PAKISTAN AND NUCLEAR

TERRORISM: HOW

REAL IS THE THREAT?

INTRODUCTION• Nuclear weapons program

of Pakistan

• Initially viewed as a threat to regional and international security.

• Because of grey marketing.

INTRODUCTION• Itself was threatened later on• Unstable domestic conditions• Fears have grown that nuclear

weapons ,technology and materials may fall into the hands of non state actors.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS VULNERABILITY! WHY?• Pakistan overrun by radical

Islamist insurgency resulting in a failed state with loose nukes.

• Example: kamra nuclear airbase attack 10dec2007

CHALLENGES FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY…. • Regional environment

• Ongoing internal instability

• Past record for support of terrorism

• Active nuclear proliferation

“FOUR FACES” OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM• Acquisition of intact nuclear weapon• Theft of HEU or PLUTONIUM• Attack or sabotage of nuclear facilities• Unauthorized acquisition of nuclear

material for making “dirty bomb”

ACQUISITION OF INTACT NUCLEAR WEAPON• Most difficult challenge for any terrorist organization.

• How it could be done?

• INSIDER COLLUSION: By the help of individuals working inside a nuclear production organization.

HOW TO AVOID INSIDER COLLUSION:

• To cope with this threat, most advanced nuclear weapons states such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China have instituted Personnel Reliability Programs (PRP), which establishes a centralized set of procedures designed to ensure that individuals developing, managing, and guarding nuclear weapons and related facilities are trustworthy.

• DIRECT TRANSFER: The direct transfer scenario is difficult to imagine as it is almost impossible to conceive of any national government voluntarily gifting their “crown jewels” to a terrorist group due to the likely reprisals they would incur if the weapon were used and the probability that the weapon would be traced back to the state of origin

THEFT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL• Refer to instances when small quantities of nuclear

material have been stolen.

• Collapse of a state with a nuclear arsenal would raise the potential for nuclear weapons and material to be diverted or stolen.

• Example : In Moldova smuggling gang attempted to smuggle a small quantity of non weapon usable uranium.(JUNE 2011)

SAFETY MEASURES AGAINST THEFT• (ESD) ENVIRONMENTAL SENSING DEVICES: block

arming system until prescribed environment is achieved .

• (IHE)INSENSITIVE HIGH EXPLOSIVES: it makes weapon resistant to detonate or explode by mechanical shock.

• (PAL’S)PERMISIVE ACTION LINKS: electronic device prevent arming of weapons unless correct codes are inserted .

WEAPONS MADE FROM THEFT NUCLEAR MATERIAL IND’S

GUN TYPE WEAPON IMPLOSION TYPE WEAPON

SIMPLE AND ROBUST SMALL AMOUNT OF PLUTONIUM.

URANIUM IS USED IN LARGE AMOUNT

• PLUTONIUM IS DIFFICULT TO BE OBTAINED BY TERRORISTS BECAUSE OF TECHNICAL ADVANCEMENT AND HEU IS LIKELY TO BE ACQUIRED BECAUSE OF HIGH AMOUNT OF URANIUM STOCKPILED AROUND THE WORLD.

ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO MAKE RDD OR DIRTY BOMB :

• DIRTY BOMB OR RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSIVE DEVICE:

• Speculative bomb that combine radiological material with conventional weapons to contaminate the area of explosion.

• Psychological effect due to widespread fear of radiation in public imagination.

• In dirty bomb cesium -137 and cobalt -60 is used for industrial purposes found in hospitals ,universities, and research areas.

• These are perceived as “soft targets” due to easy access for terrorists .

ATTACK ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

• Commercial power reactors are arguably more attractive to terrorist groups at dispersing radioactive material than research reactors because they are more numerous ,larger In size and contain more radioactive spent fuel

• Terrorists targeting a reactor or spent fuel pond could not ignite explosive chain reaction but can damage nuclear facility.

• Theft and acquisition is the least likely possibility for terrorists.

MOST POSSIBLE WAYS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM:

• Disruption of nuclear arsenal and fabrication of RDD because of level of security around commercial and research reactors.

PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

• Defines use of nuclear arsenal for what• Purpose • Circumstances

C2 SYSTEM COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

• ENSURES USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCORDING TO NUCLEAR DOCTRINE.

• PAKIISTANS NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND C2 SYSTEM HAVE BEEN OF CONCERN DUE TO POTENTIAL IMPACT ON STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA.

• ISLAMABAD HAS NEVER DECLARED A FORMAL NUCLEAR DOCTRINE.

PAKISTANS NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

• MAJOR FEATURES • DELEGATIVE C2 STRUCTURE• POLICY OF NUCLEAR FIRST USE

DELEGATIVE SYSTEM

• SUBORDINATE MILITARY COMMANDERS ARE AUTHORIZED TO LAUNCH NUCLEAR WAPONS.

• HIGH LEVEL OF AUTONOMY TO COMMANDERS.

• LIMITED ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS.

• ARSENALS DEPLOYED HIGH STATE OF READINESS.

PURPOSE OF DELEGATIVE AND ASSERTIVE SYSTEM

• TO ENSURE THAT NUCLEAR DETTERENCE WORKS

NUCLEAR FIRT USE IF INDIA CROSS FOUR MAJOR THRESHOLD MILITARY THRESHOLD SPACE THRESHOLD DOMESTIC THRESHOLD ECONOMIC THRESHOLD

SAFETY AND SECURITY OF NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES:

• LIKE RUSSIA AND USA PAKISTAN SHOULD ALSO HAVE PALS ,ESD’S AND ISE’S.

• CONFLICTING REPORTS EITHER PAKISTAN HAS THESE FACILITIES OR NOT.

• SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES

• 2 COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS

• KARACHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (KANNUP)

• CHASHMA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (CHASSHNUP)

• BOTH GENERATE 3.3PERCENT OF ELECTRICITY

• OPERATE UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARD

• PAKISTANS INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AT RAWALPINDI.(PINSTECH)

• ALSO OPERATE UNDER IAEA

• GRETAER CHANCES OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM BECAUSE OF DISPERSED AND UNASSEMBLED NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACROSS THE COUNTRY

• PRP(PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRRAME) INDIVIDUALS EMPLOYED TO GUARD AGAINST LEAK OF INFORMATION ABOUT TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE REGARDING NUCLEAR ARSENALS.