(UN)MAKING INTERNATIONAL NORMS: THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Introduction

The UN’s record as a key institution in the promotion of global governance is

somewhat mixed. From one perspective, the UN has probably done more than any

other international organization. The UN has published and endorsed some of the

most explicit calls for the establishment of new norms of global governance based on

liberal conceptions of the best way of constructing a peaceful and prosperous global

order. But this vision of the UN as a definer and promoter of global governance sits in

stark contrast to visions of the UN as an ineffective and/or unwilling actor in war

ravaged societies. When millions die in civil wars in Africa, and major powers ignore

the UN if it gets in the way of their agendas, where is the evidence that the UN does

anything at all in practical terms to establish new forms of global governance.

These conflicting perspectives largely reflect the distinction between the UN as a

generator of ideas relating to global governance, and the way in which the member

states of the UN have differential power to establish and impose norms through UN

sanctioned actions. It also reflects a distinction between different norms. Many

member states fiercely defend the principle of sovereignty, and the practice of non-

interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states which they believe should be

the bottom line in all UN activity. But this traditional norm is increasingly being

challenged by emerging norms of global governance promoted by UN commissions,

agencies, programmes and some member states. At the heart of this challenge to

sovereignty is the argument in ‘Our Global Neighborhood’ that ‘Although states are

sovereign, they are not free individually to do whatever they want’ (UN, 1995). For

proponents of this view, the UN not only has a right to intervene to prevent

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bloodshed, but in fact has a duty to protect all of the citizens of the world from

tyranny. Although this contradiction has been at the heart of much of the thinking and

debates within the UN since its inception, in the post-Cold War era there has been a

key shift in understandings of not only the relationship between sovereignty and

intervention, but also what is the best (perhaps only) path to development, and

appropriate forms of national (as well as global) governance.

This chapter focuses on the impact of this dual contradiction – between agents of

power in the UN and between different conceptions of the limits of state sovereignty –

on the UN’s position as an instrument of global governance. It suggests that the

national interest of member states – particularly those with veto power in the UN

Security Council (UNSC) – normally prevent emerging norms of intervention and

new conceptions of the limits of state sovereignty from being transferred into UN

sanctioned policy. Put another way, the existing power structure of the UN gives key

sovereign states the power to define what privileges are provided to sovereign states

in the international system. Furthermore, this structure of power and the actions (and

inactions) of UNSC members threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the UN as a

whole, and as a guarantor of security for all the peoples of the world in particular.

Nevertheless, this Chapter also starts from the assumption that ideas are important.

The ideational changes promoted by proponents of global governance in the UN

system reinforce the dominance of the hegemonic liberal ideas and ideals. And

crucially, in terms of developmental ideas at least, the UN has been transformed from

a site ideational conflict and competition to one where the neoliberal orthodoxy is

increasingly unchallenged and unchecked.

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Power and interest in the UN system

In writing about the UN system, the question of ‘who’ is involved can become rather

complex. Although the UN is a state based system over 1,500 NGOs are formally

affiliated to the UN represented by the Conference on Non-Governmental

Organizations in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council. Otto

(1996: 109) argues that:

‘There is no doubt that the extent of NGO involvement in UN activities has

vastly exceeded the expectations of those who drafted the Charter and

dramatically outstripped the scope of these legal provisions [in the original

charter]’

In terms of establishing norms, organizations such as the Amnesty International do

have influence in setting agendas and as ‘standard bearers’ - not least because of the

specialist technical knowledge that they possess (Martens, 2004). Nevertheless, the

primacy of states in the UN means that such influence is only on an ‘ad hoc basis’ and

proposals to formalize NGO participation in decision making processes remain yet to

be realized (Barnett, 1997: 538-9)1.

Even putting NGOs to one side, who or what leads in the UN in relation to

establishing norms and modes of global governance remains a complicated issue.

International Organizations are much more than just a community of member states

and an arena in which competing national interests are played out. As a wide number

of observers from often competing perspectives have observed, international

organizations can become ‘independent actors with their own agendas, but they may

embody multiple agendas and contain multiple sources of agency’ (Barnett and

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Finnemore, 1999: 705). As will be argued below, there is an internal conflict (or at

least potential for conflict) between the promoters of ideas, and the authorizers of

action within the UN system. There is also conflict between different parts of the UN

structure – some of it linked to this division between promoters and actors, and some

of it based on the differential power of member states in the UN’s organizational

structure. Most clearly, those who hold veto power in the Security Council (UNSC)

have the ultimate power to decide when to act and on what grounds – and some even

have the power to ignore the UN altogether if it gets in the way of the promotion of

national interests.

There are six peak organizations at the apex of the UN organizational structure; the

Secretariat, the General Assembly, the UNSC, the Economic and Social Council, the

Trusteeship Council and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This chapter focuses

on the first four with the focus in the Secretariat on the Office of the General

Secretary, and in the Economic and Social Council and its programmes and funds

such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and

its functional agencies such as the Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).

The Trusteeship Council (which controlled territories liberated from enemy states at

end of WWII to oversees their transition to liberation) is ignored as it was suspended

in 1994 with full independence of the last trusteeship territory, Palau, and Kofi Annan

has proposed that it now be removed from the UN Charter. The International Court of

Justice in the Hague is responsible for providing advisory opinions on legal questions

that are referred to it by member states, selected UN organs and agencies. The Court

1 As Barnett also points out, formalising a role for NGOs in the decision making process was

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does play an important role in not only providing opinion on whether international

laws have been breached, but also in defining what International Law actually is.

