AUTHORS’ RESPONSES

The Emotional Intelligence Bandwagon:Too Fast To Live, Too Young To Die?

Moshe ZeidnerDepartment of Education

Center for Interdisciplinary Research on EmotionsUniversity of Haifa, Israel

Richard D. RobertsCenter for New Constructs

Educational Testing ServicePrinceton, NJ

Gerald MatthewsDepartment of PsychologyUniversity of Cincinnati

Overview

As evidenced in the two lead articles, ensuing com-mentaries, and subsequent rejoinders, emotional intel-ligence (EI) has emerged as a high profile, yetcontentious, issue in modern day psychology (see alsoMatthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). From fairlyhumble beginnings, EI has come into its own as one ofthe most popular psychological concepts of the last de-cade. However, for all its charm and youthful energy,EI appears to be living “life in the fast lane” and ismoving at blistering pace toward conceptual stardom(Zeidner, Roberts, & Matthews, under preparation). Arecent Web search on the term emotional intelligenceresulted in over 140,000 URLs; a search of various sci-entific databases (e.g., PsychInfo, Social Sciences In-dex) resulted in a comparably modest count (i.e.,350–400 hits). The disparity in these numbers illus-trates strikingly an imbalance between popular interestand the status of EI in peer-reviewed, psychological re-search. Aside from various well-documented sociolog-ical reasons for popular interest in EI (see Matthews,Zeidner et al., 2002), most people seem intuitively tofeel that there are meaningful individual differences inthe domain of emotional functioning. As Averill (thisissue) so aptly puts it, “it [EI] has an easily recogniz-able grain of truth.” Another important factor account-ing for the widespread popularity of EI, also taken upby Averill, is the frequently observed disjuncture be-tween intellectual and emotional acumen. Thus, from

our own experiences, we can readily call to mindpeople who are high on cognitive intelligence but quiteunremarkable in their social adroitness. This dividehelps us to fully appreciate, for example, Renee’s la-conic remark in the popular TV show Ally McBeal:“Emotionally, you’re an idiot!”

In our target article we sought to separate beliefsabout EI that are speculative and mythical from state-ments and claims that have a firm foundation in empir-ical science. We thank each of the commentators foracknowledging our contribution in advancing the fieldby presenting a critical, yet not dismissive, view on theevidence for the construct of EI. We particularly wel-come Averill’s (this issue) remarks that the two leadarticles in this issue provide a “textbook example” ofhow the Hegelian dialectic of science should proceed.Accordingly, following the thesis put forth by propo-nents of EI (beginning in the early 1990s), a skepticalantithesis has been put forth, articulated in our targetarticle. The future, according to this dialectic, fore-bodes a synthesis between proponents and opponentsof EI to advance the field further (assuming the wheelsdo not come off the bandwagon altogether).

The four distinguished commentators on our articlehave made various pertinent comments relating to keyissues in the domain of EI research and have suggestedways to advance the field and push the domain-specificknowledge about EI beyond its present equivocal sta-tus. In this rejoinder, we note from the outset the fol-lowing as points of general agreement:

Psychological Inquiry Copyright © 2004 by2004, Vol. 15, No. 3, 239–248 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

1. The need to map out the construct of EI accord-ing to a more rigorous conceptual and defini-tional system.

2. A requirement to develop more sophisticatedmeasurement tools and techniques.

3. The identification of appropriate behavioralcriteria for EI.

4. The systematic mapping of the nexus of rela-tions between EI and related criterion variablesof interest.

5. The implementation of proper statistical con-trols for personality and ability measures whenconsidering the empirical status of EI.

6. The application of alternative domains of knowl-edge to complement criterion validity stud-ies—ranging from literature, creativity, and his-torical accounts to popular cultural trends.

7. The investigation of whether it is practicallyuseful in applied settings to train higher EI or tomeasure EI for selection purposes.

Despite some promising research developments re-lated to each of the preceding issues, we also take thisopportunity to further highlight various “mythical” be-liefs about EI that are not scientifically supported. Weaim to reinforce or complement previous points thatwe have made in four broad areas of EI research: (a)conceptualization, (b) assessment, (c) basic empiricalissues, and (d) practical applications. We show howeach of the commentators have substantially furtheredour case, rendering EI as having a slippery scientificstatus, which has lead to the spread of a number of un-founded myths. In certain other instances, however,moving more toward synthesis than our target articlemay suggest, we show how concepts surrounding EImay be vindicated by further conceptual refinement orempirical research.

