Listening to young people in leisure research: the critical application of grounded theory

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Listening to young people in leisure research: the critical application ofgrounded theoryDavid Piggotta

a Department of Sport, Coaching and Exercise Science, University of Lincoln, Lincoln, UK

Online publication date: 19 November 2010

To cite this Article Piggott, David(2010) 'Listening to young people in leisure research: the critical application of groundedtheory', Leisure Studies, 29: 4, 415 — 433To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/02614367.2010.525659URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02614367.2010.525659

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Leisure StudiesVol. 29, No. 4, October 2010, 415–433

ISSN 0261-4367 print/ISSN 1466-4496 online© 2010 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/02614367.2010.525659http://www.informaworld.com

Listening to young people in leisure research: the critical application of grounded theory

David Piggott*

Department of Sport, Coaching and Exercise Science, University of Lincoln, Witham House, Brayford Campus, Lincoln LN6 7TS, UKTaylor and FrancisRLST_A_525659.sgm(Received 11 January 2010; final version received 16 September 2010)10.1080/Leisure Studies0261-4367 (print)/1466-4496 (online)Original Article2010Taylor & Francis0000000002010

This paper discusses three related methodological problems from the point ofview of a researcher interested in studying young people’s leisure experiences.The first part of the paper makes a moral argument for why we should attempt tolisten to young people. The second part of the paper uses an example fromresearch with young footballers to explain how a modified grounded theory (GT)methodology can be useful in achieving this aim. Modified methods for engagingyoung people in discussion – e.g. mind maps and vignettes – are introduced herein the context of a developing GT study. The third and final part of the paperengages critically with some of the epistemological problems inherent in GT,notably the problem of induction. Two radical reactions to the problems of GT –essentialism and anarchism – are critically reviewed before a third way isintroduced. This third position is critical rationalism and it is argued that thisposition may help researchers engage in GT research in a fundamentally criticaland progressive fashion.

Keywords: young people’s voices; grounded theory; sport and leisure;essentialism; anarchism; critical rationalism

Introduction

This paper is structured around the discussion of three interrelated methodologicalproblems. These problems will be confronted in chronological order, that is, from thepoint of view of a researcher who begins with an interest in, and commitment to,listening to young people’s voices in leisure research.

The first problem is that of why we should attempt to listen to young people’svoices at all. This is a moral question and some compelling arguments exist to help usanswer in the affirmative. In the first part of the paper, the moral (sometimes legal)argument for listening to young people in leisure research will be elucidated. Thisargument is supported by some additional insights from the literature on the sociologyof childhood and the small but growing literature in youth sport and leisure.

Following logically from this solution, the second problem is that of how to listento young people’s voices successfully. This is a methodological and practical problemwhich can be solved with the adoption of a modified version of the methodology ofgrounded theory (GT). In the second part of the paper an extended example from arecent doctoral study will help to present both the main principles of GT and some

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modified techniques for collecting data with young people at different stages of a GTstudy.

The final problem is that which of the many possible versions of GT (or which GTtechniques and processes) a researcher should adopt when embarking on a study. Thisis largely an epistemological problem which is rooted in the enduring and fundamentalproblem of GT: the problem of induction. In the final part of the paper, two recentresponses to this problem – Weed (2009) and Thomas and James (2006) – will be crit-ically reviewed before a third, ‘critical rationalist’ approach is introduced and expli-cated. By way of conclusion the paper will explain how adopting a critical rationalistapproach to GT necessitates some very practical changes to the standard GT canon. Inparticular, the core GT principles of ‘theoretical sensitivity’, ‘induction’, ‘theoreticalsampling’ and ‘theoretical saturation’ are criticised and modified.

Part 1: the moral argument for listening to young people

Legal and political developments

Since ratifying the UN convention on the rights of the child in 1989, the UK govern-ment has been working to bring about legal and institutional reforms designed torecognise young people1 as legal subjects in their own right (Morrow & Richards,1996). More specifically, the UN convention stipulated that young people should havethe rights to participation; that they be consulted on matters affecting them, haveaccess to information, freedom of speech and opinion; and that they have the right tochallenge decisions made on their behalf (Article 12). However, in 1995, followingthe introduction of various statutes sympathetic to the UN convention (e.g. TheChildren Act 1989; The Child Support Act 1991), a UN examining committeeconcluded that article 12 of the convention ‘was not being addressed adequately, inlegislation or in practice’ (Lloyd-Smith & Tarr, 2000, p. 60). This indictment stimu-lated a series of consultations and, eventually, green papers aimed at ‘involving youngpeople and listening to their views’ (DfES, 2003, p. 14).

The most far-reaching and enduring of these green papers, Every Child Matters(DfES, 2003), has provided the impetus for a programme of public service reformbased around ongoing consultation with young people. The outcome of these consul-tations was eventually enshrined in the new Children Act (House of Lords, 2004)where it is made clear that service providers now have a legal obligation to listen toyoung people’s voices. For example, early in the statute, it is suggested that ‘personsexercising functions or engaged in activities affecting children [should] take accountof their views and interests’ (Part 1, Section 2a).

Along with subsequent policy papers such as Youth Matters (DfES, 2005) andthe creation of the UK Youth Parliament (with 600 elected youth members), theChildren Act (2004) represents an explicit legal and political aspiration to recognisethe rights of all young people and a commitment to listen to their views and ideas.However, despite this largely unequivocal political rhetoric, the extent to which the‘ideal translates into reality’ (Fajerman, Tresedor, & Connor, 2004, p. 3) hasrecently been questioned.