The ICJ partly defines2 international law in terms of the binding treaties and

conventions that states have formally accepted by signing and ratifying. Even here

there is room for ambiguity as the court has the right to interpret what the treaty really

meant, and also to decide whether ‘at the time of the interpretation’, the original

meaning of the treaty needs to be reconsidered. The ICJ also has the power to put

aside international law, and ‘settle a dispute without strict regard for the existing rules

of international law, but in the light of the justice and merits of the case’ if both

parties agree – something that has yet to happen since 1946.

More important for this chapter, the ICJ also defines international law as

‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’ and/or ‘the

general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’. In these cases, ‘a State

which relies on an alleged international custom practised by States must, generally

speaking, demonstrate to the ICJ’s satisfaction that this custom has become so

established as to be legally binding on the other party’. Perhaps not surprisingly, the

ICJ has been reluctant to impose its judgement on when custom becomes legally

binding, and has tended to respect state sovereignty in such cases. But there have been

cases when, notwithstanding the lack of legality defined by treaties, the ICJ has

attempted to define what customary law actually is. In 1986, the US was condemned

for training, arming, equipping and financing Contra activity in Nicaragua and for

attacks on Nicaraguan territory. It found that the US had ‘acted, against the Republic

one of the proposals of the Commission on Global Governance.

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of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to use

force against another State’3. Even here, the decision was only taken on a majority (12

to 3) with one Judge arguing that the court did not have jurisdiction to decide on

matters ‘in lieu of the relevant multilateral treaties’. And as the decisions of the ICJ

are not binding in any way, findings based on customary law in one case do not force

the defendant (nor anybody else) to modify current or future behaviour accordingly.

The Security Council, the General Assembly and changing conceptions of

sovereignty

In many of the cases brought before it, the key question is whether one state has

abrogated the sovereignty of another. And for many of the UN’s member states, the

norm of state sovereignty is, or at least should be, at the heart of the UN system. To

be sure, individual states might find it impossible to have total autonomy over

domestic affairs4. But for states that take a hard line on sovereignty like China, neither

the UN nor individual states have any right whatsoever to interfere in the domestic

politics of sovereign states no matter what is happening within that state’s borders5. A

less absolutist position considers the infringement of sovereignty as tolerable only

when international security is threatened by events in a sovereign state under the

principle of “collective security” (Cuellar, 2004). For adherents of both positions,

state sovereignty overrides any proposal to intervene when the domestic affairs of a

sovereign state are abhorrent and/or uncivilized.

2 In Article 38, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court. 3 Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua

(Nicaragua v. United States of America) Judgment of 27 June 1986 http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inus_isummaries/inus_isummary_19860627.htm

4 Strange (1999) argued that the sovereign state system had failed – failed to provide global financial stability and failed to manage transnational environmental governance.

5 Though note that this position is not always maintained by the Chinese who supported intervention in Afghanistan after 9-11. But the principle that China’s own state sovereignty should never be impinged remains firm.

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It is oft stated that the conception of sovereignty was embedded in international

relations with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. In reality, Westphalia was more

important as a symbol of change. Quite apart from the fact that many of the modern

nation states of Europe were still some time away from being created, the creation of

mechanisms to manage diplomatic relations between sovereign states did not really

occur until the end of the Napoleonic Wars with the 1815 Congress of Vienna6.

Furthermore, sovereignty was a principle that was largely reserved for European

states. The Berlin conference of 1884-5 that divided the conference into different

spheres of influence saw participation only from the major Western powers7, and the

resulting cartography of Africa owed everything to the interests of the great powers,

and nothing to concerns for sovereignty. China was forced to accept Western norms

of statehood and sovereignty in the nineteenth century through the superior military

force of first the British and later other western powers. And notwithstanding the

importance of Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points for establishing the principle of

self-determination, negotiations at the Treaty of Versailles still managed to ignore

Chinese sovereignty in delivering former German territories in China to the Japanese.

It is slightly ironic that China, which was in many ways forced to accept externally

defined universal norms of statehood and sovereignty is now one of the strongest

defenders of those norms in opposition to attempts to establish new externally defined

universal norms.

6 And the subsequent Congresses that codified the post-Napoleonic peace - Aix-la-Chapelle

(1818), Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821) and Verona (1822). 7 Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Russia, U.S.A., Portugal, Denmark, Spain,

Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium and Turkey.

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Perhaps not surprisingly, attempts to establish a new forum for ensuring international

peace have typically followed war. This is partly out of the need to redraw boundaries

at the end of war – for example, the redrawing of Europe at Westphalia at the end of

the 80 and 30 years wars. But it also is partly a ‘never again’ phenomenon – for

example, the congresses of the nineteenth century to stop the likes of the Napoleonic

war ever happening again. And there is also an extent to which new treaties and

organizations are inspired by a desire to ensure that the failings of previous treaties

and organizations are not repeated. The League of Nations sought to overcome the

failing of the 1899 International Peace Conference8 to prevent WWI, and the United

Nations sought to overcome the League of Nation’s failure to prevent WWII.

It is not just history that is written by the winners – so too are treaties and the

constitutions of international institutions. In 1814, all representatives of all European

countries were called to attend a congress in Vienna to negotiate a new peace for

Europe in the wake of the defeat of the Napoleonic armies. According to de Ligne ‘Le

congres ne marche pas, il danse’ – hence, ‘the dancing congress’ – as the majority of

participants found ways to fill their time while representatives of the five major

powers9 engaged in the real business of negotiation. Although negotiations at the

congress of Vienna were strictly limited to the major powers, they explicitly and

deliberately drew the defeated French back into diplomatic activity. By contrast,

while the negotiations to establish the League of Nations were primarily dominated by

the victorious powers10 they explicitly and deliberately not only kept the defeated

powers out of the negotiations, but also constructed a punitive peace.

8 Which established The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes

and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (1902). 9 England, Austria, Prussia, Russia and France. 10 Italy, the US, France and the UK.