Conceptual Issues

Our target article has drawn attention to the prob-lematic nature of current definitions and conceptual-izations of EI and the limited theoretical basis fordeveloping the EI construct. The lack of a consensualdefinition of EI is highlighted by the major disjunctionthat exists between ability and mixed models of EI(e.g., Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000). The constructalso lacks content validity in that, especially within themixed model approach, the multitude of qualities cov-ered by the concept is overwhelming (Roberts, 2003).Such differing definitions and conceptions have led toconsiderable confusion in the scientific literature. Ac-knowledging the tenuous conceptual status of EI, eachof the various commentators proposes interesting solu-tions (i.e., tolerating the coexistence of multiple defini-tions in semantic space, tapping related domains forin-depth understanding of EI, early foreclosure on a

specific definition or model, etc.). However, as with EIresearch in general, we see little convergence on a con-sensual definition; indeed, each new perspective mayopen further divides.

Averill (this issue) laments that the emotional com-ponent is given short shrift in the literature on EI whencompared with the intelligence component. Averill isparticularly vexed by the following conceptual pitfallhaunting, in particular, ability models of EI: Whereasthey clearly specify and delineate the information pro-cessing components central to reasoning about emo-tions (e.g., emotion perception and expression,understanding affect, assimilating emotions in mentalschemata), these models fail to specify the specificemotional content being processed by abstract compu-tational modules. Averill questions the underlyingworking assumption, namely, that the processing com-ponents are of equal relevance across different catego-ries of emotions. Extending this concern, we mayquestion whether any model of EI generalizes acrossthe universe of basic emotions, given evidence differ-entiating discrete, universal basic emotions (Ekman,1989). Furthermore, it is too early to dismiss the possi-bility of the existence of multiple EIs underlying emo-tions and their manifestations embedded withinspecific cultural contexts.

Gohm (this issue) claims that the contention thatdefinitions of EI are conceptually coherent could beviewed as a myth only if published in the popularpress, but when addressed to scientists reading Psy-chological Inquiry, sounds like a “straw man” posi-tion. This claim suggests a misreading of the peer-re-viewed literature on EI, in which questionnairestudies are at least as prominent as those using objec-tive or quasiobjective tests. The leading questionnairedevelopers are quite explicit that they seek to mea-sure an ability that predicts objective behavior (e.g.,Bar-On, 2000; Boyatzis, Goleman, & Rhee, 2000).We agree with Gohm that questionnaires are an un-promising means to this end, but we cannot dismissthis approach by arbitrary fiat. Indeed, Gohm’s(2003) own published work has used questionnairemeasures, including the Trait Meta-Mood Scale, torelate self-reports of mood management to EI. Fur-thermore, neither questionnaire nor objective ap-proaches prevail on predictive validity, so far as wecan tell from the few studies that have aimed to con-trol personality or cognitive ability (cf. Brackett &Mayer, 2003; Brody, this issue). Consequently, theweakness of correlations between objective (e.g., theMayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test;MSCEIT) and questionnaire (e.g., the EmotionalQuotient Inventory; EQ-I; Bar-On, 1997) measures ofEI may indicate a significant failing of the field as awhole (i.e., lack of convergent validity).

In fact, there are at least two dimensions of concep-tual confusion evident in the scientific literature. First,

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there is no agreement on the specific qualities that de-fine EI and no decision rules that would allow us toparse personal qualities as emotionally intelligent ornot. Emotional creativity, as discussed by Averill (thisissue), is a case in point. If we apply Oatley’s (this is-sue) method of seeking exemplars of outstanding ex-pertise, we see, like Averill and Seneca, that writersand artists with a genius for expressing emotion are of-ten poor at managing interpersonal relationships. Sec-ond, there is no agreement on the nature of the EIconstruct; is it temperament, a set of specific compo-nent processes, metacognitions of personal compe-tence, or acquired skills? The Mayer–Salovey–Carusoconception is probably the clearest with respect to spe-cific qualities, but the psychological underpinnings ofthe four branches remain ambiguous (Matthews,Zeidner & Roberts, in press-a). For example, a per-son’s understanding of the Mona Lisa may be sup-ported by various, qualitatively different processesranging from hard-wired subcortical circuits for pat-tern recognition of emotional stimuli that are activatedby a smiling face, to use of cultural knowledge aboutRenaissance Italy, to still more intimate knowledge ofDa Vinci’s artistic agenda to decode hidden meaning.The specific qualities assessed by the MSCEIT FacePerception Test are conjectural. More disturbingly, ina study of over 100 college freshman, we recentlyfound that this subtest of the MSCEIT correlates nearzero with a widely used objective measure of facialemotion recognition, the Japanese and Caucasian BriefAffect Recognition Test (in which clearly moderate re-lations would seem requisite; see MacCann,Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, in press-a).

