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Sri Lankan Armed Forces Campaign Against Tamil Insurgents
Ever since its independence, Sri Lanka had been mired by political and economic conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. With growing ethnic nationalism from both sides, Tamil groups initially expressed their grievances through political channels, and later in the 1970s encouraged by many external and regional players, resorted to violence and terrorism. Peace overtures by Sri Lankan Government did not bear any result and armed conflict sparked on. Suicide attacks and protracted insurgency also resulted into hundreds of civilian and military casualties. Sri Lankan Armed Forces finally accomplished decisive victory in this counter insurgency campaign by end of May 2009, bringing about total subjugation of the rebels along with elimination of the terrorist leadership. It had truly been a tale of unflinching national spirit, military professionalism and resolve for sacrifices by the Sri Lankan armed forces and public alike.
Above in view, carry out analysis of the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka examining its back ground, successful operations conducted by the Sri Lankan army against the terrorists. Also highlight the role played by external players in fuelling the insurgency and ‘Whole of the Government’ approach to offset such international and regional pressures. Draw pertinent lessons from the conflict to deal with such situations for any government in general and the army in particular.
THEME
3
4
Sri Lankan Armed Forces Campaign Against Tamil Insurgents
IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE COMPASSIONATE,THE MOST MERCIFUL
5
Introduction
• The pearl of Indian ocean.
• Target of a ruthless insurgent
movement
• Sri Lanka fielded a series of
responses
• Episode of violence, grief and
death 6
Introduction
• The worst face of terrorism
• LTTE had evolved into a
globally prominent organization
7
Introduction
• Managed suicide killing of two
head of states
• LTTE stood strong enough to
hold its own naval fleet
8
Introduction
• May 2009, witnessed a
decisive victory by Sri Lankan
Armed Forces
• LTTE laying down their arms
and accepting defeat
• Elimination of insurgent
leadership leaving disorder
9
Aim
To present the analysis of Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka with a view to draw pertinent lessons for dealing with terrorism
10
SEQUENCE
11
Tamil Insurgency – Its Rise and SupportLT HASAN
Part – I
Past Measures for Conflict ResolutionLT TAFSEER
Part – II
Analysis & Lessons LearntLT ANEES
Part – IV
Change in StrategyLT HABIB
Part – III
Genesis of LTTE
Role of Tamil Diaspora and India
ConclusionsRole of Tamil Diaspora
and India
Conclusions
Genesis of LTTE
Contents
PART – ITAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE &
SUPPORT
12Preview
History Of Sri Lanka Is Marked By Inveterate Mutual
Fear
Sinhalese Tamil13Part - I
In The Pre Colonial Era
• Small Sinhalese Kingdoms
in the centre and South
• Tamil kingdom in the North
of the island
14Part - I
15Part - I
INDIA
SRI LANKA
Palk
Stra
itJaffna Ta
mil Nadu
Four Centuries Of Colonial Rule
Portuguese1505-1638
Dutch1658-1796
British1815-1948
16Part - I
THE TIPPING POINT IN THE CONFLICT
Sinhala Only ActRevival of
Sinhalese NationalismIsolation of Tamils
19721972Late 70s
1956
Emergence of LTTE
Three Main Steps
Emergence Of LTTE
• LTTE came into existence
in 1974
• Prabhakaran was the
founding member
18Part - I
THREE MAIN REASONS FOR SURVIVAL
• Other groups were Marxist-
Leninist
• They entered mainstream
following Indo – Lanka accord
of 1987
• LTTE systematically lobbied
for assistance from the Tamil
Diaspora
19Part - I
Organization
20Part - I
Central Governing Committee
21Part - I
Political Wing Military
Wing
International Wing
Central Governing Committee
Military Wing
Army
Navy
Air Force
Intelligence
Special Forces
Black Tigers
Political Wing
Political Wing formed the second tier of LTTE’s
organization
23Part - I
24Part - I
Propaganda WingFund Raising
Ariyana GroupArms Procurement(KP Department)
International Secretariat
Tactics
25Part - I
“Action and inaction” was the leitmotif of LTTE’s modus operandi against SLF
Pause And Pounce
26Part - I
LTTE made use of “Outsourcing” to gain maximum benefit
Outsourcing
27Part - I
• An asymmetric strategy• Not a religious phenomenon for LTTE• Types of suicide missions
Suicide Bombing
28Part - I
• LTTE used gender manipulation to improve combat efficiency
• The women were grouped with small male teams • To ensure that the men fought for winning the
admiration
Gender Manipulation
29Part - I
• LTTE carried out
numerous high profile
assassinations
• Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi of India