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So the creation of the UN has many historical precedents. Indeed, the term ‘United

Nations’ was first used by Roosevelt as shorthand for the Allied Powers in the

‘Declaration of United Nations’ in January 1942. As with the League of Nations, the

UN was negotiated by the victors with the Charter of the ‘United Nations’ signed by

victorious powers of WWII on 26th June 1945 in San Francisco.

Despite much talk about fundamental principles and state sovereignty, even in its

inception, the construction of the UN entailed elements of political fudge based on

great power rivalries. For example, Stalin’s concerns that the UN would be weighted

towards the interests of the US and the UK had much to do with the establishment of

the type of veto powers that are still enjoyed by the permanent members of the

Security Council11. Even fundamental conceptions of statehood were subject to

political fudge. Stalin’s argument that there should be a seat for each of the separate

Soviet Republics (if each state of the British Empire was to have one each) eventually

resulting in one seat for the USSR and one each for the Ukraine and Byelorussia, but

not for the other Soviet Republics. As a result, it is not just the states that have a veto

that is largely a consequence of the great power rivalries and the emerging Cold War

politics at the end of WWII, but the extent to which veto power can be used.

It is also worth noting that the current permanent membership of the Security Council

is in some ways accidental. The Chinese seat was created for the nationalist

Guomindang on the understanding that they would be returned to power in China

after the defeat of the Japanese. While the Guomindang did indeed occupy the seat

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supposedly representing all of China even after defeat in the Chinese civil war, the

switch from ROC to the PRC in 1971 gave a permanent seat and veto power to

another communist party state – something that had not been envisaged when the UN

was being drawn up at the end of WWII. In addition, the seat currently occupied by

the Russian federation was created for the Soviet Union. Bourantonis and Panagiotou

(2004) argue that the ease at which Russia simply assumed the SU seat was because

the UK and France in particular were opposed to a wide ranging and open debate in

the General Assembly as it would bring back to the fore attention on the legitimacy of

the constitution of the UNSC and their privileged role within it.

And it is this question of the legitimacy of the UNSC that occupies much attention in

considerations of leadership in the UN. The current makeup of the UNSC is widely

considered to be unrepresentative no matter which calculation of representation is

used. Simply in terms of size, five permanent members in 1945 represented 10 per

cent of the original 1945 membership of 51 states as opposed to 191 members today.

In terms of global powers, whilst all five members are nuclear powers, they do not

have sole control over global nuclear weapons, and the conception of France and

Britain as global powers above non-members looks increasingly anomalous. Taking

economics as an indicator, then the absence of Japan and Germany and perhaps

increasingly India looks unfair. After the United States, Japan is the leading provider

of funds for the UN, but has no final say in the Security Council. Geographically,

three European states out of five with no representative from Africa or Latin America

is widely considered to be iniquitous. And with Chinese economic growth, the lack of

representation for developing countries is increasingly marked. Suggested criteria to

11 For details on how different conceptions of how the veto should work were argued through in

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be used for considering new UNSC members include a wide range including

‘peacekeeping contributions; contribution to the United Nations

budget; population; size; political and economic power and potential; stability of

economic system; military force; reduction of military expenditures; eradication of

poverty; promotion of education; and influence of civilization’ (UN, 2004: 25).

As Featherston (2004: 202) argues:

‘The Security Council is a relic of the geopolitics of 1945. To be legitimate

today it must reflect contemporary realities. It needs to accommodate today’s

powers that are currently excluded—Japan and Germany, and contemplate the

accommodation of tomorrow’s big states—India and Brazil. It must also

address the extraordinary powers inherent in the veto. Legitimacy is not to be

found in the uneven distribution of such clout. As the many failed attempts at

reform instruct us, positive change is not easy.’

Schlichtmann (1999: 5-8_goes further than most arguing that the composition of the

UNSC actually breaches the UNs own charter in respect to principle of equal rights

for all member states, the principle of equal sovereignty, and the principle of equal

representation of all geographic regions. This view was echoed by a General

Assembly report on the UNSC, which noted that:

‘Numerous delegations expressed the view that the veto was anachronistic,

discriminatory and undemocratic. They maintained that the actual use and

threat of using the veto represented a complete erosion of the principles of

transparency and accountability in the working methods and procedures of the

Security Council. It was considered by many speakers that the use of the veto

the creation of the UN, see Gowan (2003).

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created two categories of membership in the Security Council, despite the

principle of sovereign equality contained in Article 2.1 of the Charter. The

view was expressed that in no other United Nations body was the principle of

sovereign equality violated’. (UN, 2004: 30)

At the very least, the use of the veto in support of national interests, rather than in

support of ‘collective interests’ undermines the legitimacy of not just the UNSC itself,

but the entire UN system and the UN’s Millennium Declaration in 2000 noted the

need to intensify activity ‘to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council

in all its aspects’12.

Ironically, the legitimacy of the UNSC is also undermined when the veto is not

allowed to be used in those cases where major powers choose to go outside the UN

system to pursue policy – as was the case with the use of force by NATO in

Yugoslavia without UNSC endorsement, and the decision not to hold a second UNSC

vote before the invasion of Iraq. But as Wheeler argues, while ignoring the UNSC

might be considered an emasculation of the UN by the great powers, an alternative

argument is that the UNSC (or permanent members of the UNSC) has emasculated

the UN. There is no agreed framework in the UNSC for defining when intervention is

justified, and the national interest, rather than principle, often results in action being

vetoed:

‘Security Council inaction in cases where atrocities shock the conscience of

humankind equally undermines the authority of the UN.… having willed the

ends of policy, the Security Council was failing in its duty by not willing the

12 General Assembly resolution 55/2, para. 30. Available on-line at:

http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/millennium.htm

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military means to implement its demands in the face of persistent non-

compliance.’ (Wheeler, 2001: 119)

Without reform of the SC, and perhaps even with it, there is significant differential

ability for member states to decide on norms – and most importantly, to decide when

intervention should be sanctioned notwithstanding the principle of state sovereignty.