Gohm (this issue) is remarkably blasé concerningthe multiplicity of conceptualizations of EI. There is noa priori certainty that EI exists at all, and hunting a sin-gle Snark is difficult enough without admitting a wholemenagerie of disparate, possibly chimerical creaturesto be acceptable prey. Certainly, definitions developover time, with some imprecision expected of an emer-gent construct. Even so, we contend that researchersare entitled to expect greater coherence in specificationof content and process than currently exists in the EIliterature. The comparison with personality traits madeby Gohm is illuminating. In fact, contrary to her state-ment, there is very good consensus on the nature of themajor personality traits, such as extraversion(Matthews, Deary, & Whiteman, 2003). In discussingthe Five Factor Model, even critics of the trait ap-

proach concur that “a consensus about the major traitdimensions of personality has begun to emerge amongcontemporary trait psychologists” (Pervin, 2002, p.29), and “there is no disagreement among us regardingthe usefulness of a common conceptual scheme [i.e.,the Big Five] that is both parsimonious and compre-hensive” (Block, 1995, p. 26).

Indeed, the following thought experiment is illumi-nating. Imagine that trait psychologists assumed theexistence of a single construct of personality (let us callit PQ for personality quotient), so that one researcherpronounced that extraverted qualities were the key toPQ, whereas another researcher argued in favor ofemotionality. The Babel that would result is obvious.Our concern is that research on EI is hobbled by similarconfusions, exacerbated by poor discrimination fromexisting constructs. Indeed, conceptual overlaps withthe Five Factor Model (McCrae, 2000; Matthews,Zeidner et al., 2002) imply that we have at least five ex-pressions of EI that can be directly tied to the Five Fac-tor Model (see Table 1). We cannot blithely assumethat it will all come right in the end. To find the elusiveEI, we need a targeted search guided by an explicitconceptualization of either a single or multiple dimen-sion(s) of competence. We strongly advocate separateresearch efforts directed to each possible conceptual-ization listed in our original target article (and possiblyothers). Once we have better measures of well-definedconstructs, we can begin to ask whether they possess astructure (e.g., a positive manifold) that would supportthe existence of an overarching EI (or EIs).

Oatley (this issue) warns us against a prematuredefinitional narrowing of the field (while at the sametime, paradoxically, embracing a particular definitionand conception of EI)! He takes us to task for placingtoo much emphasis on definitional issues rather thandevoting more energy to clarifying the EI concept. Per-force he is also sanguine about the peaceful coexis-tence of various alternative definitions of EI insemantic space, certainly at this early stage of concep-tual development. He sees the essence of emotionallyintelligent behavior as the proper exercise of perceivedcontrol in solving problems in specific social contexts.To enrich our understanding of the EI concept, Oatleyalso suggests that we draw on novel domains (e.g., lit-erature, history, music, plastic arts, theatre, and cin-ema) and learn from the paradigmatic examples orexperts in these fields (e.g., authors of imaginativenovels, playwrights, poets, and historical figures).

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Table 1. Core Attributes of EI Allocated Across the Five-Factor Model of Personality

Extraversion Emotional Stability Conscientiousness Agreeableness Openness

Aspect of EI Social skills Tolerance of stress Self-control Empathy Creativity

Social confidence Effective coping Organizational citizenship Interpersonal sensitivity Artistic sensitivity

Optimism Lack of pessimism Hard-working Caring for others

Note. EI = emotional intelligence.

Whereas these idiographic sources may offer consider-able insight into emotional phenomena, resonating tothe emotional experiences of generations of peopleover the ages, they cannot and should not replacenomothetic empirical research. It is the latter that en-ables us to generate replicable lawful relations thatgeneralize across time and context and thereby helptransform a concept into a scientific construct.1

In defense of EI, one should bear in mind that, afterover a century of research there still remains contro-versy over the precise meaning of intelligence. How-ever, there appears to be less implicit agreementamong researchers on the content domains of EI thanwas the case for intelligence tests, even during theearly days of testing (see Roberts, Markham,Matthews, & Zeidner, in press). In part, at least, the fullpromise of EI measures (and ensuing research) de-pends on resolving issues surrounding content valid-ity; an important undertaking that needs to beaddressed for the field to progress. It is currently anopen question whether future research will arrive at amore solid operational definition of EI. If not, EI willcome to be seen as a woolly prescientific term that maybe replaced by a variety of more precisely specifiedconstructs.

Assessment Issues

In our target article, we identified myths relating toassessment: that measures of EI meet standardpsychometric criteria, that self-report EI is distinctfrom existing personality constructs, and that abilitytests meet criteria for a standard intelligence. Seriousconcerns are raised by the lack of convergence be-tween alternate measures of EI, by the high degree ofoverlap of EI with the Big Five personality traits, andby difficulties in veridical scoring of ability tests (seeMatthews, Zeidner et al., 2002; Matthews, Zeidner, &Roberts, in press-b).

