FACULTY OF MARINE SCIENCE AND MARITIME

TECHNOLOGY

DEPARTMENT OF MARITIME TECHNOLOGY

By O.O. Sulaiman PhD, CEng, CMarEng

Ocean of Discovery

O

Risk and Hazard Operability Process Of Deep Water Marine System Sulaiman1, W.B. Wan Nik2, A. H. Saharuddin3, A.S.A.kader4, M.F. Ahmad5

Ocean of Discovery

12/9/2010 28

i. INTRODUCTION

ii. RELATED WORK

iii. RISK PROCESS/ HAZOP PROCESS

iv. CONCLUSION

the word of water, maritime accident and consequential casualties.

increasing deep sea operation

challenge of design for safety , environment, reliability and

sustainability

uncertainty associated with deep sea operation, system complexity ,

environmental impose and human errors warrant

need for the use of scientific , reliability and risk base model for

sustainable, efficient and reliable system design

Uncertainty associated with HAZID -> use of HAZOP as one of the

best method for HAZID

11/23/2012 4

Introduction

GHG Amount Industrial contribution

CO2 67.5%, Combustion energy sector accounted for

86.7% of total CO2 emissions, landfills

(46.8%) and fugitive emissions from oil

and gas (26.6%)

CH4 32.4% landfills (46.8%) and fugitive emissions

from oil and gas (26.6%) accounted for

73.4% of total CH4 emissions

N2O 0.1% Traditional biomass fuels accounted for

86.4% of total N2O emissions

11/23/2012 5

Related Problem

i. Alpha piper

ii. BP oil spill

iii. Exon Valdez

KEY STUDIES

International Maritime Organisation (IMO)., (2006): Amendments to the

Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the IMO Rule

Making Process. 2006., MSC/ – MEPC.2 / Circ 5 (MSC/Circ.1023 –

MEPC/Circ.392).

Parry, G. (1996), The Characterization of Uncertainty in

Probabilistic Risk Assessments of Complex Systems. Reliability

Engineering and System Safety. 54:2-3., 119-126.

N. ,, Soares, C., A. P. Teixeira. (2001).Risk Assessment in Maritime

Transportation. Reliability Engineering and System Safety. 74:3.,.,

299-309.

UK, HSE, 1999, Offshore Technology Report” Effective Collision

Risk Management for Offshore Instalation, UK, London

US

Coast

Guard’s

(USCG)

“The US Coast Guard’s (USCG) risk-based decision-making guidelines

categorize human error into four categories, which form a matrix: intentional

errors, unintentional errors, errors of omission, and errors of commission”

“An error of omission occurs when an operator fails to perform a step or task.

An error of commission occurs when an operator performs a step or task

incorrectly .”

Nivolian

itou et. al (2004)

“ Technical factors are more readily resolved than human factors through

technological and regulatory “fixes” leaving human-related errors and

breakdowns as the probable cause of industrial accidents.”

Hee et. al (1999)

“ Hee et. al concluded that human inputs to technological and engineering

processes may actually contribute to accident risks from the begin stages of

equipment design.”

11/23/2012 7

2.LIERATURE REVIEW Major References Best Practice Human Error Data and Process

Human Factors vs. Human Errors (based on Gordon, 1998)

Institution Studies

The Norwegian

Petroleum

Directorate

Guidelines on how to apply risk analysis to meet its

regulations

UK Health &

Safety Executive

Guidance on risk assessment in the context of

Offshore Safety Cases

Canada-

Newfoundland

Offshore Petroleum

Board

Guidance on installation Safety Analysis to help

operators meet its regulations

American

Petroleum Institute

Recommended practice for design and hazard

analysis offshore production platforms.

The UK Offshore

operators

Associations

Procedure for the conduct of formal safety

assessment of offshore installations, with very brief

coverage of hazard assessment.

Pitblado & Turney

(1995)

Introduction to QRA for the process industries,

Aven (1992) Discussion of offshore QRA, focusing in particular

on reliability analysis.

Crook (1997) Qualitative review of recent technical and

regulatory developments in the field of safety

against fire, inherently safer design, and human

factor.

Brian Veitch Rescue and evacuation from offshore platform

Best Practice Model Application Drawback

Brown et al

(1996)

Environmental performance of tankers Damage analysis

deal only with oil spill

Sirkar et al

(1997)

Consequences of collisions and

groundings

Difficulties on

quantifying

consequence metrics

Brown and

Amrozowicz

(2000)

Hybrid use of risk assessment,

probabilistic simulation and a spill

consequence assessment model

Oil spill assessment

limited to use of fault

tree

Sirkar et al

(1997)

Monte Carlo technique to estimate

damage and+ spill cost analysis for

environmental damage

Lack of cost data

IMO (IMO 13F

(1995)

Pollution prevention index from

probability distributions damage and

oil spill.