Schabas (2004: 719) argues that in designing the UN, Roosevelt deliberately

constructed the UNSC as the real site of authority, leaving that General Assembly as

‘a place for the majority of small states to ‘let off steam’’. Even if this is apocrophal,

the lack of binding authority for General Assembly resolutions is juxtaposed against

the authority of the UNSC in general, the ability of the permanent members to

exercize the veto, and the ability of the hegemon to go beyond the UN system when

the national interest dictates.

Changing Conceptions of Sovereignty

From the outset, the UN has played an important role in establishing global norms

with claims to universal applicability. The adoption of the Universal declaration of

Human Rights in December 1948 being perhaps the highest profile case of the

General Assembly attempting to establish a norm of basic freedoms ‘as a common

standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’13. But since the end of the

Cold War the agenda has changed. Not only has previous reticence about impinging

on sovereignty been overcome, but there is also a move towards establishing liberal

ideals as the basis for UN policy (Barnett, 1997: 536).

13 Though of course not all states have ratified the declaration.

14

Doyle (2001) argues that Agenda for Peace in 1992 and reformulation of UN Charter

fundamentally changed traditional conceptions of sovereignty. It is now up to the

UNSC to decide what a ‘threat to peace’ actually means, and when such a threat to

peace justifies the abrogation of sovereignty and intervention. Events that take place

entirely within a sovereign state – be they civil war or violations of rights – can lead

to them losing the ‘protection afforded them by the rules of sovereignty and non-

intervention’(Wheeler, 2001: 127), with the only obstacle to the UNSC endorsing

intervention being the veto power of the five permanent members.

Following Reisman and Held, Paris (2003: 450-1) suggests that it is not so much that

the legitimate sovereignty of states has been relegated below other concerns/issues,

but that the fundamental understanding of what actually constitutes legitimate

statehood has been redefined. Increasingly, for states to be granted freedom from

external interference in their sovereign domestic affairs, they have to be liberal

democracies. Clearly, many of the UN’s members would not meet these criteria, and

the mere lack of democratic institutions is not enough on its own to justify

intervention. But rather than simply talk about respect for human freedom, UN

statements on what these standards should be are now much more explicit in asserting

that ‘governance should be underpinned by democracy at all levels’. For Paul Taylor

(1999: 540), this ‘proactive cosmopolitanism’ entails ‘a deliberate attempt to create a

consensus about values and behaviour’ based on ‘the civil and political values of

Western liberal states’. As Barnett (1997: 529) argues, the UN has become, through

its official reports at least, ‘an agent of normative integration that can increase the

number of actors who identify with and uphold the values of a liberal international

order’. Furthermore, he suggests that the UN commissions are aware that many states

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– particularly developing states – do not buy into these principles and pose serious

challenges to the universal adoption of these values and norms. As such, while the UN

might have been characterized by East-West conflict during the Cold War, it has

increasingly become an arena in which North-South issues are now played out

(Barnett, 1997: 545-6).

It is not just that democracy is the best form of government for ensuring the protection

of basic human rights. But alongside the economic prescriptions outlined above,

democracy is also portrayed as the basis for development (Forsythe, 1997). Where the

right to development may stay firmly embedded in the UN (Pace, 1998), increasingly

developmental/socio-economic rights are not seen as being separate from

human/political rights, but establishing human/political rights and democratic

institutions is seen as the prerequisite for assuring developmental/socio-economic

rights. Such an understanding has been at the heart of the agenda of both Boutros

Boutros-Ghali14 and Kofi Annan (2005). Indeed, for Forsythe (1997), a key sea

change in UN thinking on global governance occurred with the election of Boutros

Boutros-Ghali to Secretary General of the UN. Boutros-Ghali, the UN also had a

general secretary who identified himself (and thus the UN) with new thinking on how

best to establish GG and indeed what the guiding principles of GG should be – not

least by explicitly linking democracy with development - in ‘Agenda for Peace’15 and

the 1995 publication of the Commission on Global Governance’s ‘Our Global

Neighbourhood’. Although the commission on global governance is not an official

14 Perhaps most clearly enunciated in Boutros-Ghali (1995). See also Forsythe (1997). 15 The 1995 publication of Agenda for Peace was officially the supplement to his original report

adopted by the Security Council in January 1992.

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UN organization16, it carried the endorsement of Boutros-Ghali and secured part

funding from UNDP trust funds. If anything Kofi Annan’s 2005 report, ‘In Larger

Freedom’ (Annan, 2005) goes even further in establishing a normative position that

undermines the principle of state sovereignty, and explicitly promotes democracy and

free market capitalism as the correct form of governance, the best guarantors of

international peace, and the basis of economic development.

Whilst recognising that Sovereign states are the ‘basic and indispensable building

blocks of the international system’, Annan argued that states alone can no longer

provide the stability and economic development that they should promote for their

people without the active participation of both civil society and the private sector

which now occupy ‘the space formerly reserved for States alone’ (Annan, 2005: 6).

Furthermore, neither norms or legal principles of sovereignty should ever prevent the

UN from intervening to stop severe abuses of human rights and suffering in sovereign

states. Crucially, such a need to intervene is no longer simply couched in terms of

intervention to ensure international peace and collective security, but instead is based

on an ‘emerging norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect’17, which

should not be subject to arbitrary and selective application in the UNSC.