Oatley (this issue) raises the concern that the teamsauthoring the two lead papers have become too fo-cused on measurement issues, equating the concept ofEI with its measurement. In fact, there are two issueshere. The first is what type of truth is sought concern-ing EI. We agree with Oatley that coherence truth andpersonal truth are important, but it is not clear thatthese truths are properly a part of science, althoughthere is a tradition of idiographic personality researchthat points toward some possible approaches to inves-tigating EI at an individual level. In addition, truths candissociate. Classical psychoanalysis possesses coher-ence—and has generated numerous textbooks—and tothis day informs personal truth, at least among psycho-analysts and their clients. However, it has failed as apath toward scientific truth (one may comment simi-larly on religious beliefs). Furthermore, personal truth,and, we suspect, coherence truth are highly sensitive tocultural values. Oatley cites examples of the stoic vir-tues but part of the zeitgeist for current interest in EI isthe neoromanticism that values emotional expressionabove self-control (Matthews, Zeidner et al., 2002;Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000). Fashions in emo-tion are important in their own right as an object ofstudy and feed into the social aspects of emotion de-scribed by Averill (this issue). However, we cannotlook to cultural trends to define what is, and what isnot, intelligent.

Our concern is with EI as a nomothetic construct. Ifwe wish to investigate EI as an attribute of all people,measurement is the primary key to a science of EI. Infact, the history of science amply shows that scientificprogress advances hand in hand with the developmentof appropriate measurement procedures tooperationalize, and hence to define, nascent constructs.Without precise astronomical measurements of themovements of the planets, and definitions of force,mass, momentum and the like, there would be no New-tonian physics. In fact, Newton’s attempts to under-stand mathematical laws, in terms of the Cartesiantheory of his day, have been discarded (Lakatos, 1978).If EI can not be measured reliably and validly—andthis thorny issue appears to be its Achilles heel con-temporaneously—it can not be placed in a nexus oflawful relations (its nomological network) and thuswill be slow at achieving the status of a true scientificconstruct. In fact, given the problematic status of EImeasurement, it is currently difficult to advance credi-ble propositions about individual differences in EI.Consider, in particular, that the direction and magni-tude of several important group differences (e.g., menvs. women, ethnic vs. majority, gifted vs. nongifted)are measure dependent, with different profiles evi-denced as a function of differing measurement tech-niques (see e.g., Matthews, Zeidner et al., 2002;Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001; Zeidner,Shani-Zinovich, Matthews, & Roberts, 2004).

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1Furthermore, a clear and coherent definitional system is essential

in establishing the EI concept as a viable scientific construct. Accord-ing to the tenets of facet theory, it is precisely the definitional system(i.e., specification of the basic content and response facets of EI) thatspecifies the universe of discourse of the concept. The specificationof a rigorous mapping sentence for EI would help illuminate the con-cept’s key dimensions, its critical attributes, and help in differentiat-ing EI from related constructs in the same semantic domain. In fact, aconcept reaches the status of a construct if it meets three basic crite-ria: (a) the concept is accorded a formal definition, (b) an operationalprocedure can be specified for measuring the concept, and (c) it is em-bedded in a nomological network of related constructs (Kerlinger,1973). Thus, we believe that a major effort should be devoted to set-tling on a coherent definition of EI, and it may be premature to at-tempt to measure EI without first reaching some form of scientificconsensus on what we mean by EI, as well as the mapping of domainelements and the issue of dimensionality.

The second issue raised by Oatley (this issue) is theimportance of looking at expertise rather than focusingon measurement. Thus, if one wants to understand howto become more emotionally intelligent, one would ob-serve leaders or high emotionally intelligent individu-als, interview them about their propositional orprocedural knowledge, take think-aloud accounts ofhow they reason about emotionally loaded contexts,and use this to build models of what they know andhow they use their knowledge in forms that can helppeople improve their emotional skills. We endorse thisas a powerful technique, although we note that theremay be difficulties in deciding who is genuinely an ex-pert. For example, charismatic leaders of religiouscults may exert powerful control over their followers’emotions while also showing severe maladaptation tolife in general. More important, we see investigationsof expertise and measurement as complementaryrather than exclusive. We can have more confidence inexpertise that can be predicted from an independenttest than in expertise that is self-proclaimed or depend-ent on the subjective value judgments of others. Con-versely, we can have more confidence in measurementdevices if they successfully discriminate experts fromnovices. Indeed, such studies make a powerful contri-bution to the nomological network of ability con-structs. Our understanding of cognitive intelligence isinformed by studies showing which types of expertiseit predicts (various types of academic and occupationalexpertise), and which types it does not (the skills of the“idiot savant,” some forms of tacit knowledge).

Gohm (this issue) suggests that it is time tomove beyond debates about EI meets traditionalstandards for intelligence (see Mayer, Salovey,Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001; Roberts et al., 2001;Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2001). This is a cu-rious suggestion. As Brody (this issue) articulatelydiscusses, abilities have special defining proper-ties, and we cannot understand a construct withoutknowing whether it meets these criteria. In addi-tion—curious and curiouser—Gohm also suggeststhat it is up to critics to show that suggested scor-ing procedures are incorrect. We disagree. Thereare sufficient reasoned grounds for questioning thevalidity of both expert and consensus scoring thatthe onus must always be on the test developer todemonstrate that scoring is valid. Experts in psy-chology do not have an unblemished track record,and, historically, their prescriptions for curingmental illness, raising children, and managing theills of society have often been found to be fallible.Evidence that would justify the practical use of EImeasures as intelligence tests is essential as part ofthe construct validation of this fledgling conceptand can not simply be ignored for sake of expedi-ency, or because the evidence is slow or difficult tocome by.

