AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

February 21, 2017

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. The death of Omar Abdul Rahman, the planner of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, may inspire retaliatory attacks against U.S. targets.

2. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu in an effort to disrupt Somalia’s new administration.

3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may exploit famine conditions in the Lake Chad Basin to increase recruitment and build a local support base.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

Al Qaeda NetworkThe death of the ”Blind Sheikh” Omar Abdul Rahman may provoke a spree of attacks in his memory from al Qaeda and Salafi-jihadi groups. Abdul Rahman died on February 18 of natural causes in a North Caroline prison where he had been sentenced for his role as a key planner of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Al Qaeda’s General Command called for revenge attacks on Americans and U.S. interests and accused the U.S. of killing Abdul Rahman by withholding his medication in prison. Al Qaeda’s “al Nafeer” bulletin released Abdul Rahman’s will, in which he accused the U.S. of poisoning his food and abusing him while in jail. Al Qaeda’s al Sahab Media Foundation also released a pre-recorded speech from al Qaeda Ayman al Zawahiri where he lambasted the partiality of Western courts and media. AQAP and AQIM’s joint February 19 statement eulogizing the fallen leader and calling for revenge attacks against the West shows the continued close coordination and communication between the two al Qaeda affiliates. Al Shabaab separately eulogized Abdul Rahman.

Outlook: Al Qaeda affiliates will use the death of Abdul Rahman as justification for attacks against the West.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesJamatul Ahrar (JuA), a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) splinter group, is conducting a campaign that contributes to Pakistan’s deteriorating relationship with its neighbors. JuA conducted six suicide attacks across a wide area of Pakistan within the past week. ISIS Wilayat Khorasan and JuA co-claimed a high-casualty suicide bombing on a Sufi shrine in Sehwan, southern Pakistan on February 17. ISIS likely relies on JuA as a support network. Pakistan accused Afghanistan of tolerating TTP and JuA within its borders. ISIS sympathizers are likely present in the contested Kashmir region, where anti-India protesters allegedly waved ISIS flags alongside the flags of Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani Salafi-jihadi group, on February 17. It is unlikely that Pakistan will extend its crackdown on ISIS to LeT affiliates due to its reliance on LeT to counter India in Kashmir. Pakistan’s fear of strategic encirclement by Afghanistan and India will very likely cause greater isolation from American strategic partners.

Outlook: JuA will likely draw recruits from other factions in the TTP network. ISIS will likely gain support due to cooperation with both JuA and Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Kashmir.

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PoliticalThe U.S. is re-engaging the Yemen conflict, which may precede a shift in American policy in Yemen. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson met with his British, Saudi, Emirati, and Omani counterparts in Bonn, Germany. The U.S. administration has already indicated stronger support for Saudi Arabia and that it seeks to counter Iran’s growing influence in Yemen. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani expressed his support for a ceasefire in Yemen and met with counterparts in Oman and Kuwait.

Outlook: The U.S. may likely increase its support of the Saudi-led coalition and endorse Saudi policy on a ceasefire.

SecurityAl Houthi-Saleh forces intensified cross-border attacks into southern Saudi Arabia in what may be an effort to pressure the Kingdom to participate in negotiations. Saudi Press Agency is now beginning to report on Saudi casualties. Coalition-backed forces are fighting northward to seize key ports along Yemen’s Red Sea coast from al Houthi-Saleh forces but have failed to advance past Mokha city after weeks of fighting. Iran or its proxies may have transferred the capability to conduct unmanned remote-controlled boat attacks to the al Houthi-Saleh faction, threatening freedom of movement in the Red Sea.

Outlook: The al Houthi-Saleh faction’s cross-border operations come at a time of increased American support. The attacks will harden Saudi resolve in Yemen and build sympathy from U.S. policy-makers.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP continues to prioritize expanding its support base in the context of the civil war. AQAP maintained a high operational tempo against al Houthi-Saleh forces in central Yemen, where it builds relationships with anti-al Houthi tribal forces. ISIS Wilayat al Bayda, which likely consists of former AQAP members, continues to operate within AQAP’s areas of operation in central Yemen. AQAP deomonstrated its ability to quickly coordinate with other al Qaeda affiliates by producing a joint statement with AQIM hours after the death of the “Blind Sheikh” Omar Abdul Rahman.