Although Annan (like Boutros-Ghali before him) talks in terms of a growing

‘consensus’, the consensus if far from total. China, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Russia,

South Africa and Tunisia have all consistently rejected the establishment of peace-

keeping operations built on notions of humanitarian intervention (Pugh, 2004: 45).

16 It is funded by national governments, educational foundations, and nine individual national

governments and was established with a membership of 28 selected (ie: non-elected) individuals

17

The former Russian PM and Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov (2004: 49), is

explicit in rejecting any move towards a duty of care to global citizens as being

anything to do with the UN:

‘The UN charter limits the use of force to protect or restore international

peace; it does not condone the interference in the internal affairs of a state’

Indeed, for representatives of many (primarily developing) states, the promotion of a

norm of humanitarian intervention even when international peace and stability is not

threatened smacks of an attempt to use the UN as an agent of Western cultural

imperialism (Wheeler, 2001: 127-8). Attempts to construct new mechanisms of global

governance – not just through the UN - are often perceived as a means of imposing

Western preferences to ensure the continued privileged position of Western states in

the global order (Held et al, 1999: 6).

As such, the formal position of the Secretary General of the UN conflicts with the

position of a number of the UN’s member states. And no matter what the Secretary

General or any of his endorsed reports say, it is the member states that ultimately

decide on whether action should be taken and under what conditions. As Russia and

China are both resistant to emerging new norms, and both have veto power as

permanent UNSC members, then there are sizeable obstacles to translating ideas into

policies. As such, the apparent contradiction between principles of sovereignty and

intervention are in many respects replicated by the division between the UN as a

generator of ideas and ideals on one hand, and the practical actions of the UN in

UNSC mandated actions on the other.

17 Annan was quoting here the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’s report on

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Developmental norms and neoliberalism

Most of the focus on the UN as a promoter of norms focuses on political issues. And

quite clearly, the UN is far less important in terms of global economic governance

than the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. Nevertheless, the UN does play a role –

albeit a minimal one, in reinforcing if not establishing global economic norms. On

one level, the UN has taken a number of steps to embody principles of human rights

within international economic activity. In 2003, the Commission on Human Rights

published a draft ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and

Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (UN, 2003). Vagts (2003)

argues that the ‘Norms’ simply call for corporations to adhere to existing treaties

covering labour standards, the environment and broadly defined human rights in their

overseas operations, and therefore makes little concrete difference. Perhaps at best,

the Norms have symbolic importance, in establishing the right of the UNCHR to

concern itself with the economic activity of private economic actors, and in

recognising that notwithstanding the principle that states remains ultimately

responsible for ensuring that TNCs don’t abrogate basic rights, it is not always that

easy for states to exercise this responsibility in a globalized economy18.

On another level, the UN reinforces at least the hegemony of neoliberal economics as

not so much the best as the only economic strategy that will deliver countries from

underdevelopment. As Annan (2005: 7) put it, there is ‘an unprecedented consensus

on how to promote global economic and social development’. This consensus – the

2002 Monterrey Consensus – recognizes that the international economic order

contains important structural constraints on developing countries; not least amongst

‘A more secure world: our shared responsibility’ (UN, 2004).

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them lack of access to the most lucrative potential markets as a result of protectionist

trade policies. But at its heart is a commitment to the promotion of:

‘sound macroeconomic policies aimed at sustaining high rates of economic

growth, full employment, poverty eradication, price stability and sustainable

fiscal and external balances to ensure that the benefits of growth reach all

people, especially the poor. Governments should attach priority to avoiding

inflationary distortions and abrupt economic fluctuations that negatively affect

income distribution and resource allocation. Along with prudent fiscal and

monetary policies, an appropriate exchange rate regime is required.’ (UN,

2002: 4)

The Monterrey Consensus also emphasizes the importance of private capital flows

through FDI as a means of generating development:

Foreign direct investment contributes toward financing sustained economic

growth over the long term. It is especially important for its potential to transfer

knowledge and technology, create jobs, boost overall productivity, enhance

competitiveness and entrepreneurship, and ultimately eradicate poverty

through economic growth and development.’ A central challenge, therefore, is

to create the necessary domestic and international conditions to facilitate direct

investment flows, conducive to achieving national development …. To attract

and enhance inflows of productive capital, countries need to continue their

efforts to achieve a transparent, stable and predictable investment climate,

with proper contract enforcement and respect for property rights, embedded in

sound macroeconomic policies and institutions that allow businesses, both

domestic and international, to operate efficiently and profitably and with

18 This argument was made by Felice (1999) in his discussion of the Maastricht guidelines on

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maximum development impact. Special efforts are required in such priority

areas as economic policy and regulatory frameworks for promoting and

protecting investments’ (UN, 2002: 5)

The importance of policy adjustments to allow the private sector to flourish was also

at the heart of The Commission on the Private Sector and Development’s 2004 report,

‘Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making Business Work for the Poor’ (and echoed in

Kofi Annan’s 2005 report). It is important to note that while these various reports all

argue that developed countries need to make changes to domestic and multilateral

policy to ensure equity, the bottom line is that free market capitalism is the only road

to development: and ‘the primary responsibility for achieving growth and equitable

development lies with developing countries’ (UN, 2004b: 1), and is not the fault of

the international economic order.

How important is all this? Given the recommendations of these various reports, there

is very little that the UN can do to effect change. The responsibility for change is

primarily in the hands of governments in developing states. And where the

international order might need attention to ensure equity, the onus falls primarily on

the WTO and to lesser extents the WB and the IMF. But the very fact that these

reports emanate from the UN and not the WTO, IMF or WB in many ways increases

their significance. As they are not tied to the organs of economic governance which

are largely expected to promote neoliberalism, their policy prescriptions carry an air

of neutrality. It is particularly notable that the Commission on the Private Sector and

Development was jointly chaired by Canadian PM Paul Martin , and the former

violations of economic social and cultural rights, but also holds true here.