We endorse Brody’s (this issue) observation thatitems on ability-based EI tests (such as the MSCEIT)are fundamentally different from those assessing cog-nitive ability (in which there is typically a clearly jus-tified correct answer for each item). According topsychometric theorizing, for an item to be considereda true ability item it must be capable of being mappedonto a veridical (rather than sentimental) criterion us-ing some mapping rule, be it logical, semantic, empir-ical, or normative (Guttman & Levy, 1991). Thisseems not to be the case for the vast majority of itemscomprising the MSCEIT, or its predecessor, theMultifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS). Al-though the use of a greater expert pool in developingthe MSCEIT is to be applauded, it does not circum-vent this important criticism. At present, there is nodefinitive, universally accepted body of knowledgeabout emotional competence that can be used forveridical scoring, in part because of the context- andculture-dependent nature of competence (Zeidner etal., 2001).

Indeed, each of the two principal scoring meth-ods, expert and consensus scoring, adopted byMayer, Caruso, & Salovey (1999; also see Mayer,Salovey, et al., 2001) has problems. The commenta-tors add to the critique we present in our target arti-cle. As noted by Averill (this issue) and Brody (thisissue), the problems in using experts to pick the rightanswers are that experts are fallible (academics may,according to the consensus of their students,spouses, or children, be highly deficient in this re-spect!), that academic psychologists may possessdeclarative but not procedural knowledge of emo-tion, and that some items may simply not have a cor-rect answer in that the best response may depend oncircumstances. There are also doubts about the cul-ture-fairness of expert judgments.2 The obviousproblem with the second, consensus-based scoringmethod is that the consensus may not in fact be cor-rect; beliefs about emotion may be affected, for ex-ample, by culturally defined stereotypes (Zeidner etal., 2001). Brody and Averill note that a logical diffi-culty with consensus scoring is that it leaves littlescope for the itemetric analyses that are a central ele-ment of intelligence test development, such asGuttman scaling and its derivatives. Consensus scor-ing sui generis excludes identification of extremelydifficult items on which, say, only the 10% most ableindividuals pick the correct answer, and the consen-sus answer is incorrect. Distinctions between emo-

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2Curiously enough, Moshe Zeidner, one of the authors on this pa-

per, was among the 20 or so experts who were consulted in developingthe expert scoring scheme for the MSCEIT. If one asked his wife, chil-dren, or students, how he would rate on EI in true-to-life situations, theanswer may well be, in the spirit of Renee’ s assessment in AllyMcBeal’s TV show: “Emotionally, he is anything but intelligent”!

tional genius and the normal functioning person arerendered difficult if not impossible. As a result,consensually scored ability measures of EI may bemore effective in screening for “emotional stupid-ity” than in discriminating levels of EI at the upperend of the range.3 We concur with the position ad-vanced by both Brody and Averill claiming that cur-rent ability-based measures (e.g., MSCEIT) oftenassess explicit, declarative beliefs about emotion,which can be expressed verbally, in contrast to muchemotional and social knowledge, which is implicitand procedural (Wells & Matthews, 1994). Either(or both) processes may contribute to EI, but theirroles are poorly differentiated in the theorizing ofMayer, Salovey, and colleagues.

Gohm (this issue) points out that our criticism wasunjustly targeted at the first performance-based mea-sure (i.e., MEIS), whereas current judgment should in-stead rest on the newer, revised instrument (i.e.,MSCEIT; purportedly the best available ability-basedtest of EI). However, a review of the psychometric dataavailable for the MSCEIT shows that it may be less de-sirable and valid than the older version on a number ofcounts.4 Given the reduced number of items on thesubtests assessing each of the four branches of theMSCEIT, subscale reliabilities generally do not farebetter than the MEIS (see MacCann, Matthews,Zeidner, & Roberts, in press-b). The factor structure ofthe MSCEIT is difficult to assess because there areonly two marker tests for each of the branches, andstructural invariance has yet to be determined with re-

spect to disparate gender, age, ethnic, or nationalgroups.