In the UK context, Green (2007, p. 63) has argued that New Labour’s sport andleisure policies – part of their advanced liberal ‘social investment state’ – conceptua-lise children as ‘citizen workers of the future’ rather than ‘citizen children ofthe present’. In this sense, contrary to the rhetoric of Every Child Matters, sport


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policy-makers have yet to attend to the current interests and well-being of children,focussing instead on producing healthy, high-performing (medal winning?) futurecitizens. Similarly, in the US context, Giardina and Donnelly’s (2008) edited collec-tion of critical and often apocalyptic essays on contemporary youth sports cultureattests to the ‘disempowerment of youth under neo-liberal capitalism’ (p. 3). Thecommercial and political exploitation of youth sports events such as the Little LeagueWorld Series, according to White, Silk, and Andrews (2008, p. 30), contributes to the‘insidious governance of kids’ under the ‘new right’ Bush administration, producingregulated, obedient and responsible ‘docile bodies’.

In light of such claims, it is all the more important that researchers ‘seek criticalmethodologies that protest, resist and help represent and imagine radically freeutopian spaces that will allow our “kids” to flourish as free moral agents’ (Giardina &Donnelly, 2008, p. 9). Such methodologies are, indeed, beginning to emerge in linewith new ways of theorising about children and young people.

Theoretical and methodological developments

The ‘new social studies of childhood’ (Barker & Weller, 2003, p. 207) are character-ised by two basic changes to traditional approaches to studying young people andsocialisation: first, theoretical (or ontological); second, methodological.

Traditional approaches to socialisation focussed on the movement of the child intoadulthood, the acquisition of social norms (Denzin, 1977) and the process of ‘slowlycoming into contact with human beings’ (Ritchie & Kollar, 1964, p. 117). Classicalstudies of socialisation therefore viewed young people as incomplete, lacking in socialskills and ‘over determined’ by adult ‘agents of socialisation’ (Stanley & Wise, 1993,p. 101). Indeed, James, Jenks, and Prout (1998, p. 23) characterise this approach as‘transitional theorising’ where the concern is with how society shapes the individual,not with how children interpret and understand the world around them. Such anapproach, according to James et al., ‘cannot attend to the everyday world of children,or their skills in interaction and world-view, except in terms of generalising a diagno-sis for remedial action’ (p. 25).

Echoing feminist critiques of male-oriented social theory, new approaches tostudying children and childhood reject the ‘adult chauvinism and fantasy’ inherent inthe structure-oriented approach (Stanley & Wise, 1993, p. 104), focussing instead onyoung people’s agency, experiences, life-worlds and culture. Theorists such as Jenks(1996, p. 2) have argued that there is no such thing as ‘the real child’ or ‘an authenticexperience of childhood’, proposing instead a variety of ways of conceptualisingyoung people. Drawing on a selection of post-modern ideas such as ‘multiple reali-ties’, ‘regimes of truth’ and ‘cultural relativism’, James et al. (1998, pp. 27–32) haveargued that there is no universal child with which to engage, that youth subculturesmust be studied on their own terms, and that researchers need to challenge the unevenpower relations between young people and adults. In this sense, those theorising chil-dren have mobilised feminist arguments concerning the importance of social locationand identity for epistemology (cf. Stanley & Wise, 1993, p. 228). Subsequently, thisrecognition of young people as ‘disadvantaged equals’ has important implications formethodologies researchers employ (Morrow & Richards, 1996, p. 91).

The immediate methodological problem that follows from this ontological andepistemological shift is that of how to get closer to the everyday life-worlds ofchildren. In struggling with this problem, researchers have frequently drawn on


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ethnographic approaches in an attempt to become ‘adult insiders’ (cf. Beal, 1996;Giardina & Donnelly, 2008). For example, in his classic ethnography of little leaguebaseball, Fine (1987) spent three years securing the confidence of preadolescents,often acting as scorekeeper, in order to record naturalistic observations. More radicalapproaches have been pioneered recently by MacPhail, Kirk, and Eley (2003) whoemployed older adolescents as researchers, defining questions and collecting data onterms defined by young sports participants.

Following the important and difficult business of securing rapport, it is importantto recognise that ‘children may possess different competencies and may be moreskilled in other forms of communication’ than adults (Morrow, 1999, p. 204). Thisnecessitates innovation in the way researchers attempt to listen to young voices.Morgan, Gibbs, Maxwell, and Britten (2002), for example, used puppets to conductinterviews with 7- to 11-year-old asthma sufferers in order to downplay their adultstatus. Groves and Laws (2000) employed diaries and group interviews to analyseyoung people’s experiences of physical education ‘in terms defined by them’. In thefield of sport and leisure, Gard and Mayenn’s (2000) study of contact sports inAustralia and Gill and Persson’s (2008) conceptualisation of children’s leisure time inSweden all deploy a range of innovative methods in an attempt to understand youthcultures ‘from the inside’. Such examples clearly mark the growing consensus amongresearchers that young people’s views can and should be sought on issues that affectthem. However, despite these useful precedents, very few of the studies noted above– with the notable exception of MacPhail et al. (2003) – consider the broader method-ological problem at play here: how can we genuinely listen to young people – to findout what issues really matter to them – if adults (researchers, funding bodies orpolicy-makers) are framing the research questions?

Part 2: how to listen to young people

Taking this question as a starting point, the methodology of GT purportedly enablesyoung research participants to set the agenda in research and steer the theory genera-tion process (Lloyd-Smith & Tarr, 2000; Morrow & Richards, 1996). Fundamentally,GT is an approach that ‘promotes the development of theoretical accounts … whichconform closely to the situations being observed, so that theory is likely to be intelli-gible by participants’ (Turner, 1983, p. 335). Furthermore, although GT constitutes adiscrete set of methodological procedures, it does not preclude the adoption of compli-mentary principles (such as ethnography) or theories insofar as they enhance theresearcher’s sensitivity to their data (see below). As such, GT is more flexible andaccommodating than some leading texts are inclined to suggest (cf. Glaser, 1992).