21

Mexican President, Ernesto Zedillo, and notwithstanding three US based

commissioners, was dominated by representatives from the South. It might not be the

authentic voice of the South, but neither does it appear to be the voice of the

developed North alone. As such, the UN can be seen as promoting what Gosovic

(2000) calls the ‘Global Intellectual Hegemony’ designed to influence and

homogenize world public opinion. Ideational promotion by the UN increasingly

reflects the interests and agendas of developed states with the UN development

agenda no longer reflecting either the ideas or the interests of the South. Selected

words and terminologies from the old development agenda have been co-opted and

given new meanings to support the neoliberal hegemony (Gosovic, 2000: 450), while

other terms and concepts have ‘virtually disappeared from public usage (Gosovic,

2000: 451).

In many respects, it is what is not said in UN developmental discourse that is as

important as what is said. For example, although Lavelle (2001) acknowledges the

many differences of opinion within the diversity in the G-77, and the lack of Southern

unity within UNCTAD, she argues that at the very least both provided an essential

alternative (or alternatives) to neoliberal development discourses. The G-77 used

UNCTAD as a means of promoting an alternative ideology emphasising the structural

failings of the global trading system and the capitalist global economy which

perpetuated the exploitation of poorer countries by the rich. Whilst current UN

thinking on development places the onus for change on the developing countries

themselves, the call for a New International Economic Order required a root and

branch reform of the system itself. But for this study, perhaps more important than

22

specific policy prescriptions was simply that alternative models and ideas were on the

UN agenda:

‘The key ideological feature which cemented a strikingly heterogeneous

institutional alliance was not a point of theory upon which all agreed, but

rather one upon which all agreed not to agree. The third world institutional

alliance was grounded in developing countries’ refusal from the start to accept

a universal model of development’ (Lavelle, 2001: 31)

Although there may not have been a clear, distinct and coherent G-77 approach

before, the disbanding of the coalition marked the end of the ‘African input into the

discourse on development’ (Lavelle, 2001: 27).

Whilst Ian Taylor (2003: 410) shares this view of the decline of UNCTAD as a source

of alternative developmental discourses, he follows Augelli and Murphy (1988) by

placing a much stronger emphasis on its deliberate emasculation by governments in

the North, and by the US and the UK in particular under Reagan and Thatcher. The

resulting re-invention of UNCTAD as a proponent of neo-liberal economic reform in

developing states (as epitomized by the 2004 São Paulo Consensus (UNCTAD,

2004)) represents a retreat from demands for structural change, the near abandonment

of alternative developmental discourses and an:

‘Acceptance of the hegemonic discourse while (at best) attempting to

ameliorate the worst aspects of the established order …. This was a

remarkable sea-change in UNCTAD’s normative posture’ (Ian Taylor, 2003:

412)

In short, the development discourse in the UN has moved to one of ideational

competition (if not conflict) to one of unanimity and consensus. While the UN may

23

not be that important as a promoter of economic and developmental norms when

compared to the other agencies of global economic governance, crucially, it is no

longer the arena for alternative ideas and norms that it once was, and which Gosovic

(2000) argues were part and parcel of the original developmental objectives of the UN

charter. For Otto (1996), this leaves the task of promoting ‘postliberal’ approaches

within the UN to NGOs.

Between theory and practice

So much for ideas. As noted below, the extent to which these ideas are put into

practice within the UN system is, however, a different matter. There are some areas in

which the ideas promoted by or through the UN are supported by specific action. On

one level, Kofi Annan (2005: 39) has committed himself to providing more concrete

support through the UN system to promote democratization:

‘The United Nations should not restrict its role to norm-setting but should

expand its help to its members to further broaden and deepen democratic

trends throughout the world. To that end, I support the creation of a

democracy fund at the United Nations to provide assistance to countries

seeking to establish or strengthen their democracy. Furthermore, I intend to

ensure that our activities in this area are more closely coordinated by

establishing a more explicit link between the democratic governance work of

the United Nations Development Programme and the Electoral Assistance

Division of the Department of Political Affairs.’ (original emphasis)

24

On another level, there is evidence that in its peacekeeping activities, the UN is

implementing policies designed to construct new post-conflict orders as liberal

democracies. For Richmond (2004: 92):

‘the creation of the liberal peace requires an agreement on method, which can

be found in a peacebuilding consensus framed by the notion of peace-as-

governance. This occurs in the context of peace operations in which

peacebuilding recreates the state-centric order, territorial integrity and basic

human rights, while also attempting to institutionalize political, social and

economic reform according to the precepts of the democratic peace, which

have been widely accepted in the post-Cold War environment.’

Pugh (2004) similarly argues that in promotion of Peacebuilding and Peace Support

Operations, UN actions promote the preferred policy preferences of hegemonic

powers built on liberal ideas of both state construction and economic paradigms.

Indeed, holding successful elections has become a measure of the success of UN

peacekeeping operations (Barnett and Finnemre, 1999: 720). Moreover, in

establishing new orders, ideational principles can override local interests and

practicalities. There is a strong literature that warns against the ‘dangers of hasty

democratization in deeply divided countries’19, and if the new order is built by and

largely dependent on external forces with weak local support (Richmond, 2004: 93),

then there is a danger that it can create instability and violence rather than build peace.

For example, Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 720) argue that the result of pushing for

quick elections in Bosnia and parts of Africa was the very ethnic cleansing and

exacerbated ethic tensions that the operations were designed to prevent in the first

place.