Our target article highlights failures of convergentvalidity, for example, the MSCEIT appears to shareless than 5% of its variance with questionnaire-basedassessments of EI (e.g., Brackett & Mayer, 2003).Gohm (this issue) responds that because humans arenotoriously poor at evaluating their own ability, thefact that self-report measures of EI do not predict abil-ity-based EI does not necessarily discredit the con-struct. In fact, this argument would be quite tenable ifself-report measures were in fact designed to assessself-perceptions of the EI construct. However, the truthof the matter is that self-report measures, such as theEQ-i, are commonly touted as valid measures of the EIconstruct—not self-perceptions of the construct, andthere is a petite difference between these two mean-ings. Gohm also argues that, because what is to be con-sidered an emotionally intelligent response to real-lifecontexts is often unclear, we need to accept less preci-sion in our measurement of EI than we would like, andthis does not preclude important clinical predictive va-lidity. However, lack of precision of measurement pro-duces not just poor test reliability, but also limits thecorrelation between predictor and criterion (Nunnally,1978): Gohm’s prescription condemns us to ahalf-baked science of artificially low, hard-to-replicatevalidity coefficients. Furthermore, high levels of reli-ability are particularly important for assessments of theindividual, such as those performed in education andclinical practice.

Research Issues

Research on EI and Coping WithStress

The transactional theory of emotion (Lazarus, 1991,1999) provides an account of emotion and its behav-ioral consequences in terms of the personal meaning ofevents and high-level appraisal and coping processes.This level of analysis is appropriate for understandingEI as an index of individual differences in adaptation(or adaptability) to emotional demands. In particular,the emotionally intelligent person should cope moreadaptively, particularly with his or her emotions thanthe low emotionally intelligent person, perhaps in partdue to superior abilities to appraise emotions of selfand others (cf. Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer,1999).Unfortunately, the existing research literaturedoes not support the notion of a continuum of adaptivecompetence in that there are no good criteria for ratingthe outcomes of events in terms of overall adaptivesuccess or failure (Matthews & Zeidner, 2000), andempirical studies have suggested particular copingstrategies are only weakly related to outcomes

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3In a somewhat related vein, Averill (this issue) underscores an-

other major weakness of consensus scoring (i.e., that it tends to de-value unusual and exceptional emotional responses that are highlyweighted in test of creativity and ability). Thus, consensus scoringleaves little room for emotional creativity, in which respondents withnovel, different from the norm, unusual, or rare responses should begiven higher scores, rather than the opposite. In our own research, wehave also noted that consensually scored tests result in very high lev-els of kurtosis and negative skew, such that statistical analysis assum-ing multivariate normality cannot be validly applied to scores basedon these measures (MacCann, Roberts, Matthews, & Zeidner, 2004).Further research may focus on improving the validity of expert judg-ments, which do not suffer from these statistical difficulties.

4That said, the correlation between MSCEIT consensus and expert

scores of r = 0.98 for a general EI composite that Mayer, Salovey, etal. (2001) mention is impressive, and a significant advance in estab-lishing validity. Nevertheless, such a result leaves open significantunresolved questions. Are the experts in this latest study still predom-inantly White, Western, well-educated men (as was the case for theexpert weights comprising the MEIS)? Given a relatively large poolof experts, perhaps their views primarily reflect cultural consensusrather than special expertise. Also, what is the level of inter rateragreement? Furthermore, little information is available concerningthe relation between the MSCEIT and older versions of the MEIS.These shortcomings of the recent versions of the MSCEIT are partic-ularly noticeable in the context of other standardized, psychologicaltests that are operational, in which such issues are contemporane-ously given detailed treatment in test manuals and other forms of sup-porting documentation.

(Zeidner & Saklofske, 1996). More generally, it is cen-tral to the transactional approach that emotions must beunderstood within the specific context in which theyoccur. Although the concept is superficially appealing,we cannot identify EI with emotional adaptability.

Both Oatley (this issue) and Gohm (this issue) joinus in our plea for additional research designed to un-cover the relations among various facets of EI and as-pects of coping (i.e., problem-focused vs.emotion-focused coping). At present, however, verylittle empirical research has been conducted on theseissues. We have recently obtained small but significantcorrelations, rs < .2, between low EI as defined by theMSCEIT and use of emotion-focused and avoidantcoping during performance of cognitive tasks(Matthews, Emo, Funke, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002).The correlation with emotion focus, but not the corre-lation with avoidance, was mediated by neurotic per-sonality. Salovey et al. (1999) summarized pastresearch regarding some potential intervening vari-ables (e.g., social support, disclosure, rumination), butpresented little hard data bearing directly on the rela-tion between coping and EI or mediating variables. In-deed, considerable work remains in mapping out thenexus of relations among various components of EIand various aspects of coping. Furthermore, researchwould most profitably be directed not toward globalcoping effectiveness, but toward a more fine-grainedunderstanding of adaptational processes that may becloser to the EI constructs than to standard personalityand ability measures. Such processes may well relateto styles of adaptation rather than to more or less suc-cessful adaptation (Matthews, Zeidner et al., 2002).

Oatley (this issue) argues that standard self-reportcoping measures are far from generating the mostuseful source of knowledge about coping under ad-versity. Instead, Oatley champions the use of literary,historical, or live figures and examples (e.g., the stoicphilosopher Epictetus; the prisoner of war, AdmiralJames Stockdale). These figures personify the suc-cessful rallying to life’s challenges and weathering oflife’s storms. Although we can certainly profit fromthe writings of those who have suffered in life, uniqueevents such as coping with torture or eviction fromtheir homes constitute an inextricable blend of acci-dental and essential features related to coping; it isdoubtful if these case studies or unique events couldserve as a basis for deducing lawful and generalizablerelations or could help in uncovering the mechanismsunderlying the EI-coping interface, which is the verystuff of science.