It is customary in papers on GT to spend some time describing the history of themethodology and the various philosophical differences that have emerged betweenthe main authors. However, as this is partly the subject of the third section, and sincemany excellent reviews already exist (cf. Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Charmaz, 2000;McCann & Clark, 2003; Strauss & Corbin, 1994), this section will focus on introduc-ing the process and techniques of GT in the context of doing research that attempts toelucidate young people’s experiences of sport and leisure.2 The example that iscarried through the section is a doctoral study on 8- to 18-year-olds’ experiences ofgrassroots football in community clubs and schools. The empirical data werecollected and analysed at various locations in England throughout 2005 and in early2006.


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Theoretical sensitivity

The starting point of any GT study reflects a choice made by the researcher orresearchers involved. These choices are necessarily informed by the ‘intellectual biog-raphy’ of the researcher (Stanley & Wise, 1993. p. 209), especially their awareness ofconcepts and theories that may illuminate what they see and hear in the field. The GTconcept of theoretical sensitivity assists in understanding this basic assumption andimplies a critical difference between ‘an open mind and an empty head’ (Strauss &Corbin, 1998, p. 47). That is to say, it is not possible to ‘enter the field in abstractwonderment of what is going on’, as Glaser (1992, p. 22) avers, nor to achieve theory-neutral observation (Popper, 1972, p. 46; Thomas & James, 2006). Indeed, the ques-tion is not whether to use existing knowledge in the early stages of research, but how(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 48). The crucial balance for the researcher, therefore, isto be sensitive to the literature without becoming ‘stifled’ by it (Strauss & Corbin,1998, p. 49), a position that might be better labelled ‘theoretical agnosticism’(Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, p. 138).

In the example study, theoretical sensitivity was developed in a number of ways.First, as Strauss and Corbin (1994, p. 280) explain, ‘disciplinary and professionalknowledge, along with research and personal experiences’ can enhance sensitivity.As such, the researcher ‘began the research with a partial framework of “local”concepts, designating a few features of the situations’ likely to be studied (Glaser &Strauss, 1967, p. 45). These local concepts were derived from broad reading of socialtheory pertaining to children and adolescents, from a brief review of contemporaryyouth sport policies, from a close reading of recent studies on youth experiences ofsport and leisure, and from years of personal and professional experience working onyouth sport schemes, coaching football teams and running youth sports clubs.

Theoretical sampling

Once a researcher has chosen an area of study, directed by their theoretical sensitivity,they are in a position to begin collecting and analysing data. The first step in any empir-ical research is the identification of an initial sample. The implicit assumption in manytexts is that some sort of stratified random sampling is sufficient to start and that thecritical technique of theoretical sampling – that is, sampling ‘governed by the need torefine concepts and develop the properties of categories’ (Charmaz, 2006, p. 96) –takes over once initial data have been collected and analysed. Here, sampling and datacollection ‘is controlled by the emerging theory’ which helps the researcher answerthe basic question: ‘what groups or sub-groups does one turn to next in data collec-tion?’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 45, emphasis added). In GT, groups are selectedbased on their theoretical relevance, or the extent to which the researcher believes theycould help ‘fill gaps in or shed light on the emerging theory’ (Charmaz, 2000, p. 519).3

In the example study, a survey was administered to youth football clubs andschools (primary and secondary) throughout England in order to map the frequencyand extent of football provision. Over 3000 questionnaires were sent and the 857returns enabled the researcher to identify clubs and schools with frequent and diversefootball participation (e.g. male and female, mixed ethnicity, mixed ability). Oncedata had been collected, theoretical sampling helped to check some of the initialhypotheses that were generated. For example, some initial interviews with femaleplayers in schools illuminated the central role that boys play in their formative football


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experiences. Both the data and the initial hypothesis were captured in a theoreticalmemo, abridged and reprinted below.

Memo – Gender wars (18.08.05)It appears that younger girls – perhaps those less experienced and able – partic-ularly dislike playing with boys (mixed) as they feel left out of the game. Boysdon’t pass to them, which creates an ‘us against them’ scenario with girls findingboys the greatest single barrier to football participation.

Li: I don’t like it when the boys run past you or come up to you and go: ‘Youshouldn’t be playing football, it’s a boys sport’. ‘Netball’s a girls sport; we’renot allowed to play netball, so you shouldn’t be allowed to play football’.

La: And half the time, the captains are the people who absolutely hate you, which isreally annoying …(Year 6 girls)On the other hand, however, those girls who are more confident and able appearto enjoy the challenge of playing against boys, particularly because they thinkthey will improve and become more confident from pitting themselves againstbetter players.

I: So do you like it being girls versus boys or would you like it mixed?E & G: Mixed.G: It’s easier for the young team … if they have a small one then … boys have got

more touch, but when I go up to a boy and tackle, then I get more confident inhow to tackle … and you get more confidence from the boys, like, you won’t bescared to tackle anybody. (U12 girls)Hence, it is possible that attitudes towards mixed football are conditioned byexperience and ability. Those girls who have had positive early experiences in aprotected environment (i.e. an all-girl environment) are more likely to perceivemixed football in a positive light: an opportunity to improve by competing withbetter players.

The grounded theorist’s responsibility here, as compared to the theory-drivenresearcher (a critical feminist, for example), is to be sensitive to the dynamics of maledomination at play whilst remaining open to the empowering capacity of mixed foot-ball. To capture the full complexity of girls’ experiences, both views have to be takenseriously and must be accounted for in the ongoing analysis. Theoretical sampling, inthis case, meant finding a female football club that was likely to contain girls aged 10–12 who could speak about their early experiences and thus help ‘test’ the hypothesisposed in the memo above. This also meant that data collection methods became moredeductive as theoretical sampling continued.

