DEEPENING DEMOCRACY VIA PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING

22nd November 2012Wellington

Attempts of a definition of

PB

1

When we talk about PB, we are referring to an IDEOSCAPE, i.e. a

model travelling around the world, which becomes real in the

different places where it happens, and whose name is note

necessarily that representative…participativo - Budżet Partycypacyjny - Bilancio Partecipativo - deltagend

Source: Learning from the South, 2010, GIZ- Bonn

But does a “minimum common denominator” exist? And does it

need continuity or discontinuity with the pre-existing

participatory practices?

What is this common “minimum denominator”:

• According to the PB-Unit (english think thank on PB):

• Participatory budgeting is a democratic process which ENTRUST CITIZENS (and no formal citizens, too) to decide how to allocate part of a municipal budget or another budget that affects them…

So, is not just a “device” or a “technique”, but a series of principles that can use different methods and techniques to be “translated” into concrete action, according to local possibilities.

!5

WHY PB? If we take one of the definitions given by the PB Unit,

PB is based on four hypothesis:

1)That opening decision on “money” is highly practical and symbolic

2)That is possible to RIBUILD social trust

3)That both citizens and politician are better than in the other’s perspective (social collective intelligence)

4) That, in the world of today, is better starting from the individuals and then invite them to meet and listen to each other is more effective

PATIENCE is NEEDED for implementing a good process and having strong results!

AN EXAMPLE:

PORTUGAL

EXPLOSION by

CONTAGION

Source: Nelson Dias,

2012

PB beyond parties? (Portugal, 2002 /2012)42

12 11

3 3 2

Series1

Fonte: Nelson Dias | 2012

9

It’s main differences with other pre-existing tools of CONSULTATION are that is

not an INDIVIDUAL DIALOGUE between a single citizen or a single group and

one politician that is fostered :

but

… but a LEARNING BY DOING

ENVIRONMENT.

That’s why it helps to build “mutual trust”, helping to deal

with COMPLEXITY WHILE CO-DECIDING

ADOPTING PBs as “a continuity” or a “discontinuity” in relation to past experiences? Could it become na

“engine” coordinating other spin-offs?

Participatory

Budgeting

Programa

BH -Cidadania

Social Inclusion

Municipal

Plan of Sanitation

Master Plan

of Urban Drainage

Global Specific

Plans of Slums

City Master Plan

and District Plans

Regionalised

Participatory

Planning (PPR)

Social Guidelines

PRogram of

priority roads

11

PB’s MAIN FEATURES ARE:

1) explicitly discussing financial issues (resources are not always guaranteed) 2) Having cycles (negotiating needs time)3) Coinciding with an institutional responsibility (is not a “devolved pot” as in the Community Driven Development, but implies a relation with political authorities)4) Having some degree of co-decision5) Giving feedbacks to citizens

(Source: Marc Bloch comparative research, 2005-2009, Berlin)

12

Sometimes TRANSFERS and emulation look strange and models are unaware of their weight in innovation elsewhere…

• It is the case of Christchurch, which beacame the inspirational source for many German PBs (based on a “consultation on public finance” procedure) after the Bertelsmann Award for “Democracy and Efficacy of the Administration” in 1993 (through the “Cities of Tomorrow Network”) because of its system of community boards and web-transparency (NPM approach).

• It is also the case of the Hungarian 1% Budget, which is today the base of japanese PBs.

13

WHEN PB WAS BORN IN LATIN AMERICA it was mainly a matter of “EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF

RESOURCES”, if we consider the African Models, today, is a PIVOTAL TOOL to collect resources

Porto Alegre: l’epicentro

PB essence moved from

EXPENSES to the CREATION OF

INCOME and LOCAL FINANCIAL

AUTHONOMY (so

DEVELOPEMENT). See Rural

Senegal or Madagascar

(extractive industries)

Macromodels2

The Empowerment LinePB works in different ways, but should aim to be

meaningful and change how money is spent

Communicating Consulting InvolvingDecision

makingPartnership

Passive engagement (not PB) Empowerment through PB

Scope of PB activity

Progression

16

PHASE 1:

Mobilization of citizens

and employeesPHASE 2:

Structuring

and

Implementation

of public dialogue

PHASE 3:

Monitoring and

implementation of

Common decisions

Ciclo de discussão Ciclo de execução

PHASE 0:

Creation of

pre-conditions for

implementing PB

ONE PROCESS, TWO INTERLINKED CYCLES:

PROPOSING -> DECIDING -> IMPLEMENTING

THREE MAIN TYPOLOGIES OF PBs

TERRITORIA

LTEMATICACTORIAL

FACE-TO-FACE APPROACH

VIRTUAL/DIGITAL APPROACH

MIXED APPROACH (variable geoetry)

THEY CAN OVERLAP Source: Nelson Dias,

2012

LOGIPARC – Poitiers (France)

19

“ENCOURAGING DESIGNs” need to

be imagined, especially where

concentration of critical issues is high

(in Europe immigrants without voting

capacity, poor areas) in order to

guarantee PLURALITY and

DIVERSIFICATION OF PARTICIPANTS

Young People and

Schools PBs in Europe

20

TWO MAIN APPROACH TO DECISION-MAKING

CO_DECISIO

NALCONSULTATIVE

Source: Nelson Dias,

2012

22

“Branding matters”? Analyses show that “concretizing” decisions and mouth-to-mouth

works better...

It means that citizens have to be involved in both cycles (either if

they are overlapped or the process is biennial)

Virtual+

25

THE CYCLE OF CO-DECISION

APPROVAL OF PREVISIONAL

BUDGET

Winter

CITIZENS’ VOTE

PLAN OF FEED-BACKS

Feedback citizens’ Assemblies

Presentation of projects

and voting phase.

AUTUMN

PARTICIPATORY PLANNING

Thematic Assemblies

Feasibility evaluation.

Transformation of proposals to into

projects

SUMMER-AUTUMN

MAKING NEEDS AND

PROPOSALS EMERGE

Neighbourhood Assemblies

SPRING

…AND A CYCLE OF CO-IMPLEMENTATION…

HOW AN AVERAGE CYCLE LOOKS LIKE

THE PIVOTAL ROLE of the “MANAGEMENT OF EXPECTATIONS”

S ≥ R - E

Virtual

“SATISFACTION ≥ RESULTS – EXPECTATIONS”

THE CO-DECISIONAL PBs impliy “giving-up” a part of the decisional DISCRETIONALITY of PUBLIC

AUTHORITIES, but they make EXPECTATIONS MORE REALISTIC and CO-RESPONSBILIZE PEOPLE , so

produce higher results

And they are usually more SUSTAINABLE

and LONG-LASTING27

PERCEPTIONS of CITIZENS ARE VERY IMPORTANT and HAVE TO BE MONITORED CONSTANTLY.

‘If it feels like we have decided ---- it’s PB. If it feels like someone else has decided, it isn’t.’ Brazilian resident involved in PB

THE CASE of

ZEGUO, CHINA

29

INCREASING SATISFACTION: THE CASE OF OREBRO (SWEDEN)

30

The importance of Celebrations and Symbolic moments/places

(marae?)

Which goals?3

32

Fighting corruption

TRANSPARENCYGranting accountability

Reducing the debt

Bettering the machine Inve

rting

prio

ritio

es

Territorial redistribution

Social inclusion Socia

l jus

tice

Cutti

ng b

udge

tIn

crea

sing

finan

cial a

utho

nom

y

Dynamizing social fabricReconstructing social links

Com

mun

ity

Deve

lopm

ent

Democratize Democracy

Granting sustainability

Which effects to evaluate, and for which process?

