooksatbroadertrends,usingcase

studiesandotherexamplestohighlighttheurgencyofthese

problemsandthepossibilitiesfortheirimprovement.

Toulmin’s organisation of the book helps lay out a

foundationforheranalysis.Shepositionsthecasestudies

she presents with an overview of climate change in the

firstandsecondchapters,providingacontextforAfrica’s

environmentalstanding.Sheemphasisesthatsmallchanges

intemperaturecanhavevasteffectsacrossthecontinent.

Increasedaridity,sealevelrise,limitationsonfreshwater

anddeforestationareonlysomefactorsthatwillaffectthe

continentinthenearfuture.Muchoftherestofthebookis

dedicatedtolookingatspecificresourcesandareaswhere

theymaybecomestrained.Forexample,sheexaminesthe

importanceofplanning forwatershortagesata regional

level anddiscusseshowagricultural scienceshavedone

littletobenefitAfrica.Inthechapteraboutforests,Toulmin

discusses how deforestation has reduced the ability for

the earth to absorb carbon and to regulate moisture

in local ecosystems. Her analyses are detailed, yet not

overwhelming.Shehasclearlymadeanefforttopackage

theeffectsofclimateconcisely,butprovidessignificantdata

andevidencetoargueherthesiswell.Complementingher

Author CamillaToulminyear 2009Publisher ZedBooksISBN 9781848130159Pages 172

Book reviewREVIEWEDBymAxWELLg.HARDy

climate change in africa

56 I conflict trends conflict trends I 56

CONFLICT TRENDS

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MaxwellG.Hardy

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SaloméBronkhorstisacknowledgedforherassistanceinplanningthisIssue.

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ISSN1561-9818

PrintingColourPlanet,Durban,SouthAfrica

evidenceinthechaptersaresectionswithexamplesthatcontributetoherargument.Asan

example,partofthechapteraboutcitiesdiscussesGaborone–thecapitalofBotswana–where

thereisa47%povertyrate,poorsanitationandlowwatersupply.Thesefactshelpsolidify

Toulmin’soverallargumentaboutthevulnerabilityofcitiestoclimatechange.

Anotherimportantchapteroutlinesthetrendsbetweenconflictandenvironmentalscarcity–

or the lack thereof.Toulminweighs inonadebate thatwasstarted largelywithThomas

Homer-Dixon’sworkbeginningintheearly1990s.Hearguedthatenvironmentalpushfactors

contributeddirectlyto“acuteconflict”,including“scarcitydisputesbetweencountries,clashes

betweenethnicgroups,andcivilstrifeandinsurgency.”2Toulminassertsthatthelinksthat

Homer-Dixonandothersdrewbetweenenvironmentandconflictare largelyexaggerated

andthattheirpathofcausalityisfrequentlyflawed.“Thisapparentcausallinkisnotsoclear

inpractice,”sheargues,andpointsoutexampleswhereviolencedidnotevolveintimesof

resourcescarcity(p.216).Sheiscarefulnottodebunktheideacompletelythattheenvironment

caneventuallycontributetotensionthough,andoutlinesseveralflashpointswhereviolence

couldoccurinthefuture,ifcoupledwithpoorgovernance.

Toulmin’scentralargumentispersuasivethroughout.Sheisdeliberateinoutliningwhat

areasarepronetotransformationastheglobalclimatechanges,andprovidesspecificsteps

thatnationscantaketoaddresstheseproblems. Climate Change in Africadiscussesmany

programmesandinternationalagreementsthatareconstructiveorhaveshortcomings.As

awomanwithabackgroundineconomics,sheis interestedinexploringdifferentwaysto

priceecologicalgoodsandservices.Inherchapteraboutforests,forexample,shediscusses

proposalsforaReducedEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradation(REDD)scheme.The

systemisbasedonthevalueofcarboninexistingtrees,assumingthattreesareworthmore

aliveandstandingthandeadandasourfurniture.But,asshepointsout,assigningvalueto

differentpartsofanecosystemislargelydependentonthestakeholdersinvolved.Thereason

Ethiopiancoffeeissoprofitableisbecauseitisassignedapricebytheglobalmarket,touse

oneexample.Itemslikelivingforestsorflowingriversseemtoholdlessvaluebecausethese

factorsholdnomonetaryvaluetomany.Asaneconomist,Toulmincanwriteaboutinternational

agreementsornewpricingschemes,butmanyoftheproblemsAfricafacesarefarmorelocal

thantheseapproacheswouldletusbelieve–afactsheherselfpointsout. Climate Change

in Africalooksatregionalissues,butfrequentlyseemstosuggesttop-downapproachesas

solutions.Atonepoint,Toulminaddsthe“informaleconomy”toalistofproblemsinGaborone,

Botswana.yettheso-calledinformalsectorinmanywayspromotesupwardmobilityitself,of

whichDurban,SouthAfrica–acityshehighlightsastheonlyofitskindtohaveaspecificplan

tobattleglobalclimatechange–isagreatexample.Thebookdoesagreatjobofexamining

solutionsusingtheformaleconomyandinternationalagreements,butperhapsinarevisionof

thebookToulminmightaddmorecasestudiesthatlookatbottom-upsolutionsaswell.

ClimateChangeinAfricaisanexcellentoverallguidetoclimatechangeonthecontinent,

andappropriatelyarguesthatmanyofthecountriesmostpronetoradicalchangesintheir

environmentsoftenhave the leastability tospeakabout it.Thisbook isauseful tool for

anyonestartingresearchonenvironmentallymotivatedissuesinAfrica,andinmanyplaces

focusesevenmoredeeplyandmoreeloquentlythanotherbodiesofliteratureonthesame

topic.ThecombinationofasignificantrelianceoncasestudiesandexpertisemakesToulmin’s

bookessentialforunderstandingglobalclimatechange,andforadvocatingtheimportanceof

includingcountriesmostlikelytofeelitseffectsintotheglobalconversation.

maxwell Hardy was a Research Intern at ACCoRD’s Knowledge ProductionDepartment, and studies InternationalRelations andEnvironmentalStudies atRhodesCollegeintheUnitedStates.

Endnotes1 McNeill,JohnRobert(2001)Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-

Century World.Newyork:W.W.Norton&Company,p.297.

2 Homer-Dixon,ThomasF.(1991)OntheThreshold:EnvironmentalChangesasCausesofAcuteConflict.International Security,16(2).