• President Premadasa of
Sri Lanka
Political Assassinations
30Part - I
• As of 2001, Tamil Diaspora around the globe was 600,000 to 800,000 strong
• 23 to 30% of global Tamil population
Tamil Diaspora
31Part - I
• 250,000 Tamils in North America alone
• 200,000 Tamils resided in Europe
• Almost 30,000 in Australia• The Tamil Diaspora is highly
educated and occupies professional jobs
Tamil Diaspora
32Part - I
Indian involvement in the conflict was underpinned by its interest in the region
Indian Role
33
• Sri Lankan overtures towards West, caused worry• To placate the Indian Tamil population• India was not interested in Tamil independence
Reasons For Involvement
34Part - I
• 32 training camps operating all over India
Support Provided
35
INDIA
Part - I
• Indian policy makers soon realised that their policy could backfire
• India withdrew its official support after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi
Change In Indian Approach
36Part - I
INDIA
CONCLUSIONSTAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS
RISE AND SUPPORT
37Part - I
Sinhalese-Tamil Rivalry
• Sinhalese-Tamil rivalry has its roots in the history beyond the colonial rule
• Rivalry kept simmering during the colonial period and gained momentum in post independence era
38Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT
Sinhalese Nationalism
• Tamils initially pursued democratic path
• Revival of Sinhalese Nationalism
39Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT
LTTE Emergence
• Astute leadership, steadfastness to Tamil nationalism and strong link with Diaspora; enabled LTTE to emerge as the leading resistance group
40Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT
LTTE Organizational Structure
• LTTE developed an elaborate organizational structure
• That held them in good stead during the three decade long civil war
41Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT
LTTE - Novel Tactics
• Militarily, LTTE never failed to innovate and obfuscate security forces with its novel tactics
• It gave new dimensions to suicide bombing
42Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT
Tamil Diaspora
• Tamil Diaspora supported the
insurgency through all
possible legitimate and
illegitimate means
• The war can rightly be termed
as the “Diaspora funded war”
43Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT
Indian Involvement
• Indian involvement in the conflict was based on self interest
• Tamils misinterpreted Indian involvement and tried to invoke the 1971 war
44Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT
Indian Involvement
• Indians, were never interested in the Tamil Eelam
• Would have encouraged Tamil population in India
to raise demand for independence
45Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT
Contents1. Political Response 2. Military Response3. Conclusions
PART – IIPolitical And Military
Response
Thimpu Talks
SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT
TAMIL MILITANTS
TAMIL POLITICIANS
PeaceTalks
JULY 1985 47Part - II
Fighting continued between two sides and Sri Lankan forces managed to corner LTTE in Jaffna
48Part - II
Indian Sponsored Peace Talks
• Indo-Lankan agreement at Colombo in Jul 1987
• Indian forces were never welcomed by either side
49Part - II
Indian Sponsored Peace Talks
• Extremist JVP loathed presence of Indian forces
• LTTE started ambushing Indian Forces and
abandoned the truce
50Part - II
Indian Sponsored Peace Talks
• Forms the basis of “Op Pawan” by IPKF
• President Premadasa demanded immediate
withdrawal of IPKF on 2nd January 1989
51Part - II
Indian Sponsored Peace Talks
• Rajiv Gandhi refused to withdraw IPKF• V P Singh in December 1989, declared the policy
as utter failure
52Part - II
Eelam War II
• Newly elected government of
Chandrika Kumaratunga offer
peace talks
• Policy of military engagement
with the Tigers
• Retaking the control of Jaffna
from insurgents
53Part - II
1994 Peace Talks
• President Kumaratunga initiated peace talks in 1994
• Short lived cease fire took place but failed
54Part - II
• Lack of sincerity
• Lack of professionalism
• Lack of flexibility
Reasons
55Part - II
• Failure of 1994 talks led to
Eelam War III
• LTTE resorted to shoulder
fired anti aircraft, “Stinger
Missiles”
• Hit two Sri Lankan planes
flying over Jaffna
Eelam War III
56Part - II
Operation Jayasikurui
Operation terminated in 1999 without meeting all its objectives
57Part - II
13 MAY 1997
Norwegian Sponsored Peace Talks
CEASE FIRE AGGREEMENT
SRI LANKANGOVERNMENT
LTTE 58Part - II
• LTTE’s exclusion from reconstruction talks
• Tamil people were not receiving the full economic
benefits of peace
• Tamil held areas are not as peaceful
Critical Issues
59Part - II
• Mahindra Rajapakse offered to hold unconditional peace talks in 2005