THE COEHERENCE BETWEEN MEANS AND GOALS

Rebuilding mutual trust

33

Arezzo: Focus Group to test

the efficacy of informational

documents

A NEW VISION OF ACCOUNTABILITY

(TRANSPARENCY +

RESPONSIVENESS)

A BETTER INFORMATION

CAPACITY

34

Adapted to the place...to allow access to awareness and skills

35

TRACEABILITY IN EVERY

PHASE (Seville) and control

committees

36

Zanzara Tigre

Mobilità Sostenibile

>>Fine Presentazione

ALTRE INIZIATIVE

Piccioni

Raccolta Differenziata

Iniziative in Circoscrizione

Caro-affitti

Vivibilità Centro Storico

Pulizia strade

SOME EFFECTS CANNOT BE OBTAINED IF THEY ARE NOT

PURSUED…. (conclusions of INCLUIR project)

For example, social inclusion of

minorities and vulnerable groups

need to challenge structural

inequalities with specific tools.

Examples

from

Senegal

and

Ecuador

38

The same happens with the goal of redistributive justice

How to go

beyond the

“usual suspects”,

so the audience

which already is

prepared to

participate

(TRAINING)?

Geographic Area

Priority total

Need total

Population total

Total Score

% of total city score

Resource available (£41,200)

Area A 6 6 9 21 12. 9% £5,314 Area B 3 9 6 18 11% £4,544 Area C 12 12 6 30 18. 4% £7,581 Area D 3 2 2 7 4. 3% £1,772 Area E 12 2 2 16 9. 8% £4,038

etc ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Total for all areas of the city 163 100% £41,200

39

More simple ways exists for fostering solidarirty: i.e. CARAVANS seeks to create solidarity, and take into account the needs of ABSENT

people. INFORMALITY is also very important

40

Evolving and

correcting mistakes

THE CASE OF LISBON,

Portugal

Odemira Cascais Lisboa Portimão Aveiro

16.1

13.8

5.9

1.5 0.9

HOW TO CALCULATE COSTS/BENEFITS? The number of participants (in

Portugal)

3.469 23.198 29.911 694 616

Source: Nelson Dias,

2012

Cascais

Amador

a

Odemira

V. F. X

ira

Condeix

a

Lisboa

Portim

ão

Caldas

Rainha

Aveiro

Trofa

6.3

3.12.6 2.4 2.3

1.61 0.9

0.40.05

% of PB on Municipal Investments (Portugal) Source: Nelson Dias,

2012

Odemira Portimão Cascais V.F. Xira Lisboa Caldas Rainha

Amadora Aveiro

19.217.9

12.2

7.3

4.62.9 2.8

0.3

PB investments per capita (Euros) in Portugal Source: Nelson Dias,

2012

SOME LONG-TERM EFFECTS

4

Small interventions benefit PME local enterprises and generate a

new territorial redistribution of public resources (1 billion R$ untill

now)EMPREENDIMENTOS APROVADOS POR TEMÁTICA

1,3

9,7

3,7

1,1

40,0

1,9

11,0

3,1

28,2

0,0 5,0 10,0 15,0 20,0 25,0 30,0 35,0 40,0 45,0

Cultura

Educação

Esporte

Habitação

Infraestrutura

Meio Ambiente

Saúde

Social

Urbanização de Vila

Wealthy actors usually don’t appear…

The Grottammare example: “Stop new beach-housing in a touristic city; let’s improve the quality of water

and beach-facilities accordin to the

eco-system protection” (1994)

Winner of the EU blue-flag (1999/2005)

Reproducing the Porto Alegre model, where (in 10 years) 9

shores in the polluted lake were made safe for bathing

BP better addresses the goals of SUSTAINABILITY

It requires detailed deliberation on

the centarl and side.issues (through

SPIN-OGFFs)

The case of Borbona (Lazio): a strategy of sustainability which enriched the resources of PB through savings

Fragilities5

PB success depends on how

CENTRAL or MARGINAL it is,

within the local political strategy.