Lack (Sirkar et al

(1997) rational

Research

Council

Committee(199

9)

Alternative rational approach to

measuring impact of oil spills

Lack employment of

stochastic

probabilistic methods

Prince William

Sound, Alaska,

(PWS (1996)

The most complete risk assessment Lack of logical risk

assessment

framework (NRC

(1998))

Volpe National

Transportation

Center (1997)).

Accident probabilities using statistics

and expert opinion.

Lack employment of

stochastic methods

Puget Sound

Area, USCG

(1999))

Simulation or on expert opinion for

cost benefit analysis

Clean up cost and

environmental

damage omission

11/23/2012 8

3.0 Qualitative Analysis Process

• Qualitative:

• constructivist, naturalistic,

interpretive, postpositivist or

postmodern perspective.(Creswell,

2003)

• Used to describe the overall

framework/procedure

• used to look at reality,

• based on a philosophical stance

- models identify basic concepts and

describe what reality is like, and the

conditions by which we can study it.

- ideas identified in models are refer

to concepts.

Interviews:- Industry, ship Owner, classification

Society (Lloyd’s Register of Shipping), -

Manufacturer

Phone calls

Data analysis- HAZOP, expert rating

Deductive recommendation

Case study

Baseline data

Determine and collect the ship paint

application parameters and standards.

Methods:

DATA ANALYSIS

POP&C – POLLUTION PREVENTION & CONTROL

Safe Transportation of Hazardous Goods by Tankers

P6

Pollution Prevention

Environmental Impact Assessment

P7

Pollution Mitigation and Control

Environmental Impact Assessment

P5P3

P4

P2

FIRE/ EXPLOSION

pf1

COLLISION/

GROUNDINGpf2

STRUCTURAL

FAILURE pf3

LOSS OF DAMAGE

STABILITY/ SINKAGE

Pfd

LOSS OF

STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

Pfs

OIL OUTFLOW- Co

LOSS OF VESSEL-Cp

DEATH/INJURY - Cl

Calibration of Probabilis tic Index-A us ing pertinent scenarios

to match historical risk

Formalised Risk Assessment or Risk -Based Design of Tankers

Risk = Σw.Pfi x Σw.Ci.Rf

PASSIVE SAFETY ACTIVE SAFETY

RISK REDUCTION

MEASURES/ INCIDENT

MANAGEMENT Rf

LO

SS

OF

WA

TE

RT

IGH

T I

NT

EG

RIT

Y

HA

ZID

(Wat

erw

ays

and

vess

el

Dat

abas

e)

Calibration of Pf through pertinent

scenarios , us ing

s tructural reliability, to match his torical risk

STAY AFLOAT

Pfi

11/23/2012 10

Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques Qualitative

Methods

Application

Checklist Ensure that organizations are complying with standard practice

Safety/Review

Audit

Identify equipment conditions or operating procedures that could

lead to a casualty or result in property damage or environmental

impacts.

What-If Identify hazards, hazardous situations, or specific accident events

that could lead to undesirable consequences.

Hazard and

Operability

Study

(HAZOP)

Identify system deviations and their causes that can lead to

undesirable consequences and determine recommended actions to

reduce the frequency and/or consequences of the deviations.

Preliminary

Hazard

Analysis

(PrHA)

Identify and prioritize hazards leading to undesirable

consequences early in the life of a system.

Determine recommended actions to reduce the frequency and/or

consequences of prioritized hazards.

Quantitative tools Application

Frequency and Consequence

Analysis

Involve analysis of causal

factor and impact of accident

Failure Modes and Effects

Analysis (FMEA)

Use to analyse the components

(equipment) failure modes and

the impacts on the surrounding

components and the system

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Use to analyse combinations

of equipment failures and

human errors that can result in

an accident

Event Tree Analysis (ETA) Use to analyse various

consequences of events, both

failures and successes that can

lead to an accident.

Technique for Human

Performance Reliability

Prediction (THERP)

Use to analyse human error

Components of

risk based method

11/23/2012 11

Components of Risk based Methods

Components of RBM

Process Suitable techniques

HAZID HAZOP, What if analysis,

FMEA, FMECA

Risk analysis FTA, ETA

Risk

evaluation

Influence diagram,

decision analysis

Risk control

option

Regulatory, economic,

environmental and

function elements

matching and iteration

Cost benefit

analysis

ICAF, Net Benefit

Human

reliability

Simulation/ Probabilistic

Uncertainty Simulation/probabilistic

Risk

Monitoring

Simulation/ probabilistic

Cause of Accident

HAZOP PROCESS • A HAZOP analysis is detail HAZID, it mostly divided into section or

nodes involve systemic thinking and assessment a systematic

manner the hazards associated to the operation. Hazard operability

(HAZOP) is done to ensure that the systems are designed for safe

operation with respect to personnel, environment and asset.