Furthermore, the messages that Oatley (this issue)takes from studies of individual life experiences mayalso be read from standard, nomothetic stress research.Joanna Field’s (1934/1952) experiences correspond tofindings that both minor hassles and persistent worrymay significantly disturb mental equilibrium (Kohn,

1996; Wells & Matthews, 1994). Flow may be no morethan the end-point of a continuum of task engagement,a state that may be operationally defined and measuredas a complex of energetic mood, attentional focus, andintrinsic task motivation (Matthews et al., 2002). Weagree with Oatley that such studies are enlightening inthemselves, but they may be still more informative ifthe experiences of individuals are placed within a di-mensional framework, such as the Matthews et al.(2002) three-factor model of subjective states. Mayer,Perkins, Caruso, and Salovey (2001) reported interest-ing case studies of how emotionally gifted childrentalk about their emotions. Importantly, their use of theMSCEIT to assess giftedness places the idiographiccase material within a nomothetic framework.

One or Two Processing Systems?

EI is commonly viewed as the integration of ratio-nal and emotional processing systems (Ben-Ze’ev,2000), a view placing rational and emotional modes ofreasoning in direct opposition to one another(Goleman, 1995; Izard, 2001). Thus, of fundamentalrelevance to EI theory and research is the question ofwhether there are indeed two discrete forms of infor-mation processing or reasoning (i.e., emotional andcognitive, relating to people and objects, respectively).Elsewhere (Matthews, Zeidner et al., 2002), we haveidentified weaknesses of the theoretical stance positingseparate emotional and cognitive systems. In brief, theidea of separate emotional and cognitive systems isbased on a misunderstanding of cognitive psychology,presuming that cognition is necessarily slow, delibera-tive, and logical. In fact, cognition may operatethrough rapid, associative, and parallel—but stillmeaning-based—processing, operating through re-trieval of schematic information from memory (seeClore & Ortony, 2000). Thus, we have found difficul-ties with the prevalent assumption in research on EIthat IQ and “EQ” map onto separate cognitive andemotional systems. Averill’s (this issue) point that wemay be observing two different modes of functioningof the same underlying system is especially well-taken.

We concur with Gohm’s (this issue) view that emo-tional and cognitive processes are interactive in a com-plex way and that the measurement of EI does notdepend on settling the issue of separate or unitary cog-nitive versus emotional systems. However, to say thatemotion and cognition interact is to state the obvious.We cannot progress further with theoretical under-standing of constructs labeled as EI without addressingsuch issues. Zeidner, Matthews, Roberts, andMacCann (2003) presented a developmental accountof individual differences in self-regulation that differ-entiates levels of emotional competence. First, compe-tence reflects temperamental qualities such as

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emotional stability and capacity for effortful control.Such competencies are contextualized in that their re-lation to outcome success varies across situations.Emotional stability facilitates productive interactionswith caregivers, but may also promote exposure to haz-ardous situations, for example. Second, children maydiffer in their acquisition of rules for appropriate feel-ing, emotion display, and coping. Third, older childrenacquire insightful understanding of the self as a socialbeing with a particular sociocultural context. Thesedifferent types of competence may indeed support dif-ferent constructs. Self-report EI may reflect tempera-ment, ability tests may assess specific acquired skills,and self-awareness may be treated best idiographicallyrather than nomothetically.

Applications

EI research has prospered, in part, because it isclaimed to predict important educational and occupa-tional criteria above and beyond those predicted bypersonality and general intellectual ability. Unfortu-nately, however, the ratio of hyperbole to hard evi-dence is rather high. Currently, interest in promotingemotional competence in real-world settings exceedsthe contribution to psychological science made by EI.In occupational psychology, inflated claims that thepredictive validity of EQ exceeds that of IQ have notbeen substantiated by data. Indeed, there is little evi-dence that current tests predict any objective index ofwork performance with ability and personality con-trolled (Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, in press). Fu-ture research may benefit from validation researchsuggested by commentators, such as diary time/experi-ence sampling (Oatley, this issue) and behavior sam-ples in true-to-life situations (Gohm, this issue).

Brody’s (this issue) caustic review of the evidence pre-sented for the predictive validity of the MSCEIT revealssome of the key weaknesses in this body of literature (seealso Matthews, Zeidner et al., 2002). These include widereliance on unpublished studies or studies appearing innonpeer-reviewed journals, lack of proper controls for per-sonality and ability in assessing the relation between pre-dictor and criterion, use of self-report assessment ofsuccess on the job or other nonobjective external criteria,and accounting for trivial amounts of variance in the crite-rion measure. Brody contends that much of the evidence ishighly selective, incomplete, and contradictory, with re-searchers simply presenting the statistic most suitable insupporting their case for the predictive validity of currentmeasures (e.g., subtests, total score). Brody concludesrather pessimistically “there is not a single study reportedthat indicates that EI has nontrivial incremental validity fora socially important outcome variable after controlling forintelligence and personality.”