19 This literature is summarised in Paris (2003).

25

Given that ‘The UN’s peacekeepers derive part of their authority from the claim that

they are independent, objective, neutral actors who simply implement Security

Council resolutions’ Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 709), at the very least, there is

concern about whether the UN’s dual role as a promoter of norms and a hands-on

actor can be reconciled (Kent, 2004), and the legitimacy of UN peace-keeping actions

maintained. At worst, for Mégret and Hoffmann (2003), if the local populations are

forced to accept democratic structures against their wishes, then the UN itself might

violate, rather than protect, the rights of those that it is trying to build a democratic

peace for20.

Notwithstanding the apparent increasing imposition of democratic norms in peace-

keeping and peace-building operations, while many of the pronouncements associated

with the UN are built on liberal principles, in action, realist principles of national

interest and hard-nosed power balancing often trump idealistic ideals. For example,

Forsythe argues that notwithstanding the rhetorical commitment to linking

development aid to democratization, there is no evidence that this has actually

occurred in any of the 150 countries where the UNDP is involved in development

programmes. Furthermore, when the UNDP did attempt to implement a democracy

criterion in 1990, it had to backtrack in the face of opposition from developing

country members of the UN (Forsythe, 1997: 343). When principle and pragmatism

collided, pragmatism and the power of sovereign member states within the UN won

out.

26

Perhaps a better example is the actual promotion of a universal conception of Human

Rights that should be protected and promoted by the international community through

the UN. On one level, the UN’s ability to enforce change on recalcitrant states is

limited. On another, and perhaps more significant, the UN system has, to say the least,

been partial in exposing and criticising abuses of Human Rights in member states.

Although a 1995 censure of China’s human rights record failed by only one vote,

Chinese diplomatic efforts have subsequently resulted in other critical resolutions not

even being discussed on the floor of the UNHRC. In 2004 the commission adopted

resolutions critical of North Korea, Cuba, Belarus and Turkmenistan – but rejected

resolutions against China and Russian action in Chechnya as well as Zimbabwe.

At the time, Zimbabwe was one of the 53 member states that form the membership of

the UNHRC in its annual meeting. Each year, a country is elected to Chair this

meeting – in practice, this means that each of the five regional groupings21 nominate a

country to act on their behalf for that session, and no vote was needed from the

founding of the commission in 1997 until 2003. In 2003, it was the turn of the African

grouping to elect a chair and they nominated Libya, a country that was still under

some international sanctions after the Lockerbie bombing, and which was accused of

breaching a wide range of human rights by international NGOs at the time.

Not surprisingly, Libya’s nomination generated considerable opposition from human

rights NGOs, with Human Rights Watch arguing that it not only undermined the

legitimacy of the UNHRC, but also of NEPADs commitments to promoting and

20 Furthermore, the UN is not subject even to its own treaties – these only bind the UN’s

member states and not the UN itself. 21 Africa, Asia, Latin American and Caribbean states, Central and Eastern Europe, and Western

European and Other States which includes Australisia, Canada and the US.

27

monitoring human rights in Africa22. It also generated opposition from developed

countries, most notably the United States who for the first time in the UNHCR’s

history forced a vote (which Libya won 33-3 with 17 abstentions). Notably, the

decision to force a vote in itself generated condemnation of the US for violating the

norm that allowed regional groupings to nominate their own representative. The

established modus operandi within the UN was, for some, much more important than

the legitimacy of the UNHRC.

And the fact that it was the United States that had forced a vote, and that the US

consistently vetoes resolutions that are critical of Israel, was crucially important here.

Indeed, in the same 2003 session, the US was the only member of the UNHRC to vote

against a resolution condemning the treatment of Lebanese detainees in Israel. So on

one side there is the accusation that human rights abusers, not least through their

participation on the UNHRC itself, can avoid criticism and emasculate the objectives

of the UNHRC in particular and the UN in general, as a promoter of universal human

rights norms. On the other side, there is the feeling that the permanent members of the

SC, and the US in particular, use their privileged position to protect allies and decide

who should be subject to these norms, when, and with what consequences.

Criticism of US actions in the UN abound. The US has withheld funding for the UN

when policy has been unpopular at home, and though both Afghanistan and the USA

have failed to make their required payments to the UN in the past, but Afghanistan

suffered a loss of voting rights as a result and it was not the United States. The US

also vetoed the reappointment of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as secretary general in a 14-

22 http://hrw.org/press/2002/08/libya080902.htm

28

0-1 vote in 1996 (Chollet and Orr, 2001). Cannon (2004) even argues that the US is

trying to undermine the WHO strategy on diet and health because of the relationship

between the Bush Presidency and US sugar producers.

Perhaps most important of all for the legitimacy of the UN as a promoter of global

norms is the US refusal to adhere to the International Criminal Court (ICC) which,

according to Lavalle (2003: 195) ‘set off, in June and July 2002, a crisis so severe that

it threatened the survival of all United Nations peace operations’. Although Clinton

was supportive of the ICC, and in the process of negotiating the terms of the treaty a

number of concessions were made to the US that some argue diluted its original

intentions (Weller, 2002: 696), it was not ratified in the US Senate and the Bush

administration informed the UN that it was not a party to the treaty in May 2002. The

US administration argued that it was not prepared to allow its citizens to be subject to

extra-national law in the ICC – partly as a matter of absolute principle, partly because

of fears that other nations would use the ICC as a way of ‘getting back’ at the US, and

partly because as the US carries most weight in military activities either within or

without the UN and is therefore more likely to be subject to potential charges than

other countries.

For Schabas (2004), these arguments are largely unconvincing as the same questions

arise when considering myriad other treaties and conventions that the US has signed

and ratified, and the US was for a long time the main champion of international

criminal justice. The key is that the original draft for the ICC conceived as the

security council having the final authority, while the final agreement gave the court

considerable independence. While the US is prepared to subject itself to the

29

jurisdication of international organizations such as the UN, this is conditional on its

ability to influence if not control those international organizations – and in the case of

the UN, to ultimately be able to veto unfavourable outcomes. The sole superpower is

only prepared to accept new norms of global governance when it does not infringe on

its own sovereignty – a privilege that it is not prepared to extend to all other states.