Outlook: AQAP will de-conflict with local security forces in southern Yemen.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

1) 15 FEB: ISIS Wilayat al Bayda shelled al Houthi-Saleh forces in Qayfa, al Bayda.

2) 15-17 FEB: Local militias attacked al Houthi-Saleh forces in Dhamar.

3) 17-18 FEB: Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired ballistic missiles into Jazan, Saudi Arabia.

4) 19 FEB: AQAP assassinated an al Houthi-Saleh commander in al Dhaleh governorate.

5) 20 FEB: AQAP seized positions in al Bayda governorate.

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PoliticalThe UAE is expanding its military presence in the Gulf of Aden region. The UAE reached an agreement with Somaliland state to build a naval base at Berbera, northwestern Somalia. The UAE is building another base at Assab in Eritrea and may be constructing military infrastructure on Perim, a Yemeni island in the Bab al Mandab Strait. Somali President Farmajo, who will be inaugurated on February 22, has challenged the agreement with UAE. His administration may prioritize nationalist policies and the centralization of power over avoiding tensions with semi-autonomous regional governments.

Outlook: Puntland state will likely follow Somaliland’s example in seeking greater autonomy from Mogadishu.

Security AMISOM’s light footprint in central Somalia weakens regional state capacity to combat al Shabaab. Galmudug, which encompasses Galgudud and Mudug regions in central Somalia, does not possess the military capabilities required to expel pockets of al Shabaab militants. Galmudug State security forces ceded control of Amara town in Mudug region to al Shabaab after suffering defeats on February 14 and 21. Galmudug State and al Shabaab have contested for control of Amara town, a strategic point located 90 kilometers north of an al Shabaab stronghold at Harardhere, since 2015.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will expand control over inland villages in Mudug region where AMISOM forces are not active.

Al Shabaab Multiple mass-casualty VBIED attacks in 2017 indicate al Shabaab’s expanded bomb-making capabilities in Mogadishu. The group has combined VBIED attacks with an assassination campaign targeting clan elders and government officials to challenge Somalia’s security apparatus in the capital. Al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu coincide with an offensive campaign in recent weeks to increase pressure on AMISOM and SNA forces in surrounding towns.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will increase operations in the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions as security resources are likely redirected to reinforce Mogadishu. Al Shabaab may target strategic towns like Afgoi and Jowhar in the near term.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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1) 27 JAN – 19 FEB: Al Shabaab militants assassinated three clan elders in Mogadishu.

2) 14 FEB: Al Shabaab militants ambushed a Galmudug State convoy outside Amara town.

3) 16 FEB: Al Shabaab militants fired mortars near the presidential palace in Mogadishu.

4) 19 FEB: Al Shabaab militants detonated a SVBIED in Mogadishu.

5) 21 FEB: Al Shabaab seized Amara town, Mudug region.

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PoliticalEgypt, Tunisia, and Algeria are pushing for a political deal in Libya in order to be able to influence the political process. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar backed out of talks with UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister Fayez al Serraj, though the pair participated in indirect meetings that advanced minor negotiating goals. The inability to come to a definite agreement may only strengthen the LNA’s position as the most powerful military force in Libya. The GNA requested military training and development support from NATO to shore up its fragile position in Tripoli, where a coalition of Islamist militias challenges the GNA’s authority. Islamist militias, especially in Tripoli, used the sixth anniversary of Libya’s February 17 th Revolution to project their power in opposition to the GNA.

Outlook: The GNA’s cooperation with Haftar will probably alienate Islamist actors excluded from the peace process.