The constant comparative method

Along with theoretical sampling, the iterative nature of data collection and analysis,wherein the researcher constantly compares data to data and data to concepts, is argu-ably the cardinal feature of GT (Charmaz, 2003; McCann & Clark, 2003; Weed,2009). Indeed, it is this aspect of the methodology that creates the impression of natu-ral rigour as the researcher is forced to constantly check their developing ideas againstthe data. Hence, built into the GT process are ‘checks on credibility, plausibility andtrustworthiness’ (Kvale, 1996, p. 242).

With respect to data collection, GT, despite its predominant use among qualitativeresearchers, is amenable to all kinds of data and collection techniques (Glaser &Strauss, 1967, pp. 16–17). The question of how to collect data is therefore left to theresearcher and their reflections on ethical issues, the nature of their problem, andperhaps their prior training and technical expertise. In the example study, the moral


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argument presented in Part 1 served to inform this decision. In short, the researcher’smoral commitment to listen to young people’s voices necessitated the collection ofqualitative data. However, the more specific question of how to generate in-depthqualitative data with young people remained unanswered.

Initially, the length of time and depth of involvement required to develop rapportwith young people was a primary concern. Early pilot fieldwork suggested that itwould be difficult to establish trust with adolescent boys, in particular, without regularprolonged immersion in clubs and schools. The mini-ethnographies that followedtherefore ranged from two weeks (usually in schools where contact was more inten-sive) up to six months (for weekly contact with mid-adolescent male teams) andinvolved the researcher acting in various roles as the situation required (e.g. coach,assistant, referee, supporter and, with older groups, opponent player).

Drawing on previous studies (i.e. those reviewed in Part 1) the next decision wasto use focus groups as the primary data collection method (instead of one-to-one inter-views) for two main reasons. First, as Wilkinson (1998, p. 190) observes, ‘it is muchharder for the researcher to impose his or her agenda in the group context which grantsparticipants much greater opportunity to set the research agenda’. Second, whenselected based on existing friendship groups, focus groups often create ‘a trusting andcomfortable atmosphere’ (Renold, 2001, p. 372) which can help young people nego-tiate, to some degree, the natural power imbalances between themselves and the adultresearchers (Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999).

Following the selection of focus groups, the recognition that young people (espe-cially children) are proficient in different forms of communication than adults(Morrow, 1999) stimulated a review of a range of discussion prompts or activities.Governing the selection of such activities were two main variables: first, the age of theparticipants, and second, the degree of confidence in the hypothesis under discussion,or the ‘maturity’ of the emerging theory (see Figure 1).Figure 1. Changing methods throughout a GT study.As depicted in Figure 1, the methods of discussion generation evolved as the studydeveloped. In the earliest stages, where the goal of GT analysis is ‘open coding’ or thefree generation of concepts using line-by-line analysis techniques (Strauss & Corbin,1998, p. 101), mind maps and a like/dislike exercise were used to stimulate opendiscussion (Fajerman et al., 2004). Younger children were given large sheets of paperand coloured pens and asked to write and draw freely on the subject of football, or onwhat they especially liked or disliked about participation. Older adolescents (i.e. thoseover the age of 12) were provided with A4 paper and pens and asked to list and rankissues of most importance to their football participation. These activities normallylasted for around 10 minutes after which the researcher reviewed the creations, look-ing for common themes, and asked questions such as: ‘what do you mean by “beingput under pressure”?’ These questions tended to stimulate discussion qualifying whathad been drawn or written, or occasionally debate when conflicting opinions arose.

As concepts and categories were developed, new discussion prompts were createdto help subject the emerging hypotheses to criticism. In the second and third ‘itera-tions’ of the example study (see Figure 1) two new activities were added to the exist-ing techniques: agree/disagree statements (Fajerman et al., 2004) and vignettes (Finch,1987). These activities were selected as they helped present hypotheses in a ‘child-friendly’ manner, they captured the attention of the young people, and they allowedspace for the participants to expand on initial responses, thus helping to elucidate the(necessary and sufficient) conditions underpinning their reactions.4 Moreover, thecontent of (or language used in) the new activities was inspired by the stories of earlier


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participants and the observations collected during the fieldwork, thus increasing theauthenticity of the activity (cf. Hughes, 1998).

For example, a small card displaying the phrase ‘It’s not the winning, it’s thetaking part’ was passed around a group of young players who were asked to agree ordisagree. Often, they would respond with a comment like: ‘well, it depends really’before going on to discuss the conditional nature of, in this case, their motivationorientations. Similarly, a vignette describing the behaviour of a hypothetical ‘idealcoach’ was read by a group of young adolescents who were asked ‘if they liked thecoach in the vignette’ and if so, ‘what it was about the coach that they liked’. In bothcases, hypotheses were being checked and new data were being generated for thepurposes of comparison (with data and concepts) and to help ‘flesh-out’ the propertiesand dimensions of existing concepts (Charmaz, 2003).

Hypotheses, memos and substantive theory

The concept of theoretical sampling presupposes the generation of hypotheses andexplanatory models following (or perhaps during) data collection and analysis. It isinteresting, then, that hypotheses and deductive logic receive little attention in GT texts.Indeed, the following passage from the original Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 39) textis characteristic of – or perhaps a model for – much of the writing that has followed:

When he begins to hypothesise with the explicit purpose of generating theory, theresearcher is no longer a passive receiver of impressions but is naturally drawn intoactively generating and verifying his hypotheses through comparison of groups.

Figure 1. Changing methods throughout a GT study.