The case of Belo Horizonte

What are PB’s main structural LIMITS, i.e. its fragility/volatility? They are strictly linked to:1) Minimal prerequisites to be implemented (political will, a cohesion in the social fabric, a minimal financial autonomy, a good subdivision of the territory, an institutional structure which works and could be bettered, a good PB organizational ARCHITECTURE)2) The difficulty of reaching “diversity” in participants (let aside the “representativity” issue…rich sectors and the most poor are absent) 3) The growing scarcity of local financial resources within an incomplete decentralization framework

52

ARE PBs FRAGILE? Only when they create unrealistic expectations, and are not “RESILIENT”Analyzing fragilities to create “contention walls”

for the still ongoing processes…

Fonte: Alves/Allegretti (2012) baseado

em dados de Nelson Dias

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

1 36 6

1418

23

13

2531

28

-1 -3

-13

-4-8

-18

Ongoing PBs Interrupted PBs

Ongoing and interrupted (2002- 2012)

Fonte: Nelson Dias | 2012

Ruling party in Portuguese cities that have abandoned PBs, until 2010. The majority have

been interrupted by the same government that created them… Why?

55

The cycle of life and death…

DELIBERATION/

NEGOTIATION

INDIVIDUALISM

CONSULTATIVE DECISIONAL

CASES OF IN PORTUGAL BY MODEL

3

17

27

23

Interrupted PBs Ongoing PBs

Source: Nelson Dias,

2012

HOW DOES A “RESILIENT PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING*”

LOOK LIKE?

(RESILIENCE IS THE CAPACXITY OF ADAPTATION TO SURVIVE TO THE TRANSFORMATION OF

EXTERNAL ENVIROINMENT AND CONDITIONS…)

Fonte: Alves/Allegretti (2010)

Does a resilient capacity of transformation relay on clear principles? Yes, transformations along time could

be “oriented” by these ideas:

1) Maintaining people at the “centre” (for example in filtering)

2) Respecting authonomy between society and institution, being complementary to representative democracy

3) Being evolutionary (inctrementality – not repetition of a “ritual”)

Models of PB dissemination in Portugal, which can contribute to that…

Local design based on adaptation of International Models

Desenho local do processo baseado na adaptação de modelos nacionais e/ou internacionais

Implementation based on copy-paste from Internet

1ª Fase

2ª Fase

3ª Fase

Source: Nelson Dias,

2012

Che relazioni con il “Programma” elettorale?

A FAKE PROBLEM: the conflict with representative Democracy, and

electoral programs:

1) The PB is more realistic and concrete, acting as a “diacronic” filter of

what to do, in time…

2) Is representativeness so represenative? Could it catch diversity?

3) Upkeeping is easier, when there is major “onwership” of public works..

PB can compete com other process and must be rrclearly definined…

Parce que sens perception de l’innovation, n’a pas d’innovations et d’enracinement/durabilitè…

It needs that what is promised is done… (underlying its unicity)

Le BP est faite de deux cycles

From limits to challenges

6

64

RESETTING THE USE OF ICTs in an adequate and coherent manner?

65

Evaluating is always fundamental for saving energies and optimizing

investments (which in PB are also emotional, and not only material)…

BUT, OFTEN, both POLITICIANS and CITIZENS are scared of

evaluation, or they do not have RESOURCES

66

It helped to understand what are PB’s main structural LIMITS, i.e. its fragility/volatility strictly linked to:1) Minimal prerequisites to be implemented (political will, a cohesion in the social fabric, a minimal financial autonomy, a good subdivision of the territory, an institutional structure which works and could be bettered, a good PB organizational ARCHITECTURE)2) The difficulty of reaching “diversity” in participants (let aside the “representativity” issue…)3) The growing scarcity of local financial resources within an incomplete decentralization framework

Thinking in terms of RAISING DIVERSITY

The Dilemma of participation by ADVOCACY.

69

Scaling-up helps dissemination

The case of Solecki Funds in Poland (since 2009)

Fonte: SLLGO, 2012

71

A NEW OPPORTUNITY: the SCALING-UP (South Kivu in RDC, the case of Tuscany and Lazio I Italy, Malaga Province and Andalusia

Region in Spain) - HOW TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF DELIBERATION?

Numeric multiplication

Support for financial

weakness and trembling

coalitions

Fake examples?

Major procedural quality

Introducing PB principles

in other policies

giovanni.allegretti@ces.uc.ptallegretto70@hotmail.com

KIA ORA (and thanks for your patience!)

Questions are welcome!