Gohm (this issue) suggests that much of the poorevidence for EI and real-life success is based onself-report data, leaving hope for the predictive valid-ity of ability-based measures. A recent meta-analysis(Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2002) showing very mod-est predictive validity for EI measures was basedmostly on self-report measures, but the few studiesbased on the MSCEIT do not fare much better. AsBrody (this issue) discusses, the recent work ofBrackett and Mayer (2003) suggests only weak predic-tive validity for this instrument. Indeed, these authorsfound no evidence for greater predictive validity forthe MSCEIT compared with questionnaire measures.Future research on both types of instrument may iso-late aspects of behavior that are more strongly predict-able from EI. For the present,though, by contrast withthe impressive predictive validity of general intelli-gence to which Brody alludes, there is little evidencethat suggests an essential role of tests of EI inreal-world selection and assessment applications.

Conclusion

Our initial review identified seven myths sur-rounding EI, but further pitfalls and shortcomingswere identified in the commentaries and this re-sponse. The bandwagon may indeed be rolling to-ward a painful collision with reality. Nevertheless, itis important not to squash potentially informative re-search in its early stages and the mythology of EImay actually serve in the added capacity of asoupstone. For those not familiar with the term, asoupstone is an idea that is falsely believed to be anessential ingredient of valid psychological theory butnevertheless stimulates research in the area underconsideration (cf. Navon, 1984). As also suggestedby Averill (this issue), one of the major virtues of EIhas been to stir interest in the emotional domain andto put emotional competencies on the agenda of psy-chologists. Indeed, EI has already served to reorientthe study of human emotions in a more positive,functional direction by motivating policy makers inbusiness, management, politics, and education to takeemotional issues seriously. We do not actually needthe concept to understand individual differences inemotional function, but both Goleman’s (1995) bookand scientific studies (see e.g., Bar-On & Parker,2000) have increased interest in this important area ofpsychology, education, and management.

We endorse the view that there may be various newconstructs, beyond standard personality and intelli-gence, which could usefully be identified. However,such constructs may be heterogeneous in nature, andmuch of what is of interest may not in fact be properlydescribed as intelligence at all. We have recently iden-tified at least four different types of construct that ap-

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pear to be measured, to varying degrees, in current EIresearch: temperament (overlapping with personality),information-processing components, emotionalself-confidence, and acquired cultural-bound skillsand knowledge (see Table 2; also Matthews et al., inpress-b). It is precisely because of this heterogeneitythat we need clear conceptualization and definition.The confusion caused by the current free-for-all in testdevelopment will continue until researchers becomemore adept at communicating what exactly it is thatthey want to measure.

However, in the absence of definitive research find-ings, we cannot be sure that the myths delineated in ourtarget article are entirely false. At the least, most of themyths or sweeping claims made by proponents that wehave identified in our two articles are inadequately sup-ported by empirical evidence, and there are solid indica-tions from existing ability and personality research thatsome of the claims made are either false or highly over-stated. It is surprising that exaggerated and very possi-bly false statements can command such widespreadpublic acceptance. Here, we must point to the deficien-cies of the scientific studies conducted to date (whilerecognizing that these deficiencies are in large measuredue to the preliminary nature of the research). As de-scribed throughout, there are major conceptual,psychometric, and applied problems to be overcome be-fore EI may be considered a genuine, scientifically vali-dated construct. It is our hope that commentaries of thecurrent type provide a catalyst for scientific progress, ifnot necessarily in the area of EI, certainly as part of asoupstone it has sought to flavor. As EI grows up fromits flashy adolescence, it may need to trade in the band-wagon for some more modest but better engineeredform of transportation.

Notes

The ideas expressed in this manuscript are those ofthe authors and not necessarily of the EducationalTesting Service.

Moshe Zeidner, Center for the Interdisciplinary Re-search on Emotions, University of Haifa, Mt. Carmel,31905, Israel. E-mail: zeidner@research.haifa.ac.il

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Table 2. Multiple Types of Construct That May Contribute to Emotional Competence

Construct Possible Current Measure Key Processes Adaptive Significance Developmental Influences

Temperament Scales for Big Five EQ-i(Bar-On, 1997)

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Learning and socialization:For example, masteryexperiences, modeling,direct reinforcement (inemotive contexts)

Emotional knowledgeand skills

MSCEIT Multiple acquiredprocedural anddeclarative skills

Adaptive within context forlearning: may beirrelevant orcounterproductive inother contexts

Learning, socialization, andtraining of specific skillsand knowledge

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