• LTTE instead announced refresh war effort
Parliamentary Elections – 2005
60Part - II
Peace Dialogue
Peace talks started from 28-29 Oct 2006 but the peace talks broke down
62Part - II
Eelam War IV
• Resolved not to hold talks
• Pursue the military option
• Leadership is not interested in
a peaceful coexistence
• In 2006 fighting officially
resumed after a cease fire
63Part - II
Eelam War IV
• Continued fighting led to territorial gains
• Operation is termed as Eelam War IV
• Changed Sri Lankan strategy started to pay
dividends
64Part - II
CONCLUSIONSPOLITICAL AND
MILITARY RESPONSE
65
Failure Of Peace Negotiations
Attributed to LTTE’s belief that they could achieve political goals through violence and intimidation
66Part – II Political and Military Response
Lacked Sincerity Of Purpose
Both came to the negotiations table only because of either external pressure or to achieve some short-term gains
67Part – II Political and Military Response
Display Flexibility
• To reach a compromise solution• Agenda should widen as the negotiations proceed
to maintain confidence in the process
68Part – II Political and Military Response
Role Of IPKF
• IPKF failed to bring peace in Sri Lanka
• LTTE considered the agreement has deflected
their goal to establish independent Tamil State
69Part – II Political and Military Response
Role Civil Society
• Crucial for any settlement to ethnic conflicts• People’s voice was weak in Sri Lanka• Be informed of the broad contours of the talks• Broad-basing of negotiations will weaken
manipulation
70Part – II Political and Military Response
Change In Strategy
• Paid the dividends in the form of complete eradication of LTTE leadership
• Army this time focused on elimination of LTTE leadership instead
71Part – II Political and Military Response
Change in Political Thinking
Change in Military Strategy
Conclusions
2
Part
3
Part
1
Part
PART – IIICHANGE IN STRATEGY
Past Political Strategy
• Mounting pressure by the International community• Straight forward military strategy could not be
formulated• Insufficient provision of equipment and logistics• Lack of international and regional interagency and
security cooperation
74Part – III
Past Political Strategy
• Weak agencies to develop frontline intelligence
• Lack of political commitment
75Part – III
THE NEW STRATEGY 76
Nuanced Political Approach
• LTTE invited to negotiation table • LTTE’s unwillingness to implement peace
accords• International community tried to force the
government• Resisted all such external pressures
77Part – III
Model Of Fighting Terrorism
“Given the political will, the military can crush terrorism”
78Part – III
Model Of Fighting Terrorism
• Unwavering political will• Disregard for biased international opinion • No negotiations with forces of terror• Improved flow of conflict information• Absence of political intervention • Complete operational freedom• Accent on young commanders• Kept the regional countries in the loop
79Part – III
Proactive Foreign Policy
• To gain support of international community• To create awareness in support of official stance• Complete support from China, Russia and Pakistan• Keeping United States, India and Europe neutral
80Part – III
Change In Military Strategy
81Part – III
Change In Military Strategy
• Unconventional war, in a conventional mode
82Part – III
Change In Military Strategy
• Transform the national security doctrine, training and weaponry
83Part – III
Change In Military Strategy
CONVENTIONAL
GUERILLA
TRANSFORMATION
84Part – III
85Part – III
NAVAL Strategy
Air Strategy
86Part – III
• Continuous raids on identified LTTE fortifications and nerve centers
• Sri Lankan Air force did well to counter LTTE air threat
Land Forces Strategy
• Focused on destroying terrorists instead of capturing the territory
87Part – III
Operational Level
• Focused on supporting huge logistic demands for tactical level operations
88Part – III
Tactical Level
• Shifted from large scale operations to small scale platoon and section level operations
89Part – III
Tactical Level
• Multi pronged attacks to paralyze Tamil resistance
90Part – III
Morale Of Troops
• Good training• Effective casualty evacuation plans
91Part – III
Brief Account Of Operations
• Military offensive commenced in February 2007 which continued up to March 2009 and finally concluded in May 2009
• LTTE command structure completely destroyed
92Part – III
Brief Account Of Operations
93Part – III
94Part – III
xx53
55
xx57
58xx
59
TFTF
TF
TF
February 2007
95Part – III
xx53
55
xx57
58
xx59
TFTF
TF
TF
February 2007
August2008
96Part – III
xx53
55
xx59
TFTF
TF
TF
February 2007
August2008
xx58
November2008
97Part – III
xx53
55
xx59
TFTF
TF
TF
February 2007
August2008 xx
58November
2008
January2009
98Part – III
February 2007
August2008