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This passage, like the book that contains it, is full of epistemological conflict.Notice that the researcher appears to have the ability to switch her deductive facultieson and off at leisure. Also note the positivist assumption that hypotheses can be veri-fied through the technique of comparison. Subsequent texts and papers have done littleto clarify the logic of GT. Indeed, from their constructivist perspective Strauss andCorbin (1998, pp. 18–22) argue that ‘description’ is a priori to ‘conceptual ordering’and ‘theorising’, again suggesting that simple observation and description can beseparated from, and in fact leads into, the more rational act of hypothesis generation.

In the example study, it was assumed from the outset that GT is essentially aprocess of generating and testing mini-hypotheses through theoretical sampling andincreasingly deductive data collection and analysis (see Part 3). In the latter stagesof the research, models and memos were created to help articulate the potentialcausal relationships between variables or concepts. For example, the memo below,from the third iteration, demonstrates how hypotheses were being tested against dataand also how ideas from literature were ‘earning’ (Charmaz, 2003) their way intothe analysis.

Memo – ‘Self expression’ and age (30.05.06)The following passage is taken from a discussion about the ability to expressyourself in football.

Sam: I’ve heard him (U10s coach) telling them: ‘Just remember, y’know, short passing,one-twos and things, simple’. I think it should be encouraged that the flicks andthings aren’t needed, and that … I think if the coaches cut flicks out y’know … Ithink the standard of football, as you go up, I think it becomes so much betterbecause they’re learning to play football much earlier.

Craig: It’s not about enjoyment then though, so it’s a fine line … like if you’re sayingthey’re doing it for enjoyment, then they shouldn’t really be being told not to dothis and not to do that.(U18 boys)There seems to be an essential tension between ‘structure’ and ‘expression’ andthat ‘proper football’ is more closely aligned with the former (see Wall & Côté,2007 for similar ideas). For example, it seems young people are subjected anumber of external influences such as pro players (‘social learning’), who encour-age expression, and coaches (‘constrained by coach’) and parents (‘under pres-sure’), who are more likely to restrict the freedom they have to ‘expressthemselves’ (see Stratton, 1995 for more on ‘social evaluation’). The battlebetween these socialising influences – depending, of course, on the individual –is likely, over time, to force young people into a particular mould. And as Craigand Luke admit (below), as you get older, self expression in football is slowlybeaten out of you through negative reinforcement.

Craig:Like you still get quite a lot of people shouting, like: ‘No flicks’ and stuff.I: And does that sort of change the way … like has that, over time – every time

you’ve tried a flick or something to express yourself, something a bit different,and every time you do that there’s this voice from the sideline that’s like: ‘Don’ttry that’ …

Luke: Yeah, you can hear it in your head though, you know it’s coming!I: So does that, over time, ultimately shape you as a player and stop you from …Luke: Yeah. You start off as a kid – like it’s every lad’s dream to be a football player …

and as soon as you’re on that pitch it’s all flicks and overhead kicks. And then asyou progress, you realise you aint no Rooney or you aint no Henry, so you nevertry a flick, you just play it simple and get on with it. (U18 boys)

The memo above clearly articulates a series of hypothetical relationships betweensocial–structural and psychological variables. It also attempts to highlight the specific


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fragments of data that stimulated these ideas, once again illustrating the importance of‘anchoring’ the developing theory in the data (Charmaz, 1990).

At this late stage of the study, the goal is the generation of substantive theory: ‘aset of well developed categories that are systematically interrelated through statementsof relationships to form a framework that explains some specific social phenomenon’(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 22). Importantly, the substantive theory should fit the data;it should work for, and be relevant to the participants of the study; and it should alsobe modifiable through the drafting and writing phases of the study to help increasevividness and clarity (Charmaz, 1990; Glaser, 1978, pp. 4–5). This aspect of the meth-odology also helps the researcher leave an audit trail, thus increasing transparency and‘trustworthiness’ (cf. Bringer, Johnson, & Brackenridge, 2004). In the context of theexample study, the ‘validity’ of the substantive theory – its fit, work and relevance –was continuously checked as a natural consequence of the constant comparativemethod. In other words, the nature of the second/third iteration discussion prompts,coupled with the targeted nature of theoretical sampling (i.e. selecting groups for themost severe test of a hypothesis), meant that ‘validity’ (or authenticity) was a seriousand ongoing concern. Moreover, it is especially important to take such measures whenresearching young people since ‘their relatively powerless status renders them highlysusceptible to misrepresentation’ (Morrow & Richards, 1996, p. 91).

An overview of the GT process

Taking Figure 1 as a reference point, this section has tried to show that GT, coupledwith youth-friendly methods, may provide some solutions for a researcher concernedwith listening to young people in leisure research. Theoretical sensitivity provides a‘point of departure’ for the initial choices involved in a GT study: what groups tosample and what questions to ask. Thereafter, it describes a changing body of ideas,or a shifting touchstone, providing the researcher with ‘sensitive insight’ into thephenomena under study (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 251). The iterative process of datacollection and analysis, where solutions to problems are proffered and subjected tocriticism, becomes increasingly deductive as a project develops. Equally, the methodsused to stimulate the generation of data (e.g. mind maps and vignettes), along with thespecificity of theoretical sampling, also become more focussed as hypotheses becomemore specific. A substantive theory is generated as the researcher begins to specifyrelationships between variables at a higher level of abstraction. The researcher mayalso begin to introduce extant theories at this stage, as long as a critical stance isadopted and they earn their way into the narrative (Charmaz, 2006, p. 166).