SecurityThe Libyan National Army (LNA) escalated offensive operations in central Libya. The LNA increased airstrikes against Islamist forces in Jufra, central Libya, with continued Russian and Emirati support, in an effort to project LNA air power into western and southern Libya. The LNA’s transition to offensive operations in central Libya comes as the LNA attempts to transition to holding operations in Benghazi, where an Islamist insurgency continues in select neighborhoods.

Outlook: The LNA’s escalation in central Libya may spark retaliation from powerful Islamist militias based in the west.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS is conducting a campaign of attacks on water infrastructure that may be intended to disrupt resource flow to major cities, stoke tensions between rival political actors, and prolong Libya’s civil war. Suspected ISIS militants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) at a water infrastructure site between Bani Walid and al Shwayrif in northwestern Libya on February 15. Suspected ISIS militants conducted several similar attacks in the past two months. ISIS sucessfully pursued a similar strategy of denial of oil resources in the past.

Outlook: ISIS will conduct low-level IED attacks and raids in western Libya as it seeks to rebuild its military capabilities.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA

1) 15 FEB: The LNA conducted airstrikes against Islamist militants in Jufra district.

2) 15-16 FEB: Islamist militants attacked LNA observation posts and conducted sniper attacks in Qanfouda. Militants detonated two IEDs in Bosnib and Ard Majaris, Benghazi.

3) 12 FEB: Rival militias clashed in Sabratha.

4) 20 FEB: Islamist militants fired on a convoy carrying GNA leadership in Tripoli.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the MaghrebISIS in Algeria resurfaced after a four-month period of inactivity. The group claimed credit for the beheading of an Algerian intelligence officer who had attempted to infiltrate the group on February 14. ISIS in Algeria remains weak after Algerian security forces cracked down on the group in 2015 and 2016. There is little reporting in the Algerian media on this topic.

Outlook: ISIS in Algeria will conduct sporadic attacks on individuals or small groups connected to the Algerian state.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an AQIM associate drawn mainly from the Fulani ethnic group, is almost certainly positioned to benefit from growing anti-government sentiment within the Fulani community in Mali. Violence between the Fulani and members of Mali’s dominant Bambara ethnic group is increasing in central Mali as members of both communities form vigilante groups and conduct retaliatory attacks. Fulani vigilantes are beginning to turn to the MLF for support and direction. Support for al Qaeda associates within Fulani communities may spread throughout West Africa including Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria.

Boko Haram-Shekau may be targeting the supply chain of a rival faction, Boko Haram-Barnawi, as famine worsens in the Lake Chad Basin. Boko Haram-Shekau gunmen and female suicide bombers attacked an IDP camp outside of Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria. The operatives destroyed a large aid convoy destined for an area of Nigeria where Boko Haram-Barnawi routinely buys supplies from government officials. Boko Haram-Barnawi’s relationship with local populations ensures a steady source of food and medical supplies. Boko Haram-Shekau has alienated local populations and relies on supplies seized in raids. The governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria are unable or unwilling to distribute aid to areas of their countries affected by Boko Haram, further undermining the authority of the state in these regions.

Outlook: The Malian state’s crackdown on Fulani communities will drive support to the MLF. Boko Haram-Barnawi (ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya) will gain more fighters at the expense of Boko Haram-Shekau, setting conditions for the group to expand operations in West Africa.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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1) 14 FEB: ISIS in Algeria claimed responsibility for killing an Algerian intelligence officer in Jijel province, Algeria.

2) 17 FEB: Algerian security forces killed nine militants in Al Adjiba, Bouira province, Algeria.

3) 17 FEB: Tunisian security forces killed two militants in Jebel Samama, Kasserine province, Tunisia.

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1) 16 FEB: Boko Haram-Shekau killed four Cameroonian soldiers in Extreme-Nord Province, Cameroon.

2) 17 FEB: Boko Haram-Shekau gunmen and female suicide bombers attacked an IDP camp near Maiduguri, Nigeria.

3) 17 FEB: The Malian army arrested four MLF militants in Segou Region, Mali.

4) 19 FEB: Suspected Fulani vigilantes killed seven Bambara people in Segou Region, Mali.

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

arrested 

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569