November2008
January2009
March2009
CONCLUSIONSCHANGE IN STRATEGY
99Part – III
Unwavering Political Will
100Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY
Foreign Policy
• Undeterred by international pressure• Continued with its policy• Limiting the diplomatic damage through astute
diplomacy
101Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY
Warfare Transformation
• Embarked upon a transformation process from conventional to irregular warfare
• Under the dynamic leadership of the Army Chief General Fonseka
102Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY
Warfare Transformation
• Multipronged, unconventional in nature• Based on sub unit level actions instead of large scale
conventional assaults
103Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY
Personal Supervision
• Personally supervised operations • Maintained touch with field commanders• Appointed young commander to infuse enthusiasm
104Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY
Role Of Navy
• By choking LTTE’s lifeline through sea
105Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY
Role Of Air Force
• Precision strikes against insurgents and by destroying elements of LTTE
106Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY
ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT AND LESSONS LEARNT
PART IV
Contents• Political Aspects Military Aspects
Causes Of Sri Lankan Success
• Two decades in the conflict• Neither side was strong enough to overcome the
other
108Part – IV
MOB TACTICS
INTELLIGENCE
YOUNG COMMANDERS
Causes Of Sri Lankan Success
• Change in strategy came three years ago
109Part – IV
Political Aspects
• To defeat terrorism, all political forces must develop consensus
110Part – IV
Strong And Proactive Foreign Policy
FOREIGN POLICY
111Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS
CONSISTENCY
Consistency In Handling The Conflict
1974
1983
1987
1993
1994
1997
2009
112Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS
No Ceasefire/ Peace Agreements
Refit
Regroup
Re-Arm
Re-Supply
113Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS
Curtail External Support
114Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS
Economic Aspects
115
GDP
FDI
EXPORTS
CONSUMER
Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS
Military Aspects
116Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS
Clear Objectives
117Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS
Adaptable Tactical Plans
118Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS
Secrecy In Operational Planning
119Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS
Choose Men To Bring Effects
120Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS
Intelligence Gathering
121Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS
Coordinated Joint Operations
122Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS
SUSTAINED MILITARY BUILDUP
123Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS
LESSONS
Political Lessons
125Part – IV
National And Political Will
126Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS
Proactive/ Clear Foreign Policy
FOREIGN POLICY
127Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS
Concessions Will Not Defeat Terrorism
128
Re-fit
Re-group
Rearm
Resupply
Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS
Curtail Foreign Support
129Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS
Regional Cooperation On Security/ Intelligence
130Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS
Media Handling
131Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS
Border Control
132Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS
ENHANCEMENT OF LEAS ANTI TERRORISM CAPACITY
Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 133
Modernization Of Intelligence Agencies
134Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS
Strategy For Stability After War
135Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS
MILITARY LESSONS
136Part – IV
Clear Aim And Objectives
137Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS
Doctrine For LIC
Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 138
Establishing Special Warfare Center
139Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS
Procurement Of Weapons And Equipment
140Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS
Employment Of Special Operations Force
141Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS
Logistic Buildup
142Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS
Destroying Safe Havens Of Terrorists
143Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS
Isolating The Insurgents
144Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS
Identifying And Targeting Insurgent Leadership
145Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS
CONCLUSION