Part 3: different approaches to grounded theory

In her comprehensive historical–philosophical review, Charmaz (2000) distinguishesbetween two versions of GT: objectivist and constructivist. For Charmaz (2000),objectivist grounded theorists naively assume the existence of an ‘objective reality thatcan be discovered’, a reality that lies latent in the data (Bryant, 2003), that will‘emerge’ through the faithful application of GT techniques. Such a position is oftenattributed to Glaser (1992, p. 53) who claims that theory ‘really exists in the data’ andthat ‘conceptual reality does exist’ (Glaser, 2002). Constructivist GT, on the otherhand, ‘assumes that people create and maintain meaningful worlds through dialecticalprocesses of conferring meaning on their realities and acting within them’ (Charmaz,


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2000, p. 525). From this perspective, the aim is to ‘include multiple voices, views andvisions in a rendering of lived experience’ that accounts for both the respondents’ andresearchers’ co-created meanings (Charmaz, 2000, p. 525).

Reflecting on Charmaz’s (2000) review, alongside similar attempts to classify differ-ent approaches to GT (cf. Annells, 1996; McCann & Clark, 2003; Stern, 1994), it ispossible to summarise some of the main philosophical positions assumed. Table 1 repre-sents the ontological and epistemological convictions of the three main approaches.

The application of some of the labels in Table 1 would certainly be rejected by therespective authors. However, grounded theorists are rarely explicit about philosophy,and where they are explicit (usually in defining their opposition) they are oftenmistaken, as the two passages below clearly illustrate:

The position of the logico-deductive theorists … supported quantitative verificationsas the best way to reformulate and modify their theories. This meant … that theysupported the trend in sociology that pointed towards the perfection of theories. (Glaser& Strauss, 1967, p. 17)

Mid-century positivist conceptions of scientific method … stressed objectivity, general-ity, replication of research, and falsification of competing hypotheses and theories.(Charmaz, 2006, p. 4)

The clear misunderstanding present in these passages is common to all threeapproaches in Table 1. It is the association of the logico- or hypothetico-deductivemethod (or falsification) with verification, perfection and objectivity (or positivism).Even the most cursory reading of Popper’s (1959, 1972) original work would revealthat the two positions actually stand in direct opposition. Indeed, Popper (1959) devel-oped his ‘critical rationalist’ position in response to his critique of induction andpositivism (especially the ‘logical positivism’ of the Vienna School which aimed atachieving objective and certain knowledge through accurate and detached observation).Specifically, Popper (1972, pp. 46–48) showed that induction – the logic of reasoning

Table 1. Summary of the main approaches to GT.

Glaser (1992) and Glaser and Strauss

(1967)Strauss and Corbin

(1994, 1998)Charmaz

(1990, 2000, 2006)

Ontological position

Naive realist (social world or reality exists independently of human interpretation).

Constructivist (social world is actively constructed and reconstructed by individual actors).

Constructivist (but with critical realist elements, cf. Weed, 2009).

Epistemological position

Positivist (theory-neutral observer discovers reality by observing ‘the open book of nature’).

Pragmatist (theories are useful constructs, but don’t represent an external ‘reality’).

Pragmatist (symbolic interactionist).

Example passage

‘The researcher must trust that emergence will occur, and it does’ (Glaser, 1992, p. 4).

‘Although we do not create data, we create theory out of data’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 56).

‘A research product is one rendering among multiple interpretations of a shared reality’(Charmaz, 2000, p. 523).


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from repeated instances to justified conclusions – could not be possible since it presup-poses an understanding of similarity or resemblance, which, in turn, can only be judgedfrom a point of view. This means that a researcher must have a point of view beforethere can be a repetition, or, in other words, that theory must precede observation.5 So,in attempting to distance themselves (rightly) from positivism, grounded theorists have,through mistaken association with deduction, found themselves trying to defend induc-tion: the root cause of most criticisms of GT (cf. Thomas & James, 2006). With GT‘now running the risk of becoming fashionable’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 277) andthus ‘susceptible to uncritical acceptance’ (Annells, 1996, p. 391), it is of central impor-tance that researchers begin to critically engage with GT, especially its philosophicalassumptions. This is presumably Charmaz’s (2000, p. 513) concern as she poses thepartly rhetorical question: ‘so who’s got the real grounded theory? (emphasis added)’.

Methodological essentialism

One recent attempt to confront this problem situation is Weed’s (2009) concisedefence of an ‘essential’ GT canon. Having criticised a range of studies in the field ofsport psychology, Weed (2009) concludes that in order to ‘lay claim to the label ofgrounded theory’ eight sufficient conditions must be met (among which are thecontested concepts: theoretical sensitivity, theoretical sampling and theoretical satura-tion). For Weed (2009, p. 504), GT is ‘a total methodology, not a pick and mix box’and only those studies explicitly drawing on his eight ‘essences’ may apply the laud-able GT label. This conservative approach may be styled as ‘essentialism’ (Popper,1972, p. 105) as it reflects a desire to distil and petrify some essential aspects of GTin the hope of creating a yardstick against which the quality of research can bemeasured. However, two problems are immediately evident with this approach. First,one might reasonably question Weed’s authority in laying down this canon, especiallysince others have created different yet overlapping lists in the past (cf. McCann &Clark, 2003; Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Second, in attempting to arrest the developmentof GT, Weed threatens to stifle debate about its ‘essential’ elements. This is presum-ably not his intention, but with the suggestion that ‘papers laying claim to GT shouldbe reviewed by … at least one GT expert’, we are left to ponder how such ‘experts’are to be identified, and which of the many GT canons they might reference.