The US is not alone in refusing to ratify the ICC – neither have Russia, China, Israel

and Turkey. And the US is far from the only power that defends its sovereignty and

national interest in the UN system. But Cronin (2001) argues that the US is different,

and that US actions are much more likely to undermine the legitimacy of the UN

system than similar actions by other states. The UN, along with other international

organizations, was largely constructed by the hegemon to promote a hegemonic world

order. Indeed, the hegemon relies on these international organizations as a means of

legitimating its interests through the creation of legally binding treaties. Having done

more than most to establish a norm – in this case built around conceptions of rights

and the need to hold states to account if they abrogate rights – not submitting

themselves to the norm not only undermines the institution itself, but the liberal

principles that underpin the hegemonic world order per se:

‘When a hegemon fails to act within the boundaries established by its role, the

credibility of the institutions and rules it helped to establish weakens. IOs act

as the chief legitimizing agents of global politics. When these organizations

are undermined, the legitimacy of the international order itself is threatened.’

(Cronin, 2001: 113)

30

Conclusions

The US does not ratify the convention of the ICC because it considers it an

illegitimate infringement of its sovereignty. Other states consider the US’s and other

states’ decisions to abandon the UNSC to use force against other sovereign states as

undermining the legitimacy of the UN. When permanent members veto action, this is

taken as also undermining UN legitimacy through the selective application of

principles based solely on national interest – indeed, for many the use of veto in the

UNSC in itself is illegitimate and in contravention of the UN’s own charter. For some,

it is the failure to apply principles of humanitarianism that reduces legitimacy – for

others it is simply illegitimate for the UN to abrogate sovereignty and concern itself

with the domestic affairs of sovereign member states. No wonder that there is a

general consensus that the UN needs to be reformed – and no wonder that there is

little consensus on how it should be reformed.

The latest in a relatively long list of calls to reform the UNSC came in Kofi Annan’s

2005 report proposing an expanded UNSC (one model proposing extra permanent

seats and another proposing four year renewable seats). But the immediate responses

to the proposals indicate that while there might be wide agreement that the UNSC

needs to be reformed, how, and who should join, remains an area of contention. For

example, during the debates over reform proposals in 1993 and 1995, Non Aligned

Movement states expressed concern over another advanced industrialized country

joining the SC. If Japan and/or Germany were to join, then three other developing

nations should also join to provide balance – one each for Africa, Latin America and

Asia. But even then there were severe divisions over whether new permanent

members should have the same veto powers as the existing powers, and which

31

country should get the extra seats from each region (Bourantonis and Panagiotou,

2004).

Even prior to the publication of Annan’s report in 2005 calling for UNSC reform,

Brazil, Germany, Japan and India indicated their claims to UNSC membership, and

mutual support for each others bids23. Pakistan was reported to be hostile to the idea

of an Indian seat, Italy about a German seat, Argentina and Mexico about Brazil, and

China and both Korea’s expressed immediate opposition to Japan. Popular opinion in

both countries remains highly hostile towards Japan, and Annan’s report resulted in a

number of Japanese owned shops and companies in China coming under attack from

rioters in April 2005. As existing UNSC members have the ultimate right to veto any

proposals for change, and given China’s reticence and at times downright hostility to

Japan’s UNSC pretensions, it remains unlikely (at the very least) that China would

allow a permanent veto power seat for Japan. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that

the Security Council reforms quietly slipped off the agenda, and were not even

discussed in the General Assembly.

Given all this, it is tempting to argue that by promoting norms of global governance

through official reports and commissions that it cannot deliver upon or are even

blocked by its member states, the UN not only fails to promote, but actually

undermines attempts to establish global governance. Manifestations of hostility to the

promotion of liberal norms by some states, and the failure of others to always act

according to either their own avowed principles, or the principles established by the

23 After a meeting in New York on 21 September 2004.

32

secretary general, simply point to the futility of trying to build global orders that will

not simply be ignored when they conflict with perceived national interests.

But the importance of ideational promotion should not be wholly dismissed. Despite

opposition from some states, and the uneven (at best) transformation of principle into

practice, the post-Cold War era has seen the UN change. Whether the UN was ever

conceived as being an organization solely designed to promote international peace is

debateable. But in the recent era, it has become much more clearly an organization

concerned with promoting ideas on how best to achieve development, and how best to

organize national governance and governmental structures. It has also become an

arena in which liberal political and developmental ideas are promoted.

Returning to Gosovic’s (2000) conception of the homogenization of global public

opinion noted in the discussion of developmental paradigms above – an idea that

echoes Gramsci’s conception of the ‘common sense’24. By common sense, Gramsci

meant ‘the folklore of the future, a relatively rigidified phase of popular knowledge in

a given time and place’ (Gramsci, 1985: 421) – the promotion of a single idea that

becomes accepted as obvious as not to be contested (or if it is, for that contestation to

be considered as irrelevant, absurd or counter-intuitive). It is going far too far to

suggest that liberal ideals inform action in the UN system; but the UN system has

become a vehicle through which a distinctive set of liberal norms are promoted, even

though they are not yet universally accepted, nor universally applied.

24 Many thanks to Ian Taylor for pointing this out to me.

33

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Abbreviations and Acronyms Used G-77 The Group of 77 at the United Nations ICC International Criminal Court ICJ International Court of Justice IMF International Monetary Fund NGO Non-Governmental Organization UN United Nations UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNSC United Nations Security Council WB World Bank WTO World Trade Organization