• In HAZOP all potential hazard and error, including operational

issues related to the design is identified. The quality of the HAZOP

depends on the participants. Good quality of HAZOP participants

are (HSE, 1999):

Politeness and unterupting

To the point discussion- avoid endless discussion

Be active and positive

Be responsible

Allow HAZOP leader to lead

• It involve How to apply the API 14C for those process

hazard with potential of the Major Accident.

• Dynamic simulation for consequence assessment of the

process deviation, failure on demand and spurious

function of the safety system, alarm function and

operator intervention is very important for HAZOP study.

• Identification of HAZOP is followed with application of

combined Event tree and Fault tree analysis for

determination of safety critical elements, training

requirement for the operators and integrity and review of

maintenance manuals.

HAZOP PROCESS

• HAZOP process is as followed:

• Guide word/ brainstorming -> Deviation -> Consequence -> Safeguard -

>Recommended action

Propulsion failure HAZOP could follow the following:

• Guide word :i.e. No pitch, No blade

• Description: I.e. No rotational energy transformed, object in water break the

blade

• Causes: i.e. operation control mechanism

• Safety measurement to address implementation of propeller protection such

grating, jet

• Also important HAZOP, is implementation of IEC61511 to assess the

hazards associated to failure on demand and spurious trips,

• In HAZOP record the worksheets efficiently to cover all phases also play

important role.

HAZOP PROCESS

• Advance HAZOP can also e implemented through Simulation operations to

identify, quantify, and evaluate the risks. SIMOP Methodology includes:

• Consequence Assessment

• Frequency Analysis

• Risk Calculation

• Risk Analysis

• Safety Criticality Elements

• HAZOP is not intended to solve everything in a meeting. Identified hazard is solved

in the closing process of the finding from the study. Table 2 shows typical HAZOP

report.

• Safety barrier management involve optimisation between the preventive and

mitigation measures fundamental.

• To determination of the safety critical elements (SCE), performance standards for

the design of safety Critical Elements and in integrity assurance.

HAZOP PROCESS

• Safety level integrity (SIL) involves assessment and

verification according to IEC61508 and

IEC61511Qualitative SIL assessment uses the risk

graphs and calibration tables during the brainstorming

sessions where the required SIL is assigned to the

safety systems.

• dynamic simulation could be optimised with greater

accuracy. This saves a significant effort, time and cost

for the project. It involve application of

HAZOP & SIL assessment

Alarm Management

Fire & Explosion Stud

Case study

HAZOP PROCESS

Components SERM Collision Risk Model

11/23/2012 18

Fire Accident Scenario Analysis

Compression

area

Fire Hot work 3

Manifold area Toxicity Radio active

products

4

HP gas area PPE 2

Separation

area

Management

of work

permit (A)

If PTW is not

followed correctly

, the accident may

happen

3

Compressor

area

Fire &

Explosion

3

Process area Handling Halting of

proximity of

process under

pressure

4

Untility area Fire fighting

system

No availability of

Fire Fighting

system

2

Separation Fire &

Explosion

Escape routes are

obstructed

3

PPE Contractor not

using PPE

2

PPE 3

Tank area Fire No Fire & Gas

detection

2

Compression

area

Explosion Escape routes are

obstructed

3

Compression

area

Fire Hot work 3

Manfold area Toxicity Radio active

products

4

Fire ExplosionModel

Fire ExplosionFire ExplosionModelModel

LPG Hazard Model LPG Hazard Model LPG Hazard Model

Suvivability ModelSuvivabilitySuvivability ModelModel

Evacuation modelEvacuation modelEvacuation model

AccommodationAccommodationAccommodation

Compressor

room

CompressorCompressor

roomroom

Cargo leakage ModelCargo leakage ModelCargo leakage Model

Fire Protection Model Fire Protection Model Fire Protection Model

Engine room

Engine Engine room room

Loading Condition

Model

Loading ConditionLoading Condition

ModelModel

CONSEQUENCECONSEQUENCE

consequenceconsequenceconsequence

Collision Model on Langat River

11/23/2012 20

Data and Model

11/23/2012 21

Assessment of rainfall-Runoff model

Assess the impacts of wind loading

Assessment of wave loading

Assessment of system design

Assessment of disposal

Assessment of dynamic positioning

Assessment of energy system

Assessment of passing vessel

Assessment of human reliability analysis

Assessment of location

Assessment of historical data

(v). ACCIDENT DATA

Total risk

concept Risk based

method

Technolohgy element

Environmetal elements

Human element

Risk based regulation

risk based operation

risk based design

Risk (R) = Probability (P) X Consequence (C) 11/23/2012 22

Primary data Secondary data from UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB)