Methodological anarchism

In direct opposition to Weed’s position stands Thomas and James’ (2006) philosoph-ical (and in their view terminal) critique of GT. The three ‘problematic notions’Thomas and James (2006) discuss – theory, ground and discovery – are, in fact, oneand the same: the problem of induction (introduced above). Specifically, they contendthat we use theory in every aspect of starting and generating GT, that grounded theo-rists have so far failed to adequately explain the ontological assumptions that groundGT, and that theories are generated, not discovered. All of these criticisms are fair andwell argued by the authors. Indeed, they may well be right in suggesting that ‘contin-ued allegiance to GT procedures stunts and distorts the growth of qualitative inquiry’,though only if allegiance is uncritical. However, their conclusion – that we throw outGT in favour of a form of methodological anarchism (Feyerabend, 1993) – is unsat-isfactory in two ways. First, and as they themselves note, new researchers often findGT to be ‘a map and compass to navigate the open terrain of qualitative inquiry’. As


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such, GT can remain a valuable strategy for neophyte researchers providing theyengage with it critically. Second, by losing the label or ‘tether’ of GT, Thomas andJames (2006), like Weed (2009), surely risk stifling the lively scholarly debatecurrently ongoing in the GT literature. Even if GT is fundamentally flawed, and weconcede, with Becker (1996, p. 70), that ‘there are no recipes for ways of doing socialresearch’, there must still be some value in retaining the label of GT, if only as a‘hook’ on which to hang the type of critical discussion which Thomas and James(2006) themselves construct.

Table 2 summarises the two responses to the problems inherent in GT. Theessentialist view is realist and positivist because it assumes the existence of a ‘real’GT that Weed (2009) has ‘discovered’ or ‘revealed’. The anarchist view is relativistbecause it recognises that ‘all methodologies have limits’ and that ‘uniformity endan-gers science’ as it limits access to possible (better) alternatives (Feyerabend, 1993,pp. 23–29). However, contrary to Thomas and James’ (2006) contention that ‘theproblems of GT preclude any possible modification’, a third way can be constructed.

A third way: critical rationalism

Critical rationalism,6 the epistemological theory developed by Karl Popper (1959,1972) and his students (e.g. Miller, 1994), is both realist and fallibilist in outlook. Itassumes that theories can be true (that they can describe ‘reality’) but that they cannever be positively proved to be so. This view can also be applied to itself, a positionknown as ‘pan-critical rationalism’ (Bartley, 1984). It starts from the position that allinvestigation begins with a ‘horizon of expectations’ (or set of background theories),which help us identify relevant problems in a chosen field. Thereafter, studies proceedin a logic of ‘conjecture and refutation’ (Popper, 1972) whereby solutions to problemsare invented by us before being subjected to criticism. Solutions or theories thatsurvive criticism are held tentatively until more severe tests are invented. The closesimilarity in logic between critical rationalism and GT (see also Hammersley, 1989,p. 201) is illustrated in Figure 2.Figure 2. A critical rationalist reinterpretation of GT.From a critical rationalist perspective, some of the fundamental problems with GTcan be circumvented. For example, one can escape the problem of induction byaccepting that research initially proceeds with an act of abduction followed by deduc-tion (Blaikie, 1993, p. 165; Reichertz, 2007). Moreover, if this is accepted, the GTresearcher no longer has any difficulty in explaining how they intend to use existingknowledge (or theories). Existing knowledge is a necessary (but dogmatic) ‘horizonof expectations’ which help direct observations but which should also be subjected tocriticism as soon as possible. Furthermore, hypothesis generation becomes an integral

Table 2. Essentialism, anarchism and critical rationalism.

PositionEssentialism (Weed, 2009)

Anarchism (Thomas & James, 2006)

Third way: critical rationalism

Philosophical principles

Realist and positivist Relativist (cultural and epistemological)

Realist and fallibilist

Abbreviated motto

‘Deviation from “The Forms” is a movement away from perfection. All change is decay.’

‘Anything goes.’ ‘You may be right and I may be wrong, but through critical discussion we can move closer to the truth.’


428 D. Piggott

part of the GT process: a platform upon which a researcher can begin theoreticalsampling, but for negative cases, not for hopeful verifications. The movement towardssubstantive theory therefore entails a series of attempted falsifications, instead of veri-fication and saturation. Indeed, under a critical rationalist view, the concept of theo-retical saturation – where ‘gaps in theory are almost, if not completely, filled’ (Glaser& Strauss, 1967, p. 61) – makes very little sense, since solutions are always tentative,never certain. These critical rationalist ‘lessons’ for grounded theorists aresummarised in Table 3.

These critical rationalist lessons are more than cosmetic. GT does need ‘reinvent-ing’ (Thomas & James, 2006), and these epistemological insights not only help usnegotiate long-standing philosophical problems, but also entail useful modifications tothe ‘day-to-day’ activity of doing a GT study.

By way of example, the ‘gender wars’ memo presented in Part 2 demonstrates thatthe researcher’s ‘horizon of expectations’ informed the questions asked of youngfemale footballers. In being sensitive to critical feminist notions of power (linked toconcepts such as habitus and social and cultural capital), certain dynamics of maledomination in mixed football were expected (not discovered) and were clearly articu-lated by the girls.

Lisa: Yeah, Bernie [the coach] what he does is … he’ll come and he’ll like, the boyswill know everything because they go like training and everything; and then

Figure 2. A critical rationalist reinterpretation of GT.


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[to] the girls he’ll say like: ‘girls, what are you doing?’ and he’ll tell us to dosomething but we don’t know how to do it ‘cos he doesn’t like … teach usanything … and then the boys run up and down shouting: ‘Switch! Switch!Switch!’ What does that mean? (Year 6 girls)

However, upon further exploration of the phenomena, unexpected but reasonablecounter-arguments were made by girls in favour of a particular form of mixed football.

I: Do you think the boys would help you improve or …?Alex: I think they wouldn’t like it, but we would.Hannah: Nooo! ‘cos they hog the ball!I: So who thinks playing with the boys would be a good thing?Alex: Yeah, but not against them – so that we’re with them. (U12 girls)

Only by sampling cases and putting the question to different girls with contrasting earlyexperiences could the full complexity of their experiences be theorised. Moreover,having only interviewed around 50 girls in a limited range of contexts, the theory thatthe girls develop positive attitudes to mixed football if they have ‘sheltered’ formativeexperiences remains only tentative.