Categorized different types of marine casualties and incidents

System Risk Analysis: Components of System Vs

Standard Compliance Analysis High level goal assessment / Safety and environmental

protection objective

-Standards requirement

- Functional requirement

Regulatory instruments/ Classification rules, industrial

standards

Class guides, technical procedure

Secondary standards for company or individual system

- Code of practice, safety and quality systems

shipbuilding, operation maintenance and manning

Tier

1&2

Tier 3

Tier 5

Goal A

naly

sis

Goal b

ased

verificatio

n o

f

com

plian

ce

criteria

Desig

n p

rocess

Appro

val

pro

cess

Tier 4

11/23/2012 23

Components of Integrated Risk Analysis

11/23/2012 24

Formal

safety

analysis Lesson

learnt/

experience

Regulatory

standards

Hazard

assessment

Define objective

StandardA apply

Design concept

Design detail

Manufacture

Testing

Installation

Trial

Operation in service

Maintenance

Repair

Modifications

Ddecommissioning

STEP 1: Identify a

Failure Mode

STEP 2: Determine Severity

STEP 3: Determine Occurrence

STEP 4: Determine

Detectability

Risk Priority Number (RPN)

System Level Analysis -Failure Modes and

Effects Analysis (FMEA)

FMEA

Action & Check

Simplified Processes of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

RPN = Severity Rating x Occurrence Rating x Detection Rating

11/23/2012 25

Five steps of FTA:

Define the undesired event to

study

i. Obtain an understanding of

the system

ii. Construct the fault tree

iii. Evaluate the fault tree

iv. Control the hazards identified

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

AND

Gate

Output event

Input events

OR

Gate

Output event

Input events

Basic

Event

Undeveloped

Event

Figure 1: Logic Gates & Typical Primary Events

11/23/2012 26

ETA process:

i. Define the system.

ii. Identify the accident scenarios.

iii. Identify the initiating event (IE).

iv. Identify pivotal events.

v. Build the event tree diagram.

vi. Obtain the failure event probabilities.

vii.Identify the outcome risk.

Event Tree Analysis (ETA)

11/23/2012 27

Accident Consequence Modeling

Accident

Categories

Causes

C1

C3

C2

C12

C

Failures, Human and Organizational Errors, Environmental Stressors

Safeguards, Barriers, Operational Controls, Risk Control Options

Consequences

Fate and

Transport

C11

28

As Low as Reasonable Possible Principle (ALARP), Risk

Acceptability Criteria, cost Effectiveness Assessment (CEA)

Scenario Probability Consequence Cumulative Probability

S1 P1 C1 P1=P1+P2

S2 P2 C2 P2=P3+P2

Si Pi Ci Pi=Pi+3+Pi

Sn+1 Pn+1 Cn+1 Pn-1=Pn+Pn+1

Sn Pn Cn Pn=Pn

11/23/2012 29

(iii). Channel Complexity Analysis

Human Reliability Analysis

DP

Visibility

Mooring

11/23/2012 30

Criticality/ MTTB/

Stochastic Poison, Binomial

• Risk control measures are used to group risk into a limited number of

well practical regulatory and capability options. Risk Control Option

(RCO) aimed to achieve (David, 1996):

– Preventive: reduce probability of occurrence

– Mitigation: reduce severity of consequence

• In estimating RCO, the following are taken into consideration:

• DALY (Disability Adjusted Life Years) or QALY (Quality Adjusted

Life Years)

• LQI (Life Quality Index)

• GCAF (Gross Cost of Averting a Fatality)

• NCAF (Net Cost of Averting a Fatality)

• ICAF (Implied Cost of Averting Fatality

Cost Benefit Analysis, RCO

11/23/2012 31

Sustainability Analysis

Minimum sum of cost

Minimum sum of cost

costt

Cost of polution control

High damage cost with

no control

No economic gain from

polusion control

Cost of damage from

polution

Diferent between cost of polution

control and environmetal damage

11/23/2012 32

Validation

Frequency model

Consequence Model

ALARP

11/23/2012 33

Validation of HAZOP

Expert Rating workshop:

Industry

Manufacture

Classification Society

Operator

accademecian

Conclusion • Following need for maritime activities to operate in much harsh

condition, institutions are adopting system based approach that

account for total risk associated with system lifecycle to protect the

environment and prevent accident.

• Employment of risk method to address each contributing factor to

accident is very important. Qualitative risk in system description and

hazard identification can best be tackled through HAZOP.

• The outcome of HAZOP can be processed in quantitative analysis

which may include probabilistic and stochastic dynamic simulation

process for system level analysis, while fault tree and event tree

quantitative analysis can be utilized to determine risk index

• Translation of dynamic risk analysis can be translated into ALARP

influence diagram can provide decision support risk cost control option

towards sustainable, reliable, efficient propulsion technology choice y

for system design and operability.

Thank You

Ocean of Discovery