Conclusion

The challenge of listening to young people in leisure research is growing in impor-tance as young people are increasingly targeted by sport and leisure policiesconcerned with the creation of ‘future citizens’ (Green, 2007). If researchers are torepresent young people in order to contest and resist the encroachment of the neo-liberal state into their leisure spaces, they need effective qualitative methodologiesthat are both rigorous and sensitive to young people’s views and ideas (cf. Giardina &Donnelly, 2008, p. 9). GT is one such methodology in that it enables young people to

Table 3. Critical rationalist lessons for grounded theorists.

GT principle Traditional method Critical rationalist lessons

Theoretical sensitivity

Achieving a difficult balance between objectivity and subjectivity where theorists ‘hold off’ or avoid existing theory for as long as possible.

The researcher’s ‘horizon of expectations’ necessarily informs both the starting point and continuous development of the theory.

Induction The logic guiding GT. The researcher ‘builds up’ theory through systematic observation and comparison.

Induction is an ‘optical illusion’. It does not exist and nobody ever really does inductive research.

Theoretical sampling

Emerging theory ‘controls’ the selection of new groups based on the desire to extend, refine and saturate categories.

Should be about attempting to find the harshest test for generated hypotheses. Looking for people, places and situations where you believe the theory could fail.

Theoretical saturation

Criterion for judging when to stop sampling. Once a researcher is seeing similar instances over and over again they become ‘empirically confident’ that a category is saturated.

Research concludes arbitrarily. The theory is never final and concepts are never fully ‘saturated’. New questions can always be asked of the theory.


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define research problems and steer the research whilst reminding the researcher toremain close to the accounts of the young participants throughout a study. If alliedwith other methodological principles and tools that help negotiate uneven adult–childpower relations – such as ethnography (rapport building), focus groups and vignettes– GT can help researchers co-create engaging and authentic substantive theories ofyouth leisure experiences.

However, notwithstanding this promise, fundamental philosophical problems – theproblem of induction, a lack of ontological ‘ground’ – still remain entrenched in theGT canon (Thomas & James, 2006; Weed, 2009). If researchers are to employ GT,they must do so in a critical fashion. Only in this way can they start to negotiate someof the difficulties inherent in the application of GT and help move debates about ‘whohas the real GT’ in a fruitful direction. For this reason, the two radical reactions ofessentialism and anarchism should be rejected since both extinguish the possibility ofcritical discussion over the continued development of GT. The critical rationalistposition, by contrast, contends that debate over the principles of GT must remainforever open, but rejects methodological relativism in maintaining that some versionsof GT can be objectively better than others (cf. Popper, 1981).

By drawing on a critical rationalist revision of GT, as exemplified throughout Part2, researchers aspiring to the faithful and authentic (yet fallible) representation ofyouth culture will find a set of methodological principles and techniques for elucidat-ing young people’s sport and leisure experiences. Such work is also critical for thecontinued development of the emerging literature that helps us to listen to the voicesof those who are traditionally ‘seen but not heard’.

Notes1. The term ‘young people’ refers to all people aged between 5 and 18 (Cale & Harris, 2005,

p. 6). It is preferred here as it encompasses the more specific terms ‘children’ and ‘adoles-cents’.

2. Those searching for a more in-depth explication of ‘how to do GT’ may wish to seek outsome of the many texts and papers that provide more detail on the processes and techniquesof GT. Charmaz’s (2000) chapter presents an excellent overview of the method and itshistory and is an ideal starting point. Thereafter, two dedicated texts present in-depth intro-ductions to the various techniques for developing GT: Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) classictext is exhaustive, yet highly technical; Charmaz’s (2006) text is more accessible but notas precise technically. Both texts, however, are rich with examples and ideas.

3. Theoretical sampling has a slightly different purpose depending on which version ofgrounded theory one adopts. For example, for Glaser and Strauss (1967, pp. 62–77) theo-retical sampling is about discovering, diversifying and reformulating categories; for Straussand Corbin (1998, pp. 206–211), it is concerned with progressively verifying, validatingand saturating categories; whereas for Charmaz (2000, 2003, 2006, p. 96), the goal of theo-retical sampling is elaborating, extending and refining categories.

4. A collection of excellent reviews, namely Hughes (1998), Schoenberg and Ravdal (2000)and Barter and Renold (2000), contain interesting and valuable discussions on use ofvignettes in research with young people. In particular, these authors discuss the merits ofopenness and flexibility in vignettes and the extent to which contextual details can be leftstrategically absent, encouraging young people to fill these ‘situational gaps’ themselves.They also discuss practical issues of vignette creation, such as detail, length, the use ofyouth ‘vernacular’ and response instructions, all of which depend largely on the issue underdiscussion (i.e. social desirability) and the age of the research participants (see especiallyHughes, 1998).

5. For more in-depth explanations of the problem and refutation of induction, see Popper(1959, pp. 27–30) and Miller (1994, pp. 1–6).


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6. ‘Critical rationalism’ contains more or less the same ontological assumptions as ‘criticalrealism’ which, it has been suggested, always was (Annells, 1996; McCann & Clark, 2003)or could be (Weed, 2009) a clear ontological position underpinning GT. Unfortunately,these suggestions lack any clear explication of either critical realism or the way in whichthe ontology may practically influence a research project. The preference expressed herefor critical rationalism is grounded in the belief that Popper’s (1959, pp. 15–17, 1972, p. 6)position is clearer than Bhaskar’s (1989) and also has more obvious and immediateconsequences for the practice of research.

Notes on contributorDavid Piggott is a senior lecturer and programme leader in sport development and coaching atthe University of Lincoln. His research currently focusses on epistemological problems insocial research, sociological and philosophical problems in coach education and youngpeople’s experiences of sport.

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